

THE
HISTORY
OF
PHILOSOPHY:
CONTAINING
The Lives, Opinions, Actions and Discourses
OF THE
PHILOSOPHERS
Of every SECT.

By *THOMAS STANLEY*, Esquire.

THE FOURTH EDITION.

In which the innumerable Mistakes, both in the Text and Notes of all former Editions are corrected, the Citations and References exactly adjusted and compared throughout with the Originals, and with the *Latin* Translation printed at *Leipsick*.

To which is prefixed, an Account of the LIFE and Writings of the AUTHOR.

LONDON:

Printed for A. MILLAR at *Buchanan's Head*, over against *Katharine Street* in the *Strand*, A. WARD, S. BIRT, D. BROWNE, T. LONGMAN, J. OSWALD, H. WHITRIDGE, and the Executors of J. DARBY and S. BURROWS.

MDCCXLIII.

To my Honoured UNCLE,

JOHN MARSHAM Esquire.

S I R,

I Send this Book to you, because you first directed me to this Design. The Learned *Gassendus* was my Precedent ; whom nevertheless I have not followed in his Partiality : For he, tho' limited to a single Person, yet giveth himself Liberty of Enlargement, and taketh Occasion from this Subject to make the World acquainted with many excellent Disquisitions of his own. Our Scope being of a greater Latitude, affords less Opportunity to favour any Particular, whilst there is due to every one the Commendation of their own Deserts. This Benefit I hope to have received from the Variety of the Subject ; but far more are those I owe to your Encouragement, which, if I could wish less, I should upon this Occasion, that there might seem to have been expressed something of Choice and Inclination in this Action, which is now but an inconsiderable Effect of the Gratitude of,

Dear Uncle,

Your most affectionate Nephew, and

Humble Servant,

THOMAS STANLEY.

T H E

P R E F A C E.

HISTORY (which by expounding Actions past, teacheth to regulate the future, and furnisheth us with Wisdom at the Cost of other Mens Experience) is not unlike Painting: Their Scope is the same. And as in the latter it argues want of Skill to look upon the whole Draught with an indifferent Eye, but to select and insist upon some chief Particular is proper to an Artist; so he who rests satisfied with the general Relation of Affairs, (not fixing upon some eminent Actor in that Story) loseth its greatest Benefit; since what is most particular, by its nearer Affinity with us, hath greatest Influence upon us.

Hence it is that there are two Kinds of History; one represents general Affairs of State; the other gives Account of particular Persons, whose Lives have rendered them eminent. Homer hath given an Essay of each; of the first in his Iliads, a Relation of a War betwixt different Nations; of the second in his Odyssees, confined to the Person of Ulysses.

Now the Life of Man being either Practick, busied in civil Affairs of Peace and War, or Contemplative, retired from publick Business to Speculation and Study of Wisdom, Divine or Human, it follows that this personal History be twofold likewise, describing either the Actions of such Persons as are wholly interested in the Affairs of State (properly compared to the Persons of a Dramatical Design, whose single Characters and Parts serve only to make up one joint Plot: Such are most of those whose Lives are related by Plutarch, and the twelve Cæsars of Suetonius) or the Lives of such as have been excellent in some Kind of Learning. Thus Antipho writ of Poets; Eudemus of Astrologers; Cicero and Plutarch of Orators; Suetonius of Grammarians. They who writ of Philosophers exceeded the rest far in Number, of whom to give a particular Account will be unnecessary, because their Works are not extant, and therefore we shall only name them, Actius, Anaxilides, Antigonus, Antisthenes, Aristocles, Aristoxenus, Callimachus, Clitomachus, Diocles, Diogenes Laertius, Eunapius, Heraclides, Hermippus, Hefychius, Hippobotus, Jason, Idomeneus, Nicander, Nicias, Panætius, * Porrius, Plutarch, Sotion and Theodorus.

Of almost all these (which is much to be deplored) there remain not any Footsteps; the only Author in this Kind for the more ancient Philosophers is Diogenes Laertius, for the later Eunapius. And to make the Misfortune the greater, that which Laertius gives us is so far short of what he might have done, that there is much more to be found of the same Persons dispersed among o.b.r. Authors, which I have here collected and digested, with what Diligence I could.

Nor is it unreasonable at this Time to examine the Tenets of old Philosophers, when so great Variety of Opinions daily spring up; some of which are but raked out of the Ruins of Antiquity, which ought to be restored to their first Owners; others being of late Invention will receive Addition, when advanced to such Height, we look down to the Bottom from which Philosophy took her first Rise, and see how great a Progress she hath made, whose Beginnings are almost insurmountable.

Altho' some Grecians have challenged to their Nation the Original of Philosophy, yet the more Learned of them have acknowledged it derived from the East. To omit the dark Traditions of the Athenians concerning Musæus, of the Thebans concerning Linus, and of the Thracians about Orpheus, it is manifest that the Original of the Greek Philosophy is to be derived from Thales, who

* There is no such Name as Porrius, perhaps it should be Phanius.

The P R E F A C E.

travelling into the East, first brought natural Learning, Geometry, and Astrology thence into Greece for which Reason the Attribute of Wise was conferred upon him, and at the same Time upon six others for their Eminence in Morality and Politicks. Thus Learning in the ancientest Times was by the Greeks called Sophia (Wisdom) and the Professor thereof, who raised his Soul to an eminent Degree of Knowledge, Sophos (Wise :) Pythagoras first named it Philosophy (Love of Wisdom) and himself a Philosopher, affirming, that no Man is Wise, but only God.

* *As concerning those who were honoured with this Attribute of Wise, Damon the Cyrenean undervalues them all, especially the seven. Anaximenes saith, They were all addicted to Poetry; Diæarchus, that they were neither wise Men nor Philosophers, but upright Men and Law-givers. Archetimus the Syracusan wrote concerning their Meeting with Cypselus (Father to Periander) whereat he saith himself was present. Ephorus affirms they all met with Croesus, Thales only excepted. Some say they met also at the Panionian Feast, and at Corinth, with Periander at Delphi.*

There is some Controversy concerning their Sentences, of which some are ascribed to several Persons, as that,

*Lacedæmonian Chilon this profess'd,
Nothing too much; a Mean in all is best.*

There is no less Dissent concerning their Number. Leandrius for Cleobulus and Myson, inserts Leophantus Son of † Gorgiasdes a Lebedian, or Ephesian, and Epimenides the Cretan. Plato (in his Protagoras) substitutes Myson for Periander: Ephorus, Anacharsis for Myson. Some add Pythagoras. Diæarchus alledgeth four, acknowledged by all, Thales, Bias, Pittacus and Solon: Then names six more, out of which are to be selected three, Aristodemus, Pamphilus, Chilon the Lacedæmonian, Cleobulus, Anacharsis, Periander; some add ‡ Acusilaus Son of Caba or Scabra an Argive. Hermippus in his Treatise of the seven wise Men, saith, they were in all seventeen, of which seven were variously named, which were, Solon, Thales, Pittacus, Bias, Chilon, Cleobulus, Periander, Anacharsis, Acusilaus, Epimenides, Leophantus, Pherecydes, Aristodemus, Pythagoras, Lasus of Hermionea, Son of Charmantides, or (according to Aristoxenus) of Simbrinus, Anaxagoras †. Hippobotus, in his Commentary of Philosophers, reckons Linus, Orpheus, Solon, Periander, Anacharsis, Cleobulus, Myson, Thales, Bias, Pittacus, Epicharmus, Pythagoras.

Laertius reckons them thus, Thales, Solon, Chilon, Pittacus, Bias, Cleobulus, Periander; whereunto he adds, Anacharsis, Myson, Epimenides, and Pherecydes. These, saith he, were called the Wise Men, to whom some annex Pisistratus the Tyrant.

Among the Romans also three had the Sirname of Sapiens, M. Cato, C. Lælius, and L. Atilius.

* Laert. vit. Thalet.

† Not Leophantus Gorgiadem, as the Interpreters render.

‡ So Suidas Ἀκούσιος Κῶνα νῆκ' Ἀργεῖον, by which Laertius is explained contrary to the Interpreters.

† Here are but sixteen named. There should be seventeen, *Cosambon* thinks the one omitted was *Myson*.

A N
A C C O U N T
O F T H E
Life and Writings

O F
T H O M A S S T A N L E Y, Esquire.

THE Reader cannot expect to find in this Place a long Recital of Intrigues and Adventures ; for as the Life of a Courtier or a Soldier is past in a Court or a Camp, so that of a Scholar is in the Solitude of his Study : And as Mr. *Stanley's* Learning made up the brightest Part of his Character, so an Account of his Life is but a Relation of his Achievements in the Learned World.

Mr. *Stanley* was Son of Sir *Thomas Stanley*, and born at *Cumberlow-Green* in *Hartford-Shire*. At the Age of fourteen Years he was sent to *Cambridge*, and placed at *Pembroke-Hall*, under the Tuition of Mr. *Balcanchol*, Brother to the Dean of *Durham*. This worthy Gentleman, who had married the Lady *Steward's* Grandmother, took a more than ordinary Care in the Education of his Pupil : He spared no Pains to cherish and animate those Desires of Learning which visibly appeared the predominant Passion of his Mind.

While he continued yet in the Univerfity, his Fancy began to exert itself, and give some Prelages of what the World was to expect from his Genius : It was here he composed those *Madrigal Poems* *, and other Pieces, which, together with some Translations out of the *French*, *Italian* and *Spanish*, were published in one Volume after his Return from his Travels. As in his first Pieces he has given the World a Proof of the Fertility of his Invention ; so in the latter, which are incomparably better, he has, beyond Exception, done of his great Diligence and Learning.

Soon after his Return home, when he had finished his Tour of *France*, *Italy* and *Spain*, and by Travel extended his Knowledge beyond the Bounds of his native Island, he married *Dorothy*, Daughter of Sir *James Engan* of *Flower*, in the County of *Northampton*, whilst his Father and Mother were still living, and before he was arrived at that Age, which by the Laws of his Country put an End to his Minority. This Alteration in his State and Condi-

* *Europa*, *Cupid crucified*, and *Venus Vigils*, with Notes, *Lond.* 1649. — *Anacreon*, *Bion*, *Moschus*, *Kisses* by *Secundus*, *Cupid crucified* by *Ausonius*, *Venus Vigils*, with divers other Poems, 1651. Octavo.

tion of Life, did not in the least change his Temper and Disposition, or abate his Affection to Learning, which was no less vigorous now than before. Neither the Cares nor Concerns for his Family, nor the Careless and Endearments of a young Wife, could prevail with him to intermit his ordinary Studies, on which he was obstinately bent. I will not say of him as a learned Chancellor of France has spoke of himself, † who complains in Print, that upon his Wedding-Day he had not more than six Hours to employ in his Studies; but his Assiduity and Application is visible to all who shall consider the Greatness of his Works, and the short Limits of Life in which he finished them.

The first Work which he enriched the Publick with, was this History of the Lives and Opinions of the Ancient Greek Philosophers. This Work was first begun after the Example of the learned Gassendus, who has composed the Lives of Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, Peurbachius, Regiomontanus, and other modern Astronomers and Philosophers. Mr. Stanley was not the first who had attempted this Province; Diogenes Laertius, in the Time of the Emperor Marcus Antoninus, compiled a Volume of the Lives of the Elder Philosophers, and after him Eusebius writ the Lives of the Sophists. Besides what is extant, Antisthenes and many others, whose Volumes have perished, writ upon the same Subject. The learned Gerard Vossius in our Age, has writ a short Treatise of the Ancient Philosophy, and the several Sects, not to mention others; but Mr. Stanley has outdone all that preceded him in the Extent of his Design, and the vast Multitude of Particulars he has amassed together.

The many Editions of so large a Work are undeniable Proofs of the Approbation it has received from the Publick. To speak the Truth, the Excellence and Variety of the Matter, and the vast Reading which the Author has discovered in every Part of it, could not miss of Admiration. Besides, most Men have a Relish for Discourses of this Kind; and there are few who have not a Curiosity to know the Lives and Actions of those whose Virtues they admire. This has engaged so many Pens to write the Lives of Princes, great Captains, Ministers of State, and other Persons who have made a considerable Figure in the World, or had a Share in the Revolutions of Empires and Kingdoms. Others again have entertained the Publick with the Lives of Divines, Lawyers, Poets, Physicians, &c. which have been kindly received, and judged both useful and diverting.

There are two Ways of Instruction; the one by Precept, the other by Example; the former is dry and barren, and makes at most but a languid Effort; the latter is lively and brisk, and leaves a strong Impression, creating in the Mind Desires and Inclinations to imitate what is good and excellent, and a Horror for what is base and ill. Mr. Stanley only considers Philosophers, and the Amusements and Speculations of Men retired from the Hurry and Noise of the World. He has with extreme Diligence compiled an exact History of their Lives, their Opinions and Notions of Good and Evil, of God and Nature; their Theories of the Universe, their Thoughts about the Principles of Things, their Schemes of Morality and Policy, their Conduct and Behaviour.

By this we see the Steps by which the Arts and Sciences, and all Parts of human Knowledge have been promoted, and the several Advances it has made from its Infancy, till it arrived at the Pitch it is at present at.

I mentioned before those Writers who preceded our Author in this Design, but none have executed it with so much Advantage; his Aim is more comprehensive, his Account is in every Part succinct, pertinent, without Excursions, and consists of a vast Number of Fragments, which are not in others, supplied out of the vast Treasures of his Reading.

The following History consists of nineteen Parts; the first treats of the Seven Sages or wise Men of Greece, so famous in Antiquity; the other give us an ample Account of the twelve different Sects of Philosophers, the Lives of the most eminent Professors, and the Opinions held by them. The last treat of the *Chaldaick* Philosophy, an abstruse and difficult Subject, and which required no less Learning than Mr. Stanley's to venture on it.

Thales the Milesian, was the first who employed himself in natural Enquiries, and was thought to deserve the magnificent Title of *Wise*, for his noble Discoveries in Geometry, Astronomy, and the Theory of the Universe. His Principle was, That Water is the chief Material of which natural Bodies are formed, and into which they are resolved. He imagined the Earth a great Mass, floating on a vast Abyss or Ocean of Water; and from hence gave the Reason of Earthquakes and Eruption of Springs. He conceived God as the Author of all natural Motion, and the Soul which animated the Universe. Mr. Stanley tells us, he imagined *Loadstone* and *Jett* to have Souls, because of their Virtue of attracting Bodies to them. To him is ascribed the Invention of Measuring the Height of the Pyramids by their Shadows, and found the natural Reason of Eclipses, which before were look'd on as portentous, and Presages of some Calamity. Our Author tells us, he foretold that which ended the five Years Wars between the *Lydians* and the *Medes*; when those poor People, frightened at the strange Darkeness, and believing the Sun hid himself to avoid seeing the Slaughter, laid down their Arms, and compos'd their Quarrels. Besides *Thales*, *Solon*, *Chilon*, *Pittacus*, *Bias*, *Cleobulus*, *Periander*, had the same Title bestowed on them. And as *Thales* was the first, who by his Travels into the Eastern Countries, made himself acquainted with Mathematical and Natural Learning, and introduced it into Greece, these were the Authors of several excellent Laws and Schemes of Government: And as the illustrious Title of *Wise* was conferred on the First for his excellent Skill in Geometry, and the Knowledge of Nature, it was conferred on the other for their excellent Precepts in Morality and Politicks. Indeed the Attribute of *Wise* was given to all who profess'd any Sort of Knowledge above the Vulgar, till *Pythagoras* changed that into the Name of *Philosophy*, piously thinking so great a Title could only be ascribed rightfully to the infinite and supreme Wisdom.

It will not be expected we should enter into a Detail of their Lives; this would be to anticipate the Reader, who will find all their Doctrines, Letters, occasional Speeches, &c. recounted by our Author in their Place.

The Sects of Philosophers had a double Original; the one from *Anaximander* the Disciple of *Thales*, and therefore *Ionick*; and the other from *Pythagoras*, that Prince of Philosophers, which from the Place where he held his School was called the *Italic*. *Anaximander* varied from the Doctrine of his Master, and instead of *Water* made *Infinity* the Principle of all Things, but has left us without an Explanation of his Meaning. He first discovered the Obliquity of the *Zodiack*, made Geographical Charts, and invented Dials: Tho' Mr. Stanley, after *Salmasius*, thinks his Gnomon did only note the Tropick and Equinoctial Points, the Division of Hours not being used till a long Time after. Of this Sect, besides him, were *Anaximenes*, *Anaxagoras*, &c.

Socrates, an *Athenian*, was the Author of the Second Sect: His chief Study was Virtue, Morality, and the Regulation of our Lives and Actions. He was Son of a *Statuary*, but the Greatness of his Genius raised him above his Birth and Condition. He did not confine himself to set Lectures in the Chair. Wherever he was, his Conversation was still pleasant and instructive. The Camp, the *Forum*, the publick Streets, the Houses of his Friends, the Prison in which he endured great Hardship, were so many Schools of Knowledge and Virtue.

An Account of the Life and Writings

Virtue. For his great Wisdom, his manly and noble Thoughts, the Ease and Sweetness of his Expression, he was admired by all Men, and esteemed the Prince of Philosophers. He had a right Notion of the divine Nature, and vigorously opposed *Politheism*; for which his Enemies reproached him as an Infidel, and an Enemy of the Gods, and condemn'd him to Death; which he drank with such Majesty of Soul, such Serenity of Mind, as shewed the absolute Empire of his Reason over his Passions, and the Impotence of his Enemies Malice; who by Death itself could not break in upon the Tranquillity of his Mind, or make him die other than *Socrates*. There are great Disputes maintain'd, not without some Heat, among Christian, as well as Pagan Writers, concerning the *Dæmon* which attended *Socrates*, and gave him Prefages of Events which should happen soon after. The Discussion of this may be seen in an entire Chapter, in the Life of this Philosopher. Notwithstanding his eminent Virtue and Wisdom, he could not escape the Malice and Wit of *Aristophanes*, who has expos'd him in a Play called *The Clouds*, which Mr. Stanley has translated into *English*, and annexed as an Appendix to his Life.

The Succession of the *Ionick* Philosophy, which before *Socrates* was single, was soon after divided into several Schools and Sects, some of which were of less Note, and lasted but a short Time, others were more considerable, and of longer Continuance; of the first Sort were the *Cyrenaick*, *Megarick*, *Eleack*, and *Eretriack* Sects; of the latter were the *Academick* and *Cynick*, which two gave Birth to the *Peripatetick* and *Stoick*.

Aristippus, a Disciple of *Socrates*, was the chief of the *Cyrenaick* Sect. He placed the Sovereign Good in Pleasure, and thinks Virtue only commendable, as it conduces to acquire that. The Distinction of Right and Wrong, Just and Unjust, he thought arbitrary, and not established by Nature, but Law and Custom. As his Principles were loose, his Life was suited to his Doctrine, which he past away in Jollity and Mirth. His good Humour rendered him agreeable to *Dionysius* the Tyrant of *Sicily*, while the Severity of *Plato*, which he miscalled Moroseness, offended that haughty Prince. I cannot forbear here to recount one or two of the many witty Replies which are recorded of that Philosopher, and which our Author has collected among the other Incidents of his Life. When *Dionysius* asked him what brought him to his Court, he replied, He came to traffick with him, to offer him what he had, and receive from him what he wanted, meaning to barter the Wit and Humour he was Master of for the other's Money. He did not confine himself to the Rules of Temperance, Sobriety, and Continence. Upon a certain Time entering into the House of a famous Cretazan, he observed one of the Company to blush. Sir, said he, *there's no Harm in going in, but in not being able to come out*. When a certain Strumpet charged him with being with Child by him, *You know that no more*, says he, *than in passing through a Bush which Thorn it is that pricks you*. When *Dionysius* offered him three beautiful Women, and bid him chuse one out of them, which he liked best; he took them all three away with him, that he might not, as he said, incur the Fate of *Paris*, who had been so severely punished for his Indiscretion in preferring one to two. *Aristippus* owned but two Passions, Pleasure and Grief, as the Springs of all human Actions; and these are diversified according to the Temper and Complexion of every Person. He derided the Calmness and Serenity of Mind, or Exemption from all Passion, in which others place all human Happiness, regarding this as mere Inactivity, and a tiresome Indolence. He likewise derided the Plainness, Simplicity, and coarse Living of his old Friend *Antisthenes*, and admired the Plenty, Ease and Luxury of the *Sicilian* Court. Many other Pleasantries of the same Kind are mentioned in their Place, but I fear I have trespass'd the Bounds I prescribed myself, in descending to these Particulars.

Besides the *Cyrenaick*, Mr. Stanley treats of *Megarick*, *Eleack*, and other Sects; but the most eminent of all those derived from *Socrates*, was the *Academick*, who took their Name from the Place where their School was erected. *Plato* was the chief of these, concerning whole

whose Birth Mr. *Stanley* relates several odd and marvellous Rumours. It was the common Fame at *Athens*, that *Apollo* had condescended to visit his Mother's Bed; and the God appearing in a Vision to his Father, required him to refrain the Company of his Wife till after her Delivery. A pretty Artifice, sometimes used by the Pagan Women, to delude their credulous Husbands. He had a plentiful Fortune, and after he had been a Scholar of *Socrates* for a while, he travelled to hear the greatest Masters of his Time. In *Italy* he studied the *Pythagorick* Doctrines, and seems to have drawn many Things out of the Books of *Moses*, which he might probably have met with in his Voyages. He passes with some for the Inventor of Dialogue, but Mr. *Stanley* pretends he did only refine and polish it, and thinks the Analytick Way of Reasoning, a noble Invention, ought to be ascribed to him. This is the Method of discovering Truth, by supposing the Thing fought as true or known, and enquiring what the Consequents are.

Mr. *Des Cartes* has given us an illustrious Instance of the Use of this Method in his *Meditations and Method*, where the chief Truths of Philosophy are demonstrated with great Force and Exactness. The Examples of this Method are to be found in the Books of *Euclid*, *Apollonius*, *Pappus*, and other Places of the old Geometers, as Mr. *Stanley* has marked. *Plato* thought Mathematical Learning of Use in all Parts of human Knowledge, and requires all his Scholars to be previously instructed in the Elements of Geometry.

His Philosophy was held in Veneration in the first Ages of Christianity, which Mr. *Stanley* thinks proceeded from his Teaching, That God had one only begotten Son, whose Power extended over all Creatures. In short, his Notions are in many Points agreeable to the Scheme of our Religion.

Plato held the Soul was immaterial and immortal; that it was free and independent, but subject to Necessity or Fate.

He had a great and noble Genius, and surprizes the Mind with the Eloquence of his Style, and the Abundance of his Imagination. To give us a more compleat Idea of his Philosophy, Mr. *Stanley* presents us with an Abridgment of the Doctrines of the old Academy out of *Cicero*, and after that a compleat Summary. Several Collections of this Kind are found in *Plutarch*, *Laertius*, *Apuleius*; but our Author passing these by, has chosen that of *Alcius*, as most perfect and compleat, and annexed it entire, as an Appendix to the Life of this Philosopher. In the last Place, to illustrate the Matter, he has inserted a *Platonick* Discourse, written after a poetical Manner in *Italian*, by the famous *John Picus* Earl of *Mirandola*.

After the Death of *Plato*, his Disciples divided into two Sects; the first remained in the old Academy, the other took Possession of the *Lyceum*. The rest were called *Peripateticks*, of whom *Aristotle*, a Native of *Stagyra*, was chief. Neither his Birth nor Education were so advantageous as *Plato*. Mr. *Stanley* denies that he ever practised as a Quack, or sold Remedies at *Athens*. This, and the pretended divine Honours paid to his Wife *Pythias*, and being concerned in a Plot against *Alexander*, Mr. *Stanley* rejects as Calumnies, groundless and injurious to the Memory of so great a Man. He made great Improvements in Logic, as well as other Parts of Philosophy, invented Categories, formed the Syllogism, and determined several Modes and Figures, detected the Arts of Sophistry, writ a great Number of Books of Metaphysics, Physics, Natural History of Animals, &c.

The Fortune of this Philosopher is very strange; and it is surprising to find Men judge so differently of the same Person in one Age: Men have been excommunicated and treated as Hereticks for reading him to their Disciples: At other Times he has been introduced into Schools and Universities, and no other Doctrine taught to their Scholars. His Writings in

one Age have been made the Standard of Truth. He has been stiled the Genius of Nature, and his Performances the highest Pitch of human Wit. Again, at others his Philosophy has been treated as trifling, verbose, empty and litigious. However it be, Mr. Stanley has given a curious and exact Abstract of his Doctrine.

Another Branch of the School of *Socrates* were the *Cynicks*. *Antisthenes* was the chief of these, which after was made famous by *Diogenes* his Scholar. It is difficult to determine whence this Name took its Rise. Mr. Stanley thinks partly from the *Cynofarges*, the *Gymnasium* or School of *Antisthenes*, and partly the Roughness and Severity of their Manners. *Diogenes* was the most considerable of this Sect, and made so great a Noise by the Singularity of his Maxims, that *Alexander* had the Curiosity to see him. His odd Manner of living in a Tub, his seeking honest Men with a Candle and Lantern at Noon, and the other pleasant Incidents of his Life, are all collected by Mr. Stanley.

The Sect of *Stoicks* had its Original from that of the *Cynicks*. *Zeno* was the Author of this, who having first been a Scholar of *Crates*, and afterwards a Hearer of other Philosophers, at last instituted this new Sect. This Philosophy has formed great Men, and charmed a World of People by its proud and ostentatious Principles. It aims to fortify Men against bodily Torments, and arm them against the Blows of Fortune. *Zeno* admitted only one God, whose different Powers and Operations were express'd by several Names. The sovereign Happiness of Man he placed in Virtue, as the only Means to make him immortal, and afford him a solid and lasting Pleasure. He thought the Frame of the World would one Day be dissolved, and perish in Flames. That absolute Empire of Man over his Body and Mind, which he so highly asserted, gave Rise to that pernicious Doctrine, that any one might lawfully destroy himself. And yet there is something in this Philosophy which is bright and glorious, and capable of dazzling the Sight of those who only look at the Splendor of the Pagan Virtues. With what an Air did *Zeno* teach his Wise Men the Contempt of Death, and an Indifference for the Things of the World?

The *Stoicks* were subtil Logicians, as well as excellent Moralists: But we must not enter into Particulars. Mr. Stanley has collected the Remains out of *Laertius*, *Cicero*, *Stobaeus*, and others, and given us a large Summary of that Philosophy at the End of the Life of this Philosopher. Besides *Zeno*, were eminent *Cleanthes*, *Chrysippus*, *Panetius*, *Possidonius*, and others, all whom have Justice done them by our Author.

The *Stoicks* were the last of all the Philosophers derived from *Thales*, and conclude the Succession of the *Ionick* School.

Pythagoras, whom most believe a *Samian*, was chief of the *Italic* Sect. He continued a great while in *Egypt* to learn their Mysteries. Mr. Stanley tells us, that he was made Prisoner by *Cambyses*, who sent him to *Babylon*, where he became familiar with the *Magi* and *Chaldeans*, and was acquainted with the Prophet *Ezekiel*. He was a comely Man, and had a majestic Mien, proper to attract the Veneration of the People, and was thought by his Followers to be Hyperborean *Asello*.

No Philosopher had more Disciples than *Pythagoras*. He enjoined an exact Submission to all he said, and imposed a rigorous Silence on his Scholars for two Years. Temperance was the Virtue which he most earnestly recommended, as most necessary to bring the Body to an entire Subjection. His Philosophy was Cabalistical, and full of Mysteries. He held the Pre-existence of the Soul, and its Migration from one Body to another. Thus he reported in his Writings of himself, that before the *Trojan* War he was *Atalides* the Son of *Mercury*, then *Euphorbus*, then *Hermotimus*, then *Pyrrhus* a *Delian*, lastly, *Pythagoras*. In his Writings

of Thomas Stanley, Esquire.

ings he reports that he came 207 Years since from the *Inferi*, and other Extravagancies. After his Life, Mr. Stanley has annexed an Account of his Discipline and Doctrine, his symbolical Way of Teaching, and transcribed into his Works the learned *Rauchlinus* Explanation of the *Pythagorick* Doctrine. Of this Sect were *Empedocles*, *Archytus*, *Philolaus*; and to them it must be owned we are indebted for the true System of the Universe, which places the Sun in the Centre, and the Earth in the Planetary Chorus.

The Sects which spring from the *Italic* may be reduced to four, the *Heracitian*, the *Eleatic*, the *Sceptick* or *Pyrrhonian*, and the *Epicurean*.

Heracitus, by the Advantage of a good Genius, was Master of that Knowledge which others acquire with Difficulty and painful Researches.

His contemplative Humour and Disdain for the World, made him love Retirement and Solitude. He withdrew from the Society of Men, and spent his Time in the solitary Top of a Mountain, in seriously bemoaning the Follies and Vanity of the World.

Democritus, the Head of the *Eleatic* Sect, was of a Temper very different from *Heracitus*: He had a smiling Countenance, and diverted himself with laughing at the ridiculous Passion which Men discovered for Trifles, the Diligence and Pains they used to obtain them, and the Regret and Grief they shewed upon any Loss or Disappointment. The People of *Abdera*, among whom he lived, observing him to laugh frequently, began to doubt of his good Sense, and sent for *Hippocrates* to cure him. But having shewn his *Diacosmus*, the Opinion they had of his Folly was soon converted into Admiration. He was the first Inventor of the Doctrine of *Atoms* and a *Vacuum*, or the *Corpuscular Philosophy*, the Elements of which Mr. Stanley has delivered.

Pyrrho was chief of the *Scepticks*. He affirmed Man could only judge by Appearances of Truth and Falshood, and therefore pretended the Mind only ought to continue in Suspence, and not determine any Thing. All the Subtilty of these Gentlemen lay in finding Reasons of Diffidence and Distrust in Matters which appeared plain and evident. The Curious will find their entire Philosophy in its proper Place.

The Author of the last Sect was *Epicurus*, whom our Author tells us writ more than any other of the Philosophers. He placed the Sovereign Good in virtuous Pleasure. The wrong Interpretation of his Opinions, and the Abuse of them by his Disciples, has brought his Philosophy into Disrepute, and caused it to be decried as the Source of all Vice and Immorality. But Mr. Stanley affirms the Weakness of his Constitution, and his extreme Sobriety, ought to remove so injurious a Charge. Besides, the Altars erected to his Honour after his Death, will not suffer us to believe him so voluptuous a Man as his Enemies would represent him. Every one knows he taught *Atoms* and a *Void* to be the Principles of Things held, and contrary to *Aristotle* and others, that the World was not eternal. Nay, he affirms it bears sensible Marks of its Newness; urging for Instance, the Rise of Arts and Sciences as undeniable Proofs of its small Continuance. *Lucretius*, in his elegant Poem has given us his Doctrine of the Universe, Providence, the Principles of Things; and *Gassendus*, who revived his Philosophy in this Age, has written his Life.

It is Time now to proceed to the three last Parts of this large Work, which contain an Account of the *Chaldaick*, *Persian*, and *Sabeian* Learning. As the *European* Sciences had their Source in *Greece*, so the Philosophy of those People was derived from the Eastern Nations, whose Original is very obscure. The Writings of the Ancient Sages are long since perished, and *Plato* and *Pythagoras*, who have mixed their Tenets with their Philosophy, have done it in such a Manner, that it is hard to distinguish what they have borrowed, from their own Inventions.

An Account of the Life and Writings

ventions. This Difficulty has rather animated than discouraged Mr. Stanley, who with mighty Care has amassed the scattered Fragments, and by digesting what is genuine, has compiled an Idea of the Oriental Learning.

The *Chaldeans*, in the Time of *Alexander*, pretended they had continued to observe the Stars for 470000 Years. But this must be regarded as an empty Boast, since all the Observations they could then produce, as Mr. Stanley assures us, did fall short of two thousand Years, and there is nothing extant, at present, of their Astronomy more ancient than the *Era of Nabonassar*, or the 3967th Year of the *Julian Period*.

Zoroaster is commonly own'd as the first Author of Arts and Sciences amongst the *Chaldeans*, but who he was, or in what Age he lived, is dark and uncertain. His Disciples, the *Magi*, propagated this Learning, which was introduced into *Greece* by *Berosus*, before or about the Time of *Alexander*.

The Eastern Learning was not taught in Schools to a promiscuous Audience, but confined to certain Families, the Father of whom instructed his Children, and by this Means conveyed his mysterious Knowledge to Posterity. Their Wisemen were regarded by the Vulgar as sacred Persons, and had a separate Habitation, enjoying great Privileges, and an Exemption from publick Charges. They were divided into several Kinds or Sects, according to the Subject of their Studies, as *Naturalists*, *Priests*, *Astrologers*, &c.

Their Great Master *Zoroaster* divided all Things into three Kinds : The first Eternal, without Beginning or End ; the next Immortal, which had Beginning, but no End ; and the last Mortal and Corruptible : They thought the First of all Things was eternal and supreme God, whom they termed Father and King, and placed his Essence in Light and Truth.

After God, were their good and ill *Demons*, which they conceived to inhabit the Regions of Fire, Air, Water, and Earth. The Former they fancied to dwell in the Light of the Divine Presence, and were the Ministers and Messengers of God. The latter, whom they supposed to be Spirits of Darkness, did wander up and down, and were Enemies and Haters of Mankind, and continually seeking to hurt and destroy them. Of these they thought the Earth, and Sea, and their most retired Cavities and Depths were full. Of the ill *Demons*, they accounted some to be worse than others : Those who kept their Residence in the Air, they thought to be wanton and sportive, who either diverted Men with their capricious Tricks, or inspired them with sanguine and amorous Thoughts. On the contrary, those which frequented solitary and dark Places, or lodg'd in the Caverns of the Earth, were extremely malignant and fierce, and like wild Beasts, attacked and tore in Pieces whomsoever they met. If, by the Permission of Heaven, they were suffered to remove their Seats, they enter'd into the Bodies of Men, threw them into Madness, Epilepsies, Convulsions, and other dismal and affrighting Distempers.

After the Immaterial Beings, the next Order were the Corporeal Worlds, of which they accounted Seven ; one *Empyrean*, three *Etherial*, and three more *Material*, by which they meant the Terrestrial Globe compos'd of Water, Air, and Earth.

We have said enough of their *Theology* and *Physicks* ; the next Branch of the *Chaldeick* Learning was their Arts of *Prognostick*, or *Presages of Future Events*. The Chief of these were *Astrology*, *Augury*, *Interpretation of Dreams*, *Explanation of Prophecies*, and other like mystical Sciences.

The third Part of the *Widm* these Sages were famous for, was their *Magick, Natural and Theurgick*. By the Help of the former they pretended to have a great Power over the Natural World, to drive away wild Beasts and venomous Creatures, to preserve the Fruits of the Earth, to keep off Storms and Tempests, Thunder, and what not. By the latter they affirmed, they could command *Demons*, and call the Good to their Aid and Assistance, and repel and chase the malignant Ones. I shall not enter further into an Enumeration, but leave the Reader to see the Original, where Mr. Stanley has given us a large and ample Account of the Worship, Religions, Rites, Arts and Sciences of these Nations.

Having thus given a View of the History of Philosophy, we shall proceed to the rest of his learned Labours, which are either printed, or remain in Manuscript in the Hands of the Curious.

When Mr. Stanley had happily finished this Work, and before he was Twenty-eight Years of Age, he undertook * *Æschylus*, the most knotty and intricate of all the Greek Poets; and in the Year 1663, after a World of Pains spent in illustrating and restoring him, he published his accurate and beautiful Edition of that Author. This was a Work of great Difficulty, and an Enterprize worthy of Mr. Stanley's Abilities and great Skill in the Greek Language. Henry Stephens, Salmasius, and divers other Critics, thought the Difficulties insuperable, and despair'd of seeing this accomplished.

Six Tragedies of this Poet were first of all published by Aldus at Venice, in the Year 1518. After this, Adrian Turnebus printed them with various Readings at the End, in 1558. The same Year they came out at Venice, revised by Robertus, who added his own Conjectures, together with those of Michael Sopianus, and in this Edition the *Choephore* was first added with *Scolia* out of the Ancient Copies. Not long after, the Whole came out all more correct than before, by the Care of Petrus Victorius from the Press of Henry Stephens. In the last Place, these Seven Tragedies were published by G. Caisterus at Antwerp in 1580; in which Edition, besides the Correction of an infinite Number of Faults, there is an Account given of his Verification. Isaac Casaubon, in his Notes upon Strabo, declares his Intent to publish and illustrate *Æschylus*; but either he did nothing in it, or his Labours have perished, to the great Detriment of Learning.

After these great Men, Mr. Stanley engaged in this Work, and what he has done in it, may be drawn from the Account himself has premised to his Edition. The Greek Text he has taken from the *Caisterian* Edition, and the *Scolia* from *Victorius*; to which, that he might omit nothing, he has annex'd the various Readings, Epistles, Prefaces, Conjectures and Observations. He has farther collated the former Tragedies, with Two Manuscripts, the One in the Bodleian, and the other in the Arundellian Library, both of which were lent him by Mr. Selden. By Means of the First he has enriched the *Scholium* on the first Three Tragedies, and by Help of the latter published a *Scholium*, which never before saw the Light. The Account of the Verification which Caisterus published, he has amended, collected the Fragments, made a new Latin Translation; and lastly, completed the whole Work with a most learned Commentary.

Besides these Monuments of his Learning which are published, there are divers other Proofs of his unwearied Application remaining still in Manuscript; all or most of which are in the Library of the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Norwich. Here are his large Commem-

* Quis *Æschylum* possit affirmare Græcè nunc scienti, imago patere explicabilem, quam Evangelii & Epistolæ Apostolicæ. Unus ejus *Agamemnon* superat obscuritate quantum est Librorum Sacrorum cum suis Hebraicis & Syriacis & toto Hellenisticâ supellecile vel Farragine. CC. Salmas. de Hellenisticâ Ep. Ded. P. 37.

An Account of the Life and Writings, &c.

taries on *Æschylus* † in Eight Volumes in *Folio*, which were never published, his ‡ *Adversaria*, or Promiscuous Remarks, in which several Passages of *Sophocles*, *Euripides*, *Stephanus de Urbibus*, *Juvenal*, *Perfius*, *Hefychius*, *Callimachus*, and other Ancient Authors are amended and explained. Besides what is mentioned, there are large Prelections on *Theophrastus* § his Characters, and a Critical Essay on the First Fruits and the Tenths of the Spoil said in the Epistle to the || *Hebrews* to be given by the Prophet *Abraham* to *Melchisedeck*; all which are full of excellent Learning, and no less justly valued by their present Possessors.

And thus you have a short Account of our Author, who was a Gentleman of a comely Aspect, and exceeded by none of his Time for Modesty, Candour, and Learning.

His Contemporaries paid that Deference to him which he so well deserved; his Works were much beyond the Number of his Years; and in this he might be accounted another *Picus Mirandola*, in that he died about the same Age, leaving our Nation exceedingly indebted to his Family for affording Two such illustrious *English* Men as Sir *John Marsbam* and himself.

† N^o 667. Thom. Stanleii Amplissimi Commentarii in *Æschyli* Tragedias [quas sua manu scripsit nondum Editi] 8 Vol. Fol.

‡ N^o 668 Tho. Stanleii *Adversaria* in quibus *Sophoclis*, *Euripidis*, *Stephani de Urbibus*, *Juvenalis*, *Perfii*, *Achillis*, *Tatii*, *Theocriti*, *Aristidis*, *Parthenii*, *Hefychii*, *Antigoni*, *Carystii*, *Callimachi* loci plurimi emendantur & explicantur. Fol.

§ N^o 669. Tho. Stanleii Prelectiones amplissimæ in *Theophrasti* Characteres.

|| N^o 670. Tho. Stanleii *Expositio* sive Exercitatio Philologica de Primitiis seu Decimis Prædæ ad vers. 4. c. 7. Epistolæ ad *Hebræos*. Qua nonnulla sacre Scripturæ loca explicantur, veteres aliquot Ritus eruantur, Auctores plarimi præsertim *Græci* partim illustrantur partim emendatur, Ind. Cod. Manuscript. Joh. Mori Episc. Norwicensis.

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THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE FIRST PART,

Containing those on whom the Attribute of WISE was conferred.

THALES.

CHAP. I.

The Country and Parents of THALES.

GREAT Wits, which have been happy in benefiting Posterity by their excellent Inventions, have not always had the Fortune to enjoy the just Reward, their Glory being intercepted oftentimes by some later Disguise of Alteration or Addition. It were therefore Gratitude in us, who find ourselves instructed by the Ancients, to vindicate the Memory of our Masters, by enquiring diligently the Author of those Labours whereof we reap the Harvest. This Kind of Injury hath happened very considerably to *THALES*, the wife Man of *Miletus*, who first introduced Natural and Mathematical Learning into *Greece*, from whence it is derived to us; but the Honour of so noble a Design, the ambitious Opposition of some, the Industry of others hath so obscured, that there is little of the Reputation left to the deserving Author. I have therefore esteemed it worth my Pains, to digest what I could collect or observe of a Person, to whom all Lovers of Learning are so much obliged.

The Original of *Thales* is very obscurely delivered. Some conceive he was a *Phœnician* by Birth,

whose Opinion seeming to be strongly founded upon *Laertius**, and the Authorities by him alledged, it is necessary that we begin with a Disquisition upon his Words, which are, as commonly rendered, these:

Now Thales was born, as Herodotus, Duris and Democritus affirm, his Father being Examius, his Mother Cleobulina, of the Thelidæ, who were Phœnicians, the most illustrious of all from Cadmus and Agenor, [as Plato also saith.] The Testimony of Herodotus, tho' b Hyginus and c Suidas seem to understand it, according to the common Error, as if he were born in Phœnicia, expressly confirms the contrary, being thus: Thales, a Milesian, afar off by Descent a Phœnician; whence we may gather, that the other two Authorities of Duris and Democritus imported little more, or at least nothing to a contrary Sense. So likewise that of Leander, which is by d Clemens Alexandrinus cited jointly with Herodotus, to prove him of a Phœnician Extract.

He was made free of Miletus when he went with Neleus who was banish'd out of Phœnicia.] The learned e Casaubon, to reconcile this Story with that

a Diog. Laert. l. 1. §. 22. b Hygin. l. 2. c. 2. c *Afronum. Natione fuit Phœnix, ut Herodotus Milesius dicit. Which doubtless is corrupt (for what Herodotus is that?) and to be reformed to this Effect, Natione fuit Phœnix ut Herodotus, Milesius ut alii dicunt. d In voce Thales. Microd. Cilius. e Clem. Alexand. Strom. 1. In not. ad Diog. Laert.*

of *Neleus*, who was not banished out of *Phenicia* when he built *Miletus*; for *ὁ δὲ Νῆλος οὗ Νηλεὶος ἐκπολιτίσθη*, reads, *ἐκπολιτὴν* the politician, as if *Thales* being banished out of *Phenicia* had gone with *Neleus* to *Miletus*; which Alteration begetteth a very great Anachronism, for this *Thales* was above four hundred Years later than that *Neleus*. Therefore if *Laertius* meant the same *Neleus*, either he was strangely mistaken, or his Text is corrupt, and ought to be understood of the Ancestors of *Thales*, to which Sense it may be reduced with little Alteration, thus, *ἐκπολιτίσθησαν δὲ ἐν Μίλῳ οὗ Νηλεὶος οὗ Νηλεὶος ἐκπολιτὴν*, as if they being *Phœnicians* went into *Caria*, and became Citizens of *Miletus*, at what Time *Neleus*, Son of *Codrus*, being put beside the Kingdom of *Athens* by his younger Brother *Medon*, led thither the *Ionian* Colonies, whereof *Miletus* (which he built) was the chief City. Of this Colony see *Herodotus*, *Strabo*, and *Ælian*.

But as *mist say* he was born there, at *Miletus*, and of a noble Race.] So they render *ἰθαγενὴς*, but in Opposition to the first Opinion, which only mentions his Family, not Country, it may perhaps be understood here in the same Relation: Some (saith he) think he was of a *Phœnician* Extract, of those who were incorporated at *Miletus*; others, that he was of a *Grecian* Family, and that noble. Of this latter Opinion is *Plutarch*, who reproves *Herodotus* for making *Thales* descended afar off from a *Barbarian* Stock, and *Hermippus*, who ascribes that Saying to him, that he thanked the Gods he was a *Grecian*, not a *Barbarian*.

CHAP. II.

Of the Time of his Birth.

A *Pellodorus* saith, that *Thales* was born the first Year of the thirty fifth Olympiad; *Demetrius Phalerensis* saith, that he was honoured with the Title of *Wise*, when *Damafias* was Archon. *Damafias* was Archon according to *Dionysius Halicarnassæus*, the second Year of the thirty-fifth Olympiad, when *Ancus Martius* the fourth King of *Rome* began his Reign.

Hercupon an Anachronism of one Year is supposed by very learned Men, who would have *Thales* to be born the same Year that *Damafias* was Archon. Whence *Signorius*, *Vossius*, and others, bring down the Birth of *Thales* to the second Year of this Olympiad; *Scaliger*, *Meurfius*, *Peta-vius*, and others, raise *Damafias* to the first Year, that they may make his Magistracy agree with *Thales's* Birth; neither rightly; for the Office of *Damafias* relateth not to the Birth of *Thales*. For

the Clearing whereof we must take Notice, that *Damafias* in the *Athenian Festi* is twice said to be Archon, first in the second Year of the thirty-fifth Olympiad, the next Year after the Birth of *Thales*, and again the fourth Year of the forty-eighth Olympiad, when he obtained the Title of *Wise*; the latter we cannot mention without Acknowledgment of the great Light Chronology hath received by Mr. *Selden's Marmora Brunfelsiana*.

It will be also worth Observation, that *there* was another of this Name, whom *Eusebius* placeth at the eighth Olympiad, and *Laertius* and *Plutarch* make contemporary with *Homer*, *Hesiod* and *Lycurgus*. *Scaliger*, who perceived the Inconsistency of this Account, perceived not the Reason of it; for *Lycurgus* and *Iphitus* instituted the Olympic Games twenty seven Olympiads before *Coræbus* was Victor, who, according to *Eusebius*, is the first. These two *Thales's* are by some confounded; *Eusebius* calls the first a Natural Philosopher, whereas it is certain that Kind of Learning was first introduced into *Greece* by the second. *Suidas* cites *Phlegon*, that the latter *Thales* flourished in the seventh Olympiad, which *Phlegon* ^a doubtless meant of the first. ^b They who place *Thales* about the seventh Olympiad, and make him contemporary with *Romulus*, confounded the latter *Thales* with the first, and the true Epocha of the Olympiads with the Vulgar. For the first *Thales* lived in the seventh Olympiad from the first of *Iphitus*; *Romulus* liv'd about the same Distance from the Olympiad of *Coræbus*.

This Time is mistaken by that learned Father *Clemens Alexandrinus*, to prove *Thales* younger than the later Prophets. ^c Thus (saith he) it is demonstrated that they who prophesied in the Time of *Darius Hytaspes* in the second Year of his Reign, that is to say, *Aggeus*, *Zacharias*, and *Malachy*, who was one of the twelve, seeing that they prophesied in the first Year of the forty-eighth Olympiad, were more ancient than *Pythagoras*, who is said to have been in the sixty second Olympiad; and then *Thales*, eldest of the Greek Sages, who was about the fiftieth Olympiad; as if this were not rather an Argument to prove these Prophets contemporary with *Thales*, which *Eusebius* allows. ^d About the Time (saith he) of *Cyrus King of Persia*, the seven wise Men flourished; this was the Time in which the last of the Hebrew Prophets prophesied, since *Troy*, above six hundred Years after *Moses*, no less than fifteen hundred Years. But if with *Clemens Alexandrinus*, we account these Prophets coetaneous with *Darius Hytaspes*, they will appear much younger than *Thales*, for *Darius* began his Reign in the last Year of the sixty-fourth Olympiad.

^f Herodot. lib. 9. Strabo, lib. 14. *Ælian*, v. H. viii.

^g De Herod. malign.

^h Laert. vit. Thal.

ⁱ Laert.

^l Lib. 3. 96.

¹ De Atheniens. tempor.

^m De scient. mathemat. 32. 8.

ⁿ In Euseb.

^o Archont. 1. 11.

^p Rationes. temp. 3. 12.

^q Euseb.

^r De Atheniens. 1. 3. 38.

^s Vita Lycurg.

^t In Euseb.

^u In voce Thal.

^v Phlegon Hist.

^w De Sec. Augustin. de

^x Vit. Dei, lib. 13. cap. 24 & 27.

^y Strabon. 1.

^z Preper. Evangel. 10. 4.

C H A P. III.

His Travels.

HE employed the first and greatest Part of his Time in Travel; he went to *Crete*, to inform himself of the Myſteries of their Religion (for that Iſland was famous for the Birth of *Jupiter*) as is acknowledged by himſelf in an ^a Epistle to *Pherecidas*.

That he travelled alſo into *Aſia* is affirmed in the ſame Epistles; ſome ſay into *Phœnicia*, arguing from his Aſtrology, which he is thought to have learned of the *Phœnicians*, Maſters of that Science; and particularly, becauſe he is ſaid to have firſt obſerved the Conſtellation of the *Leſſer Bear* by which the *Phœnicians* ſailed. ^a *Voſſius* eſſays to prove the Word *Cynſura* to be *Phœnician*, not as derived from *κυν-ῥα*, but from *כנן* and *אור* as being a Collection of Light; or *אור* *כנן* *אור* Umbilicus igneus.

His laſt Journey (being ^b in Years) was into *Egypt*, to confer (as he acknowledged in his Epistle to *Pherecidas*) with Priests and Aſtronomers. There he was inſtructed by the Priests at *Memphis*, particularly, (ſaith ^c *Jamblichus*) by thoſe of *Jupiter*. *Laertius* affirms he learn'd Geometry of them; *Plutarch* implies as much of his Philoſophy.

He was there in the Reign of ^d *Amafis*, by whom much favoured and admired for many Things, eſpecially for meaſuring the Height of the Pyramids by the Shadow; until at laſt accuſed to him of Diſaffection to Monarchs and that Kind of Government, to which Egipt many bitter Sayings of his were alledged concerning Tyrants. As when *Molpagoras*, an eminent Perſon of Ionia, demanded what was the ſtrangeſt Sight he ever ſaw, he answered, a Tyrant old. Another Time being at a Feaſt where a Queſtion aroſe, what Beaſts were moſt dangerous; of Wild, ſaith he, a Tyrant; of Tame, a Flatterer; and Princes (ſaith *Plutarch*) however they profeſs themſelves far different from Tyrants, yet take no Pleaſure in ſuch Apophthegms: Hereupon he loſt the Favour of *Amafis*. Thus having ſtudied Philoſophy in *Egypt*, he returned to *Miletus*, and ^e transported that vaſt Stock of Learning which he had there collected, into his own Country.

C H A P. IV.

How he lived at Miletus.

HIS Life at *Miletus* (as ^f *Heraclitus* affirms) was retired and private; ſome report he married and had a Son named *Cibiffus*, but the true Opinion is of thoſe who ſay he lived unmarried,

and made his ^g Siſter's Son ^h (whom *Plutarch* calls *Cybiſſus*) his Heir. ⁱ He put off his Mother when ſhe firſt moved him to marry, by telling her it was not yet Time; and when he was more in Years, being again ſolicited by her, he answered, nor is it now Time, meaning, it was then too late. Being demanded why he took not ſome Courſe to have Iſſue, he answered, *ὅτι παλαιότερα*, which is the ſame in pronouncing with *ἐπὶ παλαιότερα*, and may be taken either becauſe he loved Children, or did not love them, as ^k *Cajaubon* conjectures; but perhaps his Meaning may better be gathered out of another Answer of his to the ſame Queſtion, ^l that he did not uſe to draw voluntary Cares upon his Life, and diſturb the Quiet thereof; or from this Story related by ^m *Plutarch*.

Solon coming to *Miletus* to viſit him, told him that he wondered he wholly neglected Marriage and Iſſue. Thales at that Time answered nothing, but ſome few Days after ſuborned a Stranger to pretend that he came within ten Days from Athens; *Solon* demanded what News from thence; nothing (answered the other as he was inſtructed) but the Burial of a young Man attended by the whole City, being, as was ſaid, Son of the moſt eminent Perſon of the City, who at the ſame Time was abroad in Travel. Unhappy Man (cries *Solon*) what was his Name? ⁿ I heard it, answered the other, but have forgot, only I remember he was very famous for Wiſdom and Juſtice. *Solon's* Fear increaſing upon every Answer, he at laſt asked him, if the Father's Name were not *Solon*? which the other affirming, he beat his own Head, and did other Actions accompanied with Speeches proper to ſuch as are transported with Grief; whereupon Thales ſmiling, and interrupting him; theſe Things, *Solon*, ſaid he, deterr'd me from Marriage, which thus diſorder even thee a moſt conſtant Perſon, but be not troubled at this News, it is counterfeit.

In this Privacy of Life he was ſolicited and ſent unto by many Princes, whoſe Invitations and Amities, (*Plutarch* ^o ſaith, he reſuſed; viſited by many eminent Perſons.

^p He is ſaid to have cohabited ſome Time with *Thraſibulus* (a Man of excellent Wit and Judgment) who was King, (or according to the *Greek* Word) Tyrant of *Miletus*, ^q tho' his Reign continued but eleven Months; ^r and about the Time that the *Mileſians* entered into a League with *Alyattes* the ſecond, then King of *Lydia*.

C H A P. V.

The Attribute of Wiſe conferred on him.

THE Attribute of Wiſe, as ^s *Plutarch* and St. *Auguſtine* ^t obſerve, was conferred upon the

^a Laert. lib. 1. cap. 6. ^b De Scien. Mathematic. cap. 31. ^c Plut. de plac. Phil. 1. ^d c. Vit. Pythag. 1. 2. ^e d. Plutarch. Symp. ſept. ſap. conviv. ^f Cyril. Julian. 1. 1. ^g Laert. 1. 1. 2. 5. ^h Laert. 1. 26. ſecl. in 782. ⁱ h. Vita Solon. ^j Laert. Plut. Symplic. 3. 6. ^k Senec. ſerm. 66. ^l in Laertianum. ^m 130th. ſerm. 66. ⁿ Vita Solon. ^o Sept. ſap. conviv. ^p Laert. 1. 27. ^q Aſſ. pol. 5. ſkion. ^r Herodot. 1. 2. ^s Vit. Solon. ^t De Civit. Dei, 8. 2.

rest in respect of their moral Rules and Practice, but upon *Thales* particularly for his speculative Learning. It was first bestowed on *Thales*, at what Time *Damofias* was Archon, under whom (according to *Demetrius Phalerus*) all the seven were called Wise. The second *Damofias* was Archon in the third Year of the 49th Olympiad, which *Salmastius* knew not, when to make the Words of *Laertius* agree with the first *Damofias*, he misinterpreted *Enfilius* and *Clemens Alexandrinus*, and substituted all other Accounts of the Birth and Death of *Thales*, whereas this fortunately complies with the Times of all the seven.

The first was *Thales*, justly preferred before the rest in respect of his great Learning, which he owed not to any Master. The Time when this Honour was conferred on him, falls upon the fifty ninth Year of his Age.

The second, *Pittacus* of *Mitylene*, who flourished in the forty second Olympiad, and died in the third Year of the fifty second.

The third, *Bias*, of *Priene*, contemporary with *Pittacus*, living under *Ayattes* and *Croesus*.

The fourth, *Solon*, who was Archon at *Athens* the third Year of the forty-sixth Olympiad. He died Olymp. 55.

The fifth, *Cleobulus* of *Lindus*, coetaneous with *Solon*.

The sixth, *Myson* of *Chene*.

The Seventh, *Chilon* of *Lacedæmon*, who was *Ephorus*, Olymp. 56.

The Credit and Glory of these Seven, was much increased (saith *Plutarch*) by a Tripod sent round from one to another, by a mutual, noble, and modest Concession: The Occasion related thus, by *Laertius* and *Valerius Maximus*.

Some young Men of *Ionis* having bought a Draught of the Milesian Fishermen, when the Net was drawn up, there was found in it a Tripod [* a Golden Delphic Table of great Weight.] Hereupon arose a Dispute, [the others affirming they had bargain'd only for the Fish; the others, that they bought the Draught at a Venture. By Reason of the strangeness of the Case, and the Value of the Tripod, it was delivered to the City *Miletus*.] The Milesians sent to the Oracle at *Delphi* about it, and received this Answer:

Com'st thou Milesian to consult my Shrine?
The Tripod to the Wisest I assign.

Hereupon the Milesians, by Agreement, presented it to *Thales*, he sent it to *Bias*, *Bias* to *Pittacus*, he to another, till it pass'd through all the seven, coming at last to *Solon*, who affirming God to be the wisest, sent it back to *Delphi*, [giving him at once the Title and Reward of greatest Wisdom.]

But *Callimachus* in his *Iambi*cs, (continueth *Laertius*) relates it otherwise; that *Bathycles* an Arcadian left a Cup, with order that it should be given to the wisest, whereupon it was presented to *Thales*, and pass'd about in Course till it came to him again, who then dedicated it to *Apollo Didymæus*, with these Verses, according to *Callimachus*:

Thales to him that rules th' Ionian State
This twice obtained Prize doth consecrate.

In Prose thus: *Thales* the Milesian, Son of *Exanius*, to *Delphian Apollo* the Grecians, offers this twice received Prize of Eminence. He that carried the Cup from one to another, was *Thyryon*, Son to *Bathycles*,] whither allude these Verses of *Phœnix* & *Colephœnus*.

Thales, whose Birth his Country blest,
Esteemed of all Men the best,
Was of the Golden Cup possessor.

Eudoxius of *Cnidus*, and *Euanthes* of *Miletus*, report that a Friend of *Croesus* having received from him a golden Cup to be given to the wisest of the Grecians, deliver'd it to *Thales*, and that at last it came to *Chilon*, who sending to the Pythian Oracle to know who was the wisest, was answered *Myson*, whom *Eudoxius* substitutes for *Cleobulus*, *Plato* for *Periander*, the Oracle concerning *Myson* was this:

Oetæan *Myson* I declare
Wiser than those that wisest are.

He that was sent upon the Enquiry was *Amarchis*. *Dædacus* the Platonist, and *Clearchus* affirm, that the Cup was sent by *Croesus* to *Pittacus*, and so carried about. *Andron* in *Tripodæ* (which seems to have been a Discourse wholly upon this Subject, and is likewise cited by *Clemens Alexandrinus*, to prove that *Thales* and the other six flourished about the fiftieth Olympiad) writes that the Argives propos'd this Tripod as a Prize to the Wisest of the Greeks, and that it was adjudged to *Aristodemus* a Spartan, who resign'd it to *Chilon*; *Aristodemus* is mentioned by *Alcæus*.

This Speech we to *Aristodemus* owe,
Money's the Man, none's poor and honest too.

There are who report that a Ship richly laden, sent by *Periander* to *Thrasibulus* Tyrant of *Miletus*, was cast away in the Coan Sea, and the Tripod taken up by some Fishermen. *Phanodius* affirms it was lost in the Athenian Sea, and afterwards brought to the City, and upon Consultation voted to be sent to *Bias*. Others say this Tripod was made by *Vulcan*.

t Laert. 1. 22. u Exercit. Pline. pag. 843. w Laert. 1. 2. 28. x Valer. Maxim. 4. 1. y Laert. ibid. z Val. Max. ibid. a Laert. ibid. b Val. Max. ibid. c Athen. diana. 21.

who gave it to Pelops as his Wife's Portion; from him it came to Menelaus, and afterwards being taken away with Helena by Paris, was by the Lacedæmonian [Helen] thrown into the Sea, calling to mind [an Oracle] that it would prove in time to come the Ground of many Contentions. After this some Lebedians fishing thereabouts drew it up, and quarrelling with the Fishermen about it, it was brought to Coos, but the Controversy not decided, the Business was sold to those of Miletus, which is the chief City of that Country; they sent a Messenger to demand it, and finding themselves slighted, made War upon the Coans; in which many being slain on both Sides, the Oracle declared that the Tripod should be given to the wisest, whereupon both Parties with joint Consent presented it to Thales, [the Coans being willing to grant that to a private Person, for which they before contested with all the Milesians] who dedicated it to Apollo Didymæus; the Effect of the Oracle to the Coans was this:

This Contestation shall continue till

The Golden Tripod's into th' Ocean cast,
By Vulcan, you present to one whose Skill,
Extends to Things to come, present and past.

To the Milesians,

Comest thou, Milesian, to consult my Shrine?
as before. Thus Laertius. ¹ Plutarch adds, that Thales said, Bias was wiser than himself, whereupon it pass'd to him, from him to another, as wiser; passing in a Circle from one to another, it came at last to Thales the second Time. Finally, it was sent from Miletus to Thebes, and dedicated to Iſmenian Apollo. Theophrastus saith it was first sent to Bias at Priene, then by Bias to Thales at Miletus, so passing through all, it came again to Bias; and finally was sent to Delphi. This is most generally reported, saving instead of a Tripod, some say it was a Cup sent from Croesus; others, that it was left there by Bathyacles.

Thus was the Priority of Thales confirmed by the Oracle, for which Reason, he is by ² Cicero and Strabo styled Prince of the Wise Men, to whom the rest yielded the Pre-eminence.

CHAPTER VI.

Of his Philosophy.

Thales (saith ³ Laertius) is by many affirmed to be the first that made Disquisitions upon Nature. Cicero ⁴ (who taught the Greek Philosophers first to speak Latin,) acknowledges Thales to be the first Author thereof. ⁵ Strabo saith, that he first of the Grecians made Enquiry into natural Causes and the

Mathematicks. ⁶ Plutarch calls him Inventor of Philosophy; Justin Martyr, ⁷ the most ancient of Philosophers; Tertullian, ⁸ the first of Natural Philosophers; ⁹ Lactantius, the first that made Enquiry after natural Causes.

SECT. I. That Water is the Principle of all Things.

IN his Disquisition of the Natural Causes of Things, he conceived Water to be the first Principle of all natural Bodies, whereof they consist, and into which they resolve. His Reasons (as delivered by ¹⁰ Plutarch, and repeated by ¹¹ Stobæus) these:

First, Because Natural Seed, the Principle of all living Creatures is humid, whence it is probable that Humidity is also the Principle of all other Things.

Secondly, Because all Kinds of Plants are nourished by Moisture; wanting which, they wither and decay.

Thirdly, Because Fire, even the Sun itself and the Stars, are nourished and maintained by Vapours proceeding from Water, and consequently the whole World consists of the same. Whence Homer supposing all Things to be engendered of Water, saith,

Ὀκεανὸς ὕδατος γένεσις πάντων τρέφεται.

The Ocean whence all Things receive their Birth.

In Pursuit (as Aristotle saith) of this Opinion, he assigned Water the lowest Place, holding (according to ¹² Seneca) that the whole Earth floats, and is carried above the Water, whether that we call the Ocean or great Sea, or any simple Moisture of another Nature, or a moist Element. *By this Water (saith he) the Earth is sustained as a great Ship, which presseth upon the Water that bears it up, because the most weighty Part of the World cannot be upheld by the Air, which is subtle and light. Thus is ¹³ Aristotle to be explained, who saith, Thales held, that the Earth being capable of swimming, resteth as Wood on the like; now of such Things, none swim upon Air, but upon Water.

Upon this Ground it was, that he held Water (as Laertius saith) to be the Cause of Earthquakes. Thus ¹⁴ Seneca, He holds that the Globe of the Earth is upheld by the Water, and carried as a Bark, and floateth by the Mobility thereof, at such Time as it is said to quake. One of his Reasons alledged by Seneca ¹⁵ is, this, because in all extraordinary Motions thereof some new Fountains commonly issued, which if they incline to one Side, and shew their Keel asidelong, gather Water; which, if it chance the Burden they bear be over weighty, raiseth itself higher towards the Right or Left Side.

¹ Plut. vit. Sol. ² Plut. vit. Sol. ³ Vit. Sol. ⁴ Cicero de Leg. 2. 11. ⁵ Strabo l. 14. ⁶ Laert. 1. 24. ⁷ Id. de Natura Deor. 1. 1. ⁸ Lib. 14. ⁹ Id. de plac. phil. 1. 3. ¹⁰ Plutarch. ad Grec. ¹¹ Apologet. c. 26. ¹² De fals. rel. 1. 5. ¹³ Placit. philosoph. 1. 3. ¹⁴ P. Elog. Phys. 1. 13. ¹⁵ Metaph. 1. 3. ¹⁶ Natur. quæst. 6. 6. ¹⁷ Metaphys. 1. 3. ¹⁸ Nat. quæst. 3. 13. ¹⁹ Nat. quæst. 6. 6.

From the Testimony of *Homer*, by which *Thales* (according to *Plutarch* and *Justin Martyr*) defended this Tenet (that Water is the Principle of all Things) it is manifest it was delivered, (tho' imperfectly) by other *Grecians* before *Thales*; *Plutarch* elsewhere producing this Authority of *Hesiod*.

Παντὸν μὲν ἀρχαῖστα ὕδωρ γένετ' ———

Of all Things Chaos was the first. ———

addeth, the greater Part of ancient Philosophers being called Water Chaos, ὕδωρ τῆς χάος from Diffusion. The Scholiast of *Apollonius* upon these Words,

— ὕδωρ, αὐτὴν εἰς ἰλύω ἐκλάσκει.

The Earth of Slime was made.

affirms (citing *Zeno*) that the Chaos, whereof all Things were made, according to *Hesiod*, was Water, which settling became Slime, the Slime condensed into solid Earth; to which add this Testimony of *Orpheus*,

* Ἐκ τῆ ὕδατος ἰλύς κατίστη.

Of Water Slime was made.

This Opinion they borrowed from the *Phœnicians*, with whom the *Græcians* had a very ancient Correspondence. *Linus* came from thence; *Orpheus* had his Learning from thence: as *Thales* is conceived to have done likewise, which appears clearly in *Numenius*, an ancient Philosopher, who cites the very Words of *Moses* for this Opinion. The Spirit of God moved on the Face of the Waters. There is an eminent Place in *Eusebius* to prove this: The Divinity of the *Phœnicians* asserts the Principle of this World to be a dark Spiritual Air, or the Spirit of dark Air, and Chaos troubled and involved in Darkness, that this was infinite, and a long Time had no Bounds: But (say they) the Spirit being moved with the Love of his own Principles, there was made a Mixture, which Nexure was called Love; this was the Beginning of the Production of all Things; but the Spirit itself had no Generation, and from this Connexion of the Spirit was begotten Mœt, which some call Slime, others Corruption of watery Mist, and of this was made the Seed of all Creatures, and the Generation of all Things.

Nor were the *Indians* ignorant of this, as *Metasthenes* delivers their Opinion. * They are of the same Mind in many Things with the *Grecians*, as

that the World had Beginning, and shall have End; that God is Matter and Governor goes quite through it; that all Things had different Beginnings, but that of which the World was made was Water.

The Word ἀρχή, Principle, because with Philosophers it includes the efficient Cause, and consequently understood singly excludes the rest, that being the most noble, hath given Occasion to some to mistake *Thales*, as if by acknowledging no other Principle, he consequently accounted Water to be God; but that *Thales* understands by Principle only the material Cause, we may easily gather from *Plutarch**, who condemneth *Thales* for confounding a Principle with an Element, and for holding them to be both one; whereas (saith he) there is great Difference; Elements are compounded, Principles are neither compounded, nor are any complex Substance; and truly Water, Air, Earth, Fire, we term Elements, but Principles we call other Natures, in this respect that there is nothing precedent to them, whereof they are engendered. For otherwise, if they were not the first, they would not be Principles, but that rather should be so termed whereof they were made. Now certain Things there are precedent, whereof Earth and Water are compounded, viz. The first, Matter without Form, the second, the Form itself, the third Privation. *Thales* therefore errs, affirming Water to be both Element and Principle of all Things. Thus we see by *Plutarch*, that the Objection can only be as to the Name, not to reason of the Name; for the Distinction of Principle and Element being not used in that Time, *Thales*, by Principle, meant nothing of the efficient Cause, which is most certain from *Aristotle*. *Thales*, saith he, affirms Water to be the Principle: Wherefore he held the Earth to be above the Water; perhaps he conceived so, because he saw that the Nourishment of all Things is humid, that Heat itself consists thereof, and that every Creature lives thereby; he held that of which Things are made to be the Principles of all Things, for these Reasons: he was of this Opinion, as also, because the Seeds of all Things are of a humid Nature, and Water is the Principle of Things humid.

SECT. 2. Of God.

*Terullian** saith, That *Thales* to *Cræsus* enquiring concerning the Deity, gave no certain Account, but desired several Times of deliberating to no Effect. He seems to reflect upon the same or a like Story to that which is reported of *Simonides* and *Hierom*.

But what the Opinion of *Thales* was concerning God, may be gathered from two Apophthegms cited by *Laertius*, repeated with this Gloss by *Cle-*

w. *Ipsis* an opus utitur? z. *Theogen.*
par. Evangel. 1. 10. c. *Streb.* lib. 15.

y. *Aristot.* 4.
d. *Be placit.* Philof.

* Cited by *Athenagoras.*
c. *Apolog.* contra gent.

a. *Porphy.* de astro Nymph.
Metaphys. 1. 3.

b. *Pan-*
f. *Strabon.* 5.

menes Alexandrinus; and what are not these the Sayings of Thales that are derived from hence, That God is glorified for ever and ever, and he openly confesses that he is called *unbegotten*, he who knoweth Hearts. For Thales being demanded what God was, that (saith he) which hath neither Beginning nor End. Another asking, if a Man might do ill and conceal it from God. How, said he, when a Man that thinks it cannot? Men ought to think (says *Cicero* in his Name) that the Gods see all Things, or rather, all Things are full of the Deity.

He acknowledged the first of Beings, and Author of the World, asserting (according to *Laertius*) that the most ancient of all Things is God, for he is not begotten; that the fairest is the World, for it is his Work. This is confirmed by *Cicero*. Thales the Milesian (saith he ^h) who first enquired into these Things, said, that Water was the Principle of Things, but that God was that Mind which formed all Things of Water. If Gods may be without Sense and Mind, why did he join the Mind to Water? Why Water to the Mind, if the Mind can subsist without a Body? Thus *Cicero*, who understands Thales to intend the material Principle to be co-eternal with the efficient; which Thales himself seems not to mean, when he declared God to be the first of Beings. But that the *Mens* of *Anaxagoras*, for the annexing of which to Matter he was so much famed, was no more than what he borrowed from Thales, the Words of *Cicero* make good.

He affirmed that God by the immutable Decree of his Providence governs the World. Thales (saith ⁱ *Stobæus*) being demanded what was most strong, answered, Necessity, for it rules all the World. Necessity is the firm Judgment and immutable Power of Providence. Hither we must likewise refer what is cited under his Name by the same *Stobæus*, that the first Mover is immovable, which ^k *Aristotle* hath borrowed from him, not owning the Author.

Something imperfectly was before delivered by *Orpheus* concerning God, alledged by ^l *Clemens Alexandrinus* and others; but as *Cicero* said, Thales was the first among the Grecians, who made any Search into these Things; and that he brought it out of Egypt, the Grecians themselves deny not, ^m for they acknowledge that they received the Names of their Gods from thence, and believed the Egyptians to be the first, who looking up to the World above them, and admiring the Nature of the Universe, reflected upon the Deity.

SECT. 3. Of Demons:

Thales, (saith *Plutarch*) with *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, and the Stoicks held, that Demons are

spiritual Substances, and the Heroes Souls separated from the Bodies, of which Sort there are two, good and bad; the good Heroes are the good Souls, the bad the bad. The same Order *Athenagoras* attests to be observed by Thales, ranking the three Degrees thus: First, that of the Immortal Gods, next Demons, thirdly, Heroes: This was followed by *Pythagoras*, that the Gods were to be preferred in Reverence before Demons, Heroes before Men.

He affirmed (as ^p *Stobæus* saith) the World to be full of these Demons. This is thought the Meaning of that of ^q *Aristotle*, repeated by *Cicero*, *Thales thought, that all Things were full of Gods*. The same Assertion *Laertius* ^r ascribes to *Pythagoras*, That all the Air is full of Souls, which are Heroes and Demons.

This Opinion was asserted by the Greeks, before the Time of Thales, particularly by *Hesiod*; but whether that be Argument enough to deny, that Thales had it from the Egyptians, I question; that they held it in the same Manner, we may learn by ^s *Jamblichus*. Besides, *Pythagoras* and *Plato* (whom *Plutarch* joins in the Tenet with Thales) drew their Learning from the same Fountain.

SECT. 4. Of the Soul.

Plutarch and *Stobæus* say, That Thales first affirmed the Soul to be *ἀκίνητος*, a self-moving Nature. ^t *Aristotle*, that he calls it *κίνητιον*, in respect to the Motion it gives to other Things, in which are included both Parts of the Definition of the ^u *Platonists*, a Substance, having within itself a Power to move itself and other Things: Which *Plato* ^v argues to this Effect: The first of Motions is that whereby a Thing moves itself; the second, that whereby it moves another: Every Thing that moves itself, lives; every living Thing lives, because it moves itself, therefore the Power of Self-motion is the Essence of that Substance which we call the Soul, which Soul is the Cause of the first Generation and Motion of Things which are, were, and shall be; and of all their Contraries, as of all Transmutation, the Principal of Motion, and therefore more ancient than the Body, which it moves by a second Motion. And afterwards declares these to be the Names of the Soul's Motion, to will, to consider, to take care, to consult, to judge rightly, and not rightly, to joy, to grieve, to dare, to fear, to hate, to love, and the like. These which are the first Motions, and susceptor of the second corporal, bring all Things into Augmentation, and Decrease, Concretion or Condensation, and Discretion or Rarefaction. This Opinion, first raised by Thales, was entertained in the Schools with the Assent of *Pythagoras*.

^g De Legib. 2. ^h De Natur. Dier. 1. 10. ⁱ Phys. c. 8. ^k Phys. 2. 7. ^l Adromic. ad gent. ^m Herodot. lib. 2. ⁿ Placit. Philof. 2. 5. ^o Apolog. ^p Physic. c. 2. ^q De Animis. 1. 1. 5. ^r De Legib. 2. ^s Vit. Pythag. ^t De mystic. ^u Eup. sub initio. ^v De Plac. Phil. 4. 2. ^w Stob. Eccl. Phys. c. 40. ^x Plato in Timæe.

ras¹, *Anaxagoras*, *Socrates*, and *Plato*, till exploded by² *Aristotle*, whose chief Arguments against it were these. 1. That nothing is moved but what is in Place, nothing in Place but what hath Quantity, which, because the Soul wants none of the four Kinds of Motion (*viz.* Lation, Alteration, Diminution, Accretion) are compatible (*per se*) to her. Secondly, that Self-motion is not essential to the Soul, because she is moved accidentally, by external Objects. The first, if understood of Circumscription, not only denies the Motion of all Things, that are definitively in Place, as Spirits, but of the highest Sphere, if compared with *Aristotle's* Definition of Place; yet that some of these Species of Motion, tho' in a different extraordinary Manner, are competent to the Soul, and not accidentally, may be argued, 1. From the further Diffusion of the Soul, according to the Augmentation of the Body. 2. From Intellection, which is acknowledged a Perfection, and consequently a Kind of Alteration, which that *Thales* understood to be one of the Soul's Motions, is clear from that Apophthegm ascribed to him by³ *Laertius*, the *swiftest of all Things is the Mind, for it over-runs all Things*: Whence⁴ *Cicero* (confessing almost in every Word of *Thales*, that *nothing is swifter than the Mind*, that no *Swiftness* may compare with the *Swiftiness* of the Mind) would interpret the *ἡτοιμασμένη* of *Aristotle*, a continued and perpetual Motion.

The second Reason may be questioned by comparing the Acts of the *Memory*, and *Reminiscence*; the first occasioned by exterior Things yet *objective* only, so that the Motion is within herself; but by the other she moves herself, from a Privation to a Habit, without the Help of any Exterior.

It is worth Notice, that among these and other Reasons alledged by⁵ *Aristotle* to destroy this Assertion, one is the Possibility of the Resurrection of the Body; but this *ὡς ἐκ νεκρῶν*.

From the second Part of the Difference in the Definition (*viz.* from moving other Things) *Thales* argued, that the Loadstone and Amber had Souls; the first because it draws Iron; the second Straw. He further (saith *Laertius*) asserted those Things we count inanimate, to have Souls; arguing it from the Loadstone and Amber: The Reason of which latter Example, ⁶ *Aldobrandinus* falsely interprets its Change of Colour, and jarring as it were at Poison: But⁷ *Aristotle* more plainly; for of those whom we mentioned, *Thales* seems to have taken the Soul to be something *κίνητικον*, apt to move, since he affirmed a Stone to have a Soul, because it moved Iron.

He asserted likewise the Soul (of Man) to be im-

mortal, and according to⁸ *Cerberus*, was the first that held so. ⁹ *Cicero* ascribes the Original of this Opinion to *Pherecydes*, but it rather seems to have been brought by *Thales* from the Egyptians; that they held so¹⁰ *Herodotus* attests.

Sec^t. 5. Of the World.

Thales held, ¹ that there was but one World, and that² made by God; which Truth was followed by all Philosophers; as³ *Aristotle* confesseth, until he rejected it, to defend, by the contrary, an Assertion equally false, that the World is everlasting, which could not be, saith he, if it had Beginning.

That⁴ the World being God's Work, is the fairest of Things, whatsoever disposed in lively Order being a Part thereof, for which Reason *Pythagoras* (according to⁵ *Plutarch*) called it first *ἡμεῖς*.

That Night is elder than Day. This Circumstance of the Creation was held likewise by⁶ *Orpheus* and *Hesiod*, who had it from the Phœnicians: For this Reason the *Numidians*⁷, *Germans*⁸, and *Gauls*⁹, reckoned by Nights.

That the World is animated, and that¹⁰ God is the Soul thereof, diffused through every Part, whose divine Moving Virtue penetrates through the Element of Water. Thus explained by the *Hermetic* Philosophers: The divine Spirit, who produced this World out of the first Water, being insus'd, as it were, by a continual Inspiration into the Works of Nature, and diffus'd largely through, by a certain secret and continual Act, moving the whole, and every Particular according to its Kind, is the Soul of the World.

That the¹ World is contained in Place. This agrees with the Definition of Place by Space; but they who with *Aristotle* define a Place a *Superficies*, tho' they hold the Parts of the World to be in Place, as forced to deny the whole to be so.

That in the World there is no Vacuum², in which (as *Plutarch* observes) all Philosophers agree, who affirm the World to be animated, and governed by Providence; the contrary defended by those who maintain that it consisteth of Atoms, is inanimate, not governed by Providence.

That³ Matter is fluid and variable.

That⁴ Bodies are passible and divisible, in infinitum, and continuous, as are also a Line, *Superficies*, Place and Time.

That⁵ Mixture is made by Composition of the Elements.

That⁶ the Stars are earthly, yet fiery; the⁷ Sun earthly. They who affirm the Stars to be fiery, saith⁸

¹ Stob. Ecl. phys. lib. 1. ² Arist. de anim. l. 2. ³ Laert. l. 35. ⁴ Tufcan. quest. 2. 10. ⁵ De anim. 1. 3. ⁶ Añ
Lycr. 1. 24. ⁷ De anim. 1. 2. ⁸ Laert. ibid. ⁹ Tufc. quest. 2. 1. ¹⁰ Plutarch de plac. phil. 1. 1. ¹¹ Laert.
3. 35. ¹² De Caelo 1. 10. ¹³ Laert. ibid. ¹⁴ De plac. phil. 2. 1. ¹⁵ O Timothy. ¹⁶ Damascen. ¹⁷ Tufc. de creat. Genn. c. 11.
¹⁸ Cæsar. de bello Gall. 6. ¹⁹ Laert. ibid. ²⁰ Laert. ibid. ²¹ Plot. sept. sapient. coeuv. ²² Plut. de plac. phil. 1. 181. ²³ v. Hail. 3. 11.
²⁴ Ibid. 1. 26. ²⁵ Ibid. 1. 23. ²⁶ Achil. Test. Ilog. in Arac. ²⁷ De Caelo 2. 7. ²⁸ Plut. de plac. phil. 2. 28. ²⁹ Ibid. 3. 9. ³⁰ Ibid. 3. 10.

Aristotle, hold so, as conceiving the whole superior Body to be Fire.

That the Moon is of the same Nature with the Sun, that she is illuminated by him, Plutarch and Stobæus affirm this to be first held by Thales, tho' Eudemus cited by Theon ascribe it to Anaximander.

That the monthly Occultations of the Moon are caused by the nearness of the Sun shining round her.

That there is but ^a one Earth, ^b round, in fashion of a Globe, ^c seated in the Midst of the World, to which relates that Speech ascribed to him by Cleodemus, that, if the Earth were taken out of the World, there must of Necessity follow a Confusion of all Things.

That the overflowing of Nilus is caused by the Etesian (yearly) Winds, which rise with the Dogstar, after the Summer Solstice, and beginning the Blow from the North, spread (as *Aristotle* describes them) into remote Quarters. These (saith *Plutarch*) blowing directly against Egypt, cause the Water to swell, that the Sea, driven by these Winds, entereth within the Mouth of that River, and hindereth it, that it cannot discharge itself freely into the Sea, but is repulsed. Whereupon (adds *Diodorus Siculus*) it overflows Egypt, which lieth low and level. But this Reason, tho' it seem plausible, is easily disproved; for if this were true, all the Rivers which are discharged into the Sea, opposite to the Etesian Winds, should have the same Overflowing. Thus *Diodorus*, in his excellent Discourse upon this Subject, which concludes with the Opinion of *Agatharchides*, that it is occasioned by Rain coming from the Mountains of *Ethiopia*.

CHAP. VII.

Of his Geometry.

A *Puleius*?, who calls *Thales* the Inventor of *Geometry* amongst the *Grecians*, is more just to his Memory than *Anticlides* and others, who ascribe the Honour thereof to *Mæris*, or to *Pythagoras*, who by the Acknowledgment of *Ἰάμβlichus*, a *Pythagorean*, learned *Mathematicks* of *Thales*. The Original and Progress of this Science², to the Perfection it received from *Pythagoras* (which gave Occasion to that Mistake) is thus delivered by *Proclus*.

Geometry was invented by the Egyptians, taking its Beginning from measuring Fields ; it being necessary for them, by Reason of the Inundation of Nilus, which washed away the Bounds of their several. Nor is it to be wondered at, that as well this, as other Sciences, should have their Beginning from Common-sense and Opportunity : since, as is said in Ge-

neration, it proceeds from imperfect to perfect^h; therefore, not without Reason is the Transition from Sense to Consideration, and from Consideration to the Mind. As therefore among the Phœnicians, by Reason of Merchandize and Traffick, the certain Knowledge of Numbers had its Beginning; so likewise among the Egyptians, Geometry was found out upon the foreaid Occasion; and Thales going to Egypt, first brought over this Science into Greece: And many Things he found out himself, and taught his Fellows the Principles of many Things, declaring some more generally, other Things more plainly. Next him Amicusus, Brother to Stelichorus the Poet, is remembred^d as having touched Geometry, of whom Hippias the Elean, makes Mention, as eminent in that Knowledge: After these, Pythagoras considering the Principles therefore more highly, advanced it into a liberal Science.

SECT. 1. • *Propositions invented by him.*

THat he improved (as *Proclus* implies) the Geometry which he learned of the *Egyptians*, with many Propositions of his own, is confirmed by *Laertius*, who saith, that he much advanced those Things, the Invention whereof *Callimachus* in the *Iambiaks*, ascribes to *Euphorbus* the *Phrygian*, as *scalene Triangles*, and others. Nor is it to be doubted, but that many of them are of those, which *Euclid* hath reduced into his Elements; whose Design it was to collect and digest those that were invented by others, accurately demonstrating such as were more negligently proved, but of them only, these are known to be his.

1. [*Every Diameter divides its Circle into two equal Parts.*] This Proposition, which *Euclid* makes Part of the Definition of a Diameter, *Proclus* affirms to have been first demonstrated by *Thales*.

2. [° In all Iſoſceles Triangles, the Angles at the Baſe are equal the one to the other, and thoſe right Lines being produced, the Angles under the Baſe are equal.] ° Proclus ſaith, that for t^{he} Invention of this likewiſe, as of many other Prop^ositions, we are beholdiſg to Thales, for he firſt obſerved and ſaid, that of every Iſoſceles, the Angles at the Baſe are equal, and according to the Ancients called equal alike. Theſe are three Paſſages in the Demonſtration, which infer nothing towards the Concluſion, of which Kind there are many in Euclid, and ſeem to confirm the Antiquity thereof, and that it was leſs curiouſly reformed by him.

3. [If two Lines cut one the other, the Vertical Angles shall equal the one the other.] ² Eudemus at-

a Stob. Eccl. Phys. α Plut. de plac. phil. g. 21. b Sept. Sap. corviv. c Isert. i. 37. d Metast. 2. 6. e De plac.
phil. q. 1. f Lib. 1. g Florid. lib. 4. Isert. vit. Pythag. h De vita Pythag. 1. 2. i In Isertid. 2. 4. k Supply the Breach
in the Text, ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ λογισμῶν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἡμετέρας φωνῆς, so Barocius translatit. l Read δὲ τοῦ ἀποδείξεως καὶ τοῦ ἀποδείξεως ἐκ τῆς
μετανοίας. m Isert. i. 25. n Lib. 1. def. 17. o Barcid lib. 2. com. 19. p This lib.; prop. 5. q Lib. 3. com. 9.
r Isertid lib. 1. prop. 15. s Prud. lib. 3. com. 29.

tests this Theorem to have been invented by *Thales*, but first demonstrated by *Euclid*.

4. [If two Triangles have two Angles equal to two Angles, the one to the other, and one Side equal to one Side, either that which is adjacent to the equal Angles, or that which subtendeth one of the equal Angles, they shall likewise have the other Sides, equal to the other Sides, both to both, and the remaining Angle equal to the remaining Angle.] ^a *Eudemus* attributes this Theorem (saith *Proclus*) to *Thales*, for showing the Distance of Ships upon the Sea, in that Manner as he is said to do, it is necessary that he perform it by this.

Pamphilia (saith *Laertius*) affirms, that he first described the Rectangle Triangle of a Circle.] ^b *Euclid* attributes to *Thales* (upon this Authority of *Laertius*) the second, third, fourth, and fifth Propositions of the fourth Book of *Euclid*, which are concerning the Ascription of a Triangle and a Circle, and consequently takes *καταγὰς* here to include both Inscription and Circumscription; whereas in all those Propositions, there is nothing proper to a Rectangle Triangle; so that if the Word *ὑποθυσίον* be retained, it must relate to the 31st Proposition of the third Book, whence may be deduced the Description of a Rectangle Triangle in a Circle. But because there is no such Proposition in *Euclid*, and this hath but an obscure Reference to Part of that Theorem; it is to be doubted that the Text of *Laertius* is corrupt, and the Word (or Mark *ωωωω* inserted by Accident, without which these Words *καταγὰς* τὸ τριγωνοῦ ὑποθυσίον exactly correspond with those of ^c *Vitruvius*, *Pythagoricum trigonum orthogonium describere*: by which he means (as he at large expresseth ^e elsewhere) the forty-fifth Proposition of the first Book of *Euclid*, that in Rectangle Triangles, the Square of the Hypotenuse is equal to the Square of the Sides containing the right Angle. That *Vitruvius*, *Proclus*, and others, attribute this Invention to *Pythagoras*, confirms it to be the same here meant by *Laertius*; who adds, that *Thales* for the Invention sacrificed an Ox, tho' others (saith he) among whom is *Apollodorus*, ascribe it to *Pythagoras*. And in the Life of *Pythagoras*, he cites the same *Apollodorus*, that *Pythagoras* sacrificed a Hecatomb, having found out, that the Hypotenuse of a right angled Triangle, is of equal Power to the two Sides, including the right Angle according to the Epigram.

That noble Scheme *Pythagoras* devis'd,
For which a Hecatomb he sacrific'd.

Cicero ^f, tho' he differs in the Author, agrees in

Quantity of the Offering with *Laertius*; affirming, that *Pythagoras*, upon any new Invention, used to sacrifice an Ox: Which Kind of Gratitude begun by *Thales*, was imitated by others also, as by *Perseus*.

^g Finding three Spiral Lines, in Sections five,
Perseus an Offering to the Gods did give.

Sect. 2. Of his taking the Height of the Pyramid.

THE Pyramids of Egypt are supposed by ^a *Solinus*, *Aufonius* ^b, *Ammianus* ^c *Marcellinus*, and ^d *Cassiodorus*, to cast no Shadow at all, which (as Mr. *Greaves* hath observed in his excellent Discourse upon this Subject) must be meant either of the Summer-time, or which is nearer the Truth, that for the three Quarters of the Year, they have none at Mid-day.

For, that *Thales* by the Shadow measured their Height is acknowledged. ^e *Hieronymus* saith, he measured the Pyramids by the Shadow, observing when they are of equal Bigness. ^f *Pliny* affirms he found out a Way to take the Height of them, and all such like, by measuring the Shadow, at what Time it is equal to the Body. But ^g *Plutarch* hath given a more regular and exact Account of his Manner of Operation, by erecting a Staff perpendicular upon the End of the Shadow of the Pyramid, and by two Triangles made by the Beams of the Sun, he demonstrated, that what Proportion there was between the Shadow, the same was betwixt the Pyramid and the Staff: A Demonstration so rational, that it is the ordinary Way of taking Heights by Shadows, founded upon this Theorem.

^h Of equiangle Triangles, the Sides that are about equal Angles are proportional, and the Sides that subtend the equal Angles are homologous.

Which, if *Proclus* had proceeded as far as the sixth Book of *Euclid*, we should in all Likelihood have found ascribed to *Thales*; for the same Argument wherewith *Eudemus* proves him Inventor of the fourth Theorem in the foregoing Section, whereby he took Distances, is of equal Force in this, whereby he took Altitudes.

The Height of the great Pyramid (which *Thales* measured) is by its Perpendicular (according to Mr. *Greaves*) 499 Feet, by its declining Ascent 693 Feet.

CHAP. VIII.

Of his Astronomy.

OMitting the Fable of ^a *Orpheus's* Harp alluding to the seven Planets, and the Observations of *Hesiod*, which were little more than of the Rising

¹ *Euclid* lib. 1. prop. 26. ² *Procl.* lib. 3. com. 37. ³ *Geom.* ⁴ *Lib.* 10. cap. 17. ⁵ *Lib.* 9. cap. 2. ⁶ *De signis Dier.* ⁷ *1*. ⁸ *Procl.* in *Euclid.* lib. 2. def. 4. where the Words perhaps are inverted, and for *ὑποθυσίον* *ὑποθυσίον* *ὑποθυσίον*, *ὑποθυσίον* *ὑποθυσίον*, *ὑποθυσίον* *ὑποθυσίον*. ⁹ *Polihist.* c. 32. ¹⁰ *1* *lib.* 22. ¹¹ *c* *Var.* 7. *Som.* 15. ¹² *Lib.* 21. ¹³ *Lib.* 35. cap. 17. ¹⁴ *1* *Cent.* 1. *cap.* 1. ¹⁵ *Euclid.* lib. 6. prop. 4. ¹⁶ *Lucian* de *Astrolog.*

and Setting of some principal Stars, (so imperfect, that *Plato* calls all those who satisfy themselves with such superficial Knowledge, *Astronomers according to Hesiod*) we may with *Eudemos* and others affirm, that *Thales* was the first of the *Grecians* that was skilful in *Astronomy*. Which Science *Pliny* asserts to have been brought out of *Phœnicia*; *Aristotle*¹, that the *Grecians* owe much of it to the *Egyptians*, where it hath been a long time practised: Thither, indeed, ² *Thales* acknowledgeth that he travelled to confer with *Astronomers*.

Sect. 1. Of the Celestial Sphere.

T *Hales* and *Pythagoras* (saith ³ *Plutarch* repeated by *Stobæus*) with their Followers, affirm, the Celestial Sphere is divided into five Circles (which they call Zones) whereof one is called *Artick*, and is always in View to us; one of the Summer Tropicks, one the Equinoctial, one the Winter Tropick, one the *Antartick Circle*, never seen by us. The oblique Circle, called the *Zodiac*, lieth under the three middle Circles, it toucheth them all three as it passeth, and each of them is cut in right Angles by the Meridian, which goeth from Pole to Pole. Unjustly therefore is the Invention of the Zones ascribed by ⁴ *Polidonius* to *Parmenides*; and that of the Obliquity of the *Zodiac* by ⁵ others to *Anaximander*, *Pythagoras*, or *Ænipodes*.

⁶ *Eudemos* saith, that he first observ'd the Tropicks; *Laertius*, that he first found out the Accession of the Sun from Tropick to Tropick. The Word *ῥέτρας*, signifies not only the Solitices, but the Equinoxes likewise: ⁷ *Sextus Empiricus*. The Tropick Signs are those into which the Sun coming, changeth and maketh Conversions of the Air; such a Sign is *Aries*, and the opposite to it *Libra*, so also *Capric*. and *Canc*. for in *Aries* is made the vernal Conversion, in *Capr*. the Winter, in *Canc*. the Summer, in *Libra* the autumnal. This Exposition ⁸ *Laertius* confirms, when he saith that *Thales* composed only two Treatises, one of the Tropicks, the other of the Equinoctials, and that he distinguished the Seasons of the Year.

Sect. 2. Of the Sun, Moon, and Stars.

H *E* first observed the apparent Diameter of the Sun, which is the Angle made in the Eye, to be the 720th Part of his Orb: This, doubtless, is the Meaning of ⁹ *Laertius*, his Words these, *ἡ ὁρατὴ τοῦ ἡλίου μέγεθος τὴν ἐναντιοῦ ἐκαστοῦ ἡμέρας ἀναγράφει*. Than which Reading, which implies the Sun to be 720 Times lesser than the Moon, nothing is more ridiculous; for knowing (as is granted by all) the Cause of Eclipses,

he must likewise know the Sun to be greater than the Moon: Nor is it much mended by those who read *ἡ ὁρατὴ τοῦ ἡλίου μέγεθος τὴν ἐναντιοῦ*, the Text seems rather to require *ἡ ὁρατὴ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ*, or something to that Effect, of which thus, ¹⁰ *Archimedes*, this we suppose when *Aristarchus* saith, the Sun appeareth, as being the 720th Part of the Circle of the *Zodiac*; for he considered how he might by Instruments take the Angle made in the Eye by the Sun's apparent Diameter: But to take any such Thing exactly is not easy; for neither the Sight nor the Hand, nor the Instruments wherewith the Observation is made, are of Credit sufficient to demonstrate it exactly. This Correction *Apuleius* thus confirms, in his declining Age he made an excellent Demonstration of the Proportion of the Sun, which I have not only learned (saith *Apuleius*) but confirmed by Practice, how many times the Sun's Magnitude is comprehended in the Circle which his Motion makes. This, as soon as he found out, *Thales* shewed to *Mandryatus* of *Pryene*, who being infinitely delighted with this new and unexpected Knowledge, bad him ask what he would in Recompence for such an excellent Invention: It will be Reward enough for me, said *Thales*, if what you have learned of me, whensoever you communicate it to others, you praise me to be the Inventor.

He first found out the Constellation of the lesser Bear, ¹¹ *Callimachus*

*He to Miletus sail'd, invited
By Thales' Glory, who quick-sighted,
Is said to have mark'd the lesser Bear,
The Star by which Phœnicians steer.*

Hyginus affirms that he first called it *Ἀρκτος*, the Bear.

Sect. 3. Of Eclipses.

H *E* was the first ¹² (saith *Laertius*) that foretold Eclipses, as *Eudemos* affirms in his *Astrologic History*; for which *Xenophanes* and *Herodotus* admire him; attested also by *Heracitus* and *Democritus*. ¹³ *Theon Smyrnanus*, and ¹⁴ *Clemens Alexandrinus* cite the same Place of *Eudemos*; and the Scope of whose Book was the History of Astrologers, and what every one found out. Thus likewise ¹⁵ *Pliny*, amongst the *Grecians*, the first that searched into Eclipses, was *Thales* the Miletian.

¹⁶ *Plutarch* affirms, that he was the first that observed the Eclipse of the Sun, and said, that it was occasioned by the Moon, coming in a direct Line underneath him, which may be seen in a Basin of Water or Looking glass. ¹⁷ That the Eclipse of the Moon

¹ *Plato* in *Epinom.* 1. ² *Lib.* 5. cap. 13. ³ *De Consol.* 2. 12. ⁴ *Epist.* ad *Phædr.* apud *Laert.* ⁵ *De plac.* phil. 2. 11. ⁶ *Stob.* 2. 5. ⁷ *Phil.* 2. 5. ⁸ *Laert.* 1. 24. ⁹ *Adver.* mathem. 5. 2. ¹⁰ *L.* 1. *Seq.* 23. ¹¹ *L.* 1. *Seq.* 24. ¹² *In Armet.* ¹³ *Achil.* *Tat.* *log.* ¹⁴ *In Ant.* *Hyginus* poetic. *astronom.* ¹⁵ *Laert.* 1. 24. ¹⁶ *Apuleius* *West.* de *Scienc.* *Mathem.* ¹⁷ *Clem.* *Alexand.* *Strom.* 1. ¹⁸ *Natur.* *Hist.* 1. 2. 9. ¹⁹ *De placit.* phil. 2. 2. ²⁰ *Plut.* de *Plac.* *Phil.* 2. 25.

Advantage on its Professors; whereupon he thus vindicated himself and the Art from that Affectation. When they upbraided him, *saith* * Aristotle, with his Poverty, as if Philosophy were unprofitable, it is said, that he by Astrology, foreseeing the Plenty of Olives that would be that Year, before the Winter was gone, antequam florere cœssisset, (*saith* * Cicero) gave earnest, and bought up all the Places for Oil at Miletus and Chios, which he did with little Money, there being no other Chapman at that Time to raise the Price; and when the Time came that many were sought for in haste, he setting what Rates on them he pleased, by this Means got together much Money, and then shewed, that it was easy for Philosophers to be rich, if they would themselves, but that Wealth was not their Aim. To this * Plutarch alludes, when he says, that Thales is reported to have practised Merchandize.

CHAP. IX.

His Moral Sentences.

OF his Moral Sentences those are first to be remembered which * Plutarch mentions upon this Occasion.

Amasis King of Egypt entering into Contestation with the King of Ethiopia concerning Wisdom, propounded these Questions to be resolved by him; *What is oldest of all Things, what fairest, what greatest, what wisest, what most common, what most profitable, what most hurtful, what most powerful, what most easy?*

The Answers of the Ethiopian were these, the oldest of Things is Time, the wisest Truth, the fairest Light, the most common Death, the most profitable God, the most hurtful the Devil, the most powerful Fortune, the most easy that which pleaseth. *Thales* demanded of *Niloxenus* whether *Amasis* approved these Solutions? *Niloxenus*, who was sent by *Amasis* into Greece with these other Questions to be resolved by the Sages, answered, that with some he was satisfied, with others not; and yet, replies *Thales*, there is not one but is erroneous and betrays Ignorance. As for the first, how can it be definded, that Time is the oldest of Things, when one Part of it past, the other present, the third yet to come, for that which is to come must in Reason be esteemed younger than all Men or Things? Next, to affirm that Truth is Wisdom, is as much as if we should say, that Light and seeing is all one. Again, if he esteem Light fair, why doth he forget the Sun? His Answers concerning God and the Devil are bold and dangerous, but that of Fortune most improbable, for if he be so powerful, how comes it that he is so easily changed. Now is Death the most common,

for it is not common to the Living. The most ancient of Things is God, for he never had Beginning or Birth, the greatest Place of the World containeth all other Things, Place contains the World; the fairest the World, for whatsoever is orderly disposed is Part thereof; the wisest is Time, for it hath found out all Things already devised, and will find but all that shall be; the most common Hope, for that remains with such as have nothing else; the most profitable, Virtue, for it maketh all Things useful and commodious; * the most hurtful, Vice, for it destroyeth all good Things; the most powerful, Necessity, for that only is invincible; the most easy, that which agreeth with Nature, for even Pleasures are many Times given over and cloy us.

To which Apophthegms these are added by * *Laertius*, The swiftest of Things is the Mind, for it over-runs all. He affirm'd that there is no Difference betwixt Life and Death; being thereupon asked why he did not die, because, *saith* he, there is no Difference; to one who asked which was eldest, Night or Day, he answered, Night by a Day; another enquiring whether a Man might do ill and conceal it from the Gods; nor think it said he. To an Adulterer, questioning him if he might clear himself by Oath; * Perjury, *saith* he, is worse than Adultery: Being demanded what was difficult, he answered, to know one's self; what easy, to be rul'd by another; what sweet, to follow one's own Will; what divine, that which hath neither Beginning nor End. At his Return from Travel, being demanded what was the strangest Thing he had seen, he answered, a Tyrant old. What will help to bear ill Fortune? to behold our Enemies in worse. How shall a Man live justly? by avoiding what he blames in others. Who is happy? he who hath a sound Body, a rich Fortune, and a docile Nature.

* Plutarch adds these; We may well report probable News, but improbable should not be related. We ought not to believe our Enemies in credible Things, nor to distrust our Friends in incredible. *Petriander* being much troubled at a Monster which a Youth brought him, born of a Mare, with the Head only of a Horse, the rest resembling a Man, he advised him not to take Care for Expiation of what the *Prodigy* portended, ἐν δὲ τῷ εὐδαίμονι (*saith* he) ἰδὼν τὸ μὴ χρεῖσθαι ποιεῖσθαι ἱερὰ, ἢ δὲ δέον γυναικας εὐλαῖαι.

Stobæus these; * Being demanded how far Falsehood was distant from Truth, as far, *saith* he, as the Eyes from the Ears. It is hard but good to know ourselves, for that is to live according to Nature.

His moral Precepts are thus delivered by *Demetrius Phalereus*; * If thou art a Surety, Lest is negligent; be equally mindful of Friends present and absent;

a. Phil. 2. p. Phil. 12. 66.

c. De divinat. 2.

p. In vit. Solon.

q. Sept. Sep. conviv.

r. Stob. serm. c. 11.

s. Brian apud

simon. 2. t. Lucet. 1. 36.

w. Symon. Sept. Sep. x. Scam. 12. 104.

y. Stob. Sermon. 2.

' mother ; it is no Matter, said he, for even so, it lights not amiss, truly always esteemed *Solon* very wife, for refusing to be King of his own Country : and *Pittacus*, if he had not taken upon him a Monarchy, would never have said, how hard it is to be a good Man : And *Proiander* being seized (as it were with an hereditary Disease, derived from his Father) by the same Tyranny, did very well to endeavour as much as he could to disengage himself from it, by frequenting the Conversation of the best Men, inviting Sages and Philosophers, and being invited by them, not approving the dangerous Counsel of *Trochilus* my Countryman, who persuaded him to take off the Heads of the chieftest. For a Tyrant, who chooseth rather to command Slaves than Free-men, is like a Husband-man, who preferreth the gathering of Locusts, and catching of Fowl, before reaping of good Corn. These Sovereign Authorities have only this Good, in Recompense of many Evils, a kind of Honour and Glory, if Men be so happy, that in ruling good Men, they themselves prove better ; as for such, who in their Office aim at nothing but Security, without Respect of Honour and Honesty, they are fitter to be set over Beasts than Men.

In the same Symposion, he gives this Account of Monarchy, Democracy, and Oeconomicks. *That Prince is happy, who lives till he is old, and dies a natural Death. That a Common-wealth is best ordered, where the Citizens are neither too rich nor too poor. That a House is best, wherein the Master may live most at ease.*

CHAP. XI.

Of his Writings.

Some affirm (saith *Laertius*) that he left nothing behind him in Writing. Others, that he writ, of Natural Philosophy : St. *Augustin* saith, that *Thales*, to propagate his Doctrine of Succession, searched into the Secrets of Nature, and committing his Opinion to Monuments and Letters, grew famous.

Of Nautick Astrology (mentioned by *Simplicius*) which is by some ascribed to *Phocæ* a Samian.

Of the Tropicks and Equinoctials : which two Treatises *Laertius* saith he composed, as judging the rest easy to be understood. These seem to be those Astrological Writings which *Loban*, an Argive, who writ concerning the Poets, affirmeth to have extended to two hundred Verses.

Of Meteors : A Treatise in Verse, mentioned by *Suidas*.

The History of his own Times : If we may give Credit to *Joannes Antiochenus*, who saith, *These Things Thales, Castor, and Polybius most wise*

Authors, committed to Writing, and after them Herodorus the Historian : but perhaps this may be no more probable, than that *Polybius* and *Castor* should precede *Herodotus*.

Adespota, of which those that are cited by *Laertius*, we have inserted among his moral Sentences ; for such they were, tending to the Instruction of the common People, a kind of loose Verse coming near Prose, whence *Demosthenes* makes two Kinds of Poets, *τῶν ὑμνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀδῶπων*, (as *Cassaubon* observes) those that write in Metre, and, (if we may so term it) those that write in blank Verse. Whatsoever *Laertius* in the Lives of the seven wise Men produceth in this Kind, seemeth not to be taken out of any Poet, but to have been written by the wise Men themselves.

Epistles, of which two only are extant, preserved by *Diogenes Laertius*, l. 1. 43.

Thales to Pherecydes.

I Hear, that you, first of the Ionians, are about to publish a Discourse to the Greeks concerning Religion, and justly you conceive that your Work ought rather to be laid in a publick Library than transmitted to uncertain Persons : If therefore it may any Way please you, I will willingly confer with you about that which you have written, and if you desire, will visit you at Syrus ; for neither myself, nor *Solon* the Athenian should deserve the Titles of wise Men, if we, who sail'd to Crete to inform ourselves of Matters there, and into Egypt, to confer with Priests and Astronomers, should not likewise make a Journey to you : *Solon* also, if you think fit, will come. You who affect home, seldom pass into Ionia, nor care to enjoy the Society of Strangers ; we, who write nothing, spend our Time in travelling through Greece and Asia.

Thales to Solon.

If you leave Athens, you may, in my Opinion, settle yourself (with those you take along with you) at Miletus, for here is nothing to trouble you. If you dislike that we Milesians are governed by a Tyrant (for you are averse to all Monarchs, even elective) yet may you please yourself in the Society and Conversation of me your Friend. Bias likewise hath sent to invite you to Priene ; if to abide at Priene please you better, we will also come and dwell there with you.

CHAP. XII.

His Auditors and Scholars.

THE first eminent Person of those who heard *Thales* and professed his Philosophy, was *A-*

1 Stob. Serm. 46. m. Thid. 47. n. Thid. 52. o. Liert. 1. 2. 23. p. De divit. Dei. 1. 8. c. 11. Viert. 9. 7. q. Laert. 2. 3. 3. Lib. 6. m. Thid. 31. ἱερὸν τῶν ἐπεὶ τὸν ὅλον καὶ τὸν ἐκαστὸν τῶν ἀστρονομικῶν καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡγεμονία ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν ἀστρονομικῶν.

o But the Interpreters render this to another Effect.

t Suid. Ἀμφικλῆς, Euclid. Prop. Evang. 10. Laert. 2. 1. 2.

nanimander Son of *Praxides* a *Mileſian*, who flouriſhed in the Time of *Polycrates* Tyrant of *Samos*.

Next is *Anaximenes* a *Mileſian* alſo, Son of *Euriphratus*, (who according to *Eufebius*) flouriſhed in the ſecond Year of the 56th Olympiad. He was Scholar to *Anaximander* and *Parmenides*; but that he heard *Thales* alſo, he acknowledgeth in an Epiſtle to * *Pythagoras*.

We may (as in that Epiſtle *Anaximenes* doth) amongſt the Diſciples of *Thales* reckon *Pythagoras* the *Samian*, Inſtitutor of the *Italic* Sect, who being from his Youth particularly addiſted to Investigation of religious Myſteries, addreſſ'd his firſt Journey to *Thales* at *Miletus*, as to one that could beſt further his Deſign, being (according to * *Jamblichus*) not fully eighteen Years old; which, if we follow the Account of *Eufebius* for his Birth (the fourth Year of the ſeventieth Olympiad) and that of *Seſicrates* for his Age, eighty Years (for the reſt, the farther they exceed that Time, are ſo much the more incapable of Reconciliation) will fall about the ſecond Year of the fifty fourth Olympiad, which is the 82d of *Thales*. From *Thales* he received the Rudiments of that Excellence which he afterwards attained. This is acknowledged by * *Jamblichus*. *Thales*, ſaith he, entertained him very kindly, admiring the Difference between him and other Youths, which exceeded the Fame he had received of him. After that he had inſtructed him as well as he was able in the Mathematics, alledging for Excuse his old Age and Infirmity, he adviſed him to go to Egypt, and to converſe with the Memphian Priests, eſpecially thoſe of Jupiter, of whom he himſelf had in his Travels learned thoſe Things, for which by many he was eſteemed wiſe; and, * again, among other Things *Thales* chiefly adviſed him to uſe Wine and Fleſh, only eating ſuch Things as are light of Diſſipation, by which Means he procured ſhortneſs of Sleep, Wakefulneſs, Purity of Mind, and conſtant Health of Body.

C H A P. XIII.

Of his Death.

Thales having now lived to a great Age, being full of Honour and Wiſdom, * died in the firſt Year of the fifty eighth Olympiad (when, according

to *Pausanias*, *Ereſylides* was Archon) as he was beholding the Olympick Games, oppreſt with Heat, Thirſt, and the Burden of his Years, which amounted to ninety two. *Laertius* under-reckons him to have lived but eighty ſeven Years, having before acknowledged his Birth to have been in the firſt of the 35th Olympiad. * *Petavius* over-reckons, who makes him live to the End of the 58th, which could not be, becauſe he died Spectator of the Olympick Games. * *Lucian* and * *Sincellus* more, who ſay he lived 100 Years. * *Soficrates* comes neareſt to the Truth, who allows him to have lived 90 Years; and to have died in the 58th Olympiad; for from the firſt of the 58th are 23 entire Olympiads.

The Manner of his Death gave *Laertius* occaſion to favour him with this Epigram.

*Viewing th' Olympick Games Elean Jove,
Thou diſt wiſe Thales from that his Race remove
Nigher thyſelf; and 'twas well done, now old
He could not well from Earth the Stars behold.*

He was buried, according to his own Appointment, in a poor obſcure Part of the *Mileſian* Field, where he preſaged that in future Times their *Forum* ſhould be; upon his Tomb this Diſtich,

*Narrow the Tomb, the Fame than Heaven more
wide,
Of wiſe Thales whom this Earth doth hide.*

There was alſo a Statue erected in Honour of him bearing this Inſcription,

*Mileſian Thales this doth repreſent,
Who all in wiſe Aſtrology outwent.*

* There were five more of this Name mentioned by *Demetrius* the *Magneſian*, an Orator of *Calantes*, an affected Imitator. A Painter of *Sicyonia*, of a great Spirit. The third very Ancient, contemporary with *Heſiod*, *Homer*, and *Lycurgus*; The fourth mentioned by *Duris*: The fifth of later Times, by *Dionyſius* in *Criticis*. * *Laertius* names *Pherecydes* as a DetraCTOR from *Thales* the Philoſopher.

^a Laert. 1. 2. 4.
comp. 1. 12.

^b De vita Pythag. 7. 2.
De longevit. c Chronol.

^c Ibid. 2. 1.
Apud Laert. 1. 38.

^d Ibid. 2. 3. 1.
Plut. vit. Solon.

^e Laert. 1. 38.
f Laert. 1. 38.

^g Pausan. Phocic. c. 5.
g Vit. Solon.

S O L O N.

CHAP. I.

His Parents, Country, and Condition.

P^{hilocles} ^a, cited by ^b*Didymus*, affirms that *Solon's* Father was named *Euphorion*, but by the unanimous Consent of all other Writers, he was called *Execestides*, a Person, though of small Fortune and Account among the Citizens, yet of the most noble Family in *Athens*, descended from *Codrus*, ^c*Solon* deriving himself from *Neleus*, Son of *Codrus*, and from *Neptune*: ^dHis Mother near of Kin to the Mother of *Pisistratus*; his Parents had another Son named *Dropeides*, Archon, the Year after *Solon*, from him was *Plato* descended.

Solon was born (according to ^e*Laertius*) at *Salamis*, for which Reason he desired at his Death that his Body might be carried thither; but from his Parents and the Place of his Residence, he was surnamed *Athenian*.

^fHis Father, by Munificence and Liberality brought his Estate so low, as to want even Necessaries: *Solon* (ashamed to receive from any, being of a House which used to maintain others) betook himself to Merchandize: Others say, he travelled rather to improve his Knowledge and Experience, for he was a professed Lover of Wisdom, and even to his last used to say, *I grow old in Learning*; Riches he esteemed not much, but to grow rich like

him who abounds

*In Heaps of Gold, as in rank Corn his Grounds,
In Mules and Horses, whilst his numerous Wealth
Made pleasing by uninterrupted Health:
If to compleat these Joys, he be possess'd
Of Wife and Children, he is truly blest.*

And elsewhere,

*Riches I wish, not Riches that are plac'd
In unjust Means, for Vengeance comes at last.*

That he was profuse and delicate, and more luxurious in his Verses than befits a Philosopher, is attributed to his practising Merchandize, such Persons requiring more than ordinary Delicacies and Freedoms in Recompence of their many and great Dangers. That he was rather in the Number of the Poor than of the Rich, is apparent from these his Verses.

*Many Unjust grow rich, and Pious poor,
We would not change our Virtue for their Store,*

For constant Virtue is a solid Base:

Riches from Man to Man uncertain pass.

^g*Aristotle* ranks *Solon* amongst the inferior Sort of Citizens, which (saith he) is manifest from his Elegies, meaning perhaps, some of those which *Plutarch* cites. *Lucian* ^hsaith, he was extremely poor: *Palæologus* ⁱ, that he neither had nor valued Wealth.

CHAP. II.

How by his Means the Athenians took Salamis, Cyrrha, and the Thracian Chersonesus.

M^{any} (saith ^j*Demosthenes*) of obscure and contemptible Birth, have become illustrious by Profession of Wisdom. *Solon* both living and dead flourish'd in extraordinary Glory, to whom the utmost Honours were not denied, for he left a Monument of his Valour, the *Megaræan Trophy*, and of his Wisdom, the Recovery of *Salamis*; the Occasions, these.

^kThe Island *Salamis* revolted from the Athenians to the *Megarænses*; ^lthe Athenians having had a long troublesome War with the *Megarænses* for its Recovery, grew at length so weary, that giving it over, they made a Law, forbidding any upon Pain of Death to speak or write any Thing to persuade the City to re-attempt it: *Solon* brooking with much Reluctance this Ignominy, and seeing many young Men in the City desirous to renew the War, (tho' not daring to move it, by Reason of the Edict) counterfeited himself mad, which he caus'd to be given out through the City, and having privately compos'd some elegiac Verses, and got them by Heart, came skipping into the Forum with his Cap (or, as *Laertius* ^msaith, a Garland) on; the People flocking about him, he went up in to the Place of the Cryer, and sung his Elegy, beginning thus:

*A Cryer I, from Salamis the fair,
Am come in Verse this Message to declare:*

ⁿThe Lines wherewith they were most excited were these:

*'Rather than Athens, would I ow'd my Birth
To Phlegæonian, or Sicinian Earth:
For Men where e'er I go will say this is
One of th' Athenians that lost Salamis.'*

^a *Plut. Sol. f. Polit. 4. 11.*
^f *Plutarch. ibid.*

^b *Laert. 1. 45.* *Plut. in Solon.*
^g *In Scythia.*

^h *Orat. 1.*

^c *Laert. vit. Sol.*
ⁱ *Orat. de falsa legat.*

^d *Proclus in Timæum.*
^k *Plutarch. Attic. c. 42.*

^e *Laert. 1. 45.*
^l *Plut. Sol.*

^m *Laert. 1. 45.*

And,

*Then let's to Salamis, renew our Claim,
And with the Isle recover our lost Fame.*

* This Poem was intitled *Salamis*; it consisted of a hundred Verses, very elegant: When he had made an End of singing, it was much applauded by his Friends, particularly by *Pisistratus*, who excited the Citizens to follow his Advice: By this Means the Law was repealed, and the War recommenced, wherein *Solon* was made General: The common Report is, that taking *Pisistratus* along with him, (whence it is that some ascribe the whole Glory of the Action to *Pisistratus*, of whom are *Frontinus*, *Aeneas* and *Justin*) he failed to *Colias*, where finding all the Women celebrating the Festival of *Ceres*, he sent a trusty Messenger to *Salamis*, who pretending to be a Renegade, told the *Megarenses*, that if they would surpise the principal Women of *Athena*, they should go with him immediately to *Colias*. The *Megarenses* believing what he said, manned a Ship, and sent it along with him; *Solon*, as soon as he saw the Ship come from the Island, commanded the Women to retire, and as many beardless young Men to put on their Gowns, Head-tyre and Shoes, hiding Daggers under their Garments, and so danced and played by the Seaside till the Enemy were landed, and their Ship at Anchor: By this Time the *Megarenses*, deceived by their outward Appearance, landed in great Haste, and came upon them, thinking to take them away by Force, & but they suddenly drawing their Swords, shewed themselves to be Men, not Women; the *Megarenses* were all slain, not one escaping, the *Athenians* going immediately to the Island took it.

* Others deny it was taken in this Manner, but that first receiving this Answer from the *Delphian Oracle*.

*Let Sacrifice be to those Heroes paid,
Who under the Alopeian Ground are laid,
And dead, are by the setting Sun survey'd.*

Solon by Night failed to the Island, and sacrificed Burnt-Offerings to the Heroes *Periphemus*, and *Cicubris*; then he received five hundred Men of the *Athenians*, with Condition, -that if they gained the Island, the supreme Government thereof should be in them: Shipping his Men in Fisher-boats, attended by one Ship of thirty Oars, they cast Anchor by *Salamis*, near a Point opposite to *Eubaea*: The *Megarenses* who were in *Salamis* hearing an uncertain Rumor hereof, betook themselves confusedly to Arms, sending forth a Ship to bring them more certain Intelligence from the Enemy, which

Solon, as soon as it came near, took, and killing the *Megarenses* manned with choice *Athenians*, whom he commanded to make directly for the City, with all possible Secrecy; in the mean time, he with the rest of the *Athenians*, assaulted the *Megarenses* by Land, and whilst they were in Sight, they who were in the Ship, making Haste, posselt themselves of the Town. This Relation is confirmed by their Solemnity, an *Athenian* Ship comes thither first in Silence, then falling on with Cries and Shouts, an armed Man leaps forth, and runs directly towards the *Scirradian* Promontory against those that come from the Land: Hard by is the Temple of *Mars*, built by *Solon*; for he overcame the *Megarenses*, and let go ransomless all those that escaped the Misery of the War. *Ælian* saith, he took two Ships of the *Megarenses*, wherewith he put *Athenian* Officers and Soldiers, bidding them put on the Armour of the Enemy, whereby deceiving the *Megarenses*, he slew many of them unarmed.

* But the *Megarenses* persisting in Obstinacy, to the Loss of many Lives on both Sides, the Builness was referred to the *Lacedæmonians* to be decided; many affirm *Solon* alleged the Authority of *Homer*, inserting a Verse into his Catalogue of Ships, which he thus recited at the Trial,

*Ajax twelve Vessels brought to Salamis,
And where the Athenian Men had stood rank'd his bis.*

By which second Verse of his own making and Addition he evinced, that *Salamis* of old belonged to the *Athenians*.) But the *Athenians* esteem this Relation fabulous, affirming, *Solon* demonstrated to the Judges, that *Phylæus* and *Eurysaces*, Sons of *Ajax*, being made free Denizens by the *Athenians*, delivered this Island to them, and dwelt, one at *Brauro* in *Attica*, the other in *Melita*, whence there is a Tribe named *Philaidæ*, from *Phylæus*, of which was *Pisistratus*. * He overcame the *Megarenses* in an Oration, getting the better of them, not with specious Words, but Weight of Argument. * More clearly to convince them, he instanced in the Burial of the Dead, and Inscription of the Names of Towns, used by those of *Salamis*, * as he shewed by digging up some Graves, after the Manner of the *Athenians*, not of the *Megarenses*; for in *Megara* they buried their Dead with their Faces to the East, in *Athena*, to the West. But *Hæreas* of *Megara* denying this, affirms, the *Megarenses* buried also with their Faces toward the West; for further Confirmation, *Solon* alleged, that the *Athenians* had for each Man a several Coffin, the *Megarenses* buried three or four in the same. It is said also, that *Solon* was much helped by certain Oracles of *Apollo*, wherein he calls *Salamis* *Ionian*. This Cause

o Plat. Sol. p Polyan. lib. 1. c. 50. Plat. Sol. q Rhod. Sol. s Var. Hist. 7. 9. s Plat. Sol. t Ælian, var. Hist. 7. 19. u Plat. Sol. w Lært. 1. 48.

was decided by five Spartans, Critoloidas, Amomphoretus, Hyspechidas, Anaxilas, and Cleonenes.

* By this Action Solon grew into great Esteem and Honour, but he became [not long after] much more admired and cried up by the Greeks, for speaking concerning the Temple at Delphi. The Cyrrhæans committed many Impieties against Apollo, and cut off Part of the Land belonging to him. Solon declared, that it behoved them to relieve it, and not to suffer the Cyrrhæans to prophane the Oracle, but that they should vindicate the Gods Cause. The Amphiditions thus incited by him, undertook the War with much Eagerness, as Aristotle affirms, ascribing to Solon the Honour of that Enterprise. Æschines saith, the Motion made by Solon was confirmed by the Oracle. Some affirm he was made General; others Alæman: But the whole Army of the Greeks was (according to Pausanias) led by Clithenes, Tyrant of Sycionia, along with whom they sent Solon from Athens to be his Counsellor. Suidas saith, he was chosen Counsellor by those who were pick'd out for the Service of that War. While Clithenes besieged Cyrrha, they enquired concerning the Victory; and from the Pythian Oracle received this Answer,

This City's Fort you shall not take before
Blue Amphitrite's swelling Billows roar (Shore.
Against my Wave-wash'd Grove, and hallow'd

Whereupon Solon advis'd to consecrate the Cyrrhæan Field to Apollo, by which Means the Sea should touch sacred Land. He used also another Stratagem against the Cyrrhæans; the River Pliſtus, which ran through the City, he diverted another Way, the Town holding out against the Besiegers, some drunk Well-water, others Rain, which they saved in Cisterns. He caused Roots of Hellebore to be thrown into Pliſtus, and when he found it was full poisoned, turned the River again into its proper Channel: The Cyrrhæans drinking greedily of that Water, were taken with a continual Flux, and forced thereby to give over the Defence of their Works. The Amphiditions being possist of the City, punished the Cyrrhæans, and avenge the Gods. These two Stratagems were ascribed to Clithenes, the first by Pœlianus, the second by Frontinus, but the Reason is apparent, he doing them by the Direction of Solon. Solon persuaded also the Athenians to reduce into their Power the Thracian Chersonesus.

C H A P. III.

How he compos'd Differences and Seditions at home, and was made Archon.

THE Cylonian Impiety had for a long time vexed the City, ever since the Complices of

Cylon, having taken Sanctuary, were persuaded by Megacles the Archon, to put themselves upon a Trial, they laying hold of a Thread which was tied to the Image of Pallas; when they came near the Images of the Furies, the Thread broke of itself, whereupon Megacles, with the other Archons, fell upon them, as persons disown'd by the Goddess; those that were without the Temple they stoned, those who run to the Altars, they were murdered; they only escaped who fled to their Wives, whence being called impious, they were accounted odious: Those that remained of the Cylonians were grown very rich, and had perpetual Enmity with the Family of Megacles; at what Time this Diffention was the highest, and the People thereby divided into Factions, Solon being of much Authority amongst them, taking with him the chieftest of the City, interposed betwixt them, and with Intreaties and Advice persuaded those who were called impious to submit to the Judgment of three hundred of the chief Citizens: Miro was their Accuser; they were condemned, the Living to be banished, the Bones of the Dead to be digged up, and thrown beyond the Confines of the Country.

During these Commotions, the Megarenſes took Nyssa, and recovered Salamis from the Athenians; the City was full of superstitious Terrors and Apparitions; the Priests declared, that the Entrails of the sacrificed Beasts imported great Crimes and Impieties, which required Expiation. There was also a great Plague; the Oracle advis'd them to lustrate the City; to this End they sent (Nicias, Son of Niceratus, with a Ship) to fetch Epimenides out of Crete, who coming to Athens, was entertained by Solon as a Guest, conversed with him as a Friend, instructed him in many Things, and set him in the Way of making Laws. This Lustration of the City, Eusebius under-reckons, placing it in the second Year of the forty-fifth Olympiad, whereas Solon's being Archon, which certainly happened after this, was in the third Year of the forty-sixth. Suidas seems to over-reckon, ranking it in the forty-fourth. The Opinion of Laertius agrees best with the Circumstances of the Story, that it was in the forty-sixth.

The Commotions of the Cylonians being thus appeased, and the Offenders extirpated, the People fell into their old Difference about the Government of the Common-wealth, whereby they were divided into as many Factions as the Province contained Distinctions of People; the Citizens were Democratical, the Countrymen affected Oligarchy, the Maritimes stood for a mix'd Kind of Government, and hindered both the other Parties from having the Rule; at the same time the City was in a dangerous Condition, by Reason of a Diffention betwixt the Rich and the Poor, arising from their

x Plat. Sol. y Ibid. z In Phoc. c. 37. a In voce Solon. b Polyz. lib. 3. c Pœlian. d Ibid. e Lib. 3. c. 5. f Lib. 3. c. 7. g Laert. 1. 47. h Plat. Sol. i Laert. 1. 110. k Plat. Sol. l Laert. Ibid. m Plat. Ibid. n In Epimenid. o Plat. Ibid.

Inequality, the Business seemed Impossible to be composed, but by a Monarchy; the Commons were generally oppressed by the Money which they had borrowed of the rich, and either had tilled their Land, paying to them the sixth Part of the Crop, whence they were called *Hektemorii* and *Thetes*, or engaged their Bodies to their Creditors, whereof some served at home, others were sold abroad, many also (there being no Law to the contrary) were necessitated to sell their Children, and leave the City, through the Cruelty of these Usurers, the greatest Part (such as had most Courage amongst them) assembling together, mutually exhorted one another not to endure these Things any longer, but chusing some trusty Man to be their Leader, to discharge those that paid not their Money at the set Day, to share the Land, and quite invert the State of the Common-wealth. The discreetest among the *Athenians* looking upon *Solon* as a Person free from any Crime (neither engaged in the Oppressions of the Rich, nor involved in the Necessities of the Poor) intreated him to take Charge of the Common-wealth, and to compose the Differences of the People. *Phanias* the *Lesbian* affirmeth, that for Preservation of the State, he deceived both Parties, promising under-hand to the Poor, a Division of the Land; the Rich, to make good their Contracts; but that he first made Scruples of undertaking the Business, deterred by the Avarice of the one, and Insolence of the other; he was chosen Archon, next after *Philomebraus* (in the third Year of the forty-sixth Olympiad) at what Time he made his Laws also, being at once a Peace-maker and a Law-giver, acceptable to the Rich, as rich, and to the Poor, as good; the People had often in their Mouths this Saying of his, *Equality breeds no Strife*; which pleased alike both Parties; one Side understanding it of Number and Measure, the other of Worth and Virtue; upon which Hope, the most powerful of both Factions courted him much, and desired him to take upon him the Tyranny of that Common-wealth, which he had now in his Power, offering themselves to his Assistance: Many also of the moderate Part, seeing how laborious and difficult it would be to reform the State by Reason and Law, were not unwilling to have a Prince created, such an one as were most prudent and just: Some affirm he received this Oracle from *Apollo*,

*Sit at the Helm of State, their Pilot be,
The Common-wealth's glad to be steer'd by thee.*

But he was most of all reproved by his familiar Friends, for being deterred by the Name of a Tyranny, as if the Virtue of a King were not diffused through the Kingdom, instancing in *Tymondas*,

long since Tyrant of *Subem*, and *Pisistras*, as present of *Mytilene*. Nothing they alleged could move him; he told them a Tyranny was a fair Possession, but it had no Passage out. To *Phebus* writing thus in Verse,

*That I preferred free my native Soil,
Nor did with bloody Tyranny defile.
My Honour, I not blush at by this Deed,
All that was done by others I exceed.*

Whereby it appears, he was of great Authority before he writ his Laws. The Contumelies of such as reproved him for declining the Government, he thus exprest in Verse:

*Nor wise is Solon, nor good Counsel knows,
For he resists the good that God bestows,
The Prey within his Power he did behold,
But would not draw the Net; Thoughts meanly cold:
Had but his Soul with noble Aims been fir'd,
The Kingdom for one Day he had desir'd,
Then split, and all his Family expir'd.*

CH A P. IV.

*What Alterations he made during his Government,
and first of the Sischythia.*

THOUGH he refused the Tyranny, yet he behaved not himself remissly in the Government; not complying with the powerful, nor making Laws to please those who had chosen him; where Things were tolerable he corrected nor altered nothing; fearing, lest if he should change and confound the Common-wealth in every Particular, he should want Strength to settle it again, and to temper it with the best Reason; but such Things unto which he conceived he might persuade the Obsequious, and compel the Refractory, those he enacted; joining (as he said) Force and Justice, whence, being afterwards demanded if he had given the *Athenians* the best Laws, the best (saith he) they would receive.

The first Change he made in the Government was this, he (introduced the *Sischythia*, which was a Discharge of Bodies and Goods; or as *Hefychius* defines it, a Law for Remission of private and publick Debts, so called from shaking off the Oppression of Usury: For at that Time they engaged their Bodies for Payment, and many through Want were constrained to serve their Creditors, he therefore ordained that for the Time past, all Debts should be acquitted, and for the future, no Security should be taken upon the Body of any; this by a moderate Term he called *Sischythia*; there wast

not (of whom is *Androtion*) who affirmed he contented the Poor, not by an absolute Discharge of the Debt, but by moderating the Interest, which he called *Sisachthia*; whereto he added the Increase of Measures, and Valuation of Money; for the Mina, which was before seventy-three Drachms, he made a hundred: By this Means the poorer Sort paid a greater Sum in less Coin, which was a great Ease to the Debtor, and no Wrong to the Creditor: But the greater Part hold it was an absolute Discharge, which agreeth best with the Verses of *Solon*, wherein he boasteth he had removed the Bounds throughout the Land, freed such as were under Oppression, called home those, who being forced to travel, had forgotten their native Language; and others that were at home under Bondage, set at Liberty. The same Law, ^w *Diodorus Siculus* observes to be among the Egyptians, conceiving *Solon* (tho' as yet he had not been there) derived it from them.

^x But in this Design a great Misfortune befel him, whilst he endeavoured to redress the Oppression of Usury, and was studying how to begin an Oration suitable to the Thing, he acquainted his intimate Friends, in whom he reposed most Confidence, *Canon*, *Clinias* and *Hippenicus*, that he meant not to meddle with Land; but to cut off all Debts; they (preventing the Edict) borrowed of the Rich great Sums of Money, wherewith they purchased much Land; the Edict being published, they enjoyed their Purchase, without satisfying their Creditors: *Solon* was much blamed, as not defrauded with the rest, but as being a Defrauder with those, and a Partaker of their Cozenage; but this Imputation was immediately washed away with five Talents, so much he had forth at Interest, which he first, according to the Law, blotted out (*Laertius* saith six, persuading others to do the like) others, of whom is *Polytelus* the Rhodian, fifteen; but his Friends were ever after called *Xestonides*.

^y This pleased neither Party; he discontented the Rich by cancelling their Bonds, the Poor more, not making good a Parity of Estates, which they expected, as *Lycurgus* had done; he being the eleventh from *Hercules*, having reigned many Years in *Lacedaemon*, great in Authority, Friends, and Wealth, whereby he was able to make good what he thought convenient for the State, rather by Force than Persuasion, even to the Loss of his Eye, effected as a Thing most expedient to the Preservation and Peace of the Common-wealth, that none of the Citizens were either rich or poor: But *Solon* attained not this in the Common-wealth, he was one of the People, and of a mean Degree; yet he omitted nothing within his Power, carried on by his own Judgment, and the Faith which the Citizens had

in him; that he displeased many, who expected other Things, is thus acknowledged by himself.

*Before they look'd upon me kindly, now
With Eyes severe, and a contracted Brow:
Had any else my Power, he would exact
Their Riches, and their fattest Milk extract.*

But both Parties soon found how much this conduced to the general Good, and laying aside their private Differences, sacrificed together, calling the Sacrifice *Savagyeia*.

CHAP. V.

How he divided the People into Classes, and erected Courts of Judicature.

Hereupon ^z they chose *Solon* Reformer and Law-giver of the Common-wealth, not limiting him to any Thing, but submitting all to his Power, Magistracies, Convocations, Judgments, Courts to take an Account of them, to prescribe what Number and Times he pleased; to disannul or ratify of the present Law what he thought good.

^a First then, he quite abolished all the Laws of *Draco*, except for Murder, because of their Rigidity and Severity, for he punished almost all Offences with Death; as that they who were surprized in Idleness should be put to Death; they who stole Herbs or Apples should undergo the same Punishment with such as had committed Murder or Sacrilege; whence *Demades* wittily said, *Draco* writ his Laws not in Ink, but Blood; he being asked why he punished all Offences with Death, answered, *he conceived the least deserved so much, and he knew no more for the greatest*. *Hæroclitus*, alluding to his Name, said his Laws were not of a Man, but of a Dragon, they were so rigid; And ^b *Aristotle* saith, there was nothing in them extraordinary and worthy of Memory, but that Severity and greatness of Penalty which was so excessive; that ^c not by any Edict or Command, but by a silent unexpressed Consent amongst the Athenians, they were laid aside; afterwards they used the milder Laws made by *Solon*, differing even in Name, the first being called *Dracoi*, the latter *Nomoi*. ^d Those of *Draco* were made in the 39th Olympiad, 47 Years (as *Ulpian* ^e accounts) before these of *Solon*.

^f Next, *Solon* (being desirous that all Offices might continue as they were, in the Hands of the Rich, but that other Privileges of the Common-wealth, from which the People were excluded, might be promiscuously disposed) took an Account and Valuation of the People [^g and divided them into four Orders] those whose Stock of dry and liquid Fruits amounted to 500 Measures, he ranked

^w Lib. 1. ^x Plut. Solon. ^y Ibid. ^z Ibid. ^a Ibid. ^b Arist. Rhet. 2. 23. ^c Ar. Cell. 11. 18. ^d Tatian. Clem. Alex. Suid. ^e in Demost. Timocr. ^f Plut. Solon. ^g Pollux. 3. 10.

in the first Place, and called *Pentacosiomedimni*, [*these paid a Talent to the publick Treasury.*] In the second Clafs were those who were able to maintain a Horse, or received 300 Measures, these he called [*for that Reason*] *Horsemen*; they paid half a Talent. The third Clafs were *Zeugitæ* (* so called) because they had 200 Measures of both Sorts, these paid 10 Minæ; the rest were all called *Thetes*, whom he suffered not to be capable of any Magistracy, neither did they pay any Thing, but only had so far Interest in the Common-wealth, as to have a Suffrage in the publick Convocation, and at Judgments, which at first seemed nothing, but afterwards appeared to be of great Consequence; for in whatsoever was brought before the Judges, he gave them leave (if they would) to appeal to the common *Forum*; moreover, writing his Laws obscurely and perplexedly, he increased the Power of the *Forum*, for not being able to determine Controversies by the Law, they were forced to have Recourse to the Judges, as Masters of the Law; this Equality he himself thus expresseth,

*The Commons I sufficient Power allow;
Honour from none I took, on none bestow;
Those who in Power or Wealth the rest outshin'd,
In Bounds of Moderation I confin'd;
To either Part I was a firm Defence,
And neither did allow Preheminence.*

Hither ^m Seneca alluding, saith, Solon founded Athens upon equal Right; and ⁿ Justin, he carried himself with such Temper between the Commons and the Senate, that he attracted equal Favour from both; he suffered no Man (saith ^o Encaz Gazette) to have a peculiar Law, but made all Men subject to the same.

^p He likewise (continues Plutarch) constituted the Court of the *Areopagus*, consisting of the yearly Archons, whereof himself (being the Chief) was one; perceiving the People to be much exalted and emboldened by the Remission of their Debts, he ordained a second Court of Judicature, selecting out of each Tribe (which were in all four) a hundred Persons, who should resolve upon all Decrees before they were reported to the People; nor should any Thing be brought to them, until it had first past the Senate: The supreme Senate he appointed Judge and preserver of the Laws, conceiving the City would be less apt to float up and down, and the People become more settled, relying upon these two Courts, as on two Anchors; thus the greater Part of Writers make Solon Institutor of the Court of *Areopagus* (of whom also is ^q Cicero) which seems to be confirmed, in that *Draco* never mentions the *Areopagites*, but in Criminal Causes always names

the *Ephectæ*; but the eighth Law of the thirtieth Table of Solon hath these Words, *Those who are branded with Infamy before Solon was Archon, let them be restored to their Fame, except such as were condemned by the Areopagites, or by the Ephectæ, &c.* And it is certain, that the Court of *Areopagus* was long before Solon's Time, until then consisting promiscuously of such Persons as were eminent for Nobility, Power, or Riches, but Solon reformed it, ordaining none should be thereof, but such as had first undergone the Office of Archon. See Meursius, *Areop.* cap. 3.

^r Pollux saith, that Solon ordained a thousand Men to judge all Accusations; ^s Demetrius Phalereus, that he constituted the Demarchi, first called Naulari.

CHAP. VI.

His Laws.

HAVING thus disposed the Common-wealth, and Courts of Judicature, he in the next Place applied himself to making Laws, which he performed so excellently, that he is generally remembered under that Notion, with Minos of Crete, and Lycurgus of Lacedæmon, whose Laws those of Solon exceeded, (as ^t Tacitus saith) both in *Exquisiteness* and Number: ^u Of how much greater Esteem they were than all before them, may be computed from this, that they were the last, and continued always in the City: They, for whom they were made, thought them more illustrious than their publick Ornaments, which transcended those of all other Cities, more impregnable than their Tower, which they accounted the strongest of all upon Earth, and far better than those Things wherein they gloried most: ^v Nor were they of less Esteem among Foreign Nations, inasmuch that the Romans agreeing concerning Laws in general, but differing about the Law-giver, sent Ambassadors to Athens, Sp. Posthumius Albus, A. Manlius, P. Sulpitius Camerinus, commanding them to transcribe the renowned Laws of Solon: ^w Which transferred out of the Books of Solon, the Decemviri, expounded in the twelve Tables. Hence ^x Ammianus Marcellinus saith, that Solon, assisted by the Sentences of the Egyptian Priests, having with just Moderation framed Laws, added also to the Roman State the greatest Foundation.

Of his Laws, these have been preserved by Plutarch and others.

^y If any Man were beaten, hurt, or violently treated, whosoever had the Means and Will might sue the Offender. Thus (saith Plutarch) he wisely brought the Citizens to a mutual Sense of one another Hurts, as if done to a Limb of their own Body.

^h Pollux. 8. 10.
offic. l. 1. 9. c. 21.
^w Liv. lib. 3. c. 31.

ⁱ Ibid.

^k Ibid.

^l Ibid.

^m Epist. 90.

ⁿ Lib. 3. 7.

^o In Theophrast.

^p Plut. Solon.

^q De

^r Lib. 8. cap. 6.

^s Schol. Aristoph. in Nub.

^t Annal. 3. 26.

^u Man. Palæolog. in proptor, al. de

^x Aurel. Vict. de vir. illust. c. 21.

^y Lib. 22. 16.

^z Plut. Sol.

Of infamous Persons, let all such as were infamous before the Government of Solon, be restored to their Fame, excepting whosoever were condemned by the Ephete, or in the Prytaneum by the Magistrates, banished for Murder, Theft, or aspiring to Tyranny. This was the eight Law of the thirteenth Table. There were two Kinds of Infamy; by the lesser, a Man was degraded and made incapable of all Honour or Office in the Common-wealth; by the greater, he and his Children were liable to be killed by any Man, and he not to be questioned for it.

Of his Laws, those seem most singular and paradoxal, which declare him infamous, who in a Sedition takes neither Part: It is cited out of Aristotle by A. Gellius in these Words: *If through Discord and Dissension, any Sedition and Difference divided the People into two Factions, whereupon with exasperated Minds both Parties take up Arms and fight; he, who at that Time, and upon that Occasion of civil Discord, shall not engage himself on either Side, but solitary and separated from the common Evil of the City, withdraw himself; let him be deprived of House, Country and Goods by Banishment.* He would not that any one saving himself harmless, should be infensible of the common Calamity, or boast himself to have no Share in the publick Grief, but that instantly applying himself to the better and juster Side, he should interest himself in the common Danger, and assist, rather than out of all Hazard, expect which Side should get the better. When we did read (saith A. Gellius) this Law of Solon, a Person endued with singular Wisdom, at first we remained in great Suspence and Admiration, enquiring for what Reason he judged those worthy of Punishment, who withdrew themselves from Sedition and civil War; then one whose Sight pierced more deeply into the Use and Meaning of the Law, affirmed, the Intent thereof was not to increase but appease Sedition; and so indeed it is: For if all good Persons, who in the Beginning are too few to restrain a Sedition, should not deter the distracted raging People, but dividing themselves, adhere to either Side, it would follow, that they being separated, as Partakers of both Factions, the Parties might be temper'd and govern'd by them, as being Persons of greatest Authority; by which Means they might restore them to Peace, and reconcile them, governing and moderating that Side whereof they are, and desiring much rather the adverse Party should be preserved than destroyed. Cicero citing this Law, averreth the Punishment to have been capital, perhaps understanding Infamy here of the more severe Kind.

Aburd and ridiculous (saith Plutarch) seemeth that Law which alloweth an Inheritance, if he who

possesseth her by Law as her Lord and Master, be impotent, to admit of any of her Husband's nearest Kindred. But some aver it is just, as to those, who tho' they are impotent, yet will marry rich Heiresses for their Money, and by the Privilege of Law wrong Nature; for when they see it lawful for the Heiress to admit whom she pleaseth, either they will refrain from such Marriages, or undergo them with the Reproach of Avarice and Dishonesty. It is well ordered also, that she may not admit any one, but only whom the will of her Husband's Kindred, whereby the Issue may be of his Family and Race. Hitherto likewise it tends, that the Bride be shut up in a Room with the Bridegroom, and eat a Quince with him. (Intimating, according to Plutarch's Interpretation, that the first Grace of her Lips and Voice should be agreeable and Sweet) and that he who marrieth an Heiress be obliged to visit her thrice a Month at the least: For tho' they have not Children, this argues a Respect due to a chaste Wife, and prevents or reconciles Unkindness and Dissension.

Those Words of the former Law, *He who possesseth her by Law as her Lord and Master*, have Reference to another Law of his, mentioned by Diodorus Siculus^b, that the next of Kin to an Heiress might by Law require her in Marriage, and she likewise might require him that was next of Kin who was obliged to marry her, tho' never so poor, or to pay 500 Drachms for her Dowry. Hereto Terence alludes.

The Law commands an Heir to marry with Her Husband's next of Kin, and him to take her.

And to the putting her off without a Dowry of 500 Drachms, (that is five Minæ)^c elsewhere.

Tho' I be injur'd thus, yet rather than I'll be contentious, or bound still to bear thee, Since she's my Kinswoman, take hence with her The Dowry the Law enjoys me, her's five Pound.

In all other Marriages he forbade Dowries, ordaining that a Bride should bring with her no more than three Gowns, and some slight Household Stuff of small Value, the Particulars whereof were expressed, as Pollux seems to imply, for he would not that Marriage should be mercenary or vendible, but that the Man and Woman should cohabit for Issue, Love, and Friendship. Hither Isidor alludes, amongst the Athenians, legal Marriage was said to be contracted in respect of Issue.

That Law of his also was commended, as Demosthenes and Plutarch attest, which forbade to revile the Dead, *Let no Man revile any dead Person,*

^a Plat. Sol. ^b Ibid. ^c Lib. 2. cap. 12. ^d Plat. Sol. ^e Ad Attic. 20. 2. ^f Plat. Sol. ^g In precept. conjugal. ^h Lib. 23. ⁱ Hist. Ant. 2. ^j Socr. 3. ^k Plutarch. Ant. 2. ^l Plat. Sol. ^m 23. 12. 25. ⁿ Lib. 3. Epist. 242. ^o Oat. in Lepin.

tho' provoked by the Ravellings of his Children. To esteem the deceased holy, is pious; to spare the absent, just; to take away the Eternity of Hatred, civil.

He forbade to revile any living Person at sacred Solemnities, Courts of Judicature, and publick Spectacles, upon Penalty of three Drachms to be paid to the reviled Person; two more to the common Treasury. To moderate Anger no where, he accounted rude and disorderly, every where difficult, to some impossible. A Law must be accommodated to what is possible; intending to punish some few, to advantage not many to no Purpose.

His Law concerning Testaments is much approved; for before, no Man had Power to make a Will, but his Goods and Lands continued in the Family of the deceased Person. Solon made it lawful for him that had no Children, to give his Estate to whom he pleased. He preferred Friendship before Kindred, and Favour before Necessity; and ordered, that Wealth should be at the Disposal of him in whose Hands it was; yet he permitted not this rashly, or absolutely, but conditionally; If he were not wrought upon by Sickness, Potions, Bondage, or the Blandishments of a Wife. Justly he esteemed it all one, whether a Man be seduced by indirect Means, or violently constrained; thus comparing Deceit with Force, and Pleasure with Pain, as being of equal Power to put a Man out of his right Mind. This Law is mentioned likewise by Demosthenes.

He also limited the Visits, Mournings, and Feasts of Women, by a Law which curbed their former Licentiousness. Her who went abroad, he permitted not to carry with her above three Gowns, nor more Meat and Drink than might be bought with an Obolus; nor a Basket above a Cubit in Bigness; nor to travel by Night, unless in a Chariot, and with Torch-light. He forbade them to tear their Cheeks to procure Mourning and Lamentation, at the Funerals of those, to whom they have no Relation. He forbade to sacrifice an Ox at Funerals, and to bury more than three Garments with the dead Body; not to approach the Monuments of Strangers, unless at their Exequies. Of which (saith Plutarch) our Laws are full. Cicero also affirms, that the Laws of the twelve Tables for contracting the Pomp of Funerals, and concerning Mourning, are transferred from those of Solon, who (as Phalarus writes) as soon as Funerals began to be solemnized with Pomp and Lamentation, took them away; which Law the Decemviri put into the tenth Table, almost in the very same Words, for that of three Neighbourhoods, and most of the rest, are Solon's; that of Mourning, in his express Words, Let no Women tear their Cheeks, nor make Lamentation at a Funeral.

Considering that all the City grew very populous, many recurring thither from all Parts of Attica, for Liberty and Security, that the Country was, for the most Part, barren and bad; that such as trade by Sea import nothing for those that have not wherewith to barter or exchange with them; he added the Citizens to Arts; and made a Law, that the Son should not be obliged to maintain his Father, if he had not brought him up to a Trade (mentioned also by Vitruvius, Galen, Theophrastus, and others) and commanded the Court of Areopagus to examine by what Gain every Man maintained himself, and to punish idle Persons, whom he made liable to the Ation of every Man; and at the third Conviction, punished with Infamy. This Law Herodotus, and Diodorus Siculus, affirm to have been in use amongst the Egyptians, made by Amasis, and from them derived by Solon to the Athenians.

Yet more severe was that mentioned by Heraclides of Pontus, which disengaged the Sons of Concubines from maintaining their Fathers. He who transgresseth the Bounds of Marriage, professeth he doth it not out of Desire of Issue, but for Pleasure, and therefore already hath his Reward, and can expect to have no further Tye upon those he begets, whose Birth is their Shame.

Most incongruous seem those Laws of Solon, which concern Women; for he permitted, that whosoever surprized an Adulterer with the Wife or Concubine of any, might kill him, (or exact Money of him.) He that ravished a free Woman was fined 100 Drachms; he that plaid the Pander, 20, (Æschines saith, to die) except to such Women as were common. He also forbade any Man to give his Sister or Daughter to that Profession, unless himself first surprize her with a Man. This (saith Plutarch) seems absurd, to punish the same Offences sometimes severely with Death, sometimes with a pecuniary Mulct; unless, because at that Time Money was very rare in Athens, the Scarcity thereof aggravated the Punishment.

He assigned five hundred Drachms to the Victor of the Isthmian Games, a hundred to the Victor of the Olympick. Attested also by Laertius, who saith, he contracted the Rewards of the Athleta's, judging them dangerous Victors; and that they were crowned rather against, than for their Country.

Whosoever brought a be-Wolf, was to receive five Drachms; for a she-Wolf, one; according to Demetrius Phalereus, this being the Price of a Sheep, that of an Ox. It is customary with the Athenians, that such as have Grounds fitter for Pasture than Plowing, make War with the Wolves.

Forasmuch as there is such Scarcity of Rivers, Lakes, and Springs in the Country, that they are constrained to dig Wells, he made a Law, Where

p Plut. Sol. q Plut. Sol. r Plut. Sol. s Orat. in Lept. t De leg. lib. 2. u Plut. Sol. v Pausan. lib. 6. z Eubot.
ad Art. y Epist. 7. z Lib. 2. b Plut. Sol. c Plut. Sol. d Lyden in Quest. to Arist. Metaph. e Arist. in The-
march. f Plut. Sol. g Laert. 1. 55. 5. h Plut. Sol. i Plut. Sol.

there was a common Well within a Hippicon, they should make Use of it. (A Hippicon is the Distance of four Furlongs.) ' They that lived further off, should procure Water of their own; and if when they digged ten Fathom deep, they find not any, they might be allowed to fill a Pitcher of six Gallons twice a Day, at their Neighbour's Well.'

' These exact Rules he prescribed for planting; Whoſoever planted any young Tree in his Ground, ſhould ſet it five Foot diſtant from his Neighbour's; who a Fig-tree or Olive-tree, nine: Becauſe the Roots of theſe ſpread far; nor is their Neighbourhood harmleſs to all, but ſucks away the Nouriſhment, and to ſome their Blatt is prejudicial.

' Whoſoever diggeth any Hole or Ditch, muſt make it ſo far diſtant from his Neighbours, as it is deep. Theſe are confirmed by ^a *Cajus*, adding, Whoſoever makes a Hedge, to divide himſelf from his Neighbour, muſt not exceed his own Bounds; if a Wall, he muſt leave the Space of a Foot; if a Houſe, two Feet; if a Well, a Fathom.'

Whoſoever placeth a Hive of Bees, ſhould obſerve the Diſtance of thirty Feet, from thoſe that were before placed by his Neighbour.

' He commanded the Archons to curſe him who exported any thing out of the Country, or that he ſhould pay a hundred Drachms to the publick Treasury, whereby they are not to be rejected, who ſay, that of old the Exportation of Figs was prohibited; and that he who diſcovered an Exporter, was called a Sycophant.

' He made a Law concerning ſuch as ſhould be hurt by a Dog, wherein he ordained, the Dog that bit to be bound in a Chain four Cubits long.

' This Law concerning Denization is difficult; That none ſhould be made free of the City, except ſuch who were baniſhed for ever out of their own Country, or came to Athens with their whole Families, to exerciſe ſome Trade. This he did, not to drive away Foreigners, but to invite them to Athens, by Certainty of Admittance into the City; conceiving ſuch would be faithful, thoſe out of Neceſſity, theſe out of Good-will.

' Likewise to be ſeated in the publick Hall, was the peculiar Inſtitution of *Solon*, which he called *μαγατρίαι*, not permitting the ſame Perſon to eat there frequently: But if he who were invited, would not accept of it, he was puniſhed; conceiving this Contempt of the publick Honour, that an inordinate Appetite.

Hitherto *Plutarch*. Theſe following are recited by *Laertius*.

' If any one maintain not his Parents, let him be infamous; as likewiſe he that devours his Patrimony.

Hitherto *Æſchines* alludes: In the fourth Place, With whom hath he to do? If any Man, by Prodigality, hath conſumed his Patrimony, or hereditary Goods. For he conceived, he who had ordered his own Family ill, would, in the ſame Manner, take Care of the Common-wealth; neither did the Law-giver imagine it poſſible that the ſame Perſon ſhould be privately wicked, and publickly good, or that it were fitting ſuch a one ſhould go up into the Chair, who took more Care to frame an Oration, than to compoſe his Life.

' He forbade ſuch as haunted common Women to plead; confirmed by *Æſchines*. In the third Place, With whom hath he to do? If any Man (ſaith he) be a Haunter of common Women, or procure Money by ſuch Means. For he conceived, ſuch a one as ſold his own Fame for Money, would eaſily ſell the Buſineſs of the State. And ^a *Demophilus*; It is worth Enquiry and Conſideration, *Athenians*, how great Care, *Solon*, the Author of this Law, had in the Common-wealth in all thoſe which he made; and how particularly ſollicitous he was herein, above all other Things; which as it is evident by many other Laws, ſo alſo by this, which forbids thoſe, *qui ſe proſtituerunt*, either to plead or judge in publick.

' He augmented the Rewards of ſuch as ſhould die in War, whoſe Sons he ordered to be brought up and inſtructed at the publick Charge. ¹ *Ariſtides*, ſpeaking of the *Athenians*, ſays, You alone, of all Men, did ordain theſe three Things by Law, That ſuch as died for their Country, ſhould be annually praiſed publickly at their Sepulchres; their Children, till grown Men, maintained at the publick Charge, then ſent back to their Father's Houſe with complete Arms. Likewiſe, that inſirm Citizens ſhould be maintained at the publick Charge. ² *Plato* adds, that the ſame Indulgence was allowed to the Parents. You know the Care of the Common-wealth, which in the Laws concerning the Children and Parents of ſuch as died in the War, commands the ſupream Magiſtrate to take Care, that the Parents of thoſe that died in the War, above all other Citizens, ſhould not receive any Injury. The State brings up the Children alſo. Herby, faith *Laertius*, they became eager of Fame and Honour in War; as *Polycritus*, as *Cynegyrius*, as all thoſe in the *Marathonian* Fight: to whom may be added *Harmodius*, *Ariſtogeiton*, *Miltiades*.

' Let not a Guardian marry the Mother of his Ward; nor let any one be Guardian to him, who if he die ſhall inherit his Eſtate; confirmed by ^b *Syrionus*, ^c *Marcellinus*, and others; who add, that the ſame Law forbade the Ward to marry her Guardian's Son.

¹ Plat. Sol. ² Plat. Sol. ³ Plat. Sol. ⁴ Lib. 4. ad 12. tab. ⁵ Plat. Sol. ⁶ Plat. Sol. ⁷ Plat. Sol. ⁸ Plat. Sol.
¹ Laert. 55. ² Oros. in Timarch. ³ Laert. ibid. ⁴ In Timarch. ⁵ Laert. ibid. ⁶ Laert. ibid. ⁷ In Panathen. ⁸ Me-
metes. T. II. ⁹ Laert. ibid. ¹⁰ In Hæmang. ¹¹ In Hæmang.

^a Let not a Graver keep the Impression of any Seal, after he hath sold it.

^a If any Man put out the Eye of another, who had but one, he shall lose both his own.

His Law concerning Theft, *Laertius* expresseth thus; *What thou laidst not down, take not up, otherwise the Punishment Death.* ^a *Æschines* adds, if they confessed themselves guilty; others affirm, the Punishment was only to pay double the Value; of whom is ^a *A. Gellias* and ^b *Hermogenes*, who affirm, the Law made that Distinction betwixt Sacrilege and Theft, punishing the first with Death, the latter with double Restitution. ^c *Demosthenes* clears this, reciting this Law exactly in these Words; *If any Man steal in the Day-time above fifty Drachms, he may be carried to the eleven Officers; if he steal any thing by Night, it shall be lawful for any to kill him; or in the Pursuit to wound him, and carry him to the eleven Officers. Whosoever is convicted of such Offences as are liable to Chains, shall not be capable of giving Bail for his Theft, but his Punishment shall be Death; and if any one steal out of the Lyceum, or the Academy, or Cynosarges, a Garment, or a small Vessel of Wine, or any other Thing of little Value, or some Vessel out of the Gymnasia, or Havens, he shall be punished with Death; but if any Man shall be convicted privately of Theft, it shall be lawful for him to pay a double Value; and it shall be also at the Pleasure of the Convictor, besides Payment of Money, to put him in Chains five Days, and as many Nights, so as all Men may see him bound.* ^d Even those who stole Dung, were by *Solon's* Law liable to Punishment.

^e That if an Archon were taken drunk, he should be punished with Death.

To those recited by *Laertius*, add these collected by others.

He allowed Brothers and Sisters by the same Father to marry; and prohibited only Brothers and Sisters of the same Mother; whereas contrariwise (saith ^a *Philo*) the Lacedæmonian Law-giver allowed these, and prohibited those. Hence ^b *Cornelius Nepos* affirms, *Cimon* married his Sister *Elpince*; invited, not more by Love, than the Athenian Custom, which allows to marry a Sister by the same Father.

^c He writ according to the Manner of the Ancients, severally concerning the Discipline of Matrons. For a Woman taken in Adultery, he permitted not to wear Ornaments, nor to come into publick Temples, lest by her Presence she should corrupt modest Women: ^d she came into a Temple, or adorned herself, he commanded every one to rend her Garments, to tear off her Ornaments, and to beat her; but not kill, or

main her. By this Means depriving such a Woman of all Honour, and giving her a Life more bitter than Death. This is also confirmed by ^e *Demosthenes*, who adds; *If any Man surprize an Adulterer, it shall not be lawful for him who took them to have the Woman in Marriage; if he continue to keep her as his Wife, let him be infamous.*

^f Let the dead Body be laid out within the House, according as he gave Order, and the Day following, before Sun-rise, be carried forth. Whilst the Body is carrying to the Grave, let the Men go before, the Women follow. It shall not be lawful for any Woman to enter upon the Goods of the Dead, and follow the Body to the Grave, under threescore Years of Age, excepting those within the Degree of Cousins; nor shall any Woman enter upon the Goods of the deceased, after the Body is carried forth, excepting those who are within the Degree of Cousins.

^g Concerning Sepulchres, he saith no more, than that no Man shall demolish them, or bring any new Thing into them; and he shall be punished, whosoever violates, casts down, or breaks any Tomb, Monument, or Column.

^h If any one light upon the dead Body of a Man unburied, let him throw Earth upon it.

ⁱ Whosoever shall dislike a received Law, let him first accuse it; then, if it be abrogated, substitute another: The Manner whereof is largely expressed by *Demosthenes*.

He ordained (according to ^j *Libanius*) that Children should be obliged to perform all due Offices to their Parents. ^k *Sextus*, saith he, made a Law of Indemnity, whereby he allowed any Man to kill his Son; but ^l *Dionysius Halicarnassæus* affirms, he permitted them to turn their Children out of Doors, and to disinherite them, but nothing more.

^m He ordained, that all such as declined to be engaged in War, or forsook the Army, or were Cowards, should have all one Punishment; to be driven out of the Bounds of the Forum, not permitted to wear a Garland, or to enter into publick Temples.

ⁿ If any one be seized on, for having abused his Parents, or forsaken his Colours, or being forbidden by Law, hath gone into Places where he ought not, let the eleven Officers take and bind him, and carry him into the Helizea; it shall be lawful for any one that will to accuse him; and if he be cast, it shall be at the Judgment of the Helizea to impose what Punishment or Fine they should think fit; if a Fine, let him be kept in Fetters till it be paid.

^o He permitted not a Man to sell Unguents, as being an effeminate Office.

^p As concerning Orators, he ordered, that the eldest of the Citizens should go up first into the Plaiders

^a Laert. lib. d. ^e Laert. lib. d. ^f Orat. in Timarch. ^g Lib. 11. c. 12. ^h Parit. sect. 4. ⁱ Orat. in Timocr. ^k Schol. Arist. ^l Lib. ad equites. ^m Laert. lib. d. ⁿ De leg. spec. lib. 2. ^o In Proem. & in Cimonis vitas. ^p Aesch. Orat. in Timarch. ^q Demost. Orat. in Phile. ^r Demost. Orat. in Phile. ^s Demost. Orat. in Phile. ^t Demost. Orat. in Phile. ^u Demost. Orat. in Phile. ^v Demost. Orat. in Phile. ^w Demost. Orat. in Phile. ^x Demost. Orat. in Phile. ^y Demost. Orat. in Phile. ^z Demost. Orat. in Phile. ^{aa} Demost. Orat. in Phile. ^{ab} Demost. Orat. in Phile. ^{ac} Demost. Orat. in Phile. ^{ad} Demost. Orat. in Phile. ^{ae} Demost. Orat. in Phile. ^{af} Demost. Orat. in Phile. ^{ag} Demost. Orat. in Phile. ^{ah} Demost. Orat. in Phile. ^{ai} Demost. Orat. in Phile. ^{aj} Demost. Orat. in Phile. ^{ak} Demost. Orat. in Phile. ^{al} Demost. Orat. in Phile. ^{am} Demost. Orat. in Phile. ^{an} Demost. Orat. in Phile. ^{ao} Demost. Orat. in Phile. ^{ap} Demost. 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Chair, modestly without Tumult and Perturbation to move, what he out of Experience should conceive best for the Common-wealth; then that every Citizen, according to his Age, should severally and in Order declare his Judgment.

^c He ordered that a Citizen of Athens should be tried no where but at Athens.

^d He commanded that no young Man should bear the Office of a Magistrate, nor be admitted to Council, tho' he were esteemed exceeding wise.

^e For the common People he ordained slow punishments, for Magistrates and Rulers of the People sudden, conceiving those might be punished at any Time, but that the Correction of these would admit no Delay.

^f As for the Gods and their Worship, he decreed nothing, ^g nor against Parricides, answering those who questioned him about it, *he did not think any could be so wicked.*

CHAP. VII.

Of the Axes and Cybes, Senators Oath, and other Institutions of Solon.

These Laws he ratified, for a hundred Years ^h; they were ⁱ carved in different Tables. Those which concerned private Actions, in oblong quadrangular Tables of Wood, with Cases, which reached from the Ground, and turned about upon a Pin like a Wheel, whence they were called ^j *ἄξονες*, ^k placed first in the Tower, then brought into the Prytaneum, that all might see them, where there were some Remains of them in *Plutarch's* Time. Those which concerned ^l publick Orders and Sacrifices, in ^m triangular Tables of Stone called *κύβητες* either from ⁿ *Κύρβος*, who took the Account of every Man's Estate, or ^o *ἀνὰ τὴν ταύτην κυβήτην τῶν χρημάτων*, or ^p *ἀνὰ τὴν κυβήτην τῶν κορυβαντίων*, to whom the Invention thereof is by some ascribed. These were placed in the *Porticus regia*. ^q Both the *Axones* and *Cybes* were written after the same Manner as Oxen turn in ploughing *ὑποστροφὰ καὶ γυρίων*; whence *Demosthenes* calls that Law the lowest which beginneth on the left Side.

^r The Senate took one common Oath to make good the Laws of Solon for a hundred Years, each of the *Thesmothetæ* sworn in the Forum at the Crier's Stone; if he violated them, to dedicate a golden Statue of equal Weight with himself at Delphi.

Some Particulars of the Oath imposed by Solon mentioned by several Authors, (as, not to abrogate his Laws, by *Plutarch*; to admit no young Man to be Judge, by ^s *Stobæus*; to bear impartially both the Plain and Defendant, by ^t *Demosthenes*; ar-

gue it to be the same which the same Author delivers in these Words.

*I will declare my Opinion according to the Laws of the Athenians, and five hundred Senators. Pyrrho Assistance from me shall Tyranny or Oligarchy be admitted. I will never side with him who hath corrupted the People, intends or endeavours it. I will never suffer any new Tables or any Division of those already received, or a Parity of Lands or Goods. I will never call home any banished or confined Person. I will consent that he be expelled the City, who denies these Laws, decreed by the Senate, confirmed by the People; I will never permit any to be injured, I will never constitute any Magistrate before he hath given account of his last Magistracy. I will never permit the same Man to be chosen twice in one Year, or at once to hold two Offices. I will neither take, nor suffer any to take Bribes or Rewards. I am thirty Years old, I will bear impartially both Plaintiff and Defendant, and condemn without Excuse those that deserve it. I swear by Jove, by Neptune, and by Ceres, may they destroy me, my House and Children, if I observe not all these Particulars. Hence perhaps it is that ^u *Hesychius* affirms, Solon in his Laws to have ordained an Oath by three Gods.*

Considering the Irregularity of Months, and the Course of the Moon, which agreed not always with the Rising and Setting of the Sun, but sometimes overtook and went past him in one Day, he called that Day the *ἡμέρα πρῶτη*, last and first, attributing that Part which precedes the Conjunction to the last Month, the rest to the Beginning of the next. Thus ^v he taught the Athenians to accommodate the reckoning of their Days to the Motion of the Moon; and was (as it appears) the first who understood rightly that of *Homer*.

When one Month ended and the next began.

The Day following he called *Νεμεμία*, the new Moon; from the twentieth Day to the thirtieth he reckon'd not by Addition but by Subtraction, in respect of the Moon's Decrase: For this see ^w *Aristophanes*.

^x He ordered the Verses of *Homer* to be recited successively, that where the first ended the next should begin; whence *Diocles* saith, he illustrated *Homer* more than *Pisistratus* (by whom the *Rhapsodies* were first collected) the principal Verses were,

They who inhabit Athens, &c.

^y He first tolerated common Courtfeans, and with

^c Liban. declam. 23. ^d Scob. 114. ^e Demost. in Aristogit.

^h Plut. Solon. ⁱ A. Gell. 2. 12. ^j Plut. Erymoll. ^k Pollux. 8. 10.

^l Schol. Aristoph. in Aves. ^m Didym. apud Harp. de Snid. ⁿ Plut. Sol.

^o Schol. Aristoph. in Aves. ^p Didym. apud Harp. de Snid. ^q Plut. Sol.

^r Theophr. ^s Stobæus. ^t Demosthenes. ^u Hesychius.

^f Maxim. Tyr. Dissert. 39.

^g Cicero orat. pro S. Rofc.

^h Suid. in Kay.

ⁱ Orat. pro Cœcen.

^j Demost. orat.

^k Athen. deipn. 13.

the Money they paid to the State erected a Temple to *Venus, ὠκεῖνη*.

^b He first taught Soldiers to march by the Sound of Fifes and Harps, observing a Kind of Measure in their Pace.

C H A P. VIII.

How he entertained Anacharſis ; his Travels to Egypt, Cyprus, Miletus, Delphi, Corinth and Crete.

IN the forty-seventh Olympiad (according to ^c *Sofſterates*) *Anacharſis* came to *Athens* ; *Eucrates* being Archon, ^d he went immediately to the Houſe of *Solon*, and knocking at the Door, ſaid he was a Stranger deſirous of his Friendſhip and Hoſpitality : *Solon* answered, *It is better to contract Friendſhip at home ; then you that are at home*, (replies *Anacharſis*) *make me your Friend and Guſt*. *Solon* admiring his Acuteness, entertained him kindly, and kept him ſome time with him, whiſt he was employed about publick Affairs, and ordering his Laws ; which *Anacharſis* underſtanding, ſmiled, that he undertook to curb the Injuſtice and Covetouſneſs of Citizens by written Ordinances, not differing from Cobwebs, holding faſt the Weak and Poor, whiſt the Powerful and Rich break through them ; where- to *Solon* answered, *That Men ſtand faſt to thoſe Covenants which it is not convenient for either Party to break* : He gave the Citizens ſuch Laws, as it was veſſel to all, that to keep were better than to tranſgreſs ; but the Event agreed more with the Conjecture of *Anacharſis* than the Expectation of *Solon*.

^e After his Laws were promulgated, ſome or other coming daily to him, either to praiſe or diſpraiſe them, or to adviſe to put in or out whatſoever came into their Minds, the greater Part to have the Meaning explained, queſtioning how every Thing was to be underſtood, and intreating him to unfold the Senſe ; he (conſidering, that not to ſatisfy them, would argue Pride, to ſatisfy them would make him liable to Cenſure) determined to avoid Ambiguities, Importunities and Occaſions of Blame ; (ſo, as he ſaid,

*In Things that are not ſmall,
'Tis hard to ſing to all.)*

Colouring his Travel with being Maſter of a Ship, and having obtained Leave of the *Athenians* to be abſent ten Years, he put to Sea, hoping in that time his Laws would become familiar to them.

^f The firſt Place of his Arrival was *Egypt*, where he dwelt, as himſelf ſaith,

At Nilus' Mouth, near the Canopian Shore.

He ſtudied Philoſophy a while with *Pſenophis* of *Heliopolis*, and *Sonches* of *Sais*, the moſt learned of thoſe Priests, by whom, ^g *Plato* affirms, he was taught the *Atlantick Fable*, which he afterwards began to explain in Verſe. When he queſtioned them in Antiquities, the elder ſaid to him, *O Solon, Solon, you Greeks are always Children, there is not one Greek an old Man*.

^h Thence he went to *Cyprus*, where he was much favoured by *Philoſcyprus*, one of the Kings of that Country, who had a little Town built by *Demophoon*, Son of *Theſeus*, upon the River *Clarius*, in a ſtrong Place, but rugged and barren : *Solon*, perſuading him, there lying a pleaſant Plain underneath it, to transfer the Town thither, making it more ſpacious and delightful : *Solon* being preſent at the doing hereof, took Care it might be peopled, and aſſiſted the King to contrive it, as well for Health as Strength ; whereupon many came in to *Philoſcyprus*, whom other Kings emulated ; for this Reaſon, he aſcribed the Honour thereof unto *Solon*, naming the City (which before was called *Æpea*) from him *Soli*. This Foundation he mentions in his Elegies, addreſſing his Speech to *Philoſcyprus*,

*Mayſt thou in Cyprus long as King abide,
And o'er this People and this Town preſide ;
In a ſea Veſſel from this Haven may
Cythera crown'd with Violets me convey.
Her kind Aſpect and Happineſs may ſhe
Grant to this Town a ſafe Return to me.*

He viſited *Thales* alſo at *Miletus*, whoſe Impoſture towards him (related already in *Plutarch's* Words) receive from *Tzetzes*.

*Solon's Friend Thales led a ſingle Life,
By Solon often mov'd to take a Wiſe ;
Theſe a Mileſian (Thales fo contriv'd)
Meeting, pretends from Athens late arriv'd,
Solon asks curiouſly what News was there ;
One that's abroad, ſaith he, hath loſt his Hair,
The City waited on his Obſequies.
Was it not Solon's Son, Solon replies ?
To this the Stranger (as ſuborn'd) aſſents :
He with torn Hair in Cries his Paſſion vents ;
Whom Thales, (tenderly embracing) leave
This Grief, ſaith he, I did thee but deceive ;
'Tis for theſe Reaſons Marriage I decline,
Which can deſtroy ſo great a Soul as thine.*

Whether it belong to this Deceit, or to a real Loſs ⁱ *Diſcorides*, and ^k *Stobæus* report, that weeping for the Death of his Son, one told him, *But*

^b Soſt. Empiric, adverſ. Mathem. 6.
ⁱ Laert. 1. 63. ^k Seim. 121.

^c Plut. Sol.

^d Laert. 1. 110.

^e Plut. Sol.

^f Ibid.

^g In Timæo.

^h Plut. Sol.

this helps nothing, he answered, and therefore I sweep.

¹ At Delphi he met with the rest of the wife Men, and the Year following at Corinth, by Periander's Invitation, which was as ² Plutarch implies, long before Pisistratus came to reign; nor doth ³ Dion Ghrysostom intend the contrary, tho' so interpreted by ⁴ a learned Person, his Words importing only this; Solon fled not the Tyranny of Periander, tho' he did that of Pisistratus.

That he went also to Crete (perhaps to visit Epimenides) is evident from an ⁵ Epistle of Thales.

C H A P. IX.

The Attribute of Wife conferred on him: His moral Sentences.

When Damascus (the second) was ¹ Archon, (in the Year of the 49th Olympiad) all the seven received the Attribute of Wife. Of these was Solon, upon whom ² Themistius saith, it was conferred as an honourable Title full of Dignity: ³ Plutarch avers that all of them (except Thales) were so called from their Skill in civil Affairs. And again, ⁴ in Philosophy Solon chiefly affected (as did likewise most of the wife Men) that Part of Morality which concerns Politicks; and speaking of ⁵ Mnesophilus, he was not (saith he) an Orator, nor of those Philosophers who are called natural, but embraced that Wisdom which teacheth Government of a State, and Prudence in publick Actions, which he retained as a Sect delivered by Succession from Solon. Whence ⁶ Macrobius instances Solon as skillful in that Kind of Learning, which draweth Philosophy deeper, and establisheth a State.

Hereto may be added his moral Learning, for which (tho' Socrates reduced it. first to a Science, and was thereupon honoured as the Inventor thereof) the seven were so famous, that some affirm the Title of Wife was given them only for excelling others in a laudable Course of Life, and comprehending some moral Rules in short Sentences; of these they had three Sorts, Apophthegms, Precepts; and ⁷ *Adages*.

Of his Apophthegms Laertius recites these, ⁸ Speech is the Image of Action; he is a King who hath Power. Laws are like Cobwebs which entangle the lesser Sort, the greater break through. Those who are in favour with Princes resemble Counters used in casting Accounts, which sometimes stand for a greater Number, sometimes for a lesser; so these are sometimes honoured, sometimes cast down. Being demanded how Men might be brought to do no wrong, if, said he, they who have received none,

and those who are wronged, be alike concerned; Satisfaction comes of Riches, Contumely of Satiety.

⁹ Plutarch and others, these; ¹⁰ He conceived that City to be best governed, where the People as eagerly prosecute Wrongs done to others, as to themselves. ¹¹ Being demanded how a City might be best ordered, he answered, if the Citizens obeyed the Magistrates, the Magistrates the Laws; he affirmed, that King and Tyrant should become most glorious, who would convert his Monarchy to Democracy. He esteemed that Family best, wherein Wealth is gotten not unjustly, kept not unfaithfully, expended not with Repentance.

¹² He defined, the Happy those who are competent by furnished with outward Things, act honestly, and live temperately; which Definition Aristotle approves.

¹³ He said, A Commonwealth consists of two Things, Reward and Punishment.

¹⁴ Seeing one of his Friends much grieved, he carried him to the Tower, and desired him to view all the Buildings below, which observing the other to have done, now saith he, think with yourself how many Sorrows have heretofore and do at present dwell under those Roofs, and shall in future Ages; and forbear to be troubled at the Inconveniences of Mortality, as if they were only yours. He said also, that if Men should bring their Misfortunes together in one Place, every one would carry his own home again, rather than take an equal Share out of the common Stock.

¹⁵ Being in drinking, demanded by Periander, whether he were silent through Want of Discourse, or through Folly, answered, no Fool can be silent amidst his Cups. ¹⁶ He said, that City was best ordered, wherein the good were rewarded, the bad punished.

¹⁷ He said, a Man ought to fear nothing, but that his End exceed not Philosophy.

¹⁸ Demosthenes recites a Discourse which he used to the Judges, in accusing one who had moved a pernicious Law, to this Effect; It is a Law generally received in all Cities, that he who makes false Money should be put to Death. Then he demanded of the Judges, whether the Law seemed to them just and commendable, whereunto they assenting, he added, that he conceived Money to be used amongst Citizens, in respect of private Contrasts; but that Laws were the Money of the Commonwealth: Therefore Judges ought to punish those, who embased the Money of the Commonwealth much more severely than those who embased that of private Persons; and that they might better understand it to be a far greater Offence to corrupt Laws than adulterate Coin, he added, that many Cities use Money of Silver alloyed with Brass or Lead, without any Prejudice to them-

¹ Laert. 1. 40. ² m Conviv. sept. sapient. ³ n Orat. 37. ⁴ o J. Meursius. ⁵ p Ad Phaezcyd. ⁶ q Apud Laert. 1. 43. ⁷ r Laert. 1. 22. ⁸ s Orat. 4. ⁹ t Vit. Sol. ¹⁰ u Vit. Themist. ¹¹ v Socrus. Scip. 2. 17. ¹² x Vit. Sol. ¹³ y Sympos. sept. sapient. ¹⁴ z Arist. Ethic. 1. 8. ¹⁵ a Cic. Epist. 15. ad Brut. ¹⁶ b Val. Max. 7. 2. ¹⁷ c Stob. Serm. 34. ¹⁸ d Ibid. 41. ¹⁹ e Johan. Salub. polyg. 8. 14. ²⁰ f Orat. in Timocrat.

themselves; but whosoever should use Laws so adulterated,
could not escape Ruin and Death.
** Mimnermus writing thus,*

From Trouble and Diseases free,
At threescore Years let Death take me.

He reproved him, saying,

By my Advice, that Wisp extend,
Nor for his Counsel slight thy Friend.
Alter thy Song, and let it be,
At fourscore Years let Death take me.

His moral Precepts are thus delivered by ^h Demetrius Phalereus, some whereof are cited by Laertius. Nothing too much. Sit not as Judge; if thou dost, the condemned will esteem thee an Enemy. Fly Pleasure, for it brings forth Sorrow. Observe Honesty in thy Conversation more strictly than an Oath. Seal Words with Silence, Silence with Opportunity. Lie not, but speak the Truth. Consider on serious Things, Say not ought is juster than thy Parents. Procure not Friends in Haste, nor procured, part with in Haste. By learning to obey, you shall know how to command. What Forfeiture you impose on others, undergo yourself. Advise not Citizens what is pleasant, but what is best. Be not arrogant. Converse not with wicked Persons. Consult the Gods. Cherish thy Friend. Reverence thy Parents. Make Reason thy Guide. What thou jest speak not. What thou knowest conceal. Be mild to those that belong to thee. Conjecture hidden Things from apparent.

His particular Sentence, according to ⁱ Didymus and Laertius was, Nothing too much; according to Aulus Gellius, Know thyself, who ascribes these also to him.

Him I dare happy call whose End I see.
Match with thy like, Unequals not agree.
By Fortune guided, none to Honour raise;
A Friend in private chide, in public praise;
Honours atchiev'd created far exceed;
If Fates be sure, what helps it to take Heed?
And if unsure, there is of Fear less need.

Of his *ἀσφίμια* Laertius mentions these.

Of every Man be careful, lest he bear
A Sword conceal'd within his Breast, a clear
Aspect, and double Tongue, a Mind severe.

C H A P. X.

How he opposed Pisistratus, and reprehended Theſpis.

DURING the Absence of Solon², the former Disſention broke forth again in the City: *Lycurgus*

was Head of the Countrymen, *Megacles* of the Maritimes, *Pisistratus* of the Townsmen, who were most violent against the Rich; *Solon's* Laws were still observed in the City, but the People aimed at Novelty and Change, not as thinking it most just, but in Hopes to be Masters of other Men's Goods, and to suppress the adverse Party. *Solon*, whilst Things stood thus, returned to *Athens*, where he was much revered and honoured by all, but could not speak or act in publick, through the Weakness of his Body and Spirits, yet privately taking every one of the Commanders apart, he endeavoured to reconcile their Differences, wherein *Pisistratus* seemed the most ready to be persuaded, with whom he had a very ancient Friendship, grounded as well upon their Kindred, as upon the good Qualities of *Pisistratus*, than whom (as *Solon* used to say) there could not be a Person of more Worth, if he were cured of his Ambition.

¹ About this Time (according to *Plutarch*) which was in the fiftieth Olympiad, *Theſpis* began to present Tragedies (which *Suidas* erroneously accounts ten Olympiads later, as is observed by *Meurſius*) the People were much taken with the Novelty of the Thing, for as yet there were no Contentions therein. *Solon* naturally desirous to hear and learn, and by Reason of his Age indulging more to Ease and Pleasure, Feasting and Musick, went to see *Theſpis* himself act, as was then the Manner; the Play ended, he went to *Theſpis*, and asked him, if he were not ashamed to speak so many Lies before so great an Auditor? *Theſpis* answered, it was no Shame to act or say such Things in Jest. *Solon* striking the Ground hard with his Staff, replied, but in a short Time we who approve this Kind of Jest shall use it in earnest, in our Contracts and Transactions. = In fine, he absolutely forbade him to teach or act Tragedies, conceiving their Falsity unprofitable, whereto he related the Deceit of *Pisistratus*, who soon after having wounded himself³, came into the Forum in a Chariot, pretending to have been so used by his Enemies in behalf of the Common-wealth, and inflamed the People with much Rage. *Solon* coming near to him, Son of *Hippocrates* (saith he) you act *Homer's Ulyſſes* ill in using the same Means to deceive the Citizens, wherewith he (whipping himself) deluded the Enemy. Immediately the People flocked in to defend *Pisistratus*. *Ariston* moved he might be allowed a standing Guard of fifty Men; *Solon* rose up to oppose it, using Speeches, the Effect wherof he afterwards thus express in Verse.

If evil your Impieties befall,
Gods not the Authors of those Mischief's call,

^g Laert. 1. 60.

^h Stub. Serm. 3.

ⁱ Clem. Alex. Strom. 1.

^k Plut. Sol.

^l Ibid.

^m Laert. 1. 59.

ⁿ Plut.

*Yourselves the Causes, have given Power to those,
Who in Requital Servitude impose.
Lion whom the Footsteps of the Fox pursue,
Whose Soul's Deceit and Vanity endure.
The Man's smooth Tongue and Speech you only heed,
But never penetrate into the Deed.*

He also foretold them the Aims of *Pisistratus*, in an Elegy to this Effect.

*Vapours condens'd ingender Hail and Snow,
And Thunder doth from radiant Lightning flow.
The Sea is troubled by the raging Wind,
When not disturb'd by that, nothing more kind.
A City by great Persons is o'erthrown,
And taught beneath a Monarchy to groan.*

But seeing the poorer Sort much addicted to *Pisistratus*, and tumultuous, the richer afraid; consulting their Safety by Flight, he retired, saying, *Athenians*, I am wiser than some, valiantier than others, wiser than those who understand not the Deceit of *Pisistratus*, valiantier than those who understand it, yet hold their Peace through Fear. The Senate being of the same Faction with *Pisistratus*, said he was mad, whereto he answered,

*A little Time will to the People clear
My Madness, when it's 'midst Truth shall appear.*

The People having granted *Pisistratus* his Request concerning a Guard, question'd not the Number of them, but conniv'd so long at his pressing and maintaining as many Soldiers as he pleased, that at last he possess'd himself of the Tower; whereupon the City being in a Tumult, *Megacles*, with the rest of the *Alcmaeonidae* fled. *Solon*, now very old, and destitute of those that might back him, went into the Forum, armed with a Spear and Shield, and made an Oration to the People, partly accusing them of Folly and Cowardice, partly inciting them not to forsake their Liberty, using this celebrated Speech, *It had been far easier to have suppress'd this Tyranny in the Growth, but much more noble to cut it off now it is at the Height.* No Man daring to hear him, he went home and taking his Arms, set them in the Street before his Door (*Laertius* saith, before the Magazine) saying, *I have helped my Country and the Law as much as lay in me; or as Laertius, O Country, I have assisted thee both in Word and Deed.* *Plutarch* adds, that from that time he lived retired, addicted to his Study; and told by many the Tyrant would put him to Death, and demanded wherein he confided so much, he answered in his Age: But *Laertius* affirms (which seems truer) that as soon as he had laid down his Arms, he forsook the Country: And *A. Gellius*, that in

the Reign of *Servius Tullius*, *Pisistratus* was Tyrant of Athens, *Solon* going first away into voluntary Exile.

CHAP. XI.

How he travelled into Lydia, and Cilicia.

Solon at his Departure from Athens, received Invitations from many; by *Thales* desired to come to *Miletus*; by *Bias*, to *Priene*; by *Epimenides*, to *Crete*; by *Cleobulus*, to *Lindus*; as is evident from their several Letters to that Effect; even *Pisistratus* pressed him to return home by this Epistle.

Pisistratus to Solon.

Neither am I the only Person of the Greeks, nor am I without Right to the Kingdom I possess, as being descended from *Codrus*: That which the *Athenians* having sworn to give to *Codrus* and his Heirs, took away, I have recovered; no otherwise do I offend either God or Man; I take Care that the Common-wealth be governed according to the Laws you ordained for the *Athenians*, and that better than by a Democracy. I suffer none to do wrong, neither do I enjoy any Privileges of a Tyrant, more than Honour and Dignity; such Rewards only as were conferred upon the ancient Kings; every Man pays the Tenth of his Estate, not to me, but to the Maintenance of publick Sacrifices, or other Charges of the Common-wealth, or against Time of War. You I blame not for discovering my Intent; you did it more in love to the State than in hate to me; besides, you knew not what Government I meant to establish, which if you had, perhaps you would have brooked my Rule, and not banished yourself; return therefore home, and believe me without an Oath. *Solon* shall never receive any Displeasure from *Pisistratus*, you know my very Enemies have not, and if you will vouchsafe to be of my Friends, you shall be of the first, for I never saw any Thing in you deceitful or false; if otherwise, you will live with the *Athenians*; use your Freedom, only deprive not yourself of your Country for my Sake.

Solon returned this Answer.

Solon to Pisistratus.

I Believe I shall not suffer any Harm by you, for before you were Tyrant, I was your Friend, and at present am no more your Enemy, than any other *Athenian* who dislikes Tyranny. Whether it be better they be governed by a single Person, or by a Democracy, let both Parties de-

termine. I pronounce you the best of Tyrants ; but to return to *Athen* I think not fitting, lest I incur Blame, who settled an Equality in the *Athenian* Common-wealth, and would not accept of the Tyranny ; by returning, I shall comply with thy Actions.

Cræsus also sent to invite him, to whom he thus answered :

Solon to *Cræsus*.

I Love your Humanity towards us, and by *Pallas*, but that I affect above all Things to live under a Democracy, I should much sooner chioose to live in your Kingdom than at *Athen*, whilst *Pisistratus* rules there by Force ; but it is most pleasing to me to live where all Things are just and equal ; yet will I come over to you, being desirous to become your Guest.

Solon upon this Invitation went to *Sardis*, where *Cræsus* (saith *Herodotus*) received him very kindly. After the third or fourth Day, the Officers, at *Cræsus's* Appointment, led him into the Treasuries, to shew him all their Greatness and Riches ; when he had beheld all, *Cræsus* spoke thus unto him : *Athenian* Guest, because we have heard much Fame of your Wisdom and Experience, having out of Love to Philosophy travelled into many Countries, I have a Desire to enquire of you if ever you saw any Man whom you could call most happy. This he demanded, hoping himself to be esteemed such. *Solon*, nothing flattering him, answered according to the Truth, saying, O King, Tellus the *Athenian*. At which Speech *Cræsus* wondering : Why do you judge Tellus the most happy ? Because (replied *Solon*) in a well ordered State, he had Children honest and good, and saw every one of those have Children all living ; thus having passed his Life as well as is possible for Man, he ended it gloriously : A Fight happened between the *Athenians* and their Neighbours in *Eleusis*, he came in to their Succour, and putting the Enemy to flight, died nobly ; the *Athenians* buried him in the Place where he fell with much Honour. Whilst *Solon* recounted the Happiness of Tellus, *Cræsus* being moved, demanded to whom he assigned the next Place, making no question but himself should be named a second. *Cleobis* (saith he) and *Bito*, they were *Argives* by Birth, they had sufficient wealth to maintain themselves ; and withal, so great Strength of Body, that both were alike Victors in the publick Games, of whom it is thus reported ; the *Argives* celebrating the Festival of Juno, it was necessary their Mother should be drawn to the Temple by a Pair of Oxen, there being no Oxen in the Field ready, these young Men, frightened in Time, undervent the Yoke, and drew the Chariot of their Mother forty-five Stadia, till they came to the Temple ;

when they had so done, in the Sight of all the People, they obtained the happiest End of their Days, whereby the God declared it better for a Man to die than to live ; the *Argives* pressing about them, the Men applauded the Piety of the Sons ; the Women the Happiness of the Mother ; the Mother herself infinitely joyed with the Action, and the Glory thereof, standing before the Image, prayed the Goddess to give her Sons, *Cleobis* and *Bito*, the best Thing that could happen to Man ; after this Prayer, having sacrificed and feasted, they lay down to sleep in the Temple, and never waked more, but so ended their Days ; their Images (as of most excellent Persons) were made by the *Argives*, and set up at *Delphi*. These *Solon* ranked in the second Degree. Hereat *Cræsus* growing angry ; Stranger (said he) doth our Happiness seem so despicable that you will not rank us equal with private Persons ? He answered, Do you enquire, *Cræsus* concerning human Affairs of me, who know, that divine Providence is severe and full of Alteration ? In process of Time we see many Things we would not, we suffer many Things we would not ; let us propose twenty Years as the Term of Man's Life, which Years consist of twenty five thousand and two hundred Days, besides the additional Month ; if we make one Year longer than another by that Month, to make the Time accord, the additional Months, belonging to those seventy Years, will be thirty five, the Days of those Months a thousand and fifty, whereof one is not in all Things like another. So that every Man, O *Cræsus*, is miserable ! You appear to me very rich, and are King over many, but the Question you demand I cannot resolve, until I hear you have ended your Days happily ; he who has much Wealth is not happier than he who gets his Living from Day to Day, unless Fortune continuing all those good Things to him, grant that he die well. There are many Men very rich, yet unfortunate, many of moderate Estates fortunate, of whom he who abounds in Wealth, and is not happy, exceeds the Fortunate only in two Things, the other, him in many ; the Rich is more able to satisfy his Desires, and to overcome great Injuries ; yet the Fortunate excels him, he cannot indeed inflict Hurt on others, and satisfy his own Desires, his good Fortune debars him of these ; but he is free from Ills, healthful, happy in his Children, and beautiful ; if to this a Man dies well, that is he whom you seek, who deserves to be called happy ; before Death he cannot be stiled happy, but fortunate ; yet for one Man to obtain all this is impossible, as one Country cannot furnish itself with all Things, some it hath, others it wants, that which hath most is best ; so in Men, no one is perfect ; what one hath, the other wants ; he who hath constantly most, and at last quietly departs this Life, in my Opinion, O King, deserves to bear that Name. In every Thing we must have Regard to the End,

whether it tends ; for many, to whom God diffeneth all good Fortunes, be at last utterly subverts. This Story is related by *Plutarch**, also mentioned by *Laertius*, who adds, that *Cræsus* being magnificently adorned, and seated on his Throne, asked him, Whether he had ever seen any Thing more glorious ? Who answered, Cocks, Pheasants, and Peacocks, who are much more beautiful in their natural Colour. *Solon* after his Discourse with *Cræsus*, not soothing him, or making any Esteem of him, was dismissed, and accounted unwise for neglecting the present Good in regard to the future. * *Æsop*, the Writer of Fables was at that Time at *Sardis*, sent for thither by *Cræsus*, with whom he was much in Favour ; he was grieved to see *Solon* so unthankfully dismiss, and said to him, *Solon*, We must either tell Kings nothing at all, or what may please them. No, saith *Solon*, either nothing at all, or what is best for them. Thus was *Solon* much despised by *Cræsus*.

Afterwards *Cræsus* being taken Prisoner by *Cyrus*, was at his Command fettered and set upon a great Pile of Wood to be burned : As he was in this Posture, it came into his Mind what *Solon* had divinely said to him, that no living Man is happy ; as soon as he remembered these Words, he fell into a great Defection of Spirit, and sighing deeply, named *Solon* thrice, which *Cyrus* hearing, commanded the Interpreters to ask upon whom he called ? They went to him and asked, he was silent ; at last pressing him further, he answered, Upon him who I desire above all Wealth, might have spoken with all Tyrants ; notwithstanding, after much Pressure and Importunity, he told them, *Solon* an Athenian came long since to him, and beholding all his Wealth, valued it at nothing ; moreover, that all which he told him had come to pass, nor did it more belong to him than to all Mankind, especially to those who think themselves happy. Whilst *Cræsus* said this, the Fire began to kindle, and the outward Parts thereof to be seized by the Flame. *Cyrus* being informed by an Interpreter of all that *Cræsus* had said, began to relent, knowing himself to be but a Man, who delivered another Man, nothing inferior to him in Wealth, to be burned alive, fearing to be punished for that Act, and considering that nothing was certain in human Affairs, he commanded the Fire to be instantly quenched, and *Cræsus*, and those that were with him to be brought off ; * whom ever after, as long as he lived, he had in Esteem. Thus *Solon* gained Praise, that of two Kings, his Speech preserved one, and instructed the other.

Plutarch relates this done in the former ten Years Travel of *Solon*, upon the finishing of his Laws,

whence he maketh an Apology for the Incongruity thereof, with the Rules of Chronology, which had less need, if with *Laertius*, he had placed it after *Pisistratus* his Usurpation of the Tyranny.

Laertius saith, he went from hence to *Cilicia*, and built there a City called after him *Solos*, whither he brought also some few *Athenians*, whose Language growing corrupt by that of the Country, they were said to solecise ; of this is the Etymologist doubtless to be understood, who derives Σολακισμὸς ἀπὸ σόλων κλιμῶν (so read we, not ἀπὸ Σόλωνος κλιμῶν.) This is also attested by *Suidas*, as a distinct Relation from that of *Cyprus*, in Confirmation whereof *Laertius* adds, the *Cilicians* were called *Solenises*, the *Cyprians* *Solii*.

CHAP. XII.

His Death.

*Heracles** affirms *Solon* lived long after *Pisistratus* began to Reign ; ^b *Lucian*, that his Life extended to a hundred Years ; with whom those best agree, who said (as *Suidas* relates) he lived in the fifty-sixth Olympiad ; ^c but according to *Phanias*, *Pisistratus* took the Tyranny upon him, when *Comias* was Archon ; who succeeded *Comias*, which was in the first Year of the fifty-fifth Olympiad. If this latter Opinion had not every where taken Place of the other, the Disagreement betwixt the Time of *Solon*'s Death, and *Cræsus*'s Reign had not been urged by many, as an Argument against the Story of their Meeting.

He died (according to ^d *Laertius*) aged eighty Years (being, as ^e *Ælian* saith, very decrepit) in *Cyprus*, (as is likewise attested by ^f *Valerius Maximus* and *Suidas*) and left Order with his Friends that they should carry his Bones to *Salamis*, and there causing them to be burnt, scatter the Ashes all over the Country ; which Story *Plutarch* (tho' he counts it fabulous) acknowledges to be attested by many Authors of Credit, particularly *Aristotle*.

* *Laertius* confirms it by the Testimony of *Cratinus*, who makes him speak thus :

*The Island I inhabit, sown,
As Fame reports in Ajax Town.*

That Desire of Knowledge which he usually professed, continued with him to his End, ^g confirmed the last Day of his Life, his Friends sitting about him, and falling into some Discourse, he raised his weary Head, and being demanded why he did so, he answered, *That when I have learned that, whatsoever it be, wherein you dispute, I may die.* His Brother's Son singing an Ode of *Sappho*, he,

u In vit. Sol. Laert. 1. 57. w Herodot. 1. 2. x Plut. Sol. y Herodot. 1. 2. z Plut. ibid. a Plut. Sol. b De Longevitate, c Plut. ibid. d Laert. 1. 62. e Val. Max. 8. 16. f Lib. 5. cap. 3. g Laert. ibid. h Val. Max. 8. 1. i Sol. 29.

delighted therewith, bad him teach him it, and being demanded why, *that*, said he, *I may learn whilst I depart out of this Life.*

After his Death, the *Athenians* erected his Statue in Brass, before the ^k checker'd Cloister ^l in the Forum: Another was set up at *Salamis*, hiding (as *Demosthenes* and *Æschines* describe it) the Hand within the Garment, in the same Habit wherein he used to make Speeches to the *Athenians*, perhaps the same that carried this Inscription,

*Fam'd Salamis, the Persian Pride cast down,
And gave to Solon Birth, the Laws Renown.*

^m *Laertius* bestows this Epigram upon him,

*A Foreign Cyprian Fire burn'd Solon, yet
Salamis keeps his Bones, their Ashes Wheat;
His Soul to Heaven mounts with his Laws so light
A Burthen, they not clog, but help his Flight.*

CHAP. XIII.

His Writings.

HIS Excellency both in Rhetorick and Poetry is attested by many: *Cicero* says, "Before *Solon's* Time, no Man is recorded for Eloquence. "And again, *Lycurgus* and *Solon* we place in the 'Number of the Eloquent.' " *Dion Chrysostom* observes, " *Aristides*, *Lycurgus*, *Solon*, *Epaminondas*, and if there be any other of the same Kind, ought to be esteemed Philosophers in the Common-wealth, or Orators, according to ingenious true Rhetorick. " *Aristides*, *Solon* is said to have sung those Things which concern the *Megarenses*; but neither his Laws nor Orations, which sometimes he made for the Rich to the Commons, sometimes for the Commons to the Rich, did he sing or compose in Verse, but used a rhetorical Form, excellently demonstrating in all these, that he deserved to be esteemed an Orator and a wise Man, having attained both those Titles and Faculties.

As to Poetry, *Plutarch* avers, "he addicted himself thereto from the Beginning, not in serious Matters, but ludicrous, used (as it seems) for his Exercise and Pastime; afterwards he included many philosophical Sentences in Verse, and many Affairs of State, not in relation to History, but to vindicate his own Actions, sometimes also to correct and reprove the *Athenians*." *Plato* saith, "That at the *Apaturian* Feast, the Boys used to repeat his Poems; and that if he applied himself to nothing but Poetry, as others did, and had finished the History he brought with him out of

Egypt, and had not been constrained by Seditions and other Distractions to lay aside that Study, neither *Hesiod*, *Homer*, nor any of the Poets would have been more famous."

Of his Writings in Prose, we must with *Laertius* name in the first Place his *Laws*; of which already.

Orations to the People.

His *Poems* are cited under that general Title by *Phrynicius*, their particular Subjects and Titles these,

Exhortations to himself, mentioned by *Laertius*, *Aristides*, and *Suidas*.

Elegies.

Salamis; of which *Chap. 2.*

Of the *Athenian Commonwealth*, which *Laertius* affirms to have extended to two thousand Verses, according to ^k *Pausanias* and *Philo*, in *Elegiac* Verse.

Iambicks, mentioned by *Laertius*, cited by *Athenæus* and *Aristides*.

Epodes, mentioned by *Laertius*.

Elegies to King Cyranor, cited by the Author of *Aratus's* Life. *Adopéva*, cited by *Laertius*.

Some, saith *Plutarch*, affirm he began to reduce his own Laws into Verse.

The last Work he undertook was concerning the *Atlantick* Speech or Fable, which beginning late, he was deterred by the greatness of the Work, as *Plutarch* saith, and prevented by Death.

Besides those Epistles already alledged, these are preserved also by ^z *Laertius*.

Solon to Periander.

"YOU send me Word there are many who plot against you; if you should put them all to Death, it would advantage you nothing; some one there may be of those, whom you suspect not, who plots against you, either fearing himself, or disdaining you, or desirous to ingratiate himself with the City, tho' you have done him no Injury; it is best, if you would be free from Jealousy, to acquit yourself of the Cause; but if you will continue in Tyranny, take Care to provide a greater Strength of Strangers than is in your own City; so shall you need to fear no Man, nor to put any to Death."

Solon to Epimenides.

"NEITHER are my Laws likely to benefit the *Athenians* long, nor have you advantaged the City by Lustration; for divine Right and Lawgivers cannot alone benefit Cities; it importeth

^k *Pausan.* Attic. ^l *Demosth.* in *Arist.* 2. ^m *Ælian*, var. hist. 8. 16. ⁿ *Laert.* 1. 26. ^o *De Orat.* lib. 1. 13. ^p *Orat.* 21. ^q *Orat.* Plat. 2. ^r *Plut.* in *Solon*. ^s *In Timæo*. 1. Crit. ^t *Laert.* 1. 61. ^u *Eleg.* dist. Attic. ^v *In Orat.* ^w *Orat.* ^x *Attic.* ^y *Orat.* ^z *Laert.* 1. 64.

* much of what Mind they are who lead the common People ; Divine Rights and Laws, if they direct them well, are profitable, if they direct them ill, profit nothing ; neither are those Laws I gave in any better Condition ; they who had Charge of the Common-wealth not preventing *Pisistratus's* Usurpation of the Tyranny, lo! the City, of which, when I foretold them, I could not be believed ; the *Athenians* would rather credit his Flatteries than my Truth ; wherefore, laying down my Arms before the Magazine, I said, that I was wiser than those who did not see *Pisistratus* aimed at the Tyranny, and flouter than those who durst not resist him : They reputed *Solon* a Madman. Lastly, I made this Profession, O Country ! behold *Solon* ready to vindicate thee in Word and Deed : They again esteemed me mad. Thus I being the only Person that opposed *Pisistratus*, I came away from them ; let them guard him with their Arms, if they please ; for know, (dear Friend) the Man came very cunningly by the Kingdom, he complied at first with the Democracy, afterwards wounding himself, came into *Eliaæ*, crying out, he had received those Hurts from his Enemies, and required a Guard of four hundred young Men, which they (not hearkening to me) granted ; these carried Halberds. After this, he dissolved the popular Government ; truly I laboured in vain to free the poorer Sort from mercenary Slavery, when they all now serve one *Pisistratus*. Such Fragments of his Poems as have been hitherto preserved are thus collected.

One of his * Elegies.

Sprung from Mnemosyne and Jove's great Line,
Pierian Muses, to my Prayer incline,
 Grant that my Life and Actions may call down
 Blessings from Heaven, and raise on Earth Renown ;
 Sweet to my Friends, and bitter to my Foes,
 To these my Sighs bring Terror, Joy to those.
 Riches I wish, not Riches that are plac'd
 In unjust Means, for Vengeance comes at last.
 Riches dispens'd by Heaven's more bounteous Hand,
 A Base on which we may unshaken stand.
 But that which Men by Injuries obtain,
 That which by Arts and Deeds unjust they gain,
 Comes slowly, swiftly by Revenge pursued,
 And Misery like a cleft Spark include,
 Which soon to a devouring Flame dilates,
 Wrong is a weak Foundation for Estates.
 Jove doth the End of every Thing survey,
 As sudden vernal Blasts chase Clouds away.
 Ranck the Bottom of the roaring Main,
 Then swiftly over-run the fertile Plain,

Ruffling the wealthy Ears ; at last they rise
To Jove's high Seat, a Calm then smooths the Skies.
The Sun's rich Lustre mildly gilds the green
Enamel of the Meads, no Clouds are seen.
Such is Jove's heavy Anger, differing far
From Men whose every Trifle leads to War :
They are not bid for ever, who offend ;
In secret, Judgment finds them in the End.
Some in the Act are punish'd, others late,
Even he who thinks he hath eluded Fate :
At last repents it in just Miseries,
Which Nephews for their Ancestors chastise.
We think it fares alike with good and bad ;
Glory and self-conceit our Fancies glad
Till Suffering comes, then their griev'd Spirits bleed,
Who did before their Souls with vain Hope feed.
He whom incurable Diseases seize,
Sooths his deluded Thoughts, with Hopes of Ease.
The Coward's valiant in his own Esteem,
And to themselves, fair the deformed seem.
They who want Means, by Poverty oppress'd,
Believe themselves of full Estates possess'd.
All is attempted, some new Seas explore
To bring home Riches from a foreign Shore :
Seas, on whose boist'rous back secur'd they ride,
And in the Mercy of the Winds confide.
Others to crooked Ploughs their Oxen yoke,
And Autumn with their Plants and Sets provoke.
Some Vulcan's and Minerva's Arts admire,
And by their Hands their Livelihoods acquire.
Others the fair Olympian Muses trace,
And lovely Learning studiously embrace.
One by Apollo is prophetick made,
And tells what Mischiefs others shall invade.
With him the Gods converse, but all the Skill
In Birds or Victims cannot hinder ill.
Some to Poonian Knowledge are inclin'd ;
Nor is the Power of Simples unconfin'd ;
The smallest Hurts sometimes increase and rage,
More than all Art of Physick can assuage ;
Sometimes the Fury of the worst Disease,
The Hand by gentle striking will appease.
That good or bad arrives as Fates design,
Man cannot what the Gods dispense decline.
All Actions are uncertain, no Man knows
When he begins a Work, how it shall close.
Some who their Business weigh with prudent Care,
Out of the Issue intercepted are ;
Whilst others, who have rashly ought design'd,
An End successful of their Labours find.
There's no Bound to those who Wealth acquire,
For they who are possess'd of more, desire
As much again, and who can all content,
Even those full Blessings which the Gods have lent,
Man variously to his own Harm applies,
When Jove by Means as various doth chastise.

Again *.

OUR City never can subverted be
 By Jove or any other Deity :
 For Pallas' Eye surveys with pious Care
 The Walls which by her Hand protected are :
 Yet the Inhabitants of this great Town,
 Fondly inclin'd to Wealth, will throw it down ;
 And those unjust great Persons who are bent
 Others to wrong, themselves to discontent ;
 For their insatiate Fancies have not Power
 To enjoy the Sweetness of the instant Hour,
 But by all wicked Means, Intent or Gain,
 From hallowed, nor from publick Things refrain.
 Riches by Theft and Cozenage to possess,
 The sacred Bounds of Justice they transgress.
 Who silent sees the present, knows the past,
 And will revenge these Injuries at last :
 Causing a careless Rupture in the State,
 And all our Liberties shall captivate.
 Rouse War from his long Slumber, who the Flower
 Of all our Youths shall bloodily devour.
 For Cities which injuriously oppose
 Their Friends, are soon invaded by their Foes.
 These are the common Evils ; of the Poor
 Many transported to a foreign Shore,

To Bondage there, and Fetters shall be sold,
 Each private House that shares the publick Fate,
 Nor can exclude it with a barr'd up Gate ;
 For scaling furiously the higher Walls,
 On those whom Beds or Corners hides, it falls.
 My Soul, Athenians, prompts me to relate
 What Miseries upon Injustice wait :
 But Justice all Things orderly designs,
 And in strict Fetters the unjust confines.
 What's sour, she sweetens, and allays what cloy.
 Wrong she repels, Ill in the Growth destroys,
 Softens the Stubborn, the Unjust reforms,
 And in the State calms all seditious Storms :
 Bitter Dissention by her Reign suppress,
 Who wisely governs all Things for the best.

Another c.

NO Man is blessed, bad is every one
 That feels the Warmth of the all-seeing Sun.

Another d.

LET me not die unpitied, every Friend
 With Sighs and Tears my latest Hour attend.

b Ex Demosth. Orat. de fals. leg.

c Stobæus Grotii. p. 404.

d Ibid. p. 502.

C H I L O.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

CHilo * was a Lacedæmonian, Son of Damagetus, corruptly termed in ¹ Stobæus, Pages. He was eminent among the Greeks for two Predictions.

The first to Hippocrates * to whom (being a private Person) happened a great Prodigy at the Olympick Games. Having prepared an Offering, and filled a Caudron with Flesh and Water, it boiled over without Fire. This Portent Chilo (accidentally present) beholding, advised him, that he should not take a Wife by whom he might have Issue ; that if he had one, he should put her away, and if a Son, turn him out of Doors. Hippocrates not following this Advice, brought up his Son Pististratus, who in the Sedition of the Maritimes and Countrymen at Athens, those led by Megacles, these by Lycurgus, stirred up a third Faction, and gained the Tyranny.

² He was much renowned also for his Prediction concerning Cythera, a Lacedæmonian Island ; examining the Situation thereof, *Would to God* (said he) it had never been ; or since it is, it might be swallowed up by the Sea ; and wisely did he foresee. Damaratus a Lacedæmonian Exile, counselled Xerxes to seize upon that Island ; which Advice, if he had followed, would have ruined all Greece. His Words (according to ³ Herodotus) were these : *You may effect your Desires if you send three hundred Ships to the Lacedæmonian Coast ; there lies an Island named Cythera, of which Chilo, a Person of greatest Wisdom amongst us, said, it were better for the Lacedæmonians that it were under Water than above. He, it seems, expected from it some such Things as I am now going to declare ; not that he foresaw your Navy, but doubting any in the same*

c Laert. 1. 68.

f Scen. 3.

g Herodot. lib. 1.

Laert. Ibid.

h Ibid. 1. 71.

i Lib. 7. 235.

Kind; let your Men issue out of this Island upon the Lacedæmonians, to strike them into Terror. Afterward^k, in the Time of the Peloponnesian War, Nicias taking the Island, placed some Athenians therein, who much infested the Lacedæmonians.

Laertius saith, That he was old in the fifty-second Olympiad, at what Time *Aëolus* flourished: That he was *Ephorus* in the fifty-sixth. (*Cassaubon* reads the fifty-fifth.) But *Pamphila* (continueth *Laertius*) saith in the sixth, he was first *Ephorus*, when *Euthydemus* was *Archon*, as *Solicrates* also affirms, and first appointed the *Ephori* to be joined with Kings, which *Satyrus* saith, was the Institution of *Lycurgus*. Hence it is doubtful whether *Chilo* was *Ephorus* in the sixth Olympiad, or in the fifty-sixth; the latter is more probable, in as much as he bore that Office when *Euthydemus* was *Archon* at *Athens*, which was in the fifty-sixth Olympiad, as appears by the *Marmor Arundelianum*, where for *Euthydemus* is corruptly read *τὸ δὲ* rendered *Archonte populo*. But it is likewise true that the *Ephori* were first created about the sixth Olympiad, when *Polydorus* and *Theopompus* were Kings of *Lacedæmon*, a hundred and thirty Years after *Lycurgus*, as *Plutarch* (in his Life affirms) from which time there were five annual *Ephori* chosen in *Lacedæmon*, whereof the first is called *ἐπὶ ἀρχῇ*, because the Year had its Denomination from him: The first of the first Election was *Elatus*; *Chilo* in the fifty-sixth Olympiad was the first of the five of his Year, which might perhaps give the Occasion of the Mistake to them, who take him to be the first of that Institution, of whom is *Scaliger*.

How he behaved himself in this Office, may be gathered from his Speech^o to his Brother, displeased that himself was not *Ephorus* at the same Time: *I can bear Injuries, saith he, you cannot.*

He was so just in all his Actions,^p that in his old Age he professed he never had done any Thing contrary to the Conscience of an upright Man, only that of one Thing he was doubtful; having given Sentence against his Friend according to Law, he advised his Friend to appeal from him (his Judge) so to preserve both his Friend and the Law: *A. Gellius* relates it thus; 'When his Life drew towards an End, ready to be seized by Death, he spoke thus to his Friends about him: My Words and Actions in this long Term of Years, have been (almost all) such as I need not repent of, which perhaps you also know truly; even at this Time I am certain, I never committed any Thing, the Remembrance whereof begets any Trouble in me, unless this one Thing only, which, whether it were done amiss or not, I am uncertain: I sat with two others as Judge upon the Life of my Friend; the Law was such as the

Person must of Necessity be condemned; so that either my Friend must lose his Life, or some Deceit be used towards the Law. Revolving many Things in my Mind for Relief of a Condition so desperate, I conceived that which I put in Practice to be of all other the most easy to be born: Silently I condemned him, and persuaded those others who judged to absolve him: Thus preserving (in so great a Business) the Duty both of a Judge and Friend; but from that Act I receive this Trouble, that I fear it is not free from Perverseness and Guilt, in the same Business, at the same time, and in a publick Affair, to persuade others, contrary to what was in my own Judgment best.

CHAP. II.

His moral Sentences, Precepts and Verses.

OF his Apophthegms, these are remembered by *Laertius*; he said, 'Providence of future Things collected by Reason, is the Virtue of a Man.' Being demanded wherein the Learned differ from the Unlearned? He answered, 'In a good Hope.' What is hard? 'To conceal Secrets, to dispose of Leisure well; and to be able to bear an Injury.'

Being invited to a Feast by *Periander*, (with the rest of the wise Men) he would not promise to come before he knew what other Company would be there, saying, a Man is necessitated to brook an ill Companion in a Ship at Sea, or in a Tent in a Camp; but to mix indifferently with all Sorts of People at a Feast is Indiscretion. Upon the same Occasion *Plutarch* recites these Sentences of his; *A Prince must not think upon any transitory mortal Things, but only upon the eternal and immortal. That Common-wealth is best where the People mind the Law more than the Lawyers. A Family must resemble as much as possible a City governed by a King. Hearing a Man say he had no Enemy, he asked him if he had any Friend; conceiving Love and Hate necessarily must follow one another.*

His moral Precepts are thus delivered by *Demetrius Phalereus*. Know thyself. Speak not much in thy Drink, for thou wilt transgress; (or as *Laertius*, rule thy Tongue, especially at a Feast.) Threaten not free Persons, for it is not just; (*Laertius*), Threaten none, for that is like a Woman.) Speak not ill of thy Neighbour; if thou dost, thou shalt bear what will trouble thee. Go slowly to the Feasts of thy Friends, swiftly to their Misfortunes; (*Laertius*), go more readily to a Friend in Adversity than in Prosperity.) Celebrate Marriage frugally. Speak well of the Dead. Reverence thy elder; (*Laertius*, Honour Age.) Hate him who

^k *Laert.* 7. 235. ^l *Plot.* vit. *Lycur.* ^m *In Euseb.* p. 67.

ⁿ *Plutarch Sympos.* sept. sup. ^o *Plot.* de animis. ^t *Stob.* serm. 3.

ⁿ *Laert.* 1. 68.

^o *Ibid.*

^p *Laert.* 1. 71.

^q *Ib.* 1. 68.

^u *Laert.* 1. 69.

^w *Ib.* 1. 70.

is inquisitive into the *Weakness* of others. *Prefer Loss before unjust Gain* (for that (adds *Laertius*) brings Grief but once, this for ever.) *Deride not the unfortunate.* If thou art strong, behave thyself mildly, that thou mayst rather be respected than feared (*Laertius*, of thy Neighbours, learn to) *Order thy House well.* Let not thy Tongue run before thy Mind. *Bridle thy Anger.* *Covet not Impossibilities.* *In the Way hasten not forward.* *Shake not thy Hand* (*Laertius*, in Discourse) for it is like a Mad-man. *Obey the Laws.* Be reconciled to those who have wronged thee, but revenge Contumelies. To which *Laertius* adds to else, *To preserve thyself.* Not to hate Divination. *Make Use of Quietness.*

* *Pliny* speaking of Authority, faith, *That Men valued Chilo amongst Oracles, consecrating three Precepts of his at Delphi, in golden Letters, which are these: Every Man to know himself, and to desire nothing too much; the Companion of another's Money and Strife is Misery.*

† He only kept within Bounds the two most fierce Affections of the Soul, Love and Hate, saying, *Love with such Limitation, as if hereafter you might chance to hate: Hate so far, as that perhaps you might hereafter love.*

Ausonius ascribes to him the Effect of these Verses:

*Me, may the Mean not fear, nor Great despise,
Have Death and Health alike before thy Eyes.
The Benefits thou givest remember never,
Of those thou dost receive, be mindful ever.
Learn of thyself and Friend to overcome crooked Fate,
Age, Youth resembling, is a light Estate,
Youth, Age resembling, is a greater Weight.*

His particular Sentence was, *To a Surety Loss is near.*

Of his *Adversity*, * *Laertius* mentions this as most eminent.

*Gold's Worth we by the Touchstone find,
Gold is the Touchstone of the Mind.*

* Lib. 7. cap. 32. y A. Gell. 1. 3. † Laert. 1. 73.
1. 73. d Lib. 1. 72. e Lud. 16p. sup. f Laert. 1. 61.

* He asked *Aescop* what *Jupiter* was doing, who answered, pulling down the High, and raising the Low.

CHAP. III.

His Death and Writings.

HE died (according to * *Hermippus*) at *Pisa*, embracing his Son, Victor in the Olympic Games of the *Cassus*, the Weakness of his Age overcome with Excess of Joy; all who were present at that great Assembly attended on his Funerals, as is affirmed by † *Pliny* and *Laertius*, who hath this Epigram upon him,

*To the illustrious Pollux Thanks I pay,
That Chilo's Son the Olive bore away.
The Father died to enjoy'd his Child to see
So crown'd; a happy Death! such befall me.*

Upon his Statue this Inscription.

*The Birth of Chilo warlike Sparta grac'd,
Who of the Seven, in the first Rank was plac'd.*

* He was short in Speech, whence *Aristagoras* calls that Manner of speaking *Chilonian*. * *Ausonius* also alludes hereto in the Speech he makes under his Name.

† He writ Elegies, extending almost to two Hundred Verses: There is likewise an Epistle of his extant to this Effect.

Chilo to Periander.

* YOU send me Word of an Expedition you are preparing against Foreigners, intending to go in Person with your Army: a Monarch, I think, hath little Safety, even at home. That Tyrant I esteem happy who dies at home a natural Death.

* Ibid. 1. 98. b Laert. 1. 72. c Lib. 7. cap. 32. Laert.

P I T T A C U S.

C H A P. I.

His Life.

Pittacus ^a was of *Mitelenus* (the chief City of *Lesbos*) Son of *Caius*, ^b or (rather) *Cyrrhadius*, a *Thracian*, his Mother a *Lesbian*, born in the thirty second Olympiad.

Laertius faith, he flourished in the forty-second Olympiad; ^c at that Time he gave Testimony of his great Courage and Love to his Country, in killing (assisted by the Brethren of *Alcaeus* the Poet) *Melanchrus*, Tyrant of *Lesbos* and *Mitelenus*.

^d *Pittacus*, grown eminent by this Action, was by the *Mitelenians* made General, and sent with a Fleet against the Athenians ^e, with whom they had a long Contest concerning the *Achillæan* Field; the Ground of their Difference this: "Pisistratus took Sigeum by Force from the *Mitelenians*, and settled there (as King) *Hegeſistratus* his natural Son, by an Argive Woman, who kept it, not without much Dispute; for betwixt the *Mitelenians* and Athenians, there was a long War; those falling out of the *Achillæan* Town, these out of Sigeum: Those lay claim to the Town, as built by *Achænaeus* of *Mitelenus*, of the Stones of old Troy (for the *Lesbians* challenged the greatest Part of *Troas* as their Hereditary Right, where they had built many Houses, some, faith ^f *Strabo*, standing at this Day, others demolished). "These opposed their Claim; alledging the *Æolians* had no more Right to this *Ilian* Country than themselves or any other of the Greeks, who assisted *Melancus* in the Recovery of *Helen*. "The Athenians sent thither as General, *Phryno*, a tall robust Person, who had been Victor in all the Olympick Exercises; perhaps the same whom *Eusebius* names in the thirty-sixth Olympiad. ^g *Pittacus* having been several Times worsted in Battle, at last challenged *Phryno* to single Combat, and met him, being armed with the Weapons of a *Fighterman*, hiding a Net under his Shield, wherewith catching *Phryno* suddenly, he flew him with his Trident and Dagger, and by his Death recovered the Field. From this Stratagem of *Pittacus*, was derived the like Kind of Fighting among the Roman Gladiators, called *Artius* (described by *Lipsius* ^h) as expressly observed by: *Polyanus* and *Æschylus*.

ⁱ But this War ended not so, until at last both Parties refused these *ſet* matches. *Pericles*, ^j choosing him *Umpire*; he awarded that each Side should

keep what they were in Possession of, whereby *Sigeum* fell to the Athenians. ^k *Demetrius* argues *Timmæus* of *Falhoob*, for affirming *Periander* built *Achilleum* (a small Town where was the Tomb of *Achilles*) in Opposition to the Athenians, of *Ilian* Stones, and thereby to have aided *Pittacus*. But neither was it built of such Stones (faith *Strabo*) nor was *Periander* the Founder: How could he be chose Arbitrator, whose Actions had declared him an Enemy?

^l Hereupon *Pittacus* was highly honoured by the *Mitelenians*, who ^m being infested by banished Persons, under the leading of *Antimenides*, and *Alcæus* the Poet; ⁿ either in Obligation to his Merit, or Confidence in his Equity, by their free Votes ^o (tho' *Alcæus* deny it) instated him in the Tyranny; ^p with many Acclamations of Praise and a great Concourse of People (as is manifest from *Alcæus*, who for that Reason reprehends them.) ^q They also with general Consent offered him great Gifts, and bad him take of that Field which he recovered from the Citizens as much as he would. He darting his Spear, demanded only so much as that had passed over; which he dedicated to *Apollo*, called (even to the Time of *Plutarch* and *Laertius*) the *Pittacæan* Field. ^r *Socrates* avers, he took Part of it for himself, saying, the Half was more than the Whole. Thus he ^s diverted his Mind from the Gift, conceiving it not fitting to diminish the Glory of the Virtue, by the Greatness of the Reward.

^t Being possessed of this Power ^u he shewed the Moderation wherewith his Braut was furnished, ^v towards *Alcæus* the Poet, who had behaved himself pertinaciously against him, with bitter Hate ^w and scurvilous Wit (whereof see many Instances in *Laertius*) *Pittacus* only inform'd him how able ^x he was to oppress him.

During his Government, he made many Laws, one whereof is mentioned by ^y *Cicero*, forbidding any Man to go to the Funeral of such as he was not Kin to. Another by ^z *Aristotle*, that whosoever being drunk, should strike any Man, should pay double as much as if he had been sober; or as ^{aa} *Laertius* delivers it, whosoever offended, being drunk, should pay a double Forfeis; which he did to restrain the *Mitelenians* from Drunkenness, because their Island

^a Laert. 1. 74. ^b Suid. ^c So the Vatican MS. of Suidas, better than the printed Editions, which reads. ^d Suid. ^e Laert. ibid. ^f Suid. ^g Laert. 1. 75. ^h Suid. ⁱ Suid. ^j Suid. ^k Suid. ^l Suid. ^m Suid. ⁿ Suid. ^o Suid. ^p Suid. ^q Suid. ^r Suid. ^s Suid. ^t Suid. ^u Suid. ^v Suid. ^w Suid. ^x Suid. ^y Suid. ^z Suid. ^{aa} Suid.

abounded in Wine. His usual Exercise, even whilst he was King, (as *Clarchus* affirms) was to grind Corn, esteeming it a healthful Exercise, much commending a Mill, that in so little Room, it afforded Exercise to many. There was a Song¹ called for that Reason *Ερμίσκος*, of which² *Thales* affirms he heard a Slave in *Lesbos* sing the Beginning as the ground, which was thus.

*Grind, grind my Mill amain,
For Pittacus that Lesbian King
To grind doth not disdain.*

Being well in Years, he was constrained to take upon himself the Leading of an Army, whereupon he said, *It is hard to be good*; which³ *Simonides* mentions, saying,

*Hard to be truly honest, this
The Pittaceian Sentence is*

Plato also remembers it in his *Protagoras*, where *Simonides* reproves *Pittacus* for saying, it is hard to continue good, which he affirms to be easy, but to become good, hard; wherein he differs from *Laertius's* Expression of it.

He continued in the Government of the Kingdom ten Years; ⁴ *Valerius Maximus* saith, only as long as the War with the Athenians concerning *Sigeum* lasted, but afterwards as soon as Peace was obtained by Victory (having in this Time settled the Affairs of the Common-wealth, he laid it down, notwithstanding the *Mitelenians* cried out to the contrary, lest he should continue Lord of the Citizens longer than the Necessities of the Kingdom required, and lived ten Years after a private Person.

He went to *Sardis*, at what Time (as some say, tho' others apply it to *Bias*) *Cræsus* having made the *Grecians* in *Asia* tributary, had given Order for the Building of a Navy to invade the *Islanders*: As soon as he came thither, *Cræsus* asked him what News from *Greece*? He by his Answer diverted the King from going forward with his building Ships. The *Islanders*, saith he, have bought a World of Horses, intending an Expedition against *Sardis*; and *Cræsus*, thinking he had spoken Truth, answered, I with the Gods would put it in their Minds to come against the *Lydians* on Horseback; he replied, It is not without Reason, great King, that you wish and hope to catch the *Islanders* on Horseback in the Continent; and what think you the *Islanders* with more, than (hearing your Preparation to set out a Navy against them) that they may catch the *Lydians* upon the Sea, and revenge the Cause

of those inland *Grecians* whom you have reduced to Servitude. *Cræsus*, much delighted with this Speech, and diffused (for it seemed to him he spoke very ingeniously) from building a Navy, gave it over, and contracted Amity with the *Ionian* *Islands*.

CHAP. II.

His moral Sentences, Precepts, and Verses.

OF his Apophthegms, *Laertius* recites these. The Gods themselves cannot resist Necessity. Power shews the Man. Being on a Time demanded what is best, he answered, To do the present well. To *Cræsus*, who asked which was the greatest Government? That of various Wood, saith he, meaning the Law carved in wooden Tables. To a *Phocæan*, who said, I must seek an honest Man; Tho' you seek much, saith he) you shall not find him. To some who demanded what was most pleasing, he answered, Time. He said it was the Part of wise Men to foresee Inconveniences, and prevent them before they came; of valiant Men, to order them well when they come.

Add these from *Plutarch*, That Prince is happy, who can make his Subject afraid not of him, but for him. That Common-wealth is best ordered, where the Wicked have no Command, and the good have. That House is best ordered, which needs nothing either of Ornament or Necessity.

He counselled *Periander* to shun Drunkenness and Excess in Feasting, lest he should be known to be what he was, not what he seemed.

To a young Man asking his Advice concerning Marriage, what Directions he gave, is thus-expressed by *Callimachus*.

*An Acarnæan Stranger Pittacus,
Hyrrhadius Son of Lesbos question'd thus;
Father, a double Match is offered me;
The Birth and Means of one with mine agree;
The other far exceeds me, which is best?
By your Advice my Aim shall be address'd.
Lifting his Staff, (his Age's sole Defence)
He pointing said, go fetch Advice from thence;
(There he espied some Boys by Chance at Play,
As they were whipping Tops along the Way)
Follow their Steps, saith he. When night be drow,
He heard them say, an Equal take to you;
By which Direction guided, he forsook
The richer Fortune; and the equal took;
Be you (as he) by this wife Counsel led,
And take an Equal to your Marriage-Bed.*

¹ Pollux. l. 4. m. *Plat. Sympol.* sept. lap. ² *Laert.* l. 77. ³ *Sympol.* sept. lap.

⁴ Hence correct *Suidas* who saith *Simon.* ⁵ *Athen. deipn.* lib. 10. ⁶ *Ep.* 1.

⁷ *Laert.* l. 750. p. 2. 6. ⁸ *Herod.*

Whither *Æschylus* (as is observed by his Scholiast) alluded to, saying,

*Wife, truly wife was he
Who first sententioufly
His Judgment thus exprest,
An equal Match is best.*

His moral Precepts are thus collected by * *Demetrius Phalereus*, 'Know Opportunity. What thou intendest, speak not before thou dost it, for being frustrate of thy Hope, thou wilt be derided. Use thy Friends. What thou takest ill in thy Neighbour do not thyself. Reproach not the Unhappy, for the Hand of God is on them. Restore what is committed to thy Trust. Bear with thy Neighbour. Love thy Neighbour. Reproach not Friend, tho' he recede from thee a little; nor with well to thy Enemy; it is against Reason. It is hard to foresee the future, what is past is certain, what is to come obscure. The Earth is faithful, the Sea faithless, Gain insatiable. Acquire Honesty; seek Obsequiousness; love Discipline, Temperance, Prudence, Truth, Faith, Experience, Dexterity, Society, Diligence, Oeconomy, and Piety.

* *Ausonius* cites these as his:

*None know to speak who know not to refrain,
One good Man's Praise fore many ill Men's Gain.
He's mad who envies in the Happy, Pride;
Or Grief in the Unhappy dash deride.
Who makes a Law must not that Law transgress.
Purchase all Friends; thou canst in Happiness;
And to the fewest trust in thy Distress.*

* Of his *Adversities*, these were most celebrated.

*Who hath a Quiver and a Bow,
Against a wicked Man should go,
Whose doubtful Tongue never exprest,
The faithless Meaning of his Breast.*

His particular Sentence was, *Know Opportunity.*

CHAP. III.

His Death, Brother, Wife, Son, Writings.

HE lived to a full Age, above seventy Years, or (following the Account of *Suidas* for his Birth) eighty. *Lucian* exceeds, who reckons

him amongst those who lived one hundred Years; for he died when *Aristomenes* was Archon, in the third Year of the fifty second Olympiad: Upon his Monument this Epitaph,

*Weep, Citizens, as sacred Lesbos weeps
For Pittacus; this Tomb his Ashes keeps.*

He had a Brother, who dying without Issue, his Estate devolved to *Pittacus*; whereupon, refusing the Wealth *Craesus* offered him, he said, he had more by half than he desired.

He married a Wife of Birth higher than himself, Sister to *Draco*, Son of *Pentbilus*; she behaved herself imperiously towards him; whereof *Plutarch* gives this Instance, *Having invited some Friends, she came in and overbrowed the Table; he seeing his Guests troubled, said, 'Each of you hath some Misfortune, he is happiest who hath no more than this. Laertius* saith, the Advice he gave concerning equal Marriage (*Chap. 2.*) was out of Remembrance of his own Troubles.

* He had a Son named *Tyrrheus*, who at *Cuma* sitting in a Barber's Shop, (as was used amongst the Ancients, by such as loved to discourse of News) was casually killed by a Barber with a Blow of a Hatchet; the *Cumeans* took the Offender and sent him to *Pittacus*; he being informed of the Accident set him at Liberty, saying, Pardon is better than Penitence.

Of his Writings *Laertius* mentions, *Adversities*, already cited. *Elegies*, amounting to six hundred Verses. *Of Laws* in Prose, directed to his own Countrymen.

Epistles; of which this is preserved:

Pittacus to Cræsus.

YOU command me to come to *Lydia* to behold your Wealth; without Sight whereof I can easily believe the Son of *Alyattes*, to be the richest of Kings, and therefore need not in that Respect go to *Sardis*; for I want not Gold, but have enough even for my Friends also; yet I will come to you to enjoy your Conversation as a Guest.

* There was another *Pittacus*, called the Lesser, a Law-giver, mentioned by *Phavorinus* and *Demetrius*.

w From *Æsch.* v. 336. x *Stob.* *Serm.* 3. y *Sent.* *Sept.* *Sep.* z *Laert.* i. 79. a *Laert.* *ibid.* b *Longev.* c *Laert.* i. 79. d *De anim. tranqu.* e *Laert.* i. 76. f *Laert.* i. 78. g *Laert.* i. 79.

B I A S.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

BIAS^a was of *Priene*, Son of *Tutamis*; some affirm he was rich, others that he had no Estate, but lived as an Inmate. *Satyrus* ranketh him first of the seven wise Men. The Occasion whereby that Title was conferred on him was this; he redeemed some Captive *Messenian* Virgins, brought them up as his Daughters, gave them Portions, and so sent them back to their Parents. A Tripod being afterwards found at *Athens* (as was related in the Life of *Thales*, the Place only different) with this Inscription in Gold, *To the Wife*. These Virgins (as *Satyrus* affirms) or (as *Phanodorus*) their Father came into the Congregation, and pronounced *Bias* *Wife*, declaring what he had done for them: Hereupon the Tripod was sent to him, which *Bias* beholding, averred *Apollo* to be the most wise, and would not accept it; some affirm he dedicated it to *Hercules* at *Thèbes*, as being descended from the *Theban* Colony, sent to *Priene*.

That he made good this Attribute, there are many Instances; ^b *Ayattes* besieging *Prime*, *Bias* turned out of the Town two exceeding fat Mules, which coming to the Camp, *Cræsus* wondered to see their Plenty extended to the very Beasts, and desirous of Reconciliation, sent a Messenger to them. *Bias* causing many Heaps of Sand to be made, and covered over with Wheat, shewed them to the Messengers, whereof *Ayattes* informed, was more eager of Peace than before, and sent immediately to desire *Bias* to come to him; but I. (answered he) with *Ayattes* may feed on Onions, meaning to weep.

^c Some ascribe it to *Bias*, the Diversion of *Cræsus* his Expedition against the *Greek* Islands, by others imputed to *Pittacus* related in his Life.

Cyrus having taken *Cræsus*, sent an Army against the *Græcians*; the *Ionians* much troubled, assembled at the *Panionium*, where *Bias* gave them wise Advice, which, had they followed (saith *Herodotus*) they might have been the happiest of all the *Greeks*: He counselled them to join together in one Fleet, to sail to *Sardinia*, and there build one City common to all the *Ionians*; whereby they might preserve themselves from Bondage, happy in possessing an Island far greater than all the rest, and commanding them; but if they continued in *Ionia*, there was no apparent Hope of Liberty. This Advice was justified, the *Ionians* being subdued.

^e *Bias*, (his Country *Priene* invaded by Enemies, all, whom the Cruelty of War suffered to escape, flying away laden with the most precious of their Wealth) being demanded why he carried none of his Goods with him; I (saith he) carry my Goods with me: He bore them (adds *Valerius Maximus*) in his Breast, not to be seen by the Eye, but prized by the Soul; not enclosed in the narrow Dwelling of the Mind, not to be demolished by mortal Hands, present with those who are settled, and not forsaking such as fly.

^f He refused not the Amity of Kings, (as *Thales* did) particularly, that of *Amasis*, King of *Egypt*, who sent him a Victim, commanding him to take from it the best and worst Part. *Bias* sent him the Tongue, for which Ingenuity he was much admired.

^g Another Question of *Amasis* he resolved, whilst he was at *Corinth* (invited thither with the rest of the wise Men by *Periander*) where *Niloxenus* brought him this Letter.

Amasis, King of *Egypt* saith thus to *Bias*, wisest of the *Greeks*: The King of *Ethiopia* contendeth with me for Pre-eminence in Wisdom; master'd in other Things, he in Conclusion requires an absurd, strange Thing, that I drink up the Sea; this Proposition, if I resolve, I shall have many of his Towns and Cities; if I resolve not, I must lose all those which are about *Elephantina*. Ponder it, and send *Niloxenus* back with all Speed; whatever we can do for your Friends and Country, shall not be wanting.

Having read the Letter, *Bias* with a short Pause, recollecting himself, and having whispered to *Glauculus* who sat next him. What (saith he) *Naucrates*, *Amasis*, who commands so many Men, and possesseth so excellent a Country, will he for a few obscure contemptible Villages drink up the Sea? *Bias* (saith *Niloxenus* smiling) consider, as if he meant to do it, how it might be effected. Bid the *Ethiopian* (replied *Bias*) with-hold the Rivers from running into the Sea, until he hath drunk off that which is now Sea; for the Impossibility concerns that only which is such at present, not what shall be hereafter. *Niloxenus* embraced him with Joy, the rest applauding his Solution.

^a Livet. I. 82. ^b Ibid. I. 84. ^c Livet. ibid. ^d *ἡ δὲ πόλις ἡν ἡμεῖς λέγομεν τὴν ἰσθμὸν τοῦ ἰονίου καὶ τὴν ἰσθμὸν τοῦ ἰονίου* read *ἰσθμὸν τοῦ ἰονίου*.
^e Val. Max. 7. 2. ^f Plut. conv. sept. sap. ^g Plut. ibid.

^d *ἡ δὲ πόλις ἡν ἡμεῖς λέγομεν τὴν ἰσθμὸν τοῦ ἰονίου καὶ τὴν ἰσθμὸν τοῦ ἰονίου*

CHAP. II.

His moral Sentences, Precepts, and Verses.

HIS Apophthegms are thus delivered by *Laertius*, and others. 'He is unfortunate who cannot bear Misfortune. It is a Disease of the Mind to desire such Things as cannot be obtained, and to be unmindful of the Miseries of others. To one that ask'd what is hard, he answered, to bear courageously a Change to the worse. Being at Sea in Company with wicked Men, who, a Storm arising, called upon the Gods; hold your Peace, saith he, lest they know you are here. To a wicked Man, enquiring what was Piety, he was silent, the other asking the Reason of his Silence: I answer not, saith he, because you enquire after that which nothing concerns you. Being demanded what is sweet to Mankind, he answered, Hope. It is better to decide a Difference betwixt our Enemies than Friends, for one of the Friends will certainly become an Enemy, one of the Enemies a Friend; being asked what a Man did with Delight, he answered, Gain by Labour. We should lo live, as tho' our Life would be both long and short. So love, as if hereafter we might hate, conversing in Friendship with Caution, remembering that it may possibly convert to Enmity.

‘ To one demanding whether he should take a
‘ Wife; she must be (faith he) either fair or foul;
‘ if fair, she will be common, if foul, a Pennance.

1 That Tyrant shall gain most Glory, who
 2 first himself obeys the Laws of his Country :
 3 That Common-wealth is best ordered, wherein
 4 every Man fears the Law more than a Tyrant.
 5 That Family is best ordered, where the Master
 6 behaves himself voluntarily within Doors, as he
 7 doth without by Constraint of the Law.

Those who busy themselves in vain Knowledge resemble an Owl, which seeth only in the Night, but is blind in the Light; so is their Mind sharp-sighted in Vanity, dark at the Approach of true Light.

▪ *Ausonius* hath these under his Name.

*What is our chiefest Good ? A Conscience free.
Our greatest ill ? Man's Man's worst Enemy.
Poor ? Th' avaricious. Rich ? Who naught desires.
A Wife's best Dower ? The Fame chaste Life ac-
quires.
Chaste ? She, of whom Report dare speak no Ill.
Wife ? Who hath Power to hurt, but wants the
Will.
A Fool ? Who wants the Power, and yet would kill.*

His moral Precepts, according to a *Demetrius Phalerus* theſe. ' Moſt Men are evil. (° His particular Sentence) Before you do any Thing, behold your Face in a Glaſs; if it ſeem handſome, do handſome Things; if deformed, ſup- ply the Defects of Nature. Praſtice Honesty. Undertake deliberately, but having once begun, go through. Abhor to ſpeak haſtily [*Laer.* It is Madneſs.] left thou ſin, for Repentance follows: Be neither ſimple nor ſubtle. Admit not Imprudence. Love Prudence. Every where profeſs there are Gods. Weigh what is to be done. Hear much, ſpeak ſeaſonably. If poor, reprove not the Rich, unleſs great Advantage may ariſe there- by. Praiſe not an unworthy Perſon for his Wealth. Acquire by Perſuaſion, not by Violence. When thou doſt good, impute it not to thyſelf, but the Gods. In thy Youth, gain Wealth, in thy Age, Wiſdom. [Or as *Laertius*, from thy Youth to thy Age gain Wiſdom, for it will be more ſure to thee than all other Poſſeſſions.] Preſerve in thy Actions Remembrance; in Oppor- tunity, Caution; in thy Manners, Ingenuity; in Labour, Patience; in Fear, Warineſs; in Wealth, Love; in Diſcourſe, Perſuaſion; in Silence, a Decorum; in Sentence, Juſtice; in Boldneſs, Fortitude; in Action, Power; in Glo- ry, Eminence; in thy Nature, Generoſity.'

^p Of his 'Admirers, these were most esteem'd.

*To all the City where thou liv'st be kind,
They who most Favour show, most Favour find:
But Pride is often with Destruction join'd.*

And,

*Strength is a Gift, which Nature's Hand bestows.
Rhetorick and Policy the Wise Soul knows,
Riches a Present that from Fortune flows.*

CHAP. III.

His Death and Writings.

HE was much addicted to Pleading, very earnest therein, but always employed in just Causes; which Demodocus the Alerian implies, saying, *If thou chance to be a Judge, give Sentence on the Prienzan Side; and Hipponas, to plead a Cause better than Bias the Prienzan.* And in that Manner he died, being very old, as he was pleading, having ended his Speech he reposed his Head in the Bosom of his Sister's Son; his Adversary having ended his Defence, the Judges gave Sentence on *Bias's Side*; the Court dismiss'd, he was found dead in his Nephew's Bosom. The City bestowed

h Laert. i. 36. i A. Gell. 5. 11. k Plut. conviv. sept. sp.
Serm. 3. o Laert. i. 38. p Ibid. i. 36. q Ibid. i. 84.

1 Stob. Serm. 3. m Aufon. in Lind. sept. sap. n Stob.
r Ibid. ἀναμίδιον is ἀλαίσι: Perhaps, it should be ἀναμίδιον; i

a magnificent Monument upon him, with this Inscription ;

*Bias of Prieæan fam'd Descent
Lies here, Ionia's great Ornament.*

They also dedicated a Temple to him, called the *Tutamian*.

* *Laertius* bestows upon him this Epigram.

*Bias lies bidden here, whom Hermes led
To th' Grave, when Age had snow'd upon his
Head.
His Head, which (pleading for his Friend) en-
clin'd
Upon his Nephew, so long Sleep resign'd.*

He writ concerning *Ionia*, by what Means it might be most happy (perhaps that *Cæsar* already mentioned) two thousand Verses.

* *Laert.* l. 26.

C L E O B U L U S.

CHAP. I.

His Life, Death, and Writings.

Cleobulus was of *Lindus*, (a City of *Rhodes*) or, according to *Duris*, of *Caria*, Son of *Evagoras*, lineally descended from *Hercules*; excellent both in Wisdom, outward Beauty, and Strength*, beyond all those of his Time; learned in the Philosophy of the *Egyptians*: That he was Tyrant of *Lindus*, is manifest from * *Plutarch*. He re-edified the Temple of *Minerva*, founded by *Danaus*.

He had a Daughter*, whom he named *Eumetis*, but was called commonly from her Father *Cleobulina*: She composed Verses and Riddles, in Hexameters, famous for her Wisdom and Acuteness in those Riddles, some of her Questions having spread as far as *Egypt*, which she used jocularly, like *Dice* upon Occasions, only contesting with such as provoked her: she was also endued with an admirable Height of Mind, and a Wit both Politick and full of Humanity, c-using her Father to govern his People with more mildness. *Cratinus* also mentions her in a Comedy named from her *Cleobulina*, often cited by *Athenaus*.

† He died full of Years, which extended to seventy. His Tomb carried this Inscription,

*Wife Cleobulus's Death, the Lyndian Shore,
To which his Birth was owing, doth deplore.*

* He composed Verses and Riddles to the Number of three thousand; of which was this Riddle concerning the Year, (by *Suidas* ascribed to his Daughter *Cleobulina*.)

*One Sire, twelve Sons, from every one a Race
Of thirty Daughters with a double Face:*

*Their Looks are black, and white successively;
Immortal they are all, and yet all die.*

* Some assert him the Author of this Epigram upon *Midas* (not *Homer*; who, as they account, lived long before *Midas*, tho' *Herodotus* otherwise.)

*A brazen Virgin stretch'd on Midas's Tomb,
To last whilst Water runs, and Trees shall bloom;
Whilst Sun and Moon dart their successive Beams,
And the rough Sea supplied by gentle Streams,
I dwell upon this dismal Sepulchre,
To tell all those that pass, Midas lies here.*

There is likewise extant under his Name this Epistle^b.

Cleobulus to Solon.

YOU have many Friends, and a Habitation every where; but I dare affirm, *Lindus* would be most pleasing to Solon, being governed by a Democracy; an Island where there is no Fear of *Pisistratus*, thither your Friends will come to you from all Parts.

CHAP. II.

His moral Sentences, Precepts, and Verses.

OF his moral Sayings*, are these: *Employ thyself in something excellent. Be not vain and ungrateful. Bestow your Daughters, Virgins in Years, Matrons in Discretion: Implying, that the Virgins also should be instructed, which the Greeks used not, the Romans brought them up in the Liberal Sciences. Do good to your Friend, that he may be more*

* *Laert.* l. 29. a *Suid.* *Kl.* 607. w *De Ascl.* x *Plut.* *conviv.* *sept.* 29. y *Laert.* l. 93. s *Ibid.* l. 93. z *Ibid.* l. 93.

your Friend, your Enemy that he may become your Friend; for we should beware of the Calumny of Friends, of the Treachery of Enemies: When any Man goeth forth, let him consider what he is to do; when he returns, examine what he hath done.

A Prince may be happy, if he trust none that are about him. That Common-wealth is best ordered, wherein the Citizens fear Reproach more than Law. That Family is best, wherein more love than fear the Master.

His Precepts thus collected by * Demetrius Phalereus. *A Mean is best.* († His particular Sentence) To reverence thy Father is Duty. Take Care of thy Body and Soul. Hear willingly, but trust not hastily. (Or as Laetius, 'tis better to love to hear, than to love to speak.) It is better to know many Things, (Laetius, to love Knowledge) than to be ignorant of all. Teach your Tongue to speak well. It is proper to Virtue, and contrary to Vice, to hate Injustice. (Laetius, be a Friend to Virtue, a Stranger to Vice.) Preserve thy Piety. Advise thy Countrymen what is best. Govern thy Tongue. (Laetius Pleasure.) Do nothing by Violence. Instruct thy Children. Pray to Fortune. Forego Enmity. The Enemy to thy Country, esteem thy own. Fight not, nor be kind to thy Wife in the Presence of others,

one argues Folly, the other Madnes. Corraet not your Servants when they are drunk, it shews as if you were drunk yourself. Marry with your Equal; far by matching into a higher Family, you procure Masters, not Kinsmen. Laugh not in Compliance with him who derides others; for you will be hated by those he derides. Rich, be not exalted; Poor, be not dejected. (Laetius adds, Learn to bear the Changes of Fortune.)

‡ Ausonius ascribes these to him,

*The more is in thy Power, desire the less;
Not to be envied is Unhappiness.
None long in his Impieties can thrive,
In others much, naught in thyself forgive.
All Men would spare the good, the bad cast down.
We share not in our Ancestors Renewal:
But their inglorious Actions often own.*

Of his 'Adquæra these were most noted †.

*By Ignorance most Deeds are sway'd,
In many specious Words array'd;
But all Things shall by Time be weigh'd.*

d Plot. Sympos. sept. Sep.

e Stob. Scem. 3.

f Laert. 1: 93.

g Auson. in Lud. sept. Sep.

h Laert. libi.

P E R I A N D E R.

C H A P. I.

The Country, Ancestors, and Parents of Periander.

Periander was Son of Cephalus Tyrant of Corinth, his Mother Crætae, his Ancestors the Heraclidae, († descended from Hercules and Jardana) reigned Kings of Lydia five hundred and five Years, the Son continually succeeding the Father for two and twenty Generations. The Original of Cephalus, and the Manner of his obtaining the Kingdom receive thus from * Herodotus.

When Corinth was governed by an Oligarchy, inhabited by the Bacchiadae, who never would marry out of their own Family, one of them (called Amphion) had a lame Daughter (by name Labda): whom when none of the Bacchiadae would take to Wife, Eetion married (Son of Ecobates of the Bætræan Tribe, but descended afar off from Lapithe and Genis) having no Children, he consulted the Delphian Oracle about it; as soon as he entered, the Prophetess spake thus to him:

*Eetion none will thee tho' great respect,
A Stone from Labdas fruitful Womb expect,
Which shall the People crush, Corinth correct.*

This Oracle to Eetion, agreed with another delivered to the Bacchiadae (tho' by them not understood) to this Effect.

*A Lyon by an Eagle shall be laid,
Upon a Rock, fierce, making all afraid.
Corinthians, what I say consider well,
Who in tall Corinth and Priene dwell.*

The Bacchiadae, who could not comprehend the Meaning of this Oracle, when they heard that to Eetion, understood their own by the Affinity it had with the other, and thereupon secretly designed amongst themselves to kill Eetion's Child. His Wife being delivered, they sent ten Men of their own

† Laert. 1: 94. Herod. 1.

‡ Libi. 5.

to the Tribe wherein *Eetion* dwelt, that they should murder the Infant; when they came to *Petra* to *Eetion's* House, they demanded the Child. *Labda* (not knowing their Intent, but thinking they came to congratulate with the Father) brings her Son, and gives him into the Hands of one of them. They had agreed (upon the Way) that he into whose Hands the Child were delivered, should dash out its Brains against the Ground, but by divine Providence, the Child smiling upon him to whom *Labda* had given it, he was moved therewith to such Compassion, that he could not find in his Heart to kill it, but delivered it to another, he to a third, until at last it past through the Hands of all the ten; none of them having Power to kill it, they restored it to the Mother. Then going forth and standing before the Door, they began to find Fault with one another, but chiefly with him who took the Child first, for not performing the Agreement; after some Debate, they agreed to go in all, and be equal Sharers in the Murder; but it was decreed that *Eetion's* Child should be the Oppressor of *Corinths*, for *Labda* standing at the Door heard all their Discourse, and fearing lest their Minds changing, they should murder it, carried away the Child, and hid it in a Measure of Corn (called *Cypselus*) a Place which she conceived they could never search if they returned, and so it fell out. They came back and fought all about; when they could not find him, they agreed amongst themselves to tell those who sent them, they had done what they required, and returning home, did so. *Eetion's* Son growing up was called *Cypselus* from the Danger he had escaped in the Corn-measure. When he came to Man's Estate, he consulted with the *Delphian* Oracle, and received a doubtful Answer, in Confidence whereof he attempted *Corinth* and took it, the Oracle was this,

*Happy is Cypselus, who to my Fate
This Pift makes; he Corinth's Crown shall gain;
He and his Sons (but not their Sons) shall reign.*

Being possessor of the Kingdom, he persecuted the *Corinthians*, depriving many of their Estates, more (by far) of their Lives; having reigned thirty Years, he died, and was succeeded by his Son *Periander*, whose Reign completed this Tyranny, which lasted according to *Aristotle* seventy three Years and six Months: So that *Cypselus* began to reign in the second Year of the thirtieth Olympiad.

CH A P. II.

The Time of his Birth, his Reign, and the Change of his Disposition.

Periander^m (by Computation from his Death, which, according to *Laertius*, was in the eigh-

tieth Year of his Age, the last of the forty-eighth Olympiad) was born in the last Year of the twenty-ninth Olympiad. His Reign (according to *Aristotle's* Account, lasting forty four Years) begun in the fourth Year of the thirty-seventh Olympiad. *Suidas* saith, he succeeded in the Kingdom, * as being his Father's eldest Son, which *Plutarch* calls, a *Dispute hereditary to him*, & flourished in the thirty eighth Olympiad.

Heⁿ was at first of a mild gentle Disposition, but afterwards grew very rigid upon this Occasion^r. His Mother, whilst he was very young, kept him much in her Company, when he grew more in Years, fell in love with him; with Time her Passion increased to such Extremity, that she could no longer suppress it; assuming Confidence, she told her Son, there was a beautiful Lady fallen in love with him, and advised him not to slight her Affection. He answered, he would not transgress Law and Virtue, by touching a married Woman. His Mother pressed him with Intreaties; at last he consented; she appointed a Night, advising him not to have any Light in his Chamber, nor to constrain the Lady to speak, but to excuse her for Modesty's Sake. *Periander* engaged himself to do all she directed. She, attired as richly as she could, went to his Chamber, and departed again before Day-break. On the Morrow she enquired if he were pleased, and if the Lady should come again to him. *Periander* said; it was his chiefest Desire, and that he affected her excessively. From that Time she visited her Son often. He, at last, was moved with a great Curiosity to know who she was, and solicited his Mother very importunately that he might have some Discourse and Acquaintance with her, seeing he was so much taken with Love of her, affirming it was unreasonable he should be denied the Sight of one, with whom he had so often a nearer Acquaintance. His Mother affirmed it could not be done, in respect to the Modesty of the Lady. Hereupon he gave one of his Servants Order to hide a Light in his Chamber: She came as she used, and when she was asleep, *Periander* rose, took the Light, and seeing it was his Mother, was about to have killed her, but with-held by some Genius or Apparition, forbore. From that Time forward he was troubled in Mind, grew cruel, and killed many of his Subjects. His Mother, much accusing her unhappy Genius, slew herself. *Laertius* saith^s; they were both conscious hereof, and that being discovered, he grew cruel to every one.

In the Beginning of his Reign he was much more merciful than his Father, but keeping Correspondence by Messengers with *Thrafskulus* Tyrant of *Miletus*, (* to whom in Times past he had been a Guest, before he arrived to the Government) he became at last much more bloody than his Father.

^l Hist. Polit. s. 12. ^m Laert. s. 95. ⁿ Politic. s. ^o Excerpt. Nicol. Damasc. Suid. ^p Conviv. sept. sep. ^q Laert. 1.
^r Pausan. Erotic. c. 17. ^s Laert. 1. 96. ^t Herod. l. 1. ^u Laert. 1. 95.

He sent an Express to *Thraſibulus*, to know what Courſe he ſhould take to ſettle himſelf, and to govern the City in the beſt Manner. *Thraſibulus* led the Meſſenger out of the Town, and as they walked together in a Corn-field, queſtion'd him concerning his coming from *Corinth*, and in the mean time lopp'd off all the Heads of Corn that grew higher than the reſt, and threw them away; in this Manner he went over the whole Field, not ſpeaking one Word to the Meſſenger, and ſo ſent him home; where being returned, *Periander* greedily enquired what Inſtructions he had brought; he answered, *Thraſibulus* had given him none, and that he wondered he would ſend him to a Mad-man, who deſtroyed his own Goods. *Periander* enquired what *Thraſibulus* did, and immediately apprehended that he adviſed him to put the moſt eminent in the City to Death. * *Laertius* recites a Letter to that Effect, which, if not ſuppoſitious, muſt have been ſent at another Time after this Meſſenger departed:

Thraſibulus to Periander.

I Gave your Meſſenger no Answer, but carrying him into a Field of Corn, lopp'd off with my Sick ſuch Ears as grew higher than the reſt, whiſt he followed me; if you enquire, he will relate all to you that he hath heard or ſeen: Do you ſo likewiſe, if you mean to ſettle yourſelf in the Government, take off the Heads of the chiefſt Citizens, whether your profeſſed Enemies, or others. A Tyrant muſt ſuſpect every Friend.

Tho' * *Plutarch* deny he followed this Advice, *Herodotus* avers, that from thence forward *Periander* exerciſed all Cruelty upon his Subjects, diſpatching thoſe that had eſcap'd the Rigour and Perſecutions of his Father. † He firſt appointed a Guard of Halberdiers to ſecure his Perſon, which conſiſted of three hundred, and converted the Government to a Tyranny († through his Cruelty and Violence). He forbade the Citizens to keep any Servants, or to be idle, always finding ſome Employment for them: If any Man ſat in the Forum, he was fined, for he feared leſt they ſhould plot againſt him. * The Citizens being deſirous to live in *Leves* he would not ſuffer them; he was always in War, being of a martial Diſpoſition. He made Ships with three Banks of Oars, which he uſed in both Seas. He attempted to dig the Iſthmus off from the Continent.

Of his Friendſhip and Correſpondence with *Thraſibulus*, † *Herodotus* gives another Inſtance, affirming he ſent to inform him of the Oracle's Answer to *Alcetas* King of *Lydia*, concerning the re edi-

ſying of the Temple of *Minerva*, and adviſed him to provide before-hand for his own Security.

He made a Vow, if he were Victor in the Chariot-race at the Olympick Games, to erect a Statue of Gold: He chanced to be victorious, and wanting Gold, beholding upon a Feſtival of that Country the Women richly adorned, he took off all their Ornaments, and ſo ſent them home.

C H A P. III.

Of his being plac'd in the Number of the ſeven Sages. His Sentences and Writings.

Periander (ſaith † *Plutarch*) being become a Tyrant by hereditary Diſeaſe derived to him by his Father, endeavour'd to purge himſelf thereof as much as poſſible, by uſing the ſun: Converſation of good Perſons, and invited wiſe Men to come to him; * to which Purpoſe he ſent this Epiſtle to thoſe of *Greece*, at ſuch Time as they met at *Delphi*.

Periander to the Wiſe Men.

I Give Pythian Apollo many Thanks, that you bring me together there, will alſo by my Letters be brought to *Corinth*; I will entertain you as you well know very kindly. I bear that laſt Year you met at the *Lydian King's* in *Sardis*: Delay not now to come to me, Tyrant of *Corinth*, for the *Corinthians* will look kindly upon you, if you come to the Houſe of *Periander*.

Upon this Invitation they went to him, not ſeven, but twice as many, of whom was *Diſcles*, *Periander's* Friend, in whoſe Name † *Plutarch* makes a large Deſcription of their Entertainment, which was not in the City, but at the Port *Lecheon*, in a great Hall appointed to ſolemn Feaſts, joining to the Temple of *Jenus*, to whom he had not ſacrificed ſince the unhappy Death of his Mother until that Time, the Particulars of the Feaſt, by Reaſon of the largeneſs of the Diſcourſe, we refer to *Plutarch*.

He was alſo himſelf put into the Number of theſe wiſe Men, who, † *Plutarch* ſaith, were originally but five, but that afterwards *Chabulius* Tyrant of *Lindus*, and *Periander* Tyrant of *Corinth*, who had neither Virtue nor Wiſdom, by the Greatneſs of their Power, the Multitude of their Friends, and the Obligations they conſider'd upon thoſe that adhered to them, forced a Reputation, and thruſt themſelves violently into the uſurped name of *Wiſe-men*; to which End, they ſpread abroad Sentences and remarkable Sayings throughout all *Greece*, the very ſame which others had ſaid before, whereat the other firſt Sages were much diſpleaſed, yet would

w Leert. 1. 100. x Sept. ſap. conviv. Herodot. 1. 1. y Leert. 1. 9. * Emerſt. Nicod. Damascen. and Scitius from him.
a Leert. 1. 94. b Lib. 1. c Lib. 1. 95. d Sept. ſap. conv. e Leert. 1. 96. f Comen. ſep. ſap. g De ſi Delphi.

not discover or convince their Vanity, nor have any publick Controversy about that Title with Persons of so much Wealth and Power; but meeting together at Delphi, after some private Debate, they consecrated there the Letter *E*, the fifth in the Alphabet, and in Numeration, to testify to the God of that Temple they were no more than five, and that they rejected and excluded from their Company the sixth and the seventh, as having no Right thereto.

Of those ^b who excluded him out of the Number of the Seven, some (as ^c Plato) substitute in his Room *Myso*; ^d others say there were two of this Name Cousins, one the Tyrant, the other of *Ambracia*. But *Aristotle* and others, assert him of *Corinth* to be the Wise, which Attribute seems to be conferred upon him, not in respect to his Actions, but moral Sayings and Writings, which were these.

^e *Do nothing for Gain, that is proper to Tradesmen. They who will rule safely, must be guarded with Love, not Arrogance. Being demanded why he continued King, because (saith he) it is dangerous willingly to resign, or unwillingly to be deposed.*

^f When the other six had given their Opinions concerning Tyranny (at the Feast to which he invited them) he being desired to add his, answered with a troubled Countenance, *Enough has been said to deter any Man of sound Judgment from Rule.* When they had in like Manner declared their Opinions concerning a Common-wealth, he added, *The Result of all which had been said, commended that Democracy most, which came nearest an Aristocracy.*

^g Being demanded what was the greatest in the least, he answered, a good Mind in a human Body.

His Precepts (according to ^h Demetrius Phalereus) were these, *Consideration is all* (ⁱ which was his particular Sentence) *Quiet is good, Temerity dangerous. Gain sordid, the Accusation of Nature. A Democracy is better than a Tyranny. Pleasures are mortal, Virtues immortal. In good Fortune be moderate, in bad prudent. It is better to die than to want. Study to be worthy of your Parents. Be praised living, beatified dead. To your Friends in Prosperity and Adversity be the same. What thou hast promised amidst, perform not. [Laert. Keep thy Word.] Betray not Secrets. So reproach, as if thou shouldst ere long be a Friend. Use new Diet, but old Laws. Punish those who have sinned; restrain those that are about to sin. Conceal thy Misfortune, that it may not glad thy Enemies.*

^j *Ausonius ascribes these to him.*

*Pleasure and Profit never disagree,
As more solicitous, more happy be.*

^k *Tis ill to wish, but worse to fear to die,
With what Necessity enjoins, comply.
If thou art fear'd of many, many fear:
Be not exalted when thy Fortune's clear:
Nor be dejected, if a Storm appear.*

^l He writ two thousand Verses of moral Instructions.

CHAP. IV.

The Story of Arion.

During the Feast we mentioned (by ^m Plutarch's Account) or rather according to *Eusebius*, in the fortieth Olympiad, there happened a strange Accident, which (because *Herodotus* calls it a Miracle shewed to *Periander*) we shall relate in his Words.

ⁿ *Arion*, the most famous Lutinist of that Time, having lived a long Time with *Periander*, took a Voyage to *Italy* and *Sicily*, there having gotten together much Wealth, he designed to return to *Corinth*: At *Tarentum* he hired a *Corinthian* Vessel, confiding above any in *Corinthians*; they, when they were at Sea, plotted to cast *Arion* over board, that they might be Masters of his Wealth, which he understanding, offered to give them all, so they would save his Life; they refusing, bad him lay violent Hands upon himself, if he would be buried in his own Country, otherwise to leap immediately into the Sea. *Arion* reduced to this Extremity, intreated them to give him Leave to put on his richest Ornaments, and so standing upon the Poop of the Ship, to play a Tune, promising, as soon as he had done, to deliver himself into their Hands. The Men moved with a great Desire to hear the most excellent Lutinist in the World, retired from the Poop to the Middle of the Ship: He put on his best Ornaments, and standing upon the Poop, began that Tune which they call the Morning Hymn, as soon as he had ended it, he threw himself into the Sea, with his Ornaments and Lute; the ship failed on to *Corinth*. It is reported, a Dolphin took him upon his Back, and carried him to *Tenarus*, where he landed, and took Shipping again for *Corinth*; he arrived there in the same Habit, and related all that passed; which *Periander* not believing, committed him to close Custody, not permitting him to go any whither, and in the mean time sent for the Mariners. When they came, he asked them News of *Arion*. They answered he was very well in *Italy*, and that they left him safe at *Tarentum*: Immediately *Arion* appeared, attired as when he leaped out of the Ship, whereto they were so confounded, they could not say any Thing in their own Defence. This is attested both by the

^b Suidas. ⁱ Protogoras. ^j Laertius. ^k 98. ^l Ibid. ^m 97.
ⁿ Laertius. ^o 98. ^p Ausonius in *Ludi septuaginti*. ^q Laertius. ^r 97.
^s See also A. Gellius, who translates this of Plutarch, Lucian, and others.

¹ Plut. sept. sap. conv. ² in Steeb, Serm. 30. ³ in Steeb, ibid. ⁴ Herod. 1. 1.
⁵ Plut. conv. sept. sap. ⁶ Euseb. Chronic.

Corinthians and Lesbians. At *Tanarus* there is a little Image given as an Offering of a Man sitting upon a Dolphin's Back: That *Periander* caused such a one to be made, is evident from this Epigram of *Bianor*.

"The Statue of Arion o'er the Main
Sailing upon a Dolphin's Back was carv'd
By *Periander's* Order. See, Men slain
By cruel Men, by Fishes kind preserv'd.

CHAP. V.

Of his Wife.

HIS Wife was named *Lysis*, by him called *Melissa*, Daughter to *Procleus*, Tyrant of *Epidaurus* and *Eristhenea*, the Daughter of *Aristocratis*, by the Sister of *Aristodemus*, which Persons ruled over the greatest Part of *Arcadia*. * He fell in love with her seeing her in a *Peloponesian* Dress, in her Petticoat, without a Gown, giving Drink to her Father's Workmen: † Long after he killed her in his Fury, big with Child, with a Stool, or a Blow of his Foot, being wrought upon by the Accusations of his Concubines, whom he afterwards burnt.

‡ He sent one Day to *Threspotos*, upon the River *Acheron*, to enquire by Necromancy concerning a *Depositum*. *Melissa* appearing, said, she would not tell them of what Place it was laid, because she was cold and naked, the Cloths wherein she was buried doing her no good, for they were not burned, confirming the Truth whereof by *Periander's* putting Bread into a cold Oven; which Answer carried to *Periander* made good the Suspicion that (‡ through Excess of Love) *κατὰ τὴν Μελέην ἐμύθη*. Hereupon he caused Proclamation to be made, that all the *Corinthian* Women should come to *Juno's* Temple to celebrate a Festival, attired in their richest Ornaments: When they came, having placed a Guard of Soldiers in Ambush, he stripped them all, without any Distinction (Free-women and Servants) of their Clothes, which he carried to *Melissa's* Grave, and having prayed, burnt them to her: This done, he sent Messengers to enquire the second Time; to whom *Melissa's* Ghost appeared, and told them where the *Depositum* was laid.

CHAP. VI.

Of his Children.

HE had^b by *Melissa* two Sons, *Cypselus* and *Lycophron*, the younger ingenious, the elder a Fool; he had likewise a Daughter; his elder Son at the Time of his Mother's Death was eighteen Years old, the younger seventeen. These their

Grandfather with the Mother's Side *Procleus* (Tyrant of *Epidaurus*) sent for over to him, and loved them much, as in Reason he ought, being the Children of his own Daughter; when he was to send them back, he said to them, Do you know, Children, who slew your Mother? The elder took no Heed to that Speech, but *Lycophron* the younger was so troubled at it, that when he came to *Corinth*, he neither spoke to his Father, nor would make him any Answer, looking upon him as the Murderer of his Mother; whereat *Periander* at length became so incensed, that he turned him out of Doors. He being gone, *Periander* question'd the elder what Discourse his Grandfather had with him; he related to him how kindly he used him, but told nothing of that which *Procleus* had said to them at their Departure, for he had not taken any Notice of it; *Periander* said, it was not possible but that he should say something more, and pressed him more strictly; at last he calling it to Mind, told him this also; which *Periander* relenting, and not willing to use his Son more mildly, sent to the People with whom he lived in his Ejection, forbidding them to receive him into any of their Houses. Turned out of that wherein he was, he sought to go into another, but was denied; *Periander* having threatened those that should entertain him, and commanded all to drive him away. Expelled thence, he went to another of his Acquaintance, who knowing him the Son of *Periander*, entertained him, tho' with Fear: At length *Periander* proclaimed, That whosoever received him into their House, or spoke to him, should pay what Fine to *Apollo* he should impose; from that Time none durst venture to entertain him or speak to him; nor would he himself make Trial of a Thing which he knew to be desperate, but passed his Time in the common Walks. Four Days after, *Periander* seeing him poor and extenuated with Fasting, took Compassion of him, and laying aside his Anger, drew nigh to him, and said, Son, which is better, to undergo what you now suffer, or by obeying your Father to enjoy my Wealth and Kingdom? You being my Son, and next Heir to the Kingdom of fruitful *Corinth*; have made Choice of the Life of a Vagabond, angrily opposing him whom you ought not to oppose; if any Unhappiness befall you in those Things whereof you suspect me, is befall me, and I have so much the greater Share therein, in being the Instrument thereof; bear how much better it is to be envied than to be pitied, and what it is to be angry with our Parents or Betters. In these Words *Periander* reprovd his Son, who made him no other Answer, than, That he ought to pay a Fine to the God for speaking to him. *Periander* perceiving the Evil of his Son to be incurable, removed him out

u Anthol. l. 4. c. 16. w Laert. 1. 94. x Athen. Delph.

y Laert. Diad.

z Herod. 5.

a Suid.

b Herod. lib. 3.

of his Sight, and sending him by Ship to *Corcyra*, of which he was also Tyrant: Having thus disposed of him, he made War with his Father-in-law, *Procleus*, as the chief Cause of all that happened.

Laertius mentions an Epistle which he sent him to this Effect:

Periander to Procleus.

WE committed unwillingly that Crime upon your Daughter, but you, if willingly, you alienate my Son's Mind from me, you do unjustly; therefore Sister soften his Mind towards me, or I shall revenge this Injury; I have satisfied your Daughter by burning in her Honour the Garments of all the Women of Corinth.

In fine, he took *Epidaurus* and *Procleus* therein, whom he preserved alive.

“In process of Time *Periander* growing old, and knowing himself to be no longer fit for the Charge of the Common-wealth, sent to *Corcyra* to invite *Lycophron* to the Government of the Kingdom; conceiving his eldest Son incapable of that Office by Reason of his Stupidity. *Lycophron* would not vouchsafe so much as to speak to the Messenger. *Periander* (affectionate to him) sent the second Time his Son's Sister, his own Daughter, hoping he would be sooner persuaded by her; she coming, said to him, *Brother, bad you rather the Kingdom should fall into the Hands of others, and our Father's House be dispersed, than go home and have it yourself?* Return to your own House, injure yourself no longer. *Obstinacy is an unhappy Inheritance: Cure not one Evil with another; many prefer Compliance before Justice; many in pursuit of their Mother's Right lose their Father's Kingdom; a Kingdom is a slippery Thing coveted by many; our Father is old and feeble, give not your own Goods to others.* Thus she pleaded to him as her Father had instructed her; he answered he would never come to *Corinth* whilst his Father lived there: Which, as soon as *Periander* understood, he sent a Messenger the third Time, to let him know he would remove to *Corcyra*, and to command him to come to *Corinth* to take the Government upon him; to this the Son assented. *Periander* prepared for *Corcyra*, his Son for *Corinth*: The People of *Corcyra* informed hereof, that *Periander* might not come into their Country, killed his Son: In Reveng of which Fact *Periander* sent three hundred Boys of

the chief of the *Corcyraens* to *Sardis* to *Alyattes* King of *Lydia*, there to be begt: The *Corinthians* who had Charge of them, were driven upon *Samos*, the *Samians* understanding to what End they were sent to *Sardis*, advised them to take Sanctuary in the Temple of *Diana*, and would not suffer them, as being Suppliants, to be pulled away: The *Corinthians* not permitting any Food to be given them, the *Samians* celebrated a Festival, which is observed (saith *Herodotus*) at this Day; when Night was come, the Company of Youths and Maids danced whilst the Children were praying, and in their Dance, having made Cakes of Meal and Honey, flung them amongst the Children, whereby they were sustain'd alive; this they did so long till the *Samians*, who had Charge of the Children, were fain to go away and leave them; then the *Samians* conveyed the Children home to *Corcyra*. “*Antenor* and *Dionysius* affirm, the *Gnidians* came to *Samos* with a Fleet, drove away *Periander's* Guard from the Temple, and carried the Children to *Corcyra*; for which Reason the *Corcyraens* allowed the *Gnidians* many Honours and Immunities which they gave not (even) to the *Samians*.

CHAP. VII.

His Death.

EXcessive Melancholly (amidst these Crosses) occasioned his Death, in the last Year of his forty-eight Olympiad, the eightieth Year of his Age. Being desirous none should know where he was buried, he thus contrived it: He commanded two Men to go to a certain Place at Night, and to kill whom they first met, and bury him. After them he sent four to kill and bury the two; after the four, more: They obeyed his Order; the first killed him. The *Corinthians* erected for him an empty Monument with this Inscription.

*Periander lies within Corinthian Ground,
For Power and Wisdom above all renown'd.*

Laertius hath this Epigram upon him:

*At whatso'er shall happen be not sad:
Alike for all that God dispenses glad.
Wise Periander did through Grief expire,
Because Events not join'd with his Desire.*

c Herod. lib. 3. d Ibid.

e Plat. de malign. Herod.

f Laert. 1. 95.

S O C I A D E S

His Collection of

The Precepts of the Seven Sophists.

Follow God*. Obey the Law. Worship the Gods. Reverence thy Parents. Suffer for Justice. Understand what thou learnest. Know what thou hearest. Know thyself. About to marry, chuse Opportunity. Consider mortal Things. When thou art a Guest, acknowledge it. Respect Hospitality. Command thyself. Relieve thy Friends. Govern thy Anger. Exercise Prudence. Honour Providence. Use not Swearing. Love Friendship. Apply thyself to Discipline. Pursue Glory. Emulate Wisdom. Speak well of that which is good. Disparage none. Praise Virtue. Do what is just. Be kind to thy Friends. Revenge upon thy Enemies. Practice Generosity. Abstain from Evil. Be sociable. Keep what is thine. Refrain from what belongs to others. Speak Words of good Omen. Hear all Things. Gratify thy Friend. Nothing too much. Husband Time. Regard the future. Hate Injury. Have Respect to thy Servants. Instruct thy Children. If thou hast ought, gratify others. Fear Deceit. Speak well of all. Be a Lover of Wisdom. Judge according to Equity. What thou knowest, do. Abstain from Bloodshed. With Things possible. Converse with the Wise. Examine Wits. What thou hast received restore. Distrust none. Make Use of Art. Defer not what thou intendest to give. Esteem Benefits. Envy none. Guard thyself. Approve Hope. Hate Calumny. Possess justly. Reverence the Good. Acknowledge thy Judge. Be moderate in Wedlock. Respect Fortune. Fly Engagements for any. Converse with all. Make Use of thy like. Regulate Sumptuousness. Enjoy what thou possessest. Exercise Modesty. Return Benefits. Pray for Prosperity.

Love Fortune. Hearing, see. Aim at Things that may be acquired. Hate Diffention. Abhor Reproach. Curb thy Tongue. Repel Injury. Determine equally. Make Use of thy Wealth. Examine without Corruption. Blame the present. Speak knowing. Use no Violence. Live pleasantly. Converse mildly. Go through thy Undertakings fearless. Be benign to all. Confide not in thy Children. Govern thy Tongue. Do well to thyself. Be affable. Answer seasonably. Labour with Equity. Do that whereof thou shalt not repent. When thou hast sinned be penitent. Confine thy Eye. Counsel profitably. Persevere quickly. Preserve Amity. Be grateful. Observe Concord. Declare no Secret. Fear what is more powerful. Pursue what is profitable. Wait for Opportunity. Dissolve Enmities. Expect Age. Boast not of Strength. Use to speak well. Fly Hatred. Possess Wealth justly. Forsake not Glory. Hate Malice. Be not weary of Learning. Hazard thyself prudently. What thou joyest in, quit not. Admire Oracles. Love those thou maintainest. Blame not the Absent. Reverence thy Elders. Teach those that are younger. Confide not in Wealth. Stand in Awe of thyself. Begin no Injury. Crown thy Ancestors. Die for thy Country. Oppugn not Life. Deride not the Dead. Console with the Unhappy. Gratify without Damage. Be not troubled upon every Occasion. Let thy Children be by a Free-Woman. Promise none. Wrong not the Dead. Suffer as Mortal. Trust not Fortune. Be in Childhood modest, in Youth temperate, in Manhood just, in old Age prudent. Die untroubled.

g Stob. Sec. 3.

AUSONII LUDUS

Septem Sapientum.

The PROLOGUE.

THE seven wise Men, (that Name Times past applied

To them, nor hath Posterity deny'd)
 Themselves this Day unto your View present.
 Why dost thou blush, gown'd Roman? Discontent
 That such grave Men should on the Stage be brought!
 Is't Shame to us? 'Twas none to *Athens* thought:
 Whose Council-Chamber was their Theatre.
 True; here for Business several Places are
 Assign'd, the Cirque for Meetings, Courts to take
 Enrolments, *Forums* in which Pleas to make:
 But in old *Athens*, and all *Greece* was known
 No other Place for Business but this one.

viz. the Theatre.

Which latter Luxury in *Rome* did raise.

The Edile heretofore did build for Plays
 A Scaffold-Stage, no Work of carved Stone;
 So *Gallius* and *Murena*, 'tis well known.
 But after, when great Men not sparing Cost,
 Thought it the highest Glory they could boast,
 To build for Plays a Scene more eminent,
 The Theatre grew to this vast Extent;
 That *Pompey*, *Balbus*, *Cæsar* did enlarge,
 Vying which should exceed for State and Charge.

But to what End all this? we came not here
 To tell you who first built the Theatre,
 Forum, or City Gates, but 'twill in
 Grave Sages, who by Gods approv'd have been.
 Such as in pleasing and instructive Verse,
 Their own judicious Sentences rehearse,
 Known to the Learned, and perhaps to you.
 But if your Memories cannot well renew
 Things spoke so long since; the Comedian shall,
 Who better than I knows them, tell you all.

Enter Comedian.

A *Therian Solon*, Fame sings, wrote at *Delphis*
Γνωὶ σεαυτὸν, whose Sense knew thyself, is.
 But this to *Spartan Chilon* must assign.
 Some question, *Chilon*, whether this be thine,
Τελὸς ὄραν μακρὰ βίη, The Close
Of a long Life regard; but must suppose
 That *Solon* this to *Lydian Cræsus* spake.

From *Lesbian Pittacus* this Motto take,
Γινώσκες καιρὸν; that's Know Time. But he
 By *Καιρὸν* here means *Opportunity*.

Οἱ φλησῖτοι κακὸν, *Bias* did proceed
 From thee; that is, *Most Men are ill.* Take Heed
 You not mistake him; for by ill Men here
 He means the ignorant. The next you hear
 Is *Periander's* Μελιτὴ τὸ πᾶρ,
 That is, *Thought's all in all;* a thoughtful Man!
 But *Lydian Cleobulus* does protest
Ἀρίστην Μίτρον; Mean in all is best.
Thales ἡγυῖα παρὲς δ' ἄνθρ cries,
 Upon a *Surety* present Danger lies.
 But this, for those who gain by it to tell,
 May 'chance displease. Now *Solon* comes, farewell.
Exit.

Enter Solon.

LO! *Solon* in his *Greeks* Drefs treads the Stage,
 To whom (as of the seven the greatest Sage)
 Fame gave the Prize of Wisdom from the rest;
 But Fame is not of Censure the strict Test.
 Nor first nor last I take my self to be,
 For there's no Order in Equality.
 Well did the *Delphick* Prophet sport with him
 Who ask'd, which first of the wise Men might seem,
 Saying; if on a Globe their Names he writ,
 None first or lowest he should find in it.
 From midst of that learn'd Round come I, that so
 What once I spake to *Cræsus*, all here now
 Might take as spoken to themselves; 'tis this:
ὄρα τὸ τέλος μακρὰ βίη, which is,
Mark th' End of a long Life; till when forbear
 To say these wretched, or those happy are:
 For all till then are in a doubtful State,
 The Proof of this we'll in few Words relate.
Cræsus the King or Tyrant (choose you which)
 Of *Lydia*, happy thought, and strangely rich;
 Who to his Gods did Gold-wall'd Temples build,
 Invites me o'er; I to his Summons yield.
 His Royal Summons went to *Lydia*,
 Willing his Subjects by our Means might find
 Their King improv'd, and better'd in his Mind.
 He asks me whom I thought the happiest Man?
 I said *Talana*, the *Athenian*,
 Who his Life nobly for his Country gave.
 He pities at it, will another have.
 I told him then *Aglau*, who the Bounds
 Ne'er past in all his Life of his own Grounds.

Smiling

Smiling he says, What think you then of me,
Esteem'd the happiest in the whole World? We
Reply'd, his End could only make that known.
He takes this ill. I willing to be gone,
Kiss his Hand, and so leave him. For some Ends,
Mean time, 'gainst Persia he a War intends;
And all Things ready, does in Person go.
How speeds? He's vanish'd, Prisoner to his Foe,
And ready now to yield his latest Breath,
(For by the Victor he was doom'd to Death)
Upon the Funeral Pile round with Flames
And Smoke, he thus with a loud Voice exclaims
O Solon! Solon! now I plainly see
Th' art a true Prophet! thrice thus naming me;
Mov'd with which Words, Cyrus, (the Conquerour)
Commands the Fire be quench'd, which by a Show'r
Of Rain then falling, happily was laid.
Thence to the King, by a choice Guard convey'd
And question'd who that Solon was? and why
He called so on his Name? He, for Reply,
In Order all declares. Pity at this
The Heart of Cyrus moves; and Cræsus is
Receiv'd to Grace, who in a princely Port
Liv'd after, honour'd in the Persian Court.
Both Kings approv'd and prais'd me, but what I
Said then to one, let each Man here apply.
As spoke 't' himself, 'twas for that End I came.
Farewel. Your Liking let your Hands proclaim.

Exit.

Enter Chilon.

MY Hips with sitting, Eyes with seeing ake,
Expecting when Solon an End would make.
How little and how long your Atticks prate!
Scarce in three Hundred Lines one Word of Weight,
Or a grave Sentence, how he look'd on me
At going off? — Now Spartan Chilon see!
Who with Læonian Brevity commends
To you the Knowledge of yourselves, kind Friends!
Τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν, in a Delphos Fane.
'Tis a hard Work, but recompenc'd with Gain.
Try your own Strength; examine what 'tis you
Have done already, what you ought to do.
All Duties of our Life, as Modesty,
Honour and Constancy included be
In this, and Glory, which we yet despise.
Farewel, your Claps I not respect nor prize. [Exit.]

Enter Cleobulus.

I Cleobulus, tho' my Native Seat
Be a small Isle, am Author of a great
And glorious Sentence; Μένειν ἀπέρχεται,
A Mean is best. You, Sirs, that sit upon
The fourteen middle Benches next unto
Th' Orchestra, best may judge if this be true.
Your Nod shews your Assent. We thank you but
We shall proceed in Order. Was it not

One: After (who a Man of your own Clime is)
That said once in this Place, *Ute ne quid nimis?*
And hither does our Master's aim.
The Dorick and the Latin mean the same.
In speaking, being silent, or in sleep,
In good Turns, or in bad, a Mean still keep,
In Study, or whatever you intend.
I've said, and that I mean, I keep here End. [Exit.]

Enter Thales.

I'M Thales, who maintain (as Pindar sings)
Water to be the best and first of Things.
To whom by Phœbus Mandate, Fishers brought
A golden Tripod, which they Fishing caught,
By him as Present to the Wisest meant.
Which I refus'd, and unto others sent
In Knowledge my Superiors as I thought.
From one to th' other of the Sages brought,
By them again return'd, to me it came,
Who to Apollo consecrate the same.
For since to seek the Wisest, he enjoin'd,
I judge no Man, but God by that designed.
Now on the Stage (as those before) I come
To assert the Truth of my own Axiom.
Perhaps by some 't may be offensive thought:
But not by those by sad Experience taught.
Ἐγγὺς πάντες θ' ἔστω, say we,
Be Surety, and be sure a Loser be.
A thousand Instances I could produce
To prove Repentance is the only Use
That can be made of it, but that we here
Examples by their Names to cite, forbear.
Make your own Application, and conceive
The Damage Men by this sole Act receive.
Nor this our good Intention take amiss,
You that like, Clap, you that dislike it, Hiss.

[Exit.]

Enter Bias.

I Am Priænean Bias, who once taught
Οὐ φανερὸν καλῶς, That most Men are naught.
I wist'd had been unpoke; for Truth gains Hate.
But by bad Men, I mean illiterate,
And those who barbarously all Laws confound.
Religion, Justice; for within this Round
I see none but are good; believe all those
Whom I proclaim for bad among your Foes.
Yet there is none so partially apply'd
To Vice, but with the Good will side,
Whether he be truly such, or would fain
Of a good Man the Reputation gain.
The hated Name of an ill Man all shun.
Then (my good Men) your Praise, and I ha' done.

[Exit.]

Enter Pittacus.

I'M Pittacus, who once this Maxim penn'd,
Ἵππεύς κρείσσον, that's, Time apprehend.

But

But by Time we meant Time in Season, as
In tempore venit is your *Roman* Phrase.
 And your own Comick Poet *Terence*, he,
 Chief of all Things makes Opportunity,
 Where *Drems* come unto *Antiphila*
 I'th' Nick of Time; consider what I say,
 And mark how great an Inconvenience
 Most suffer through this want of Providence
 But now 'tis more than Time we should be gone;
 Farewel, and give your Approbation. [Exit.

Enter Perander.

NOW on the Stage see *Perander* move!
 He who once said, and what he said will prove,

Μολέται τὸ πᾶν, Thought is all in all.
 Since him a perfect Agent we may call,
 Who first considers what he undergoes;
 For we should still forecast, as *Terence* shews,
 Th' Event of Business; whether good or bad,
 Ere w^t undertake it; where may best be had
 Conveniency for Planting, where to Build,
 When to wage War, and when to pitch a Field.
 Nor inconsiderately take in hand
 Or great, or small Things, for that makes a Stand
 In the free Progress of all new Designs;
 Like Consultation; hence we see it clear,
 Who use it not, by Chance, not Counsel steer,
 But I retire, whilst you with better Fate
 Employ your Thoughts how to uphold your State.
 [Exit.

A N A C H A R S I S.

CHAP. I.

His Life and Writings.

THESE Nations (saith ^a *Herodotus*) which Border upon the *Euxine Sea*, are of all most illiterate, the *Scythians* only excepted; we can alledge nothing relating to Learning of any People within the Compasses of that Sea, neither know we any Person learned but the *Scythians* *Anacharsis*. ^b Amongst those, notwithstanding the Roughness of their Education, (for they fed upon Mares Milk, and dwell in Waggon) were some who far exceeded all in Justice.

Such was *Anacharsis*, ^c Son of *Gnmrus*, Brother of *Cadovides*, King of *Scythia*; his Mother a Grecian, by which Means he had the Advantage of two Languages, but was Owner of no other House than the Custom of that Country allowed, a Chariot, whence ^d he compared his Dwelling to that of the Sun, carried in that Manner round the Heavens.

^e The *Scythians* never travel beyond their own Confines, but *Anacharsis*, as a Person endued with more than ordinary Wisdom, extended his Journey farther, ^f being sent by the King of *Scythia* to *Greece*. ^g He came to *Athens* in the first Year of the forty-seventh Olympiad, *Euerates* being Archon; and ^h first met with *Taxaris* one of his own Country, by whom, as the most compendious Way to take a Survey of *Athens* and *Greece*, he was address'd to *Solon*. How *Solon* received and entertained him,

is already related in his Life. He instructed him in the best Disciplines, recommended him to the Favour of noblest Persons, and sought all Means of giving him Respect and Honour. *Anacharsis* admired his Wisdom, continually followed him, in a short Space learned all Things of him, and was kindly received by every one for his Sake, being (as *Theoxenus* attests) the only Stranger whom they incorporated into their City.

ⁱ Thus was he much honoured by the Grecians for his Perfection, Wisdom, Temperance, wherein he excelled many of their Philosophers, whereupon they conferred the Attribute of *Wise* upon him, some accounting him one of the Seven. *Perander* invited him with the rest to *Corinth*; the Feast is largely described by *Plutarch*: There *Anacharsis* carrying with him Chaplets of Flowers, Ivy, and Laurel, drunk, as the *Scythians* use, to great Excess, ^k and required the Prize of Drinking to be given him, because he was first drunk. In a Race (saith he) he wins who comes first at the Post, in Drinking he who comes first to the End deserves the Reward.

^l Having seen much of the World, and improved his Knowledge, he returned to *Scythia* (as *Lucian* conjectures, not until *Solon* was dead.) As he sailed along the *Hellepont*, he put in at *Cyzicum*, and

^a Lib. 1.
 c. 1. 101.
 deipa. 10.

^b Strab. lib. 7.
 h Lucian. Scyth.
 1 Herod. 4.

^c Laert. 1. 101.
 i Strab. lib. 7.

^d Plut. conviv. sept. Sap.
 Clem. Alex. Strom. 1.

^e Asian. var. hist. 4. 7.
 Clem. Alex. Strom. 5.

^f Herod. 4.
 Asian. lib. 2.

^g La.
 k Athen.

finding the People celebrating a Festival to the Mother of the Gods, with much Splendor and Munificence; he made a Vow, if he got safe home, to sacrifice in the same Manner as he had seen those of Cyzicum, and to institute a Vigil. When he came into Scythia, he withdrew himself privately to Hylæa, near the Achyllean Course, a Place abounding with Trees, and performed the Rites of the Goddess with a Timbrel (and Cymbal * about his Neck.) A Scythian spying him, carried Word to Saulius the King, who went immediately thither, and being an Eyewitness thereof, shot him through with an Arrow (to punish his Efficinacy, and prevent the Infection thereof in others). * And now if any enquire concerning Anacharis, the Scythians deny they knew him, because he travelled into Greece, and affected the Customs of that Country. As I am informed by Timæus, Tutor of Spargapithes, who was Uncle to Indathyrus, King of Scythia, Son of Gnorus, Son of Lycus, Son of Spargapithes. Now Anacharis being of this Family, it is manifest he was slain by his Brother, (that his Brother was King of Scythia, and slew him, is confirmed by Laertius, tho' he differ in the Name) for Indathyrus was Son of Saulius, Saulius was he who slew Anacharis, and consequently is the same whom Laertius calls Cadovoides, adding, some report that he shot him in hunting; for being addicted to the Greek Customs, and endeavouring to alter the Laws of Scythia, whereupon he dying, said, he returned fast out of Greece, guarded by his own Wisdom, but was slain at home by the Envy of others. Upon him Laertius † hath this Epigram.

From Travel Anacharis came at last,
And Scythia in a Grecian Mould was cast:
Whilst he was teaching how, by the Surprise
Of a wing'd Arrow carried to the Skies.

† There were many Statues erected in Honour of him by the Grecians, upon which was writ, ΤΙΜΩΝ, γαστήρ αἰδέσθαι σέβεται. He was temperate and skilful in many Things. He freely and largely discoursed of the Manner of Diet and Medicine, which the Scythians used in curing the Sick. From the plain Freedom he used in Speech, arose a Proverb, The Scythian Phræst. He writ eight hundred Verses of Orders for the Scythians and Greeks, concerning frugal Living and martial Affairs. There are also two Epistles of his extant.

Anacharis to Cræsus.

King of the Lydians, I came into Greece to be informed of their Manners and Studies; I need

not Money, it is enough if I can return into Scythia bettered: But I will come to Sardis, because I highly esteem your Favour.

* Anacharis to Hanno, Healtib.

MY Apparel is a Scythian Rug, my Shoes the Hardness of my Feet, my Bed the Earth, my Sauce Hunger; I feed on Milk, Cheese, and Flea. You may come to me as to one that's contented: But those Gifts which you so much esteem, bestow either on your Citizens, or the immortal Gods.

† He is said to have invented Tinder, * the Anchor, and the Potter's Wheel; but this latter is by Strabo evinced clearly to be false, because mentioned by Homer, who lived long after him, Anacharis being in the Time of Cræsus.

G H A P. II.

His Apophthegms.

HIS Apophthegms are these, * He said a Vine bare three Grapes, the first of Pleasure, the second of Drunkenness, the third of Repentance. He wondered, that amongst the Greeks, Artists contended, and they who were no Artists determined. Being demanded by what Means a Man might be brought not to love Wine, he said, by setting before his Eyes the Actions of drunken Persons. He wondered the Grecians, who punished Injuries by Law, rewarded the Athletæ at publick Exercises for beating one another. Being told a Ship is four Inches thick, so far from Death, said he, are they who sail. He said Oil was a Receipt procuring Madnefs, because the Athletæ, the more they were anointed therewith, the more fierce they were against one another. How comes it, said he, that they who forbid lying themselves, lye openly, when they put off their Wares? He wondered that the Greeks in the Beginning of a Feast drank in little Cups, and when they were full in great. † Being demanded (by Ardalus) whether there were any Flutes in Scythia, he answered, not so much as Vines (which * Aristotle calls a Demonstration στῖν, by the remote Cause.) Ardalus adding, are there not Gods amongst the Scythians? Yes, reply'd he, which understand all Languages. ‡ Being asked what Ship was safest, he answered, that which is in the Haven. He affirmed the most remarkable Thing he had seen among the Grecians to be this, that they left the Smoke upon the Mountains; and carried the Wood into their Cities. Being demanded whether the Number of the Dead or the Living were the greatest; amongst which, saith he, do you account those who are at Sea? To an Athenian, who reproached him for being a Scythian,

† m Clem. Alex. admittit. ad gent. n Ibid. o Herod. continens. p For δεινὰ ἀνὰ φῶς read ἀνὰ φῶς. q Laert. 1. 102. r Ibid. 1. 104. Plut. conviv. sept. sp. s Cic. Tuscul. quest. 5. Epistle. ἡσπὶν ἀνὰ φῶς, ἡσπὶν ἀνὰ φῶς, ἡσπὶν ἀνὰ φῶς. u Strab. 7. Strab. 15. s Anstet. post. 1. 23. a Plut. conviv. sept. sp.

b For δεινὰ ἀνὰ φῶς read ἀνὰ φῶς. c Laert. 1. 102. d Clem. Alex. cites this Fragment, doubtless out of the same u Laert. 105. x Ibid. 103. y Plut. conviv. sept. sp. z Laert. 1. 105.

my Country, (saith he) is a *Disgrace* to me, but you are a *Disgrace* to your Country. Being demanded what in Man is both good and bad, he answered the Tongue. He affirmed it is better to have one Friend worth much, than many worth nothing. He said the Forum was the proper Place for Cheating and unjust Gain. To a young Man who reproached him at a Feast; Youth, said he, if at these Years you cannot bear Wine, when you grow old, you will not be able to bear Water.

^c When he returned to Scythia, he told the King who sent him, the Greeks were busied in all Kinds of Wisdom, except the Lacedæmonians, who only knew how to give and receive prudently.

^d He said, the Greeks made no other Use of Money but to account with it. ^e At a publick Assembly in Athens, he said, he wondered, why in the Greek Convocations, wise Men propounded Business, and Fools determined it. ^f That Prince is happy who is wise. That City is best, wherein (all Things else being

equal) Virtue hath the better Condition, Vice the worse.

^g To one, who, as they were drinking, said, beholding his Wife, Anacharsis, you have married one who is nothing handsome: I am (answered he) of that Opinion also; but put less Water in my Wine, that I may make her handsome.

^h Relating the Qualities of the Vine to the King of Scythia, and shewing him some Slips thereof, he added, and by this Time it would have reached into Scythia, if the Greeks did not every Year cut off its Branches. ⁱ At a Feast, such being sent for, as might procure Mirth, he alone smiled not; afterwards, an Ape being brought in, he laughed, saying, that Beast is ridiculous by Nature, Man by Art and Study.

Whilst he slept, he used *κατιχων τῇ μὲν λαῖ τὰ αἰδοῦναι τῇ δὲ τῷ στυμμε*, implying that a Man ought to take great Care to govern both, but that it is harder to restrain our Pleasure than our Tongue. He said, that to him all the Grecians were Scythians.

c Herod. 4. d Plut. de profect. virtut. sent. e Plut. vit. Sol. f Plut. conv. asp. g Stob. serm. 16. h Athen. deipno. lib. 10. i Athen. deipno. lib. 14. Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 5. Clem. Strom. 1.

M I S O N.

Mysſon^k was (according to Hermippus) Son of Sircomen, born at Chene, a Village either of Oetæa, or Lacedæmonia, his Father a Tyrant. Anacharsis demanding of the Oracle, if any were wiser, was answered (as was in the Life of Thales mentioned of Chilon.)

Oetæan Mysſon I declare
Wiser than those who wisest are.

His Curiosity increasing by this Answer, he went to the Village, and finding him fitting a Ploughshare to the Plough, said, *Mysſo*, it is not yet Time to plough: But it is (answered he) to prepare. Others affirm the Oracle called him Etean, about which there is much Difference. Parmenides saith, that Eteæ was a Lacedæmonian Village, whereof Mysſon was. Socrates, that he was Etean by his Fa-

ther, Chenean by his Mother. Euthyphron, that he was a Cretan, Eteæ being a City of Crete, Anaxilaus an Arcadian. Hippanax mentions him in these Words: And Mysſo, whom Apollo declared the wisest of all Men. Aristomenes affirms he was of the same Humour as Timon and Apemantus, a Man-hater. He retired from Lacedæmon into the Desert, and was there surprized all alone; smiling, being demanded why he smiled, no Man being present, he answered, for that Reason. Aristoxenus saith, he was of no Account, because not of the City, but of an obscure Village; whence some ascribe his Sayings to Pysſistratus, but others reckon him one of the Seven. ^l Plate puts him in the Room of Periander. He said, *We must not seek Things from Words, but Words from Things; Things were not made for Words, but Words for Things.* He died ninety-seven Years old.

k Laert. 1. 106. l Protagor. t. 1.

E P I M E N I D E S.

E *Pimenides* is by all acknowledged a *Cretan*, (tho' contrary to the Custom of that Place he wore long Hair) but in the Town where he was born they agree not. *Laertius*, following the greater Part of Writers, saith it was *Cnossus*, *Strabo*, *Phæstus*. There is no less Difference about the Names of his Parents; some call his Father *Phæstius*, or *Phæstus*, others *Dofades*, his Mother *Blafsa*, others *Agefarchus*; *Apollonius*, *Bolus*, *Laertius*, and *Suidas* name his Mother *Blafsa*; *Plutarch* *Balta*, supposed a Nymph.

It is reported, that when he was a Youth, being sent by his Father and Brethren to their Field to fetch home a Sheep to the City, tired with the Heat and Travel in Search thereof, he withdrew himself at Noon (or as *Apollonius*, at Night) from the common Way into a private Cave, where he slept (according to *Theopompus*) fifty seven Years, according to *Varro*, *Plutarch*, and *Tertullian*, fifty, *Pausanias* forty, in which Interval of Time, most of his Kindred died; at the End hereof awaking, he betook himself again to the Search of his Sheep, thinking it the same, or the next Day to that wherein he lay down, and that he had slept but a little while; not finding it, he returned to the Field, where he saw all Things changed, and a Stranger in Possession thereof; thence to the City much amazed; going into his own House, they questioned who he was; at last he met with his younger Brother, now grown old, by whom he was informed of all that passed, and the Time of his Absence. *Plutarch* saith, he awaked an old Man; *Pliny* and *Laertius*, that he grew old in as many Days as he had slept Years. * Some affirm he slept not, but retired a while, employing himself in cutting up Roots.

Many other Wonders are reported of him; * some say, he received Food of the Nymphs, which he kept in an Ox's Hoof, and took thereof a little every Day, requiring no other Sustainance, never being seen to eat; * he often counterfeited Resurrection from Death to Life; his * Soul going out of his Body whenever he pleased, and returning again.

* He is reported to be the first that lustrated Houses and Fields, * which he performed by Verse. To this End the *Athenians* in the forty-sixth Olympiad, visited with a Plague, and commanded by the Oracle to lustrate the City, sent *Nicias*, Son of *Niceratus* with a Ship to *Crete*, to desire *Epi-*

menides to come to them, which he did, and there contracted Acquaintance with *Solon*, whom he privately instructed, setting him in the Way of making Laws. He reduced the divine Rights to a lesser Charge; he moderated the Mourning of the Citizens, he added some Sacrifices to the Ceremonies of Funerals, taking away barbarous Customs which the Women used upon those Occasions; and (which was of greatest Concernment) by Proportions, Procurations, and Offerings, he lustrated and expiated the City, rendering the People more obsequious to Justice and Unity, * and stayed the Pestilence in this Manner: He took Sheep, black and white, and brought them into the *Areopagus*; there he let them loose, to go whither they would, giving Order to those who followed them, that whenever any of them lay down, they should sacrifice in that Place to the proper Deity, whereby the Plague ceased. Hence it is, that at this Day, (saith *Laertius*) are to be seen in many *Athenian* Villages, nameless Altars, Monuments of that Expiation. Some affirm he imputed it to the *Cylenian* Impiety (of which already in the Life of *Solon*) and allwaged it, by putting to Death two young Men, *Cratinus* and *Ctesibius*.

* He is supposed first to have built Temples; one he erected in *Athen* to the *Eumenides*; another he intended to consecrate to the Nymphs, but a Voice from Heaven was heard in these Words, *Epimenides, not to the Nymphs but to Jupiter*.

* Beholding the Haven *Munychia*, he said to those who stood by, how blind is Man to the future! The *Athenians* would tear this Haven in Pieces with their Teeth, if they foresaw how much it will infect the City. This he foretold many Years before it came to pass, which was in the second Year of the 114 Olympiad, when *Antipater* put a Garison of *Macedonians* into the *Munychia*.

The *Athenians* * being afraid of the *Persian* Navy, he told them, it would not invade them for many Years, and when it did, the *Persians* should not effect the least of their Hopes, but depart home with greater Loss to themselves than they had given their Adversaries; which was fulfilled in the Fights at *Marathon* and *Salamis*.

* He foretold the *Lacedæmonians* (and *Cretans* also) the Overthrow they should receive by the *Arcadians*, which happened when *Euricrates* and *Archidamus* reigned in *Lacedæmon*.

These Predictions, (for which the *Grecians*

m *Laert.* 1. 109. n *Val. Max.* 8. 13. o One of these Names perhaps is corrupt. p *Apollon. Hist. con.* cap. 1. *Plin.* 7. 52. *Laert.* 1. 109. q *De Ling. Lat.* 6. r An *feni* *et* *gerenda* resp. u *Plin.* 7. 52. w *Laert.* 1. 115. x *Apollon. Laert.* 1. 114. y *Laert.* 1. 115. z *Suid.* a *Laert.* 1. 112. b *Strabo* 1. 10. c *Laert.* 1. 110. d *Laert.* 1. 112. e *Plut. vit. Sol.* f *Philo-*
to de leg. 1. 2. g *Laert.* 1. 115. h *Ibid.* 1. 109. i esteemed

esteemed him 'divine, beloved of the Gods, * and put him in the Number of their Sophists; the *Cretans* ', whose Prophet he is stiled by " St. Paul, sacrificed to him as a God, were either not known, or not credited by *Aristotle* ", who avers, he used not to prophesy of future Things, but only such as were past and obscure.

For his Lustration of the City and other Things, he was much honoured by the *Athenians*, who offered him many Gifts, would have rewarded him with a Talent, and appointed a Ship to transport him back to *Crete*: He refused their Gifts and Money, nor would accept of any Thing but a little Branch of sacred Olive out of the Tower, wherewith (having procured a League betwixt the *Cnosians* and *Athenians*) he returned home, and soon after died ° 157 Years old, or according to ° others, 150, the *Cretans* say he wanted but one of 300. *Xenophanes* affirms he heard him when he was 154 Years of Age. His Body the *Lacedemonians* kept by the Direction of the Oracle. It was taken up many Years after, marked all over with Characters, whence arose a Proverb concerning abstruse Things, the *Skin of Epimenides*. He called himself *Æacus*, others named him *Cures*.

He was a great ° Poet, and writ many Things in Verse; the Subject of his Writings were these. *Initiations, Lustrations*, and other obscure Matters in Verse.

The Generation and Theogony of the Curetes and Coribantes, 5000 Verses.

The Building of Argo, and Expedition of Jason to Colchos, 6500 Verses.

Of Sacrifices, in Prose.

Of the Cretan Common-wealth.

Of Minos and Radamanthus.

i Plat. l. c. k Plat. Sol. l Laert. 1. 109. m Tit. 2. n Rhetor. 3. 17. o Laert. citing Phlegon. Plin. 1. 52.
p Apollon. Hist. com. 1. citing Phlegon. Suid. q Suid. r D. Hieronym. in Epistol. ad Titum. See the Place. Tit. 11. 2.

s Laert. 1. 113. t Laert. ibid.

* *Of Oracles and Responses*, out of which St. Paul cites this Verse.

ἔγχετ' ἀει-ψόσται, καὶ ἐπὶ δαίμα, παρτίης ἐγχεῖν.

The Cretans are always Lyars, Evil Beasts, Slow-bellies.

There is extant under his Name (saith *Laertius* *) an Epistle to *Solon* concerning the Orders of Government given by *Minos* to the *Cretans*; which *Demetrius* conceives of later Date, not written in the *Cretan*, but *Athenian* Language; but I have met with another to this Effect.

Epimenides to Solon.

BE of Comfort Friend; for if Pisistratus were Ruler of Athenians, inured to Servitude, and void of Discipline, his Way perhaps might continue for ever. But now he subjects not base People, but such as are mindful of Solon's Instructions, who ashamed of their Bondage will not brook his Tyranny; and tho' he should settle himself in the Government unmoveable, yet I hope it will not devolve to his Children; for it is hard for free Persons, brought up under excellent Laws, to suffer Bondage. As for you, wander not, but come to Crete to me, where you will find no oppressive Monarch. If in travelling up and down you should light upon some of his Friends, I fear you may suffer some Mischiefe.

There were two more of this Name, one a Genealogist: The other writ in the *Dorick* Dialect concerning *Rhodes*:

P H E R E C T D E S.

Perceydes * was of *Syrus* (one of the *Cyclades* near *Delos*) Son of *Bady*, or as others, *Babis*; born according to * *Suidas* in the 46th Olympiad; he lived in the Time of *Alyattes* King of *Lydia*; contemporary with the seven Sophists, by some accounted one of them. *Laertius* saith he was in the fifty-ninth Olympiad, * *Cicero* in the Time of *Servius Tullius*.

There are who affirm he heard *Pittacus*; others say he had no Master, but procured and studied by himself the abstruse Books of the *Phænicians*.

u Laert. 1. 116. w *Suidas* &c. x *Tusc. quest.* 2. y Laert. ibid. z Apollon. hist. comment. esp. 5. a Laert. ibid.
b De Divin. 1. 13. c Apollon. ibid. Laert. ibid.

* Many strange Things are related of him. * *In Syrus* being thirsty, he required Water of one of his Scholars, which * (being drawn out of a Well) he drank, and thereupon declared there would be an Earthquake within three Days in that Island; which happening as he foretold, gained him much Credit, tho' ascribed by *Cicero* ° not to a divine, but a natural Cause.

° Again going to *Juno's* Temple in *Samos*, he beheld a Ship with full Sail entering the Harbour, he said to those that were present, it would never

come into the Haven ; whilst he was speaking, a Storm arose, and the Ship sunk in their Sight.

¶ Going by *Messana* to *Olympia*, he advised *Perilaus*, at whose House he lay, to remove thence with all his Family ; which he obeyed not : *Messana* was soon after taken.

¶ He had the *Lacedæmonians* not to esteem Gold or Silver. *Hercules* having so commanded him in a Dream, who appeared likewise to the Kings, and bad them obey *Pherecydes* : This some ascribe to *Pythagoras*.

He held Opinions contrary to *Thales*, but agreed with him in that of Water, that it is Principal of all Things. He said the Gods called a Table *Sumpas*. ¶ He first asserted the Immortality of the Soul, according to some. ¶ *Tætzet* affirms he was Master to *Thales*, but that suits not with their Times : That he instructed *Pythagoras* is generally acknowledged.

The Manner of his Death is variously related. *Hermippus* saith¹, in a War betwixt the *Ephesians* and *Magnesiens*, he, desirous the *Ephesians* might be Victors, demanded of one present, whence he was ? Who answer'd of *Ephesus* : Draw me then, saith he, by the Legs into the *Magnesian* Territory, and bid your Countrymen, after they have gained the Battle, bury me. I am *Pherecydes*. This Message he delivered ; they overcame the *Magnesiens*, and finding *Pherecydes* dead, buried him honourably. Some affirm he went to *Delpbi*, and threw himself from the *Corycean* Mountain ; but the more general Opinion is, that² he died most miserably ; his whole Body eaten up with Lice (*Pliny*³ saith, with Serpents which broke out of his Skin) where-by, when his Face became deform'd, he avoided and refused the Sight of his Acquaintance. When any one came to visit him (as *Pythagoras* did) and demanded how he did, he putting out his Finger at the Key-hole, consumed by his Disease, shewed them the Condition of his whole Body, saying *χρησθῆναι, the Skin sheweth* ; which Words the Philosophers take in an ill Sense. The *Delians* affirm the God of that Place sent this Disease to him out of Anger, because he boasted much of his own

Wisdom to his Disciples, saying, if he should never sacrifice to any God, he should lead a Life no less pleasant than those that offered Hecatombs. *Pythagoras* buried him ; his Tomb carried this Inscription,

*Of Wisdom I comprise the utmost Bound ;
Who further would be satisfied, must found
Pythagoras, of Greeks the most renown'd.*

Some affirm⁴ he was the first that writ in Prose, which others ascribe to *Cadmus*. He writ

Heptamuchos or *Theocrasia* ; perhaps the same with his *Theology*, ten Books containing the Origin and Succession of the Gods (if not mistaken for the Theogony of the younger *Pherecydes*) an obscure dark Work, the Allegories whereof *Isidore* cited by *Clemens Alexandrinus*⁵ conceives taken from the Prophecy of *Cham*.

Concerning this Book there is extant an Epistle under the Name of *Pherecydes*, but may well be suspected to be spurious.

Pherecydes to Thales .

WELL may you die whenever your fatal Hour arrives ; as soon as I received your Letter I fell sick, was over-run with Lice, and had a Fever ; whereupon I gave Order to my Servants, that as soon as I was buried they should carry the Book to you ; if you, with the rest of the wise Men approve it, publish it ; if you approve it not, publish it not, for me it doth not please ; there is no Certainty in it ; whatsoever the Theologist saith, you must understand otherwise ; for I write in Fables, constrain'd by my Disease. I have not admitted of any Physician or Friend, but when they came to the Door, and ask'd how it was with me, putting my Finger out at the Key-hole, I shewed them how desperate ill I was, and bespake them to come on the Morrow to the Funeral of *Pherecydes*.

There was another of this Name of the same Island, an Astrologer. There are more mentioned by *Suidas*.

¹ Laert. 1. 116. ² Ibid. ³ Achil. Tat. l. 6. in Art. ⁴ Cicero. Tusculan. quest. 1. 16. ⁵ Chilian. 1. ⁶ Laert. 1. 117.
⁷ Elian. 4. 28. See also 5. 2. ⁸ Nat. Hist. l. 7. ⁹ Suidas in *epist.* ¹⁰ Clem. Alexand. Strom. 6. ¹¹ Laert. 1. 122.

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY,

THE SECOND PART,
Containing the *Ionick* Philosophers.

A N A X I M A N D E R.

CHAP. I.
Of his Life.

PHILOSOPHY had a twofold Beginning ^a, one from *Anaximander*, another from *Pythagoras*. *Anaximander* was Disciple to *Thales*, whence that Philosophy was called *Ionick*; *Thales* being an *Ionian*, for he was of *Miletus*. *Pythagoras* was Disciple to *Phercydes*; that King of Philosophy, called from the Place where he taught, *Italic*. *Thales* was succeeded by *Anaximander*, *Anaximander* by *Anaximenes*, *Anaximenes* by *Anaxagoras*, *Anaxagoras* by *Archelaus*, in whom (as *Plutarch*, *Laertius*, and others affirm) it ended. *Socrates* (the Scholar of *Archelaus*) introducing Morality.

Anaximander, a *Milesian*, ^b Countryman, Companion and ^c Kinsman of *Thales*; was his Disciple also, and ^d Successor in the Propagation of his Doctrine; Son of *Praxiadus* (corruptly called by some ^e *Praxidamus*) born the third Year of the 42^d Olympiad. ^f He flourished most in the Time of *Polecrates*, Tyrant of *Samos*.

^g He demonstrated the Compendium of Geometry; ^h being next *Homer*, the first Master of that Science; he first set forth a Geographic Table, of

which ⁱ *Laertius* is to be understood, who affirms, *he described the Circumference of the Sea and Land*.

^k In the 50th Olympiad he found out the Obliquity of the Zodiac, *that is*, (saith *Pliny*) *he opened the Gates of all Things*. ^l He invented the *Gnomon*, and set up the first in an open Place at *Lacedæmon*. He ^m found out the Equinoctial Solstices and Horologies; ⁿ He framed *Horoscopes* to denote the Tropicks and Equinoxes; whence ^o *Salmasius* conceives the Use of his Dial was only to delineate the Tropick and Equinoctial Points, that they did not serve to distinguish the Hours or twelve Parts of the Day, he proveth because the very Name *ὥρα* in that Sense, or the Division of the Day into twelve equal Parts, was not known a long Time after.

^p He advised the *Lacedæmonians* to quit their City and Houses, and to lie armed in the open Field, foretelling an Earthquake which threw down the whole City, and tore away a Piece of the Mountain *Taygetus*.

^q As he sung, the Boys used to deride him,

^a *Laert. pref.* ^b *Cic. acad. quest. 4.* ^c *Suid. Anaximander.* ^d *Strab. lib. 1. & 4.* ^e *Clem. Alexand. Strom. 1.* ^f *Laert. lib. 1.* ^g *Suid. ibid.* ^h *Strab. lib. 1.* ⁱ *Laert. 2. 1.* ^k *Plin. 2. 6.* ^l *Laert. 11. 1.* ^m *Suid.* ⁿ *Laert. 11.* ^o *Plin. man. exercit.* ^p *Cicer. divinat. Plin. 2. 79. 1. 50.* ^q *Laert. 2. 2.*

where-

whereupon he said, we must learn to sing better for the Boys.

Of his Auditors are remembered *Anaximenes* and *Parmenides*.

Of his Writings these:

1. *Περὶ φύσεως, Of Nature.* This Treatise perhaps *Laertius* means, who saith he digested his Opinions into Commentaries, which Book fell into the Hands of *Apollodorus* the Athenian.

Γὰς ἀνθρώπων.

Περὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν.

2. *Of the Sphere, with other Things.*

He was, according to *Apollodorus*, 64 Years old the second Year of the 58th Olympiad, and died soon after.

CHAP. II.

Of his Opinions.

SECT. 1. That Infinity is the Principle of all Things.

THales (saith *Cicero*) *who held that all Things consist of Water, could not persuade his Countryman and Companion Anaximander thereto, for he asserted, that Infinity is that whereof all Things were made, or (according to Plutarch, Laertius, and Justin Martyr), that it is the Principle and Element of Things (for these two he confounded, as was observed of his Master Thales) but not declared what this Infinity is, whether Air, Water, Earth, or any other Body, for which he was condemned by Plutarch.*

That it is *one, infinite in Magnitude* (not Number) whence *Aristotle* reprehends him for imagining Contraries can proceed from the same Principle. *That is for that Reason is infinite, that it may not fail.*

That the Parts thereof are changed; the whole is immutable. (*Simplicius* saith moveable) *That out of it all Things proceed, and resolve into it.*

That there are infinite Worlds generated which corrupt into that whereof they were generated.

SECT. 2. Of the Heavens.

HIS Opinion (according to *Cicero*) was, that the Gods are native (having a Beginning) rising and setting by long Intervals, and that there are innumerable Worlds: This *Plutarch* and *Stobæus* apply to the Heavens and Stars. But how can we (adds *Cicero*) understand a God that is not eternal. That *Heaven consists of Cold and Heat mixed.*

That the Stars are globous Influences, consisting of Air full of Fire, respiring Flames at some certain Part; moved by the Circles and Spheres whereon they inhere; which Assertion *Aristotle* borrowed from hence.

That the Sun is seated highest, the Moon next, then the fixed Stars and Planets.

That the Circle of the Sun is 28 Times (*Theodoret* saith 26) greater than the Earth, having a hollow Circle about it like a Chariot-wheel, full of Fire; in one Part whereof there is a Mouth, at which the Fire is seen as out of the Hole of a Flute, which is the Sun's equal in Bigness with the Earth.

That the Cause of the Sun's Eclipse is the stopping that Hole in the Midst, out of which the Fire issues.

That the Circle of the Moon is 29 Times greater than the Earth, like a Chariot Wheel, having a hollow Orb, in the Midst full of Fire (like the Sun) and oblique, breathing Fire out at one Part as out of a Tunnel.

That the Eclipse of the Moon happens according to her Conversions, when the Mouth out of which the Fire issues, is stopped.

That the Moon hath a Light of her own, but very thin; that she shineth in the Light she borroweth from the Sun; which two Assertions are so far from being inconsistent, that it is the common Opinion both are true.

SECT. 3. Of Meteors.

THAT Wind is a Flasion of the Air, when the most subtle and liquid Parts thereof are either stirred or resolved by the Sun.

That Thunders, Lightnings, Presters, and Whirlwinds are caused by the Wind enclosed in a thick Cloud, which, by Reason of its Lightness breaketh forth violently; the Rupture of the Cloud maketh a Crack, and the Division by Reason of the Blackness causeth a flashing Light. *Seneca* more expressly, He ascribed all to Wind. Thunder (saith he) is the Sound of a breaking Cloud: Why unequal? Because the Breakings are unequal. Why doth it thunder in a clear Day? Because even then the Wind breaketh through the thick and dry Air. Why sometimes doth it thunder and not lighten? Because the thinner and weaker Spirit is able to make a Flame but not a Sound. What is Lightning? The Agitation of the Air severing itself, and rushing down, discharging a faint Fire. What is Thunder? The Motion of a piercing thick Spirit.

1. *Laert. ibid. Seid.* 2. *Acad. quest. 4. 37.* 3. *De plac. phil. 1. 3.* 4. *Par. ad Grec.* 5. *Laert. 2. 2.* 6. *Symplect. in Phys. 1. 2. phys. 1. 5.* 7. *Plat. plac. phil. 1. 3.* 8. *Laert. ibid.* 9. *Acad. quest. 4.* 10. *Cap. 6. h. ac. acad. quest. 4.* 11. *Plat. plac. phil. 1. 5.* 12. *De nat. deor. 1. 10.* 13. *In plac. phil. 1. 7.* 14. *Stob. Eccl. phys. 1. c. 25.* 15. *Stob. Eccl. 1. 1.* 16. *Plat. plac. phil. 1. 20.* 17. *Throd. Therapeut. 1. 1.* 18. *Plat. plac. phil. 1. 21.* 19. *Laert. 2. 1.* 20. *Plat. plac. phil. 2. 24. Stob. 1. 1.* 21. *Plat. plac. phil. 2. 25.* 22. *ibid. 2. 28.* 23. *Laert. ibid.* 24. *As a learned Person conceives upon these Words of Laert. 1. c. Caluhen.* 25. *See Emmon. Reinholdus in Theophrastus Parachyl. pag. 261.* 26. *Plat. plac. phil. 3. 7.* 27. *ibid. 3. 2.* 28. *Stob. 1. c.* 29. *Nat. quest. 2. 18.*

* All Things are so ordered, that some Influence descend from the Ether upon inferior Things; so Fire sounds, forc'd upon cold Clouds: When it breaks them it shines; the fewer Flames beget Lightnings, the greater, Thunder: A great Part, the rest was altered from its natural Kind by its excessive Heat.

† That the first Creatures were bred in Humidity, and enclosed within sharp thorny Barks, but as they grew older, they became drier, and at last the Bark being broken round about them, they lived some little Time after it.

‡ Sen. nat. quest. 2. 19.

§ Plut. plac. phil. 5. 19.

ANAXIMENES.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

ANaximenes^a, was a Milesian, Son of Euristratus, ^b Friend, ^c Disciple and Successor to Anaximander. According to Eusebius, he flourished in the second Year of the 56th Olympiad. Suidas^d saith he lived in the 55th Olympiad at the taking of Sardis when Cyrus overthrew Cræsus. So that the Account of ^e Apollodorus (who affirms he was born in the 63d Olympiad) is corrupt. He heard also, as some affirm, Parmenides. He used the Ionick Dialect, plain and uncomposed. ^f Pliny calls him the Inventor of Gnomonicks; but perhaps it is a Mistake for Anaximander. Of his Auditors were Anaxagoras and Diogenes Apolloniates.

These two Epistles of his are preserved by Lærtius^g.

Anaximenes to Pythagoras.

THales having lived happily even to old Age, ended his Days unfortunately. One Night going out of his House (as he used) with his Maid, to contemplate the Stars, gazing, and not taking heed to the Place, he lighted upon a Precipice and fell down. This was the Fate of the Milesian Astronomer. But let us who were his Auditors, preserve the Memory of the Person, and our Sons and Auditors after us. Let us still retain his Sayings, and begin all our Discourses with Thales.

Anaximenes to Pythagoras.

YOU are more adviſed than we, who leaving Samos for Crotona, live there in quiet; the Encides prove injurious to others, and the Milesians want not Tyrants of their own chooſing. The King of Media is likewise terrible to us, but

would not be so, should we pay him Tribute. The Ionians are resolved to war with the Medes for the general Liberty, and if they fight we have no Hope of Safety. How then can Anaximenes, perplexed with Fear of Death and Slavery apply his Mind to Celestial Speculations? But you are coveted by the Crotonians and all Italians; Auditors come to you as far as from Sicily.

CHAP. II.

His Opinions.

SECT. 1. That the Air is the Principle of all Things.

HE held that ^h the Air is the Principle of the Universe, of which all Things are engendered, and into which they resolve; our Souls by which we live are Air, so Spirit and Air contain in being all the World, for Spirit and Air are two Names signifying one Thing.

That ⁱ the Air is God, begotten, immense, infinite, ever in Motion; ^k but that those Things which arise out of it are finite, first are begotten, Earth, Water, Fire, then of these all Things. That the Air is God, he understands of the Faculties penetrating through the Elements or Bodies.

SECT. 2. Of the Heavens.

THAT ^l the outward Superficies of Heaven is earthly.

That the Stars are of a fiery Substance, invisible, earthly Bodies intermixt with them; that they are inherent, as Nails in Chryſtal.

That ^m they are forced back by the thick resisting Air, ⁿ and move not above (or under) but about the Earth.

^a Lært. 2. 3.
^g Lært. 2. 4.
plac. phil. 2. 11.

^b Simplic. 1. 2. Phys.
^h Plut. de plac. 1. 3.
m Ibid. 2. 23.

^c Cic. acad. quest. 4. 37.
^j Justin Martyr. paræm. 1. 3.
ⁿ Lært. 2. 3.

^d Suid.
ⁱ Cic. de nat. Deor. 1. 10.

^e Lært. ibid.
^k Cic. acad. quest. 4.
^f Lib. 2.
^l Plut.

That ^a the Sun is flat as a Plate, of fiery Substance.

That ^b the Signs of Summer and Winter come not by the Moon, but by the Sun only.

That ^c the Sun is eclipsed when the Mouth out of which issueth his Heat, is closed.

That ^d the Moon is likewise of a fiery Nature.

That ^e the Moon is eclipsed when the Mouth out of which issueth her Heat, is closed.

SECT. 3. Of Meteors.

THAT ^f the Clouds are made by Condensation of Air, Rain by Condensation of the Clouds, out of which it is squeezed; Snow of Rain congeal'd in falling, and Hail of the same, contracted by a cold Wind.

^g Concerning Thunder, Lightning, &c. to the Assertion of Anaximander he added the Comparison of the Sea, which being broken with Oars, shineth.

^a Plut. plac. phil. 2. 19. ^b Ibid. 2. 16. ^c Ibid. 2. 22. ^d Ibid. 2. 19. ^e Ibid. 2. 24. ^f Ibid. 3. 4. ^g Stob. 1. c. 1.
^h Plut. plac. phil. 3. 5. ⁱ Ibid. 3. 15. Meteor. 2. 7. Senec. nat. quæst. 6. 10. ^j Plut. de primo frig.

A N A X A G O R A S.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Time, and Study of Philosophy.

ANaxagoras ^a was of Glazomenæ, Son of Hegesibulus or Eubulus, born in the 70th Olympiad, according to Apollodorus, in the first Year thereof; eminent for his noble Birth and wealthy Fortunes, but more for his magnanimous Contempt of them. ^b He left his Lands and Patrimony, faith ^c Cicero to learn and obtain the divine Delight of Philosophy: And ^d converted himself from civil Affairs to the Knowledge of Things. Suidas affirms, he left his Grounds to Sheep and Camels to be eaten up: And therefore Apolloneus Tyaneus said, he read Philosophy to Beasts rather than to Men. ^e Plato derides him for quitting his Estate; Laertius ^f reports, he assigned it to his Friends; whereupon being by them accused of Impiety: why (answered he) do not you take Care of it? To one who reproved him, as taking no Care of his Country, wrong me not, faith he, my greatest Care is my Country, pointing to the Heavens. To another, asking for what End he was born, he answered, to contemplate the Sun, Moon, and Heavens. ^g In fine, he withdrew himself to Contemplation of natural Philosophy, not regarding

civil Affairs. In this Study Anaximanes was his Master ^h from whom he received his Learning.

ⁱ In the twentieth Year of his Age, the first of the 75th Olympiad, Calliades being Archon (whom Laertius ^j corruptly calls Callias) at the Time of Xerxes's Expedition into Greece, he went to Athens to study Philosophy, where he continued thirty Years, and was honoured with the Title of *Nês*, the Mind, as being the first that added that Principle to Matter; so Timon,

Where dwells fam'd Anaxagoras, the Mind,

For he that Agent first to Matter join'd,

Which Things confused orderly designed.

CHAP. II.

Of his Opinions.

SECT. I. Of the first Principles and Beginning of Things.

HE held that the material Principle of all Things is one and many *ἁπλοῦς* Parts infinite, sinu-

^a Laert. 1. 6. ^b Plut. contra uer. Lyfand. ^c Tusc. quæst. 3. ^d De orator. 3. ^e Hip. maj. 1. 3. ^f Laert. 2. 6. ^g Ib. 2. 10. ^h Cic. de nat. Deor. 1. 11. ⁱ Laert. 2. 7. ^j Ibid. 2. 6. ^k Laert. perhaps *αὐτὸν διὰ τὴν ἀρετήν*.

lar, and contrary, continuous to the Touch, ^a satisfying themselves, not contained by any other. His Grounds these: First, because, according to the common Rule of natural Philosophers, of nothing proceeds nothing, it is not possible any Thing can be made of that which is not; or that which hath a Being can be resolv'd into that which hath none. Secondly, because Contraries are made mutually of each other, therefore they were in each other before; for if it be necessary, that whatsoever is made, be made of that which is, or is not, but that it should be made of that which is not impossible, where in all agree that ever discours'd upon Nature, it follows necessarily, that they be made of Things that are, and are within these very Things, tho' by Reason of their Smallness, not discernable by us: Hence it is that they say, every Thing is mix'd with every Thing; because they see any Thing made of any Thing: But Things seem different, and are called divers in respect to one another, by Reason that the Multitude of Infinities which are within, aboundeth in the Mixture; for the whole is neither quite white nor black, Flesh nor Bone, but every Thing seemeth to be of the Nature of that whereof it hath most ^a of simple Nourishment, as Bread, Water, and the like, are bred the Hair, Veins, Arteries, Nerves, Bones, and other Parts of the Body, all Things are therefore in this Food, as Nerves, Bones, and the like, discernable by Reason, tho' not by Sense: Of these Atoms the whole World consisteth, as ^a Gold of Grains; these homogeneous Parts are the Matter of all Things, his Opinion is thus express'd by ^b Lucrētius.

Next Anaxagoras we must pursue,
And his Homœomeria review;
A Term that's nowhere mention'd but among
The Greeks, too capricious for our narrow Tongue:
Yet may the Sense be in more Words array'd;
The Principle of all Things, Entails made
Of smallest Entails, Bone of smallest Bone,
Blood of small sanguine Drops reduc'd to one;
Gold of small Grains, Earth of small Sands compacted,
Small Drops to Water, Sparks to Fire contrasted;
The like in every Thing suppos'd, yet be
Nature asserted from all Vacuum free;
And held that each corporeal Being might
Be subdivided into infinite.

That ^a God is an infinite self-moving Mind, that this divine ^a infinite Mind, not inclosed in any Body, ^a is the efficient Cause of all Things; out of the infinite Matter consisting of similar Parts, every Thing being made according to its Species by

the divine Mind, who, when all Things were at first confusedly mingled together, came and reduced them to Order.

SECT. 2. Of the Heavens.

THAT the higher Parts of the World are full of Fire, the Power that is there be called *Æther*, and that properly, saith *Aristotle* ¹, for the Body, which is continually in quick Motion, is conceived to be divine by Nature, for that Reason called *Æther*, none of those that are here below being of that Kind.

That ^a the ambient *Æther* being of a fiery Nature by the Swiftness of its Motion, snatcheth up Stones from the Earth, which being set on Fire, become Stars, ^a all carried from East to West.

That ^a the Stars are impelled by the Condensation of the Air about the Poles, which the Sun makes more strong by compressing.

That ^a the Stars are earthly, and that after the first Secretion of the Elements, the Fire separating itself, drew some Parts of the Earth to its own Nature, and made them like Fire; whereupon he farther affirmed,

^a The Sun is a burning Plate or Stone, ^a many Times bigger than Peloponnesus, whose Conversion is made by the Repulse of the northern Air, which be, by compressing, makes more strong.

^b That the Moon is a dark Body, enlightened by the Sun, habitable, having Plains, Hills and Waters; that ^c the Inequality in her Face proceeds from a Mixture, cold and earthly, for there is Darknes mix'd with her fiery Nature, whence she is called a Star, or false Light. ^d Plato saith, that the Moon was occasion of Dishonour to him, because he assumed the Original of this Opinion of her borrowing Light to himself, whereas it was much more ancient.

^e That the Milky-way is the Shadow of the Earth upon that Part of Heaven, when the Sun, being underneath, enlightens not all; ^f or as *Aristotle*, that the Milky-way is the Light of some Stars, for the Sun being under the Earth, looks not upon some Stars, the Light of those on whom he looks is not seen, being swallowed up in his; the proper Light of those which are hindered by the Earth from the Sun's Illumination, is the Galaxy. *Laertius* ^g saith, he held the Galaxy to be the Reflection of the Light of the Sun.

SECT. 3. Of Meteors.

THAT ^a Comets are the Co-appearance of wandering Stars, which approach so near each other, as that they seem to touch one another: Or as *Laertius*, the Concourse of Planets, emitting Flames.

^a Plat. plac. phil. 1. 3.

^b Arist. phys. 3. 7.

^c Arist. phys. 3. 7.

^d Plat. ibid.

^e Laert. 2. 8.

^f Lib. 1. 5.

^g Laert.

^h Arist. nat. Deor. 1. 11.

ⁱ Cic. nat. Deor. 1. 11.

^j August. de Civ. Dei. 8. 2.

^k Arist. Met. 1. 3.

^l Arist. Met. 1. 3.

^m Plat. plac. phil. 2. 20.

ⁿ Laert. 2. 8.

^o Achil. Tat. Hag.

^p Meteor. 1. 8.

^q Laert. 2. 9.

^r Arist. Meteor. 1. 6.

^s Ibid. 2. 30.

^t Laert. 2. 30.

^u In Cratyl.

^v Plat. plac. phil. 3. 1.

That ^a *Fallings Stars* are *thrown down from the Æther*, as *Sparkles*; and therefore *soon extinguished*.

That ^b *Thunder* is the *Collision* of the *Clouds*; *lightning*, their *mutual Attrition*; or as *Plutarch*, the *Cold falling upon the Hot*, or the *ætherial upon the aerial*, the *Noise* which it makes is *Thunder*; of the *Blackness* of the *Clouds* is caused *Lightning*, of the *Greatest* of the *Light Thunderbolts*, of the more *corporeal Fire*; *Whirl-winds*, of the more *cloudy Prefers*.

That *Lightning distils from the Æther*; and that from that great *Heat of Heaven* many *Things fall down*, which the *Clouds preserve* a long *Time enclosed*.

That ^c the *Rainbow* is a *Refraction* of the *Sun's Light* upon a *thick dark Cloud*, *opposite to him* as a *Looking-glass*; by the same *Reason* (saith he) appeared chiefly in *Pontus*, two or more *Suns*.

That ^d *Winds* proceed from *Extenuation* of the *Air* by the *Sun*.

That ^e *Earthquakes* are caused by the *Air* or *Æther*, which being of its own *Nature apt to ascend*, when it gets into the *Veins* and *Caverns* of the *Earth*; finding *Difficulty* in the getting out, causeth that *shaking*; for the upper *Parts* of the *Earth* contract themselves by the *Benefit* of *Rain*, *Nature* having made the whole *Body thereof alike*, *lax and spongy*, the *Parts* as in a *Ball*, *superior and inferior*, the *Superior*, that which is *inhabited by us*, the *Inferior*, the other. This *Wind* getting into the *inferior Parts*, breaks the *condensed Air*, with the same *Force* as we see *Clouds broken*, when, upon the *Collision* of them, and *Motion* of the *agitated Air*, *Fire* breaks forth; this *Air* falls upon that which is next, seeking to get out, and tears in *Pieces* whatsoever it meets, until through those narrow *Passages*, it either finds a *Way* to *Heaven*, or forceth one; which *Lactantius* obscurely expresseth, the *Repulsion* of the *Air* upon the *Earth*.

That ^f *Snow* is not *white*, but *black*, nor did it seem *white* to him, because he knew the *Water* whereof it is *congealed* to be *black*.

SECT. 4. Of the Earth.

That ^g the *Beginning of Motion* proceeding from the *Mind*, the heavy *Bodies* obtained the *lowest Place*, as the *Earth*; the *light* the *highest*, as the *Fire*; those betwixt both, the *middle*, as the *Air* and *Water*: Thus the *Sea* subsists upon the *Superficies* of the *Earth*, which is *flat*, the *Humidity* being rarified by the *Sun*.

That ^h the *primitive Humidity* being diffused, as a *Pool* was burned by the *Motion* of the *Sun* about it, and the *unfurious Part* being exhaled, the *Remainder* became *Salt*.

That ⁱ as soon as the *World* was made, and *living Creatures* produced out of the *World*, the *World inclined* of itself towards the *South*, according to *divine Providence*; that some *Parts* thereof might be *habitable*, others not *habitable*, by *Reason* of the *Extremities* of *Heat* and *Cold*.

That ^j the *Mixture* of the *Elements* is by *apposition*.

That ^k the *Inundation* of *Nilus* is caused by the *Snow* of *Æthiopia*, which is dissolved in *Summer*, and congealed in *Winter*.

SECT. 5. Of living Creatures.

That ^l *Creatures* were first generated of *Humidity*, *Calidity*, and *earthly Matter*; afterwards mutually of one another, *Males* on the right *Side*, *Females* on the *Left*.

That the *Soul* is that which moveth, that it is *aerial*, and hath a *Body* of the *Nature* of *Air*.

That ^m there is a *Death* of the *Soul* likewise, which is *Separation* from the *Body*.

That all *Animals* have *active Reason*.

That ⁿ *Sleep* is an *Action* of the *Body*, not of the *Soul*.

That ^o in the *Hand* of *Man* consists all his *Skill*.

That ^p the *Voice* is made by the *Wind*, hitting against firm resisting *Air*, returning the *Counter-blow* to our *Ears*, which is the *Manner* whereby also the *Repercussion* of the *Air* is formed, called *Echo*.

That ^q the *Gall* is the *Cause* of acute *Diseases*, which overflowing, is dispersed into the *Lungs*, *Veins*, and *Cysts*.

CHAP. III.

His Predictions.

Suidas saith, he foretold many *Things*: Of those, two *Instances* only have been hitherto preferred. The first thus related by *Pliny*, ^r The *Grecians* celebrate *Anaxagoras* of the *Clazomenian*, and for foretelling by his *Learning* and *Science* in the second *Year* of the 78th *Olympiad*, on what *Day* a *Stone* would fall from the *Sun*, which happened in the *Day* time in a *Part* of *Thrace* at the *River Ægos*, which *Stone* is at this *Day* shewn, about the *Bigness* of a *Bean*, of an *adust Colour*, a *Comet* also burning in those *Nights*.

^s *Plutarch* adds, that it was in his *Time* not only shewn, but revered by the *Peloponnesians*. *Eusebius* reckons the *Fall* of this *Stone* upon the fourth of the 78th *Olympiad*, which is two *Years* after *Pliny's* Account of the *Prediction*. *Silenus*, cited by *Laertius* ^t, saith, it fell when *Dymilus* was *Archon*, which, if it be to be read *Dynibilis* (for

i Laert. 2. 9. Plat. plac. phil. 3. 3. k Plut. plac. phil. 3. 5. l Laert. 2. 9. m Arist. Meteor. 2. 7. Plut. plac. phil. 3. 15. Senec. nat. quest. 6. 9. n Cic. Acad. quest. 4. o Laert. 2. 8. p Plut. plac. phil. 3. 16. q Ibid. 2. 8. r Ibid. 1. 17. s Ibid. 4. 1. t Laert. 2. 9. u Plut. plac. phil. 4. 1. w Ibid. 5. 24. x Ibid. 5. 25. y Ibid. 2. Plut. de amore frat. a Arist. de Part. Animal. 4. b Plin. nat. hist. 1. 11. 59. c Vit. Lyfand. d Laert. 11. 11.

goras; but seeing him persecuted for his Opinions, lastly converted himself to Tragic Poetry.

Socrates, Son of *Sisymachus*, was, according to *Aristocritus*, an Auditor of *Anaxagoras*, till he left the City, and thereupon applied himself to *Archelaus*, which *Porphyrus* reckons above the 17th Year of his Age, or rather the 19th.

Democritus also is by some affirmed, being younger than *Anaxagoras* forty Years, to have applied himself to him; but *Laertius*^a affirms he could not endure *Democritus*, and thunn'd his Conversation; *Phavorinus* likewise attests, that because he would not admit him, *Democritus* professed himself his Enemy, and denied his Opinion of the Sun and Moon, but said they were ancient, and that he stole them, as likewise his Description of the World, and the Assertion concerning the Mind.

Metradorus of *Lampsacum* is likewise mentioned by *Laertius*^b as Friend to *Anaxagoras*.

CHAP. V.

Of his Trial, Death, Sentences, and Writings.

OF his Trial, saith *Laertius*^c; there are several Reports. *Sotion*, in his Treatise of the Succession of Philosophers saith, he was accused by *Cleon* of Impiety, for asserting the Sun to be a burning Plate; but being defended by *Pericles* his Scholar, he was fined five Talents and banished.

Satyrus^d, that he was cited to the Court by *Thucydides*, who was of the contrary Faction of *Pericles*, accused not only of Impiety, but of holding Intelligence with the *Persians*, and in his Absence condemned to Death; when News was brought him at the same time, both of the Death of his Sons, which (according to *Ælian*) were two, all that he had, and his own Condemnation, of the latter, he said, Nature long since condemned both them and me to Death. Of his 'Sons' (with a calm Look) *'You tell me nothing new or unexpected; I knew that I begat them mortal, which some ascribe to Solon, others to Xenophon; Demetrius Phalereus saith, he buried them with his own Hands.'*

^e *Hermippus*, he was imprisoned to be put to Death, but *Pericles* appearing before the Judges, asked if they knew any Thing in his Life that they could accuse? To which they answered nothing; but I, saith he, am his Disciple, then he not transported by *Calumnies* to kill the Man, but believe me and set him at Liberty; so he was dismissed; but not able to brook the Disgrace, he killed himself.

^f *Hieronymus* saith, that *Pericles* brought him into the Court in poor Garments extenuated with

Sickness, an Object fitter for Compassion than Justice. And thus much saith *Laertius* of his Trial.

Suidas, that he was cast into Prison by the *Athenians* for introducing a new Opinion concerning God, and banish'd the City, tho' *Pericles* undertook to plead his Cause, and that going to *Lampsacum*, he there starved himself to Death.

Josephus^g, that the *Athenians* believing the Sun to be God, which he affirmed to be without Sense and Knowledge, he was by the Votes of a few of them condemned to Death.

But if we credit *Plutarch*^h, he was neither condemned nor accused but by *Pericles*, who feared the Ordinance of *Diopithes*, which cited those which held prophane or sublime Opinions sent out of the City.ⁱ Yet elsewhere he confesseth he was accused.

His Departure from *Athens* being thirty Years after his coming thither, falls the third Year of the eighty second Olympiad, the sixty third of his Age. Thence he went to *Lampsacum*, where he continued the rest of his Age, which extended to 22 more, so little mindful of *Athens*, or of his Country, as to one, who told him that he was deprived of the *Athenians*; he answered no, but they of me; and^j to his Friends, who, when he fell sick, asked if he would be carried to *Clazomenæ* his Country; no, said he, there is no Need, the Way to the Grave is alike every where. Before he died, the Magistrates of the City asked him if he would they should do any Thing for him; he answered, that his only Request was, that the Boys might have Leave to play yearly on that Day of the Month whereon he died; which Custom (saith *Laertius*)^k is continued to this Time. Those of *Lampsacum* buried him magnificently, with this Epitaph.

*Here lies, who through the truest Paths did pass
O' th' World Celestial, Anaxagoras.*

Ælian mentions two Altars erected to him; one inscribed to the Mind, the other to Truth. *Laertius* concludes his Life with this Epigram.

*Fam'd Anaxagoras the Sun desin'd
A burning Plate, for which to die, design'd:
Saw'd by his Scholar Pericles; but he
Abandon'd Life to seek Philosophy.*

^l He is observed never to have been seen either to laugh or smile.

^m Being demanded if the Mountains of *Lampsacum* would in Time become Sea; he answered, Yes, if Time fail not first.

ⁿ Beholding the Tomb of *Mausolus*, he said, a sumptuous Monument was a Sign the Subtance was turned into Stone.

^a Laert. 2. 19. ^p Ibid. 2. 24. ^q Ibid. 2. 14. ^r Ibid. 2. 12. ^s Plut. consol. ad Apollon. ^t Simplic. in Epictet.
^u Val. Max. 5. 10. ^w Laert. 2. 55. ^x Ibid. 2. 14. ^y Adv. Appion. l. 2. ^z Vit. Peric. ^a De superst. ^b Cic. Tusc.
quæst. 1. 43. ^c Plut. instruat. polit. ^d Laert. 2. 14. ^e Ælian. var. Hist. 5. 3. ^f Laert. 2. 10. ^g Ibid. ^h Ibid.

He first affirmed the Poesy of *Homer* to consist of Virtue and Justice ; to which *Metrodorus* added, that the Poet was skilful in natural Philosophy.

^k He conceived that there were two Lessons of Death, the Time before our Birth, and Sleep.

Laertius ^l and *Clemens Alexandrinus* assert him first of the Philosophers that put forth a Book. He writ

Of natural Philosophy, out of which *Aristotle* cites the Fragments, *All these Things werea together* ; which was the Beginning of the Book ; and, *to be such is to be changed.* ^m *Plato* this, the Mind is the Disposer and Cause of all Things. ⁿ *Athenæus*

this, *what is commonly called the Milk of the Hen, is the White of the Egg.* *Plato* censures the Book as not using the Mind at all, nor assigning any Cause of the Order of Things, but Aerial, Ætherial, and Aquatick Natures, and the like incredible Things for Causes.

The Quadrature of the Circle ; which Treatise, *Plutarch* ^o faith, he compos'd during his Imprisonment.

^p There were three more of the same Name ; the first an Orator, Follower of *Isocrates* : The second a Statuary, mentioned by *Antigenus* : The last a Grammarian, Scholar to *Zenodotus*.

^l Laert. 2. 70. ^k Stob. Serm. 119. ^l Laert. 2. 11. Strom. 1. ^m Phœd. 1. ⁿ Athen. l. 2. Phœd. 1. ^o De Edil. p. Laert. 2. 15.

A R C H E L A U S.

Archelaus was either an *Athenian* or a *Milesian* ; his Father *Apollodorus*, or according to some, *Mydon* ^q ; he was Scholar to *Anaxagoras*, Master to *Socrates*. He first transferr'd Natural Philosophy out of *Ionía* to *Athens* (but how that can be, when *Anaxagoras* his Master taught there thirty Years, *Cassaubon* justly questions) and therefore was called the *Natural Philosopher* : In him Natural Philosophy ended, *Socrates* his Scholar introducing Morality ; but he seems also to have touched Moral Philosophy, for he treated of Laws, of Things honest and just ; from whom *Socrates* receiving his Learning, because he increased it, is therefore thought to have invented it ; whereas, as *Gassendus* ^r observes, Moral Philosophy was far more ancient, that being the principal Ground of the Attribute of *Wise* conferred upon the Seven, whose Learning lay chiefly that Way : But *Socrates* is called the Author thereof, because he first reduced it to a Science. *Archelaus* asserted,

That Principles of all Things are twofold, one incorporeal, the Mind, (not Maker of the World) the corporeal, infinite in Number, and dissimilar, which is the Air, and its Rarefaction and Condensation, whereof one is Fire, the other Water.

That the Universe is infinite.

That the Causes of Generation are two ; Heat and Cold.

That the Stars are burning Iron Plates.

That the Sun is the greatest of Stars.

That the Sea is made by Percolation of the hollow Parts of the Earth.

That living Creatures are generated of Slime or warm Earth, emitting a milky Kind of Slime like the Chyle ; that this humid Matter being dissolved by the Fire, that of it which settles into a fiery Substance is Earth, that which evaporates is Air.

That the Winds getting into the hollow Places of the Earth, filling all the Spaces, the Air condensed as much as possible, the Wind that comes next presseth the first, forcing and disturbing it by frequent Impulsions. This Wind seeking a Room through the narrow Places, endeavoureth to break Prison, whereby it happens, the Wind struggling for Passage, that the Earth is moved.

Of the Definition of the Voice, by *Plutarch* ^s attributed to *Anaxagoras*, *Laertius* ^t makes *Archelaus* the Author, describing it a Percussion of the Air.

That what is just or dishonest is defined by Law, not by Nature.

^v These five, *Thales*, *Anaximander*, *Anaximenes*, *Anaxagoras*, *Archelaus*, by continual Descent succeeding one another, compleat the *Ionick Sect*.

^q Laert. 2. 16. ^r Gassend. in lib. 10. Laert. ^s Stob. Ecl. phys. 1. ^t Plut. plac. phil. 1. 3. ^u Sen. nat. quest. 6. 12. ^w Plut. de plac. phil. 1. 4. ^x Laert. 2. 16. ^y Plut. de plac. 1. Laert. Proem.

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE THIRD PART,
Containing the *Socratick* Philosophers.

SOCRATES.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, and Time of Birth.

Socrates was by Country an *Athenian*^a, born at *Alopec*, a Town, according to *Suidas* and *Phavorinus*, belonging to the *Antiochian* Tribe. This was one of those small Villages scattered thro' *Attica*, before *Theseus* reduced the People within the Walls of a City, which notwithstanding his Decree, were not deserted, but continued and preserved by their Inhabitants.

His Parents were very mean; ^b *Sostroniscus* (an *Athenian*^c) his Father, ^d a Statuary, or Carver of Images in Stone; *Phenareta*, his Mother, a Midwife, a Woman of a bold, generous and quick Spirit, as is implied by the Character ^e *Plato* gives her, (tho' wrested by ^f *Athenaus*) of which Professions of his Parents, he is ^g observed to have been so far from being ashamed, that he often took Occasion to mention them.

Apollodorus, *Laertius* and *Suidas* affirm he was born in the fourth Year of the seventy-seventh Olympiad; which may likewise be collected from the Marble at *Arundel House*, which saith, he died when *Laches* was *Archon*, and reckons seventy Years of his Life, which was compleat, because

Plato^h says *αὐτὸς ἔςδεκαμύητος*, and from ⁱ *Demetrius Phalerus* (who was himself *Archon* the fourth Year of the hundred and seventeenth Olympiad) who saith, he died the first Year of the ninety-fifth Olympiad, when he had lived seventy Years, the seventieth Year inclusively upwards, is the fourth of the seventy-seventh Olympiad, when *Apsephion*, (or, as some call him, *Aphephion*) was *Archon*, of whose Name, in ^k *Diodorus Siculus*, no more is left than ^l *αὐτῶς*, which should be *αὐτοῦτος*, but hath been incuriously alter'd into *αὐτῶς*, which if ^m *Maurinus* had observed, he had not corrected *Laertius* without Cause, nor he and *Allatius* followed the Mistake of *Scaliger* (whom they term *Anonymus*) in placing *Aphephion* in the fourth Year of the seventy-fourth Olympiad.

The Day of *Socrates*'s Birth was, ⁿ according to *Apollodorus*, the sixth of the Month *Thargelion*, memorable (saith *Laertius*) for the Birth of *Diana*, according to the Traditions of the *Delians*, upon which Day the *Athenians* did yearly lustrate their City. Many other good Fortunes happening to the *Athenians* upon this Day, are recorded by ^o *Ælian*.

^a *Laert.* s. 18. ^b *Laert. lib. 1. Plat. Theæt. Alibi. 2.* ^c *Liban.* ^d *Laert. lib. 1. Val. Max. 3. 4. memorabilia.*
^e *Theæt.* ^f *Diogenes.* ^g *Liban. Apol. 1. Apolog. 1. Laert. lib. 1.* ^h *Lib. 11.* ⁱ *Archon. s. 7.* ^m *Dialog. de script.*
^j *Socr.* ⁿ *Laert. s. 44.* ^o *Var. hist. s. 25.*

The Day following, viz. the seventh of this Month was the Birth-day of *Plato*, both which were kept with much Solemnity by the *Greek* Philosophers (° even to the Time of *Plotinus*) as is affirmed by *Plutarch* ², who thereupon observes it as the Effect rather of Providence than of Chance, that their Birth-days should be so near, and that of the Master precede the Scholars.

To accommodate this Time with our Account, is neither easy nor certain, yet in respect it may give some Satisfaction by Way of Conjecture, we shall found it upon these Hypotheses, taking that Order of Months which *Petavius* gives.

1. That after the Olympiads, the Beginning of the *Grecian* Year was always on the first of *Hecatombeon*, and Olympick Games on the fifteenth.

2. That the *Neomenia* of *Hecatombeon*, did (at least in the Times wherein we enquire) never precede the Solstice, being then about the Calends, or *pridie Calendarum Julii*, they supposing them in *cæcis signorum*, it did not precede the ninth of *July*. This *postulatam*, tho' it be doubly questioned by *Petavius*, yet none of his Arguments pretend beyond *Meton's* Time.

3. That upon that Supposition, if *Scaliger* hath rightly ordered the *Neomenia* in his Olympic Period (against which *Petavius* brings no one sufficient Argument) and consequently the rest, the Olympic Period doth certainly exhibit the *Neomenia* of *Hecatombeon*. It is true, that *Petavius* disputes the Period of seventy-six Years, as having never been used till *Calippus* his Time, but we take it here only proleptically, as the *Julian* Year, to which we would accommodate it.

4. That this being after *Salen's* Time, the Civil Year was *Lunary* (and consisted of Months, which were alternately of twenty nine, and thirty Days) at *Athens*, tho' divers Places of *Greece*, especially the more remote from thence, did not for a long Time after part with their tricenary Months.

These things supposed the sixth of *Thargelion*, will (according to the *Julian* Account, taken proleptically) fall upon *Tuesday* the twentieth of *May*; according to the *Gregorian*, upon *Tuesday* the thirtieth of *May*, in the Year of the *Julian* Period 4247, before the Incarnation 467 Years, the fourth Year of the seventy seventh Olympiad, at which Time *Socrates* was born.

CH A P. II.

His first Education.

Plutarch faith ³, that as soon as he was born, *Sophroniscus* his Father consulting the Oracle, was by it advised to suffer his Son to do what he pleased,

never compelling him to do what he disliked, nor diverting him from that whereto he was inclined; to give Thanks for him by Sacrifice to *Jupiter Agæus* and the Muses; to be no farther solicitous for him, he had one Guide of his Life within him, better than five hundred Masters.

But his Father not observant of the Oracle's Direction, applied him to his own Trade of carving Statues, contrary to his Inclination, wherupon some ⁴ have argued him of Disobedience, reporting that oftentimes, when his Father bad him work, he refused, and went away following his own Will.

His Father dying, left him (according to *Libanius*) fourscore Minæ, which being entrusted with a Friend for Improvement, they miscarried. This Loss (though it were of all his Stock, and he thereby reduced to incredible Poverty) *Socrates* passed over with Silence, but was thereupon necessitated to continue his Trade for ordinary Subsistence. This *Suidas* intimates when he faith he was first a Statuary. ⁵ *Duris*, ⁶ *Pausanias*, and the Scholiast of *Aristophanes* affirm three Statues of the Graces clothed, (for so they were most anciently made, not naked) set up before the Entrance into the Tower at *Athens*, were his Work. *Pausanias* implieth as much of a Statue of *Mercury* in the same Place; which *Pliny* seems not to have understood, who faith, they were made by a certain Person named *Socrates*, but not the Painter. Hence *Timon*.

From these the fluent Statuary came,
Honour'd through Greece, who did against the
Name
Of Orator abusively declaim.

But being naturally averse from this Profession, he only followed it when Necessity enforced him: *Aristæus* faith ⁷, he wrought for Money, and laid up what he got till it came to a little Stock, which being spent, he betook himself again to the same Course.

These Intermissions of his Trade were bestowed upon Philosophy, wherunto he was naturally addicted, which being observed by *Crito*, a rich Philosopher of *Athens* ⁸ he took him from his Shop, being much in Love with his Candour and Ingenuity, and instructed, or rather gave him the Means to be instructed by others; taking so ⁹ much Care of him, that he never suffered him to want Necessaries. And tho' his Poverty were at last so great as to be brought by ¹⁰ some into a Proverb, yet he became at last, as *Demetrius* affirmeth, Master of a House and fourscore Minæ, which *Crito* put out to Interest: But his Mind (faith *Libanius*) was raised far above

⁴ Porphyry. vit. ⁵ Sympos. 2. 1. ⁶ De Gen. Soc. ⁷ Porphyry apud Theodor. de Genet. afflic. cur. lib. 12. ⁸ Apud. Soc. u. Lect. 2. 19. ⁹ Lib. 9. ¹⁰ In lib. 17. 4. ¹¹ Lect. 2. 19. ¹² Lect. 2. 20. ¹³ Lect. 2. 20. ¹⁴ Apud. Soc. u. Crit. ¹⁵ *Ælian*, var. hist. 2. *Plot.* de uell. virtut. ¹⁶ *Plot.* compert. vit. *Aulid.* 2. *Cato*, ⁴ Apud.

his Fortune, and more to the Advantage of his Country, not aiming at Wealth, or the Acquisition thereof by sordid Arts, he considered that of all Things which Man can call his, the Soul is the chief; that he only is truly happy, who purifies that from Vice; that the only Means conducing thereto is Wisdom, in Pursuit whereof he neglected all other Ways of Profit and Pleasure.

C H A P. III.

His Master.

THE first Master of Socrates was *Anaxagoras*, whereby, amongst other Circumstances, it is demonstrable, that the Account of *Laertius* is corrupt, *Anaxagoras* not dying in the seventy-eighth, but eighty-eighth Olympiad.

Aristoxenus saith, that as soon as *Anaxagoras* left the City, he applied himself to *Archelaus*, which, according to *Porphyrius*, was in the seventeenth Year of his Age. ^a Of him he was much beloved, and travelled with him to *Samos*, to *Pytho*, and to the *Isthmus*.

He was Scholar likewise to *Damon*, whom *Plato* calls a most pleasing Teacher of Musick, and all other Things that he would teach himself to young Men. *Damon* was Scholar to *Agathocles*, Master to *Pericles*, *Clinias* and others; intimate with *Prodicus*. He was banished by the unjust ^b *Ostracism* of the *Athenians* for his Excellence in Musick.

He heard also (^c as he acknowledged) *Prodicus* the Sophist, a *Cian*, whom *Eusebius* ranks in the eighty sixth Olympiad, contemporary with *Gorgias*, *Hippias*, and *Hippocrates* the Physician.

To these add *Diogenes* and *Aspasia*, Women excellently learned, the first supposed to have been inspired with a prophetic Spirit. By her he affirmed that he was instructed concerning Love, by corporeal Beauty to find out that of the Soul; by the Angelical Mind, of God. See *Plato's Phædrus*, and that long Discourse in his *Symposium* upon this Subject, which *Socrates* confesseth to be owing to her.

Aspasia was a famous *Milesian* Woman, not only excellent herself in Rhetorick, but brought many Scholars to great Perfection in it, of whom were *Pericles* the *Athenian*, and (^d as himself acknowledged) *Socrates*.

^e Of *Euenus* he learned Poetry, of *Ichomachus*, Husbandry, of ^f *Theodorus* Geometry. *Aristagoras* a *Mælian* ^g, is named likewise as his Master.

Last in his Catalogue is *Comarus*, ^h *Nobilissimus* *fulcrum*, as *Cicero* terms him, which *Arc Socrates* learned of him in his ⁱ old Age, ^j for which the

Boys derided *Comarus*, and called him the old Man's Master.

C H A P. IV.

Of his School and Manner of Teaching.

THAT *Socrates* had a proper School, may be argued from ^k *Aristophanes*, who derides some Particulars in it, and calls it his *Phrontisterium*.

^l *Plato* and *Phædrus* mention as Places frequented by him and his Auditors, the *Academy Lycæum*, and a pleasant Meadow without the City on the Side of the River *Iliissus*, where grew a very fair Plain-tree. Thence, according to the Fable, *Boreas* snatched away *Orithya*, to whom, three Furlongs from thence was a Temple, and another to *Diana*.

^m *Xenophon* affirms, he was continually abroad, that in the Morning he visited the Places of publick Walking and Exercise; when it was full the Forum; and the rest of the Day he sought out the most populous Meetings, where he disputed openly for every one to bear that he would.

He did not only teach, saith *Plutarch* ⁿ, when the Benches were prepared, and himself in the Chair, or in set Hours of Reading and Discourse, or Appointments of walking with his Friends, but even when he played, when he eat, or drank, when he was in the Camp or Market; finally, when he was in Prison; thus he made every Place a School of Virtue.

His Manner of Teaching was answerable to his Opinion, that the Soul pre-existent to the Body, in her first separate Condition, endowed with perfect Knowledge, by Immersion into Matter, became stupified, and in a manner lost, until awakened by Discourse from sensible Objects; whereby, by Degrees, she recovers her first Knowledge; for this Reason, he taught only by Irony and Induction: The first ^o *Quintilian* defines, an absolute Dissimulation of the Will more apparent than consent; so as in that, the Words are different, from the Words, in this the Sense from the Speech, whilst the whole Confirmation of the Cause, even the whole Life, seems to carry an Irony, such was the Life of *Socrates*, who was for that Reason called *eiros*; that is, one that personates an unlearned Man, and is an Admirer of others as wise. ^p In this Irony (saith *Cicero*) and Dissimulation he far exceeded all Men in Pleasantness and Urbanity; it is a very elegant, sweet and subtle kind of Speech; acute with Gravity, accommodated with Rhetorick, Words, and pleasant Speeches; ^q he detracted from himself in Dispute, and attributed more to those he meant to confute, so, when he said or thought another Thing, he freely used that Dissimulation which the Greeks call Irony; which *Ysaïus* also saith, was in *Africanus*.

^f Isocr. 2. 19. ^g Cic. Tusc. quæst. 5. ^h Isocr. 2. 25. ⁱ Plat. in Phædr. ^j Plat. Men. ^k Plat. Alcibiad. ^l Men. in Tyr. Dial. 2. ^m Plat. Theætet. ⁿ Schol. Aristoph. in Nub. ^o Quintil. 1. 2. ^p Cicero. 1. 2. ^q Plat. Theætet. ^r Cicero. 1. 2. ^s Cicero. 1. 2. ^t Cicero. 1. 2. ^u Cicero. 1. 2. ^v Cicero. 1. 2. ^w Cicero. 1. 2. ^x Cicero. 1. 2. ^y Cicero. 1. 2. ^z Cicero. 1. 2.

Induction is by ^a Cicero defined a Manner of Discourse, which gains the Assent of him with whom it is held, to Things not doubtful, by which Assents it causeth that he yield to a doubtful Thing, by Reason of the Likeness it hath to those Things whereunto he assented: This Kind of Speech Socrates most used, because he would not himself use any Argument of Persuasion, but rather chose to work something out of that which he granted him with whom he disputed, which he, by Reason of that which he already yielded unto, must necessarily approve; of which he gives a large Example in Plato's ^b Meno. Thus, whosoever disputed with him, of what Subject soever, (his End being only to promote Virtue) was at last brought round about to give an Account of his Life past and present, whereinto being once entered, he never gave him over till he had sufficiently examined those Things, and never let them go (^c Proteus like) till they came at last to themselves.

For this Reason ^d he used to say, his Skill had some Affinity with that of his Mother, he being like a Midwife, tho' barren (as he modestly affirms) in himself, endeavoured, with a particular Gift in assisting others, to bring forth what they had within themselves; ^e and this was one Reason why he refused to take Money, affirming that he knew nothing himself, and that ^f he was never Master to any.

These Disputes of Socrates were committed to writing by his Scholars, wherein ^g Xenophon gave Example to the rest, in doing it first, as also with most Punctualness, as Plato with most Liberty, intermixing so much of his own, as it is not easy to distinguish the Master from the Scholar; ^h whence Socrates hearing him recite his *Lysis*, said, how many Things doth this young Man feign of me? And ⁱ Xenophon denying Socrates ever disputed of Heaven, or of natural Causes, or the other Disciplines which the Greeks call *mathēmatika*, saith, they, who ascribe such Disquisitions to him, he falsely, wherein (as ^j A. Gellius observes) he intends Plato, in whose Books Socrates discourseth of Natural Philosophy, Music, and Geometry.

CHAP. V.

Of his Philosophy.

PORPHYRIUS (who was so abusive, as ^k Nicephorus observes, that he traduced Socrates with no less Bitterness, than, as if he endeavoured to out-do his Accusers, Anytus and Melitus) affirms; ^l He was ingenious in nothing, unlearned in all, scarce able to write, which when upon any Occasion he did, it was to Derision, and that he could read no better than aammering School-boy: To which we shall oppose these Authorities: Xenophon, who attests he was ex-

cellent in all Kinds of Learning, inasmuch as Aristotle, Geometry, and Astrology; ^m Plato, in Natural Philosophy; ⁿ Idem, in Rhetoric; ^o Laertius, in Medicine; In a Word, Cicero ^p avers, That by the Testimony of learned Men, and the Judgment of all Greece, as well in Wisdom, Acuteness, Politeness, and Subtily, as in Eloquence, Variety, and Copiousness, to whatsoever Part he gave himself, he was, without Exception, Prince of all.

Having searched into all Kinds of Science, he observed these Inconveniencies and Imperfections: First, ^q That it was improper to leave those Affairs which concern Mankind, to enquire into Things without us. Secondly, That these Things are above the Reach of Man, whence, are occasioned all Disputes and Oppositions, some acknowledging no God, others worshipping Stocks and Stones; some asserting one simple Being, others infinite; some that all Things are moved, others, that all Things are immovable. And thirdly, that these Things, if attained, could not be practised, for he who contemplating divine Mysteries, enquires by what Necessity Things were made, cannot himself make any Thing, or upon Occasion produce Winds, Water, Seasons, or the like.

Thus esteeming speculative Knowledge as far only as it conduceth to Practice, he cut off in all Sciences what he conceived of least Use.

^r In *Arithmetic*, he approved only as much as was necessary. (^s Plato instanteth in Merchandise and Tactics) but to proceed to useless Operations he disallowed. In *Geometry* he allowed that Part which teacheth Measuring, as no less easy than useful; but to proceed to infinite Propositions and Demonstrations he disallowed, as wholly unprofitable. In *Astrology* he approved the Knowledge of the Stars, and Observation of the Night, Months and Seasons, as being easily learned, and very beneficial in Navigation, and to those who hunt by Night; but to examine the Difference of Spheres, Distance of Stars from the Earth, and their Circles, he disallowed as useless.

^t Finally, Noting how little Advantage Speculation brought to the Life and Conversation of Mankind, he reduced her to *Abstr.* He first, saith Cicero ^u, called Philosophy away from Things involved by Nature in Secrecy, wherein, until his Time, all Philosophers had been employed, and brought her to common Life, to enquire of Virtues and Vices, Good and Evil.

Man, who was the sole Subject of his Philosophy, having a twofold Relation of divine Speculation, and human Conversation, his Disquisitions were in the former Respect *Metaphysical*, in the latter *Moral*.

^a De invent. 1. ^b Plat. Lach.

Aristoph. in nub. p. 129. ^c Plat. Apol.

to. 36. m Theodoret. ^d De Crat. 3. 16.

21. ^e Acad. quest. 1.

^f Liban. Apol. ^g Plat. Etyph.

^h Laert. vit. Xenoph. ⁱ Laert. vit. Plat.

^j Laert. vit. Plat. ^k Epist. ad Alcibi.

^l Hist. Nod. ^m De Crat. 3. 16.

ⁿ Xen. mem. 1. pag. 710.

^o Xen. mem. 4.

^p De leg. 1. ^q De leg. 1.

^r De leg. 1.

^s Plat. Timæ. ^t Plat. Timæ. ^u Plat. Timæ.

^v Plat. Timæ. ^w Plat. Timæ. ^x Plat. Timæ.

^y Plat. Timæ. ^z Plat. Timæ. ^{aa} Plat. Timæ.

^{ab} Plat. Timæ. ^{ac} Plat. Timæ. ^{ad} Plat. Timæ.

^{ae} Plat. Timæ. ^{af} Plat. Timæ. ^{ag} Plat. Timæ.

^{ah} Plat. Timæ. ^{ai} Plat. Timæ. ^{aj} Plat. Timæ.

^{ak} Plat. Timæ. ^{al} Plat. Timæ. ^{am} Plat. Timæ.

^{an} Plat. Timæ. ^{ao} Plat. Timæ. ^{ap} Plat. Timæ.

SECT. 1. *Metaphysics.*

HIS Metaphysical Opinions are thus collected and abridged out of Plato^a, Xenophon, Plutarch, and others.

Philosophy is the Way to true Happiness, the Offices whereof are two, to contemplate God, and to abstract the Soul from corporal Sense.

There are three Principles^a of all Things, God, Matter, and Ideas; God is the universal Intellect; Matter the Subject of Generation and Corruption; Idea, an incorporeal Substance, the Intellect of God; God the Intellect of the World.

God is one^a, τὸ αὐτὸ ἰσχυρὸν ἅπαντα αὐτὸ τὸ ἀλόω, αὐτὸ τὸ ζῶν ὅλον; perfect in himself, giving the Being, and Well-being of every Creature; what he is, (saith he) I know not, what he is not, I know.

That God, not Chance, made the World and all Creatures; is demonstrable from the reasonable Disposition of their Parts, as well for Use as Defence, from their Care to preserve themselves, and continue their Species, that he particularly regards Man in his Body, from the excellent Upright Form thereof, from the Gift of Speech, from Allowance τὰς τῶν ἀποδείξεων ἰδίων, εὐνοίας, ἀνείκελα in his Soul, from the Excellency thereof above others; in both for Divinations, predicting Dangers; that he regards Particulars; from his Care of the whole Species; that he will reward such as please him, and punish such as displease him; from his Power to do it, from the Belief he hath imprinted in a Man, that he will do it; profess by the most wise and civilized Cities and Ages; that he at once sees all Things, from the Instances of the Eye, which at once over-runs many Miles; and of the Mind, which at once considereth Things done in the most distant Places. Finally, that he is such, and so great, that he at once sees all, hears all, is every where, and orders all. This is the Sum of his Discourse with Aristodemus, to which we may annex what is cited under his Name (if not mistaken) by Stobæus,

Care, if by Care ought may effected be;
If not, why car'st thou, when God cares for thee?

He held, That the Gods knew all Things, said, done, or silently desired.

That God takes Care of all Creatures, is demonstrable from the Benefits he gives them of Light, Water, and Fire, seasonable Production of Fruits of the Earth, that he hath particular Care of Man, from the Nourishment of all Plants, and Creature; from Man's Service, from their Subjection to Man, tho' they excel him never so much in Strength, from the Variety of Man's Senses, accommodated to

the Variety of Objects, for Necessity, Use, and Pleasure; from Reason, whereby he discoursed through Reminiscence, from sensible Objects; from Speech, whereby he communicates all that he knows, gives Laws, and governs States; that God, notwithstanding he is invisible, hath a Being, from the Instances of his Ministers, invisible also, as Thunder and Wind, from the Soul of Man, which hath something with the divine Nature in governing those that cannot see it. This is the Effect of his Discourse with Euthedemus.

The Soul is immortal, for what is always moveable is immortal; but that which moveth another, or is moved by another, hath a Cessation of Motion and Life.

The Soul is pre-existent to the Body, endued with Knowledge of eternal Ideas, which in her Union to the Body she loseth, as stupified, until awakened by Discourse from sensible Objects. Thus is all her Learning only Reminiscence, a Recovery of her first Knowledge.

The Body^b being compounded, is dissolved by Death, the Soul being simple passeth into another Life, incapable of Corruption.

The Souls of Men are divine, to whom, when they go out of the Body, the Way of their Return to Heaven is open, which to the best and most just is the most expeditious.

The Souls of the Good after Death, are in a happy Estate, united to God in a blessed inaccessible Place; the bad, in convenient Places, suffer condign Punishment; but to define what those Places are^c, is hominis vix p̄i ἔχοντος; whence being demanded what Things were in the other World, he answered, neither was I over there, nor ever did I speak with any that came from thence.

SECT. 2. *Ethicks.*

HIS Morals consider a Man either as a single Person, or as the Father of a Family, or as a Member of the Common-wealth; In the first Respect are his Ethicks, wherein such Sentences as have been preserved by Xenophon, Diogenes, Lærtius, Stobæus, and others, are thus collected.

Of Virtue and Vice.

HE^a exhorted his Friends to endeavour to be the most wise and beneficial, because, what wants Reason, wants Respect, as the Bodies of dead Friends, and Hair, Nails, and the like, which are cut off and cast away.
The unemployed is good and beneficial; to be idle, hurtful and evil: They that do good are employed, they that spend their Time in vain Recreations, are idle.

^a Plat. Phæd. ^b Plutarch. plac. phil. 1. 1. ^c Plat. Phæd. ^d Schol. Aristoph. in nub. p. 124. ^e Plat. Phæd. ^f Cic. de amicis. ^g Ibid. 1. 1. p. 711. ^h Ibid. 4. ⁱ Xen. mem. 1. p. 720. ^j Ibid.

‘ He ’ that hath most Advantage by Gifts of Nature, as well as he that hath least, must learn and meditate on those Things wherein he would be excellent.

‘ He ’ only is idle who might be better employed.

‘ To ’ do good, is the best Course of Life, therein Fortune hath Share.

‘ They ’ are best, and best pleasing to God, who do any Thing, with any Art or Calling ; who followeth none, is useless to the Publick, and hated of God.

‘ He ’ taught every where, ‘ That a just Man and a happy were all one, and used to curse him who first by Opinion divided Honesty and Profit (which are coherent by ‘ Nature) as having done an impious Act, for they are truly wicked who separate profitable and just, which depends on ‘ Law.’ The Stoicks have followed him so far, that whatsoever is honest, the same they esteem profitable.

He asked Menon ‘ a Thessalian, who thought himself very learned, and that he had reached (as Empedocles saith) the Top of Wisdom, ‘ What is ‘ Virtue ? He answered readily and boldly, that there is one Virtue of a Child, another of an old Man, one of a Man, another of a Woman, one of a Magistrate, another of a private Person, one of a Master, another of a Servant. Very good, replies Socrates ; I ask for one Virtue, and you give us a whole Swarm ; truly conceiving, that he knew not one Virtue, who named so many. ‘ Being demanded by Gorgias, ‘ If he accounted not the great King of Persia happy ? I know not answered he, how he is furnished with Learning and Virtue : ‘ As conceiving that true Happiness consisteth in these two, not in the frail Gifts of Fortune.

‘ Euripides in his Age saying of Virtue ; ‘ It is best carelessly to pass with these ; he rose up and went away, saying, ‘ It was ridiculous to seek a lost Servant, or to suffer Virtue too to go away.

‘ He ’ said, ‘ he wondered at those who carve Images of Stone, that they take such Care to make Stones resemble Men, whilst they neglect and suffer themselves to resemble Stones.

‘ He ’ advised young Men to behold themselves every Day in a Glass, that if they were beautiful they might study to deserve it ; if deformed, to supply or hide it by Learning.

He said, ‘ To begin well is not a small Thing, but depending on a small Moment.

‘ He ’ said, ‘ Virtue was the Beauty, Vice the Deformity of the Soul.

‘ He ’ said, ‘ Outward Beauty was a Sign of inward Beauty, and therefore chose such Auditors.

‘ In the Life of Man, as in an Image, every Part ought to be beautiful.

‘ Incense to God, Praise is due to good Men.

‘ Who are undeservingly accused ought to be defended ; who excel others in any good Quality, to be praised.

‘ A Horse is not known to be good by his Furniture, but Qualities ; a Man by his Mind, not Wealth.

‘ It is not possible to cover Fire with a Garment, Sin with Time.

‘ Being demanded, *who live without Perturbation ?* He answered, *They who are conscious to themselves of no Ill.*

‘ To one who demanded *what Nobility is ?* He answered, *A good Temper of Soul and Body.*

Of Affections, Love, Envy, Grief, &c.

‘ That ’ two Brothers God meant should be more helpful to each other than two Hands, Feet, Eyes, or whatsoever Nature hath formed ; doubtless, because if they love they may at great Distance mutually help one another, is the Scope of his Discourse with *Chararmates*.

‘ That all Things are good and fair to those Things wherewith they agree, but ill and deformed in respect of those Things with which they agree not, is the Conclusion of his second Discourse with *Aristippus*.

‘ Envy is a Grief, not at the Adversity of Friends, nor the Prosperity of Enemies, but at the Prosperity of Friends ; for many are so foolishly inclined as to malign those in good Fortune, whom in Misfortune they pities.

‘ A Ship ought not to trust to one Anchor, nor Life to one Hope.

‘ To ground Hopes on an ill Opinion, is to trust a Ship to a slight Anchor.

‘ The Beauty of Fame is blasted by Envy as by a Sickness.

‘ Many adorn the Tombs of those, whom living they persecuted with Envy.

‘ Envy is the Saw of the Soul.

‘ Nothing is pleasant or unpleasant by Nature, but by Custom.

‘ Unseasonable Love is like Hate.

‘ Being demanded, ‘ What is grievous to the Good,’ he answered, ‘ The Prosperity of the Wicked.

‘ Being demanded, ‘ How a Man might live without ‘ Trouble,’ he answered, ‘ It was not

de Xen. mem. 3. p. 778.

i Ibid. p. 779.

k Ibid. p. 78.

de offic. 3. & de lev. 1.

o Plut. de amicor. mult. p. 93.

p Plut. de lib. educ.

q Laert. 2. 33.

r Ibid.

s What was

per se, is explained by Aristotle, polit. 5. 3. & physic. 2. 4.

k h form. 1.

i Ibid. 1.

j Ibid. 37.

k Ibid. 37.

l Ibid. 37.

m Ibid. 37.

n Ibid. 37.

g Stob. form. 109.

h Stob. 2.

i Ibid. 23.

j Ibid. 38.

k Ibid. 38.

l Ibid. 38.

m Ibid. 38.

n Ibid. 109.

possible but that he who lives in a City or a Family must sometimes be infected.

Wicked Hopes, like ill Guides, deceive a Man, and lead him into Sin.

A Woman cannot deceive without a Man; nor a good Hope produce any Benefit without Labour.

Winter had need of Garments, old Age of Disengagement from Grief.

In Life, as in a Theatre, we should continue so long as the Sight of Things, and Actions of Life seem delightful.

The Mad should be bound, the Ignorant instructed.

That we should endeavour to shun the Cen-
sorious, and to apply ourselves to such as are can-
did; that we should undertake only such Things

as we can perform, and decline such as we can-
not; that whenever we undertake any thing,

we should employ therein our utmost Study and
Endeavour, is the sum of his Advice to *Eutherus*.

He said, The Office of a wife Man is to dis-
cern what is good and honest, and to shun that

which is dishonest.

They who know what they ought to do, and
do it not, are not wise and temperate, but Fools

and stupid.

Justice, and every other Virtue, is Wisdom.

To be ignorant of ourselves, to seem to know
those Things whereof we are ignorant, is next to

Madness.

That a pious Person is rightly defined, such
a one as knows what is lawful as to the Gods, just,

he that knows what is lawful to Men, that a Man
is wise as far as he knows, that what is profitable

is fair to that whereto it is profitable, that they
who know how to use terrible Things, and dan-

gerous, are valiant, the contrary timorous, is the
Sum of his Discourse with *Euthidamus*.

He conceived the only Wisdom of Man to
consist in not thinking he understands those Things

which he doth not understand.

To one that complained he had not benefited
himself by Travel, *And not without Reason*, saith

he, *because thou didst not travel with thyself*.

He affirmed There is but one good Thing,
Knowledge; one ill, Ignorance; but that Riches

and Poverty had nothing in them of Worth, but,
on the contrary, all Evils.

When a wife Man openeth his Mouth, his Vir-
tues are as illustrious as Images in a Temple.

In Navigation we ought to be guided by the
Pilot, in the Course of Life, by those of better

Judgment.

Being demanded what Wisdom was, he an-
swered, *The Compassure of the Soul*. Being demand-

ed what were wife, *They*, said he, *who do not easily*
err.

The Soul's Reason augmenteth itself as in a
Play; the wisest, not the richest, ought to bear
the Prize.

Fugitives fear, tho' not pursued; Fools, tho'
not in Adversity, are troubled.

Seeing a young Man rich, and unlearned, *De-
bold*, saith he, a *Golden Slave*.

The Luxurious is hardly cured in Sickness, the
Fool in Adversity.

The Coward useth Arms against himself, the
Fool Money.

Achilles Armour fits not *Thersites*, nor the good
Habits of the Soul a Fool.

Be not forward in Speech, for many Times
the Tongue hath cut off the Head.

In War, Steel is better than Gold; in Life,
Wisdom excelleth Wealth.

Of Piety and Obedience.

That the greatest of Vices is Ingratitude; of
Obligations, that to Parents; that a diso-

bedient Son the Gods will not bless, nor Men
love, as doubting his Return of either, knowing

he doth it not where so much is due; is the Sum
of his Discourse with *Apiles*.

Our Prayers should be for Blessings in gene-
ral, for God knows best what is good for us; our

Offerings proportioned to our Abilities, for he con-
siders Integrity, not Munificence.

He said (with the *Pythian Oracle*) that the
Gods are to be worshipped according to the Law

of the City where a Man lives; they who do
otherwise, he thought superstitious and vain.

The best Way of worshipping God, is to do
what he commands.

Superstition is obedient to Pride, as its Parent.

A harsh Father, like a severe Law, must not
withstanding be obeyed.

The Reproof of a Father is a kind Remedy;
it brings more Ease than Pain.

Of Fortitude and Imbecility.

That a Man ought to inure himself to volun-
tary Labour and Sufferance, so as what

shall be imposed by Necessity, may appear in him
not compulsive, but free; that soft Ways of liv-

ing in Pleasures beget no good Constitution of
Body, nor Knowledge of the Mind; that Tole-

rance raiseth us to high Attempts, is the Effect of
his Discourse with *Aristippus*.

To one who was fearful to go so far on Foot as
Olympia, he demonstrated (to make the Journey

y Xen. mem. 2. p. 719. w Xen. mem. 2. x Xen. mem. 3.
 2. 31. f Stob. 3. h Stob. 3. i Stob. 3. k Stob. 4. l Stob. 4. m Stob. 79. n Stob. 211.
 o Xen. mem. 2. p. 722. q Xen. mem. 2. 722. r Xen. mem. 4. 803. s Stob. 22. t Stob. 78.
 u Stob. 81. w Xen. mem. x Xen. mem. 3.

seem easy) that it was no more than his daily Walk within Doors, if extended at length, would easily reach.

* One that complained he was weary of a Journey, * He reproved him for being more weary than his Servant that followed him laden.

* He said, 'Death resembled either a deep Sleep, or a long Journey out of our Native Country, or an absolute Annihilation of Soul and Body, examining all which, he affirmed, Death to be in none of those respects evil. As to the first, saith *Plutarch*, it is not ill with those that sleep, and we esteem that Sleep sweetest which is deepest; and if we look on it as a Journey, it is rather a Blessing, for thereby we are freed from the Slavery and Affections of the Flesh, which possess and insatiate the Mind: In the last Respect, it makes us insensible of Ill and Pain, as well as of Good and Pleasure.

* A Statue stands firm on its Base, a virtuous Man on firm Resolutions.

* Voluntary Labours are delighted with Assurance of Ease; Idleness, and transitory Pleasures, beget neither a good Constitution of Body, nor any good Habit in the Soul.

* Being demanded, 'What is Strength? He answered, the Motion of the Soul with the Body.

* Seeing the Gates of *Corinth* strongly barr'd, he asked, 'Dwell Women here?

* An honest Death is better than a dishonest Life.

* He used to say, 'Liberty is Sister to Sloth; in stancing in the *Indians* and *Persians*, both lazy; the *Phrygians* and *Lydians* very industrious, as being under Servitude.

Of Temperance, Continence, and Contentedness.

* HE advised to shun all Occasions of Incontinence, affirming that such as conversed much with fair Women could not easily be continent.

* That the Sight and Kisses of the Fair infuse a Poison more dangerous than that of *Scorpions* and *Spiders*, is the Sum of his Discourse to *Xenophon* and *Critobolus*.

* That a free Man ought not to entertain a Servant addicted to Pleasures; that he which is a Slave to Pleasures, should pray to the Gods for better Masters, is the Conclusion of his Discourse de continentia.

* That Happiness consists not in Luxury and Pride; that to want nothing is divine; to want the least, next to divine, is the Conclusion of his Discourse with *Antipho*.

* He advised such as could not easily obtain at Feasts, to take heed of such Things as persuade those that are not hungry to eat, and those that are not thirsty to drink, for they destroyed the Appetite; the Head, and the Soul. He used to say merrily, *Circe* turned Men into Swine, by feasting them with such Meats; but that *Ulysses*, partly through *Minerva's* Advice, partly through his own Temperance, refraining from such Things, remained unchanged.

* That Health of Body ought diligently to be preserved, as that whereon all Knowledge of the Soul depends, is the Sum of his Discourse with *Epigenes*.

* He advised one that complained he had no Delight in his Meat, to refrain from Eating, whereby his Diet would become more pleasant, cheap, and wholesome.

* In the Word *εὐχρηδαι* (to feast) the Particle *eu* implies, that we should eat only such Things as will not hurt the Mind nor the Body, and are easy to be gotten.

* That only temperate Persons, that discern and choose the best Things, refraining from the worst; that by Temperance Men become the most excellent, and most happy, fittest for Discourse; is the Sum of his Discourse with *Euthydemus*.

Hearing one of his Friends say, 'This Town is exceeding dear, *Chiar* Wine costs a Mina, Purple three, a Pint of Honey five Denaries, he carried him to the Mealmen; Here, saith he, a Pint is sold for an *Obolus*; it is cheap living in this Town. Then to those that sold Olives, a *Choenix* two Farthings; thence to the Frippery, a Suit ten Drachms; Things are cheap in this Town.

* He said, the Hungry wanted no Sauce, the Thirsty no choice of Wines.

* He commended Quiet and Leisure above all Things.

* He said, they who buy early Fruits at dear Rates, believe they will not come in their due Season.

* Being asked what was a young Man's Virtue, he answered, to do nothing too much.

* Seeing one eat Broth very greedily, he said, 'Which of you here present useth Bread for Broth, and Broth for Bread?' Of which, see more at large, *Xenophon* his *Memorab. Lib.*

* One saying, That it was a great Matter to abstain from what a Man desires, he answered, 'But it is much a greater not to desire at all.

* A clear Fire becomes the Chimney, Serenity the Mind.

* He said, 'We ought not to seek Pleasures in others, but in ourselves, the Body being predispersed according as it ought.

y Xen. mem. 3. z Plut. consul. ad Apollon. f. *Ælian*. var. Hist. 10. 14. g Xen. mem. 1. h Xen. mem. 1. i Xen. mem. 2. k Xen. mem. 1. l Xen. mem. 3. m Xen. mem. 3. n Xen. mem. 3. o Xen. mem. 4. p Plut. de anim. tranquil. q Laert. 2. 27. r Laert. lib. t Laert. lib. u Laert. lib. w Laert. lib. x *Ælian*. var. Hist. 9. 29. y Stob. 3. z Stob. 5.

a Stob. 1. & 296.

b Stob. 7.

c Stob. 39.

d Stob. 155.

e Stob. lib.

f *Ælian*. var. Hist. 10. 14.

g Xen. mem. 1.

h Xen. mem. 1.

i Xen. mem. 2.

k Xen. mem. 1.

l Xen. mem. 3.

m Xen.

n Xen. mem. 3.

o Xen. mem. 4.

p Plut. de anim. tranquil.

q Laert. 2. 27.

r Laert. lib.

s Laert. lib.

t Laert. lib.

u Laert. lib.

w Laert. lib.

x *Ælian*. var. Hist. 9. 29.

y Stob. 3.

z Stob. 5.

* He said, It is the Property of God to need nothing; to need least, nighest to God.

* Being demanded from what Things we ought to refrain most, he answered, ' From fordid unjust Pleasures.

* Contentedness is like a short and pleasant Way, it hath much Delight, little Toil.

* He that would see Virtue as his Country, must pass by Pleasures, as Syrens.

* Being demanded whom he thought richest, he answered, ' Him who is contented with least; for Content is the Riches of Nature.

* Being demanded what Continence is, he answered, ' Government of Corporeal Pleasures.

* He said, ' The Wicked live to eat, but the Good eat to live.

* When a Woman saith she loveth thee, take heed of those Words more than when she revileth thee.

Of Liberality, Prodigality, and Covetousness.

* HE conceived, that they who took Money of any, owned them for their Masters in the meanest Degree of Servitude.

* That Wisdom is prostituted as well as Beauty, by taking Money for it; that he who meets with an ingenious Person, ought to acquaint him with all the Good he can, gratis, whereby he acquires a Friend, and doth the Part of a good Member of a Commonwealth; is the Sum of this second Discourse with Antipho.

* He said, If a rich Man be proud of his Wealth, that he could not praise him till he knew how he would employ it.

* None can safely manage a Horse without a Bitt, nor Riches without Reason.

* He compared covetous Persons to Birds, one devoureth whatever it meets till it choaks itself, the rest falling upon what the first left, are one after another choaked also.

* The Wealth of covetous Persons is like the Sun after he is set, delights none.

* He that gives to a rich Man, throws Water into the Sea.

* The Life of a covetous Person is like the Feasts made for the Dead, he bath all, but enjoys nothing.

* He compared the Wealth of Prodigals to Fig-Trees growing on a Precipice: for these none are the better, but Kites and Crows; for those only Harlots and Flatterers.

* Being demanded who were covetous, he answered, Such as seek after sordid Gain, and neglect their necessary Friends.

* Wine changeth with the Vessel, Riches follow the Manners of the Owner.

Of Magnanimity and Pride.

* TO one angry for having saluted a Man that returned not his Salutation; it is ridiculous, saith he, if you are not angry with every one you meet of worse Shape or Form than yourself, to be angry with any for having less Manners.

* Pride, like an ill Potter, or Statuary, represents the Forms of Things inverted.

* Wind puffs up empty Bladders, Opinion Fools.

* To be exalted with good Fortune, is to run in a slippery Way.

Of Patience.

* THERE is less Danger in drinking intemperately of troubled Water, than with a troubled Mind full of Wrath, before it be allayed and purified, to satisfy thy Anger in the Punishment of a Kinsman or Countryman.

* If every one should bring his Misfortunes into the publick Stock, to be shared alike amongst all Men, the greater Part of those that now complain so much, would be contented and glad to keep their own.

* It is all one if a Man being overcome in any Gymnick Sports should sue his Adversary, as for a Man overmaster'd by Fortune to accuse her; not knowing upon what Conditions we entered into the Contests of Life.

Of Veracity and Flattery.

* THERE is no better Way to Glory than to endeavour to be good, as well as to seem such.

* The Kindness of Flatterers is chased away by Adversity.

* Hunters take Hares with Hounds, many take Fools with their own Praises.

* Wolves resemble Dogs, and Flatterers Friends, but their Aims are quite contrary.

* Flattery is like a painted Armour, only for Shew, not Use.

* Think not those faithful who praise all thy Words and Actions, but those who reprove thy Faults.

* Suffer not a Talker and Slanderer, for he tells not thee any Thing out of Good-will; but as he discourseth the Secrets of others, so will he thine to others.

* Good Men must let the World see that their Manners are more firm than an Oath.

a Stob. ibid. b Stob. ibid. c Stob. ibid. d Stob. ibid. e Stob. 32. f Stob. 64. g Stob. ibid. h Stob. 67. i Xen. mem. 1. k Xen. mem. 1. l D. Basil. hom. 24. de legand. lib. gentil. m Stob. 32. n Stob. 17. o Stob. 41. p Stob. 42. q Stob. 38. r Stob. 17. s Stob. 140. t ibid. u Xen. mem. 3. v Stob. 22. w Stob. 22. x Stob. ibid. y Stob. 147. z Plat. de his qui fero h. mem. vind. a Plat. de consul. ad Apollon. b Stob. 108. c Xen. mem. 1. d Stob. 14. e Stob. ibid. f Stob. ibid. g Stob. ibid. h Stob. ibid. i Stob. 53. k Stob. 85.

Of Urbanity and Conversation.

- “ A Little Hall will serve to dance in, and every Place and Posture to speak.
 “ Wind kindles Fire, Conversation Love.
 “ Freedom of Discourse, like the Seasons of the Year, is best in its proper Time.
 “ It is Arrogance to speak all, and to be unwilling to hear any Thing.
 “ Converse at Distance, and softly, with those that are in Authority.

Of Justice.

- “ That the Gods prescribe just Things by Law, and that just and Lawful is to them the same Things, is the Sum of his Discourse with *Hippias*.
 “ They who convert Goods ill gotten to good Uses in a Common-wealth, do like those who make religious Use of Sacrilege.

Of Friendship.

- “ That a discreet virtuous Friend is of all Possessions the most fertile, and ought chiefly to be regarded, is the Scope of his Discourse, de *amicitia*.
 “ That every Man should examine himself, of what Value he is to his Friend, and endeavour to be of the most Worth he can to him, is the Effect of his Discourse with *Antisthenes*.
 “ That wicked Men cannot be Friends, either amongst themselves, or with the Good: That the Way to procure Friends is first, to endeavour to be good, wherein he would seem good: That all Virtues may be augmented by Study and Learning, is the Scope of his Discourse with *Critobulus*.
 “ That we ought, to our utmost Abilities, to relieve the Necessities of our Friends, is the Effect of his Discourse with *Aristarchus*.
 “ He said, he had rather have *Darius* to his Friend, than his *Darics*, a Coin so named from him.
 “ He wondered that every Man kept an Inventory of his Goods, none of his Friends.
 “ They who violate Friendship, though they escape the Punishment of their Friends, shall not escape the Vengeance of God.
 “ They who forsake their own Brethren, to seek out other Friends, are like those who let their own Grounds lie fallow, to till another's.
 “ Fear not a Friend in Adversity.
 “ We esteem not that Corn best which grows on the fairest Ground, but that which nourisheth

- “ best; nor him a good Person or Friend who is of highest Birth, but most noble in Qualities.
 “ Physicians must relieve the Sick, Friends the Afflicted.
 “ It is pleasant to grow old with a good Friend and sound Sense.

Sect. 3. Oeconomicks.

IN the second respect are his Oeconomicks, which he learned of *Ishomachus*, by *Xenophon* expressly delivered in a Treatise upon that Subject, to which add these few Sentences.

- “ So contrive the Building of your House, as that those Parts which are towards the South may be highest, that the Winter Sun be not excluded; those toward the North lowest, that they may be less subject to the Wind. In fine, so order it, that a Man may live in every Quarter thereof with most Delight and Safety. Pictures and Colours take away more Pleasantness than they afford.
 “ To one who beat his Servant for being gluttonous, covetous, and idle, he said, *Did you at any Time consider whether you deserve not more to be beaten yourself?*
 “ To one that asked his Advice about taking a Wife, *Whether you do or not*, saith he, *you will repent it*.
 “ To others that asked his Opinion concerning Marriage, he said, *As Fishes in a Net would fain get out, and those without would get in, take heed, young Men, it be not so with you*.
 “ Men must obey the Laws of their Country, *Wives their Husbands*.

Sect. 4. Politicks.

IN the third Respect are his Politicks, which *Hefsebius Illustrius* makes to be the same which *Plato* hath delivered under this Name, where you may have them, though disguised with the Language and Additions of *Plato*, to which may be annexed those Sentences of his in that kind out of *Xenophon*, *Stobæus*, and others.

- “ They who cannot, upon Occasion, be useful either to an Army, a City, or a Commonwealth; yet have Confidence of themselves, ought, though never so rich, to be under Restraint.
 “ Antipho demanding how he might make others skillful in Politicks, whilst himself meddled not therein, although he knew that he could manage them, which Way, saith he? *Antipho*, I do most affect the Business of the Commonwealth, if I prac-

l Plot. de san. tuend. m Stob. 6. n Stob. 49. o Stob. 95. p Stob. 170. q Xen. mem. 2. r Stob. 10. s Xen. mem. 2. t Xen. mem. 2. u Xen. mem. 2. w Xen. mem. 2. x Plot. de frat. amore. y Laert. 2. 30. z Stob. 135. a Stob. ibid. b Stob. 84. c Stob. 84. d Stob. 112. e Stob. 150. f Xen. mem. 3. g Xen. mem. 3. p. 7. 88. see more there, Laert. 2. 33. h Stob. 124. i Stob. ibid. k Stob. 72. l Hefsebi. Plat. m Xen. mem. 1. n Xen. mem. 2.

'life it only, or if I endeavour to make many able to act therein.

o 'That Place is fittest for Temples and Altars which is most open, and yet retired; for it is fitting that they who pray, see; and no less fitting that they come thither pure.

p 'They are not Kings who are in Possession of a Throne, or come unjustly by it, but they who know how to govern.

q 'A King is a Ruler of willing Subjects according to the Laws, a Tyrant is a Ruler of Subjects against their Will, not according to the Laws, but arbitrary; an Aristocracy is that Government wherein the Magistrates are.

r 'The Offices of a good Citizen are, in Peace, to enrich the Common-wealth, in War, to subdue the Enemies thereof, in Embassy to make Friends of Foes, in Sedition to appease the People by Eloquence.

s 'Of common People he said, they were as if a Man should except against one Piece of bad Money, and accept a great Sum of the same.

t 'He said, 'The Law was not made for the Good.

u 'Deserving Persons ought to be Sharers in the good Fortunes of the Common-wealth.

v 'Being demanded *What City is strongest?* he said, *that which hath good Men.*

w 'Being demanded, *What City is best ordered?* he said, *that wherein the Magistrates friendly agree.*

x 'Being demanded, *What City was best?* he said, *that wherein are proposed most Rewards of Virtue.*

y 'Being demanded, *What City lives best?* he said, *that which liveth according to Law, and punisheth the Unjust.*

CHAP. VI.

Of his *Dæmon*.

T HAT Socrates had an Attendant Spirit (meant, as Plutarch conceives by the Oracles Answer to his Father) which diverted him from Dangers, is impugned by *Athenæus*, not without much Prejudice, which the Bitterness of the Discourse betrays. Souls that are not candid, and think ill of the best, faith *Origen*, never refrain from Calumny, seeing that they mock even the Genius of Socrates as a feigned Thing. On the contrary, we have the Testimony of *Plato*, *Xenophon* and *Antisthenes* contemporary with him, confirmed by *Laertius*, *Plutarch*, *Maximus Tyrinus*, *Dion Chrysostomus*, *Cicero*, *Apuleius*; by Fathers, *Tertullian*, *Origen*, *Clement Alexandrinus* and others, whereof a great many Instances (as *Cicero* saith) were collected by *Antipater*: These only preferved by other Authors.

a 'Theocritus going to consult *Enthyphron*, a

'Sooth-sayer, found him with much Company walking in the Streets, amongst whom were *Simæus* and *Socrates*, who was very busy, asking him many Questions. In the midst of his Discourse he made a sudden Stop, and after some Pause, turned back and went down another Street, calling out to the rest of the Company to return and follow him, as being warned by the *Dæmon*. The greater Part did so, the rest went forward, on Purpose to confute the *Dæmon*, and drew along with them one *Charillus* that played on the Flute; but in the Way, which was so narrow as not to give them room to pass by, they were met, and overturned in the Dirt by a great Herd of Swine; by Repetition of which Accident, *Charillus* often afterwards defended the *Dæmon*.

Nor did the Advice of this Spiritual Attendant only respect the Good of Socrates, but extended to such Friends as conversed with him, whereof himself gives these Instances.

'*Charmides* Son of *Glauco*, going to exercise in the *Nemean* Race, as he was discoursing with *Socrates*, was by him, upon Notice of the Voice, dissuaded from going, to which he answered, that perhaps the Voice meant that he should not get the Victory, but, faith he, however, I shall advantage myself by exercising at this Time; which said, he went to the Games, where he met with some Accident, which tho' it be not related, is acknowledged to have justified the Counsel given him by the *Dæmon*.

'*Timarchus* and *Philemon* Son of *Philemonides*, having plotted together to murder *Nicias*, Son of *Herolcamander*, were at the same time drinking with *Socrates*. *Timarchus*, with Intention to execute what they had determined, offered to rise from the Table, saying to Socrates, will Socrates, drink you on, I will but step a little Way and return immediately. Rise not, said Socrates, (hearing the *Dæmon* as soon as he spake) for the *Dæmon* hath given me the accustomed Sign; whereupon he sat still, presently after he offered again to be gone; Socrates bearing the Voice, with-held him. At last, as Socrates was diverted by something, and did not mind him, he stole away and committed the Murder, for which being brought to Execution, his last Words, to his Brother *Clitomachus* were, that he was come to that untimely End for not obeying Socrates. Another time, seeing his Friend *Crito*'s Eye tied up, he asked him the Reason, who answering, that as he walk'd in the Field, one pulling a Bough, it gave a Jerk back, and bit him in the Eye; then you did not take my Advice, replies Socrates, for I call'd you back, making Use, as I have accustomed, of divine Prefage.

That it had likewise a great Influence upon the

o Xen. mem. 3. p Ibid. 3. 779. q Ibid. 4. 813. r Ibid. 4. w Stob. 41. x Ibid. y Ibid. z Ibid. a De Gen. Secr. b Apud Athenæum. c De dram. lib. 1. d Plat. de Gen. Secr. e Plato. Theag. eilian. var. lib. 5. 1. f Plat. Theag. g Cic. de Divinat. 1. 54.

Souls of those who conversed with him, and lived with him, ^h he allegeth as Examples *Aristides* Son of *Lyfimachus*, and *Thucydides* Son of *Meliffus*. The first leaving *Socrates* to go to the Wars, lost, with his Company, the Habit of Learning, which he acknowledged to have gained, not by any verbal Instructions, of which he had none from him, but by being near him, seeing him, and sitting in the same Room with him. The second as easily, by the same Means attained the same Habit.

And not only to particular Persons, but to general Affairs did these Predictions extend: He foretold some Friends the Defeat of the *Athenian* Army in *Sicily*, as is attested by *Plutarch*, and mentioned by himself in *Plato*, where he gives another fair Example, or rather Trial of the Truth of the *Dæmon's* Predictions, speaking of a Business whereof the Event was at that Time doubtful: *You will hear*, saith he, *from many in Sicily, to whom it is known what I foretold concerning the Destruction of the Army, and we may now have an Experiment if the Dæmon speak true.* Sannion, Son of Calus, is gone in an Expedition, the Sign came to me: He goes with *Thrasylus* to War against *Ephesus* and *Ionia*: My Opinion is, that he will either be slain, or at least in much Danger, I greatly fear the whole Design. These are his Words in *Plato*, delivered before the Event of that Action, which fell out according to his Prediction; ^k for *Thrasylus* was repulsed and beaten by the *Ephesians*, the *Athenians* put to flight with the Loss of four hundred Men; of which Victory the *Ephesians* erected two Trophies: This was in the one and twentieth Year of the *Peloponnesian* War.

We have alleged the universal Consent of Authors, that *Socrates* had such a spiritual Attendant; yet is there some Disagreement concerning the Name, more concerning the Nature of it.

It is commonly named his *Dæmon*, by which Title he himself owned it. *Plato* sometimes calls it his Guardian, *Apuleius* his God, because (saith St. *Augustine*) the Name of *Dæmon* at last grew odious. But we must observe, that he did not account it a God, but sent from God, and in that Sense affirmed the Signs to come from God, to wit, by the Mediation of this Spirit. This, besides other Places, we may argue from his first Epistle, where he speaks of the Sign itself; he useth the Word *Dæmon*, when of the Advice, whereof that Sign was the Instrument, he names God. Thus are we to understand these, and all other Places of the same Nature in *Plato*, where *Socrates* speaking of the *Dæmon* saith, *if it please God, you shall learn much, and the Sign from God did not offer to stay me.*

As for the Sign or Manner of the Prediction, some affirm ^m it was by sneezing, either of himself or others; if any chanced to sneeze standing before

him, behind him, or on his Right Hand, he went immediately about that which he intended; if on the Left Hand, he refrained or desisted; if he sneezed himself before the Enterprize, it was applause, if in the Action, disapproval. There needs not much Argument to prove this Opinion. If this Sternutation proceeded either from Chance, or his natural Constitution, it could not have that provident supernatural Effect; if it proceeded from some more excellent outward Cause, we recur to the Genius.

Others confine this Prescience within the Soul of *Socrates* himself, that he said, his *Genius* advised him, they interpret it, as we usually say, his Mind gave him, or so inclined him. In this Sense indeed *Dæmon* is not seldom taken; but this is inconsistent with the Description which *Socrates* gives of a Voice and Signs *ab exteriore*, besides this Knowledge is not above Human Nature.

Plutarch having exploded the Opinion of *Tertullian* concerning sneezing, conjectured first, that it might be some Apparition; but at last concludes, that it was his Observation of some inarticulate unaccustomed Sound, (or Voice) conveyed to him by some extraordinary Way, as we see in Dreams. This avoids not the Inconvenience of the former; if *Socrates* did first of himself interpret this Sound, it is the same with the last Opinion, that his Soul had a prophetic Inspiration, if by any Help it will come at last to the Genius.

Some conceive it to be one of those Spirits which have a particular Care of Men; which *Maximus Tyrius*, and *Apuleius* describe in such Manner, that they want only the Name of a good Angel.

But there want not those who give it that Appellation: ⁿ *Lactantius* having proved that God sends Angels to guard Mankind, adds, and *Socrates* affirmed that there was a *Dæmon* constantly near him, which kept him Company from a Child, by whose Beck and Instruction he guided his Life. *Eusebius*, upon these Words of the Psalmist, *He hath given his Angels charge over thee, that they should keep thee in all thy Ways.* We learn out of Scripture (saith he) that every Man hath a Guardian appointed him from above; and *Plato* doubteth not to write in this Manner: *All Souls having chosen a Condition of Living, they proceed in order thereto, being moved by the Dæmon, which is proper to every one, and is sent along with them to preserve them in this Life, and to perfect those Things whereof they have made Choice.* And immediately after; *You may believe*, saith he, *that Socrates meant this, when he often affirmed that he was governed by a Dæmon.* More plainly ^o *Eugubinus*, the *Dæmon* of *Socrates*, saith he, mentioned so often by *Plato* (seeing that *Socrates* was a good Man, and exhorted all Men to Virtue, and by the *Dæmon* was always excited to that which was good) may perhaps not unjustly be thought his

^h Plat. Theog. ⁱ Ibid. ^k Xenoph. hist. Græc. 1. ^l De civ. Dei. 8. 15. ^m Plat. de gen. Socr. ⁿ De Orig. error. 2. 15. ^o In Psalm. 91. ^p De perenn. philo. 1. 8.

Angel, as that which appeared to Balaam the Prophet, and diverted him from his Wickedness. * But *Ficino* expressly; if you are not pleased, saith he, speaking of this Spirit, to call the familiar Guide of a Man his Spirit, call it if you please, his good Angel.

The chiefest Argument of *Collius*, who opposeth this Opinion, and endeavours to prove it was an evil Spirit is, that the *Dæmon* never dissuaded or diverted from Vice, but only from outward Danger, whereas the contrary is evident enough from the foregoing Story of *Timarchus* and *Philemon*.

True it is, that the Advice of the *Dæmon* was always dissuasive, never, * as *Cicero* saith, *impulsive, often coercive*. *Apuleius* flatters *Socrates* with this Reason; *Socrates*, saith he, as being a Man absolute and perfect of himself, ready in all Offices that concerned him, never needed any Exhorter, but sometimes a Prohibiter, if it happened there were any Danger in that which he went about, that being forewarned he might take Heed, and decline the Undertaking for that Time; which afterwards he might resume, or attempt some other Way.

CHAP. VIII.

His Military Actions.

IT is observed by many, that *Socrates* little affected Travel, his Life being wholly spent at home, saving when he went out in Military Service.

In the second Year of the eighty-sixth Olympiad broke forth a War, the greatest that ever happened amongst the *Grecians*, betwixt the *Lacedæmonians* and the *Athenians*, the Occasions and Pretexts of it arising from the Controversies of the *Athenians* with the *Corinthians*, concerning *Coryra* and *Potydæa*, both which being revolted from the *Athenians*, to whom they had been tributary, sought for Aid from the *Lacedæmonians*, who sent Forces to the Relief of *Potydæa*.

In this War was *Socrates* thrice personally engaged; first at the Siege of *Potydæa*, in the second Year of the eighty-sixth Olympiad, against which the *Athenians* sent one thousand six hundred choice Men of Arms, under the Conduct of *Phormio*, who besieged it from the Sea by his Gallies, and on the Land-side by a Wall: Amongst these were *Socrates* and *Alcibiades*: *Laertius* saith, they were on the Sea-side, and that there was no Means to come on the Land-side further. * *Plato*, that they served both on Foot, which disagrees not with the other; for there was not any set Battle during all the Time of the Siege, only Sallies and Skirmishes. Here *Alcibiades* his Comrade attests, *Socrates* outwent all

Soldiers in Hardiness; and if at any Time, saith he, as it often happens in War, the Provisions failed, there was none could bear the want of Meat and Drink like him; yet on the other Side, in Times of Feasting, he only seemed to enjoy them, and tho' of himself he would not drink, yet being invited, he far out-drank all others, and which is strangest of all, never any Man saw him drunk. The Excesses of Cold in the Winter, which in that Country are extraordinary, he as wonderfully endured; when the Frost was so sharp that very few durst go out of their Tents, and those wrapping their Legs and Thighs in Skins and Furs, he went along with them, having no more Cloaths than those he usually wore. He walked bare-footed upon the Ice with less Tenderness than others in Shoes, to the Wonder of the Soldiers, who thought themselves reproached by his Hardiness. His contemplative Rapture at the same time was no less worthy Admiration; he fell into a deep Contemplation one Morning, and continued all the while standing in the same Posture; at Noon it was taken Notice of by the Soldiers, who told it from one another, that *Socrates* had stood still in the same Place all that Morning: In the Evening some Ionian Soldiers wrapping themselves warm, came and lay down by him in the open Field, to watch if he would continue all Night in the same Posture, which he did until the Morning, and as soon as the Sun arose, saluted it, and retired. Of these Kind of Raptures *A. Gellius* saith he had many. We must not omit how he behaved himself there in Fight; seeing his Friend *Alcibiades* deeply engaged, and much wounded, he stepped before him, defended him and his Arms from the Enemy, and brought him safely off. Nor was his Modesty inferior to his Love or Courage; for whereas after the Battle, the Generals were to bestow an honourable Reward upon him that had fought the best, the Judges assigned it to *Socrates*, he declined it, and by his earnest Intercession, procured that it might be conferred upon *Alcibiades*.

The second Action of *Socrates* was in the first Year of the eighty ninth Olympiad at *Delium*, a Town in *Boetia*, which the *Athenians* took. The *Boetians* (saith *Thucydides*) led by *Pagondas*, followed them, and bid them Battle, the left Wing of the *Boetians*, to the very Middle of the Army, was overthrown by the *Athenians*, and fled to the other Parts, where they were yet in Fight; but the Right had the better of the *Athenians*, and by little and little forced them to give Ground, and followed them from the very first. *Pagondas*, whilst the Left Wing of his Army was in Distress, sent two Companies of Horse secretly about the Hill, whereby that Wing of the *Athenians* which was victorious, apprehending upon their sudden Appearing, that they

p. Argum. ad Apol. Soc. r De anim. pagin. 5. 14. s De divin. 1. 54. t Laert. 2. 22. u Thucyd. 1. 1. w Laert. 2. 23. x Symph. y Plat. Symph. s Lib. 2. cap. 11. a Plat. Symp. Athen. deipn. citing Antisthenes.

had been a fresh Army, was put into a Fright, and the whole Army of the Athenians, now doubly terrified by this Accident, and by the Thebans that continually won Ground, and broke their Ranks, betook themselves to Flight, some fled towards Delium and the Sea, others to Oropus, others the Mountain Parnethus, and others other Ways, as to each appeared Hope of Safety. The Boetians, especially their Horse, and those Locrians that came in after the Enemy was defeated, followed, killing them. Socrates in this Engagement behaved himself with his accustomed Valour (so well, that ^b Laches confesseth, if the rest had fought like him, they had not lost the Day) and Care of his Friends; for ^c fixing Xenophon unhorsed in the Flight, and thrown down on the Ground (himself likewise having his Horse slain under him, fought on Foot) he took him upon his Shoulders, and carried him many a Stadia, and defended him till they gave over the Pursuit. And being thus at the Loss of the Day, with others dispersed in Flight (amongst whom was Laches the Archon, and Alcibiades) ^d in the constant slowness of his Retreat expressing a Courage far above Laches, frequently looking back and round about, as greedy to be revenged of the Enemy, if any should pursue them; which was the Means that brought him off more safely; for they who express least Fear in their Retreat, are lest subject to be assaulted, than such as repose their Confidence in flying.

^e As they came to a Way that was divided into two, Socrates made a Stand, and advised those that were with him not to take that Way which they were going into, along the Mountain Parnethus, but the other by the Way Retiste, for, saith he, I heard the Demon's Voice. The greater Part were angry, as if he had trifled at a Time so serious; some few were perswaded to go along, amongst whom were Laches and Alcibiades, and got safely home; the rest were met by some Horsemen, who returning from the Pursuit, fell upon them; they at first resisted, but at last enclosed by the Enemy, who exceeded them in Number, they gave back, and were in the End oppressed and all killed, except one, who by the Help of his Shield getting away, brought the News to Athens, and Pyrilampes Son of Aniphan, who being wounded by a Javelin, was taken Prisoner; and when he heard by those that were sent from Athens to Thebes to treat of Peace, that Socrates and the rest with him got safe home; he openly professed to the Thebans, that Socrates had often called him and others of his Company back, who not following the Advice of his Genius, were slain.

The last Military Engagement was the same Year

at Amphipolis, which was then taken by Brasidas the Lacedemonian General.

CHAP. IX.

How he carried himself in the Democracy, and the Oligarchy.

Socrates forebore to accept any Office in the Common-wealth, (except in his latter Years that of Senator) either (as ^f Ælian saith) because he saw the Athenian Government, tho' under the Form of a Democracy, was yet nearer to a Tyranny or Monarchy, or ^g as himself professeth, being dissuaded by his Genius from meddling in publick Affairs, which Advice was his Preservation, being too honest to comply with the Injustices of the Common-wealth, and to oppose them was extremely dangerous, as he found experimentally in that short Time.

^h He was chosen into the Senate for the Antiochian Tribe, whereunto (as we have said) *Alcepe*, the Town where he was born belonged, and in order thereto took the Oath which *Solon* appointed to be given to every Senator, to give Sentence according to the Laws, not biased either by Favour, Hatred, or any other Pretext: In the third Year of the 93d Olympiad (the Pre-eminence coming in Courte to the Antiochian Tribe, and Socrates thereupon becoming President of the People) he had this Occasion of manifesting his Contancy. ⁱ There happened a Sea-fight between the Athenians and the Lacedemonians at *Arginusæ*: The Athenian Commanders were ten; the Lacedemonians Commander in chief, *Callicratidas*; the Lacedemonians were overthrown, their Admiral sunk; the Athenians went back to *Arginusæ* with the Loss of twenty five Ships, and all the Men in them, except some few that escaped to Land; the ten Commanders ordered *Theramenes* and *Thrasibulus*, (Captains of the Gallies) to look out after the Vessels that were shipwreck'd, which, as they were going to do, a sudden Tempest arose and hindered them; six of those Commanders returned to Athens, where they no sooner came, but upon the Account they gave of the Fight, the Senate committed them to Prison; *Theramenes* was their Accuser, who urged that they might be questioned for not relieving those that were lost by Shipwreck; the Commanders justly answered, that they had given Order for their Relief, and that *Theramenes* and *Thrasibulus*, on whom that Charge was imposed, were (if any) to be condemned; but that they would not retort the Fault on their Accusers, for the Tempest sufficiently excused them. This satisfied the Senate for that Time; but at the next Feast, being the *Apaturia*, some Friends of *Theramenes*, by his Indignation

^b Plato Sympo. ^c Scrab. lib. 9. ^d Laert. 2. 23. ^e Plat. ibid. ^f Plut. de Demon. & Socrat. Epist. 1. ^g Plat. Apol. ^h Plat. Apol. ⁱ Xen. memor. 1. ^k Plat. Apol.

1. 22. ^l Thucyd. 1. 4. ^m Var. hist. 3. 17.

ⁿ Xenoph. hist. Græc. 1.

having their Hair, and putting on Mourning Apparel, pretending to be Kinsmen of those that were drowned, came in that Habit to the Senate, and causing the Charge against the ten Commanders to be renewed, so much incensed the People, that they by Menaces contrary to all Law, enforced the Senate to condemn them. *Socrates* being ordered to write the Decree against them, avoided it, by pretending he could not write, and knew not the Form, which occasioned Laughter in the Senate (and perhaps that Asperion of *Porphyrius*, that he was scarce able to write, which when he did, it was to Derision) but the true Reason is by *Athenæus* acknowledged to be his constant Fortitude, in that he would not violate the Laws of the Commonwealth contrary to the Oath he had taken, * to which he took more Heed than to the Violence wherewith he was threatened; for when the Senate proceeded to their Condemnation, † he alone opposed it with his Suffrage, whereupon many Orators prepared to accuse him, and the People cried out with loud Clamours, that he might be brought to answer for it: But he chose rather to hazard himself for Law and Justice, than through Fear of Imprisonment and Death to consent to Injustice, as the Death of these Men was afterwards known to be, even to the *Athenians* themselves: And was soon after punished in *Theramenes* by the like, wherein *Socrates* gave the same Testimony of his Courage upon this Occasion.

Athen, after a long War with the *Lacedæmonians* of twenty-seven Years, being taken at last by *Lysander*, the *Lacedæmonian* General, in the first Year of the 94th Olympiad, there grew some Debate concerning the Alteration of the Government, from a Democracy to an Oligarchy; *Theramenes* stood for the Continuance of the Democracy, but being overfwayed by the Power and Threats of *Lysander*, yielded to the Constitution of thirty Persons, by Title ‡ Governours, in effect Tyrants, of which Number was *Theramenes* (whom they took, in regard of his known Moderation and Equity, to bridle the Rapine and Avarice of others) *Critias* first a Friend, but now a great Enemy to *Socrates* for reproving his Love of *Euridamus* *Charicles* and others, whose Names are set down by *Xenophon*, as are also their Murders, unjust Sequestrations of Lands, and Confiscations of Goods; they began with Punishment of the worst Persons, proceeded to the richest, and ended with the best. Never (saith § *Seneca*) was any City more miserable; 1300 (¶ *Æschines* saith, 1500) of the best Persons they put to Death without any legal Trial, nor was their Fury thereby assuaged, but more exasperated; that City where was the *Areopagus*, the most religious Court of Judicature, where the Senate and People

like the Senate used to assemble, was daily made a sad College of Executioners, an unhappy Court, too narrow for the Tyrants without rest from Oppression, without Hope of Liberty or Remedy. All fled the City but *Socrates*, who all this while set not his Foot out at the Gates; he was continually amongst the People, comforting the lamenting Fathers, encouraged those that despaired of the State, reproached the Rich, that had lived in Fear to lose their Wealth, the late Repentance of their dangerous Avarice, and to those that would imitate him, gave great Examples, whilst he walked free amidst the thirty Oppressors.

Theramenes opposing this Cruelty and Injustice, was accused by *Critias* for betraying the Trust of the Commonwealth, whereof he acquitted himself to the Satisfaction of the Senate; but *Critias* and his Faction, fearing he might overthrow the Oligarchy, seized upon him with a Troop of Soldiers; *Theramenes* run to the Altar, but being dragged from thence by the Officers, he behaved himself like (saith † *Disdorus*) the Disciple of *Socrates*; the People pitied him, but none of them durst offer to help him, because he was compassed in by the Soldiers, except *Socrates* and two of his Companions, who ran to him and endeavoured to rescue him out of the Hands of the Officers; *Theramenes* desired them to forbear, telling them that he much loved and commended their Kindness and Virtue, but that it would be the greatest Misfortune he could have, if their Love to him should occasion their Deaths; whereupon *Socrates* and his Companions seeing none come in to join with them in his Aid, and that the contrary Party was too strong for them, gave over: *Theramenes* was carried to Prison, and there (being sentenced to drink Hemlock) died.

These Outrages of the thirty Tyrants *Socrates* did not forbear to censure: ‡ Seeing many eminent Persons put to Death, and the rich circumvented and betrayed to excessive Punishments, he said to *Antisthenes*, Dost it repent thee that we have done nothing in our whole Lives great and remarkable, as those Monarchs who are described in Tragedies, *Atreus's*, *Thyestes's*, *Agamemnon's* and *Egisthus's*? They are in those Plays beheaded, feasted with their own Flesh, and generally destroyed; but no Poet was ever so bold and impudent as to bring a Hog killed upon the Stage.

¶ To another, who murmured because he was not looked upon since they began to rule, Are you sorry for it said he? He said likewise, † that it were strange if a Neat-herd who diminished and impoverished his Herd, should not confess himself an ill Neat-herd; but more strange that one who being set over the City, made the Citizens worse, and their Number less, should not confess himself an ill Governour. This

m *Xenoph. memor.* 1. n *Loert.* 2. 24. 'Αλλὰ δ' αὖτε (perhaps μέγα ἀντιφρονέσθαι τὸν διὰ κρατῆρα. o *Diod. Sic.* lib. 14. p *De tranquill. animi* c. 11. *Cicero*, q *Deed.* 1. 1. 24. † *Edin.* *mem.* lib. 2. 11. ‡ *Loert.* 2. 34. † *Xenoph. memor.* 1.

came to their Knowledge, whereupon Critias and Charicles sent for him, and forbid him strictly to teach or discourse with any of the young Men. Socrates asked them, if in Acts of Prohibition he might be permitted to question what he understood not, which they granting; Then (continues he) I am ready to obey the Laws, but lest I transgress them thro' Ignorance, I desire to be informed, whether when you forbid me the Act of Speaking, this Act be to be understood of Things spoken rightly or not rightly; if of the first, I must abstain from speaking what is right; if of the second, I must take Care to speak nothing but what is right. Hereupon Charicles being displeased, said, Since you understood not that, Socrates, we command you what is easier to be understood, that hence-forward you speak not at all with any of the young Men. To take away all Ambiguity, replies Socrates, that I may not exceed my Limitation; let me know expressly at what Years you call a young Man. So long (saith Charicles) as he is incapable of being Senator, and hath not attained to the Height of his Judgment; you are not to speak with any under Thirtiety. May I not buy (answers Socrates) of any under that Age, nor ask them the Price of any Thing? That you may, (saith Charicles) but your Custom is to ask Questions of Things which you know very well; forbear those. And shall I not then (replies Socrates) make Answer, if any one ask me where Charicles dwells, or where Critias is? To such Questions (saith Charicles) you may. You must (continues Critias) refrain from the Artificers, whose Ears you have sufficiently grated with your impertinent Discourse; I must then abstain (saith Socrates) from Justice, Piety, and the like; even from the very Neat-herds, (replies Charicles) which unless you do, take heed your Herd come not short home.

This Ill-Will and Jealousy which they had conceived against Socrates, was increased by the secret Departure of some Friends of his out of the City; which was reported to be done by his Contrivement, to give Intelligence to the Thebans: Nor was that Suspicion without Reason, as is manifest by his last Epitile. Hereupon, they summoned him into the Court, where some Complaints were brought against him; of which having acquitted himself, they (to get a better Cause of Quarrel against him) gave Order to him and four more to go to the Pyreum, and to apprehend Leon, whom they meant to put to Death, that they might possess his Estate: but Socrates refused, adding, that he would never willingly assist an unjust Act; whereupon Charicles said, Dost thou think, Socrates, to talk thus peremptorily, and not to suffer? A thousand Ills, (answered Socrates) but none so grievous as to do unjustly. Charicles made no Reply, nor any of the rest; the other Four went for Leon, Socrates directly to his House; but from thenceforward, the Jealousy they

had of him was so much increased, that * if their Power had not been soon dissolved, they would have gone near to have taken away his Life.

CHAP. X.

His falling out with the Sophists, and with Anytus.

THE Sophists, Masters of Language in those Times, saith * Cicero (whereof was Gorgias of Leontium, Thrasimachus of Chalcedon, Protagoras of Abdera, Prodicus a Ceian, Hippias an Elian, and many others) profess in arrogant Words to teach, how an inferior Cause (such was their Praise) might, by speaking, be made superior, * and used a sweet fluent kind of Rhetorick, argute in Sentence, lofty in Words, fitter for Ostentation than Pleading, for the Schools and Academies, rather than the Forum, were so highly esteemed, that † whereforever they came, they could persuade the young Men to forsake all other Conversation for theirs. * These Socrates opposed; and often, by his Subtlety of disputing, refelling their Principles, † with his accustomed Interrogatories, demonstrated that they were indeed much beneath the Esteem they had gained; that they themselves understood nothing of that which they undertook to teach others; he withdrew the young Men from their empty Conversation. These, who till then had been looked upon as Angels for Wit and Eloquence, he proved to be vain Affecters of Words, ignorant of those Things which they professed, and had more need to give Money to be taught, than to take (as they used) Money for Teaching. The Athenians, taken with these Reproofs which Socrates gave them, derided them, and excited their Children to the Study of solid Virtue.

Another Quarrel Socrates had of long Continuance, for it was the Occasion of his Death, but begun many Years before, with Anytus, an Orator by Profession, privately maintained and enriched by Leather-sellers. He had put Two of his Sons to Socrates to be taught; but not being pleased, that whilst they were in that Way, they had not learn'd so much as to be able thereby to get their Living, he took them from Socrates, and put them to that Trade which himself was ashamed to own; whereupon Socrates being much displeased in respect of the two Youths, whose Ruin he presaged, (and truly, for they fell afterwards into Debaucheries which occasioned it) spared not to reproach Anytus in discoursing to his Scholars, † telling them, That the Trade of dressing Leather was not fit to be spoken of amongst young Men; for they who benefit themselves by any Art, cherish and profess it, as Acumenus Physician, Damon and Connus Musick; even Anytus, whilst his Sons were his Scholars, was not ashamed of that which they learned, though it were not sufficient to maintain them by Pleading; but for himself, he gloried that he walk'd invisible with Pluto's Hel-

met, or Gyges's Ring, concealing from the People the true Means of his Subsistence, which indeed was by dressing Leather, which was not just, to be ashamed of the Trade, and not of the Profit; for he ought to own this, or to disclaim that.

Anytus (saith ^c Ælian) to answer this Reproach, studied all Occasions and Ways of Revenge; but feared the Athenians, doubting if he should accuse Socrates, how they would take it, his Name being in high Esteem for many Respects, chiefly for opposing the Sophists, who neither taught nor knew any solid Learning. He ^d advised with Melitus, a young Man, an Orator, unknown to Socrates, described by ^e Plato, with long plain Hair, a high Nose, and a thin Beard, one that for a Dram might be bought into any Thing, by whose Counsel ^f He begins, by making Trial in lesser Things, to sound how the Athenians would entertain a Charge against his Life; for to have accused him upon the very first, he conceived unsafe, as well for the Reason already mentioned, as lest the Friends and Followers of Socrates should divert the Anger of the Judges upon himself, for falsely accusing a Person so far from being guilty of any Wrong to the State, that he was the only Ornament thereof. To this End he suborns Aristophanes, a comic Poet, whose only Business was to raise Mirth; to bring Socrates upon the Stage, taxing him with Crimes which most Men knew him free from, impertinent Discourse, making an ill Cause by Arguments seem good; introducing new and strange Deities, whilst himself believed and revered none; hereby to insinuate an ill Opinion of him, even into those who most frequented him. Aristophanes taking this Theme, interweaves it with much abusive Mirth: The best of the Grecians was his Subject; not Cleon, the Lacedæmonians, the Thebans, or Pericles himself, but a Person dear to all the Gods, especially Apollo. At first (by reason of the Novelty of the Thing, the unusual personating of Socrates upon the Stage) the Athenians, who expected nothing less, were struck with Wonder. Then (being naturally envious, apt to detract from the best Persons, not only of such as bore Office in the Commonwealth, but any that were eminent for Learning and Virtue) they began to be taken with the Clouds, (so was the Play named) and cried up the Actor that personated Socrates with more Applause than ever any before, giving him with many Shouts the Victory, and sending Word to the Judges, that they should set down no Name but that of Aristophanes. Socrates came seldom to the Theatre, unless when Euripides contested with any new Tragedian, there, or in the Pythæum, then he went; for he affected the Wisdom, Goodness, and Sweetness of his Verse. Sometimes Alcibiades and Critias would invite him to a Comedy, and in a manner compel him; for he was so far from esteeming Comedians,

that he contemn'd them as lying, abusive, and unprofitable; whereat they were much displeased. These (with other Things suggested by Anytus and Melitus) were the Ground of Aristophanes his Comedy, who, it is likely, got a great Sum of Money by it, they being eager in Prosecution of their Design, and he prepared by Want and Malice to receive their Impression: In fine, the Play got extraordinary Credit, that of Cratinus being verified,

The Theatre was then
Fill'd with malicious Men.

^g It being at that Time the Feast of Bacchus, a Multitude of Grecians went to see the Play: Socrates being personated on the Stage and often nam'd, (nor was it much the Players should represent him, for the Potters frequently did it upon their Stone Jugs) the Strangers that were present (not knowing whom the Comedy abused) raised a Hum and Whisper, every one asking who that Socrates was? which he observing, (for he came not thither by Chance, but because he knew himself should be abused in the Play, had chosen the most conspicuous Seat in the Theatre) to put the Strangers out of doubt, he rose up, and all the while the Play lasted, continued in that Posture, (^h laughing) ⁱ one that was present asked him if it did not vex him to see himself brought upon the Stage? Not at all, (answered he) methinks I am at a Feast, where every one enjoys me. ^j This Comedy was first acted when Isarchus was Archon, Cratinus Victor, in the first Year of the eighty ninth Olympiad. Aristophanes being by some reprehended for it, to vindicate himself, caused it to be acted again the Year following, Amintas being Archon, but with worse Order than at first.

^k Amiphsias also (another Comic Poet) derided him thus in Tribone.

O Socrates, the best of few, the vainest
Of many Men; and art thou come amongst us?
Where is thy Gown? Did not this great Misfortune
Besal thee by the Leather-dresser's Help?

CHAP. XI.

His Trial.

^l MANY Years past since the first falling out betwixt Socrates and Anytus, during which Time, one continued openly reproving the other, secretly undermining; until at length, Anytus seeing the Time suit with his Design, procured Melitus to prefer a Bill against him to the Senate in these Terms.

Melitus Son of Melitus, a Pythæan, accusest Socrates Son of Sophroniscus, an Alopecian. Socrates

^c Var. hist. 2. 23. ^d Schol. Aristoph. ab Nob. ^e Liban. ^f Ælium. Ibid. ^g Ælian, var. hist. 5. 8. ^h Plut. de educand. lib. ⁱ Schol. Aristoph. in Nob. ^j Laert. 2. 25. ^k Plut. Apol. Liban. Apol.

violates the Law, not believing the Deities which this City believeth, but introducing other new Gods. He violates the Law likewise in corrupting Youth; the Punishment Death.

This Bill being preferred upon Oath (Plato calls it *ἡ δ' ἡμετέρα*) Crito became bound to the Judges for his Appearance at the Day of Trial. * Soon after, Anytus sent privately to him, desiring him to forbear the mention of his Trade, and assuring him that he would thereupon withdraw his Action; but Socrates returned him Answer, that he would never forbear speaking Truth as long as he lived; that he would always use the same Speeches concerning him; that his Accusation was not of Force enough to make him refrain from speaking those Things which he thought himself before obliged to say.

The Interval of Time betwixt his Accusation and Trial, he employed in his usual philosophical Exercises, not taking any Care to provide his Defence, for which being observed and questioned by Hermogenes, Son of Hipponicus, 'I provide Apology enough (saith he) in considering and pursuing the constant Curse of my Life; Hermogenes demanding how that could be? Because (saith he) I never did any unjust Act, which I conceive the best Apology: But we often see Judges (saith Hermogenes) overway'd by Rhetorick, to condemn the Innocent and acquit the Guilty: The Truth is, (replied Socrates) going about to make my Apology, I was twice with-held by the *Dæmon*, whereat Hermogenes wondering, Is it strange (continues he) that God should think it fit for me to die at this Time? Hitherto no Man hath lived more uprightly; which, as it is now my greatest Comfort, so it was the greatest Delight to myself and Friends; if I live longer, I know I must undergo what is proper to old Age, Defects of Hearing and Sight, Slowness to apprehend, Aptness to forget, how can I then be pleased to live longer and grow worse? It is likely God in his Love to me hath ordained that I should die in the most convenient Age, and by the gentlest Means; for if I die by Sentence, I am allowed the Benefit of the most easy Kind of Death; I shall give my Friends the least Trouble, I shall do nothing unseemly before those that are present, and shall depart sound in Body and Soul; is not this very desirable? God with much Reason forbids me to make any Defence: If I could effect it, I should only stay longer to be taken away by the Torment of Diseases, and Imperfections of Age, which truly Hermogenes I desire not; if when I give an Account of my Actions towards God and Men, the Judges think fit to condemn me, I will rather chuse to die than beg of them a Life worse than Death. Other Friends used the same Persuasions to him with Assurance of

Victory. * *Lyfias* an excellent Orator offered him an Oration, which he had written in his Defence, desiring him if he thought good to make Use of it at his Trial; *Socrates* perused it, and told him, that it was a good one, but not fit for him. *Lyfias* asking how that could be? Why (saith he) may not a Garment or Shoes be rich, yet not fit for me? If you should bring me *Sicilian* Shoes, I would not wear them tho' they were fit for my Feet, because they are effeminate: He conceived the Oration to be ingenious and eloquent, but not stout and manly; for tho' it were very bitter against the Judges, yet it was it more rhetorical than became a Philosopher.

The Day of Trial being come, *Anytus*, *Lyrs*, and *Melitus* prepared to accuse him, one in behalf of the People, the second of the Orators, the last of the Poets: *Melitus* first went up into the Chair proper for that Purpose, and there spoke an Oration which was in itself mean enough, but withal delivered so unhappily and School-boy like, that sometimes he was out with Fear, and turned about to be prompted like a Player, enough to beget Laughter even in those that were most concerned in so serious a Cause: Part of the Effect whereof seems to be the same, which is thus by *Xenophon* imperfectly delivered, some Particulars whereof are confirmed by *Libanius*.

That Socrates persuaded his Auditors to condemn the received Laws, saying it was fit only for Fools to be governed by a Bean, (meaning the Suffrages of the Senate so gathered.)

That he was intimately conversant with Critias and Alcibiades, one most covetous and violent in the Oligarchy, the other ambitious of Tyranny.

That he taught Disrespect and Disobedience to Parents, telling his Scholars he would make them wiser than their Fathers, and that it was lawful for any one to bind his Father, if he were mad, and for those that were the more wise, to do as much as those that were less wise.

That he taught also Disrespect of all other Kinsmen, saying they were not useful to the Sick, or to the Accused, the first being in more need of a Physician, the latter of an Orator; that the good Will of unable Friends was nothing worth, that only the most knowing Persons were most worthy of Honour; by which Means he would arrogate all Respect to himself.

That he selected out of the Poets some ill Places, and perverted others that were not so, to excite his Friends to impious Actions; as that of *Hesiod*,

There is no Work pursued, Shame:

'Tis Idleness that merits Blame.

He expounded, as if the Poet meant all Mankind might be committed for Gain.

m See Suidas upon that Word.

* Liban. Apol. p. 644.

n Xenoph. Apol. & mem. 4.

o Cic. de Orat. 2. Leet. 2. 41.

p Plat. to Rhetor.

q Leet. 2. 40.

r Plat. Apol.

s Xenoph. mem. 1.

That he often repeated and misinterpreted these Words of Homer, as if the Poet allowed the Poor to be beaten.

*When he a Prince, or some great Person meets,
Such with soft Language kindly thus he greets;
Happy above the Reach of Fear are you;
Sit down, and bid your Followers do so too.
But of the lower Sort when any speaks,
Forb these Words with Blows his Anger breaks,
Be quiet; to thy Betters Wretch submit;
For Action and Advice alike unfit.*

Melitus (his Oration ended) came down; * next him came *Anytus* with a long malicious Speech, and last of all *Lyco* with all the Artifice of Rhetorick concluded the Accusation.

Socrates * would not (as was the Custom) procure an Advocate to plead for him; all the while his Accusers were speaking, he seemed to employ his Mind about nothing less: As soon as they had done, he went up into the Chair, (* in which Action he observed that the Dæmon did not with-hold him) and with * an angry Smile began * this unpremeditated Answer, * not as a Suppliant, or guilty Person, but as if Master of the Judges themselves, with a free Contumacy, proceeding not from Pride, but the Greatness of his Mind.

* But I wonder first (*Athenians*) how *Melitus* * came by this Knowledge, that (as he saith) I do * not worship those Gods the City worships? Others * have seen me, (and so might *Melitus* if he had * pleaded) sacrifice at common Festivals on the publick Altars; how do I introduce new Deities, * when I profess to be directed in all my Actions * by the Voice of God? They who observe the * Notes of Birds, or Answers of Men, are guided * by the Voice: None doubts of Thunder whether * it be loud or oracular: Doth not the Priests on * the Tripod convey to us by Voice what the God * delivers to her? And that he foreknows Events, * communicating them to whom pleaseth him, all * Men (as well as I) believe and profess: Others * call those that foretell Events, Augurs, Soothsayers, * and Diviners, I the Dæmon, and (I conceive) * more religiously than they who ascribe a divine * Power to Birds: That I am no Impostor herein, * many can attest who have asked my Advice, * and never found it fail. Here there arose a Murmur in the Senate, some not believing, others envying what he said, that he should surpass them in such a particular Favour of the Deity. * Let such * as are incredulous hear this also, to confirm their * Opinion that I am not favoured of the Gods; * when *Chærophon*, in the Presence of many Witnesses, question'd the Delphian Oracle concerning me, *Apollo* answered, that no Man was more free,

* more just, or more wise; (here another Murmur * arose amongst the Judges; he proceeded) yet the * same God said more of *Lycurgus* the *Lacedæmonian* Law-giver, that he knew not whether to call * him a God or a Man; me he compared not with * the Gods, tho' he gave me the Priority amongst * Men. But trust not the God herein, consider me * exactly yourselves; whom know you less a Servant to corporeal Pleasures? whom more free? * I accept not either Rewards or Gifts; who more * just than he who so conforms himself to the present Time, as he needs not the Help of any other; * who will say he deserves not the Title of Wife, * who since he was able, never desisted to learn by * Enquiry all Good possible? And that I took not * this Pains in vain, is evident in that, many Citizens and Strangers studious of Virtue, prefer my * Conversation above all others: What is the Reason, that tho' all Men know I have no Wealth * to requite them, so many desire to oblige me by * Gifts? That I require no Return from any, * yet engage so many? That when the City being * besieged, every one lamented his Condition, I was * no more moved than when it was most flourishing? * That whilst others lay out Money on outward * Things to please themselves, I furnish myself from * within myself with Things that please me better? * If none can disprove what I have said, deserve I * not the Commendations both of Gods and Men? * And yet you *Melitus* pretend that with these Instructions I corrupt Youth; every one knows * what it is to corrupt Youth: Can you name but * one that I of religious have made impious, of modest, impudent, of frugal, prodigal, of sober, debauch'd, of hardy, effeminate, or the like? But I * know those, answered *Melitus*, whom you have * persuaded to be more obedient to you than to their own Parents: That as far as concerns Instruction, * replied *Socrates*, I confess they know to be * my proper Care: For their Health Men obey * Physicians before their Parents, in Law-suits * Counsellors before their Kindred. Do you not in * War prefer the most experienced Soldiers to command before your own Allies? Yes, answers * *Melitus*, 'tis fit we should. And do you think it * Reason, then, replies *Socrates*, if others are preferred for such Things as they are excellent in, * that because in the Opinion of some, I have an * Advantage beyond others in educating Youth, * which is the greatest Benefit amongst Men, I * ought therefore to die? * *Anytus* and *Melitus* * (saith he, addressing himself to the Judges) may * procure my Death, hurt me they cannot: * To * fear Death is to seem wise, and not to be so; for * it is to pretend to understand that which we understand not: No Man knows what Death is, * whether it be not the greatest Happiness that can

* Liban. Apol. t. 1. u Cic. de divin. 1. w Cic. de divin. 1. x Socratic, Epist. 14. y Plat. Apol. z Cic. de Orat. 1.
a Xenoph. Apol. b Plut. de trans. anim. c Plut. de consol. ad Apol.

‘ arrive to a Man, and yet all fear and shun it as if
‘ they were sure it were the greatest Misfortune.

This and more (saith *Xenophon*) was said both by himself and his Friends, but the Judges were so little pleased with his unusual Manner of Pleading, that ^d as *Plato* went up into the Chair, and began a Speech in these Words, *Tho’ I, Athenians, am the youngest of those that come up in this Place, they all cried out, of those that go down, which he thereupon was constrained to do, and they proceeding to vote, Socrates was cast by 281 Voices; it was the Custom of Athens, as Cicero observes, when any one was cast, if the Fault were not capital, to impose a pecuniary Mulct; when the Judges had voted in that Manner, the guilty Person was asked the highest Rate whereat he estimated his Offence; the Judges willing to favour Socrates, propounded that Demand to him, he answered 25 (or as *Eubulides* saith, 100 Drachms, nor would he suffer ^e his Friends, *Plato, Crito, Critobolus and Apollodorus* (who desired him to estimate it at 50 *Minae*, promising to undertake the Sum) to pay any Thing for him, saying, that to pay a Penalty, was to own an Offence, and telling the Judges that (for what he stood accused) he deserved the highest Honours and Rewards, and daily Sustainance at the publick Charge out of the *Prytaneum*, which was the greatest Honour that was amongst the *Grecians*; with this Answer the Judges were so exasperated, that they condemned him to Death by eighty Votes more.*

^f The Sentence being past, he could not forbear smiling, and turning to his Friends, saith thus, they who have suborned false Witnesses against me, and they who have born such Testimonies, are doubtless, conscious to themselves of great Impiety and Injustice; but as for me, what should more deject me now than before I was condemned, being nothing the more guilty; they could not prove I named any new Gods for *Jupiter, Juno*, and the rest, or swore by such. How did I corrupt young Men, by insuring them to Sufferance and Frugality? Of capital Offences, as Sacrilege, Theft, and Treason, my very Adversaries acquit me; which makes me wonder how I come to be condemned to die; yet that I die unjustly will not trouble me, it is not a Reproach to me, but to those who condemned me; I am much satisfied with the Example of *Palamedes*, who suffered Death in the like Manner; he is much more commended than *Ulysses* the procurer of his Death; I know how future and past Times will witness, I never hurt or injured any, but on the contrary have advantaged all that conversed with me to my utmost Ability, communicating what Good I could, gratis. This said, he went away, his Carriage answerable to his Words,

his Eyes, Gesture, and Gate expressing much cheerfulness.

CHAP. XII.

His Imprisonment.

Socrates (saith ^h *Sensae*) with the same resolved Look wherewith he singly opposed the thirty Tyrants, entered the Prison, and took away all Ignominy from the Place, which could not be a Prison whilst he was there. Here (ⁱ being fettered by the eleven Officers) he continued ^k thirty Days after he was condemned upon this Occasion. ^l The Ship which carried *Theseus* and fourteen more Persons into *Crete*; he vowed, if they got safe home, as it fortuneed they did) to dedicate to *Apollo*, and to send it every Year with a Present to *Delos*, which Custom the *Athenians* religiously observed; before the Solemnity, they used to lustrate their City, and all condemned Persons were relieved till it returned from *Delos*, which sometimes, the Wind not serving, was a long Time. The Priest of *Apollo* began the Solemnity, by crowning the Poop of the Ship, which happening the Day before *Socrates* was condemned, occasioned his lying in Prison so long after.

In this Interval he was visited by his Friends, with whom he past the Time in Dispute after his usual Manner; he was often solicited by them to an Escape, some of them offered to carry him away by Force, which he not only refused but derided, asking, if they knew any Place out of *Attica* whither Death could not come? ^m *Crito*, two Days before his Death, came very early in the Morning to him to the same Purpose, having by his frequent Visits and Gifts gained some Interest in the Jaylor, but finding him asleep, sat still by him, admiring in the Soundness of his Sleep, the happy Equality of his Mind; as soon as he waked, he told him that he came to bring sad News, if not such to him, yet to all his Friends, that the Ship would certainly be at home to-morrow at furthest (some that came from *Suniam* affirming they had left it there) but that in all Likelihood it would come that Day, and he should die the next. In good Time he it, answered *Socrates*, but I do not believe it will come to-day, for the Day following I must die, as they say who have the Power in their Hands; but that I shall not die to-morrow, but the Day after, I guess by a Dream I had this Night, that a Woman very beautiful, in a white Garment, saluted me by my Name, saying,

*Thou, ere three Days are told,
Rich Phthia shalt behold.*

(The same Relation, according to *Laertius* ⁿ, he

^d Laert. 2. 47.
^k Xen. memor. 4.

^e Xenoph.
^l Plat. Phaed.

^f Plat. Apol.
^m Plat. Crit.

^g Xenoph. Apol.
ⁿ Laert. 2. 35.

^h Consolat. ad Helv. 14.

ⁱ Maxim. Tyr. Dissert. 39.

made to *Alcibiades* this Occasion *Crito* took to persuade him to save himself, which he prest with many Arguments; 'That his Friends would be accused of Covetousness, as more desirous to spare their Wealth than to redeem him; that it might be effected with little Trouble and Expence to them who were provided for it; that himself was rich enough to do it, or if not, *Simmias*, *Cebes*, and others would join with him; that he ought not voluntarily to thrust himself into Destruction, when he might avoid it; that he should leave his Children in an uncertain mean Estate; that it would not be construed Contfancy, but want of Courage. Consider well these Reasons, saith he, or rather (for it is now no Time to stand considering) be persuaded, what is to be done must be done this Night, or it will be too late. *Socrates* answered, that his cheerful Readiness to relieve him was much to be esteemed, if agreeable to Justice, otherwise, the less just, the more blameable: That Opinion and Censure ought not to be regarded, but Truth and Equity; that Wrong must not be requited with Wrong; that Faith should be kept more strictly with a City than with private Persons; that he had voluntarily subjected himself to the Laws of his Country, by living under their Government, and to violate them at last, were great Injustice. That by breaking Prison, he should not only draw his Friends into many Inconveniencies, but himself also into many Dangers, only to live and die in Exile; that in such a Condition, he should be nothing more capable to bring up his Children well, but dying honestly, his Friends would take the more Care of them; that whatsoever Inconvenience might ensue, nothing was to be preferred before Justice; that if he should escape by Treachery, the Remainder of his Life would be never the more happy, nor himself after Death better entertained in the next World. These Things (saith he) I hear like the *Corymbian* Pipes, the Sound of these Words makes me deaf to every Thing else; therefore, whatever you shall say to the contrary, will be to no Purpose; but if you have any other Business, speak. *Crito* answering, he had not any else; as for this then (concludes he) speak no more of it, let us go the Way which God points out to us.

CHAP. XIII.

The Time and Manner of his Death.

THE Time of *Socrates* Death is formerly touched; the Marble at *Arundel-House* saith, he died when *Laches* was Archon, aged seventy Years, which (according to *Plato*) were complete, for he saith *quod idem est*. • *Demetrius Pha-*

lorius saith, he died the first Year of the ninety fifth Olympiad, having lived seventy Years. • *Diadorus Siculus* avers, it was done in that Year, *Laches* being Archon.

Altho' there be not any Thing in the *Greek* Story settled by better Authority, than the Years of *Socrates*; *Leo Allatius* with much Confidence, and little Reason, controverts the received Chronology of his Life and Death, the Occasion is this; the fourteenth of the *Socratick* Epistles published by him, mentioneth an Oration of *Polycrates*, as spoken at the Arraignment of *Socrates*; but the Walls of *Athens* repaired by *Canon* six Years after the Death of *Socrates*, being spoken of in that Oration, the Epistle is thereby rendered suspicious. The Truth seems to be this; after the Death of *Socrates*, it became an ordinary Theme in the Schools of Rhetorick (which was at that Time much studied at *Athens*) to speak for and against *Socrates*. *Polycrates*, a Sophister, to exercise his Wit, wrote an Inveictive. *Lylius*, a famous Orator, who died about the hundredth Olympiad, had written (as we have already said) an Apologetic, which is by the Scholiast of *Aristides* cited in answer to *Polycrates*. Apologies were in like manner written by *Plato*, *Xenophon*, and (long after by) *Libanius*; altho' *Isocrates* admonished *Polycrates* of certain Errors in his Oration against *Socrates*, yet the Anachronism continued, for Chronology was not yet studied in *Athens*; and thence it is that *Plato* himself is in that Respect so much reprehended by *Athenaus*, *Aristides*, *Macrobius*, and others: The Writer of the *Socratic* Epistle admits *Polycrates* as the Accuser at the Trial, and the Oration as then and there spoken, so also doth *Hermippus* whom *Laertius* cites to the same Effect; but *Phavorinus*, a Critick of later Times, when Chronology was more exact, detects the Error by Computation of Times. *Allatius* will by no Means have the Criticism of *Phavorinus* allowed, and labours to introduce an Uncertainty of the Time, to the End he may persuade that *Socrates* lived beyond the Reparation of the Walls of *Athens*. The great Engine wherewith he labours to demolish all that hath been asserted by the Ancients, is the Testimony of *Suidas*, who (I know not upon what Authority) saith, he lived eighty Years: His smaller Artillery are the groundless Emendation of *Maurusius*, and the Mistake of *Scaliger* before noted; the absurd Metachronism of the *Chronicon Alexandrinum*, which makes *Socrates* die in the one hundred and fourth Olympiad, and in the ninetieth Year of his Age; the Anistority of the unknown Writers of *Aristotle's* Life, who supposeth him in the seventeenth Year of his Age, to have heard *Socrates* three Years, and which is most ridiculous, the notorious Anachronisms of *Plato* must serve as irresistible Arguments to im-

pugn the Truth. With these Proofs, in the philosophical Disguise of a Dialogue, he endeavours to puzzle the unwary Reader.

The Manner of his Death receive from *Plato* in the Person of *Phædo* an Eye-witness; 'Every Day (saith he) I went with other Friends of his to visit him; we met in the Court where he was tried, it being near the Prison; where we entertained ourselves with Discourse till the Prison was opened, then went in unto him and spent many Times the whole Day with him. But that Day we met sooner than ordinary, for the Evening before as we came out of the Prison, we heard the Ship was come from *Delos*, and thereupon we appointed to meet early the next Morning at the usual Place, where being come, the Porter came out to us, and told us that we must stay a While before we could be admitted, for the eleven Officers were there taking off his Fetters, having brought him Word that he must die to-day: Not long after he came out again, and told us we might go in, where, when we came, we found *Socrates*'s Fetters newly taken off, and *Xantippe* sitting by him with a Child in her Arms; she, as soon as she saw us, burst forth into Tears, and cried out, Ah, *Socrates*, this is the last Time thy Friends shall ever speak to thee, or thou to them. *Crito* (saith *Socrates*, addressing himself to him) let some Body carry her home; whereupon some of *Crito*'s Servants led her away exclaiming, and beating her Breast. *Socrates* who was sitting upon the Bed, drew up his Leg and rubbed it, saying the whilst, how strange a Thing, Friends, is that which Men call Pleasure, how near a-kin to Pain, to which it seems so contrary? They arrive not indeed together, but he that takes one, is immediately overtaken by the other, as if they were tied together: If *Æsop* had observed this, certainly he would have made some Fable of it, as if God willing to compose their Difference, had joined them by the End, not being able to make them absolutely one; so that whosoever hath one, must straight have the other also, as it happens to me at this Time, the Pain my Fetters even now gave me, is now turned to a Kind of Pleasure, and tickles me. You have opportunely (saith *Cebes*) put me in Mind to ask, why, since your Imprisonment (which you never did before) you have writ Poems, a Hymn to *Apollon*, and *Æsop*'s Fables rendered into Verse; many have questioned me about it, particularly *Eucelus*; if he repeat this Demand, what Answer shall I give him? Tell him (answers *Socrates*) that truly I did it not to contend with him and his Verses, but to comply with a Dream (which I have had more than once) enjoining me to practise Musick; in Obedience whereunto I first made Verses in Honour of the God whose Feast this was; then, conceiving it essential to a Poet

to write Fictions, which of myself I use not, I made Use of some of *Æsop*'s, which I had in Memory, as they first came into Fancy; tell *Eucelus* this, and bid him from me farewell, and if he be wise, follow me, for it seems I must go hence to-day, the *Athenians* have so ordered it. What is that, said *Simmius*, which you bid *Eucelus* do? I have often conversed with him, but, as far as I understand him, he will not be at all ready to be rul'd by you. What, saith he, is he not a Philosopher? He seems so, answers *Simmius*; then he will (replied *Socrates*) and so will all who deserve that Name; but perhaps he will not lay violent Hands upon himself, that is not lawful. And as he was speaking thus, he set down his Leg again to the Ground, and sitting so, continued all the rest of the Dispute. Then *Cebes* asking why, how it could be that it should be prohibited to ones self, yet that a Philosopher ought to desire to follow a dying Person? He answered, Men are the Possessions of God, would you not be angry if your Slave should kill himself against your Will, and if it were in your Power punish him? We must expect a Summons from God, an inevitable Necessity (such as I have at this Time) to take us hence. This is Truth, replied *Cebes*, but what you asserted even now is inconsistent with it; God taking Care of us as his Possessions, can a wise Man desire to be out of his Protection? He cannot think to mend his Condition by freeing himself from so excellent a Government. *Socrates* seemed much pleased with the Subtlety of *Cebes*, and turning to us said, *Cebes* is always inquisitive, nor will easily admit any Thing: To me, said *Simmius*, what he hath said seems Reason, how can wise Men endure, much less endeavour to part with those that are so much better than themselves? But *Cebes* here-in reflects upon you, who are so ready to leave us, and the Gods whom you acknowledge good Governors: You say well, answers *Socrates*, I suppose you would have me answer as in a Court of Judicature; by all Means, saith *Simmius*; well then, replies he, I will endeavour to defend myself better against you than I did before the Judges. Truly, did I not believe I should go to just Gods, and to Men better than any living, I were inexcusable for contemning Death; but I am sure to go to the Gods, very good Masters, and hope to meet with good Men, and am of good Courage, hoping that something of Man subsists after Death, and that it is then much better with the Good than with the Bad. Here *Crito* interrupting him, told him that he who was to administer the Poison, advised him to speak little, and not heat himself with Dispute, for it agreed not with that Kind of Poison, which some neglecting, had been constrained to take it two or three Times. Mind him not, said *Socrates*, let him provide as much

'as may serve twice or thrice, if Need be.' Then he proceeded in a large Discourse, to declare that the chief Office of a Philosopher is to meditate on Death; therefore he ought not to fear the Approach of it; That as Death is the Solution of the Soul from the Body, so is it the Office of a Philosopher to free the Soul from corporeal Affections; that if we understand the better, the more the Soul is disengaged from Sense, we shall understand most perfectly when she is wholly freed from the Body by Death, which Perfection of Knowledge is the sole End of Philosophy.

This Part of the Discourse ended, *Cebes* occasions the renewing of it, by the desiring him to prove the Immortality of the Soul, which he doth, first from the necessary Succession of Generation and Corruption as Contraries, the Ground of the *Pythagorean* Transmigration; next, from the Soul's Manner of Reasoning, which being only by Reminiscence, argues it had a Being before the Body (when it had perfect Knowledge of those Ideas which upon occasion of sensible Objects it recovers) and constantly shall subsist after it. Much more is spoken by *Plato* under his Name, whereof almost all is manifestly *Plato's* own, nor is it possible to select that which is not from the rest; the Conclusion of his Discourse (as contracted by *Cicero*) was, 'That there are two Ways, and a twofold Course of Souls when they go out of the Body: For such as have defiled themselves with human Vices, given over to Pleasures wherewith they are blinded, according as they are polluted with domestick Sins, or have used inexpressible Deceits to wrong the Publick, take a By-way, secluded from the Counsel of the Gods: But they who have preserved themselves intire and chaste from the least Contagion of their Bodies, having always withdrawn themselves from them, and in human Flesh imitated the Lives of Gods, find a ready Way open for them, leading them to those from whom they came. And as Swans are (not without Reason) sacred to *Apollo*, because they seem to have learned Divination from him, whereby foreseeing the Good that is in Death, they die with Songs and Delight; so ought all good and knowing Persons to do.' Let every one therefore prepare for this Journey against the Time that Fate shall call him away; you *Simmias*, *Cebes*, and the rest here present, shall go at your appointed Hour, me Fate now summons (as the Tragedian saith) and perhaps it is Time that I go into the Bath, for I think it best to wash before I take the Poison, that I may save the Women the Labour of washing me when I am dead.

'When he had made an End of speaking, *Crito* asked him what Directions he would leave concerning his Sons and other Affairs; and if they

could do any Thing that might be acceptable to him? I desire no more (saith he) than what I have often told you, if you take Care of yourselves, whatsoever you do will be acceptable to me and mine, tho' you promise nothing; if you neglect yourselves and Virtue, you can do nothing acceptable to us, tho' you promise never so much; that, answered *Crito*, we shall observe; but how will you be buried? As you think good, saith he, if you can catch me, and that I give you not the Slip. Then with a Smile applying himself to us, I cannot persuade *Crito*, saith he, that I am any Thing more than the Carcase you will anon behold, and therefore he takes this Care for my Interment; it seems that what even now I told him, that as soon as I have taken the Poison, I shall go to the Joys of the Blessed, hath been to little Purpose; he was my Bail, bound to the Judges for my Appearance, you must now be my Sureties to him that I am departed; let him not say that *Socrates* is carried to the Grave, or laid under Ground, for know, dear *Crito*, such a Mistake were a Wrong to my Soul; be not dejected; tell the World my Body only is buried, and that after what Manner thou pleasest. This said, he arose and retired into an inward Room, taking *Crito* with him, leaving us discoursing upon our own Misery, shortly to be deprived like Orphans of so dear a Father. After his Bathing, came his Wife, and the other Women of his Family with his Sons, two of them Children, one a Youth; when he had taken Order with these about his domestick Affairs, he dismissed them and came out to us.

'It was now Sun-set (for he had staid long within) when the Officer entered, and after a little Pause said, I have not, *Socrates*, observed that Carriage in you which I have found in others, but as I thought you the most generous, the mildest and best of all Men that ever came into this Place, so I now see you hate me not for that whereof others are the Cause; you know the Message I bring, farewell; bear what you cannot remedy. With that he departed weeping; and fare thee well, (said *Socrates*) I will: How civil is this Man? I found him the same all the Time of my Imprisonment, he would often visit me, discourse with me, used me always courteously, and now see how kindly he weeps for me. But come, *Crito*, let us do as he bids us, if the Poison be ready, let it be brought in. The Sun is yet scarce set, answers *Crito*. Others take it late after a plentiful Supper and full Cups; make not so much Hast, there is Time enough. He replies, they who do so think they gain Time, but what shall I gain by drinking it late? Only deceive myself as covetous of Life, and sparing of that which is no longer mine;

pray, let it be as I say. Then *Crito* sent one of the Attendants, who immediately returned, and with him the Man that was to administer the Poison, bringing a Cup in his Hand; to whom *Socrates*, Pr'ythee honest Friend (for thou art well versed in these Businesses) what must I do? Nothing; said he, but as soon as you have drunk, walk till you find your Legs begin to fail, then lie down, and in so saying he gave him the Cup; *Socrates* took it cheerfully, not changing either Countenance or Colour, and looking pleasantly upon him, demanded whether he might spill any of it in Libation, who answered, he had made no more than would just serve; yet, saith *Socrates*, I may pray to God, and will, that my Passage hence may be happy, which I beseech him to grant, and in the same Instant drank it off easily without any Disturbance; many of us, who till now had refrained from Tears, when we saw him put the Cup to his Mouth and drink off the Poison, were not able to contain any longer; which *Socrates* observing, *Friends* (saith he) *what mean you?* For this Reason I sent away the Women lest they should be so unquiet: I have heard we should die with Gratulation and Applause, be quiet then and take it patiently; These Words made us with Shame suppress our Tears; when he had walked a while, perceiving his Legs to fail, he lay down on his Back as the Executioner directed him, who looking on his Feet pinched them hard, asked him if he felt it, he answered no, he did the like to his Legs, and shewing us how every Part successively grew cold and stiff, told us when that Chills came at his Heart he would die; not long after he spake these his last Words, O *Crito*, I owe *Aesculapius* a Cock, pay it, neglected it not. It shall be done, saith *Crito*; will you have any Thing else? He made no Answer, lay still a while, then stretching himself forth; with that the Executioner uncovered him, his Eyes were set, *Crito* closed them. This (saith *Plato*) was the End of the best, the wisest, and most just of Men. A Story which *Cicero* professeth he never read without Tears.

Aristotle saith, that a *Magus* coming from *Syria* to *Athens*, not only reprehended *Socrates* for many Things, but foretold him also that he should die a violent Death. *Laertius* closeth his Life with this Epigram,

*Drink Socrates with Jove, next whom enthron'd,
By Gods, and Wisdom's self as wisest own'd.
Thee, the Athenians gave a poisonous Draught,
But first the same they from thy Lips had quoff'd.*

C H A P. XIV.

What happened after his Death.

HE was buried with Tears and much Solemnity, (contrary to his own Direction) by his Friends, amongst whom the excessive Grief of *Plato* is observed by *Plutarch*, and the Mourning Habit of *Isocrates*: As soon as they had performed that last Service, fearing the Cruelty of the Tyrants, they stole out of the City, the greater Part to *Megara* to *Euclid*, where they were kindly received, the rest to other Parts.

Soon after, a *Lacedaemonian* Youth, who had never more Acquaintance with *Socrates* than what Fame gave him, took a Journey to *Athens*, intending to become his Disciple; being come as far as the City Gates, and ready to enter, with Joy to be so near the End at which he aimed, instead of *Socrates*, he met there the News of his Death, whereat he was so troubled, that he would not go within the City Gates, but enquiring the Place where he was buried, went thither, and breaks forth into a passionate Discourse, accompanied with many Tears, to the enclosed dead Body; when Night was come, he fell asleep upon the Sepulchre; the next Morning, affectionately kissing the Dust that lay upon it, and with much Passion taking Leave of the Place, he returned to *Megara*.

Suidas tells a like Story, (for that there were, more Examples than one in this Kind, *Libanius* implies) of a *Cibian* named *Cyrfas*, who coming to *Athens* to hear *Socrates*, went to his Tomb, and slept there, to whom *Socrates* appeared in a Dream, and discoursed with him; with which only Satisfaction he went directly home again.

By these Accidents the *Athenians* were awakened into a Sense of their Injustice, considering they were obnoxious to the Censure of the *Lacedaemonians* by extraordinary Crimes, whose Children were so affectionate to the Philosophers whom they had murdered, as to take such long Journeys to see *Socrates*, whom they would not keep when he was with them; heretofore became so exasperated, that they were ready to tear those wicked Men that were the Occasion of his Death piece-meal with their Teeth, the whole City cried out, they disclaimed the Act, and that the Authors thereof ought to be put to Death. *Antisthenes* furthered their Rage by this Means, *Some young Men* of *Pontus* invited to *Athens* by the Fame of *Socrates*, met with *Antisthenes*, who carried them to *Anytus*, telling them he was much wiser than *Socrates*; whereupon those that were present, with much Indignation turned

p De Nat. Deor. l. 3.
socrat. Epist. 17.

q Laert. 2. 45.
w Laert. vit. Aristot.

r Plat. de virt. mor. Plat. vit. deo Ont.

s Liban. Apol.

t Strab. Epist. 17.

Anytus out of the City. Thence he went to *Heraclæa*, where some say the Citizens also expelled him, others * that they stoned him to Death. *Melitus* was by the *Athenians* condemned and put to Death, others * affirm = the like of all his Accusers without Trial. * *Plutarch*, that they so much hated them, as they would not suffer them to kindle Fire at their Hearths, they would not answer them any Question, they would not wash with them, but threw away the Water they had touched as impure, until unable to brook this Hatred, they hanged themselves.

In further Testimony of their Penitence, they called home his Friends to their former Liberty of meeting; they forbade publick Spectacles of Games and wrestling for a Time; they caused his Statue, made in Brass by *Lyfippus*, to be set up in the *Pompæum*; and (a Plague ensuing, which they imputed to the Injustice of this Act) they made an Order, that no Man should mention *Socrates* publickly, or on the Theatre, that so they might forget what they had done. *Euripides* (restrained by this Order from doing it directly) reproached them overtly in a Tragedy named *Palamedes* (in whom he alluded to *Socrates*) particularly in these Verses.

*A Philomele, ne'er Mischief knew,
Is slain, alas! is slain by you.*

At which Words, all the Spectators understanding they were meant of *Socrates*, fell a weeping.

The Death of this sole Person (saith * *Eunapius*) brought a general Calamity upon the City; for it may easily be collected by Computation of Times, that from thenceforward the Athenians did nothing considerable, but the City, by Degrees, decayed, and with it all Greece.

CHAP. XV.

Of his Person and Virtues.

AS to his Person, he was * very unhandsome, of a melancholy Complexion, * bald, * a flat Nose, Eyes sticking out, a severe down-cast Look, difficult in Speech, and * too concise; his Language rough and careless, but more efficacious than all the Eloquence of *Themistocles*, *Pericles*, or any other; so acute, that he could maintain either Side in any Question, therefore is reproached by *Aristophanes*, as having two Languages, whereof one was to defend Wrong; fervent in Dispute; often so transported, that he would beat himself, and tear his Beard, to the Deniall of the Standers-by, which

he took quietly: Patient to be redargued. * Sometimes he covered his Face in Discourse, that he might not be diverted by any Object of Sight: * His Constitution strong and hardy, * which he preserved such, by taking diligent Care of his Health; * well bearing Cold, Hunger, and upon Occasion, Excess of Wine without Disturbance; * his Habit the same in Winter as in Summer, having but one Garment a Year; * no Shoes; his Diet sparing. In fine, his Countenance promised so little, that * *Zopyrus*, a Physiognomist, who undertook to discover the Dispositions of Men by their Looks, said he was stupid, because there were Obstructions in his jugular Parts; adding he was given to Women, and many other Vices; whereat *Alcibiades*, and other Friends of his that were present, knowing him free from those Imputations, fell a laughing; but *Socrates* justified his Skill, answering, He was by Nature prone to those Vices, but suppressed his Inclinations by Reason; whence * *Alcibiades* used to say, he resembled the Image of *Silvius*; * (as he did indeed in his Countenance, Baldness, and flat Nose) carved on the outside of little Boxes, sitting and playing on a Pipe; for as those Boxes within held Images of the Gods, so was he adorned with Chastity, Integrity, and all inward Beauty; ravished, as * *Plutarch* saith, with a divine Zeal to Virtue, in all Kinds whereof *Xenophon*, *Laertius*, and others, assert these Instances.

* He was so wise, that he never erred in judging betwixt better and worse, nor therefore needed any other Help; yet he constantly profess'd, that he only knew that he knew nothing; * for which Reason he was, by the Oracle of *Apollo* at *Delphi*, declared of all Men the most wise, in this manner, to *Chærephon*, many Witnesses being present.

* Wife *Sophocles*, wiser *Euripides*,
But wisest of all Men is *Socrates*.

* *Apollo* (saith *Cicero*) conceiving the only Wisdom of Mankind to consist in not thinking themselves to know those Things whereof they are ignorant. * This Oracle, though he were nothing exalted with it himself, procured him much Envy.

* He was so religious, that he never did any Thing without advising first with the Gods; * never was known to attempt or speak any Impiety.

* He bare a Reverence to the Gods; not human, but such as transcended the greatest Fear. * Some say it was out of his great Reverence to the Divinity that he used to swear by a * (Cock) a Dog, and a

* *Themist. Orat. 2.* y *Laert. 2. 43.* s *Diog. Sic. 14. Socratic. Epist.* a *De laud. & odio.* b *Tai sñi λαιώνες αἰφύρε :*
For *patres* seems to have been some Glaze to explain *αἰφύρε*. So *Callimachus. Epigr. Al Ni vna* (seems) *αἰφύρε*. c *De laud. & odio.* d *Plat. Phaed.*
Thucyd. e *Schol. Aristoph.* f *Plat. Phaed. Theomet.* g *Plat. Protag.* h *Plat. Phaed.* i *San. Epist. 1. 103.* j *Xenoph.*
mem. 1. Laert. 2. 92. k *Plat. Sympo.* l *Sanct. Epist. 6. Libani.* m *Plat. Phaed.* n *Cicero. Tusculan. 5. de fin.* o *Plat.*
conviv. q *Schol. Aristoph. p. 124.* r *Aristot. Colot.* s *Xenoph. mem. 1. 4.* t *Plat. apert. Apol. Libani. Apolog.* u *Schol.*
diodor. v *Academ. Acad. 1.* x *Laert. 2. 36.* y *Xen. mem. 4. pag. 818.* z *Xen. mem. 1. p. 710.* a *Plat. Phaed.*
b *Said.* c *Schol. Aristoph.*

Plain Tree, (under which they used to sit) though it were interpreted Atheism.

^a *He was constant, and a Lover of the Publick Good; as appears in his acquitting the ten Captains, in his denying thirty Tyrants to fetch Leon in, his refusing to escape out of Prison, and reproving such as grieved for his Death.* ^b *Xantippe used to say, that when the State was oppress'd with a thousand Miseries, he always went abroad and came home with the same Look, never more cheerful, or more troubled; for he bore a Mind smooth and cheerful upon all Occasions; far remote from Grief, and above all Fear. In his declining Age, falling sick, he was asked by one that came to visit him, how he did? Very well (saith he) either Way; if I live, I shall have more Emulation; if I die, more Praise.*

^c *He was so temperate, that he never preferred that which is pleasant before that which is wholesome. He never did eat more than Appetite (which was his Sauce) made delightful; all Drink was pleasing to him, because he never drank but when he was thirsty, and then with such temperate Caution, that he poured out the first Draught of Water upon the Ground; and if he were at any time invited to a Feast, he, which to others is very difficult, with much Ease took Care not to eat more than consisted with his Health, whereof he was very careful, because the Exercises of the Soul depend thereon; and in order thereto, used to walk constantly before Meals; whereupon, being asked by one that observed it, what he did? I get Sauce, saith he, for my Supper. To this Temperance it is imputed, though ^d *Athens* were often in his Time visited with the Pestilence, he alone escaped it.*

^e *He was so frugal, that how little soever he had, it was always enough.* ^f *Wanting the Means to live splendidly, he taught not anxiously how to acquire more, but how to accommodate his Manner of Life to that which he had, wherewith he was so contented, that he affirmed himself to come nearest the Gods, because he wanted least. Seeing the great Variety of Things expos'd to Sale, he would say to himself, *How many Things there are that I need not; and often had in his Mouth these Verses.**

*Purple, which Gold and Gems adorn,
Is by Tragedians to be worn.*

^g *Alcibiades, ambitiously munificent, sent him many great Presents; Xantippe admiring their Value, desired him to accept them: *Woe* (answered Socrates) will consist in Liberality with Alcibiades,*

not accepting, by a kind of Munificence, what he hath sent us.

^h *To the same, who offered him a large Plot of Ground to build an House upon: And if I wanted Shoes, (saith he) would you give me Leather to make them? But deserve I not to be derided, if I accept-d it?*

ⁱ *He slighted Archelaus King of Macedonia, and Scopas Son of Cranonias, and Eurilocus Son of Larisaeus, not accepting their Money, nor going to them. Archelaus sending to him to desire his Company, he said, *He would not go to one from whom he should receive Benefits, which he could not equal with Return.* To Perdiccas, who demanded why he would not come to him, he answered, *Left I die the most ignoble Death; that is, left I receive a Benefit which I cannot requite.**

^j *Coming home late one Night from a Feast, some wild young Men knowing of his Return, lay in wait for him, attired like Furies, with Vizards and Torches, whereby they used to affright such as they met; Socrates, as soon as he saw them, nothing troubled, made a Stand, and fell to questioning them, according to his usual Manner, as if he had been in the Lyceum, or Academy.*

^k *He despised those that cavilled at him.* ^l *Being told that such an one had reviled him behind his Back; Let him beat me; saith he, whilst I am not by: And that another spoke ill of him; He hath not yet learnt, said he, to speak well.*

^m *Being kicked by an insolent young Fellow, and seeing those that were with him much incensed, ready to pursue him, he said, What if an Ass kick me, would you have me kick again, or sue him? But the Fellow escaped not unpunished, for every one reproached him for this Insolence, and called him the Reviler; so that at last, for Vexation, he hanged himself.*

ⁿ *Another striking him a Box on the Year, he said no more, but that it was hard a Man knew not when to go abroad with a Helmet.*

^o *Another fell upon him with much Violence, which he endured without the least Disturbance, suffering him to vent his Anger; which he did so long, till he made his Face all swelled and bruised.*

^p *Whosoever he perceived himself to grow incensed with any of his Friends,*

*Before the Storm arose,
He to the Harbour goes.*

He used to moderate his Voice, to look smilingly and moderately upon them, reserving himself untainted with Passion, by Recourse to the contrary.

d Laert. 2. 24. e Aelian. V. H. g. 7. Cic. Tusc. quest. 3. Offic. 1. f Plin. 7. 19. g Xenoph. mem. 4. 818. h Plot. de Garrul. i Xen. mem. 1. p. 712. k Aelian. 13. 27. l Xenoph. mem. 711. m Liban. 1. n Laert. 2. 25. o Aelian. 9. 29. p Laert. 2. 24. q Laert. 2. 25. r Senec. de benefic. 5. 6. s Anton. vit. lib. 11. t Aelian. g. 29. u Laert. 2. 26. v Sen. 53. x Laert. 2. 10. y Plot. de educ. liber. z Senec. de ira. l. 3. a D. Basil. b Plot. de ira. c. 10. c H.

* He *was* not such as conversed with him to be covetous, for he took no Money of his Scholars, therein expressing his own Liberality.

* Hunger or Want could never force him to flatter any; yet was he very complaisant and facetious in Company. As he one Day openly at Dinner reproved one of his Friends something harshly. Plato said to him, *Had not this been better told in private?* Socrates immediately answered, *And had not you done better, if you had told me so in private?* * Being demanded what Countryman he was? he answered, Neither of Athens, nor Greece, but of the World. Sometimes he would feast in a fine Robe, as Plato describes him; and when the Time allowed, learned to sing, saying, *It was no Shame to learn any Thing which one knew not*: He also danced every Day, conceiving that Exercise healthful; nor was he ashamed to play with little Children.

* He was so just, that he never in the least wronged any Man, but, on the contrary, benefited all such as conversed with him, as much as he could.

* His Continence was invincible. He despised the Beauty of Alcibiades, derided Theodora and Calista, two eminent Courtizans of that Time.

* He took great Delight in the Conversation of good Men; to such he communicated whatsoever he knew; with them he studied the Writings of the ancient wise Men, selecting what was good out of them (which confirms what was said before in the Life of Solon, that Moral Philosophy was commenced by the Sophists) and esteemed this mutual Friendship which he contracted with them above all Treasure. * Towards this his outward Endeavour was so affected and desired by them, as much as he affected and desired them.

CHAP. XVI.

His Wives and Children.

HE had two Wives; the first Xantippe, a Citizen's Daughter of Athens, as Theodoret affirms, who adds, that she was dishonest before he married her, even with himself, besides others: * Athenæus also saith, that after he was married, he lent her to a Friend, and that Alcibiades lay with her. But Aristoxenus, and Porphyrius, from whom these Aspersions are derived, have been noted of too much Malignity, to be of any Authority.

She was (according to the Character * A. Gellius gives her) curst, froward, chiding and scolding all ways, both Day and Night; * and for that Reason he chose her, as he professes to Antiphones, from observing, that they who would be excellent in Horsemanship, chose the roughest Horses, knowing, if they are able to manage them, they may easily rule

others. He, desirous to use much Conversation with Men, took her to Wife, knowing, if he could bear with her, he might easily converse with all Men. To Alcibiades, who said, her Scolding was intolerable, he professes it was nothing to him, being used to it; like such as live in the continual Noise of a Mill. Besides, saith he, *cannot you endure the racking of Hens?* But they (answered Alcibiades) bring me Eggs and Chickens: And my Xantippe, (replies Socrates) Children.

Of her Impatience, and his Sufferance, there are several Instances. * One Day, before some of his Friends, she fell into the usual Extravagancies of her Passion; whereupon, he not answering any Thing, went forth with them, but was no sooner out at the Door, when the running up into the Chamber, threw down Water upon his Head; whereat, turning to his Friends, *Did I not tell you* (saith he) *that after so much Thunder we should have Rain?*

* Another Time, she pulled his Cloak off from his Shoulders in the open Forum; some Friends present counselled him to bear her. Yes, saith he, *that whilst we Two fight, you may all stand by and cry, Well done Socrates, To him Xantippe.*

To some other Story of the same kind, * Antoninus alludes in these Words; *How Socrates looked when he was fain to gird himself with a Skin, Xantippe having taken his Cloaths away, and carried them forth with her, and what he said to his Friends, who out of a modest Respectfulness, went back, seeing him so attired.*

* Having brought Euthydæmus from the *Palæstræ*, to dine with him, Xantippe running to the Table, angry, overturned it; Euthydæmus, much troubled, rose up, and would have gone away, when Socrates; *Did not a Hen the other Day*, saith he, *the very same Thing at your House, yet I was not angry therewith?*

* Alcibiades having sent him a curious March-pane, Xantippe (furiously, as her Manner was) threw it out of the Basket, and trod upon it; whereat Socrates laughing, *And shall not you* (saith he) *lose your Share in it?*

* Another Time, she offered to go to a publick Show, attired undecently; *Take heed* (saith he) *you be not rather the Spectacle than the Spectator.*

* With Reason thereof he said, *I had three Evils, Grammar, Poetry, and an ill Wife; two I have shaken off, but my ill Wife I cannot.*

His other Wife was named Myrto, * Niece to Lyfimachus Daughter of Aristides, not the Just, as * Laertius, and from him Suidas affirms, but another of that Name, the Third from him, as is observed by * Athenæus; for the two Daughters of

c Xenoph. memor. r. d Laert. 2. 28. e Plat. de exil. f Senec. de tranquill. g Xenoph. memor. 4. p. 818. h Quintil. 8.
4. i Xen. memor. 3. k Xenoph. mem. 2. p. 752. l Theod. Therapent. 12. m Athen. l. 5. n l. 17. o Laert. 2. 37.
p Laert. ibid. q Laert. 8. 37. r Lib. 2. 26. s Plat. de iust. coh. t Aelian. var. hist. 11. 12. u Aelian 7. 10. Stob. 124.
w Stob. 183. x Theodoret. Therap. 12. y Laert. 2. 26. z Athen. l. 13.

Aristides the Just, could not but be of great Age before the 77th Olympiad, wherein *Socrates* was born, long before which Time, *Aristides* died an old Man in Exile; for that *Themistocles* died the second Year of the 77th Olympiad is certain, and as *Emilius Probus* affirms, *Aristides* died four Years before *Themistocles* was banished *Athens*, hereupon *Plutarch* more cautiously calls her not the Daughter, but Neice of *Aristides*.

Some, because *Xantippe* (as is manifest from *Plato*)^a out-liv'd him, believe he was first married to *Myrto*, but that he had both these Wives at the same Time, which is attested by *Demetrius Phalereus*, *Aristoxenus* (to whom *Athenæus* saith, that *Aristotle* gave the Ground) *Calisthenes* and *Porphyrius*: Whence *Aristippus*^b in his Epistle to his Daughter *Myrto*, advised her to go to *Athens*, and above all to honour *Xantippe* and *Myrto*, and to live with them as he with *Socrates*:

The Occasion, whereupon the *Athenians*, who from the Time of *Cecrops* had strictly observed single Marriage, allowed Bigamy, in the Time of *Socrates*, was this; in the second Year of the 87th Olympiad, and the third of the 88th, *Athens* was visited extremely with the Pestilence, which attended by War and Famine, occasioned so great a Scarcity of Men, that they made an Edict it might be lawful for any that would to take two Wives. *Euripides* made use of this Indulgence; and that *Socrates* also did so, is attested by *Satyrus* the peripatetic, and *Hieronimus* the *Rhodian*, who recorded the Order; to which *Athenæus* imputes the Silence of the comic Poets in this Particular, who omitted no Grounds of Reproach. *Plutarch* implies, that he took her out of Charity, for she was a Widow^c (without any Portion or Dowry) extremely in Want.

^d *Porphyrius* reports, that when these two (*Xantippe* and *Myrto*) quarrell'd, * they would at last fall both upon *Socrates*, and beat him, because he stood by and never parted them, but laughed as well when they fought with him, as with one another.

By *Xantippe* he had a Son, named *Lamprocles*, who could not brook her impatience so well as his Father, and being vex'd by her into Disobedience, was reclaim'd by *Socrates*; he died young, as may be gathered from *Plutarch*,^e who saith, *Timarchus* of *Chæronea*, dying very young, desired earnestly of *Socrates* that he might be buried near his Son *Lamprocles*, who died but few Days before, being his dear Friend, and of the same Age. It appears from ^f *Plato*, that he had more Sons by her; for in his Apology he mentions Three, two grown Men, the other a Child, which seems to be the same brought by *Xantippe* to him in Prison, the Day of his Death, and, as ^g *Plato* describes it, held in her Lap.

By *Myrto* he had two Sons; the eldest *Sapranif-*

cus, the youngest *Menedemus*, or *Menedemus*, tho' some say he had *Menedemus* by *Xantippe*.

CHAP. XVII.

His Scholars and Auditors.

Whereas (saith ^h *Cicero*) many springing from *Socrates*, by reason that out of his several various Disputes diffused every where, one laid hold of one Thing, another of another; there were some, as it were, so many several Families differing amongst themselves, much disjoined and disagreeing; yet all these Philosophers would be called, and conceived themselves to be Socraticks: Of these were

Plato, from whom came *Aristotle* and *Xenocrates*; the first taking the Name of Peripatetic, the other of Academic.

Antisthenes, who chiefly affected the Patience and Hardiness in *Socrates* his Discourse; from whom came first the Cynics, then the Stoics.

Aristippus, who was more delighted with his more voluptuous Disputations; from him sprung the Cyrenaick Philosophy.

Others there were who likewise called themselves Socraticks, but their *Stills*, by the Strength and Arguments of the former are broken, and quite extinct; such were

Phædo, an Elean, who instituted a particular School, from him called Eliack, which afterwards was called Eretrick, from *Menedemus*, who taught at Eretria; from him *Pyrro*, thence the Pyrrhonians.

Euclid of Megara, Institutor of the Megarick School, so named from *Clinomachus* his Disciple, called the Dialectick, ending in *Zeno* the Citian, who introduced the Stoick.

The Herillians are named also, as a School that would be called Socratick. To these recited by *Cicero*, *Suida* adds

Bryso of *Heraclea*; who, together with *Euclid*, invented disputative Logic.

Theodorus, surnamed the Atheist, who invented a peculiar Sect called *Theodorean*; the Opinion which he taught was *ἀπάθεια*, Indifference.

Other Disciples of *Socrates* there were, who followed his Philosophy, not appropriating out of it any particular Sect, and therefore most properly deserve the Title of Socraticks, such are *Crito*, *Chærophon*, *Xenophon*, *Æschines*, *Simmius*, *Cebes*, *Glauco*, and *Terpsion*.

The last kind of his Auditors were those who made no Profession of Philosophy; of whom were

Critias and *Alcibiades*, who afterwards proved the most ambitious Spirits of the *Athenians*; but it was discovered in neither whilst they conversed with *Socrates*; either that their Youth was not capable

^a Laert. 2. 26.

^b Socratic. Epist. 37.

^c Laert. lib. 4.

^d Theodoret.

^e Theophrast. 22.

^f Xenoph. 1. 2.

^g Plat. de Co-

vio. h Plato Apol.

i Plat. Phæd.

k De Orator. lib. 3.

of expressing their Vice, or that they cunningly complied (as *Xenophon* conjectures) with *Socrates*, in Hopes of being by his Conversation enabled to manage their former Designs, which as soon as they attempted they left off their Friendship with *Socrates*. *Critias* fell from him and converted his Affection into Hate, because he reproved his Love to *Euthydemus*; *Alcibiades* naturally dissolute, was reclaimed by *Socrates*, and continued such whilst he conversed with him. He was of Form so exquisite as gave Occasion to some to calumniate the Friendship betwixt him and *Socrates*, to which Effect *Aristoxenus* is cited by *Laertius* and *Athenæus*, and some Verses of *Apollis* by the latter; his Vindication we refer to *Plato* and *Xenophon*.

Of *Socrates* his Instructions to *Alcibiades* there are these Instances.

^m He told him he was nothing of what a Man ought to be, that he had no Advantage by the Greatness of his Birth above an ordinary Porter; whereat *Alcibiades* much troubled, with Tears besought him to instruct him in Virtue, and to reform his Vices.

¹¹ Perceiving *Alciadas* to be exceeding proud of his Riches and Lands, he shewed him a Map of the World, and bade him find *Attica* therein ; which done, he desired that he would shew him his own Lands, he answered, that they were not there. *Do you boast* (replies *Socrates*) *of that which you see is no (considerable) Part of the Earth ?*

Alcibiades being, by reason of his Youth, bashful and fearful to make an Oration to the People, *Socrates* thus encouraged him; *Do you not esteem (saith he) that Shoemaker (naming him) an inconceivable Fellow? Alcibiades* assenting; *And so likewise (continues he) that Crier, and that Tent-maker. Alcibiades* granting this, *Doth not (saith he) the Athenian Commonwealth consist of these? If you condemn them single, fear them not in an Assembly. To these add*

² The four Sons of *Crito* the Philosopher; the eldest *Critobulus*, ³ exceeding handsome and rich, but by *Socrates* (who valued his own Estate at five *Minæ*) ⁴ demonstrated to be poorer than himself.

The second *Hermogenes*, who falling into Poverty, *Socrates* persuaded *Diodorus* his Friend to entertain.

The third *Epigenes*, 'a young Man of an infirm Body, whom *Socrates* advis'd to study his own Health, as that wherein consisted the well-being and Knowledge of his Mind.

The youngest *Ctesiphus*.

Of Poets, *Euripides* (as the "Writer of his Life affirms) and *Æschylus*.

Of Orators *Lyfias*, eminent in that kind, & easy to be understood, hard to be imitated, he came to *Athens* in the second Year of the 82d Olympiad. *Lyfias*, whom of refractory he made plant, and *Isocrates*, of whom when very young, *Socrates* prefiged great Things. In the Number of his Scholars and Auditors were also *Adimantus* and *Glauco* Sons to *Arifto*, Brothers to *Plato* : And *Charmides* Son of *Glauco*. *Glauco* before he was twenty Years old had taken upon him to be an Orator, and aimed at some great Office in the Common-Wealth, not to be wrought off from this Fancy which made him every where appear ridiculous, until address'd by some Friends to *Socrates*, who made him acknowledge his own Error and Ignorance of that which he had undertaken. On the contrary, his Son *Glauco* of excellent Parts, fit for any Office in the Common-Wealth, yet timorously shunning all public Affairs, was by *Socrates* induced to undertake the Magistracy.

* *Nicostratus* Son of *Theodotides* and his Brother *Theodotus*.

^a *Æantodorus*, and his Brother *Apollodorus*.

Lysanias, Father of *Æschines*.

^b *Chærecrates*, Brother to *Chærephon*, betwixt whom there was a great Quarrel, but reconciled by *Socrates*.

^c *Paralus*, Son of *Demodocus*, whose Brother was *Theages*.

^d *Antipho*, a *Cephisian*, Father of *Epigenes*: with whom he discourses of Self-sufficiency, teaching gratis, and of Veracity in ^e *Xenophon*.

Eumares a *Phliasian*, and *Xenomedes* an *Atbenian*.

Besides these, there are with whom *Socrates* discoursed and instructed.

¹ *Arifodemus* firnamed the little, who would not sacrifice, pray, or use divination, but derided all such as did, was by *Socrates* convinced.

* *Aristarchus* troubled that he had a Charge of Kindred lying upon him, by *Socrates* converted to a willing Liberality towards them.

¹ *Eutherus*, who returning from Travel, his Lands taken away, his Father having left him nothing, chose rather to follow a Trade than to apply himself to Friends, but diverted by *Socrates*.

¹ *Diodorus*, whom *Socrates* persuaded to take *Hermogenes*.

^k *Enthydemus*, who had collected many Sentences of Poets and Sophists, though he excelled all his Equals, and hoped no less of his Superiors, who was by *Socrates* constrained to acknowledge his own Error and Ignorance, and departed much troubled.

i Laert. 2. 23. Aethn. l. 5. m Cic. Tull. quest. 3. Plat. conviv. n Aelian 3. 28. o Aelian 2. 1. p Laert. vit. Cit.
q Macro. Saturn. 7. 3. r Xenoph. mem. l. 5. s Xenoph. mem. t Xenoph. mem. 4. p. 786. u Euseb. μαθητῆς ἐν τοῖς ἑσπερίοις.
ζαυροῦν ἐν τῇ τοῦ Ἰσίδου ἐκ φιλοσοφίας. v De deificatione, *perit ex Dio* (read *homo*), to which effect also Plutarch *πῶς ἐστὶν*
καλεῖν ἐν ἑσπερίοις (deificatione). Dion. Halicarn. in Critica. x Plat. Apol. y Xenoph. mem. 3. p. 772. & p. 774. Laert. 2. 24.
z Plat. Apol. a Plat. Idd. b Xenoph. mem. 2. p. 745. c Plat. Apol. d Plat. Apol. e Memor. 1. p. 729, 731, 732.
f Xenoph. mem. 1. p. 754. g Xen. mem. 2. h Xen. mem. 2. i Xen. mem. 2. k Xen. mem. 4.

^m *Hippias*, an *Elean*, with whom *Socrates* discoursed of Justice.

ⁿ *Nicomachides*, *Pericles*, and *Iphicrates*, with whom he discoursed concerning the Office of a General. ^o Into the last he infused Courage, by shewing him the Cocks of *Midas* bruffling against those of *Callias*.

^p *Thætetus* disputing of Knowledge, he dimitts, inspired as it were with divine Wisdom.

^q *Euthyphron* who intended to accuse his own Father, he dissuaded.

With *Pharbobasias* a Painter, *Clita* a Statuary, and *Piglias* an Armourer: He disputes in *Xenophon* concerning their several Arts.

CHAPTER XVII.

His Writings.

They who affirm that *Socrates* writ nothing (as *Cicero*, *Plutarch*, *Dion Chrysostom*, *Aristides*, *Origen*, and others) mean in respect to his Philosophy, in which Kind he never wrote any Thing himself, but what he discoursed was committed to Writing by *Xenophon*, *Plato*, and others of his Scholars. Hence the Works of *Plato* (particularly *Phædo*) went under the Name of *Socrates*, and are so cited by *Aristotle*; but that some Things were written by *Socrates* himself, is evident from those who affirm,

^r He writ together with *Euripides*, and aided him in making Tragedies, whence *Menselochus*,

The Phrygians is Euripides' new Play;
But Socrates gave it the best Array.

And again, *Euripides is steer'd by Socrates and Callias*.

Now thou with Pride and Self-conceit o'erflow'st;
But all the Cause to Socrates thou ow'st.

Hither refer we that of ^s *Cicero*, who saith, when *Euripides* made his Play *Orestes*, *Socrates* revoked the three first Verses. He writ also some Fables of *Æsop* in Verse, not very elegant, mentioned by *Plato*, *Plutarch* and *Laertius*, beginning thus:

To those who dwell in Corinth, Æsop said,
Virtue with vulgar Wisdom be not twigg'd.

A *Pæan* or *Hymn* in Honour of *Apollo* and *Diana*. One that went under his Name beginning thus.

Dælian Apollo, and thou fair,
Diana, hail; immortal Pair.

is by *Dionysidorus* denied to be his: This is mentioned also by *Plato*, to which some add,

The Enconium of *Gryllus* Son of *Xenophon*, slain in the *Mantinean* Fight, which the Disagreement of Times will not allow; more certain it is he framed

^t *Dialogues*, which he gave to *Æschines*, seeing him in Want, that he might get Money by them; to these add,

Epistles, some whereof are published by *Leo Allatius*; that he writ more is implied by *Arrian* and *Athenæus*.

Socrates his Epistles.

Epistle I.

YOU seem unacquainted with my Resolutions, else you would not have sent the second Time, and enlarged your Offers; but you believe *Socrates*, as well as the *Sophists*, mercenary of his Counsel, and that what I writ before was not real, but only to draw great Overtures from you: Therefore now you promise Wonders, in Confidence to oblige me by your many Presents to quit my Interest and Commerce with the Athenians, and to come over to you. I think it most unseemly a Philosopher to sell his Advice, and extremely contrary to my Practice; for ever since by God's Command I first entered into Philosophy, I was never known to take any thing, but keep my Exercises in publick, for every one to hear that will; I neither lock the Door when I teach, as is reported of *Pythagoras*, nor go abroad to the Multitude, and exact Money of the Hearers, as some heretofore have done, and some in our Times yet do; I have enough from within myself, should I accept of more from others I know not where to deposit it, nor whom to trust better than the Givers themselves, whose Faith, if I suspect, I shall be thought imprudent to confide in; if honest, I can receive from them, tho' I lay up nothing with them; for they that would be faithful Keepers of Money, will not be unfaithful Preservers of their own Gratitude, and they will never go about to defraud me of what they would have given; but receiving that of me gratis, for which others take Money, they will consider me when I want. In a Word, if Friends, they will like you, impart of their own to us; if not Friends, they will seek to deprive us of what is ours.

Besides, I have not Leisure to board up Money,

^m Xenoph. mem. 4. ⁿ Xen. ibid. ^o Laert. 2. 30. ^p *ἐπιγράμματα, ἃ ἐν ποσειδωνίου ἰνδίου ἑκαστὸν ἀλλήλων ἀντιμωμιῶν τινάσσοντο*
^q Plat. Theæt. 2. 29. ^r Laert. ^s Mem. 3. ^t Apud Allat. de Scrip. Socra. ^u *ἡ ἐπιστολὴ αὐτῆς*
^w Tusc. quest. 4. ^x Laert. vit. Xenoph. ^y Laert. vit. *Æschin.* ^z *Allatius* understandeth this otherwise. ^a *Τὸ δὲ βιβλ. ἔστι, ὅτι ἐν τῇ*
this Sense the Words are passible (so is not the Interpretation of *Allatius*, *ἅπαντες ἀντιμωμιῶν ἑαυτῶν πᾶσι τὰς ἀπορίας*). But I conceive
the Words of *Socrates* were, *Τὸ ἐπιγράμ. ἡ δὲ πᾶσι.* ^b *Allatius* understandeth.

but wonder at them that say, they get Riches^a for their own Sake, and have a high Opinion of themselves for their Means, who neglect Learning to addict themselves to Gain, and so become admired for their Riches, derided for their Ignorance, esteemed for all Things except themselves. * But if we so much abhor to have Recourse to Friends, † to depend on others to eat their Bread, how comes it that we are not ashamed to suffer the same from Money? Do we not know that these Men are respected only for their Wealth, and if Fortune turn, they live in all Disrespect? They are not fully contented when they are in Esteem, because it is not for their own Sakes, but in disesteem are much more discontented, being themselves the Cause of their own Dishonour.

First therefore, you were mistaken, if you did imagine Socrates would do that for Money which he would not without, not knowing that many Occasions, but chiefly the Necessities of my Country detain me. Wonder not that I say I discharge my Country's Business, being not employed either in Army or Court, every one ought to apply himself to that which he is capable of; † Things above his Reach he must leave to others, and perform those that are within his Compass: And in such Cities as this, not only Counsellors, or Commanders for Sea or Land are requisite, but some likewise, that may admonish others in their Offices; for it is † nothing strange, that they fall, as it were asleep under the Weight of their Charge, and need a Goad to waken them: Over these God hath placed me, for which I become, and not without Cause, odious to them.

But he, in whom I most confide, will not suffer me to go, he knows better than myself what is good for me; when I resolved to come to thee he withheld me, and when thou sentest the second Time, forbid me; I dare not disobey him. Pindar taught this Wisdom, saying, When God points out the Beginning of any Work, it is the direct Way to obtain Virtue, the End glorious. The Verses are much to this Purpose. Other Poets have said as much of the Gods, that what is undertaken with their Advice succeeds well; but what without God, is unprofitable to the Undertakers. The wisest Cities of Greece consult the Oracle of Delphi, and as many as follow it have good Success, who do not, most commonly receive Prejudice.

Yet I shall not wonder, if you give no Faith to what I deliver of the Dæmon, for I have met with not a few alike incredulous; most of those that were in the Delian Fight did not believe me; I was then in Arms, and sallied out of the City with the People to skirmish; many of us were dispersed in Fight, and as we came to a certain Way, the accustomed Sign came upon me; I stopp'd, and said, in my Opinion,

Friends, we should not go this Way, for I heard the Dæmon's Voice: The greater Part were angry, as if I had trifled at a Time so serious; some few were persuaded to go along with me another Way, and got safe home; one that came from the others brought word they were all slain: Some Horsemen returning from the Pursuit, had fallen upon them, whom they at first resisted, but being at last enclosed by them, who were more in Number, they gave back, and were in the End oppressed and killed; he that brought this News was dangerously wounded, and escaped only by the Help of his Shield. I have also by Instructions from God foretold many Events to particular Persons.

You offer Part of your Kingdom, and invite me to it, not as to a changed Government, but to rule both your Subjects and yourself: But I confess, I have not learned to command, and would no more undertake to rule, not knowing how, than to play at Dice, having never been taught: And doubtless, if other Men were of the same Mind, there would be fewer Troubles in Life; whereas now the Confidence of such as are ignorant, undertaking Things they do not understand, occasions these many Disturbances: Hence is it, they make Fortune greater than she is, and by their own Folly increase her Power. Besides, I am not ignorant, that a King ought to be more honoured and admired than a private Person, and as I would not undertake to be a Horseman, having no Skill in Horsemanship, but had much rather be a Footman, tho' the Charge be less honourable: The same is my Opinion as touching Kings and private Persons, nor puffed up by Ambition will I desire more glorious Affections. They who invented the Fable of Bellerophon seemed to imply something to this Purpose, for he was oppressed with Misfortunes, not because he sought to rise higher in Place, but for aiming at Things above him, and being thrown down from his Hopes, led the rest of his Life poorly and ignominiously, driven by Mocks out of Cities into the Wilderness, and shunning Path-ways, not what we commonly call so, but the Freedom wherewith every one orders his Life. But let this be taken how the Gods please, my Resolution you now hear again, that I will not change this Place for that, † conceiving 'tis fittest for me; nor is God willing I should, who hath been ever until now, my Counsellor and Guide.

Epistle II.

YOU are not ignorant how great Esteem we have of Chærephon, who being chosen Ambassador by the City to the Peloponnesians, will perhaps come to you; a Philosopher is entertained with small Trouble, but the Journey is dangerous, especially because of the

^a This Interpretation seems to be confirmed by the Particle *ἔπειτα* before *ἀνέειπε*.
^b *ὅτι μὴ τῶνδε ἵππων καὶ ἀνδρῶν, οὐκ ἀνέειπε*.
^c *ὅτι μὴ τῶνδε ἵππων καὶ ἀνδρῶν*.
^d *ὅτι μὴ τῶνδε ἵππων καὶ ἀνδρῶν*.
^e *ὅτι μὴ τῶνδε ἵππων καὶ ἀνδρῶν*.

^f *ὅτι μὴ τῶνδε ἵππων καὶ ἀνδρῶν*.

^g *ὅτι μὴ τῶνδε ἵππων καὶ ἀνδρῶν*.

^h *ὅτι μὴ τῶνδε ἵππων καὶ ἀνδρῶν*.

ⁱ *ὅτι μὴ τῶνδε ἵππων καὶ ἀνδρῶν*.
^j *ὅτι μὴ τῶνδε ἵππων καὶ ἀνδρῶν*.
^k *ὅτι μὴ τῶνδε ἵππων καὶ ἀνδρῶν*.

Tumults that are there at this Time, from which, if thou protect him, thou wilt preserve our Friend, and infinitely engage us.

Epistle III.

ANeso of Amphipolis was commended to me at Potidæa, he is now coming to Athens, being thrown out of his House by the People; for at present Affairs are much embroiled and clouded there, but I believe within a little while they will clear up. In assisting him, you will oblige a deserving Person, and benefit both the Cities; Amphipolis, left by rebelling it incur irremediable Danger; ours, lest we be involved in their Troubles, as at this present we are reduced almost to Extremity for Potidæa.

Epistle IV.

MEeting with Critobulus, I persuaded him to study Philosophy; but I think he is of another Mind, and more addicted to Affairs of State, in which he intends to make Choice of the fittest Method and best Instructor, for the most excellent sojourn now in Athens, and with many of them we are intimate. Thus much concerning him; as for us, Xantippe and the Children are well, and I continue to do, as when you were with me.

Epistle V.

WE hear you are at Thebes, and Proxenus gone into Asia, to take Part with Cyrus; whether your Designs will prosper God knows, they are here condemned by many, for it is conceived unfit the Athenians should assist Cyrus, thro' whose Means they were deprived of Command by the Lacedæmonians, and fight for him who fought against them. It is not therefore strange if the State being altered, some be ready of themselves to accuse you of temporising, and the better your Success is, the greater will be their Censures; for I am well acquainted with the Dispositions of some. But since we have undertaken this, let us prove ourselves honest Men, and call to Mind what we use to say of Virtue, accounting this one of the best Sentences of the Poet, Our Father's House must not be discredited. Know therefore, that to War these two are requisite, Courage and Bounty; for this we are loved of our Friends; for that, feared of our Enemies: Of both, thou hast domestic Precedents.

Epistle VI.

I Have taken such Care of your Strangers as you desired, and retained one to plead their Cause before

the People, & a Friend of ours, who profess himself the readier to undertake it, out of his Desire to serve thee.

As for that which you write in Jest concerning Wealth, and such as are solicitous for it, perhaps it is not unreasonable. First, because whilst others study to be rich, I choose to live meanly. Then, tho' I might receive many Gifts and Legacies from living and dead Friends; yet I freely disclaim them, and for a Man thus inclined, to be by others judged mad, is nothing strange: But we must examine not this only, but the rest of our Life; and since we disagree in the Use, no Wonder that we differ in the Acquisition of Riches; my Diet is very sparing, my Habit the same in Winter as in Summer: I never wear Shoes, I am not taken with popular Applause, but with the Study of Wisdom and Integrity. But they who are intemperate, luxurious in Meat, not every Year, but every Day putting on new Apparel, are transported with unlawful Delights; and as they who lose their natural Complexion have Recourse to Paint, so these losing the true Glory of Virtue, which every one ought to have, fly to that which depends upon Complaisance with others, courting vulgar Applause with Largestes and Feasts. Hence I suppose it comes, that they need much Wealth; they themselves cannot live upon a little, nor will others admit them into their Society, unless they receive a Salary for commending them.

But my Life is well as to both these: I will not deny but in some Things I may fail, I know that wisest Men prefer those, most Men these; Reflecting sometimes within myself upon God, I find that he exceeds us, in that he hath Need of nothing; it is the Property of a most excellent Nature not to want any Thing, and to comprehend within himself all that he enjoys. Thus is he wiser than others, who imitates the most wise, and happier, who resembles the most happy. If Riches could do this, Riches were to be preferred; but since Virtue only can obtain it, it were Folly to forsake the real Good to pursue the seeming. Hence I cannot easily be persuaded but that my Condition is better than theirs.

As for Children, who as you say ought to be provided for, the Care that I take for them, all Men may see, I know but one Ground of Happiness, Wisdom. The Fool who reposes his Trust in Gold, possesseth not that which he hath, and is wiser so much more miserable than others, in that they who are oppressed with Poverty may grow wise hereafter. But he, out of an Opinion of his own Happiness, neglecting true Gain, is corrupted with Plenty. Besides, that he never yet obtained Man's essential Good, is deprived of Hope thereof for the future. Nor is it possible that such a Man can go on securely to Virtue, who is entangled in the Flatteries of those who

i Read Περὶ τὴν διὰ καλὰς αἰτίας τὴν Ἀσίαν, or διὰ καλὰς αἰτίας εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν.

m Read κατετάληκεν ἀνέχοντα, &c. n Perhaps Πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπέστηκεν, ἢ διὰ τοῦτο ἔλεος ἀπέχεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπαινετικῶν, &c. or, ἐπεὶ αὐτὸν ἐπείκει ἑστῆν ἡμῶν ἡλικίᾳ ἀνέχοντα ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπαινετικῶν, τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦτο παύει. Ac. Certainly Allusion to some words which he is to use in the way of a hint.

o Others say, ἡ δόξα μόνον, &c. which I choose, reading immediately after for τὸ δόξαν, τὸ δόξαν τῶν.

are Masters in all insinuating Arts, and in the Charms of Pleasures which glide into the Soul thro' every Sense, and drive out all wifdom and sound Judgment. How then can be choose but give his Children Occasion of Folly rather than Instruction, who not only in Words but Actions expresseth that in these Things he hath placed his Hope, who not proving good, their Subsistence fails, and they die miserably for Want of Food, justly punished for their Idleness. Parents are by Law enjoined to bring up their Children till they are Men. But you, perhaps some Citizen, may say to his Sons greedy to inherit, spare me not dying, and whilst you live rely for Maintenance upon me, tho' dead not ashamed to lead a Life more lazy than Death; you expect that my Fortunes should extend to others, even after my Decease, but your own are not content for yourselves whilst you are yet alive. Such rough Speeches happily he will use to his Children, taking the Liberty both of a Father and a Patriot. My Fortunes in the Estimate of other Men are mean, but in the Effect nothing inferior to the Rich. I will not leave my Children Money, but a more honourable Heritage, discreet Friends, whom, as long as they keep they can want as Necessaries, and if they use them ill, doubtless they would use their Money worse.

But if to you, who know the Negligence of Friends, I seem to give ill Advice; I answer, that all Men are not alike affected to their Friends, for some take Care of them after they are dead, and it is likely that ours are not of a neglectful Humour, but pleased with the past Advantage they have received by us, no less than with the present of a short Benefit, the Requital is short; lasting Benefits produce a Return equal to their Profit, and I foresee that what is mine, will hereafter appear more gracious to my Friends, and therefore I exact no Rewards of them. I account nothing of equal Value in Exchange with Friendship but Friendship, nor like the Sophists, have I any Diffidence of those Things that are mine, for being old they renew, and in their decaying Age flourish, which makes them more acceptable to the Disciples, and their Father more esteemed; a Living he obtains Honour, dead is thought worthy of Memory, and if he leave a Kinsman behind him, they will respect him like his Nephews and Brethren, and shew him all Kindness, as being allied to him by more than a natural Affinity; neither, if they would, can they neglect him in Misfortunes, no more than we can slight them who are near to us in Blood; for Affinity in Soul forceth them to relieve the Son of the Dead as if he were their own Brother; when they call to mind his Father, whose Dis honour they account their own.

Now judge if I order my Affairs ill, or take no Care for my Children, so as when I die they shall be destitute of Necessaries, who leave them not Wealth,

but such Guardians as will have a Care of them and Wealth. No History makes mention of any Man that hath been made better by Riches; a tried Friend in this is to be preferred before tried Gold, that he is not beneficial to every one who desires him, but to those he loves best. Nor does he supply only the Necessities of Life, but is serviceable as well to the Soul of him that hath him, and is most conducing to Virtue, without which nothing profiteth; but we will consider more exactly upon these Things when we meet; thus much may serve as a cursory Answer to your Demand.

Epistle VII.

I Wonder not at what you write, that you do suspect the thirty continue the same Mind to us since your Departure, which they had when you were here. As soon as you were gone, they began to have a Jealousy of me, and there past amongst them a Murmur that these Things were not done without Socrates; within few Days they cited me to the Court, where some Complaints were preferred against me, and when I defended myself, they commanded me to go to the Pytæum to apprehend Leon, their Intention was to put him to Death, that they might enjoy his Estate, and make me Partner in their Injustice; when I refused, and said something to this Effect, that I would never willingly subscribe to an unjust Act. Charicles was present and inwardly vexed. Socrates, saith he, dost thou think to talk thus peremptorily, and not suffer ten thousand Ills? Charicles, said I, but none so heinous as to do unjustly. He answered not a Word, nor any of the rest, but ever since they have liked me the worse.

As for you, some were then present, reported that your Affairs succeed to your Wish; that the Thebans in your Exile received you kindly, and will assist your Return to their utmost. Some were troubled at this News, and the more because it lessened their Hopes of Supply from Lacedæmon; for they who came along with the Ambassadors, affirmed, that the Lacedæmonians were engaged in a great War, and the Ephori hearing of these Troubles, were discontented, and said, that the Lacedæmonians had not entrusted them with the City to see it destroyed; for if they would have done so, it were most easy for them who had the Command, being withal instigated thereunto by the Corinthians and Thebans, and that the City might be better governed under an Oligarchy than a Democracy. If all this be true, and your Affairs succeed as they report, there is great Likelihood that upon your coming in with the Thebans, the Lacedæmonians not aiding these, all Things here may be easily composed. Besides, many of the Natives who now are quiet through Fear, if they perceived never so little that you were firm, will rea-

Perhaps Socrates said, do all things seem to me, to me, &c.

For what is said is equal.

Perhaps Socrates said, do all things seem to me, to me, &c.

dily forsake this Party, because in this Government of the City nothing is left them entire, but through many and continual Enormities all is in Confusion; the greater Part is revolted as well as you, the rest, if they had the least Encouragement from abroad would suffer the same that you have. So that if no other, yet this Example would manifest, that the greatest Unhappiness of Cities is the Wickedness of their Rulers; for they are so blinded with self-inter-

est, that they will not desist, tho' they see all Things go to Ruin, but with what they first troubled, think to settle Affairs, continuing Banishments, Sequestrations, and unjust Deaths; not considering he is an ill Physician who prescribes for a Remedy the Cause of the Disease. But those are incurable; you shall do well to have a Care of yourself, for all that are here have but this Hope left, if you act wisely, to be freed from a heavy and grievous Tyranny.

T H E

C L O U D S

O F

A R I S T O P H A N E S :

Aided (not as a Comical Divertisement for the Reader, who can expect little in that Kind from a Subject so ancient and particular, but) as a necessary Supplement to the Life of Socrates.

A C T I. S C E N E I.

Strepsiades, Phidippides, Servant.

Streps. OH, oh,
Great Jove, how long a Night is this,
how endless!

Will't ne'er be Day? I heard the C.ck again,
Yet still my Servants snore; 'tis but of late
They durst do thus: a Curse o' this War that
awes me,

And will not suffer me to beat the Rogues.
My good Son sleeps too, wrap'd o'er Head and Ears:
Well, let me try to bear them Company;
Alas, I cannot, so perplex'd and tortur'd
With Charges, Bills for Horse-meat, Interest:
All for this hopeful Son, who in's curl'd Locks,
Aids Matches, keeps his Coach, and dreams of
Horses,

Whilst I (unhappy!) see th'unwelcome Moon
Bring on the Quarter-day, and threaten Use-money.
Boy, snuff the Light, bring my Account-book
hither,

That I may sum my Debts and Interest:
Let's see, twelve Pound to *Pasia*, ha! twelve Pound
to *Pasia*, how laid out? to buy *b* *Coppatis*:
Would I had paid this Eye for him.

Phid. Hold, *Phile*,
You're out of the Way, begin again.

Streps. Ay, this,

This is the Misery that ruins me;
His very Sleeps are taken up with Horses.

Phid. How many Courses will the Manage hold?

Streps. Many a weary Course thou lead'st thy
Father.

But how much more owe I than this to *Pasia*?

Three Pound t' *Aminias* for Chariot Wheels.

Phid. Go Sirrah, take that Horse and turn him
out.

Streps. Ay, thou hast turn'd me out of all my
Means.

Charges at Law will eat me up, my Creditors
Threaten to sue me to an Execution.

Phid. Why do you wake all Night, and toils so,
Father?

Streps. I cannot sleep, the Scriv'n'r doth so bite
me.

Phid. Yet let me rest a little longer.

Streps. Do so.

All these will one Day light upon thy Head,
Curs'd be the Hour when I first saw thy Mother,
I liv'd before most sweetly in the Country,
Well stock'd with Sheep and Bees, Olives and
Grapes,

Till from the *Megaclean* House took I
This Niece of *Megacles*: out of the City,

^a The Athenians in Time of War with the Lacedaemonians made an Edict, that no Man should beat his Servants, lest they should go over to the Enemy. Schol. ^b Their Horses were named from the Marks they had, if a K, *Coppatis*; if an S, *Samphons*. Schol.

Well fashion'd, highly bred, and richly clothed;
We married, as I said, and lay together:
I smelling strong of Drugs and greasy Wool;
But the of Unguents, Crocus, wanton Kisses,
Of vain Expence, Dainties and Luxury;
I will not tell the idle Life she led,
And yet she spun, that I have often told her,
Shewing this Coat, ' you spin a fair Thread, Wo-
man.

Serv. Sir all the Oil i' th' Lamp is wasted.

Streph. Ha!

Why didst thou put in such a drunken Wick?

If thou wert near me I would beat thee.

Serv. Why Sir?

Streph. Because the Wick is thicker than the Oil.
Well, my good Wife, and I betwixt us got
At last this Son; about his Name we differ'd;
She'd have it something that belong'd to Horses,
Callippides, *Xantippus*, or *Charippus*;
I from his Grandfather, *Phidonides*.

Long time we wrangled thus, at last agreed
He should be call'd *Phidippides*; thus Son

She takes, and stroaking kindly, thus instructs him,

' When thou art grown a Man frequent the City,

' Follow the Fashion, keep a Coach and Horses,

' Like *Megacles* thy Uncle.' No, said I,

' Go in a homely Coat, and drive thy Goats

' Into *Phellus*, as thy Father doth.

But my Advice prevail'd so little on him,

That now he wastes my Means in keeping Horses,

Which all this Night I have been thinking how

To remedy, and now have found the Way;

To which could I persuade him, I were happy.

Phidippides, *Phidippides*.

Phid. Your Will, Sir?

Streph. Kiss me, give me thy Hand.

Phid. Here, Sir.

Streph. Dost love me?

Phid. By *Nepheus*, God of Horses.

Streph. Do not name

That God, for 'tis from him springs all my Sorrow.

But if thou lov'st me truly, heartily,

O Son, be rul'd.

Phid. In what should I be rul'd?

Streph. Change without more Delay thy Course
of Life,

And do as I would have thee.

Phid. What is that?

Streph. But wilt thou do it?

Phid. Yes, by *Bacchus* will I.

Streph. Come hither then, feast thou that little
Door?

That is the *Phrontisterium* of wise Soul,

Of learned Men that tell us Heaven's an Oven,

And we the Coals inclos'd in the wide Arch:

They, if we give them but a little Money,

Will teach us to gain all Causes, right or wrong.

Phid. Who can these be?

Streph. Their Names I know not; good

They are, and busied in continual Study.

Phid. Oh now I know the Wretches that you
mean,

The meagre, wan, proud, bare-foot, begging Fel-
lows;

Whose evil Genius's are *Socrates*

And *Chærephon*.

Streph. Peace, talk no more so idly;

If you'll obey a Father, let me see you

Give o'er your Horses and turn one of these.

Phid. Not I, by *Bacchus*, no tho' you should
tempt me

With all *Legara's* Breed of Racers.

Streph. Dear Son, be rul'd and learn.

Phid. What should I learn?

Streph. 'Tis said they have two Tongues, and
one of them

Able to prove any Injustice Reason;

Couldst thou but learn that Language, we were
made,

And might dispute our stubborn Creditors

Out of the Debts I have incur'd for thee;

They get not then a Penny more than Words.

Phid. I cannot do't, were I so lean and pale,

I durst not look a Jockey in the Face.

Streph. By *Ceres* then, you stay with me no longer.

You, nor your Coach-Horse, nor your *Sampbaras*.

But all together pack out of my Doors.

Phidip. My Uncle *Megacles* will neither see
Me nor my Horses want, so long I care not. *Exit.*

SCENE II.

Strephades, Scholar.

Streph. THO' I have fail'd, I'll not give over thus,
But say my Prayers, and go myself to
School

To learn this Art: But how can I, by Age

Dull and forgetful, reach such Subtleties?

Yet on I will, why should I doubt? Ho, Friend.

Schol. A Mischief on you, who's that knocks at
Door?

Streph. *Strephades*, *Cecinnian Phado's* Son.

Schol. 'Twas rudely done to knock so hard,
y'have made

My labouring Brain miscarry of a Notion.

Streph. Forgive me, I was bred far off i'th'
Country:

But pray what Notion was't that prov'd abortive?

Schol. 'Tis lawful to discover that to none

But Fellow-Scholars.

Streph. Then you may tell me,

For I come hither to be one of you.

Schol. I will; so we will value't as a Mystery.

Socrates tother Day ask'd *Chærephon*

c. Ἰσχυρὸν δὲν ὁρῶντες ὁ σπουδαῖος. Schol. M. S. d. A stormy crazy Place in Attica. In such Storms delight most. Schol. M. S.
e. ἵνα τὸν διανοῖται ἀνδρῶν ὁρῶντες ὁρῶντες ὁρῶντες. Schol. M. S. f. Ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱσχυρῶτος. Schol. M. S.

How many of her Feet a Flea could leap,
For one by Chance had bit *Cheraphon's* Eye-brow,
And leapt from thence upon the Head of *Socrates*;

Streph. How could he measure this?

Schol. Most dexterously.

Both Feet o' th' Flea he dipt in melting Wax,
Which strait congeals to Shoes; these he plucks off,
And with them more exactly measures it.

Streph. Great *Jupiter*, how subtle are these Wits!

Schol. If you should hear their other Speculations,
You would say so indeed.

Streph. Pray what was that?

Schol. This *Cheraphon* the *Sphesian* ask'd him
once,

If a Gnat sounded from her Mouth or Tail.

Streph. And what said he?

Schol. It had a strait thin Gut,

At End of it a Bladder, into which
The Air being forc'd, sounded in breaking forth.

Streph. Then I perceive that a Gnat's Tail's a
Trumpet;

How blest is this Anatomist of Gnats!
Sure he can hide himself from purblind Justice,
That knows so well these dark intestine Ways.

Why should we cry up *Thales* any longer?

Come open me your *Phronisiterium*,
And quickly let me see this *Socrates*;
I long to learn; open the Door. — *O Hercules*,
What strange Beasts have we here?

Schol. Why do you wonder?

Whom do they look like, think you?

Streph. Like the poor

Lacedaemonian Captives ta'en at *Pylus*.

Why look they so intently on the Ground?

These seek out Things that appertain to Earth!

Oh they seek Leeks; trouble yourselves no more,
Friends,

For I know better where are good and great ones.

Schol. Come let's go in.

Streph. Let's stay a little while, and talk with
'em.

Schol. No, no, they cannot long endure the Air.

Streph. What's this? for Heaven's sake say!

Schol. This is Astronomy.

Streph. And this?

Schol. Geometry.

Streph. But what is it good for?

Schol. To measure Land.

Streph. What, Arable, or Pasture?

Schol. No, the whole Earth.

Streph. A pretty Jest indeed!

That were a mighty Help to Husbandmen!

Schol. Here's all the World; and this is *Athens*.

Streph. How?

I'll scarce believe that; What's become o' th' Judges?

Where the *Cicennians*, my Countrymen?

Schol. Here; this *Eubara*; see how far 'tis
stretch'd.

Streph. Ay, almost stretch'd in Pieces betwixt us,
and *Pericles*; and where is *Lacedaemon*?

Schol. Here.

Streph. 'Tis too high us, why with all your Skill
Do you not help to thrust it farther off?

Schol. It is not possible.

Streph. No? you will rue it then.

But what Man's that hangs yonder in the Basket?

Schol. That's he?

Streph. He, what he?

Schol. *Socrates*.

Streph. How, *Socrates*?

Call him.

Schol. Call him yourself, I'm not at Leisure.

SCENE III.

Strephades, Socrates.

Streph. **H**O *Socrates*.

Socr. Why dost thou call me mortal?

Streph. First, I would gladly know what thou
dost there?

Socr. I walk i'th' Air, and gaze upon the Sun.

Streph. Why in a Basket dost thou view the Gods,
Not from the Ground?

Socr. I could not elevate

My Thoughts to Contemplation of these Mystries,
Unless my Intellect were thus suspended;

Where my thin Thoughts melt into Air (their
Likeness)

Stood I upon the Ground, I should find nothing,

Though I sought ne'er so strictly up and down;

For the magnetic Virtue of the Earth

Would draw away the Humour of my Brain,

Just as we see in Nose-smart.

Streph. How, how's that?

Doth the Brain draw the Humour out of Nose-
smart?

Come down, sweet *Socrates*, and teach me quickly
The Knowledge of those Things for which I came.

Socr. What earnest thou for?

Streph. To learn the Art of Speaking.¹

With Debts and Usury I'm torn in Pieces,

Toft up and down, forc'd to pawn all my Goods.

Socr. On what Occasion did you run in Debt?

Streph. By Horses eaten into this Consumption;
And I would learn of you some other Language,

Which teacheth Men to pay nothing; for which,
By all the Gods, I'll give you what you'll ask.

Socr. By all what Gods? We do not here allow
Those Gods the City worships.

Streph. How then swear you?

By Copper Farthings, like the *Byzantines*?

Socr. Wouldst thou be skillful in divine Affairs?

¹ The School discovered; the Scholars in several Postures: *Socrates* hanging in a Basket.

² Said, lib.

³ The Words of *Silanes* (whom

Socrates resembled for Deformity) in *Plinius* School.

Socr. The Clouds can take what Form they list,
as when
They see a hairy Fellow curl'd like *Clitus*,
They mock his Madneſs in a Centaur's Shape.

Streph. And when they ſee one that defrauds or
plunders
The Commonwealth, like *Simon*, What then do
they?

Socr. They do reſemble him, turn ravenous
Wolves.

This was the Reaſon Yeſterday, when they
Beheld *° Cleonymus*, they fled like Deer:
And ſeeing *° Cliphentes*, are now turn'd Women.

Streph. Great Queens, if you are deſign'd to ſpeak
to Mortals,

Make me acquainted with your rumbling Voice.

Chor. *°* All hail, old Man! who doſt on Wiſdom
prey,

° And thou the Prieſt of ſubtle Trifles, ſay,
° What wouldſt thou have with us? To none but
thee,

° Of all the Meteor Sophiſts, thus ſcoop we;
° Save *Prodicus*, to him as grave and wiſe;
° To thee, becauſe thou walk'ſt upright, thy Eyes
° Rowling on every Side, thy Look ſevere,
° And barefoot many Miſeries doſt bear.

Streph. Good Heavens! What Voice is this?
How ſtrange and ſtately!

Socr. Theſe are our Goddeſſes; the reſt are Toys.

Streph. Is then Olympian *Jove* no Deity?

Socr. What *Jove*? There's no ſuch Thing, meer
Fancy.

Streph. How?

Whence then proceeds all *°* Rain?

Socr. Only from theſe.

Didſt thou e'er ſee a Shower without them? Take
The Clouds away, and Heaven muſt rain fair
Weather.

Streph. By *Phæbus* thou haſt clear'd it well;
till now

I thought *Jove* made Water through a Sieve.

But whence comes Thunder? When I'm ſick, that
frights me.

Theſe thunder as they tumble up and down,
How can that be?

Socr. *°* When they are full of Water,
By their own Weight driven upon one another,
They roar and break.

Streph. But who is it that drives them?
Is not that *Jove*?

Socr. No, an ætherial Whirlwind.

Streph. A Whirlwind! hum; I knew not that
till now.

But whence comes Lightning then, that glittering
Fire

Which terrifies and burns us? *Jupiter*
Uſeth to dart this down on perjur'd Men.

Socr. And how (thou phlegmatick dull Saturnine,
If darted on the perjurd, how comes *Sinen*,
Theorus, and *Cleonymus* to 'ſcape it?
No; his own Temple, or the *Sunian* Promontory,
Or ſturdy Oaks he ſtrikes; Did they e'er wrong
him?

Did the Oak e'er forſwear itſelf?

Streph. I know not:

That which you ſay ſeems Reaſon; But what then
is Lightning?

Socr. When the Winds are ſhut up cloſe,
They ſwell the Clouds like Bladders, and at laſt
Break out with Violence and horrid Noiſes;
And by Contrition kindle one another.
But thou who ſearch'ſt amongſt us for Wiſdom,
How happy wilt thou be above all *Gretians*,
If thou conceive well, and remember, and
Canſt ſuffer much, and never wilt be tired,
Standing or walking, nor have Senſe of Froſt;
Nor care for dining, and refrain from Wine,
From Exerciſes, and all other Toys.

Streph. O for a ſolid Soul, reſtleſs with Cares;
Sparings, ſelf-torturing, one that can ſeaſt
Upon a Diſh of Herbs, you never could
Be better fitted; a meer Anvil I.

Socr. Doſt thou believe no God but thoſe we
teach?

The Chaos, Clouds, and Tongue, only theſe three?

Streph. I'll not ſo much as ſpeak of any other,
Much leſs beſtow an Offering on their Altars.

Chor. *°* Say boldly then, ſay what is thy Requeſt?
° For if thou honour us, thou ſhalt be bleſt.

Streph. Great Queens, I ſue for a ſmall Matter;
that

I may out-talk all *Greeks* a hundred Furlongs.

Chor. *°* To thee alone this Gift we will allow;
° None ſpeak ſuch mighty Sentences as thou.

Streph. I do not care for mighty Sentences,
But ſubtle ones, to cheat my Creditors.

Chor. *°* It is not much thou aſk'ſt, and ſhalt
obtain it,

° Learn of our Miniſters, and thou ſhalt gain it.

Streph. I ſhall, relying on your Promise; forc'd
By Want, *Coppetia*, and a luckleſs Match.
Now let 'em uſe me as they liſt; bear, ſtarve me;
Burn, freeze, or ſlay me, fo I ſcape my Debts.

I care not though Men call me impudent,
Smooth-tongu'd, audacious, petulant, abominable,
Forger of Words and Lies, contentious Barretour,
Old, winding, bragging, teſty, crafty Fox.

Socr. Said like a Man of Courage: If thou lean
Of me, thy Fame ſhall ſpread wide as the Heavens.

Streph. What ſhall I do?

Socr. Thou ſhalt ſpend all thy Time
With me; a Life the happieſt in the World.

Streph. I long to ſee that Day.

Socr. Thy Door ſhall always

Be throng'd with Clients that will come to thee
For Counsel, and discourse of Cafes worth
The Wealth of Kingdoms, to thy Heart's Desire.
Chor. ' Try this old Man ; first see if he be fit ;
' Put him to th' Test, and sound the Depth of 's Wit.
Socr. Come tell me now your Disposition ;
That when I know it I may fit my Machines
Accordingly.

Streps. You will not undermine me.
Socr. No, I would know if you have any Memory.

Streps. Yes, when another owes me any Thing,
I can remember very well ; but what
I owe myself, I'm ready to forget.

Socr. Hast thou a natural Faculty in speaking ?
Streps. No, I can mar Words sooner far than
make 'em.

Socr. How wilt thou learn then ?
Streps. Fear me not ; I tell you

Well, when I make some learned deep Discourse.
Socr. ' You must be sure to catch't up presently.

Streps. What, must I snap at Learning like a
Dog ?

Socr. This is a very Fool, an unknown Clown ;
I am afraid, old Man, thou wilt need whipping.
What if thou should'st be beaten ?

Streps. Then I am beaten.
Socr. But what would'st do ?

Streps. I would take Witnesses on't,
And sue them on an Action of Battery.

Socr. Off with your Cloak.
Streps. Why, how have I offended ?

Socr. No ; but our Orders admit none but naked.
Streps. I came not hither to steal any thing.

Socr. Down with your Cloak ; Why dost thou
trifle ?

Streps. Now
Tell me if I prove apt and diligent,
Of all your Scholars who shall I come next ?

Socr. Thou may'st, perhaps, be like our *Chorep-
bom*.

Streps. Alas, alas ! What, an Anatomy ?
Socr. No, no ; But if thou wilt be any thing,
Follow me without more Delay.

Streps. I want
A Cake for your *Cerberus* ; I go methinks
As if 'twere into the *Trephianian* Cave.

Socr. On, on ; Why stayest thou gazing at the
Door ?

Chor. ' Go, for thy Courage blest ; whose aged
' Mind

' To Wisdom soars, and leaves the young behind.

A C T II.

Socrates, Strepsades.

Socr. **BY** *Chor.*, and this Air I breathe, I never
Met any thing so stupid as this Fellow,

So clownish and oblivious ; easy Toys
He learns not half so fast as he forgets 'em ;
I'll call him forth ; what, ho *Strepsades* ;
Come out, and bring your Bed along with you.
Streps. The Fleas will hardly let me bring my-
self.

Socr. Quick, down with't there, and make
I lay to you.

Streps. I am ready.
Socr. What have you most Mind to learn :
Measures, or Verse, or Rhyme ?

Streps. By all means Measures ;
For I was cheated by a Meal-man lately,
Two Pecks.

Socr. That's not the Thing that I demand ;
I'd know which you conceive the fairest Measure ;
The *Trimeter*, or the *Tetrameter*.

Streps. The fairest Measure, in my mind, is a
Bushel.

Socr. 'Tis nothing that you say.
Streps. What will you lay,
That your *Tetrameter* holds not a Bushel ?

Socr. Away, away ; how dull thou art, and
blockish.

But thou wilt be, perhaps, more apt at Rhime.
Streps. What Help can Rhimes afford me in my
Meal ?

Socr. First, they will make thee pleasant in all
Company,

Then thou shalt know which suits with Anapæstic,
And which with Dactyles.

Streps. Dactyles ? I know that sure.
Socr. Why what's a Dactyle ?

Streps. What, but this same Finger ?
'T has been a Dactyle e'er since I was a Child.

Socr. Th'art an unprofitable Dunce.
Streps. I care not

For learning these Devices.
Socr. What then wouldst thou ?

Streps. That, unjust and cheating Sophistry.
Socr. But there are Things that must be learnt
before

You come to that ; What Creatures are there mas-
culine ?

Streps. Sure I know that, or I were mad indeed.
A Ram, a Bull, a Goat, a Dog, a Pidgeon.

Socr. ' See how thou err'st, that call'st both
Male and Female

A Pidgeon.
Streps. Right, by *Neptune* ; How then must I ?

Socr. Call this a Cock Pidgeon, and that a Hen.
Streps. A Pidgeon, Cock and Hen, ha ! by this
Air,

For this sole Document, I will replenish
Your *Cardopus* with Meal.

Socr. Again th'art wrong ;
Thou call'st it *Cardopus*, but 'tis *hec Cardopus*,
And therefore henceforth call it *Cardops*.

¹ As the Scholium of *Symonides*, especially *Xenophon* and *Plato*.
The Greek Word has a subsyllable Transposition, but signifies Article.

² Denoting *Socrates*, significant in Grammar. ³ A Meal-Trough.

Next it is fit you know which Names are masculine,

And which are feminine.

Strepf. I know well which
Are feminine I'm sure.

Socr. Let's hear.

Strepf. *Philina*,

Chloris, *Demetria*, and *Lyfina*.

Socr. And which are masculine?

Strepf. A World, *Philoxenus*,
Melefias, and *Aminias*.

Socr. Thou art out.

Strepf. Are not these masculine with you?

Socr. By no means.

How if you saw *Aminias*, would you call him?

Strepf. *Aminia*, ho!

Socr. What, make a Woman of him?

Strepf. And Reason good; h' has thrown away
his Arms,

And will not fight. But to what Purpose learn I
These common Trifles?

Socr. Not so common neither:

But come, lie down.

Strepf. What must I do?

Socr. Consider

Within yourself the Business that concerns you.

Strepf. Not in this Bed, I thank you: if I must
Lie down, I'll meditate upon the Ground.

Socr. But here's no Room besides.

Strepf. Wretch that I am.

How shall I be tormented with these Fleas?

Socr. Now think into the Depth of thy Affairs;
Try every Turn and Winding, every Double;

And if you stick at any thing, giv' t' o'er,
And to some other; but be sure you sleep not.

Strepf. Oh! oh!

Socr. How now, the Matter?

Strepf. I am kill'd

By these blood-suckers, these *Corinthians*.

Socr. Do not torment yourself.

Strepf. How can I chuse,

When I have neither Money left, nor Colour;
Scarce Life, no Shoes, grown almost to a Ghost
with watching?

Socr. Now what think you, nothing?

Strepf. Yes,

By *Niptune*.

Socr. What?

Strepf. I'm thinking of the Fleas

Will leave a Piece of me or not.

Socr. Death on thee.

Strepf. You might have spar'd your Curse, I'm
dead already.

Socr. Fy, fy, you must not be so tender, "cover
Your Face, and study for some subtle Cheat.

Strepf. Would I could learn to cheat these wicked
Fleas,

Socr. Let's see what does he? what, asleep, ha'ye
thought

Of nothing yet?

Strepf. What would you have me think on?

Socr. What would you learn?

Strepf. I have told you that already

A thousand Times; I'd learn to pay no Use-money.

Socr. Come then, cover yourself, and subtilize

Your Thoughts, direct your Business into Atoms.

Strepf. Alas!

Socr. Lye still, and if you stick at any Thing,

Pass by it a while, and come to it again.

Strepf. Ho, my dear *Socrates*.

Socr. What is't old Man?

Strepf. I have found out what will do it.

Socr. As how.

Strepf. First tell me

Where I may meet with some *Thebanian* Witch;

For I would steal the Moon one of these Nights,

And having got her, lock her in a Chest

As charity as I would keep a Glass.

Socr. What wilt thou get by that?

Strepf. What, if the Moon

Ne'er rise again, I'm bound to pay no Use.

Socr. How so?

Strepf. 'Cause Use, you know, is paid by th'
Month.

Socr. 'Tis well, but I'll propound another Bu-
siness;

Suppose that you were tied upon a Statute

To pay five Talents, could you raise Figures?

Strepf. I know not, but I'll try.

Socr. You must not limit

Your Thoughts so narrowly within yourself,

But like a Beetle fetter'd in a Thread,

Allow them play, and flutter in the Air.

Strepf. I ha't, I ha't; the rarest Way to cancel

A Deed, as you'll confess when you have heard it.

Socr. What is't?

Strepf. Did you ne'er see at any Grocer's

A clear transparent Stone, with which they use

To kindle Fire?

Socr. You mean a Burning-glass.

Strepf. The very same.

Socr. What wouldst thou do with it?

Strepf. Whilst that the Scriv'ner writes the
Deed, d'ye mark,

Thus standing by him with my Burning-glass

Against the Sun, I'll burn out every Letter.

Socr. Wisely, by all the Graces.

Strepf. How I long

To cancel thus a Bond of fifty Pound.

Socr. 'Tis well, now tell me if thy Adversary

Sue thee, and thou art like to be overthrown

For want of Witnesse, how wilt thou void

His Suit?

Strepf. Most easily.

^t Effeminate Cowards.

^u So Socrates disputes in Plato's *Phaedrus*, that exterior Objects might not divert him; which *Antiphanes* here decides.

Socr. Which Way ?

Strepf. Before.

It comes to Judgment, I would hang myself.

Socr. Pish, thou say'st nothing.

Strepf. Yes, by *Jove* there's none

Will prosecute a Suit against the Dead.

Socr. Away, thou fool! I'll teach no more.

Strepf. Dear *Socrates*

Why ?

Socr. Thou forgett'st as fast as thou canst learn.

Tell me the first Thing thou wert taught to day.

Strepf. The first ; stay let me see ; the first

Thing say you ?

How call you that we use to put our Meal in ?

Wretch I have forgot it !

Socr. See, deservest thou not.

Forgetful to be punish'd for a Dunce ?

Strepf. Alas, what shall I do ? for if I learn not

The cheating Language, I'm quite undone.

Good Clouds advise me what Course I shall take.

Cho. * If an ingenious Son thou hast at home,

* Thou hadst best send him hither in thy Room.

Strepf. I have a Son, and he's ingenious too ;

But will not learn, the more my Misery.

Cho. * And wilt thou suffer it ?

Strepf. Of a promising Person

His Mother is a Woman of great Spirit :

Once more I'll try ; if he refuse, I'll make

No more ado but turn him out of Doors ;

Stay but a while, I'll be quickly back.

A C T III.

Strepfades, Phidippides, Socrates.

Strepf. **N**OW by the Clouds thou stay'st no longer here ?

Hence, and go feed in *Megacles* his Stable.

Phid. Alas, what Fury hath possess'd you, Father ?

By *Jove* I think you are besides yourself.

Strepf. See, see, he swears by *Jove*, art thou not mad

At these Years to believe there is a *Jove* ?

Phid. Is Truth to be derided ?

Strepf. Well, I see.

Th'art still a Child, and credit'st old Wives Tales.

Come, and I will tell thee what shall make thee

A Man, so you be sure to tell it no body.

Phid. Pretty ; what is it ?

Strepf. Thou swor'st e'en now by *Jove*.

Phid. I did so.

Strepf. See how good it is to learn ;

There's no such Thing as *Jove*.

Phid. What then ?

Strepf. A Whirl-wind

Hath blown *Jove* quite away, and rules all Heaven.

Phid. What Fooleries are these ?

Strepf. They are serious Truth, Son.

Phid. Who tells you so ?

Strepf. Our *Socrates* the * *Melian*,
And *Chærephon*, that trace the Steps of Fleas.

Phid. How are you grown to such a Height of
Madness

As to believe such melancholly Dreamers ?

Strepf. Good Words ; Defame not Men of such
deep Wisdom

And subtle Spirits ; these live sparingly,

Are never at the Charges of a Barber,
Unguents or Baths, whereas thou wastest my Means
As freely as if I were dead already.

Come then, and be their Scholar in my Room.

Phid. What can be learnt that's good of such
as they are ?

Strepf. All Things that are accounted Wisdom,
Boy ;

And first to know thyself, and what a Dunce

Thou art, how blockish, rustick, and forgetful.

But stay a little, cover thy Face a While.

Phid. Alas ! my Father's mad, what shall I do,

Accuse him to the Court of Folly, or

Bespeak a Coffin for him, for he talks

Idly, as he were drawing on ?

Strepf. Come on now.

Let's see what's that ?

Phid. A Pigeon.

Strepf. Good ; and that ?

Phid. A Pigeon.

Strepf. Both the same ? ridiculous.

Take Heed you make not such Mistakes hereafter.

This you must call a Cock, and that a Hen.

Phid. A Hen ? Is this the goodly Learning, Fa-
ther,

You got since your Admission amongst these Earth-
worms ?

Strepf. This and a great deal more ; but being old,
I soon forget what I am taught.

Phid. I think

* 'Twas want of Memory made you lose your Cloak.

Strepf. No, 'tis hung up upon the Arts and Sci-
ences.

Phid. And where your Shoes ?

Strepf. Loft for the common Good,

Like *Pericles* : But let's be gone and see

You learn to obey me, and to wrong all else.

Remember that I bought thee, when thou wert

But six Years old, a little Cart to play with.

Phid. Alas, you'll be the first that will repent
this :

Strepf. Take you no Care for that, do as I bid you.

Ho, *Socrates*, I've brought my Son at last,

Tho' much against his Will.

Socr. Ay, that's because

He's rude, untaught, a Child of Ignorance,

And unacquainted with our hungry Baskets.

Phid. Go hang yourself in one of them.

* As if he should say, the Admitt : For the *Melians* were infamous for Admission from *Dagones* who profest it. *Socrates* was Scholar to *Antigonas* a *Melian*. See Chap. 3.

Streps. How Impudence ! dost thou talk thus to thy Master ?

Socr. So go hang, with what a seeming Grace was that pronounc'd !

How do you think that he should ever learn To overthrow a nimble Adversary, Or win a Judge's Heart with Rhetorick ?

Streps. Fear not, but teach him ; he's ingenious By Nature ; for when he was but a little one, He'd build you Houses, and make Leather Coaches, And Ships, and cut Frogs out of Apple Parings. What's your Opinion then ? Do you not think He's capable to learn both Languages ? Or if not both, be sure he learn the worse.

Socr. Well, we shall try what may be done with him.

Streps. Farewell, and so remember that in all I say that's just you learn to contradict me.

ACT IV. SCENE I.

Strepsades.

Streps. THE * fifth, the fourth, the third, the second ! hum ;

The most abhor'd and dreadful Day's at Hand, The old and new ; all I owe Money to Threaten to sue, and vow my utter Ruin ; Yet I require nothing but what is just Reason : My Friend, forbear me till some other Time ; But they all answer me, Words are no Payment, Revile me, swear they'll put their Bonds in Suit, And let 'em, what care I, so my *Phidippides* Have learnt the Art of Cheating : I shall know straight ;

It is but knocking at the School ; ho Son !

SCENE II.

Strepsades, Socrates.

Socr. SAVE you, *Strepsades*.

Streps. The like to you. First ' take this Bag of Meal, for it is fit We pay our Duty to our reverend Master. Now tell me, has my Son attain'd the Art For which I plac'd him with you ?

Socr. Yes, exactly.

Streps. Thanks to Deceit, the Queen that governs all Things.

Socr. Now you may overthrow all Adversaries.

Streps. What tho' a Witness swear that I have borrow'd.

Socr. Ay, tho' a thousand swear it.

Streps. Io, Io.

Triumph my Boys, woe to you Money-mongers, You and your Bonds, your Use on Use may hang now,

You'll trouble me no more ! O what a Son

Have I, that fenceth with a two-edg'd Tongue, My House's Prop and Guardian, my Foes Terror, Quickly come forth, and meet my glad Embraces, Come forth and hear thy Father.

Socr. See the Man.

Streps. O my dear Boy !

Socr. Away, and take him with you.

SCENE III.

Strepsades, Phidippides.

Streps. IO my Son ! O how I joy to see Thy chang'd Complexion ! Thou look'st now methinks

As thou wert inspir'd with Contraction, I read cross Questions in thy very Face, Thy very Eyes methinks say, how, how's that ? Thou can'st perfwade the World that thou art wrong'd,

When thou art he that does the Wrong. I see't I plainly see't ; a very *Attick* Mien ; Now let it be thy Study to recover Him, whom thou almost hast undone.

Phid. Why, what

Is't that you fear ?

Streps. The old and the new Day.

Phid. Can one and the same Day be old and new ?

Streps. I know that : I'm sure my Creditors By Joint-consent that Day threaten to sue me.

Phid. They'll lose by it if they do : For, 'tis impossible

To make two Days of one.

Streps. How is't impossible ?

Phid. As for a Woman to be old and young

At once.

Streps. But Law has so determin'd it.

Phid. But these Men know not what the Law doth mean.

Streps. Why, what's the Meaning of it ?

* *Phid.* Ancient *Solen*

Was naturally a Lover of the People.

Streps. What's that to this ?

Phid. He did appoint two Days,

The last Day of the old Month for Citation,

The first o'th' new for Payment of the Money.

Streps. But why the last Day for Citations ?

Phid. That

The Debtor having thus one Day of Warning Might fly and shun the Trouble of the next.

Streps. Why do the Magistrates then take all Forfeits

Upon the old and new Day ?

Phid. They are hungry, And taste their Meat before they should fall too.

Streps. Io, ye Fools that sit still and do nothing,

We that are wise and quick have done the Business ;

Ye Blocks, ye Stones, ye Sheep, ye empty Bubbles ;

Let me congratulate this Son of mine,

* From the twentieth Day of the Month they reckoned backward, tho' not Money. * See the *Life* of *Solen*.

See the *Life* of *Solen*.

y Such *Gists* signifying *summons* excepted.

Myself and my good Fortune in a Song.

Now *Strephiad*s th'art blest,
Of the most discreet the best,
What a Son thou hast, now may
All my emulous Neighbours say,
When they hear that he alone
Hath my Creditors o'erthrown.
But come my Boy, now thou shalt feast with me.

SCENE IV.

Pasias, Strephiad, Witness.

Paf. AND must a Man be outed of his own thus?
Better take any Course than suffer this.
You must assist me in this Business, Neighbour,
That I may call my Debtor to account;
There's one Friend made a Foe; yet I'll not shame
My Country, e'er I do it, I'll give him Warning.
Strephiad.

Streph. How now, what would you have?

Paf. The old and new Day's come.

Streph. Bear Witness, Friend,

He nam'd two Days. What Sum is't you demand?

Paf. Twelve Pounds you borrow'd when you
bought your Son

A Race-Horse; with the Interest.

Streph. A Race-Horse!

You know I ne'er car'd for 'em in my Life.

Paf. And swore by *Jove* and all the Gods to pay it.

Streph. By *Jove*? 'Twas then before my Son
had learnt

The all-convincing Speech.

Paf. You'll not deny it.

Streph. What have I got but that for all this
Learning?

Paf. Dar'st thou deny it, if I should put thee to
Thy Oath, and make thee call the Gods to wit-
ness it?

Streph. What Gods d'ye mean?

Paf. *Jove, Mercury and Neptune.*

Streph. By *Jove*? Yes that I will, I hold thee
Three-pence.

Paf. Curse on thee for this Impudence.

Streph. If thou wert rubb'd with Salt, 'twould
make thy Wit the quicker,

Paf. D'ye laugh at me?

Streph. Thou wilt take up six Bushels.

Paf. So help me, *Jupiter*, and all the Gods,

I will be even with you for this Scorn.

Streph. I'm extremely taken with your Gods,

And this same *Jupiter* you swear by, they

Are excellent Pastime to a knowing Man.

Paf. Well, you will one Day answer for these
Words.

But tell me whether I shall have my Money

Or not, give me say Answer, and I am gone.

Streph. Stay but a little, I will answer presently,

And plainly.

Paf. Sure he's gone to fetch the Money.

Streph. Where is the Man that comes to ask me
Money?

Tell me, what's this?

Paf. That which it is, a *Cardopus*.

Streph. You ask for Money, and so very a Dunce!

I'll never whilst I live pay him a Penny,

That calls a *Cardopa* a *Cardopus*.

Paf. You will not pay then?

Streph. Not for ought I know:

You'll stay no longer, pray about your Business.

Paf. Yes, I'll be gone, but in the mean time
know

I'll have my Money, if I live this Day.

Streph. You may chance to go without it; yet
I'm sorry

You should be punish'd so for a Mistake,

For saying *Cardopus* for *Cardopa*.

SCENE V.

Amyntas, Strephiad, Witness.

Amynt. OH, oh, alas!

Streph. Who's that keeps such a Bawling?

What art thou? one of *Karkinus*'s Sons?

Amynt. 'Tis I, unhappy I!

Streph. Keep it to thyself.

Amynt. Unlucky Chance, oh cruel Destiny,

To spoil at once my Cart and all my Horses!

Oh *Pallas*, how unkindly hast thou used me?

Streph. What Hurt did ever *Tlepolemus* do thee?

Amynt. Deride me not, but rather bid your Son

Pay the Money which he had of me,

For I was never in more Need of it.

Streph. What Money, Man?

Amynt. That which he borrowed of me.

Streph. Then I perceive you're in a sad Condition.

Amynt. I had a scurvy Fall driving my Horses.

Streph. Thou dost but jest, 'twas driving an Ass
rather.

Amynt. I do not jest when I demand my Money.

Streph. Upon my Word thou art not right.

Amynt. How so?

Streph. Thy Brain, methinks is troubled.

Amynt. Either pay me

My Money straight, or I will trouble you.

Streph. Tell me, Doth *Jove* beget and send down
Rain,

Or doth the Sun exhale it from the Sea?

Amynt. I neither know nor care.

Streph. What? are you fit

To receive Money, and so ignorant

Of these sublime and subtle Mysteries?

Amynt. Well, if you cannot let me have the
Principal,

Pay me the Interest.

* Which were *Xenodorus, Xenochorus, and Demochorus*, Tragic Poets and Actors.

b This and the following Line are taken from *Xenodorus*, which is the Reason of *Strephiad*'s Answer.

Strepf. Interest, what Kind
Of Creature's that?

Any. What, but the Increase of Money

* By Months and Days, as Time runs on.

Strepf. 'Tis well.

And do you think the Sea is fuller now
Than 'twas at first?

Any. No, not a Drop, it is
Nor fit it should.

Strepf. The Sea by your Confession
Is nothing grown; then with what Conscience
Can you desire your Money should increase.

Go get you from my Doors, fetch me a Whip there.

Whit. Well, I'll bear Witness for him.

Strepf. Why d'ye not go, will you move *Sam-
phoras*?

Any. Is not this riotous?

Strepf. Will you be gone?

Or shall I lead you in a Chain, and make you
Shew Tricks? If you stay but a little longer,
I'll send you and your Cart and Horses packing.

Chor. 'Now, observe what 'tis to bend

' Studies to an evil End.

' This old Man, that is intent

' Creditors to circumvent,

' Foolishly himself hath crost,

' And will find fo to his Cost;

' That in this false Art his Son

' Hath attain'd Perfection:

' Justice cunning to refute,

' That at last he'll wish him mute.

ACT V. SCENE I.

Strepfiades, Phidippides.

Strepf. O Neighbours, Kinsmen, Countrymen,
help, help,

I'm beat, all, all over, oh my Head, my Back!

Thou strick'st thy Father, Rogue.

Phid. I do so, Father.

Strepf. See, see, he stands in't too.

Phid. I do indeed.

Strepf. Thieff, Villain, Parricide.

Phid. More I beseech you,

I am much taken with these pretty Titles.

Strepf. Rascal.

Phid. Pray stick me fuller of these Roses:

Strepf. Dost beat thy Father?

Phid. Yes, by *Jove*, and justly.

Strepf. Oh Rogue, what Justice can there be in
that?

Phid. I will demonstrate it by Argument.

Strepf. By Argument?

Phid. Most easily, which Language shall I dis-
pute in?

Strepf. Language?

Phid. Yes, the greater

Or lesser?

Strepf. I have bred thee well indeed
If thou canst make this good, that any Son
May beat his Father.

Phid. You'll confess as much

If I to prove it, that you cannot answer it.

Strepf. Well, I will hear for once what you can
say.

SCENE II.

Chorus, Strepfiades, Phidippides.

Chor. O I.D Man, it much concerns you to confute
' Your Son, whose Confidence appears
to suit

' With a just Cause; how happen'd this Dispute?

Strepf. I shall relate it from the first; as soon
As we had dined, I took a Lute and bid him

Sing the Sheep-shearing of *Simonides*!

He told me 'twas an old and ugly Fashion

To sing at Dinner like a Miller's Wife.

Phid. And was not this sufficient to deserve

' A Beating; when you'd make Men chirp like
Grass-hoppers?

Strepf. Just so he said within; and added that
Simonides was an unpleasant Poet.

I must confess I hardly could forbear him;

But then I bid him take a Myrtle-branch

And act some Piece of *Æschylus*: That *Æschylus*,

Saith he, is of all Poets the absurdest,

The hardest, most disorderly, and bombast.

Did not my Heart pant at this Language think you?

Yet I repress it; then said I, rehearse

A learned Speech out of some modern Wit;

He strait repeats out of *Euripides*

A tedious long Oration, how the Brothers

(Good Heavens) did violate the Sister's Bed.

Here I confess I could contain no longer

But chid him sharply; to dispute we went,

Words upon Words, till he at last to Blows,

To strike, to pull, to tear me.

Phid. And not justly?

You that would commend *Euripides*,

The wisest of all Poets.

Strepf. Wisest? ah

What did I say? I shall be beat again.

Phid. By *Jove* and you deserve it,

Strepf. How, deserve it?

Ungrateful Wretch, have I not brought thee up,

Fed and maintain'd thee from a little one,

Supply'd thy Wants? How then can I deserve it?

Chor. 'Now I believe each youthful Breast

' With Expectation posset,

' That if the Glory of the Day

' Be from the Plaintiff born away,

' By this Example they may all

' Upon the old Men heavily fall;

* The Horse's Name which he bought of him.

† At Noon. Virg. *Ecl.* 2.

What you have done with utmost Art,
To justify is now your Part.
Phid. How sweet it is to study, sage new Things;
And to condemn all fundamental Laws!
When I applied my Mind to Horse-courting
I could not speak three Words but I was out;
Now since I gave it o'er, I am acquainted
With ponderous Sentences; and subtle Reasons;
Able to prove I ought to beat my Father.

Streps. Nay, follow Racing still, for I had rather
Maintain thy Horses, than be beaten thus.

Phid. I will begin where you did interrupt me,
And first will ask, Did you not beat me when
I was a Child?

Streps. But that was out of Love.
Phid. 'Tis very right, tell me then, ought not I
To recompence your Love with equal Love?
If to be beaten be to be below'd,
Why should I suffer Stripes, and you have none?
I am by Nature born as free as you;
Nor is it fit the Sons should be chastiz'd,
And not their Parents.

Streps. Why?
Phid. You urge the Law,
That doth allow all Children to be beaten:
To which I answer, old Men are twice Children,
And therefore ought, when they offend, be punished
As well as we.

Streps. But there's no Law that says
The Parents should be punished.

Phid. Was not he
Who made that Law, a Man as you and I?
He form'd a Law, which all the old Men follow'd.
Why may not I as well prescribe another,
And all the young Men follow my Advice?
But all the Blows before this Law was made
Must be forgiven without all Dispute.
Besides, mark how the Cocks and other Creatures
Fight with their Sires, who differ not at all
From us, save only that they make no Laws.

Streps. Why then if you will imitate the Cocks,
Do you not dine upon a Dunghill, and
Lodge in a Hen-roost?

Phid. 'Tis not all one Case,
Our *Socrates* doth not approve so far.

Streps. Approve not then their Fighting, but in
this

Thou pleasest against thyself.

Phid. How so?

Streps. Because
Th' Authority I exercise o'er thee
Will be thine own, when e'er thou hast a Son.

Phid. But if I ne'er have any, then I never
Shall have Authority, and you will go
To th' Grave deriding me.

Streps. 'Tis too much Reason.

Phid. Hear now another Argument.

Streps. I'm lost.
Phid. And then perhaps you'll take the Blows
I give you
Not half so ill.

Streps. What Good shall I get by them?

Phid. I'll beat my Mother too?

Streps. What sayst thou?

Why this is worse than t'other.

Phid. What if I

Prove by the second Language that I ought?

Streps. Why then you will have nothing more
to do

But prove that you, and your wife *Socrates*,
And wiser Language may hang all together.
O Clouds, all this I suffer through your Means,
For I in you wholly repos'd my Trust.

Chor. Thyself art Author of this Misery,

'Cause to ill thou didst thy Mind apply.

Streps. Why did you then give me no Warning
of it?

You know I was a rude and aged Man.

Chor. This is our Custom whensoever we find

'Any to Malice or Deceit inclin'd,

'Into some dreadful Mischief such we thrust,

'That they may fear the Gods, and learn what's
just.

Streps. Alas, this is a Mischief, and a just one,
For ought I not, when I had borrowed Money,
To seek out Ways to avoid restoring it?
Come then, my Son, let's be reveng'd
Upon that wicked *Socrates* and *Charephen*,
Who have abus'd us both.

Phid. I will not wrong

My Masters.

Streps. Reverence Celestial *Jove*.

Phid. Celestial *Jove*, see how you rave now Pa-
ther:

There's no such Thing as *Jove*.

Streps. There is.

Phid. A Whirl-wind

Hath blown *Jove* quite away, and rules all Heaven.

Streps. No Son, he's not expell'd, I was but
fool'd

To worship in his Room a feeble Deity.

Phid. Nay, if you will needs be mad, be mad
alone.

SCENE III

Strepsiades.

Streps. MAD that I was to trust in *Socrates*,
and cast off all our Gods; good Mer-
cury,

Be not displeas'd, or punish, but forgive me,
That took such Pains, and studied to talk idly,
And tell me what I'd best do with these Fellows,
Sue them or punish 'em some other Way—
Th'art in the Right, I will not sue them then,

But as thou bidst me, set their Neck on Fire;
Come *Xanthias*, come, a Fork and a Ladder quickly.
Get up and pluck the House about their Ears,
Quick, if thou lovest thy Master; one of you
Go light a Torch, and bring it hither straight,
Proud as they are I mean to bring 'em lower.

SCENE IV.

Scholar, Strepsiades, Socrates, Chærephon.

Schol. Oh, oh!

Streps. Torch to thy Work; set Fire
apace.

Schol. What art thou doing, Man?

Streps. That which I am doing;

Disputing somewhat hotly with your School here.

Schol. Alas, who's this that sets our House on
Fire?

Streps. He whom you call'd of his Clerk.

Schol. Thou kill'st,

Thou kill'st us, Man.

Streps. That is the Thing I mean,

If my Fork hold, and Ladder do not fail me.

Socr. How now, what do you make on our
House-ridge.

Streps. 'I walk in the Air and gaze upon the
Sun.

Socr. Alas, I'm chok'd.

Streps. Why dost thou scorn the Gods then?

Char. Oh me, I burn;

Streps. Now you may calculate

The Motions of the Moon; tear, pluck, beat,
burn 'em.

For many Reasons they deserve the Flame,

But most because they did the Gods disclaim.

f AD. II. Scene III.

X E N O P H O N.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, and following of Socrates.

Xenophon^a was an Athenian, Son of Gryllus, of
the Erechian Tribe. The Time of his Birth
is no where expressly delivered. ^b *Stesilides*
affirms, he died the first Year of the one hundred and
fifth Olympiad. ^c *Lucian* that he outlived ninety
Years: Whence it is evident he was born at or be-
fore the first Year of the eighty second Olympiad,
which if the learned *Cassaubon* had observed, he had
not^d altered *Athenæus* upon Supposition that he
was but ten Years old, the 4th Year of the eighty
ninth Olympiad (the Time of his *Symposium*) where-
as he was then no less than thirty-six Years of Age.
^e *Laertius* faith, he flourished the fourth Year of the
ninety-fourth Olympiad. (*Suidas* reads of the ninety
eight) or, according to others, that he flourished in
the eighty ninth Olympiad with the rest of the Socra-
tick Philosophers; of whom he became one upon
this Accident.

^f Meeting *Socrates* in a narrow Lane, he stopt
him with his Staff, and asked him where all Kind
of Meats were to be sold; to which *Socrates* made
a serious Answer: And then demanded of him,
where it was that Men were made good and virtu-
ous? Whereat *Xenophon* pausing, follow'd me them,
faith he, and learn. From thence forward he be-
came a Disciple of *Socrates*.

In the Time of that great War betwixt the Lo-

cedemonians and Athenians, called the *Peloponnesian*
War, (the natural Forwardness of his Spirit, being
perhaps excited by the Example of his Master *Socra-
tes*) he was personally engaged in the Fight before
Delium, the first Year of the 89th Olympiad,
wherein the *Bæotians* overcame the *Athenians*; in
which Defeat^g *Xenophon* in the Flight, unhorsed
and thrown down, *Socrates* (who, his Horse being
likewise slain under him, fought on Foot) took him
upon his Shoulders, and carried him many Furlongs,
until the Enemy gave over the Pursuit. This was
the first Essay of his Military Profession, which he
afterward resumed upon this Occasion.

CHAP. II.

Upon what Occasion he followed Cyrus into Asia.

Artaxerxes^h succeeded *Darius* his Father, in the
Kingdom of *Persia*, *Cyrus* his younger Bro-
ther having been sent for out of his Government of
Lydia upon his Father's Sickness, which is the first
and last, plac'd by the *Armenian* *Strabo* in the first
second Year of the 73d Olympiad (counted by a
learnedⁱ Period with the last six Years after)
was imprisoned by his Brother upon the Accusation
of *Tissaphernes*, but released by the Mediation of
his Mother *Parysatis*. Being restored to his Go-

^a *Laert.* 2. 48. ^b *Ibid.* 2. 56. ^c *De Longev.* ^d *Animadv.* 5. 12. ^e *Laert.* 2. 56. ^f *Ibid.* 2. 48. ^g *Strab.* 2. 9.
^h *Laert.* 2. 23. ⁱ *Xenoph. expolit. Cyr. lib.* 1. ^j *Marshall ad Oros. Apoc. can. Chronog.* pag. 213.

his Quality, and were the fittest sepulchral Ornaments of a valiant Man. His Shield was of *Argas*, his Breast-plate of *Attica*, his Helmet of *Bœotia*, his Horse of *Epidaurium*; whereby *Ælian* argued the Elegance of the Person, in choosing such Things as were fair, and esteeming him worthy of such. Thus adorned, he made an Oration to the Army, advising them (from the Examples of their late Commanders) not to trust the Enemy, but in order to their Return, to burn their Carriages and Tents. This Advice was put in Execution; *Cheirisophus* a *Lacedæmonian* had Charge of the Van, *Xenophon* of the Rear, chosen (saith *Chio*) as well for his Courage as Wisdom, being in both excellent. Betwixt these two there grew so great a Friendship, that in all the Time of the Retreat, they never had but one Difference. Their March was directed towards the Heads of those great Rivers which lay in their Way, that they might pass them where they were fordable. Having crossed the River *Zatbe*, *Mithridates* came up to them, and galled the Rear with Shot, which the *Greeks* not able to requite, *Xenophon* provided two hundred Slings, and finding fifty Horses fit for Service, employed among the Carriages, mounted Men upon them, whereby having frustrated the second Attempt of *Mithridates*, they marched to *Larissa*, seated upon *Tygris*, thence to *Mispila*. In their March from thence, *Tissaphernes* overtook them with a great Army, but was twice worsted; whereupon (as the securest Course) he seized on a Mountain under which they must of Necessity pass; *Xenophon* with a Party gained by another Way the Top of that Mountain, not without much Difficulty of Passage and Trouble; and to animate his Soldiers, one of them, named *Soleridas*, murmured that he was on Horseback, whereas himself marched on Foot, oppressed with the Weight of his Shield; which *Xenophon* hearing, alighted, took his Shield from him, and thrusting him out of his Rank, marched (notwithstanding he had also a Horseman's Cuirass) in his Room: But the Soldiers beat and reviled *Soleridas*, till they constrained him to take again his Shield and Place. When they had gained the Top, the Enemy, being prevented, fled, and set Fire on the Villages. The *Grecians* (intercepted by the River *Tygris*) marched over the Mountains into the Country of the *Carduchi*, a People Enemies to the *Persians*, rough and warlike, from whom they found such Opposition, that in seven Days March through their Country, they were put to continual Fights, and suffered more Distresses than the *Persian* had put them to. Forging the River *Kentrites*, which bounds that Country, they passed into *Armenia*, where having put to Flight some Troops of Horse, raised by the King's Deputies in these Parts to oppose their Passage, they

marched without Disturbance to the Heads of *Tygris*, which they passed; thence to the River of *Teleboe* in *Wgi Armenia*, molested with extreme Snows, losing many by Extremity of Cold, till they came to the River *Phasis*, near which lived the *Phasians*, *Tacchi*, and the *Chalybes*. The *Tacchi*, into whose Country they first came, conveying their Provisions into strong Holds, reduced the *Greeks* to great Want, until with much Pains they forced one of them, where they took as much Cattle as maintained them in their Passage through the Country of the *Chalybes*, a stout Nation, of whom they could get nothing but Blows: Thence they marched to the River *Harpasus*, so to the *Scythini*, where the Lord of *Gymnias*, a Town in those Parts, led them through the Enemy's Country (which he willed them to burn as they went) to the Mountain *Thebes*, from whence they might behold the Sea, to the great Joy of the Soldiers. Passing friendly through the Country of the *Macrones*, to the *Colchian* Mountains, discomfiting the *Colchi*, who opposed them, they arrived at *Trapezond*, a City upon the *Euxine* Sea, where was a *Greek* Colony: Here they sacrificed and celebrated Games. *Cheirisophus* they sent to *Anaxibius*, the *Lacedæmonian* Admiral, (with whom he was intimate) to procure Ships for their Transportation home. Whilst they staid in Expectation of his Return, they maintained themselves by Incursions upon the *Colchi* and *Drylani*; but he not coming, and their Provision failing, *Xenophon* persuaded the Cities adjoining to clear them a Passage by Land, which they took to *Cerasus*, a *Greek* City, where mustering their Men, they found but eight thousand six hundred left of ten thousand that went up with *Cyrus*, the rest consumed by Enemies, Snow, and Sicknefs. They shared the Money that had been made by the Sale of Captives, reserving a Tenth for an Offering to *Apollo* and *Diana*. *Xenophon* preserved his to be disposed at *Delphi* and *Ephesus*. From *Cerasus* they passed through the Country of the *Masyraci*, a barbarous People, divided into Factions; the stronger Part despising their Friendship, they joined with the weaker, whom they left Masters of all: Then they marched to the *Chalybes*, thence to the *Tibarenæ*, passing quietly through their Country to *Cotiora*, a *Greek* Town and Colony of the *Sinopians*. Thus far the Army marched on Foot; the Distance of the Place where they fought with *Artaxerxes* to *Cotyora*, being one hundred twenty two Encampings, six hundred twenty Parasangs, ten thousand eight hundred twenty Furlongs, the Time eight Months.

Those of *Cotyora* refusing to afford them a Market, or Entertainment for their Sick, they entered the Town by Force, and took Provision, partly out of *Paphlagonia*, partly out of the Territory of

a *Chien. Ep. 3. ad Metast.*b *Xenophon. lib. 4.*c *Ibid. lib. 5.*

the *Cotierites*; whereupon the City of *Sinope*, to which *Cotiera* was tributary, sent Ambassadors to them, complaining of this Dealing, and threatening to join with *Corilas* and the *Paphlagonians*: whereupon *Xenophon* answered, *That they feared not, if need were, to War against them both, but could, if they pleased, gain the Friendship of Corilas and the Paphlagonians as well as they.* Upon which Answer, the Ambassadors growing calm, promised them all Friendship from the State of *Sinope*, and to assist them with Shipping for the whole Army; it being impossible to go by Land, by reason of the Rivers *Thermodon*, *Haliis*, *Iris*, and *Parthenius*.

Xenophon had designed to plant a Colony there, but his Intention being divulged by *Silanus*, a Sooth-sayer, those of *Sinope* and *Heraclea* sent to the *Grecians*, promising them not only a sufficient Fleet, but desiring under-hand *Timastian*, a Greek Commander, to promise the Army a good Sum of Money to convey them to *Troas*; which Offers *Xenophon* (who only desired the common Good) per-suaded them to accept, and to engage mutually not to forsake one another, till they were all in Safety. Those of *Heraclea* sent Shipping, but not the Money; whereupon *Timastian*, and other Commanders, fearing the Soldiers, desired *Xenophon* the Army might go to *Phasis*, which he refused; but thereby was occasioned a Suspicion that he should plot to deceive the Army, and to bring them back to *Phasis*, whereof he acquitted himself. Here a general Inquisition was made of all Offences since the Death of *Cyrus*, and they were punished: Some accused *Xenophon* for beating them, all which proved for just Causes; one for offering to bury his sick Companion alive; some for forsaking their Ranks; others for lying on the Ground in the Snow, or lingering behind. Thus were all Things quietly settled.

CHAP. IV.

End of the Retreat.

^a **T**HE *Greeks*, as soon as their Fleet was ready, set Sail for *Harmene*, the Port of *Sinope*, when *Chirisophus* met them with some Gallies from *Anaxibius*, who promised them Pay as soon as they should come into *Greece*. The Army desirous of a General, intreated *Xenophon* (with extraordinary Testimony of Affection) to accept that Command: *Xenophon* refused; either dissuaded by inauspicious Sacrifice, or unwilling to displease the *Lacedaemonians*, in putting by *Chirisophus*, who was thereupon chosen, but soon after deposed, for refusing to extort a great Sum from *Heraclea*, a Greek City, their Friends. *Xenophon* also denying to be employed therein, the Army thereupon became divided; they chose ten Captains out of themselves; with *Chirisophus* remained two Thousand one Hundred,

with *Xenophon* two Thousand Foot and Forty Horse. *Chirisophus* went by Land to meet *Cleander* Governor of *Byzantium*, at the Mouth of the River *Calphas*, leaving such Shipping as he had to *Xenophon*, who landing in the Confines of *Thrace*, and of the *Heraclean* Country, marched quickly through the midst of the Land. The Mutineers landing at *Calphas*, surprized and spoiled the Country thereabout: The *Thracians* rising up against them, cut off two Regiments, and besieged the Hill where the rest encamped. *Xenophon* on the Way being inform'd of the desperate Condition of these *Greeks*, went directly to the Place, setting on Fire as he went all that was combustible; the Enemy fearing to be set upon in the Night, stole away, as did the *Greeks* also; whom *Xenophon* overtaking in the Way to the Port of *Calphas*, they embraced him with great Joy, and arriving at the Haven, made a Decree that it should be Death for any Man to propound to divide the Army, and that they should depart the Country in their first Order. The former Commanders being restored in the Room of *Chirisophus*, who died, they substituted *Neon*, who going forth with two Thousand Men to pillage the Country, was discomfited by *Pharnabazus*, Lieutenant to the King of *Persia*, and lost five hundred Men; the rest rescued by *Xenophon*, the Army, by his Encouragement, marched through a large Forest, defeating *Pharnabazus*, who opposed their Passage there. *Cleander* came over to them, and having expressed much Kindness to *Xenophon*, and contracted Hospitality with him, departed. The Army marched through *Bythinia* to *Chrysopolis*, in the Territories of *Chalcedon*.^c Thence *Anaxibius*, the *Lacedaemonian* Admiral, transported them to *Byzantium*, where he had promised they should, as soon as they arrived, receive Pay, without which he sent them out of the City; whereat the Soldiers incensed, returned and entered the City by Force, intending to spoil it; but *Xenophon* thrusting himself amongst the Crowd, dissuaded them, and appeased the Tumult; as is particularly attested by ^d *Chio*, an Eye-witness. By this Means they were brought to depart the City quietly, which as soon as they had done, *Xenophon* desirous to go Home, took Leave of the Army, and returned to *Byzantium* with *Cleander*. *Anaxibius* being put out of the Admiralty, and thereupon slighted by *Pharnabazus* (at whose Instigation he had treated the *Greeks* so hardly) desired *Xenophon* to return to the Army, to lead 'em to *Perinthus*, whence they should be transported into *Asia*; the Army received him with much Joy. When they came to *Perinthus*, *Aristarchus* the Governor would not suffer them to be transported. *Sentus* King of *Thrace* had invited them to aid him against *Medocus*, Usurper of his Kingdom, with large Offers of Money

^a *Xenoph. lib. 6.* ^c *Xenoph. lib. 7.* ^d *In Epistola ad Motidem.*

to every Soldier, of his Daughter to *Xenophon*. To him therefore, not knowing where to winter, they went. At Supper, every one (according to the Custom) drank to the King, and made him a Present. *Xenophon*, who sat next him, rising up, and taking the Cup, told him, *He gave himself and all his Companions to be his faithful Friends, and ready Servants in the Recovery of his Kingdom*: Herein their Assistance did much advantage *Seuthes*. The Army wanting Pay, *Xenophon* reproved *Heraclides* for not taking Order about it; who thereupon endeavoured to work him out of Favour with *Seuthes*, to whom he brought the rest of the Commanders, counselling them to say, that if need were, they could lead the Army upon Service as well as *Xenophon*; but they jointly protested unto *Seuthes*, they would not serve at all without him. So he sent for *Xenophon* also, and being agreed to proceed, they marched towards the Country of the *Melinophagi*, as far as *Salmydessus*; which Places having reduc'd, they returned to the Plains of *Selybria*: Thither came *Charminus* a *Lacedæmonian*, *Polinicus* sent from *Thymbro*, who told them that the *Lacedæmonians* had designed War against *Tissaphernes*, the Charge thereof was committed to *Thymbro*, who desired this Army of *Greeks* to assist them, promising them good Pay. *Seuthes* willingly yielded the Army into their Hands. They sent *Xenophon* to demand their Arrears, which not without much Importunity he obtained. Thence they failed to *Lampsacus*, where *Euclides*, a Soothsayer of *Xenophon's* Acquaintance, asked him, How much Gold he had brought? *Xenophon* protested he had not enough to carry him Home, but that he sold his Horse and other Things which he had about him. The next Day they marched to *Ophrynum*, whither came *Brito* and *Euclides*, to pay the Army; they being *Xenophon's* Friends, restored (refusing the Price of Redemption) his Horse which he much loved, and had pawn'd at *Lampsacus*. Then marching forward by *Atramiitium* and *Certonium*, not far from *Alarna*, to the Plain of *Caicus*, they reached *Pergamus*, a City of *Lydia*. Here *Hellas*, Wife of *Gongylus* an *Eretrian*, Mother of *Gorgion*, and *Gongylus*, entertained *Xenophon*. By her Information *Xenophon* surprized *Afidates* a rich *Persian*, with his Wife and Children, and all his Goods. Returning to *Pergamus*, the *Lacedæmonians*, Captains and Soldiers, by Agreement gave him also an extraordinary Share of Horses, Oxen, and other Things. Then came *Thymbro*, and taking the Army, join'd it to the rest of the *Grecian* Forces, wherewith he made a War against *Tissaphernes*.

Of the King's Provinces, through which they passed, the Governors were these; *Artimas* of *Lydia*, *Artacamus* of *Phrygia*, *Mithridates* of *Laconia*, and *Cappadocia*; of *Cicilia*, & *Scyennesis*; of

Phœnicia and *Arabia*, *Dernes*; of *Syria* and *Assyria*, *Belefs*; of *Babylonia*, *Raparas*; of *Media*, *Arbaces*; of the *Phasian* and *Hesperita*, *Teribazus*; the *Carduchi*, *Chalybes*, *Chaldeas*, *Macrones*, *Colchi*, *Mosynachi*, *Cæti*, and *Tibareni*, are free Nations. *Paphlagonia* governed by *Corpas*, the *Bithynians* by *Pharnabazus*, the *European Thracians* by *Seuthes*. The total Number of the Ascend and Descent is two hundred and fifteen Encampings, one thousand one hundred and fifty Parafangs, thirty four thousand two hundred fifty five Furlongs; the Time of the Ascend and Descent, one Year and three Months.

C H A P. V.

His following of Agesilaus, and Banishment.

After this Expedition, the Defeat in Pontus, and Breach of Promise of *Seuthes* King of the *Odryians*, *Xenophon* went into Asia with *Agesilaus* King of the *Lacedæmonians*, to whom he delivered, for a Sum of Money, the Soldiers of *Cyrus*, and beloved infinitely, *ἐκ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν*. ¹ *Emilius* *Probus* saith, he conversed intimately with him: *Cicero*, that he instructed him. ² *Plutarch* affirms, that by his Advice *Agesilaus* sent his Sons to be educated at *Sparta*, to learn and art them, which none was more excellent, how to obey and command. *Agesilaus* passed into Asia, the first Year of the 96th Olympiad. He war'd successfully with the *Persian*, but the Year following was called Home by the *Lacedæmonians*, to help his Country, invaded by the *Thebans*, and their Allies, whom the *Persian* had corrupted; thereby to withdraw the War out of his Country. *Xenophon*, in his returning with *Agesilaus* out of Asia into *Boætia*, apprehending the Danger of the War they were entering into, when he came to *Ephesus*, left one Half of the Gold¹ which he had reserved for an Offering out of his Share (of the Money which the Army divided at *Cerasunt*, in their Return from the Expedition of *Cyrus*) with *Megabyzus*, *Diana's* Priest, willing that if he escaped the Danger of that War, it should be restored to him; if he miscarried, consecrated to *Diana*, and either made into an Image dedicated to the Goddess, or disposed some way that he should conceive most acceptable to her. The other Half he sent an Offering to the *Athenian* Treasury at *Delpi*,² inscribing thereon both his own Name, and that of *Proxenus*, his Predecessor in the Command of that Regiment. *Agesilaus* returning, wasted *Boætia*, and overcame the *Thebans* and their Allies in a great Battle at *Coronea*,³ particularly described by *Xenophon*, who was there present.

During the Absence of *Xenophon* out of his own Country, the *Athenians* (because he took Part against the King of *Persia*, their Friend, and followed *Cyrus*, who had assisted the *Lacedæmonians* against

^g Which perhaps was a common Name to the Kings of that Country, as *Ptolemy* to those of *Egypt*. See *Thales*, chap. i. In *Vit. Agef.* de *Orat.* l. 3. ^k In *Vit. Agef.* ^l *Laert.* *supr.* chap. 3. ^m *Xenoph.* lib. 5. ⁿ *Agefil.*

^h *Laert.* a. 31.

them, ^o supplying *Lysander* their General with Money for a Navy) proclaimed a Decree of Banishment against him. ^p After faith, he was banished by the Decree of *Eubulus*, and called home by the same. *Laertius*, that he was banished for *Lacedaemonism*, upon his going to *Aegilaus*. Some place this Decree in the third Year of the 96th Olympiad; but the Writer of the History of *Cyrus* his Expedition implieth, that it was before his first Return out of *Asia*; affirming, that before the Delivery of the Army to *Thymbra*, *Xenophon*, ignorant of this Decree, intended to have gone Home.

C H A P. VI.

How he lived at Scilluns, and at Corinth.

THE *Lacedaemonians*, ^q to requite him for suffering in their Cause, maintain'd him at the publick Charge; and chafing *Scilluns* of the *Eleans*, built a Town there, and bestowed a fair House and Land upon *Xenophon*; whereupon he left *Aegilaus*, and went thither, carrying with him his Wife named *Philisus*, and his two Sons which he had by ^r her, *Diadros*, and *Gryllus*, called the *Discuri*. ^s Thither *Pelopidas*, a Spartan, sent him Captives for Slaves from *Dardanus* for a Present, to dispose of them as should please him.

^t *Scilluns* was near *Olympia*, eminent for Celebration of the Games, which *Megabyzus* coming to see, restored to *Xenophon* the Money which he had left in his Custody, wherewith, ^u by Advice of the Oracle, he purchased a Portion of Land; and consecrated it to *Diana*, in a Place designed by *Apollo*, through which ran the River *Selinus*, of the same Name with that at *Ephesus*, running by *Diana's* Temple. The River was stored as well with Shell-Fish as others; the Land with all kind of Beasts for Game. He built also a Temple, and after, with the consecrated Money offering the Tythes of the Fruits of the Land to *Diana*, all the Citizens and Neighbours, Men and Women, were invited to the Feast; where they had from the Goddess's Allowance, Bread, Wine, and Part of the Flesh of such Beasts as were either taken out of the consecrated Ground, and sacrificed, or killed in hunting with the Sons of *Xenophon*, and other Citizens, exercised against the Time of the Feast out of the sacred Ground; and out of *Phaloe* were taken wild Boars, Goats, and Stags. The Place lies in the Way betwixt *Lacedaemonia* and *Olympia*, twenty *Stadia* from the Temple of *Olympian Jupiter*. In the sacred Ground were Woods and Hills, stored with Trees sufficient to maintain Swine, Goats, and Sheep, whereby the Beasts of Carriage of such Merchants as come to the Feast are maintained plentifully. About the Temple a Grove of Fruit-

trees of all Sorts. The Temple was an Imitation in little of that at *Ephesus*. An Image of *Cypress* here resembling that of Gold there. A Pillar near the Temple bore this Inscription; GROUND SACRED TO *DIANA*. HE WHO POSSESETH IT, LET HIM PAY THE TYTHE OF HIS YEARLY INCREASE, AND WITH THE SURPLUSAGE MAINTAIN THE TEMPLE: IF HE NEGLECT, THE GODDESS WILL TAKE ORDER FOR IT. At this Place of Retirement *Xenophon* employed his Time in Hunting, and writing Histories, inviting his Friends thither; ^v of whom, amongst others, came *Phaedo* and *Aristippus*, much delighted with the Situation, Building, and Trees planted by the Hand of the Owner.

^w At length, a War arising betwixt the *Eleans* and *Lacedaemonians*, the *Eleans* invaded *Scilluns* with a great Army; and before the *Lacedaemonians* came to their Relief, seized on the House and Lands of *Xenophon*. His Sons, with some few Servants, got away privately to *Lepreum*; *Xenophon* first to *Elis*, then to *Lepreum* to his Sons, and lastly with them to *Corinth*, where he took a House, and continued the rest of his Life. During this Time, the *Argives*, *Arcadians*, and *Thebans*, jointly opposed the *Lacedaemonians*, and had almost opprest them, when the *Athenians* made a publick Decree (^x mentioned by *Xenophon*) to succour them. *Xenophon* sent his Sons upon the Expedition to *Athens*, to fight for the *Lacedaemonians*; for (as *Diocles* affirms) they had been educated at *Sparta*, in the Discipline of that Place.

This Enmity ended in a great Battle at *Mantineia*, in the 2d Year of the hundred and fourth Olympiad. *Diodorus*, without adding any Thing memorable, gave off safe, and had afterwards a Son of his Brother's Name. *Gryllus* was rank'd opposite to the *Theban* Horsemen. The *Thebans* having by the Valour of their General *Epaminondas*, got the better of the Day, a resolute Company of *Spartan* Horsemen broke in upon him; of whom was *Gryllus*, who slew *Epaminondas* with his own Hand, as *Pausanias* affirms to have been attested both by the *Athenians* and the *Thebans*; adding, that he had seen at *Athens* a Picture of the Battle at *Mantineia*, confirming the same; and that at *Mantineia* was erected a Pillar, with the Statue of *Gryllus* on Horse-back. In this noble Action ^y *Gryllus* lost his Life; the News of whose Death came to *Xenophon* at *Corinth*, as he was sacrificing, crown'd with a Garland. As soon as he heard his Son was slain, he took off his Garland, and laid it aside; then demanding after what Manner he died; it was answered, fighting stoutly in the midst of his Enemies; of whom having slain many, he fell at last himself. Hereupon *Xenophon* took again his Garland, and

^o Pausan. *Eliae*. 6. ^p Laert. 2. 51. ^q Laert. 2. 52. ^r Suid. ^s Laert. *ibid*. ^t Xenoph. de *exped. Cyr.* 5. Laert. ^u Strab. 8. ^w Laert. *ibid*. ^x Epist. Socratic. 18. ^y Laert. *ibid*. ^z Græc. hist. ultim. ^a Laert. *Eliae*. var. hist. 3. 3. D. Hieron. Epist. Nepot. ad Heliod. Stob. *Serm.* 106.

putting it upon his Head, proceeded to sacrifice, not so much as shedding one Tear; only saying, *I knew that I had begot a Mortal*; ^b and calling the Gods to whom he sacrificed, to witnesses, that the Virtue of his Son gave him more Content, than his Death Sorrow. ^c Innumerable were the Epitaphs and Encomiums that were written upon *Gryllus* to please *Xenophon*, whence may be collected in how great Esteem he was.

That he made a Visit to *Dionysius*, Tyrant of *Sicily*, (but at what Time is uncertain) is implied by ^d *Athenæus*, who relateth, That being at a Feast of his, compelled by the Cup-bearer to drink, he called the Tyrant by Name; *What is the Matter, Dionysius, (saith he) your Cook, though excellent in that Art, doth not enforce us to eat against our Inclination?*

C H A P. VII.

His Death, Person, Virtues.

Xenophon being ^e full of Years (which according to ^f *Lucian* exceeded Ninety) died at *Corinth*, in the first of the Hundred and sixth Olympiad, *Callidemus*, or *Callimedes* being Archon, at what Time *Philip*, Son of *Aminius*, began his Reign in *Macedonia*. He had an ingenious modest Look, long thick Hair, handsome (to use the Words of *Laertius*) beyond Expression; adroit in every Thing; particularly addicted to Horses and Hunting; skillful in Tactics, as his Writings attest; devout; a great Lover of Sacrifices, skillful in interpreting them; an exact Imitator of *Socrates*; temperate, as appears from his saying, that *It is pleasant, hungry, to eat Herbs; thirsty, to drink Water*. So candid and ingenious, that ^g when he might have stolen the Writings of *Thucydides*, which lay concealed, he chose rather to publish them with Honour.

In a Word; he was a Person every Way absolute, as well for Action as Contemplation. *Xenophon* (saith ^h *Eunapius*) *was the only Man of all the Philosophers who adorned Philosophy with his Words and Actions. He describes Moral Virtue in his Discourses and Writings. In his Actions he was singular. As to his Conduct, a most excellent General. Alexander had not been Great, if Xenophon had not aided. Even the personatory Actions of valiant Persons ought to be recorded.*

ⁱ He was the first that committed the Disputes of *Socrates*, his Master, to Writing; and that with much Fidelity, not inserting Excursions of his own, as *Plato* did; whom for that Reason, as ^j *A. Gellius* observes, he argueth of Falshood. That there was a great Enmity betwixt these Two is affirmed by the same Author; who, as a Proof thereof, al-

lledgeth, that neither of them names the other in any of their Writings. ^k *Vossius* only observes, that *Xenophon* mentions *Plato* once in his *Memorabilia*, overseen by *A. Gellius*. This Enmity is further acknowledged by ^l *Athenæus* and *Laertius*, confirmed by the Epistle of *Xenophon* to *Æschines*, wherein he condemns *Plato*, that not being satisfied with the Doctrine of *Socrates*, he went to the *Pythagoreans* in *Italy*, and to the *Ægyptian Priests*; Arguments of a Mind not content to *Socrates*. That he was at Difference with ^m *Aristippus* also, argued from his Writings.

ⁿ *Laertius* hath two Epigrams concerning him, the first upon his going with *Cyrus* into *Upper Asia*.

*Great Xenophon at once made two Ascents,
To Asia in Person, and to Heaven by Fame:
His Style and Action (lasting Monuments)
Lay to Socratick Wisdom equal Claim.*

The other upon his Banishment.

*Thou the Cæcropsians, noble Xenophon,
Banish'd their Land 'cause Cyrus thou didst aid;
But Strangers prov'd far kinder than thy own:
What Athens ow'd thee, was by Corinth paid.*

^o *Laertius* reckons seven *Xenophons*. This the first. The second an *Athenian*, Brother to *Nicæstratus*, Author of the *Tebes*; besides many other Things, he wrote the *Lives* of *Pelepidas* and *Egaminondas*. The third a Physician of *Cos*. The fourth, Writer of the History of *Hannibal*. The fifth, Writer of fabulous Monstrs. The sixth, of *Paros*, a Statuary. The seventh, an old comick Poet. *Suidas* reckons three more; one of *Antioch*, the second of *Ephesus*, the third of *Cyprus*, Historians, or rather Writers of Romances; that of the first called *Babylonica*; of the second *Ephesica*, in ten Books; of the third *Cyprica*: The Story of *Cynarus*, *Myrrha*, and *Adonis*.

C H A P. VIII.

His Writings.

Dionysius *Halicarnassensis* ^p saith, that *Xenophon* was a studious Emulator of *Herodotus*, both in Words and Language. His Style (according to *Cicero*) *soft and sweet* (melle dulcior) *far differing from the Noise of Orators in the Forum. In his Voice, the Muses seem to speak*; whence he was surnamed the *Attick Muse*; or according to others, the *Attick Bee*, a Title formerly conferred on ^q *Sophocles*. His Style and Manner of Writing is at large dis-

^b Val. Max. 5. 10.

^c Laert. 2. 57.

^d Laert. vit. Aristipp.

^e Cic. Ont.

^f Laert. citing Aristotle. 2. 55.

^g Promm.

^h Laert. 2. 48.

ⁱ Laert. 2. 59.

^j Deipnos. lib. 10.

^k Lib. 14. 3.

^l De Vit. Script. vet.

^m Laert. 2. 56.

ⁿ De histor. Grec. 1. 5.

^o Brut. & de Oratore. lib. 2.

^p Laert. 2.

^q De Imagin.

^r Lib. 3.

^s Deipnos. 11.

^t Oration. 6. 29.

^u Athen. deip.

^v Deipnos. 11.

^w Oration. 6. 29.

^x Vit. Sophoc.

To Crit. Epit. II.

*S*ocrates often told us, that they who provide much Wealth for their Children, but neglected to improve them by Virtue, do like those that feed their Horses high, and never train them to the Manage: By this Means their Horses are the better in Case, but the worse for Service, whereas the Commendations of a Horse consists not in his being fat, but serviceable in War. In the same Kind err they who purchase Lands for their Children, but neglect their Persons; their Possessions will be of great Value, themselves of none, whereas the Owner ought to be more honourable than his Estate. Whosoever therefore breeds his Son well, though he leave him little, gives him much. It is the Mind which makes him great or small; whatsoever they have, to the Good seems sufficient, to the Rude too little. You leave your Children no more than Necessity requires, which, they being well educated, will esteem plentiful. The Ignorant, though free from present Trouble, have nothing the less Fear for the future.

To Solira. Epit. III.

*D*Death, in my Opinion, is neither good nor ill, but the End of the Life; not alike to all, for as stronger or weaker from their Birth, their Years are unequal; sometimes Death is hastened by good or evil Causes: And again: Neither is it fitting to grieve so much for Death, knowing that Birth is the Beginning of Man's Pilgrimage, Death the End. He died as all Men (though never so unwilling) must do: But to die well, is the Part of a willing and well educated Person. Happy was *Gryllus*, and whosoever else chooseth not the longest Life, but the most virtuous; though his (it pleased God) was short.

To Lamprocles. Epit. IV.

*Y*OU must first approve the excellent Assertion of *Socrates*, that Riches are to be measured by their Use. He called not large Possessions Riches, but so much only as is necessary: In the Judgment whereof he advised us not be deceived, these he called truly rich, the rest poor, labouring under an incurable Poverty of Mind, not Estate.

* Epit. V.

*T*HEY who write in Praise of my Son *Gryllus*, did as they ought; and you likewise do well in writing to us the Actions of *Socrates*; we ought not only to endeavour to be good ourselves, but to

praise him who lived chastly, piously, and justly, and to blame Fortune, and those who plotted against him, who are long will receive the Punishment thereof. The *Lacedæmonians* are much infected at it, (for the ill News is come hither already) and reproach our People, saying, they are mad again, in that they could be wrought upon to put him to Death whom *Pythia* declared the wisest of Men. If any of *Socrates's* Friends want those Things which I sent, give me notice, and I will help them, for it is just and honest: You do well in keeping *Æschinus* with you, as you send me Word. I have a Design to collect the Sayings and Actions of *Socrates*; which will be his best Apology, both now and for the future, not in the Court where the *Athenians* are Judges, but to all who consider the Virtue of the Man. If we should not write this freely, it were a Sin against Friendship, and the Truth. Even now there fell into my Hands a Piece of *Plato's* to that Effect, wherein is the Name of *Socrates*, and some Discourses of his not unpleasant. But we must profess that we heard not, nor can commit to writing any in that Kind, for we are not Poets as he is, though he renounce Poetry; for amidst his Entertainments with beautiful Persons, he affirmed that there was not any Poem of his extant, but one of *Socrates*, young and handsome. Farewell, both, dearest to me.

Epit. VI.

*I*ntending to celebrate the Feast of *Diana*, to whom we have erected a Temple, we sent to invite you hither; if all of you would come, it were much the best, otherwise, if you send such as you can conveniently spare to assist at our Sacrifice, you will do us a Favour. *Arifippus* was here, (and before him) *Phædo*, who were much pleased with the Situation and Structure, but above all, with the Plantation which I have made with my own Hands. The Place is stored with Beasts convenient for hunting, which the Goddess affects; let us rejoice and give Thanks to her who preserv'd me from the King of the *Barbarians*, and afterwards in *Pontus* and *Thrace* from greater Evils, even when we thought we were out of the Enemies reach. Though you come not, yet am I obliged to write to you. I have compos'd some Memorials of *Socrates*, when they are perfect you shall have them. *Arifippus* and *Phædo* did not disapprove of them; salute in my Name *Simon* the Leather-dresser, and commend him that he continueth *Socratick* Discourses, not diverted by Want, or his Trade, from Philosophy, as some others, who decline to know and admire such Discourses and their Effects.

Epist. VII.

COME to us, dear Friend, for we have now finished the Temple of *Diana*, a magnificent Structure, the Place set with Trees, and consecrated, what remains will be sufficient to maintain us; for as *Socrates* said, if they are not fit for us, we will fit ourselves to them; I write to *Gryllus*, my Son and your Friend, to supply your Occasions; I write to *Gryllus*, because, of a little one, you have professed a Kindness for him.

To *Xantippe*. Epist. VIII.

TO *Euphron* of *Megara* I delivered six Measures of Meal, eight Drachms, and a new Raiment for your Use this Winter: Accept them, and know, that *Euclid* and *Terpsion* are exceeding good honest Persons, very affectionate to you and *Socrates*. If your Sons have a Desire to come to me, hinder them not, for the Journey to *Megara* is neither long nor incommodious. Pray forbear to weep any more, it may do Hurt, but cannot help. Remember what *Socrates* said; follow his Practice and Precepts. In grieving you will but wrong yourself and Children; they are the young ones of *Socrates*, whom we are obliged not only to maintain, but to preserve ourselves for their Sakes; lest if you or I, or any other, who after the Death of *Socrates* ought to look to his Children, should fail, they might want a Guardian to maintain and protect them. I study to live for them, which you will not do, unless you cherish yourself. Grief is one of those Things which are

opposite to Life, for by it the Living are prejudiced. *Apollodorus*,^a firamed the *jest*, and *Dion* praise you, that you will accept nothing from any, professing you are rich; it is well done, for as long as I and other Friends are able to maintain you, you shall need none else. Be of good Courage, *Xantippe*, lose nothing of *Socrates*, knowing how great that Man was; think upon his Life, not upon his Death; yet that to those who consider it will appear noble and excellent. Farewell.

To *Cebes* and *Simmias*. Epist. IX.

IT is commonly said, nothing is richer than a poor Man. This I find true in myself, who have not so much; but whilst you, my Friends, take Care of me, seem to possess much; and it is well done of you to supply me as often as I write. As concerning my Commentaries, there is none of them but I fear should be seen by any in my Absence, as I protest in your Hearing, at the House where *Euclid* lay. I know, dear Friends, a Writing once communicated to many is irrecoverable. *Plato*, though absent, is much admired throughout *Italy* and *Sicily* for his Treatises; but we cannot be persuaded they deserve any Study. I am not only careful of losing the Honour due to Learning, but tender also of *Socrates*, lest his Virtue should incur any Prejudice by my ill Relation of it. I conceive it the same Thing to calumniate, or not praise to the full those of whom we write. This is my Fear, *Cebes* and *Simmias*, at present, until my Judgment shall be otherwise informed. Fare ye well.

^a Epist. Socr. 19. ^w Epist. Socr. 21. ^x The Reason manifest from *Xenophon* and *Laertius*, who describe him such. *Xenophon* calls him *lively*, *Apolog. Socrat.* in all Things but his Affection to *Socrates*. *Leo Allatius* is much perplexed concerning this Appellation. ^y Epist. Socr. 22.

Æ S C H I N E S.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

^a *ÆSCHINES* was Son of *Chabrias* Ἀλκίωνα, or as ^b *Plato*, and others, of *Lyfania*, an *Athenian*, of the *Spettion* Tribe. He was from his Childhood very industrious. Addressing himself to *Socrates*, he said to him, I am poor, and have nothing to give you but myself. Do you not know, answered *Socrates*, that you have made me a rich Person? He was the most diligent of all his Scholars, and never quitted him; whereupon *Socrates* said, that he only, ἰσχυροτάτω valued him. He was not beloved of *Plato*, nor *Aristippus*. *Idem* saith, it was he who counselled *Socrates* to escape out of Prison, which *Plato* ascribes to *Crito*.

Being very poor, *Socrates* bad him take some of his Dialogues, and make Money of them; which *Aristippus* suspecting when he read them at *Megara*, derided him, saying, How came you by these, *Plagiarist*? Another Time, *Aristippus* talking out with him, was questioned, What became of his Friendship? He answered, It is asleep, but I will wake it; and mixing with *Æschines*, Do I seem so inconsistent to you, said he, and unfortunate, as not to deserve Correction? It is no wonder, answers *Æschines*, if your Nature, exceeding mine in every Thing, find out first what is consistent.

^c *Laert.* 2. 60.

^a *Locustorum* stirpem.

^b *Plot.* de ira cōhib.

^c *Instigated*

Instigated by Poverty, he went to Sicily, to Dionysius the Tyrant, at what Time Plato and Aristippus were there. Plato being out of Favour with the Tyrant, took Occasion, by presenting Æschines, to ingratiate himself. ^a He desired he might be admitted to speak with him, which the Tyrant granted, supposing he would alledge something in Defence of himself. As soon as he came into his Presence he began thus: If you knew, Dionysius, of any that came with a hostile Intent to do you Hurt, tho' he sail'd of the Occasion, would you suffer him to depart unpunished? Nothing less, answered Dionysius: For not only the ill Actions, but Designs of Enemies deserve to be chastised. Then (replies Plato) if any Man should come hither out of an Intent to do you a good Office, and you not give him leave, ought you to neglect and despise him? Dionysius demanded who he meant; Æschines, (said he) a Person of as great Integrity as any of Socrates his Friends, able to reform those with whom he converseth, who having undertaken a great Voyage by Sea to come hither, and discourse philosophically with you, is neglected. Dionysius was so pleased at this, that he embraced Plato, admiring his Candour and Greatness of Spirit, and entertained Æschines bountifully and magnificently. Thus Plutarch; but ^c Laertius saith, that Æschines coming thither, was despised by Plato, and recommended by Aristippus, the latter, the Socratick Epistle confirms. To Dionysius he imparted some Dialogues, and was gratified by him, with whom he lived until he was deposed, and Dion brought into the Kingdom; then returned to Athens, where not daring to profess his Philosophy, because the Names of Plato and Aristippus were so great, he taught and took Money privately, at last applied himself to framing Orations for the Forum, in which Timon saith, he was very persuasive. Lysius wrote one Oration in answer to him, intitled, *περὶ Κοκοῦλλας*, according to ^d Athenæus, *περὶ Κοκοῦλλαν τὸν Σαυμασίαν χεῖρος*, wherein he asperseth him for many Things, which are not any Way probable, as (besides patronising an unjust Cause, and borrowing without Intent to restore) for pretending to sell Unguents contrary to the Laws of Solon, and Precepts of Socrates, and for injuring Hermæus his Wife and Children. See Athenæus. Aristotle surnamed *ὁ Μῦθος* was his intimate Friend. ^e Laertius reckons eight of this Name; the first, this Æschines the Philosopher; the second wrote of Rhetorick; the third an Orator, contemporary with Demosthenes; the fourth an Arcadian, Scholar to Isocrates; the fifth of Mitilene, surnamed Rhetoromachus; the sixth a Neopolitan; an Academick Philosopher, Disciple to Melancthius a Rhodian; the seventh a Mi-

lesian, who wrote *Politicks*, Friend to Cicero to the eighth a Statuary.

CHAP. II.

His Writings.

HE wrote *Dialogues*, *Orations*, and *Epistles*. By the first ^f Athenæus affirms, he gained a great Esteem of Temperance, Humanity, and Integrity. Menædemus accuseth him of owning many *Dialogues of Socrates*, which he had of Xantippe. Pausanius believes them to be his own, not counterfeit. Those (saith ^g Laertius) which express the Socratick Habit, are seven; the first, *Mitriades*, written in a lower Style; the second, *Callias*, wherein he is blamed by Athenæus for treating of the Enmity betwixt Callias and his Parents, and for deriding *Anaxagoras* and *Prodicus* in their Scholars, *Theramenes*, *Philoxenus*, and *Astiphrades*; the third, *Rhion*; the fourth, *Alpasia*, cited by Athenæus and *Harpocration*; the fifth *Alcibiades*, cited also by Athenæus ^h; the sixth *Asiochus*, wherein (saith ⁱ Athenæus) he traducteth Alcibiades as given to Wine and Women; which Particular not being to be found in that *Asiochus* extant amongst the spurious Platonick *Dialogues*, argues contrary to the Opinion of *Vossius*, that it is not the same; the last *Telauges*, the Scope whereof was a satyricall Derision of the Vices of that Person, as appeareth from *Demetrius Phaleræus*, and ^j Athenæus.

^k There were seven other *Dialogues*, stiled *ἀνεκτάτοι*, which went under the Name of Æschines, very loose, and not expressing enough the Socratick Severity; whence *Pisistratus* the Athenian denied that they were his, and *Perseus* saith, the greatest Part were written by *Pisiphon of Eretria*, falsely mingled with the *Dialogues of Æschines*; their Names (according to *Suidas*) *Phædon*, *Polyænus*, *Dracon*, *Erixias*, (perhaps that which is extant) of *Virtue*, *Erasistratus*, the *Syrtians*.

^l His *Orations* gave full Testimony of his Perfection in *Rhetorick*, in Confirmation whereof *Laertius* instanteth, that in *Defence of the Father of Phæacus the General*, and those wherein he chiefly imitated *Gorgius the Leontine*, of ^m *Philostratus*, cites that concerning *Thargelia*.

Of his *Epistles*, one to *Dionysius* the Tyrant, is mentioned by *Laertius*, as extant in his Time. Another there is under his Name amongst the ⁿ Socratick *Epistles* in these Words:

As soon as I arrived at Syracusæ, Aristippus met me in the Forum, and taking me by the Hand, carried me immediately to Dionysius, to whom he said, Dionysius, if a Man should come hither to insinuate

^a Laert. 2. 60. Philostrat. vit. Apollon. and from him Suidas. ^d Plutarch adulat. & amici. discrim. ^e Laert. 2. 61. ^f Laert. Hæsch. Hæsch. ^g Athen. l. 13. ^h Laert. 2. 60. ⁱ Athen. l. 13. ^k Laert. 2. 60. ^l Lib. 14. ^m Lib. 5. ⁿ Epist. 23. ^o Laert. 2. 60. ^p Laert. 2. 63. ^q Epist. ad Jul. August.

Folly into you, did he not aim at your Hurt? To which Dionysius consenting, *What then, continues Aristippus, would you do to him? The worst, answers Dionysius, that could be: But if any one, saith he, should come to improve you in Wisdom, did he not aim at your good? which Dionysius acknowledging; Behold then (continues he) Æschines, one of Socrates's Disciples come hither to instruct you, he aims at your Good, therefore on him confer the Benefits you confess due to such.* Dionysius (said I, interrupting him) Aristippus expresseth an admirable Friendship in this Address, but we are Owners only of so much Wisdom as restrains us from abusing those with whom we converse. Dionysius hereat pleased, commended Aristippus, and promised to make good what he had confessed due to me. He heard our Alcibiades, and delighted, it seems, therewith, desired, if we had any other Dialogues, that we would send them to him, which we promised to do, and therefore, dear Friends, we intend to be shortly with you. Whilst I read, Plato was present (which I had almost forgot to tell you) and whispered something in my Behalf privately to Dionysius, by Reason of Aristippus; for as soon as he was gone out, he told me that he never spoke freely when that Man (naming Aristippus) was present; but for what I said to Dionysius concerning you, I refer myself to him: The next Day Dionysius in the Garden confirmed his Speech as said of me, with many sportive Sayings (for they were no better) I advised Aristippus and Plato to cease their Emulation, because of their general Fame; for we shall be most ridiculous, if our Actions correspond not with our Profession.

C R I T O.

Crito was an Athenian^a, Scholar to Socrates; whom he loved so entirely that he never suffered him to want Necessaries, of which more hath been said in the Life of Socrates. Being much troubled and sued by those who had not received any Injury from him, but abused the Quietness of his Disposition, which would sooner part with Money upon no Ground than go to Law, Socrates advised him to entertain one of the same busy, troublesome Humour, to keep off the rest; Crito in pursuit of this Counsel, made Choice of Archidamus, an excellent Lawyer, but poor, who being obliged by his Gifts and Kindness, persecuted eagerly all such as molested not him only, but any of his Friends. Crito wrote seventeen Dialogues comprised in one Volume, thus reckoned by Laertius^b; That the Good are not made such by Learning; Of having

most; What is expedient, or the Politician; Of Honesty; Of Wickedness; Of Security; Of Law; Of Divinity; Of Arts; Of Conversation; Of Wisdom; Protagoras, or the Politick; Of Letters; Of Poetry; Of what is best; Of Learning; Of Knowing or Science; What it is to know. He writ also an Apology for Socrates.

* He had four Sons, Critobulus, Hermogenes, Eupigenes, and Ctesippus, all Auditors of Socrates; of whom already.

* Suidas reckons three more of his Name. One wrote Getic Stories. The second was of Piria, a City in Macedonia. The third of Naxos, both Historians.

S I M O N.

Simon was an Athenian^c, a Leather-dresser. Socrates coming to his Shop, and disputing there, he committed to Writing all that he remembered thereof, whence his Dialogues were called *στυνισμοί*. They were three and thirty, all in one Volume: Of Gods; of Good; of Honesty; what is Honesty; of Just, the first; the second of Virtue; that it cannot be taught; of Fortitude, the first, second, third; of Law; of Popularity; of Honour; of Poetry; of Health; of Love; of Philosophy; of Knowledge; of Musick; of Poetry; what is honesty; of Doctrine; of Disputation; of Judgment; of that which is; of Number; of Diligence; of Labour; of Avarice; of Boasting; of Honesty; or according to others, of Counsel; of Discourse; of Expedients; of doing ill. He is reported the first that used the Socratick Discourses. Pericles promising that if he would come to him, he should want nothing, he answered, that he would not sell his Freedom of Speech. There is extant amongst the Socratick Epistles, this under his Name, as in answer to Aristippus.

I hear that you^d deride our Learning to Dionysius; I confess I am a Leather-dresser, and work upon that Trade to the^e Reproof of indiscreet Persons, who think to follow Socrates, yet live luxuriously. As for your Children, Antisthenes will correct them, to whom you writ scolding at my Manner of Life: But of this Mirth enough, only be mindful of me and of Thirst: These conduce much to the wife.

G L A U C O.

Glauc was an Athenian^f. He writ nine Dialogues, comprised in one Book: Phidylus,

^a Suid. ^c Xen. l. 2. ^d Laert. 2. 121. ^e Suid. ^f Laertius. ^g Laert. 2. 122. ^h Perhaps τολιδαν rather δαυιδαν-
τω. ⁱ Νεωδωρος, which Albius renders *Ingratissimus*. ^k Laert. 2. 174.

Euripides, Amyntichus, Euthias, Lyfimbides, Aristophanes, Ephalus, Anaxiphenus, Menexenus. There are two and thirty more falsely ascribed to him.

living ; of Possibility ; of Wealth ; of Life ; what is honest ; of Industry ; of Love.

S I M M I A S.

Simmius was a *Theban*. He writ three and twenty Dialogues in one Book ; Of Wisdom ; of Ratiocination ; of Musick ; of Verse ; of Fortitude ; of Philosophy ; of Truth ; of Letters ; of Doctrine ; of Art ; of Conduct ; of Decency ; of what is to be chosen, and what to be shunned ; of Friendship ; of Knowledge ; of the Soul ; of Well-

C E B E S.

Cebes was of *Thebes*, a Philosopher, Disciple to *Socrates*. He writ three Dialogues. The Tablet (which is extant) the seventh. *Phrynichus*, he writ also an *infernal Narrative*, and other Things. These are the Philosophers who did not distract the Doctrine of their Master into Sects, in which Respect they may more properly be termed *Socratic*, tho' the rest also assume that Title.

c Laert. 2. 174.

d Ibid. 2. 125.

CHRONOLOGY.

Olympiads.	Archontes.	
xxxv		<i>Thales</i> Born. <i>Laert.</i>
2	Damafias 1. <i>Halic.</i>	<i>Solon</i> born about this Time : By Compute from his Death.
3		<i>Phryno</i> Victor in all the Olympick Exercises, <i>Euseb.</i>
4		probably the same with whom <i>Pittacus</i> fought.
xxxvi		
2		
3		
4		
xxxvii		
2		
3		
4		
xxxviii		<i>Periander</i> began to reign at <i>Corinth.</i>
2		
3		
4		
xxxix	Draco <i>Tatian. Clem. Suid.</i>	<i>Draco</i> makes Laws at <i>Athens.</i>
2		
3		
4		
xl		<i>Arian's</i> Story. <i>Euseb.</i> 11 $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{2}$ <i>Periander</i>
2		
3		
4		
xli	Heniochides <i>Hal.</i>	
2		
3		<i>Pittacus</i> flourished. <i>Laert.</i>
4		
xlii		<i>Alyattes</i> King of <i>Lydia</i> began to reign. <i>Anaximander</i>
2	Aristocles <i>Marm.</i>	born. <i>Laert.</i>
3		
4		
xliiii		
2		
3		
4		
xliv		
2		
3		
4		
xlv		
2	Critias 1. <i>Marm.</i>	
3		
4		
xlvi		<i>Epimenides</i> Inhabits the City of <i>Athens.</i> <i>Laert. Epi-</i>
2	Philombratus. <i>Plat. Sol.</i>	<i>menides</i> born. <i>Suid.</i>
3	Solon. <i>Laert.</i>	<i>Solon</i> made Archon. His Laws.
4	Dropides. <i>Phil. in Critia.</i>	

xlvi	592	Eucrates. <i>Laert.</i>			<i>Anacharsis</i> came to <i>Athens</i> to visit <i>Solon.</i> <i>Laert.</i>
2		Simon. <i>Marm.</i>			
3					
4					
xlvi		Philippus. <i>Clem.</i>			
2					
3					
4					
xlvi					<i>Periand.</i> died, having reigned 40 Years. <i>Arist.</i>
2					<i>Polit. 5. Laert.</i>
3		Damasias. <i>Marm.</i>		1	The Attribute of <i>Wise</i> conferred on <i>Thales</i> and the
4				2	other six.
1				3	About this Time <i>Thespis</i> began to present his Tra-
2				4	gedies. <i>Anaximander</i> found the Obliquity of the
3		Archestratides. <i>Hal. 4.</i>		5	Zodiack. <i>Plin.</i>
4				6	
li				7	
2				8	
3				9	
4				10	
lii				11	
2				12	
3		Aristomenes. <i>Laert.</i>		13	<i>Pittacus</i> died. <i>Laert.</i>
4				14	
lii				15	
2				16	
3				17	
4				18	
liv				19	
2				20	<i>Pythagoras</i> visits <i>Thales.</i> Collected from <i>Jamblic.</i>
3				21	
4				22	
lv		Conias. <i>Plut. Sol.</i>		23	
2		Hegestratus. <i>Plut.</i>		24	
3				25	
4				26	
lvi		Euthydemus. <i>Laert.</i>		27	<i>Chilon</i> was <i>Ephorus.</i> <i>Laert.</i>
2				28	<i>Anaximenes</i> flourished.
3				29	<i>Eusebius.</i>
4				30	
lvii				31	
2				32	
3				33	
4				34	
lviii				35	<i>Thales</i> died. <i>Laert.</i>
2		Erxcilides. <i>Paus.</i>		36	
3				37	
4				38	<i>Cyrus</i> takes <i>Sardis</i> and <i>Craesus.</i>
lix				39	
2				40	
3				41	
4				42	
lx				43	
2				44	
3				45	
4				46	

lxi		47	
2		48	
3		49	
4	Heraclides. <i>Hal.</i> 4.	50	
lxii		51	
2		52	
3		53	
4		54	
lxiii		55	<i>Plutarchus</i> died, having reigned 17 Years. <i>Arist.</i>
4		56	<i>Polit.</i> 5.
2		57	
3		58	
lxiv	Miltiades. <i>Hal.</i> 7.	59	
2		60	
3		61	
4		62	
lxv		63	Darius began his Reign.
2		64	
3		65	
4		66	
lxvi		67	
2		68	
3		69	
4		70	
lxvii		71	
2		72	
3		73	
4		74	
lxviii	Lyfagoras. <i>Marm.</i>	75	
2		76	
3		77	
4		78	
lxix	Acestorides. <i>II. Hal.</i> 5.	79	
2		80	
3		81	
4		82	
lxx	Myrus. <i>Hal.</i> 5.	83	Anaxagoras born. <i>Laert.</i> by compute.
2		84	
3		85	
4		86	
lxxi	Hipparchus. <i>Hal.</i> 6.	87	Pythagoras died. <i>Euseb.</i>
2	Pithocritus. <i>Marm.</i>	88	
3		89	
4		90	
lxxii	Diogenes. <i>Hal.</i> 6.	91	The Marathonian Fight.
2	Hybridides. <i>Hal.</i> 7. <i>Pauf.</i>	92	
3	Phænippus. <i>Plut. Arist.</i>	93	
4		94	
lxxiii	Anchises. <i>Hal.</i> 8.	95	
2		96	
3	Aristides. <i>Marm.</i>	97	Darius died. Xerxes succeeded,
4	Philocrates. <i>Marm.</i>	98	
lxxiv	Leopoldus. <i>Hal.</i> 8.	99	
2	Nicodemus. <i>Hal.</i> 8.	100	
3		101	
4		102	
lxxv	Calliades. <i>Marm.</i>	103	Xerxes cross'd the Hellespont. The Fight at Sala-
2	Xantippus. <i>Marm.</i>	104	mis. Anaxagoras went to Athens
3	Timosthenes. <i>Marm.</i>	105	
4	Adimantus. <i>Marm.</i>	106	

lxxvi	Phædon. <i>Diod. Sic.</i>	107
2	Dromocleides	108
3	Acestorides	109
4	Menon	110
lxxvii	Chares	111
2	Praxiergus	112
3	Demotion	113
4	Apelphion	114
lxxviii	Theagenides	115
2	Lyfistratus	116
3	Lyfianias	117
4	Lyfitheus	118
lxxix	Archidemides	119
2	Tlepolemus	120
3	Conon	121
4	Euippus	122
lxxx	Phrafcleides	123
2	Philocles	124
3	Bion	125
4	Mneftithides	126
lxxxi	Callias 1.	127
2	Sofiftratus	128
3	Ariston	129
4	Lyficates	130
lxxxii	Chærephanes. <i>Hal.</i>	131
2	Antidotus	132
3	Euthydemus	133
4	Pedicus	134
lxxxiii	Philifcus. <i>Hal.</i>	135
2	Timarchides	136
3	Callimachus	137
4	Lyfimachides	138
lxxxiv	Praxiteles	139
2	Lyfianias	140
3	Diphilus	141
4	Timocles	142
lxxxv	Murichides	143
2	Glaucides	144
3	Theodorus	145
4	Euthemenes	146
lxxxvi	Naufimachus	147
2	Antilocheides	148
3	Chares	149
4	Apfeudas. <i>Prol.</i>	150
lxxxvii	Pythodorus. <i>Thuc.</i>	151
2	Euthidemus. <i>Athen. 5.</i>	152
3	Apoilodorus. <i>Athen. 5.</i>	153
4	Epaminondas	154
lxxxviii	Diotimus	155
2	Euclides	156
3	Euthydemus	157
4	Stratocles	158
lxxxix	Ifarchus	159
2	Amynias	160
3	Alcæus	161
4	Ariston	162
xc	Aristophylus	163
2	Archias	164
3	Antiphon	165
4	Euphemus	166

Socrates Born.

A Stone fell down from Heaven at *Egei Potamus*; foretold by *Anaxagoras*.

Xenophon Born about this Time. 169 *after* 1464

Anaxagoras (having profefs'd Philosophy 30 Years at *Athen*) condemned and banished; collected from *Laert*.

1 Year of the *Peloponnefian War*. *Thucid. lib. 2.*

2

3

4 *Anaxagoras* died, by Compute from *Laert*.

5

6

8 The Fight at *Delium*, wherein *Socrat*. and *Xen*. fought; The Clouds of *Aristophanes* acted.

9 The Clouds of *Aristophanes* acted the second Time.

10

11 The Time of *Xenophon's* Symposium.

12

13

14

15

16

xcI	Aristomnestus	167	17
2	Chabrias	168	18
3	Pisander	169	19
4	Cleocritus	170	20
xcii	Callias	171	21 <i>Thucydides</i> ends his History; <i>Xenophon</i> begins where he left.
2	Theopompus	172	23
3	Glaucoippus	173	24
4	Diocles	174	25 The first Ascent of <i>Cyrus</i> into <i>Asia</i> . <i>Marm.</i>
xciii	Euclæmon. <i>Marm.</i>	175	26 <i>Dionys.</i> made K. of <i>Syrac.</i> <i>Diod.</i> The Fight at
2	Antigenes. <i>Marm.</i>	176	27 <i>Arginusæ</i> . The ten Captains put to Death.
3	Callias. <i>Marm.</i>	177	The thirty Tyrants. <i>Theramenes</i> put to Death.
4	Alexias	178	
xciv	Pythodorus. <i>Athen.</i>	179	
2	Euclides	180	
3	Micon	181	The Ascent of <i>Cyrus</i> into <i>Asia</i> against his Brother. His
4	Exenætus	182	Death. <i>Xen.</i> retreats with the Army. The 50 Ty-
xcv	Laches	183	rants put down.
2	Aristocrates	184	<i>Socrates</i> put to Death. <i>Timbra</i> sent into <i>Asia</i> against <i>Tissaphernes</i> by the <i>Lacedæmonians</i> ; and of <i>Xenophon's</i> Re-
3	Ithicles	185	treach.
4	Lyfades	186	
xcvi	Phormio	187	<i>Agæfilæus</i> goes into <i>Asia</i> against the <i>Persian</i> .
2	Diophantus	188	<i>Agæfilæus</i> called home; fights with the <i>Boærians</i> at <i>Cop-</i>
3	Eubulides	189	<i>robræa</i> .
4	Demostratus	190	<i>Conon</i> re-edifies the Walls of <i>Athen</i> .
xcvii	Philocles	191	
2	Nicoteles	192	
3	Demostratus	193	
4	Antipater	194	
xcviii	Pyrrhion	195	
2	Theodorus	196	
3	Mistichides	197	
4	Dexitheus	198	
xcix	Diotrephes	199	<i>Aristotle</i> Born. <i>Laert.</i>
2	Phanostratus	201	
3	Menander	202	
4	Demophilus	203	
c	Pytheus. <i>Marm.</i>	204	
2	Nicon. <i>Hal.</i>	205	
3	Naufinicus. <i>Hal.</i>	206	
4	Callias. <i>Hal.</i>	207	
ci	Chariander	208	
2	Hippodamus	209	
3	Socrates	210	
4	Alteius. <i>Paus.</i>	211	
cii	Alcisthenes. <i>Hal.</i>	212	
2	Phraclides. <i>Marm.</i>	213	
3	Discinetus. <i>Paus.</i>	214	
4	Lyfistratus	215	
ciii	Naufigenes. <i>Marm.</i>	216	
2	Polyzelus. <i>Hal.</i>	217	
3	Cephalodorus. <i>Hal.</i>	218	
4	Chion	219	
civ	Timocrates. <i>Hal.</i>	220	
2	Cariclides	221	
3	Molon. <i>Hal. dinar.</i>	222	
4	Nicophemus	223	<i>Xenophon</i> died. <i>Laert.</i>
cv	Callimedes	224	
2	Eucharistus	225	
3	Cephalodorus	226	
4	Agathocles. <i>Paus. Marm.</i>	227	

cvi	Elpines	228	
2	Callistratus. <i>Marm.</i>	229	
3	Diotimus	230	
4	Eudemus	231	
cvii	Aristodemus	232	
2	Theſſalus	233	
3	Apollodorus	234	
4	Callimachus. <i>Athen.</i>	235	
cviii	Theophilus. <i>Paus. Athen.</i>	236	<i>Plato died 82 Years old. Athen. lib. 5.</i>
2	Themistocles	237	
3	Archias	238	
4	Eubulus	239	<i>Aristotle went to Mitilene. Laert.</i>
cix	Liziscus	240	
2	Pithodorus	241	<i>Aristotle went to King Philip; Alexander being sixteen Years old. Laert.</i>
3	Sofigenes	242	
4	Nicomachus	243	
cx	Theophrastus	244	
2	Lysimachides	245	
3	Charonidas	246	
4	Phrynichus	247	
cx i	Pythodorus. <i>Arr.</i>	248	
2	Euzenetus	249	<i>Aristotle teacheth in the Lyceum 13 Years.</i>
3	Æſicles	250	
4	Nicocrates	251	
cxii	Niceratus	252	
2	Aristophanes. <i>Arr.</i>	253	
3	Aristophon. <i>Arr.</i>	254	
4	Cephiſophon	255	
cxiii	Euthycritus	256	
2	Hegemon. <i>Hal. Arr.</i>	257	
3	Chremes	258	
4	Anticles	259	
cxiv	Hegesias. <i>Arr.</i>	260	
2	Cephiſodorus	261	
3	Philocles. <i>Laert.</i>	262	<i>Aristotle went to Chalcis, and died there near 63 Years old. Laert. Theophrastus succeeded.</i>
4	Archippus. <i>Laert.</i>	263	
cxv	Næcilmus. <i>Hal.</i>	264	
2	Apollodorus	265	
3	Archippus	266	
4	Demogenes	267	
cxvi	Democles	268	<i>Polemo, President of the Academy.</i>
2	Praxibulus	269	
3	Nicodorus	270	
4	Theophrastus	271	
cxvii	Polemo	272	
2	Simonides	273	
3	Hieromnemon	274	
4	Demetrius Phalereus	275	
cxviii	Carinus	276	
2	Anaxicrates	277	
3	Coræbus	278	
4	Xenippus	279	
cxix	Phericles. <i>Hal.</i>	280	
2	Leoſtratus	281	
3	Nicocles	282	
4	Calliarchus	283	
cxx	Hegemachus. <i>Laert.</i>	284	
2	Euctemon	285	
3	Mneſidemus	286	
4	Antiphanes	287	

cxxi	Nicias	286
2	Nicostratus	287
3	Olympiodorus	288
4	Philippus	289
cxix		290
2		291
3		292
4		293
cxix		294
2		295
3		296
4		297
cxix		298
2		299
3		300
4		301
cxix		302
2		303
3		304
4		305
cxix		306
2		307
3		308
4		309
cxix	Pytharatus. Cic.	310
2		311
3		312
4		313
cxix		314
2		315
3		316
4		317
cxix	Diognetus. Marm.	318
2		319
3		320
4		321
cxix		322
2		323
3		324
4		325
cxix		326
2		327
3		328
4		329
cxix		330
2		331
3		332
4		333
cxix		334
2		335
3		336
4		337
cxix		338
2		339
3		340
4		341

Lacydes President of the Academy 26 Years.
Laert.

cxxxv
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cxxxvi
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cxxxvii
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cxxxviii
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cxxxix
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cxl
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Lacydes resigns the School to *Evander* and *Telles*. *Laertes*.

Charnerdes born.

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE FOURTH PART,
Containing the *Cyrenaick, Megarick, Eleack, Eretriack* Sects.

The *Cyrenaick* Sect. ARISTIPPUS.

CHAP. I.

His Country and Parents.

THE Estimation which Philosophers had daily gain'd among the *Grecians* about this Time, caus'd it exceedingly to multiply, whilst every Professor, ambitious to be held wiser than his Master, and teaching something new, desir'd to have the Honour to be Author of a Sect.

The Succession of the *Ionick* Philosophy, which before *Socrates* was single, after him was divided into many Schools, whereof some were but of short Continuance; others had longer Succession. Of the less durable were the

Cyrenaick.
Megarick.
Eleack.
Eretriack.

so called from the Places where the Professors flourish'd. Others of longer Succession, the

Academick, } out of which came the { *Peripatetick.*
Cynick, } { *Stoick.*

We shall first dispatch those which were of shortest Continuance, whether that they were founded upon less Reason, and were in short Time broken, as *Cicero*'s faith, and quite extinct by the Strength and Arguments of the others; or that being instituted and founded in more obscure Parts, they were not so lasting as those which were profess'd in the most flourishing City of *Athens*.

Aristippus a Disciple of *Socrates*, after his Death return'd home into his Country at *Cyrene* in *Africa*, from whence the Doctrine which his Scholars retain'd had the Name of *Cyrenaick*.^a He was Son of *Areteades* of *Cyrene*.

CHAP. II.

How he went to Athens, and heard Socrates.

FROM *Cyrene* *Aristippus* went first to *Athens*, invited by the Fame of *Socrates*, concerning whom he fell into Discourse with *Ischomachus*, meeting him casually at the *Olympick Games*, and enquiring what Disputes they were wherewith *Socra-*

^a De creatis lib. 3.

^b Suid.

^c Laert. x. 65.

^d Plut. de curios.

tes prevailed so much upon the young Men, he received from him some little Seeds and Scatterings thereof, wherewith he was so passionately affected, that he grew pale and lean, till, to assuage his fervent Thirst, he took a Voyage to Athens, and there drank at the Fountain, satisfying himself with the Person, his Discourse and Philosophy, the End whereof was to know our Evils, and to acquit ourselves of them. Aristotle¹ said, Philosophy doth Harm to those who misinterpret Things well said. Aristippus² chiefly delighted with the more voluptuous Disputes of Socrates, asserted Pleasure to be the ultimate End wherein all Happiness doth consist. His Life was agreeable to the Opinion, which he employed in Luxury, sweet Unguent, rich Garments, Wine and Women; maintained by a Course as different from the Precepts and Practice of Socrates as the Things themselves were. For, notwithstanding he had a good Estate (and three Country Seats)³ he first of the Socratick Disciples took Money for teaching. Which Socrates observing, asked him how he came to have so much? He replied, How came you to have so little? A further Dislike of this Course Socrates expressed, when Aristippus sending him twenty Minæ, he returned it, saying, his Dæmon would not suffer him to take it.

CHAP. III.

How he went to Ægina.

Leaving Socrates, he went to Ægina, where he lived with more Freedom and Luxury than before. Socrates sent Exhortations to reclaim him, frequent but fruitless, and to the same End published that Discourse which we find in Xenophon. Here he became acquainted with Lais, the famous Corinthian Courtesan, who came thither yearly at the Feast of Neptune, and was as constantly frequented by Aristippus, for whose Sake⁴ Hermesianax saith, he took a Voyage to Corinth (mentioned among his Aposthegmis.)

To Corinth Love the Cyrenean led,
Where he enjoyed Thessalian Lais' Bed;
No Art the subtle Aristippus knew
By which the Power of Love he might eschew.

Whilest he was upon his Voyage to Corinth, a great Tempest arose, whereat he was much troubled; one of the Passengers saying unto him, *Woe ordinary People are not afraid, but you Philosophers fear* (or *is 't* *Alban, are you afraid like other People?*)⁵ our Souls, answered he, *are not of equal Value, I hazard a wicked and unhappy Life, I Felicity and Beatitude.*

To those who blamed him for frequenting Lais,

¹ Cic. de nat. Derr. ² Cic. de Orat. 3. ³ Athen. Deipn. 12. ⁴ Laert. 2. 65. ⁵ Athen. deipn. 12. ⁶ Ibid. 13. ⁷ Athen. deipn. 13. ⁸ In Phædonem. ⁹ Socratick. Epist. 16. ¹⁰ Laert. Proem. ¹¹ Galen. Hist. Phil. ¹² Laert. 2. 92.

I possess her, saith he, not she me. Lais, in Emulation of Phryne gave Admittance to all Sorts of People, Rich and Poor; whereupon Aristippus, reprehended by his Servant for bestowing so much on her, who entertained Diogenes the Cynick gratis, I give her Money, saith he, that I may enjoy her, not that others may not. Diogenes reproached him for frequenting the Company of Lais, saying, Aristippus, you and I converse with the same Woman, either give over, or be like a Cynick. Do you think it absurd, saith he, to dwell in a House wherein others lived before, or to sail in a Ship that hath carried other Passengers? It is no more absurd to affect a Woman whom others have enjoyed.

At Ægina he continued till the Death of Socrates, as (besides the Testimony of Plato) appeareth by this Epistle of his written upon that Occasion.

Of the Death of Socrates, I and Cleombrotus have received Information, and that when he might have escaped from the eleven Officers, he said he would not, unless he was acquitted by Law; for that were as much as in him lay to betray his Country. My Opinion is, he being unjustly committed, he might have got his Liberty any Way, conceiving that all which he could do ill or inconsiderately must be just. From whence again I blame him not, as if he had done ill even in this. You write me word that all the Friends and Disciples of Socrates have left Athens, out of Fear the like should befall any of you; it is well done; and we being at present at Ægina will continue here a while, till we come to you, and wherein we are able, serve you.

CHAP. IV.

His Institution of a Sect.

Aristippus returning at length to his own Country Cyrene, professed Philosophy there, and instituted a Sect called a Cyrenaick from the Place, by some a Hedonick, or voluptuous from the Doctrine. They who followed the Institution of Aristippus, and were called Cyrenaick, held thus:

They rejected Physick and natural Disquisitions, from the seeming Incomprehensibility thereof. Logick they handled because of its great Usefulness. But Meleager and Clitomachus affirm they despised both Physick and Dialectick alike, as unuseful; for that without these, a Man who hath learned what Things are good, what evil, is able to discourse well, and to shake off Superstition and the Fear of Death.

SECT. I. Of Judgment and Judicatories.

They held, that the Senses inform not always truly, that nothing extrinsical can be perceived,

¹ Ibid. 13. ² Ibid. 13. ³ Ibid. 13. ⁴ Ibid. 13. ⁵ Ibid. 13. ⁶ Ibid. 13. ⁷ Ibid. 13. ⁸ Ibid. 13. ⁹ Ibid. 13. ¹⁰ Ibid. 13.

those Things only can be perceived which are felt by inward Touch, as Grief and Pleasure, neither know we what Colour any Thing is, nor what Sound it makes, but only that we feel ourselves affected after such a Manner; * that Passions are comprehensive, that Objects are not comprehensive. That nothing judgeth but by interior Promotion, and the Judgment of true and false consists of inward Touch.

^b *Sextus Empiricus* more fully. They assert that Passions or Affections are the Judges and the only Things that may comprehend, and not fallacious, but of those Things which cause Passions, there is nothing which is comprehensible, or that may not deceive us. For, that we are made white, or affected with sweet, may be said expressly and firmly, but that the Thing which causeth this Affection is white or sweet, cannot in like Manner be asserted. For it is possible that we be affected with whiteness from a Thing that is not white, and with sweetness from a Thing that is not sweet, as to him who is dim-sighted or hath the Yellow-Jaundice, all Things seem yellow to one, dusky to the other, and he who pincheth his Eye, thinketh he sees Things double, he who is mad fancies two *Thebes's*, two Suns; in all these, they that are so affected, to wit, with Yellowness or Duskyhness, or Duplicitly, is true, but that the Thing which moveth them is yellow or dusky, or double, is conceived to be false: So it is most consonant to Reason, that we comprehend nothing more than our own Passions. For we must hold that the Things seen are either the Passions themselves, or the Causes of those Passions; if we say our Passions are the Things seen, we must likewise affirm all Things seen, to be true and comprehensive: If we say the Things seen are the Causes of those Passions, we must confess all Things seen to be false and incomprehensible. For that Passion which happeneth to us, sheweth us itself and nothing more, so that to speak truly, the Passion or Affection itself is the only Thing that is apparent to us, and for that Reason, in their proper Affections none err, but in the external Object, all. The first are comprehensive, the second incomprehensive, the Soul being weak in the Discernment thereof, by Reason of Places, Intervals, Motions, Mutations, and many other Causes.

Hence they assert, that there is not in Man any one common Thing which judgeth, but they impose common Names on the Judgments; all commonly name white and sweet, but something common that is white and sweet they have not, for every Man apprehends his own Affection. Now whether the same Affection happeneth to any one, and to him that is next him, from white, neither is he able to say, as not receiving the Affection of the other, neither can the other that is next him say, as not receiving his Affection. There being therefore no common Affection in us, it were a

rash Thing to assert, that whatsoever seemeth such to me, seemeth also such to him; that is next me; for perhaps my Constitution is such as to be whitened from that which externally incurereth, another hath his Sense so ordered, as that he is affected otherwise. That therefore which is seen and appeareth is not common.

That by Reason of the differing Constitutions of the Sense we are not moved alike, nor in the same Manner, is manifest from those who have the Jaundice, and those that are pur-blind, and those that are affected according to Nature. For, as from the same Object, some are so affected as to be black, others red, others white; so is it likewise consonant to Reason, that they who are affected according to Nature, by Reason of the different Constitution of Senses, are not moved alike by the same Things, but one Way the white, another Way the black, another Way he whose Eyes are blue, another Way he whose Eyes are black; whence we impose common Names on Things, having ourselves proper and particular Affections.

Sect. 2. Of the End, or chief Good.

TO these Assertions (continueth *Sextus Empiricus*) concerning the Judicatures, agreeth what they assert concerning Ends.

Of Affections, some are pleasant, some harsh and troublesome, some mean; the harsh and troublesome are ill, whose End is Grief; the pleasant, Good, whose End, which cannot be deceived, is Pleasure. The Mean are neither good nor ill, whose End is neither good nor ill, which is an Affection between Pleasure and Grief. Affections therefore are the Judges and Ends of all Things, and we live, say they, observing Evidence and Liking, Evidence in the rest of the Affections, Liking in Pleasure.

Laertius saith ^c, they assert two Passions or Affections, Grief and Pleasure: Pleasure, a soft, smooth Motion; Grief, a harsh Motion. One Pleasure differeth not from another Pleasure, nor is one Pleasure sweeter than another Pleasure: This Pleasure is coveted by all living Creatures, the other shunned.

They assert ^d a corporeal Pleasure to be our ultimate End, as *Panaetius* saith in his Book of *Sects*, not catastematick permanent Pleasure, which consisteth in Privation of Grief, and a Quict void of all Disturbance, which *Epicurus* held.

The End differeth from Beatitude ^e, for the End is some particular Pleasure: Beatitude is that which consisteth of all particular Pleasures, wherein are included both the past and future. Again, particular Pleasure is expetible in itself, Felicity, not in itself, but for particular Pleasures.

^a *Laert.* 2. 32. ^c *Cic. Acad. quest. lib. 4. 7.*

^b *Adv. Mathem.*

^c *Laert.* 2. 36.

^d *Ibid.* 2. 37.

^e *Ibid.* 2. 35.

That Pleasure is our chief End is manifest, in that from our first Infancy, without any Instruction of others, we naturally aim thereat, and having obtained it, seek nothing else. Moreover, we avoid not any Thing so much as its contrary, Grief.

Pleasure is good, tho' proceeding from the most sordid dishonest Thing, as *Hippobotus* in his Book of S. 2; for, altho' the Action be dishonest, yet the Pleasure thereof is expetible in itself, and good.

In *John 6*, which *Epicurus* held, they esteem not Pleasure, nor want of Pleasure Grief; for both these consist in Motion, but Indolence and want of Pleasure consists not in Motion, for Indolence is like the State of a sleeping Man.

They hold, that some Men may not desire Pleasure, through Perversity of Mind.

All spiritual Pleasures and Pains arise not from corporeal Pleasures and Pains: For from the simple Prosperity of our Country or ourself, we are affected with Joy.

But neither the Remembrance of past Goods, nor Expectation of future compleat Pleasure, as *Epicurus* thought, for by Time and Expectation the Motion of the Soul is dissolved. Pleasure, according to *Aristippus*, is *μὴ ὄντων*, consisteth only in one Part of Time, the present: For the Remembrance of past Pleasures, or Expectation of the future, is vain and frivolous, and nothing appertaineth to Beatitude: But that only is good which is present. With those Pleasures which he received heretofore, or shall receive hereafter, *Aristippus* said, he was nothing at all moved, the first being gone, the other not yet come, and what it will prove when it is come, is uncertain. Hence he argued, that Men ought not to be solicitous either about Things past or future, and that not to be troubled at such Things is a Sign of a constant clear Spirit. He also advised to take Care only for the present Day, and in that Day, only of the present Part thereof, wherein something was done or thought: For he said, the present is only in our Power, not the past or future, the one being gone, the other uncertain whether ever it will come.

Neither do Pleasures consist merely in simple Sight or Hearing, for we hear with Delight those who counterfeits Lamentation, and those who lament truly, we hear with Displeasure. This Privation of Pleasure and Grief they called *mean States*.

The Pleasures of the Body are much better than those of the Soul, and the Pains or Grievs thereof much worse; for which Reason those who offend actually, are most grievously punished.

To grieve is more unnatural to us, to delight, more natural; for which Reason, much more Care is requisite for the ordering of one than of the other, yet, many Times we reject Things which effect

Pleasure, as being grievous, so that the Concurrence of Pleasures which effecteth Beatitude, is very difficult.

Moreover they hold¹, that every wise Man doth not live pleasantly, nor every wicked Man unpleasantly, but so for the most Part: For it is enough that a Man be affected and reduced by Incidence of one single Pleasure.

They held, that² Grief is the greatest Ill; that Grief is not effected by every Ill, but by the unexpected and unforeseen; that one Man is more grieved than another.

They assert, that Riches are efficient Causes of Pleasure³, yet not expetible in themselves.

SECT. 3. Of Virtue.

ALL good consisteth in Pleasure⁴, Virtue itself is only laudable, as being an efficient Cause of Pleasure.

Nothing is just, honest, or dishonest by Nature, but by Law and Custom; yet a good Man will do nothing that is evil, because of the Censure or Esteem which would fall upon his Actions, and that⁵ such a one is wise.

Prudence is a good, yet not expetible in itself, but for the Sake of those Things which proceed from it.

A Friend is to be embraced for the Use we may have of him, as the Body cherisheth every Part thereof as long as it remaineth sound.

Of Virtues, some are in the unwise.

Corporeal Exercise conduceth to the Acquisition of Virtue.

A wise Man is not subject to Envy, Love, or Superstition, for all these proceed from the Vanity of Opinion; but he is subject to Grief or Fear, as being natural Accidents.

CHAP. V.

How he went to Dionysius his Court.

ABOUT this Time *Dionysius* the *Sicilian* Tyrant flourished, to whom resorted many Philosophers, amongst the rest *Aristippus*, invited by his sumptuous Magnificence. *Dionysius* asked him the Reason of his coming: He answered, *To give what I have, and to receive what I have not*, or, as others, *when I wanted Wisdom, I went to Socrates, now I want Money, I come to you*. He soon insinuated into the Favour of *Dionysius*, for he could conform himself to every Place, Time, and Person, act any Part, continue whatsoever happened to the best; and thus enjoying present Pleasure, never troubled himself for the absent. As *Horace*⁶,

f Athen. deign. 12. g *Æl. var. hist. lib. 14. 6.* h Laert. 2. 90. i *Ibid. 2. 97.* k *Cic. Tusc. quest. 2. 6.* l *Laert. 2. 92.* m *Cic. de Offic. 3. 33.* n *Laert. 2. 93. 99.* o So *Causation reads*, but doubtless there is a Defect in the Text. p *Phil. 1. 135.* q *Laert. 2. 78.* r *Lib. 1. Ep. 17.*

*Every Condition, Habit, and Event,
With Aristippus suits, with all content.*

Of his Compliance with *Dionysius's* Humour there are these Instances. * *Dionysius* at a Feast commanded, that all should put on Purple Robes; *Plato* refused, saying,

*I will not with a formal Robe disgrace
My self, who am a Man of manly Race.*

But *Aristippus* took it, and beginning to dance,

*If it come pure, a mirthful Feast
Never corrupts a modest Breast.*

† Another Time suing to *Dionysius* in the Behalf of his Friend, he would not hear him; at last he threw himself at his Feet, and his Petition was granted; for which being reprehended, *Blame not me, saith he, but Dionysius, whose Ears are in his Feet.*

‡ *Dionysius* shewed him three Courtezans, bidding him take his Choice; he leading them all three away, said, *Paris was punished for preferring one before the other two.* But, having brought them to the Door, he dismiss them, as ready to condemn as accept: Whereupon *Strato* (or as others *Plato*) told him, *You can only wear old Garments and Rags, for which likewise they admired him that he would wear a Threadbare, and a rich Milesian Cloak with equal Decorum, accommodating himself to both.*

§ When *Dionysius* had spit upon him, he took it patiently; for which being reproved, *Fishermen* said he, *suffer themselves to be wet all over that they may catch [salter] a Gudgeon, and shall I be troubled at a little Spittle, who mean to take a Salmon?*

¶ He begged Money of *Dionysius*, who said to him, you told me a wife Man wanted nothing: Give me, and we will talk of this afterwards. When *Dionysius* had given it him, *Now, saith he, you see I do not want.*

By this Complaisance he gained so much upon *Dionysius*, that he had a greater Esteem for him than all the rest of the Philosophers, tho' sometimes he spoke so freely to *Dionysius*, that he incurred his Displeasure.

* To *Dionysius* asking why Philosophers haunted the Gates of rich Men, but rich Men not those of Philosophers: *Because, saith he, the one knows what he wants, the other not.*

† To *Dionysius*, urging him to treat of Philosophy; *It is ridiculous, saith he, if you learn of me what it*

is, to teach me when it should be said. Whereat *Dionysius* displeased, bad him take the lowest Place, which he did quietly, saying, *You have a Mind to make this Seat more honourable.* ‡ The next Day the Tyrant asked him what he thought of that Place wherein he then sat, in respect of that wherein he sat the Night before? He answered, they were alike to him: To-day, saith he, because I left it, it is contemned, what Yesterday was esteemed the most honourable, that where I sit To-day esteemed most honourable, which Yesterday, without me, was accounted the lowest.

§ Being asked why *Dionysius* fell out with him, he answered, for the same Reason he falleth out with others.

¶ *Dionysius's* saying, (out of *Sophocles* as *Plutarch* affirms, who ascribes this to *Zeno*.)

*Who'er goes to a Tyrant, he
A Servant is, tho' he came free.*

He immediately answered,

No Servant is if he came free.

Dionysius offering *Plato* a great Sum of Money, which he refused; *Aristippus* being at the same time in the Court of *Dionysius*, said, *Dionysius* bestows his Liberality upon good Grounds, to us who ask much, he giveth little, to *Plato*, who requireth nothing, he offereth much.

¶ Another Time *Helicon* of *Cyzicus*, one of *Plato's* Friends, having foretold an Eclipse of the Sun, which when it fell out accordingly, he was much honoured for it: *Aristippus* jesting with other Philosophers, said, he could foretell a stranger Thing. They demanding what it was: I prognosticate, saith he, that *Plato* and *Dionysius* will ere long be at Variance, and so it happened.

CHAP. VI.

His Emulators.

THIS Favour which he found with *Dionysius*, was perhaps the Occasion, for which he was malign'd by the rest of the Philosophers, amongst whom was,

† *Xenophon*, who out of Ill-will to him, published the ‡ Discourse between him and *Socrates* about Pleasure.

§ *Plato* likewise, through the same Disaffection, tacitely reprehends him, in *Piwadone*, for being in *Egina* at the Time of *Socrates* his Death. ¶ *Plato* to being in *Dionysius's* Court, when he was there, reproved his sumptuous Life: Whereupon *Aristippus*

* Laert. 2. 78. † Ibid. 2. 79. ‡ Ibid. 2. 67. § Ibid. 2. 68. ¶ Which being pronounced, is equivocal; for, *Plato* signifies a Fish like a Godfish, and *Plato* a Tyrant; as I find in a MS. Lesson communicated by my learned Friend Mr. John Pearson, *Plato* I interpret, *Plato* I interpret, and again, *Plato* I interpret, (read *Plato*) *Plato* I interpret, confirmed by *Athenaeus*, deipn. 7. 10. † Laert. 2. 82. ‡ Ibid. 2. 67. § Ibid. 2. 73. ¶ *Athen. deipn.* 12. citing *Hephaestus*. c Laert. 2. 73. d Ibid. *Plut.* in vit. Pomp. e *Plut.* vit. Dion. f Laert. 2. 65. g *Memorab.* lib. 2. h Laert. 2. 65. i Ibid. 2. 69.

asked him, whether he thought *Dionysius* a good Man, or not. *Plato* affirmed, he thought him good; Yet he, replied *Aristippus*, liveth much more sumptuously; therefore it is not incompatible with Goodness.

Phædo likewise seemed to deride him, demanding who it was that finell'd so strong of Unguents; It is I, unhappy Man that I am, answer'd *Aristippus*, and the Persian King, Who is more unhappy than I? But as other Things are not the worse for this, neither is a Man. A Curse on those effeminate Persons who brought a Scandal upon so good a Thing.

Æschines also, and he, were sometimes at Difference. Once, after some falling out betwixt them, *Aristippus* said to him, Shall we not be Friends? Shall we not give over Foeing? Or do you expect some Body should kick us into Kindness? Willingly, answered *Æschines*. Now, saith *Aristippus*, remember, that though I am the Elder, yet I yielded first. *Æschines* replied, And justly, for you are better than I; I begun the Enmity, you the Reconciliation. *Plutarch* relates it thus. Being fallen out with *Æschines*, he met one who asked him, Where is now your old Friendship, *Aristippus*? It is aspest, saith he, but I will wake it: And going trait to *Æschines*, Am I so unhappy, saith he, and so inconsiderable in your Esteem, as not to deserve Correction? *Æschines* answer'd, It is nothing strange that, exceeding by Nature in all Things, you should first know what is fit to be done.

Antisthenes is to be numbered also amongst those who were displeased at his Manner of Life, as appeareth by an Epistle of his to that Effect, extant amongst the Socratic Epistles; to which *Aristippus* returned this Answer.

• *Aristippus to Antisthenes.*

• **W**E are, *Aristippus*, unhappy beyond Measure.

How can we be otherwise, living with a Tyrant, daily eating and drinking deliciously, perfumed with choicest Unguents, attired in rich loose Garments brought from Tarentum; and none will deliver me from the Cruelty of *Dionysius*, who detains me, not as a rude Person, but one that is versed in Socratic Learning; supplying me (as I said) with Meat, Unguents, Garments, and the like; fearing neither the Judgments of Gods nor Men. And now the Misfortune is much increased. He hath bestowed on me three Sicilian Virgins of extraordinary Beauty, and many Utensils of Silver; and when this Man will give over doing such Things, I know not; you do well therefore to be concerned for the Miseries of others;

in the Requitul whereof I rejoice in your Happiness, and return you Thanks. Farewel.

The Figs which you have, lay up against Winter, and the Cretan Meal; for these Things seem to be better than Riches. Wash and drink of the Fountain of *Enneacruisus*; wear the same Garment in Winter as in Summer, and that sordid, as becomes a free Person living under the Athenian Democracy. As for me, I knew as soon as I came into the City and Island governed by a Monarch, I should suffer those Ills of which you write to me. Now the Syraculians, Agrigentines, Geloans, and the rest of the Sicilians, 'compassionately admire me; but 'for my Madness in coming inconsiderately to these unseemly Things, I wish this Curse to fall upon me, that I may never be quit of these Evils; because being of Years of Discretion, and pretending to Wisdom, I would not undergo Hunger and Cold, nor contemn Glory, nor wear a long Beard. I will send you some great white Lupines to eat, after you have asked Hercules to the Boys; of which Things it is reported you esteem it not absurd to discourse and write. But if any Man should speak of Lupines to *Dionysius*, I think it were against the Rules of Tyranny. Of the rest, go and discourse with Simon the Leather-dresser, than whom you esteem nothing more wise; for I am not allowed Familiarity with Artificers, because I live under Obedience to others.

Notwithstanding this jarring betwixt them, *Aristippus* was nothing backward in employing the Interest he had at Court, for some Friends of *Antisthenes*, to preserve them from Death; as this Letter of his to *Antisthenes* doth manifest.

The Locrian young Man, of whom you write to me, will be set at Liberty, neither put to Death, nor fined, though they were very near Death. Let not *Antisthenes* know I have saved his Friends, for he loves not to converse with Tyrants, but with Meal-men and Victuallers; such as sell Meat and Drink at Athens, without Fraud; and such as sell thick Cloaths in cold Weather, and such as serve Simon; these are not Riches.

Diogenes followed the Example of his Master *Antisthenes*, in deriding *Aristippus*, calling him the Court Spaniel. As *Aristippus* passed by, *Diogenes* busied about washing Herbs, called to him, saying, If you had learned to do thus, you need not have followed the Courts of Princes. And you, said he, if you had known how to converse with Men, need not to have washed Herbs. Thus expressed by Horace.

Diog. On Herbs if *Aristippus* could have din'd,
The Company of Kings he had declin'd.

i Laert. 2. 76. k Laert. ibid. l Senec. de benefic. Clem. Alex. m Laert. 2. 82. n De in cohib. o Socratic. Epist. p Ironically answering a former Letter of *Antisthenes*. q For *ῥημασιν* reading *ῥημασιν* instead of *ῥημασιν*, see *ῥημασιν*, the last Word of the following Epistle, *ῥημασιν*, Scipio. r Make a Point at *ῥημασιν*, and read *ῥημασιν* for *ῥημασιν*, *Doric*; a ridiculous and acute Irony; for *ῥημασιν* signifies to look on a Thing with Admiration, which is not proper to Compassion. s Read *ῥημασιν* for *ῥημασιν*. t *ῥημασιν*. Perhaps *ῥημασιν*. u The Letter seems to be written to *Antisthenes*; and this meaning ironically. w The Leather-dresser. x Epist. 1. 37.

*Arif. He who derides me, had be Wit to use
The Company of Kings, would Herbs refuse.
I mine own Jester; thou the People's art;
My Choice is of the better, nobler Part;
I, by a King maintained, on Horseback ride;
Thou by the meanest People art supply'd,
Than those that do maintain thee thou art less;
Yet to want nothing vainly dost profess.*

¹ *Theodorus*, in his Book of Sects, reproached *Aristippus*; and ² *Alexis* the comick Poet, in his *Galatea*, bringeth in a Servant speaking thus of one of his Disciples.

*My Master young on Rhetorick first intent,
Next to Philosophy his Study bent.
A Cyrenæan liv'd at Athens then,
Nam'd Aristippus, justly, first of Men
Esteem'd for Sweetety and Luxury,
A Talent him my Master gave, to be
His Scholar; but of Arts he none was taught,
Save only Cookery, that away he brought.*

CHAP. VII.

His Apothegms.

OF Apothegms (in ^a which Kind he was conceived to have an Acuteness beyond all the other Philosophers) these are remembered.

^b He once gave fifty Drachms for a Partridge; for which being reproved by another; *You would have given a Penny for it*, saith he; which the other granting; *So much*, saith he, *are fifty Drachms to me.*

^c Being demanded what was the greatest Benefit he had received by Philosophy, he answered; *To converse freely with all Men.*

^d Being reproached for living high; *If Magnificence were a Sin*, saith he, *it would not be practis'd upon Days of Festival to the Gods.*

^e To one who asked, wherein Philosophers excelled other Men; *Though all Laws were abolished*, saith he, *we should lead the same Lives.*

^f Being demanded how the Learned differ from the Unlearned, he answered; *as Horses unback'd, from such as are well managed.*

^g Going into the House of a Courtesan, a young Man of the Company blush'd, to whom he said, *It is not ill to go in, but not to be able to come out.*

^h To one who desired him to resolve a Riddle; *Thou Fool*, saith he, *why wouldst thou have me resolve that which unresolved finds us such Entertainment?*

He said, *It is better to be a Beggar than unlearned; for one wants only Riches, the other Humanity.*

Being reviled, he went aloof off; he that reviled, asked why he fled; *Because*, saith he, *to speak ill is in your Power, not to hear is in mine.*

One saying, he saw Philosophers at the Gates of rich Men; *And Physicians*, saith he, *at the Gates of the Sick; but no Man would for that Reason chuse to be sick rather than a Physician.*

To one who boasted he learned much: *As they*, saith he, *who eat and exercise much, are not better than those who eat only to satisfy Nature; neither are they Learned, who make large, but profitable Collections.*

An Orator pleading for him, and gaining the Cause, asked him, *What are you the better for. Socrates?* *So much*, saith he, *as that I make good those Things which you alledged in my Defence.*

He instructed his Daughter *Arete*, to condemn all that is too much.

To one who demanded, what his Son would be the better for Learning; *If in nothing else*, in this, saith he, *that in the Theatre one Stone shall not sit upon another.*

Of one who would have preferred his Son to him, he demanded 500 Drachms; *For so much*, saith the other, *I can buy a Slave: Do so*, answered he, *and then you will have Two, your Son, and him you buy.*

He said he took Money of his Friends, not to make Use of it himself, but to let them know the right Use of it.

Being reproached for entertaining an Orator to plead his Cause; *And when I would feast*, saith he, *I hire a Cook.*

^k To one who boasted of his Swimming; *Are not you ashamed*, saith he, *to glory in the Property of a Dolphin?*

Being demanded, wherein the Learned differ'd from the Unlearned; *Send them naked to Strangers*, saith he, *and you shall see.*

To one who boasted he could drink much, without being drunk; *So*, saith he, *can a Mule.*

Being blamed that he took Money, being the Disciple of Socrates; *And justly*, saith he; for Socrates, *when they sent him Wheat and Wine*, took a little for his present Use, and sent back the rest; *the chief of all the Athenians were his Purveyors*, mine Eutichydes, a mercenary Servant.

Being reproved by Plato, [†] for buying a great Quantity of Fish; *They cost me*, saith he, *but an Obolus; Would not you have given so much for them?* To which Plato assenting; *It is not that I am profuse then*, saith he, *but that you are covetous.*

¹ *Simon*, Pantler to *Dionysius*, a Phrygian, a Man of ill Conditions, brought him to his House, paved curiously with Marble; *Aristippus* spits in his Face,

^y Laert. 2. 65. ^a Athen. Deipn. 12. ^a Soid.
^g Ibid. ^h Laert. 2. 70. ⁱ Plut. de pac. educ.

^b Laert. 2. 68. ^b Laert. 2. 73. etc.

^c Laert. 2. 68. ^d Ibid.
[†] Athen. Deipn. 13.

^e Ibid.
¹ Laert. Ibid.

^f Laert. 2. 69.

whereat the other growing angry; *I could not find, faith he, a fitter Place.*

Being demanded how Socrates died ^m; *As I would wish to do, faith he.*

Polyxenus the Sophist coming to his House, and seeing there Women, and a great Feast, reproved him. *Aristippus* gave him Way, and after a little Pause; *Will you dine with me, faith he?* whereto he consenting; *Why then, continues he, do you reprove me?* *'Tis not the Feast, but the Cost which you condemn.*

His Servant being upon a Journey, weary with carrying of Money; *Throw away, faith he, what is too much, and carry as much as you can.*

ⁿ *He had his Slaves away his Money throw, Because o'erbarg'd with Weight, they went too slow.*

^o Being at Sea, and understanding the Owners of the Vessel were Pirates, he took his Money, and counted it, then let it fall into the Sea, as unwillingly, and sighed. Some affirm, that he said, *It is better these perish for Aristippus, than Aristippus for them.*

^p He reproved Men for looking upon Goods exposed to Sale, and taking no Care to furnish their Minds. Others ascribe this to Diogenes.

^q Living in Asia, he was seized by Artaphernes, the King's Lieutenant; wherupon, one saying to him, *And where is now your Confidence?* *When, faith he, you Fools, should I be confident, if not now, when I shall meet with Artaphernes?*

Those who, being endowed with the Liberal Arts, forsok Philosophy, to apply themselves to Mechanical Sciences, he compared to the Suitors of Penelope; *They could get the Good-wills of Melantho, Polydora, and others of the Servants, but could not obtain the Mistress in Marriage.* Not unlike is that of *Ulysses*, who said, that *Ulysses*, when he went to Hell, saw all the Dead, and spoke to them, but could not come so much as to the Sight of the Queen.

Being demanded what Boys ought to learn; *That, faith he, which they ought to practise when they are Men.*

^r To one who accused him for going from Socrates to Dionysius: *To Socrates, faith he, I went for *wisdom*, Education; to Dionysius for *pleasure*, Recreation.*

^s To a Courtezan who told him she was with Child by him; *You know that no more, said he, than if passing through a Bush, you should say this Thorn pricked you.*

To one who blamed him, that he took Money of Dionysius, *Plato* a Book; he answered, *I want Money, Plato* a Book.

^t Having lost a great Farm, he said to one, who seemed excessively to compassionate his Loss; *You have but one Field, I have three Left; Why should not I rather grieve for you? It is Madness (adds Plutarch) to lament for what is lost, and not rejoice for what is left.*

^u When one told him, the Land is lost for your Sake; *Better, faith he, is it that the Land be lost for me, than I for the Land.*

^v Seeing one angry vent his Passion in Words; *Let us not, faith he, suit Words to our Anger, but appease our Anger with Words.*

^w Seeing a little Woman exceeding fair; *This, faith he, is a little Evil, but a great Beauty.* They who invert these Words, and read, *A little fair one, but great Evil*, mistake the Meaning of *Aristippus*, who plays upon that ordinary Saying, applying the Inversion to his own luxurious Humour.

^x To one, who demanded his Advice, whether he should marry or no; he said, *No, if you take a fair Wife, faith he, she will be common; if foul, a Fury.*

^y He used to advise young Men to carry such Provision, as in a Shipwrack they might swim away withal.

^z As a Shoe that is too big is unfit for Use, so is a great Estate; the Bigness of the Shoe troubles the Wearer; Wealth may be used upon Occasion, either wholly, or in Part.

C H A P. VIII.

His Writings.

^a SOME affirm, (of whom is *Sisocrates*) that he wrote nothing at all; others, that he wrote, *The Libyan History*, three Books, dedicated to *Dionysius*.

Dialogues, twenty five (or rather twenty three; for the Number seems corrupt) in one Book; some in the *Attick* Dialect, others in the *Doric*. Their Titles these; 1. *Artabazus*. 2. *To the Shipwreck'd*. 3. *To Exiles*. 4. *To a poor Man*. 5. *To Lais*. 6. *To Perus*. 7. *To Lais*, concerning a Looking-Glass. 8. *Hermias*. 9. *The Dream*. 10. *To the Cup bearer*. 11. *Philomelus*. 12. *To Servants*. 13. *To those who reproved him for using old Wine, and common Women*. 14. *To those who reproved him for Feasting*. 15. *An Epistle to Arete*. 16. *To the Olympick Exercises*. 17. *An Interrogation*. 18. *Another Interrogation*. 19. *A Chria to Dionysius*. 20. *Another on an Image*. 21. *Another on Dionysius's Daughter*. 22. *To one who conceived himself dishonoured*. 23. *To one who endeavoured to give Advice*.

Exercitations six Books.

^b Of *Pleasure*, mentioned by *Laertius* in the Life of *Epicurus*.

^m Laert. 2. 76. ⁿ Horat. Sat. 2. 3. ^o Laert. 2. 77. Cic. de invent. p. 118. ^p Laert. 2. 79. ^q Laert. 2. 80. ^r Ibid. ^s Ibid. ^t Plut. de trans. anim. ^u Stob. Eth. 35. ^v Stob. Eth. 76. ^w Stob. Eth. 153. ^x Stob. Eth. 153. ^y Stob. Eth. 153. ^z Stob. Eth. 153. ^a Ibid. ^b Ibid. ^c Stob. Eth. 92. ^d Laert. 2. 84. ^e A Chria is a short Commemoration, aptly relating the Speech or Action of some Person. The third of these (viz. to Dionysius's Daughter) *Vossius* inserts amongst the Greek Histories; If that were Historical, it is likely this to Dionysius was of the same Nature. ^f Laert. 10. 4.

Of *Physiology*, out of which *Laertius* cites, that *Pythagoras* was so named, because he spoke no less Truth than *Pythius*.

Of the *Luxury of the Ancients*, four Books; containing Examples of those who indulged to Love and Pleasure; as the Love of *Empedocles* to *Pausanias*, in the first Book; of *Crates* to her Son *Periander*; of *Aristotle* to the Concubine of *Hermias*, in the Fourth; of *Socrates* to *Alcibiades*, *Xenophon* to *Clinias*, *Plato* to *Aster*, *Xenocrates* to *Pislemo*. But these latter Instances shew, that these Books were not writ by this *Aristippus*.

Epistles, four are extant under his Name, in the *Socratick Collection*, put forth by *Leo Allatius*.

Socion and *Panætius* reckon his Treatises thus.

Of *Discipline*.

Of *Vertue*; an Exhortation.

Artabazus.

The *Shipwreck'd*.

The *Banish'd*.

Exercitations, six.

Cbria, three.

To *Lais*.

To *Porus*.

To *Socrates*.

Of *Fortune*.

CHAP. IX.

His Death.

HAVING lived long with *Dionysius*, at last his Daughter *Arete* sent to him, to desire him that he would come to *Cyrene* to her, to order her Affairs; for that she was in Danger of Oppression by the Magistrates. *Aristippus* hereupon took Leave of *Dionysius*, and being on his Voyage, fell sick by the Way, and was forced to put in at *Lipara*, an *Ælian* Island, where he died; as may be gathered from this *Epistle*, which he then sent to his Daughter.

¹ *Aristippus* to ² *Arete*.

I Received your Letter by *Teleus*, wherein you desire me to make all possible Haste to *Cyrene*, because your Business with the *Præfects* goeth not to your Mind, and your Husband is unfit to manage your domestic Affairs, by reason of his Bashfulness, and being accustomed to a retired Life, remote from the Publick. Wherefore, as soon as I get Leave of *Dionysius*, I sail'd towards you; and being upon my Journey, fell sick by the way, at *Lipara*, where the Friends of *Sonicus* provide carefully for me, with such Humanity as is useful for one near Death. As for your Demand, what Respect you should give those whom I manumissed, who profess they will never de-

ferre *Aristippus* whilst they have Strength, but ever serve him and you; trust them in all Things; they have learned from me not to be false. For yourself, I advise you to apply yourself to the Magistrates, which Counsel will profit you, if you affect not rather to have much. You will live most at Ease, if you condemn Excess; for they cannot be so unjust as to leave you in Want. You have two Orchards left sufficient to maintain you plentifully. And that Possession in *Bernicia*, if alone left you, were sufficient to supply you fully. I do not counsel you to neglect small Things, but not to be troubled for small Things, since Vexation is not good even for great. If when I am dead, you want my Advice for the Education of young *Aristippus*, go to Athens; and above all, esteem *Xantippe* and *Myrto*, who have often spoke to me, to bring you to the *Eleusinian Festivals*. Whilst you lead this pleasant Life with these, let the *Cyrenean Præfects* be as unjust as they please, in your natural End they cannot prejudice you. Endeavour to live with *Xantippe* and *Myrto*, as I did heretofore with *Socrates*, composing yourself to their Conversation; for, Pride is not proper in that Place. If *Tyrocles*, the Son of *Socrates*, who lived with me at *Megara*, come to *Cyrene*, it will be well done to supply him, and to respect as your own Son. If you will not nurse a Daughter, because of the great Trouble it gives you, send for the Daughter of *Eubois*, to whom you have heretofore express'd so much Kindness, and named after my Mother, and I have also often call'd her my Friend. Above all, take Care of little *Aristippus*, that he may be worthy of us, and of Philosophy. For this I leave him, as his true Inheritance, the rest of his Estate finds the *Cyrenean Magistrates Adversaries*. But you writ me not Word, that any offered to take that away from you. Rejoice, dear Daughter, in the Possession of those Riches which are in your Power, and make your Son possess 'em likewise. I wish he were my Son; but, being disappointed of that Hope, I depart with this Assurance, that you will lead him in the Paths trodden by good Men. Farewell, and grieve not for us.

³ Of his Children, besides this *Arete* his Daughter, whom he educated in Philosophy, is remembered also a Son, whom, for his Stupidity, he disinherited, and turned out of Doors; for which being reproved by his Wife, who alledged, that he came from himself; he, spitting, said, "This comes from me too, but profits me nothing. Or, as *Laertius*; *Ἦν ἐστὶν ὁ πατήρ μου, ὡς φησὶν, αὐτὸν ἀνεπαιδείαν ὡς ἄνθρωπος* as far as we can from us.

⁴ *Arete* had a Son named from his Grandfather *Aristippus*, and from his Mothers instructing him in Philosophy, surnamed *Ἰουστινιανός*.

¹ *Laert.* in vit. *Emped.* *Perand.* *Aristot.* &c.

² *Laert.* 2. 85.

³ *Socr.* *Epist.* 27.

⁴ So supplied by *Leo Allatius*.

⁵ *Pleasure*.

⁶ *Leo Allatius* reads *Lamproci*; but that cannot be; for *Lamproci* was dead long before.

See *Life Socratick*, ch. p. 16.

⁷ *Stob. Ecl.* 74.

⁸ *Laert.* 2. 81.

⁹ *Laert.* 2. 85.

^a Besides these two (*Aristippus* the Grandfather, and the Grandson) *Laertius* reckons two more of the same Name; one writ the History of *Arcadia*, the other was of the new Academy.

CHAP. IX.

His Disciples and Successors.

OF the Auditors of *Aristippus*,^c besides his Daughter *Arete*, (whom he taught with much Care, and brought up to great Perfection in Philosophy) are remembered *Ethiops* of *Ptolomais*, and *Antipater* of *Cyrene*.

q Laert. 2. 83. r Laert. 2. 85. s Laert. 2. 86.

Arete communicated the Philosophy she received from her Father, to her Son *Aristippus the younger*. *Aristippus* transmitted it to *Theodorus the Atabist*, who instituted a Sect, called *Theodorean*.

Antipater communicated the Philosophy of *Aristippus* to *Epitimidus*, his Disciple; *Epitimidus* to *Parabates*; *Parabates* to *Hegesias* and *Anniceris*; these Two last improving it by some Additions of their own, obtained the Honour each of them, to have a Sect named after them, *Hegesack* and *Annicerick*.

H E G E S I A S.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

HEGESIAS, Disciple to *Parabates*, was named *αὐθιβάτης*, *Death's Orator*, from a Book he writ, intitled, *Αὐθιβάτης*, upon Occasion of one who had famished himself nigh to Death, but was call'd back to Life by his Friends; in Answer to whom, he, in this Book demonstrated, that Death takes us away from ill Things, not from good; and reckoned up the Incommodities of Life, and represented the Evils thereof with so much Rhetorick, that the sad Impression thereof penetrated so far into the Breasts of many Hearers, that it begot in them a Desire of dying voluntarily, and many laid violent Hands upon themselves. Whereupon he was prohibited by *Ptolomy* the King to discourse any more upon this Subject in the Schools.

CHAP. II.

His Philosophy.

HIS Disciples were from him called *Hegesians*.^t They held the same chief Good and Evil with the *Cyrenaans*; further asserting,

That 'Kindness, Friendship, and Benevolence, are in themselves nothing; not expetible, but in respect of those Benefits which cannot consist without those Persons.

That 'Perfect Felicity is absolutely impossible, because the Body is disordered by many Troubles, in which the Soul shares, and most of those Things which we hope are prevented by Chance.

That 'Life and Death are in our Choice.

That 'nothing is by Nature pleasaunt or unpleasant, but by the Rarity and Unusualness of Things, or Satiety; some are delighted therewith, others not.

That 'Poverty and Wealth confer nothing to Pleasure; neither are the Rich affected with more exquisite Pleasure than the Poor. Servitude and Liberty, Nobility and Meanness, Glory and Ignominy differ nothing in this Respect.

That 'to live is advantageous for a Fool, indifferent to a wife Man.

That 'a wife Man ought to do all Things in Consideration of himself, and prefer none before himself, for though possibly he may receive Benefits from others, very great in outward Appearance, yet are they nothing in Comparison of those which he dispenseeth.

That 'Sense confers nothing to certain Knowledge, for all act by the Rules of their own Reason.

That 'Offences ought to be pardoned; for no Man offends willingly, but compell'd by some Affection.

That 'we should hate no Man, but instruct him better.

That 'a wife Man should not insist so much upon Choice of good Things, as upon evil; making it his Scope and End to live neither in Labour nor Grief; which they do, who are inclined neither Way to the Objects of Pleasure.

t Cic. Tusc. qu. 1. 34. u Val. Max. 8. 9. w Laert. 2. 91.

ANNICERIS.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

ANNICERIS^a was of Cyrene, Disciple to *Parabates*. *Suidas* saith, he was an *Epicurean*, and that he lived in the Time of *Alexander*. He^y was excellent in Chariot-racing, of which one Day he gave a Testimony before *Plato*, and drove many Courses round the *Academy*, so exactly, that his Wheels never went out of the Track, to the Admiration of all that were present, except *Plato*, who reprehended his too much Industry, saying, It was not possible but that he who employed so much Pains about Things of no Value, must neglect those of greater Concernment, which are truly worth Admiration.

^a When *Plato*, by the Command of *Dionysius*, was sold as a Slave in *Ægina*, *Anniceris* fortun'd to be present, who redeem'd him for twenty, or according to others, thirty *Minæ*, and sent him to *Athens* to his Friends, who presently returned the Money to *Anniceris*, but he refus'd it, saying, They were not the only Persons that deserv'd to take Care of *Plato*.

^y He had a Brother named *Nicoteles*, a Philosopher; he had likewise the famous *Poisonius* to be his Disciple.

CHAP. II.

His Philosophy.

HIS Disciples were call'd *Annicerians*.^b They, as the rest, plac'd all good in Pleasure, and conceiv'd Virtue to be only commendable as far as it produc'd Pleasure. They agreed in all Things with the *Hegeians*, but they abolish'd not Friendship, Good-will, Duty to Parents, and Actions done for our Country. They held,

That altho' a wise Man suffer Trouble for those Things, yet he will lead a Life nothing the less happy, tho' he enjoy but few Pleasures.

That the Felicity of a Friend is not expetible in itself; for to agree in Judgment with another, or to be rais'd above, and fortify'd against the general Opinion, is not enough to satisfy Reason, but we must accustom ourselves to the best Things, because of our innate vicious Inclinations.

That a Friend is not to be entertained out of useful or necessary Ends, nor when such fail, is to be cast off, but out of an intimate good Will, for which we must also undergo Trouble. For tho' they plac'd (as the rest) the chief End and Good in Pleasure, and profess'd to be griev'd at the Loss thereof, yet they affirm that we ought to undergo voluntarily Labours, out of Love to a Friend.

^x Laert. 2. 85. ^y Æl. var. hist. 2. 27. ^z Laert. vit. Plat. ^a Suid. ^b Cic. de offic. 3. ^c Laert. 2. 96.

THEODORUS.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

THEODORUS^d heard *Anniceris*, *Dionysius* the Logician, *Zeno* the Cittiean, and *Pyrro* the Ephectic. He was call'd the *Albeist*, because^e he held there was no God, and wrote a Treatise (*Suidas* saith many) wherein he endeavour'd to refel all Arguments to the contrary, out of which *Epicurus* borrow'd much. Afterwards was abusively call'd *Θεός*, upon Occasion of a Dispute with *Stilpo* to this Effect: *Do you believe, saith Stilpo, you are whatsoever you affirm yourself to be?* *Theodorus* granting; *Then*, continues *Stilpo, if you*

should say you were a God, were you so? To which *Theodorus* assenting, *Stilpo* reply'd; *Then impious Man, you are a Bird, or any Thing else by the same Reason.*

He was ejected out of *Cyrene*^f by the Citizens, whereupon he said pleasantly; *You do not well, Cyreneans, to thrust me out of Lybia into Greece.* Thence he went to *Athens*, where he should have been cit'd to the Court of *Areopagus*, and lost his Life, but that he was freed by *Demetrius Phalcreus*. Being likewise banish'd thence, he went to *Ptole-*

^d Laert. 2. 98. ^e Suid. ^f Plut. plac. phil. 17. ^g Cic. de nat. deor. 1. ^h Laert. 2. 101. ⁱ Ibid. 2. 104.

my the Son of *Lagus*, with whom he lived, and was by him sent on an Embassy to *Lyfimachus*, to whom, speaking atheistically; *Lyfimachus* said, *Are you not that Theodorus that was banished Athens?* He answered, *It is true, the Athenians when they could bear me no longer, as Semele Bacchus, cast me out.* *Lyfimachus* replied, *See that you come no more to me.* No, answered he, unless *Ptolemy* send me. *Mythra*, Son of *Lyfimachus* being present, said, *You seem not only ignorant of Gods but of Kings.* How, said he, *Am I ignorant of the Gods, who believe you an Enemy to them?* *Lyfimachus* threatened him with Death: *You glory*, said he, *in a great Matter, a Cantharides can do as much.* Or as *Stobæus*, *I knew not that you had not the Power of a King but of Poison.* Hereat incensed, he commanded he should be crucified. Threaten, said he, *these Things I pray to your purple Nobles, it is all one to Theodorus whether he rot above or under Ground.*

* Finally, he went to *Cyrene*, and lived with *Murius* in much Repute, in that City out of which he was first ejected.

† Disputing with *Euryclides* a Priest, he asked, what Persons those were who defile Mysteries: *Euryclides* answered, *Those who communicate them to Persons not initiated.* Then, replied he, *you do impiously in declaring them to such.*

‡ What others ascribe to *Arctippus* and *Diogenes*, some attribute to *Theodorus* and *Metrocleus*, a Cynick, who saying, *You would not want Disciples if you washed Herbs:* *Theodorus* answered, *Neither would you wash Herbs, if you knew how to converse with Men.*

§ He said of *Hipparchia* the Wife of *Crates*, *This is she who hath given over the Shuttle to put on a Cloak.*

CHAP. II.

His Philosophy.

HE taught all Manner of Learning, and instituted a Sect, called *Theodorean*. ° He asserted Indifference, that there is no Difference of Things.

¶ That our End, or chief Good and greatest Ill, are Joy and Sorrow; one consisting in Prudence, the other in Imprudence.

That Prudence and Justice are good Things, the contrary Habits ill, the mean, Pleasure and Grief.

He took away Friendship, because it is neither in Fools nor wise Men; these being incapable to make Use of it, the Thing itself vanishest; these not needing it, as being sufficient to themselves.

That it is reasonable that a wise Man expose not himself to Danger for his Country; Wisdom ought not to be lost for the Preservation of Fools.

That the World is our Country.

That a Man upon Occasion may commit Theft, Adultery and Sacrilege, there being nothing in these naturally evil, if that Opinion were taken away which is built upon the Agreement of Fools.

That a wise Man may publickly without Shame ejaculate *γυναικας*.

He used such Inductions as these: *Is not a Woman that is skilful in Grammar, profitable in that Respect as a Grammarian?* Yes. *Is not the same of a Youth?* Yes. *Is not a beautiful Woman then profitable, as being handsome?* Yes. *Then she who makes right Use of it doth not amiss.* In these Kinds of Questions he was very subtle.

CHAP. III.

His Death, Writings, &c.

Amplicrates said, † that he was condemned by the Law for Atheism, and drunk Hemlock.

He wrote, besides that which appertained to his Sect, many other Things.

Laertius reckons twenty of this Name. The first a *Samian*, Son of *Rhæcus*, who advised to lay the Foundation of the Temple at *Ephesus* upon Embers: For, the Place being wet, he said, that Coals, when they forsake the Nature of Wood, acquire a Solidity not to be violated by Moisture.

The second of *Cyrene*, a Geometrician, whose Disciple *Plato* was.

The third this Philosopher.

The fourth writ of exercising the Voice, a famous Book.

The fifth writ of Lawgivers, beginning with *Terpander*.

The sixth a Stoick.

The seventh writ the *Roman History*.

The eighth a *Syracusan*, writ *Tactics*.

The ninth a *Byzantine*, a Sophist, eminent for civil Pleas.

The tenth of the same Country, mentioned by *Aristotle* in his Epitome of Orators.

The eleventh of *Thebes*, a Statuary.

The twelfth a Painter, mentioned by *Polemon*.

The thirteenth of *Athens*, a Painter, of whom writes *Menodotus*.

The fourteenth of *Ephesus*, a Painter, of whom *Theophrastus* in his Treatise of Painting.

The fifteenth a Poet, who wrote Epigrams.

The sixteenth wrote of Poets.

The seventeenth a Physician, Disciple to *Athenæus*.

The eighteenth of *Cbier*, a Stoick.

The nineteenth of *Miletus*, a Stoick.

The twentieth a Tragic Poet.

i Sen. de tranq. anim. 6. Cic. Tusc. qu. 1. Plot. an. victor. ad insul. suff. k Laert. 2. 703. l Ibid. 2. 701. m Ibid. 2. 103. n Ibid. 6. 98. o Suid. in Socrat. p Laert. 2. 96. q Ibid. 2. 102. r Suid.

B I O N.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

OF the *Theodorean* Sect was *Bion*, a *Boristhenite*. What his Parents were, and what his Employments, he diverting himself to Philosophy, related to *Antigonus*, King of Macedonia, in this Manner. *Antigonus* asked, *Whence art thou? Who thy Parents? What thy Town?* *Bion* perceiving himself to be reproached, answered thus, my Father was a Freeman, τὸ δυνάμις ἀνελευθέρων, implying he was a Seller of Salt-Fish, a *Boristhenite*; he had not a Face, but instead thereof a Brand-mark, which declared the ill Disposition of the Owner: My Mother he married out of a common Brothel-house; [*a* Lacedæmonian Courtesan, named *Olympia*] being such a Woman as such a Man could get. My Father for couzening the State, was sold, and all our Family, for Slaves. I being a young likely Youth, was bought by an Orator, who died, and left me all he had. I tore and burnt his Papers, went to *Athens*, and there applied my self to Philosophy.

This is the Blood and Race I boast to own. Thus much concerning myself. Let *Perseus* therefore, and *Philonides* forbear to enquire after these Things, and look you upon me, as I am in myself. You do not use, O King, when you send for Archers, to enquire of what Parentage they are; but set them up a Mark to shoot at; even so of Friends, you should not examine whence, but what they are.

Bion indeed, setting this aside, was of a versatile Wit, a subtle Sophist, and gave many Furtherances to the Exercisers of Philosophy: In some Things he was magnificent, and not altogether free from Pride.

He first heard *Crates* the Academick; but, despising that Sect, took a sordid Cloak and Scrip, and became a Cynick. To which *Laertius* ascribes his Constancy, expert of Perturbation. Then he followed *Theodorus* the Atheist, who professed all Manner of Learning; to whose Opinions he addicted himself, and was called a *Theodorean*: Afterwards he heard *Theophrastus* the Peripatetic.

CHAP. II.

His Apophthegms.

HE left many Memorials*, and profitable Apophthegms; as, being reproved for not endeavour-

ing to catch a young Man; New Cheese, saith he, will not stick to the Hook.

Being demanded what Man is most perplexed? He, saith he, who aims at the highest Content.

To one who asked his Advice whether he should marry or not (for this some ascribe to *Bion*, which *A. Gellius* to *Bias*, the Mistake perhaps grounded upon the nearness of their Names) he answered, if you take a foul Wife, she will be a Torment; if a fair, common.

He said, *That Age is the Haven to which all Ills have Recourse; That Glory is the Mother of Years; That Beauty is a Good which concerns others, not ourselves; That Riches are the Sineews of Things.*

To one who had consumed his Patrimony, *Earth*, saith he, devoured *Amphiraraus*, but you devour *Earth*.

He said, *It is a great Ill, not to be able to bear ill.*

He reproved those who burn Men, as having no Sense, and again burn them as having Sense.

He used to say, It is better to yield our own Youth and Beauty to others, than to attempt another's; for he that doth so, injures both his Body and Soul.

He vilified *Socrates*, saying, If he could enjoy *Alcibiades* and did not, he was a Fool; if he could not, he did no great Matter.

He said the Way to the next World is easy, for we find it blindfold.

He condemned *Alcibiades*, saying, When he was a Boy, he drew away Husbands from their Wives; when a Man, Wives from their Husbands.

At *Rhodes*, whilst the *Athenians* exercised Rhetorick, he taught Philosophy; for which being reprov'd, I bought Wheat, saith he, and shall I sell Barley?

He said, they who are punished below would be more tormented if they carried Water in whole Vessels than in Vessels full of Holes.

One that was extremely talkative desiring his Assistance in a Business, I will do what I can for you, saith he, if you send a Messenger to me, and come not yourself.

Travelling with very ill Company, they fell amongst Thieves; we shall be undone, saith he, unless we be known.

He said, Arrogance is the Obstruction of Virtue.

* Laert. 4. 46. t Athen. deipn. 33. u Laert. 4. 47. 4. 53. w Ibid. 4. 51. x Laert. 4. 47.

Of a rich Man covetous ; he hath not Money, faith he, but Money him.

He said, covetous Persons keep their Wealth so strictly, that they have no more Use of their own than of another's.

He said, when we are young, we use Courage, when old, Wisdom. Wisdom excels other Virtues as the Sight the other Senses.

He said, no Man should be reproached for old Age, that being a Condition all pray they may arrive at.

To an envious Man said, I know not, faith he, whether some Ill hath befalln you, or some Good another.

He said, Impiety is an ill Companion to bold Language ;

*For tho' his Speech be free,
To Bondage yield must be.*

That Friends, whatsoever they prove, ought to be retained : Lest we seem to have conversed with wicked Persons, or to shun good.

Being demanded if there were any Gods, he said, *Old Man, wilt thou not drive this Crowd away.*

He conceived that he might make a Field fertile sooner by praising than by manuring it.

He said, they who love to be flattered, are like Pots carried by the Ear.

To one who asked him what Folly is, he said the Obstruction of Knowledge.

He said, good Men, tho' Slaves, are free, but wicked Men, tho' free, are Slaves to many Pleasures.

He said, Grammarians whilst they enquire after the Errors of *Ulysses*, mind not their own, nor see that they themselves go astray as well as he, in taking Pains about useless Things.

He said, Avarice is the Metropolis of all Evil.

Seeing a Statue of *Perseus*, under which was written, ΠΕΡΣΕΙΟΣ ΑΘΗΝΩΝΟΣ Ο ΚΙΤΤΗΣ, *Perseus, of Zeno, a Citiſſean*, he said, the Writer mistook ; for it should be, *δουλός*, Zeno's Servant ; as indeed he was.

C H A P. III.

His Death.

AT last falling sick * (as those of *Chalcis* say, for he died there) he was persuaded to suffer Ligatures (by Way of Charm) he recanted and proſtrest Repentance for all he had said offensive to the Gods. He was reduced to extreme Want of such Things as are most necessary to sick Persons, until *Antigonus* lent to him two Servants, and himself followed in a Litter, as *Phavorinus* affirms in his various History ; of that Sickness he died : On whose Death thus *Laertius*.

*Bion the Boristhenite,
By his Birth to Scythia known,
Did Religious Duties flight,
Gods affirming there were none.*

*If to what he then proſtrest,
Firm he had continued still,
Then his Tongue had spoke his Breast,
And been constant, tho' in Ill.*

*But the same who Gods deny'd,
He who sacred Fanes despis'd,
He who Mortals did deride,
When to Gods they sacrific'd ;*

*Tortur'd by a long Disease,
And of Death's Pursuit afraid, -
Gifts their Anger to appease
On their Hearts and Altars laid.*

*Thus with Smoke and Incense tries
To delight their sacred Scent ;
I have sinn'd, not only cries,
And what I proſtrest repent :*

*But unto an old Wife's Charms
Did his willing Neck submit,
And about his feeble Arms
Caus'd them Leather Thongs to knit.*

*And a youthful Sprig of Bays
Did set up before his Gate :
Every Means and Way essays
To divert approaching Fate.*

*Fool to think the Gods might be
Brib'd with Gifts, their Favours bought,
Or the sacred Deity,
Were, and were not, as he thought.*

*But his Wisdom's Titles (now
Turn'd to Abuse) not avail
With stretched Arms, I know not bow,
Idly be cry'd, great Pluto, bail.*

Of this Name *Laertius* reckons ten. The first contemporary with *Pherecydes* the Syrian of *Proconessus*, who writ two Books extant in his Time.

The second a *Syracusan*, wrote of the Art of Rhetorick.

The third this Philosopher.

The fourth an *Alderite*, of the Family of *Democritus*, a Mathematician. He wrote in the *Attick* and *Ionick* Dialect. He first said there were some habitable Parts of the Earth, where it was six Months Day and six Months Night.

The fifth of *Soleis*. He wrote the *Æthiopick* History.

The sixth an Orator, who wrote nine Books, intituled by the Names of the Muses.

The seventh a Lyrick Poet.

The eighth a *Milesian* Statuary mentioned by *Polemon*.

The ninth a Tragick Poet, one of those who were called *Tarfici*.

The tenth a Statuary of *Clazomene* or *Chios*, mentioned by *Hipponax*.

The Megarick Sect.

E U C L I D.

CHAP. I.

His Country and Masters.

EUCLID^a, (Institutor of the *Megarick* Sect) was born at *Megara*, a Town adjacent upon the *Isthmus*, tho' others say at *Geta*, a City of *Sicily*.

He first studied the Writings of *Parmenides*, then went to *Athens* to hear *Socrates*: Afterwards the^b *Athenians* made an Order, that if any Citizen of *Megara* came into the City of *Athens*, he should be put to Death: So great was the Hatred the *Athenians* bore to the *Megarenses*.^c *Thucydides* mentions this Decree, whereby the *Megarenses* were prohibited to make Use of any Laws within the *Athenian Jurisdiction*, or the *Attick Forum*; which Order the *Lacedæmonians* requiring to be repealed, and not prevailing, the *Peloponnesian* War ensued thereupon, the cruellest and longest that ever was amongst the *Grecians*.

Euclid^d, who was of *Megara*, and before that Decree used to go to *Athens*, and hear *Socrates*, after it was promulgated, came by Night in a long Woman's Gown, and Cloak of several Colours, his Head attired in a Woman's Veil (so *Varro* expounds *Rica*) from his House in *Megara* to *Athens*, to *Socrates*, that he might be in that Time Partaker of his Counsel and Instructions, and went back again before that Day in the same Habit twenty thousand Paces.

^e Upon the Death of *Socrates*, *Plato* and the rest of the Philosophers, fearing the Cruelty of the Tyrants, went to *Megara* to him, who entertained him kindly.

CHAP. II.

His Institution of a Sect.

HE^f affected litigious Disputes, and^g was therefore told by *Socrates*, that he knew how to contend with *Sophists*, but not with *Men*. Suitable to

his contentious Humour, he instituted a Sect,^h first called *Megarick*, from the Place, afterwards *Eristick*, from the litigious, sophistical Nature thereof: Whenceⁱ *Diogenes* said, it was not *σχολή*, a School, but *χολή*, Anger: Thus reproved by *Timon*^k,

*Of all these Tribes, I not value ought,
Which Phædo nor litigious Euclid caught,
Who to the Megareans mad Contention taught.*

Lastly, it was called *Dialectick*; which Name *Dionysius*, a *Carthaginian*, first gave them, because their Discourse consisted of Question and Answer.

He affirmed, That there is but one Good, which is called by several Names, sometimes Prudence, sometimes God, sometimes the Mind, and the like. He took away all Things opposite to good, saying, there was no such Thing.

He used Arguments not by Assumption, but by Inference.

He took away Disputation by Similitude, saying, that it consisted either of like or unlike; if of like, it were better to examine the Things themselves to which they are like; if of unlike, the Comparison is to no Purpose.

CHAP. III.

His Apophthegms, Writings.

HE was famous in the Schools (saith^l *Plutarch*) so farasmuch as hearing his Brother in a Rage, say, *Let me perish if I be not revenged*: He answered, *And I, unless I persuade you to lay aside your Anger, and love me as at first*. If^m *Hierocles* (who relates the same Story) for τὸ Σωφιστικόν, writ not as *Plutarch* τὸ Σωφιστικόν, that Epithet occasioned the Mistake.

^a Laert. 2. 106. ^b A. Gel. 6. 10. ^c Lib. 2. ^d A. Gel. 6. 10. ^e Laert. 2. 106. ^f Ibid. ^g Laert. vii. Socr. 2. ^h Laert. 2. 24. ⁱ Laert. vii. Diog. 6. 107. ^k Laert. ibid. ^l Di. fratrem amare. ^m Stob. serm. 8a.

remaining for the Heirs, amount not at least to the fourth Part of the Goods] *The Question is, what Right you have? I say the Question is not to be resolved, being of that Kind which the Dialecticks call $\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\delta\alpha\gamma\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$, what Part soever we take for true will prove false. If we say the Legacies are valid, the Will comes within Compass of the Falcidian Law, whereby the Condition being defective, the Legacy is invalid. Again, if because the Condition is defective, the Legacies are valid, it is not liable to the Falcidian Law; and if the Law take not Place upon the Condition, you are not to have what was bequeathed you. So much was this Sophism esteemed, that ¹ Seneca affirms many Books to have been written upon it.*

² *Laertius reckons six distinct Treatises of Chrysippus. ¹ Athenæus and Suidas aver, that Philetus a Cboan, died of a Consumption, occasioned by excessive Study upon this Question only.*

Electra, named (likewise) from the chief Examples; of which thus Lucian: ^m Electra the illustrious Daughter of Agamemnon, knew and knew not the same Thing. Orestes unknown standing by her, she knew that Orestes was her Brother, but she knew not that he was Orestes.

¹ *Εὐκκαλῶμιμος, the Veiled; named also from the Matter, thus instanced by Lucian. CHR. Answer me, Do you know your Father? MERC. Yes. CHR. What if I should bring one unto you veiled, what would you say, that you knew him or not? MERC. That I did not know him. CHR. And yet that Man proves to be your Father, therefore if you knew not the Man, you knew not your Father. MERC. No truly; but pull off his Veil, and I shall discover the Truth. Of the same Kind is that of the Sophists, which ⁿ Aristotle affirms Socrates (in Plato's *Meno*) vainly labours to resolve; Do you know all Pairs are even or not? The other answering he knew it. The Sophist brings forth a Pair of something which he had held hidden under his Cloak, and asks, did you know that I had this even Pair or not? The other confessing he knew not; then, saith he, you know and know not the same Thing.*

Sorites, by Cicero termed ^o Acerualis, who defines it to be ^p when any Thing by Degrees is added or taken away: As a Heap ($\Sigma\omega\epsilon\iota\varsigma$) is made by ad-

ding a Grain, or rather as ¹ Julianus, when from Things evidently true, by very short Mutations the Dispute is led to such Things as are evidently false; the same ² Ulpian, the common Example mentioned by ³ Cicero, ⁴ Laertius, ⁵ Sextus Empiricus, and others in this: Are not two a few? Are not three so likewise? Are not four the same? So on to ten. But two are a few, and therefore ten.

Kespilim, the Horned, denominated as the rest from the Example, What you lost not you have, you lost not Horns, therefore you have Horns. Repeated by Seneca, A. Gellius and others. Of this Kind St. Hierom ^v observes that to be which the Pharisees objected to our Saviour. He came (saith he) from Galilee to Judea, wherefore the Faction of Scribes and Pharisees asked him whether it were lawful for a Man to put away his Wife for any Cause, that they might entrap him by a horned Syllogism, whatsoever he would answer being liable to Exception: If you should say, a Wife might be put away for any Cause, and another taken, he being a Professor of Modesty, should contradict himself; but if he should answer, a Wife ought not to be put away for any Cause, he should be accounted guilty of Sacrilege, and judged to do contrary to the Doctrine of Moses, and by Moses of God. Our Lord therefore so tempers his Answer, that he passeth by their Trap, alledging for Testimony the sacred Scripture and natural Law, opposing the first Sentence of God to the second, which was granted not from the Will of God, but Necessity of Sin. The same Father instances another of the same Kind propounded to him, ^x I was assaulted at Rome by a very eloquent Person, with that which they called Horned Syllogism, so as which Way soever I turned I was more entangled. To marry a Wife, saith he, is it a Sin or not? I plainly, not thinking to avoid his Ambush, said, it is not a Sin; he then propounded another Question in Baptism. Are good Works remitted or Evil? I with the like Simplicity answered, Sins are remitted. When I thought myself secure, Horns began to bud out on each Side of me, and the hidden Forces to discover themselves. If, saith he, to marry a Wife be not a Sin, and that Baptism remitteth Sins, whatsoever is not remitted is reserved.

ⁱ Epist. 6. 45. ^k Vit. Chrytip. ^l Deipn. 8. ^m Lucian Vit. Aust. ⁿ Analyt. post. 1. 1. ^o Divin. 2. ^p Cic. Lucul. ^q Digest. lib. 15. ^r Lib. 48. ad Sabina. in tit. de verb. & rer. signific. ^s in Lucullo. ^t In Chrytip. ^u Adv. Logic.

^w Lib. 3. in Mat. ^x Epist. 83.

A L E X I N U S.

AMongſt the many Diſciples ^y of *Eubulides* was *Alexinus* an *Elean*, a great Lover of Contention, and therefore called *Ελεγξίμης* from redarguing; he moſt oppoſed *Zeno*.

Hermippus ſaith, he went to *Olympia*, and there profeſſed Philoſophy. His Diſciples queſtioning why he lived there; he answered, he meant to in-

ſtitute a Sect, and call it *Olympick*, but his Diſciples wanting Subſiſtence, and diſliking the Air, departed. He continued there ſolitary with one Servant only, and ſwimming in the River *Alpheus*, was hurt with a Reed, whereof he died.

He wrote againſt other Philoſophers beſides *Zeno*, and againſt *Ephorus* the Hiſtorian.

y Laert. 2. 109.

E U P H A N T U S.

FROM ^a *Alexinus* came *Euphantus* an *Olinthian*, Maſter to King *Antigonus*, Father of *Demetrius*, Grandfather of *Antigonus Gonatas*. He died of Age. He writ,

The Hiſtory of that Time.

Tragedies many, which upon their publick Re- preſentations were much applauded.

An *Oration* upon a Kingdom, to *Antigonus*, very celebrated.

a Laert. 2. 110.

A P O L L O N I U S C R O N U S.

OF the ^a Diſciples of *Eubulides*, was *Apollonius Cronus*; ^b *Strabo* ſaith, he was a *Cyrenæan* by Birth, and calls him *Cronus Apollonius*, implying

the latter to be a Surname, from *Apollonia*, a Town of *Cyrene*.

a Laert. 2. 110. b Lib. 14.

D I O D O R U S.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

DIODORUS ^c was of *Yafus* a City of *Caria*, Son of *Aminias*. *Laertius* ſaith, he heard *Eubulides*; ^d *Strabo* that he heard *Apollonius Cronus*, after whom he was called *Cronus*, the Name of the Maſter being transmitted to the Diſciple, by Reason of the Obscurity of the true *Cronus*. ^e Of *Diodorus* thus *Callimachus*;

— Ev'n Momus writ
Upon the Walls, *Cronus* bath Wit.

He lived with *Ptolomeus Soter*, in whoſe Preſence being queſtioned by *Strabo* in ſuch Things as upon the ſudden he could not answer, he was not only

c Laert. 2. 111. d Lib. 14. & 17. e Laert. 2. 111.

punished by the King, but reproached with the Name of *Cronus*; whereupon he went from the Feast, and having written an Oration upon that Question, died of Grief.

C H A P. II.

His Philosophy.

¹ *Strabo* and *Laertius* affirm he was a *Dialectick*. The *Dialecticks* (saith ² *Cicero*) teach in their Elements, whether a *Connex* (a Proposition which hath the Conjunction *if*) be true or false; as this, if it be Day, it is Light, how much is it controverted? *Diodorus* is of one Opinion, *Philo* of another, *Chrysippus* of a third. That *Diodorus* called much herein, appears from an Epigram of *Callimachus*, cited and explained by ³ *Sextus Empericus*.

Concerning these Propositions, the Disagreement of *Diodorus* from *Philo* and *Chrysippus*, (already mentioned by *Cicero*) is thus explained by ⁴ *Sextus Empericus*. But when, saith he, or how it followeth, they disagree among themselves; and those Things whereby they determine a Consequence to be judged, oppose one another. As *Philo* said; It is a true *Connex*, when it beginneth not from true, and endeth in false; so that, according to his Opinion, a true *Connex* may be true several Ways, a false only one Way. For when it beginneth from true, and endeth in true, it is true; as this, If it be Day, it is light. Again, when it beginneth from false and endeth in false, it is true. As this, If the Earth flies, the Earth hath Wings. Likewise, that which beginneth from false and endeth in true, is true. As this, If the Earth flies, it is Earth. That only is true which beginneth from true, and endeth in false. Such is this, If it be Day it is Night; for if it be Day, that it is Day is true, which is the Antecedent; but that it is Night is false, which was the Consequent. *Diodorus* saith, that is a true *Connex* which is not contingent, beginning from true, and ending in false. This is contrary to the Opinion of *Philo*; for such a *Connex* as this; if it be Day I discourse, and if at present it be Day, and I discourse, it is, according to *Philo's* Opinion, a true *Connex*; for it begins from true, it is Day, and ends in true, I discourse. But according to the Opinion of *Diodorus*, it is false; for it may so happen, that though it begin from true, to wit, it is Day, yet it may end in false; to wit,

that I discourse when I am silent. Thus by Contingency it may begin in true, and end in false; for before I began to discourse, it began from true; to wit, it is Day, but ended in false, to wit, I discourse.

And again, ⁵ for that we examine not many Opinions concerning a *Connex*, let us say that *Connex* is in itself right, which beginneth not from true, and endeth in false. This; if there be Motion, there is Vacuity, according to *Epicurus's* Opinion; beginning from true, to wit, there is Motion, and ending in true, will be true. According to the *Peripateticks*, beginning from true, to wit, there is Motion, and ending in false, to wit, there is Vacuity, will be false; according to *Diodorus*, beginning from false, to wit, there is Motion, and ending in false, to wit, there is Vacuity, will be true; for the Assumption, to wit, there is Motion, he denies as false.

⁶ Some affirm, he invented the veiled and horned Arguments (of which already in the Life of *Eubulides*) ⁷ *Alexander Aphrodisicus*, saith he, used *Kuewosadizon*, the dominative Argument; of whose Original and Efficacy thus ⁸ *Epictetus*. The dominative Argument seems to have been interrogated and collected upon such like Occasions as these; for, there being a common Fight amongst these three Propositions to one another. The first, that every Thing past is necessarily true. The second, that Possibility follows not Impossibility. The third, that what is not possible, neither is nor shall be true. This Fight *Diodorus* observing, made use of the two first, to prove, that nothing is possible which is not, nor shall be. And ⁹ *Alexander*; for that I be at Corinth, is possible, if that I have been, or ever shall be there; but if neither, it is not possible. It is possible, that a Child be made a Grammarian; if he be made such, in Confirmation hereof *Diodorus* interrogated by the Dominative Argument.

He held, that nothing is moved, ¹⁰ arguing thus. If a Thing be moved, it is neither moved in the Place wherein it is, or in the Place wherein it is not, but not in that wherein it is, for it resteth in the Place wherein it is; nor in that wherein it is not, for where a Thing is not, there it can neither act, nor suffer; therefore nothing is moved, and consequently nothing is corrupted or perished.

¹¹ He asserted, that the Principles of Things are least indivisible Bodies, in Number infinite, in Magnitude finite.

¹ Laert. lib. 14. ² Acad. Quest. 4. 47. ³ Advect. Gram. ⁴ Pynch. Hyp. 2. ⁵ k Cap. eodem. ⁶ Laert. 2. 117. ⁷ m In lib. 1. Prior. ⁸ Lib. 2. cap. 19. ⁹ Laert. 1. Prior. ¹⁰ Sext. Empir. Symbol. hyp. 3. 8. ¹¹ Sext. Empir. advect. Gram. ¹² Sext.

I C H T H Y A S.

¹ *ICHTHYAS*, Son of *Metalus*, an eminent Person, is remembered amongst these Philoso-

phers that are derived from *Eulid*. To him *Diogenes* the Cynick dedicated a Dialogue.

CLINOMACHUS.

A Mongst these descended from *Euclid*, was likewise *CLINOMACHUS*, a *Thurian*. He first wrote concerning Axioms, [Propositions] Ca-

togorems, [that Part of a Proposition which is predicated of the other] and the like,

Laert. 2. 112.

STILPO.

CHAP. I.

STILPO his Life.

STILPO was of *Megara* in *Hellas*. He lived in the Time of the first *Ptolomy*. Of the Masters which he heard are reckoned,

Euclid, the Founder of this School. But this agrees not with his Time, as was before observed.

Some Followers of *Euclid*.

Thrasymachus of *Corinth*, Friend to *Ichthyas*. So *Heraclides* attesteth.

Diogenes the *Cynick*.

Pasicles, a *Theban*, who heard *Crates* the *Cynick*, his own Brother.

Diocles of *Megara*.

Cicero saith, he was very acute, much approved by those Times. His Friends (saith he) writ, he was much inclined to Wine and Women, yet relate not this in his Dispraise, but rather in his Commendations, that he by Learning so subdued and repress'd his vicious Nature, that none ever saw him drunk, none ever discovered any Lasciviousness in him. *Plutarch* magnifies his Height of Courage, mixed with Meekness and Temperance.

He was much addicted to Civil Affairs. Besides his Wife, he kept Company with *Nicarete*, a Courtesan. He had a Daughter of ill Fame, whom *Simmias*, a *Syracusan*, his intimate Friend, married. She living incontinently, one told *Stilpo* she was a Dishonour to him; No more, saith he, than I am an Honour to her.

Ptolemy Sater much esteemed him; and when he took Possession of *Megara* by Conquest, gave him Money, and invited him along with him to *Egypt*. Of the Money he took a little, but absolutely refused the Journey. Going to *Agina*, he stayed there till *Ptolomy*'s Return. *Demetrius*, Son of *Antigonus*, upon the taking of *Megara*, gave Order that his House might be preserved, and whatsoever belonged to him restored; and bidding him give them an Inventory of such Things as he had

lost, he said that he had lost nothing that belonged to him, for none had taken away his Learning; his Learning and Knowledge were both left.

With *Demetrius* he disputed of Humanity so efficaciously, that he became a studious Auditor of him.

Concerning *Minerva*'s Statue, carved by *Phidias*, he asked a Man, whether *Minerva*, Daughter of *Jove*, were a God; he affirmed she was. But this, saith he, is not of *Jove*, but of *Phidias*; to which the other assented. Then, saith he, she is not a God. Hereupon, being cited to the Court of *Areopagus*, he denied it not, but justified it, averring she was not a God, but a Goddess. But the *Areopagites*, nothing satisfied with this Evasion, ordered that he should depart the City. Hereupon *Theodorus*, surnamed *Orde*, said in Derision, How came *Stilpo* to know this? Did he put aside her Veil, and look upon her Breast? *Theodorus* was bold of Speech, but *Stilpo* reserved; inasmuch, as being demanded by *Crates*, whether the Gods delighted in bent Knees and Prayers; Thou Fool, saith he; do not question me in publick, but when we are alone together.

He was sincere and plain, void of all Artifice. *Crates* the *Cynick*, not answering him, but answering, I knew, saith he, you would speak any thing rather than that which is decent.

Crates, in propounding a Question, delivered a Fig to him, which he took and eat; *Crates* presently cried out, that he had lost his Fig. *Stilpo*, saith he, and your Question also, of which that was an Earnest.

Seeing *Crates* half frozen in cold Weather, *Crates*, saith he, thinks you want a Garment, (which one Way implies a new Garment, another Way, both a Garment and Wit) *Crates*, ashamed, answered thus.

w Laert. 2. 113.

x Laert. 6. 76. vit. *Diogenes*.

y De sto.

z Plot. adv. Colu.

a Laert. 2. 114.

b Laert. 2. 114.

c Ibid.

d Laert. 2. 177.

e Ibid.

*Stilpo at Megara I saw oppress'd,
Where vast Typhceus lies with Weight oppress'd.
To hear him wrangle many Sabelars came;
Fair Truth to chase away was all their Aim.*

At Athens he wrought so much upon the People, that they would run out of their Shops to see him. They wonder at thee, Stilpo (said one to him) as a Monster. No, faith he, but as a true Man.

As he was speaking with Crates, in the midst of their Discourse he went away to buy Fish; Crates pursued him, crying out, that he gave over the Discourse. No, faith he, I carry along the Discourse with me, but I leave you, the Discourse will stay, the Fish must be bought.

Being asked, what is harder than a Stone, he answered, A Fool.

CHAP. II.

His Philosophy.

HE was Master of the Megarick School, excellent in *Eristick* Disputes, by his subtle Tenets and Discourses beautifying himself, his Country and Friends.

He took away all Species (Universals) affirming, that he who faith, a Man, denotes not any Man, the Term being not proper to this or that Person; for why to one rather than to another, therefore not to this; and again, that which we see is not an Herb, for an Herb was many Years ago, therefore this was not an Herb.

He likewise denied one Thing to be predicated of another, arguing thus; *If running be predicated of an Horse, the Subject is not the same with the Predicate; the Definition of Man is one Thing, that of God another. So an Horse is a differing Thing from running, for upon Demand, we give several Definitions of each; for if a Man, and good, or an Horse, and running were the same, how could Good be predicated of Food or Physick, and running of a Horse, which are Things so different?* Thus he admitted no Conjunction with the Subject, in Things which are in a Subject, or predicated of a Subject, but conceived that both these, unless they be the very same with the Subject, cannot be predicated of it, even not as an Accident. This, though it were one of those little Sayings which Stilpo sportively used to cast out amongst the Sophisters, Colotes the Epicurean opposed so eagerly, that he framed a large Discourse against Stilpo, grounded only upon this Assertion, (which yet he neither refuted nor received) affirming, that by holding one Thing is not

predicated of another, he takes away good Life: But that Stilpo (faith Plutarch) was offended only at some Words, and opposed the Manner of Speaking, but took not away the Course of Life, or abolished Things, is most evident.

He asserted the chief Good to be a Mind not subject to Passion.

CHAP. III.

His Disciples.

HE so far exceeded others in fluent Discourse and Learning, that he converted almost all Greece to the Megarick Sect. Philippus of Megara faith he drew

Metrodorus, surnamed the Theoretick, and Timagorus the Geloan, from Theophrastus.

Clitarchus and Simmias, from Aristotle the Cyrenaean.

Of Dialecticks, Pæonius, from Aristides.

Diphilus, Son of Euphantus; and Myrmex, Son of Exenatus, coming to dispute against him, became both Followers of him. Thus far Philippus. He likewise attracted

Phrasidemus the Peripatetick, excellent in Natural Philosophy.

Alcimus, the most eminent Orator at that Time in Greece.

Zeno the Phœnician, an Epicurean Philosopher.

Crates, and others. In a Word, whomsoever he would himself.

Heraclides faith, that Zeno the Citisean, Founder of the Stoical Sect, was his Disciple.

CHAP. IV.

His Death, Writings.

HERMIPPUS affirmeth, that he died of Age; but drank a Draught of Wine to hasten his End.

Suidas faith, he wrote twenty Dialogues; Laertius but Nine; and those not very efficacious; their Titles these.

Moschus,
Aristippus, or Callias.
Ptolemæus.
Chærestrates.
Mitrocles.
Anaximenes.
Epigenes.
To his Daughter.
Aristotle.

He had a Son named Dryse, a Philosopher also.

f Laert. 2. 139. g Stob. Sermon. 4. h Plut. adv. Colot. i Laert. 2. 139. k Plut. ibid. l Senec. Epist. 9. m Laert. 2. 139. n Laert. 2. 126.

THE ELEACK and ERETTRIACK SECTS.

P H Æ D O.

* THE Eleack Sect was instituted by *Phædo*, an *Elean* of a noble Family. It chanced that he was taken by Thieves or Pirates, and sold to a House of common dishonest Refort; where being forced to sit at the Door, he was observed by *Socrates* in passing, who noting the Ingenuity of his Countenance (which was extraordinary) perswaded (as *Laertius* saith) *Alcibiades* or *Plato* (as *A. Gellius*) *Cebes* to buy him; from which Time he addicted himself diligently to Philosophy, and was a constant Disciple of *Socrates*; so much affected by *Plato*, that he called that most excellent Discourse of the Immortality of the Soul, after him, *Phædo*.

He instituted a Sect called from him *Eleack*. The Dialogues ascribed to him were,

Zopyrus,
Medus,
Simon,
Antimachus, or the *Old Man*,
Nicias,
Simmias,
Alcibiades,
Critolaus.

**Panæti* doubts whether any of these were written by *Phædo*. *Medus* is, by some, ascribed to *Æschines*, and by others to *Polæmus*; as are also *Antimachus*, and the *Scythian* Discourses.

o Laert. 2. 105. p Gell. 2. 18. q Laert. vit. Æsch.

P L I S T H E N E S.

* THE Eleack Sect was continued by *Plisthenes*, was succeeded by *Menedemus* and *Asclepiades*. an *Elean*, Successor to *Phædo*. *Plisthenes*

r Laert. *ibid.*

M E N E D E M U S.

C H A P. I.

His Country, Parents, Teachers.

* *Menedemus* was one of those Philosophers that continued the School of *Phædo*, which hitherto was called *Eleack*, but from *Menedemus* was termed *Erettriack*. He was an *Eretrian*, Son of *Clisthenes*. *Clisthenes* was of the Family of the *Theopropidæ*; yet tho' noble by Descent, Mechanick by Profession, and indigent. Some affirm, he was a Maker of Tents, (*Hesychius Illustris* terms him an Architect) adding, that he taught both Arts to his Son *Menedemus*; so that when *Menedemus* wrote

a Decree, an *Alexinian* Philosopher reproved him, saying, *It becomes not a wife Man to frame both Tents and Decrees.*

Menedemus being sent by the *Eretrians* with a Command of Soldiers to *Megara*, went from thence to *Athens*, to hear *Plato* at the Academy, with whom he was so taken, that he gave over his Military Employment.

By *Asclepiades*, a *Phrygian*, his intimate Friend, he was carried to *Stilpo* at *Megara*, whom they

s Laert. *ibid.*

both

both heard. Thence taking a Journey to *Elis*, they met with *Anchippus* and *Mofchus*, who belonged to the School of *Phædo*.

Some affirm, he despised *Plato* and *Xenocrates*, and *Parabates* the *Cyrenean*, but admired *Stilpo*; concerning whom being demanded his Opinion, he only answered, that *he was free*.

CHAP. II.

His School and Philosophy.

BEING returned home to *Eretria*, he set up a School, and taught Philosophy there. The *Eliack* School being thus transferred to *Eretria*, was from thenceforward call'd *Eretriack*.

In his School there was no Order of Place, no Seats round about it; but as every Man chanced to be sitting, or standing, or walking, in the same Postures they heard him.

He held, that *there was but one Virtue and Good*, reprehending those who asserted more. Whence of one who held there were many Gods, he demanded ironically *how many?* and *whether he thought there were more than an Hundred?*

He was of a versatile Wit, and in Composure of his Speech a difficult Adversary. He turned himself every Way, and found something to say for every Thing. He was very litigious, as *Antisthenes*, in his Successions, affirms, and used this Question; *What is not the same, is different from that with which it is not the same?* Yes. *To benefit is not the same with Good, therefore Good doth not benefit.* He took away *Negative Propositions*, leaving only the *Affirmative*; and of these he admitted the Simple only; but rejected those which were not simple, calling them *conjoined and complex*.

Heraclides saith, he was a *Platonick*, and derided *Dialectick*. *Hexinus* asking, whether he had given over beating his Father; *I neither did beat him, saith he, nor have given over.* The other replied, *Either say yes or no, to dissolve the Ambiguity.* It is ridiculous, saith he, to follow your Laws, when a Man may withstand them in the very Entrance.

He writ not, or composed any Thing, because (saith *Antigonus Carystius*) he was of no certain Opinion, yet in Dispute he was so vehement, that he many Times went away with black and blue Eyes.

CHAP. III.

His Manner of Living.

HE contracted a strict Friendship with *Asclepiades*, nothing inferior to that of *Pilades* to *Orestes*. *Asclepiades* was the Elder, whence there went a common Saying, that he was the Poet, *Menedemus* the Player.

* When they were yet both young Philosophers, and indigent, they were cited to the Court of *Areopagus*, to give Account (according to *Solon's Law*) by what Means (spending the whole Day amongst Philosophers, without any Labour, and having no Estate) they subsisted, and were in so good a Condition. They desired that one of the Masters of the common Prison might be sent for; who, when he came, attested, that they went down every Night into the Prison, where the common Malefactors ground, and did there grind, and in Pay of their Labour, received two Drachms. At which the *Areopagites* much wondring, bestowed, as an honourable Reward upon them, Two Hundred Drachms.

* They had other Patrons that bestowed Gifts upon them. *Archepolis* gave them three Thousand Pieces of Silver. They both contended which should receive last; and in Conclusion, neither accepted it. The chief Persons that received them were *Hipponicus* a *Macedonian*, and *Ægetor* a *Lamian*. *Ægetor* gave each of them thirty *Minæ*. *Hipponicus* gave *Menedemus* two thousand Drachms towards the Marriage of his Daughters; which, as *Heraclides* saith, were three, by his Wife *Oropia*.

For *Asclepiades* and *Menedemus* took each of them a Wife. *Asclepiades* married the Daughter, *Menedemus* the Mother. *Asclepiades's* Wife dying, he took the Wife of *Menedemus*. *Menedemus* being made a chief Magistrate, married a rich Wife; notwithstanding, he allow'd his first Wife an equal Interest in the Government of the House. *Asclepiades* having lived with *Menedemus* in great Plenty, yet with great Temperance, died old at *Eretria*. At that Time, one, whom *Asclepiades* much loved, coming late at Night, intending to have feasted with him, the Servants shut him out of Doors. But *Menedemus* bad them let him in, saying, *Asclepiades* would admit him even under Ground.

* *Menedemus* was much given to Entertainments; and, because the Country was unwholesome, made many Feasts. What Order he observed therein is thus delivered by *Antigonus Carystius*, and out of him (though not cited) by *Laertius*. He dined but with one or two Companions at the most. If any came to him, they were admitted after Dinner was ended; if they came sooner than the set Time, they walked short Turns before the Door, and demanded of the Servants what Course was carried in; if they told them Fish-broth (with which they began their Dinner) they went away; if any Flesh, they went into a Room prepared for that Purpose. In Summer-time, *Menedemus* had the Couches or Beds of his Dining-room cover'd with Flax and Rushes, in Winter with Sheep-skins. Every Guest brought a Cushion; the Cup they had was no bigger than

† Laert. 2. 130.
‡ Laert. 2. 133.

§ Laert. 2. 136.

¶ Laert. 2. 137.

‡ Athen. Deip. 4.

γ See Life of Solon.

δ Laert. 2. 137.

a large Spoon; instead of Sweet-meats, they had Lupinus and Beans; sometimes such Fruit as the Season afforded; in Summer, Pomegranates; in Spring, Pulse; in Winter, Figs. This *Lycophron* the *Chalcidian* confirms in his Satyrical Comedy upon *Menedemus*, where *Silenus* speaks thus to the Satyrs.

*Sons imiters of a pious Father, I
(You see) with your Delights and Sports comply:
But never by the Gods at such a Feast
In Caria, Rhodes, or Lydia, was a Guest.
How plentiful!*

And not long after,
*A little Pot half full of Water clear,
Rated at Farthings five, a Boy did bear
To every Guest; about vile Lupines went,
With which the Beggar's Table's scarce content.*

Whilst they drank (after the Feast) *Menedemus* proposed Questions, and instead of a Desert, gave them Discourse, which excited all to Temperance and Continence. These continued sometimes 'till the Crowing of the Cock broke them off, much against the Will of his Guests, who never thought they had enough of them.

CH A P. IV.

His Civil Employments.

HE was first condemn'd by his Countrymen, and called Dog and Fool; but at last so much honoured by them, that they committed the Government of the Commonwealth to his Charge, and paid him yearly two Hundred Talents, whereof he sent back fifty.

After he applied himself to Civil Business, he was so thoughtful, that going to put Incense into a Censer, he put it besides. *Crates* reproaching him for undertaking publick Employments, he sent him to Prison; whereupon, as he chanced to pass by, *Crates* rose up and saluted him with the Title of *Agamemnonian*, Leader of the City.

He was sent Ambassador from the *Eretrians* to *Ptolemy*, and to *Lysimachus*, (much honoured whosoever he came) and to *Demetrius*, all three Kings of *Macedonia*, of whom *Demetrius* first reigned, then *Lysimachus*, and after him (*Pyrrius* intervening) *Ptolemy*.

Some accused him to *Demetrius*, that he would betray his City to *Ptolemy*; of which Charge he acquitted himself by an Epistle, beginning thus; *Menedemus* to King *Demetrius*, Health. *I hear that you are informed many Things concerning us, &c. advising him to take heed of one of those that were his Enemies, by Name Aeschylus.* When he was

on Embassy to *Demetrius*, he spoke very earnestly and effectually concerning *Oropus*.

Antigenus also, King of *Macedonia*, loved him exceedingly, and profess'd himself his Disciple. In his Behalf he made a Decree, clear and void of Ostentation, beginning thus. *Forasmuch as King Antigenus, having overcome the Barbarians in Fight, returneth into his own Country, having good Success in all his Undertakings; the Senate and People have thought good, &c.*

CH A P. V.

His Virtues and Apothegms.

MENEDEMUS was of exceeding Gravity, for which *Crates* deriding him, said,

Asclepiad the *Philiassian*, and the *Eretrian* Bull and *Timon*,
Going to speak, he swells with Pride, and with rude grinning.

In Severity he was so awful, that *Eurylocus* being invited by *Antigenus*, together with *Clippides*, a Youth of *Cyzicum*, refused to go, fearing *Menedemus* should know it.

In Reproof he was bitter and bold; of which *Laertius* instanceth his Sayings to a young Man over-confident, to *Hierocles*, &c. to an Adulterer boasting, &c. to a young Man crying, &c.

Antigenus asking, whether he should go to a luxurious Banquet; not speaking whether he should go or not, he bad him send them Word that he was a King's Son.

One who intruded himself upon him, and discoursed very absurdly, he asked if he had a Farm; he answered, *Many.* Go then, saith he, and look after them, lest in losing your Rusticity, you lose them also.

To one asking, whether a good Man may take a Wife, he said, *Do you think I am good, or not?* The other assenting; *But I*, saith he, *have taken one.*

Not able to limit the Prodigality of one who invited him to Supper, he silently reproved him, eating nothing but Olives.

This Freedom brought him into Danger when he was in *Cyprus* with *Nicocreon*, together with his Friend *Asclepiades*; for, the King having invited him with the rest of the Philosophers to a Monthly Feast, *Menedemus* said, *This Convention, if it be good, ought to be every Day; if otherwise, this Day is too much.* The Tyrant answered, that he had set apart that Day to converse with Philosophers. *Menedemus* persisting in his Assertion, demonstrated from what he had said of the Sacrifice, that Philosophers ought to be heard at all Times. Where-

upon, if one of the Musicians had not helped them to escape, they had been put to Death; whence the Ship being endangered by a Storm, *Aclepiades* said, that the Humanity of the Musician preserved them, the Roughness of *Menedemus* had undone them.

He was negligent, and (as we said) careless in every Thing that concerned the Order of his School; likewise high-minded, and covetous of Glory; in so much that when he and *Aclepiades* first exercised the Trade of Building, *Aclepiades* was seen upon the House-top, carrying Clay; but *Menedemus*, if he espied any Man passing by, hid himself.

He was somewhat inclined to Superstition. Having eaten, in a Cook's Shop, the Flesh of something that had died of itself, ignorantly with *Aclepiades*, as soon as he knew it, he grew sick, and looked pale, 'till *Aclepiades* reproved him, saying, *He was not sick of the Meat, but of Fancy.*

In all other respects he was a Person of a great and free Soul; in Strength, even in his old Age, equal to those who wrestled in Exercise; strong made, swarthy of Complexion, fat and corpulent; but of indifferent Stature, as appears (saith *Luertius*) by his Statue in *Eretria*, in the *Old Stadium*, so exactly carved, that it expressed the naked Proportion of his Limbs.

He loved *Aratus*, and *Lycophron* the Tragick Poet, and *Antagoras* the Rhodian; but above all, he was studious of *Homer*; next of the *Lyrics*; then of *Sophocles*. In Satyrs he assigned the second Place to *Achæus*; the first to *Aschylyus*, whence to those in the State who defended the contrary Part; he said thus.

*The Swift, in Time, out-strip'd are by the Slow;
A Tortoise thus an Eagle may outgo.*

These are Verses of *Achæus*; they therefore are mistaken, who say he read nothing but the *Medea* of *Euripides*, which is put among the Poems of *Neophron* the *Sicyonian*.

Of *Bion*, who spoke with much Diligence against Prophets, he said, *He murdered the Dead.*

To one who said, *The greatest Good is to enjoy*

those Things which we desire; It is a much greater, saith he, to desire those Things which are sitting.

He was violent (as we said) in Controversy, but most affable in Conversation and Action. *Alexinus*, whom in Dispute he had often circumvented, and bitterly derided, he gratified in Deed; taking Care for the safe Conduct of his Wife from *Delphi* to *Gbalcis*, the Way being much infested with Thieves.

He was an excellent Friend, as is manifest from his Affection to *Aclepiades*, of which we have already spoken; only to *Perseus* he was constantly a profess'd Enemy; for it was known, that when *Antigonus*, for *Menedemus* his sake, would have restored the *Eretrians* to their first Liberty, *Perseus* withstood it. Whereupon, at a Feast, *Menedemus* openly inveighed against him, using, amongst many others, this Expression; *He is indeed a Philosopher, but of all Men that are, were, or ever shall be, the most wicked.*

CHAP. VI.

His Departure from Eretria, and Death.

THE Friendship he held with *Antigonus*, made him suspected by his own Countrymen, as if he meant to betray the City to him; of which being accused by *Aristodemus*, he fled, and lived a while at *Oropus* in the Temple of *Amphiaræus*. Thence some golden Cups chancing to be stolen, he was, by a publick Decree of the *Besians*, forbidden to stay there any longer; whereupon he returned privately into his Country, and taking his Wife and Children along with him, went from thence to *Antigonus*, where he died of Grief.

But *Heraclides*, on the contrary, affirmeth, that whilst he was Præfect of the *Eretrians*, he often defended his Country against those who would have made *Dionatrius* Tyrant thereof; neither would he therefore have betray'd it to *Antigonus*; but that was falsely laid to his Charge. He afterwards went to *Antigonus*, petitioning that he would restore his Country to their Liberties; which *Antigonus* denying, he, out of Grief, fasted seven Days, and so died. The same Relation is delivered by *Antigonus Carystius*. *Heraclides* saith, he lived eighty four Years.

b Laert. 2. 142.

i Laert. 2. 143.

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE FIFTH PART,
Containing the *Academick* Philosophers.

P L A T O.

CHAP. I.

The Country, Parents, and Time of PLATO.

THE most eminent of all the Sects derived from *Socrates* was the *Academick*, so called from the *Academy*, a Place in *Athens*, where the Professors thereof taught. This Sect was instituted by *Plato*, continued by *Speusippus*, *Xenocrates*, *Polemon*, *Crates*, *Crantor*; thus far called the *first or old Academy*. *Arcefilaus*, succeeding *Crantor*, instituted the *middle Academy*, continued by *Lacydes*, *Telecles*, *Evander*, and *Hegefinus*. *Carneades* founded the *new Academy*, of which was also *Clitomachus*. Some reckon a *fourth Academy*, instituted by *Philo* and *Charmidas*. A fifth by *Antiochus*.

^a *Plato* was out of doubt an *Athenian*. Nor are they to be credited who relate him ^b a *Theban*, born at *Cynoccephalus*. ^c *Antileon* affirms his Parents to be of *Collyttus*. ^d He was born (according to *Phavorinus*) in the Island *Ægina*, in the House of *Phidias*, Son of *Thales*. His Father sent with others thither at the Division of the Land (upon their Defection from, and Subjection by the *Athenians*, at the Beginning of the *Peloponnesian War*) and returned to *Athens*; at what Time those *Athenians* were ejected by the *Lacedæmonians*, in Aid of the *Æginetæ*.

^e He was of an eminent Family; his Father *Aristo* (Son of *Aristocles*) of the Race of *Codrus*, Son of

Melanthus, who (as *Thrafilus* affirms) derived themselves from *Neptune*. *Melanthus* flying *Megana*, came to *Athens*; where afterwards, by a Stratagem, killing *Xanthus*, he was made King after *Thymoetes*, the last of the *Theseidæ*. His Mother *Perictione*, by some called *Patone*, whose Kindred with *Solon* is thus described by *Laertius* and *Proclus*. *Execistides* had two Sons, *Solon* and *Droptides*: *Droptides* had *Critias*, mentioned by *Solon* in his Poems.

*Bid fair-hair'd Critias his Sire observe;
A wand'ring Mind will from his Leader swerve.*


Critias had *Callechrus*; *Callechrus* had *Critias*, one of the thirty Tyrants, and *Glaucon* (whom ^f *Apuleius* calls *Glauco*) *Glaucon* had *Charmides* and *Perictione*; *Perictione* by *Aristo* had *Plato*, the sixth from *Solon*: *Solon* was descended from *Neptune* and *Neleus*, [Father of *Nestor*.] Thus *Laertius*, from whom *Proclus* differs only in that, that he makes *Glaucon*, Son of the first *Critias*, Brother to *Callechrus*, which *Critias* manifestly (saith he) in *Plato*. *Charmides* confirms; calling *Glauco* (Father of *Charmides*) his Uncle. Thus was *Plato* descended both ways from *Neptune*.

^a Laert. 3. 1. ^b Tetz. Chilian II. 390. ^c Laert. 3. 3. ^d Laert. ibid. Suid. ^e Laert. 3. 1. Apul. Suid. ^f In Theophr.

^g Apul. de Dogm. Plat.

*He did not issue from a mortal Bed;
A God his Sire, a God-like Life he led.*

^a *Aristo* had afterwards by *Perictione* two Sons, *Adimaretus* and *Glaucō*, and a Daughter *Potone*, Mother to *Speusippus*. These Relations of *Plato* will be more conspicuous in this Genealogical Table.



h. Dogm. Plat. i. Laert. 2. 2. *ἡ ἐπιστομὴ τοῦ Πλάτωνος* *ἐπὶ διαιρέσει*. Perhaps it should be *ἡ διὰ τὴν ἐπιστομὴν*. Amongst the Writings of Sappho is mentioned *Πλάτωνος ἡ ἐπιστομὴ*. k. Sympos. 8. 1. i. Apul. dogm. Plat. m. Advect. Gortinian. n. Laert. 3. 4. *ἡ ἐπιστομὴ τοῦ Πλάτωνος*. o. Apollodor. lib. 3. p. Pausan. Corinth. q. Laert. Proclus.


For the Year of his Birth (to omit the Mistakes of *Eusebius*, who placeth it in the fourth Year of the eighty eighth Olympiad, in the Archonship of *Strateles*, and of the *Chronicon Alexandrinum*, that placeth it the Year following) *Laertius* saith, *He was born, according to the Chronology of Apollodorus, in the eighty eighth Olympiad*, which seems to be towards the Beginning of the first Year, whilst *Aminias* was yet Archon. For *Laertius* elsewhere saith, That he was six Years younger than *Isocrates*; for *Isocrates* (saith he) was born when *Lyfimachus*, Plato, when *Aminias* was Archon, under whom *Pericles* died. In the third Year of the *Peloponnesian* War. This *Aminias* is, by the *Scholias* of *Euripides*, called *Ameimon*; by *Athenaus*, *Épameimon*; by *Diodorus Siculus*, *Epaminondas*. The various reading, occasioned either by Addition or Detraction of the Preposition *ἐν*, but by which of these two cannot easily be evinced. *Salmasius* endeavouring to prove the Name to be *Ἀμείμων*, positively affirms, that the *Greeks* never name an Archon without the Preposition *ἐν*. But that Error *Pe-tavius* confutes, whose Opinion is confirmed by the ancient Marble at *Arundel House*, which addeth not the Preposition to the Names of the Archons.

Neither is the Opinion of *Athenaus* much different, who affirms, *Plato* was born the Year before, *Apollodorus* being Archon; who succeeded *Euthydemus*, who was Archon the third Year of the 87th Olympiad; and that under *Euphemus*, in the fourth

Year of the 90th Olympiad, he was fourteen Years old. For both *Laertius* and *Athenaus* agree in the Year of his Death, viz. in the first of the 108th Olympiad, when *Thesphylus*, the Successor of *Calimachus*, was Archon. *Athenaus* only differeth in this, that, computing 82 Archons, he attributes 50 many Years to *Plato's* Life; whereas 'tis certain, he lived but eighty one.

The Day of his Birth, according to *Apollodorus*, was the seventh of *Thargelion*, at which time the *Delians* did celebrate the Feast of *Apollo*. So likewise *Florus*, cited by *Plutarch*, who adds, that the Priests and Prophets call *Apollo* *ἑδσuarvius*, as being born upon this seventh Day; whence perhaps was occasioned the Fiction, that he was the Son of *Apollo*, which *Plutarch* esteems no Disparagement to his Deity. In the first Year of the 88th Olympiad, the *Neomenia* of *Hecatombaen* fell upon *August* the second; and (upon those Hypotheses which we laid down formerly in the *Life of Socrates*) the Dominical Letter for that Year being *E*. the seventh of *Thargelion* will (according to the *Julian* Account, taken proleptically) fall upon *Friday* the thirtieth of *May*; according to the *Gregorian*, upon *Friday* the ninth of *June*, in the Year of the *Julian* Period, 4286. B.C. 417

This is according to the Faith of the Historians, with whom the Astrologers do not agree; for *Julius Firmicus* hath erected the Scheme of his Nativty after this Manner.



If the Ascendent, saith he, shall be *xx*, *g*, *g*, and the seventh, having *g* for his Sign, and in the second the *g* therein posited; and if *Λ* then be placed in the *g* in *Λ* and the *Λ* in *II* in the fifth House, behold

† *Laert.* 2. 4. † *Argum. Hippo* † *Deipn.* 5. † *Lib.* 13. † *Elm. Euseb.* p. 157. † *Doct. temp.* c. 8. † *Deipn.* 5.
 † *Laert.* 3. 2. † *Sympo.* 3. 1. † *Cup.* 1. † *Astron.* 1. 6.

the Ascendant with a Δ Aspect, and η in the ninth from the Ascendant in π . This Geniture renders a Man Interpreter of divine and heavenly Institutions, who endued with instructive Speech, and the Power of divine Wit, and formed in a Manner by a celestial Institution, by the true License of Disputations shall arrive at all the Secrets of Divinity. Thus Firmicus, whose Scheme agreeth not with the other Calculation, as being betwixt the midst of February and of March, during which Time the \odot is in κ .

Hence will appear the great Anachronism of those who affirm, that Plato went to Egypt, in the time of the Prophet Jeremias^a (whom Eusebius placeth in the thirty sixth Olympiad) and heard him there. Jeremias at the Captivity of the Jews into Babylon, was carried by Johanan Son of Careah into Egypt. The Jews were carried away by Nebuchadnezzar, at what Time Tarquinius Priscus reigned at Rome, Vapores in Egypt, to whom the rest of the Jews fled, which was in the forty seventh Olympiad, 160 Years before Plato was born. This Opinion, once held, was afterwards retracted by St. Augustine, in his Book of Retractions, and confuted de Civit. Dei, 8. 11.

CHAPTER II.

His first Education, Exercise, and Studies.

WHilst^b Plato was yet an Infant, carried in the Arms of his Mother Perictione, Aristo his Father went to Hymettus (a Mountain in Attica, eminent for abundance of Bees and Honey) to sacrifice to the Muses or Nymphs, taking his Wife and Child along with him; as they were busied in the divine Rites, he laid the Child in a Thicket of Myrtles hard by; to whom, as he slept (*c in cunis dormienti*) came a Swarm of Bees, Artists of Hymettian Honey, flying and buzzing about him, and (as it is reported) made a Honey-comb in his Mouth. This was taken for a Prefage of the singular Sweetness of his Discourse; his future Eloquence foreseen in his Infancy.

His Parents (saith^c Alexander) named him after his Grandfather, Aristocles: ° Spesippus (instituted in his Domestick Documents) extollt his sharpness of Apprehension, whilst yet a Child, and the admirable Modesty of his Disposition (° which was such, that he was never, even all those Years, seen to laugh immoderately) affirming, that the Beginnings of his Youth were seasoned with Labour and Love of Study; which Virtues increased and met with all the rest when he came to Man's Estate.

° Of Dionysius the Grammarian (mentioned in his *de Negra*) he received the first Rudiments of Learning. Of Aristo, an Argive, he learned the

Art of Wrestling (at that Time much in esteem, as being one of the Olympick Exercises) wherein he became so great a Proficient, that some affirm he wrestled at the Isthmus in the Pythian Games.

° As in Years and Virtue, so likewise he increased extraordinarily in outward Proportion and Shape, inasmuch that Aristo named him Plato (which implieth Latitude) in Allusion to the largeness of his Person; others say, to the Wideness of his Shoulders; Neanthes of his Forehead; some to his large Eloquence. Whatsoever the Occasion were, this Name wore out and displaced the other. That he was called also Sarapis, is affirmed by^d Hesychias. There was not any Imperfection throughout his Person, except a Gibbosity in the hinder Part of his Head, and (as Timotheus affirms) a Kind of; Hesitation in his Speech.

° He learned also (as Dicæarchus relates) to paint. He addicted himself much to Poetry, and wrote many Poems: First, *Dithyrambs*; then Epick Poetry; which comparing with Homer, and finding far short of him, he burnt. Then he betook himself to writing Tragedies. He made a compleat Tetralogy (four Drama's as the Manner was, when they contested, to be presented at four several Festivals, *Lenæan, Panathæan, Chytræan*, the fourth Satyrical) and gave it to the Players to be acted, intending to contest for the Palm upon the Olympick Theatre: But the Day before it should have been presented, chancing to hear Socrates discourse at the Olympick Theatre (° before the *Bacchanals*) he was so taken with that Syren, that he not only forebore to contest at that Time, but wholly gave over all Tragick Poesy, and burnt all his Poems, saying that of Homer,

Vulcan come hither, Plato needs thy Aid.

From that Time (the twentieth Year of his Age, which falls about the 4th of the 92d Olympiad) he became a Follower of Socrates, and studied Philosophy.

Some affirm (of the Truth of which Report, *Ælian* ° justly doubts) he was driven by Poverty to betake himself to the Wars, but intercepted by Socrates, and instructed in that which concerns Mankind, he sold his Arms, and through his Persuasion, addicted himself to Philosophy.

That he fought for his Country is certain, expressed in his Answer to ° Crobylus the Syccophant. *Aristoxenus* and *Ælian* affirm he was engaged thrice; first at ° Tanagara; the second Time at Corinth; and lastly at Delium, where he fought best of all the Soldiers. Thus *Aristoxenus*. But that this is false, may be easily evinced by Computation of

^a Jerem. chap. xlix. ^b De Doctr. Christ. 1. 28. ^c Elian. var. hist. 10. 21. ^d Cic. divinat. lib. 1. ^e Laert. 3. 4.
^f Laert. 3. 26. ^g Ibid. 3. 4. ^h Ibid. ⁱ In verbo *Zeuxippe* Laert. 3. 10. ^j *Zeuxippe*, which besides *Zeuxippe*, finalness of Voice, in which Sense it is here taken by the Interpreters and *Plutarch* signifies an Imperfection of Speech by stammering.
^k Laert. 3. 51. ^l Elian. var. Hist. 2. 30. ^m Laert. 3. 8.
ⁿ Var. Hist. 3. 27. ^o Afterwards cap. 11. ^p Laert. 3. 24. ^q Var. Hist. 7. 14.
Y 2 Times.

Times. The first Fight of the *Athenians* at *Tenagra*, was in the 4th Year of the 80th Olympiad, 17 Years before *Plato* was born; the second, in the first of the 89th, when he was but six Years old. The Fight at *Delium* was in the first of the 89th, at what Time he was but four Years old; from the last Words of *Aristoxenus*, ἡβητα ἔχοντος (implying, that at *Delium* he had the Prize for fighting best) may be conjectured that this was meant of *Socrates*, who was thrice personally engaged, and at *Delium* should have had the Prize for fighting best, but that his Modesty procured it to be conferred upon *Alcibiades*.

CHAP. III.

His Masters in Philosophy, and his Travels to that End.

Socrates, the Night before *Plato* was recommended to him, dreamed, that a young Swan fled from *Cupid's* Altar in the Academy, and sat in his Lap, thence fled up to Heaven, it delighted both Gods and Men with its Musick. As *Socrates* [the next Day] was relating this to some of his Auditors, *Aristo* came at the same time, and presented his Son *Plato* to him to be his Disciple. As soon as *Socrates* saw him, reading in his Looks his Ingenuity, Friends, saith he, this is the Swan of *Cupid's* Academy.

Eight Years he lived with *Socrates*, in which time, he committed (as others of his Disciples) the Effect of his Master's Discourse to Writing: Hereof he composed Dialogues, but with so great Additions of his own, that *Socrates* hearing him recite his *Lysis*, cried out, Oh! *Hercules*, how many Things doth this young Man feign of me? For not a few Things (adds *Laertius*) of those which he writ, *Socrates* never spoke.

At the Time of *Socrates's* Arraignment, the first Year of the 95th Olympiad, he was one of the Senate, the youngest of the Convention. That he was a Senator, implies he was full thirty Years old at that Time, according to *Solan's* Law. This argues *Hermodorus's* of a Mistake, who saith, he was twenty eight Years old when he fled to *Megara*, upon the Death of *Socrates*, and subverts the Accounts of those who under-reckon his Birth. The Judges being much displeased with *Socrates*, *Plato* went up into the Orator's Chair, intending to plead in his Defence, and begun thus: *Tho' I* (*Athenians*) am the youngest of those that come up into this Place. But all the Senate crying out, of those who go down, he was thereupon constrained to do so. *Socrates* being condemned, *Plato* offered him to procure for some Money as might purchase his

Liberty, but *Socrates* refused the Offer. * About that Time, *Socrates's* Friends being together to console his Death, *Plato* encouraged them, and bid them not despair, for that himself was capable to govern the School; and in so saying, drank to *Apollodorus*, who answered, he would sooner take up the Cup of Poison from the Hand of *Socrates*, than pledge him upon that Condition. Upon the Death of *Socrates*, *Plato* (whose excessive Grief upon that Occasion is observed by *Plutarch*) with others of his Disciples, fearing the Tyranny of those Persons who put their Master to Death * fled to *Eudid* at *Megara*, who friendly entertained them, till the Storm was blown over.

* *Apuleius* saith, that before he came to *Socrates*, he was initiated in the Sect of *Heraclitus*. But more likely is that which is affirmed by *Laertius*, that after *Socrates's* Death he applied himself to *Cratylus*, a Follower of *Heraclitus*, and to *Hermogenes*. He conceived, saith *St. Augustine*, That his own Invention and *Socrates's* Instructions came short of the true Aim of Philosophy. He considered with himself what Course he should take to benefit himself most; for this Purpose, he determined to travel to any Place, where Report told him he might drink of the Spring of Learning, even to the farthest Parts of the Earth, saith *Cicero*.

* First, to *Italy*, where he addicted himself to the Discipline of *Pythagoras*, which, tho' he saw replenished with curious and high Reason, yet he chiefly affected to imitate the Continence and Chastity thereof, tho' the *Pythagoreans* themselves affirm he had all his natural Philosophy from thence.

* Perceiving the Knowledge of the *Pythagoreans* to be assisted with other Disciplines, he went to *Cyrene*, to learn Geometry of *Theodorus* the Mathematician: Thence to *Egypt* (which was then under the Empire of *Artaxerxes Menemon*) * under Pretence of selling Oil; but the Scope of his Journey was to fetch Astrology from thence: To learn Arithmetic and celestial Speculations of the Barbarians, (saith *Cicero* *) and to be instructed in the Rites of the Prophets. * He travelled over the Country, informing himself all the Way by their Priests, of the multiplicitous Proportions of Geometry, and the Observation of celestial Motions. At what Time young Students at *Athens* were enquiring for *Plato* to instruct them, he was busied in surveying the inexplicable Banks of *Nilus*, the vast Extent of a barbarous Country, and the winding Compass of their Trenches, a Disciple to the Egyptian old Men. * Having taken a full Survey of all the Country, he at last settled himself in the Province of *Sais*, learning of the wise Men there, what they held concerning the Universe, whether it had a Beginning, and whether it is moved at present,

r. See *Socrates's* Life, cap. 71. s. *Apul. dogm. Plat. Laert. 3. 5.*
Socr. x. *Athen. deipn. lib. 11.* y. *De virtut. moral.* z. *Laert.*
 c. *De finib. 5.* d. *Apul. dogm. Plat.* e. *Porphy. vit. Pythag.*
 libid. k. *Val. Max. 2. 7.* l. *Epist. Socr. 26.*

Suid. t. *Laert. 3. 35.* u. *Laert. 2. 42.* v. *Laert. vit. Socr.* x. *Athen. deipn. lib. 11.* y. *De virtut. moral.* z. *Laert.*
 f. *Apul. libid.* g. *Plut. in Solon.* h. *De finib. 5.* i. *Apul.*

wholly or in *Part*, according to Reason. From these, *Pausanias* affirms, he learned the Immortality of the Soul, which that they held, as likewise the Transmigration thereof into several Bodies, is affirmed by *Herodotus*. Some say, that *Euripides* followed him to *Egypt* and falling sick, was cured by the Priests with Sea-water, whereupon he said,

The Sea doth wash away all Ills of Man.

But this agrees not with the Time of his Death, which was before that of *Socrates*, viz. in the 93d Olympiad.

From *Egypt* *Plato* returned to *Tarentum* in *Italy*, at what Time *L. Camillus* and *P. Claudius* were Consuls at *Rome*, as *Cicero* affirmeth. What *Fassi* he used, I know not, for in those which are now with us received as authentick, there are no such Consuls during the whole Life of *Plato*. And indeed, in those Times, *Rome* was for the most Part governed by Tribunes. Here he conversed with *Eurytus* of *Tarentum*, the Elder, *Archytas* the Elder (at whose Discourse concerning Pleasure he was present) and with the rest of the *Pythagoreans*, *Echecrates*, *Timæus*, *Acrio* (corruptly in *Valerius Maximus*, *Ario*) and *Coetus*, *Locrians*. Thus to the Learning of *Socrates* he added that of *Pythagoras*, and informed himself in those Things which *Socrates* neglected: He would have gone also to the *Indians* and to the *Magi*, but that the Wars which at that Time were in *Asia* hindered him.

CHAP. IV.

What Authors he followed.

Eugubinus affirms, that *Plato* borrowed the mystick Part of his Philosophy from *Hermes Trismegistus*; particularly that concerning the divine Goodness; which, I suppose, he rather asserts from his own Conjecture, in regard *Plato* had been long in *Egypt*, than from any good Authority. He was induced thereunto by those Books which are now commonly, but falsely, vended under the Name of *Hermes Trismegistus*; whereas the learned *Casaubon*, in his Exercitations upon *Baronius*, hath sufficiently taught us the Forgery of those Books, which seem by some Impostor, to have been compiled out of the Works of *Plato*, and the divine Scripture.

That *Plato* received some Light from *Moses*, is affirmed with much greater Authorities of several Nations and Religions: Of Jews by *Aristobolus*, *Plato* (saith he) followed our Law in many Things, his various Allegations evince him a curious Observer thereof; for the Volumes of *Moses* were translated

before *Alexander's* Time. And *Josephus*; *Plato* chiefly followed our Lawgiver. Of *Philosophers*; by *Numerius*, What is *Plato* (saith he) but *Moses* speaking Greek? Of *Fathers*, by *Justin Martyr*, *Clement Alexandrinus*, *Eusebius*, *Theodoret*, *St. Augustine*, &c.

When *Plato* went to *Sicily*, he bought the Books of *Philolaus*, a *Pythagorean*, which were three, of natural Philosophy, the first that ever were published out of that School. Some say, he had them of *Dionysius's* Friends, for four *Alexandrian* *Minæ*; others, that *Dionysius* had them of a young Man, one of *Philolaus's* Disciples, and gave them to *Plato*; others, that he sent to *Dion* at *Syracuse* to buy them for him, which he did for 100 *Minæ*. *A. Gellius* saith, ten thousand *Denaries*. For having received of *Dionysius* above eighty Talents, he was very full of Money. Out of these, he is said (as *A. Gellius* and *Laertius* affirm) to have taken a great Part of his *Timæus*, for which derided by *Timon* (in *Sillis*) thus:

*You (Plato) with the same Affections caught,
With a great Sum a little Treatise bought,
Where all the Knowledge, which you ever, was
taught.*

Alcinus in his four Books to *Amintas*, affirms, that *Plato* borrowed much from the Writings of *Epicarmus*, the Comic Poet: In the first Book he hath these Words; In *Sensibles* (saith *Plato*) neither Magnitude nor Quality is permanent, but in continual Fluxion and Mutation; as if we should subtract Number from them, which are neither equal, nor certain, nor quantitative, nor qualitative; these are they where Generation is always, their Essence never. To *Insensibles* nothing can be added, nothing can be taken away. This is the Nature of eternal Beings, the like and same ever. Thus *Plato* cited by *Alcinus*. Indeed he teacheth this in many Places, particularly in *Timæus*, where he at large explaineth what is that which never is, and never had Beginning, and that which hath Beginning but no Being. He concludes the first comprehensible, by the Intellect with Reason, the other by Sense and Opinion. But the Citation of *Alcinus* seems to refer to *Plato's Theætetus*, the Subject of which Dialogue is Science. There he examines some Definitions of Science by the Ancients, amongst the rest, the Assertion of *Protagoras*, that Science is Sense; against which he disputes largely; the Sum this: That the Soul apprehends some Things by Mediation of the Body, others without: Of the first Kind are Things warm, light, dry, sweet, &c. of the other, Essence, and not Being, Similitude and Dissimilitude,

m Meffin. n Lic. 2. o Laert. libid. p Cat. Major. q Cic. Apul. libid. r Peren. Philof. 2. 27. s 5. 2. s Exerc.
t. 1. num. 12. t Euseb. prep. Evang. 9. 6. u Contra Appion. lib. 2. w Clem. Alex. Strom. 2. x Strom. 1. Suid.
y Pansen. z Strom. 1. a Præpar. Evang. lib. 12. b Cov. Del. 8. 12. c 3. 17. d Laert. 3. 90.

Identity and Diversity, Unite and Number. Hence it follows, that Sense apprehends not Essences, and consequently not Truth, for Essence and Truth are convertible. This Assertion of Plato Alcimus deduceth from Epicarmus, who, (saith he) hath plainly spoken of Things subject to Sense and Reason, in these Words :

*Gods always were, to be, desisted never,
Like them eternal, still the same persevere.
Chaos the first begotten Deity
Is still'd ; of something, how can nothing be ?
Thence not the first nor second nothings are,
How we esteem of those we thus declare :
If we can even or uneven sum
Alter, by adding or subtracting one,
Seems it to you the same ? To me not so,
If a continu'd Measure shrink or grow,
It is not the same Measure ; such the Lives
Of Men are, one decays, another thrives ;
That Nature, which new Being ever takes
Is different from the Being it forsakes,
Not Yesterday the same were I and you,
Nor shall To-morrow be what we are now.*

¶ Again, Alcimus, *The wise say, that the Soul apprehends some Things by Mediation of the Body, as when she hears or sees ; others she conceiveth within herself, without using the Body, whence of Beings, some are subject to Sense, others, comprehensible by the Intellect.* Therefore Plato saith, that they who desire to know the Principles of the Universe, must first distinguish the Ideas in themselves, as Similitude, Unity, Multitude, Magnitude, Restauration. Secondly, add in itself, honest, good, just, and the like. Thirdly, examines what Ideas cohere mutually with one another, as Science, Magnitude, Power ; and withal, to think that those who are amongst us, because they participate of them, should be called by the same Name, as for Instance, just Things are those which participate of just, honest which of honest ; one of every Species is eternal, perceptible by the Mind, and consequently free from Perturbation. Wherefore he asserts Ideas in Nature as Exemplars, after whose Likeness other Things are made. Thus Alcimus ; the first Part whereof seems to be taken out of Plato's Theætetus, the latter out of his Parmenides. The Words of Epicarmus concerning Gods and Ideas, to which Alcimus refers this of Plato, are these :

*Is Musick then a Thing ? It is ; the Man
Musick ? No. What then ? a Musician
A Man or not ? He is the same of good,
Good from the Thing a Part is understood.
Whoever learns good by that Art is made,
Who Musick, Musician ; of each Trade ;*

*As Dancing, Weaving, and the like the same,
The Art and Artist have a different Name.*

¶ Again, Alcimus : Plato in his Opinion of Ideas saith thus ; If there is Memory there must be also Ideas ; for Memory is of a quiet permanent Thing, but nothing is permanent except Ideas, for how, saith he, could living Creatures be preserved unless by their Idea, and receiving a natural Mind ? Now they remember Similitude and their Nourishment ; shewing that all Creatures have an innate Understanding of their own Similitude, and therefore perceive Things belonging to their Kind. Thus Alcimus ; What Place of Plato he means I know not, Scaliger reads, *πλάτωνος τῇ ἀσπείδῳ ὑπολήψεις ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδέαι*, &c. omitting *ἐν μὲν*, as if he made a Doubt whether that both of the Opinions of Ideas were Plato's ; but I rather think Alcimus meant not the Title of any Book, having named none in the rest of his Citations, but what himself abstracts out of Plato's Opinion concerning Ideas. Plato in *Philebo*, teacheth this concerning Memory, that Sense is a Motion common to the Soul and Body ; this suffering from external Senses, the other acting and adjudicating ; that Memory is a Conservatory or Repository of the Senses. For the Soul, as oft as she in herself, or by Assistance of the Body, calls to Mind what she hath suffered, she is said to remember. To Plato's Assertion, Alcimus applieth this of Epicarmus :

*Eumæus Wisdom's not to one confin'd ;
Various in every living knowing Mind.
The Hen first doth not living Things beget,
But sits and hatches with enlivening Heat :
This Wisdom only Nature's Friend discerns,
Of whom (her Mistress) she this Lesson learns.*

And again,

*This is not strange, for every Thing we find
Is to its proper Species most inclin'd ;
To Dogs a Bitch seems fairest, and to Kine
A Bull, an Ass to Asses, Swine to Swine.*

These Things Laertius¹ cites out of Alcimus, adding, that there are more of the same Kind in those four Books, whereby he intimates the Help that Plato received by the Writings of Epicarmus, neither was Epicarmus himself ignorant of his own Wisdom, as may be collected from these Verses, predicting that he should have a Follower :

*This I assert, and what I now maintain,
Shall Monuments to future Times remain,
Some one hereafter will my Verse review,
And cloathing it in Language rich and new
Invincible himself, others shall die.*

^c Laert. 3. 10.

^f Ibid.

^g Ibid. 3. 14.

^h Arist. de Anim. 3. 16.

ⁱ Laert. 3. 16.

* Moreover *Aristonemus* alledgeth the whole Form of *Plato's* Common-wealth in *Protagoras's* Antilogicks; others say, he borrowed his Politicks from *Socrates*.

† Lastly, it is related, that much of *Plato's* Morality was in the Books of *Sophron* the Minograph, which having been long neglected, were by him first brought to *Athens*, and were found lying under his Head when he was dead.

CHAP. V.

His School,

BEING returned to *Athens* from his Journey to *Egypt*, he settled himself in the Academy, a Gymnasium or Place of Exercise in the Suburbs of that City, beset with Woods, taking Name from *Ecademus* one of the Heropes, as *Eupolis*.

In sacred Hecademus shady Walks,

And *Timon*,

*The fluent sweet-tongu'd Sage first led the Way,
Who writes as smoothly as from some green Spray
Of Hecademy, Grasshoppers chirp their Lay.*

Hence it was first called *Ecademy*; the Occasion of his living here, was, that he was poor, and had nothing but one Orchard, in or adjoining to the Academy, which was the least Part enjoyed by his Successors. This Orchard at first yielded but three *auri nummi* of yearly Rent to the Owners, afterwards the whole Revenue amounted to a thousand or more. It was in process of Time much enlarged by Well-willers and studious Persons, who dying, bequeathed by Will something to the Professors of Philosophy, their Riches, to maintain the Quiet and Tranquillity of a Philosophical Life.

Plato (the Academy being said to be a sickly Place, and Physicians advising him to transfer his School to the *Lyceum*) would not be persuaded, but answered, I would not live on the Top of *Athos* to linger my Life. The unwholesomeness of the Place brought him to a quartan Ague, which lasted eighteen Months; but at length by Sobriety and Care he master'd it, and recover'd his Strength more perfect than before.

First, he taught Philosophy in the Academy, and after in the Gardens of *Colonus*. At the Entrance of his School in the Academy was written, *Let none ignorant of Geometry enter here*, meant, not only of the Measure and Proportion of Lines, but also of the inward Affections.

CHAP. VI.

How he instituted a Sect.

HAVING thus fitted himself in the Academy, he began out of the Collection he had made from others, and his own Invention, to institute a Sect, called from the Place where he taught, *Academick*. He mixed the *Heraditian* Discourses with the *Socratick* and *Pythagorick*, following in Sensibles *Heraclitus*, in Intelligibles *Pythagoras*, in Politicks *Socrates*. Whereas Philosophy, saith *St. Augustine*, concerns either Action or Contemplation (thence assuming two Names, *Contemplative* and *Active*) the *Active* consisting in Practice of moral Actions, the *Contemplative*, in Penetration of abstruse Physical Causes, and the Nature of the Divinity; *Socrates* excelled in the *Active*, *Pythagoras* in the *Contemplative*. But *Plato* joined them into one perfect Kind, which he subdivided into three several Parts; Moral, consisting chiefly in Action, Natural, in Contemplation, Rational in Distinction of true and false, which, tho' useful in both the other, yet belongeth more particularly to Contemplation. So that this Trichotomy contradicts not the other Dichotomy, which includeth all within Action and Contemplation. And as of old in Tragedy, the Chorus acted alone, then *Thespis* making some Intermissions of the Chorus introduced one Actor, *Æschylus* a second, *Sophocles* a third: In like Manner Philosophy was at first but of one Kind, *Phyick*; then *Socrates* added *Ethick*; thirdly, *Plato* inventing *Dialectick*, made it perfect.

Of these three Parts as they were held by *Plato*, and the rest of the old Academy, we cannot have a general better Account than this of *Cicero*.

Sect. I. *Ethick.*

The first, concerning Well-living they sought in Nature, affirming that she ought to be obeyed; and that in nothing else but Nature was to be had that chief Good whereto all Things should be referred; that the ultimate Being of desirable Things, and End of all Good in the Mind, Body and Life were acquired by Nature. Those of the Body they placed in the whole, and in the Parts: Health, Strength, Beauty in the whole; in the Parts, sound Sense, and a certain Excellence of particular Parts, as in the Feet Swiftnes, Strength in the Hands, Clearness in the Voice, in the Tongue Plainness of Expression. Of the Mind were these which are proper to comprehend the Power of Wit, which they divided into Nature and Manners. To Nature they ascribed Quickness

† *Laert.* 3. 37. 1 *Ibid.* 3. 13. m *Ibid.* 3. 7. n *Ibid.* 3. 8. o *De civit. Dei lib.* 3. 4. p *Laert.* 3. 56. q *Acad.* 1. 1. 5.

of Apprehension and Memory, both proper to the Mind and Wit; to Manners belonged Study and a Kind of Wisdom, formed partly by a continual Exercise, partly by Reason, in which consisted Philosophy itself, wherein that is begun and not perfected, is called Progression to Virtue, what is perfected, Virtue; Perfection of Nature of all Things in the Mind the most excellent. Thus of Minds. The Adjuncts of Life, that was the third, they asserted such Things as conduced to the Practice of Virtue.

SECT. 2. Physick.

Of Nature (for that was next) they so treated as to divide it into two Things: One the efficient, the other giving itself to this, that, therefore might be made something. In that they conceived to be a Power, in this a certain Matter to be effected; in both, Matter could not cohere, unless contained by some Power, nor the Power without some Matter, for there is nothing which is not enforced to be somewhere; that which consists of both, they called Body and Quality. Of Qualities, some are primary, others arising from these; the primary are uniform and simple; those which arise from these are various, and as it were multiform. Air, Fire, Water, and Earth are primary; of these arise Forms of living Creatures, and of these, Things which are made of the Earth. These Principles are called Elements, of which Air and Fire have a Faculty to move and effect; the other Parts, Water and Earth, to suffer. To all these there is subjected a certain Matter without Form, destitute of Quality, out of which all Things are expressed and formed. It is capable of admitting all; and of changing all Manner of Ways, in the whole, and in every Part. This resolves nothing to nothing, but into its own Parts, which are divisible into infinite, there being in Nature no least which cannot be divided. Those which are moved, are all moved by Intervals, which Intervals likewise may be divided infinitely, and that Power which we call Quality, being moved and agitated every Way, they conceive the whole Matter to be thoroughly changed, and by that Means these Things which they call Qualitative, to be produced, of which, in all coherent Nature continued with all its Parts, was effected the World, beyond which there is not any Part of Matter or Body. The Parts of the World are all Things therein, kept together by a sensitive Nature, wherein is likewise perfect Reason. It is also sempiternal, for there is nothing more strong whereby it may be dissolved. This Power they call the Soul of the World, God, a certain Providence over all Things subjected to him, regarding in the first Place heavenly Things, next on the Earth those Things which appertain to Man. The same they sometimes call Necessary, because nothing can be otherwise than is by him ordained; a fatal

immutable Continuation of eternal Order; sometimes Fortune, as producing many Things not foreseen or expected by us, by Reason of the Obscurity and our Ignorance of the Causes.

SECT. 3. Dialectick.

Of the third Part of Philosophy, consisting in Reason and Dissertation, they treated thus. The Judgment arise from the Sense, yet the Judgment of Truth is not in the Senses. The Mind they affirmed to be Judge of Things, conceiving her only fit to be credited, because she alone seeth that which is simple, and uniform, and certain: This they called Idea. All Sense they conceived to be obtuse and slow, and no Way able to perceive those Things which seem subject to Sense, which are so little as that they cannot fall under Sense; so moveable and various, that nothing is one, constant, nor the same, because all Things are in continual Alteration and Fluxion. All this Part of Things they call Opinative. Science they affirmed to be no where but in the Reasons and Notions of Mind, whence they approved Definitions of Things, and applied them to all whereon they discoursed. They approved likewise Explications of Words by Etymologies. They used Arguments and Marks for Things, to prove and conclude what they meant to explain: In this consisted all the Discipline of Dialectick, that is, of Speech concluded by Reason.

This Account in general Cicero gives of the old Academy: Plutarch, Laertius, Apuleius, and others, have made Collections more particular, we shall make Choice of that of Alcimus, as most full and perfect, which, by Reason of the Length is referred as an Appendix to Plato's Life.

CHAP. VIII.

His Inventions.

HE added much to Learning and Language by many Inventions, as well of Things as of Words. To omit Dialectick, of which we treated last, Phavorinus attributes to his Invention, discoursing by Way of a Question: But Aristotle ascribes it to Alexamenus, a Sicilian or Teian, and it appears by the Dialogues of Plato, that Socrates also used that Form of arguing. Laertius informs us, that Zeno Eleates was the first Composer of Dialogues, yet in my Opinion, saith he, Plato hath so much refined the Form thereof, that he deserves it to be preferred before all others, as well for Invention as for Refinement.

More properly may be attributed to him the Invention of Analytical Method, which reduceth the Thing sought unto its Principle, the best of Methods. He taught it to Leodamas, and by it found out many Things in Geometry: Analysis, as defined by

the 'Scholiast upon *Euclid*, is a *Sumption of the Thing sought*, by the *Consequents*, (as if it were already known) to find out the *Truth*. Examples thereof we find in the five first Propositions of the 13th Book of *Euclid*, besides several others, that occur in *Apollonius Pergæus*, and *Pappus Alexandrinus*.

Amongst his Geometrical Inventions also must be remembered the *Duplication of a Cube*, the Occasion and Manner whereof is related by * *Plutarch* and * *Philoponus*. The *Delians* afflicted with the Pestilence consulted the Oracle of *Apollo*, he answered, the Plague would cease if they doubled their Altar, which was of a Cubick Figure. *Plutarch* saith, that hereupon the Overseers of the Altar, made all the four Sides double to what they were before, so instead of doubling the Altar, they made it octuple to what it was. *Philoponus* saith, they caused another Cube of the same Bigness with the former to be set upon it, whereby they changed the Figure of the Altar, which was no longer a Cube, but *Δωδεκάεδρον*, a quadrilateral Pillar. The first Way it was Cubical, but not double; the second Way double, but not cubical. The Plague not ceasing, they consulted the Oracle again. *Apollo* answered, they had not fulfilled his Command, which was to build a cubical Altar as big again as the former. Hereupon they went to *Plato*, as most skillful in Geometry, to learn of him the Oracle's Meaning, and how they should find out the Way of doubling a Cube, retaining the cubick Figure. *Plato* answered, that the God mocked the *Grecians* for their Neglect of Philosophy and Learning, insulting over their Ignorance, that he commanded them seriously to addict themselves to Geometry, that this could not be done any other Way, than by finding out two mean Proportionals between two right Lines in a duple Proportion. (*Plato's* particular Method is delivered by *Eutocius* in his Comment upon the first Proposition of the second Book of *Archimedes*, de *Sphæra & Cylindro*.) He added, that *Eudoxus the Gnidian*, or *Helico the Cyzicene* would do it for them. That the God needed not this Duplication of his Altar, but commanded all the *Grecians*, that avoiding War, and the Miseries wherewith it is attended, they should apply themselves to the Muses; and having settled the turbulent Commotions of their Minds, converse harmlessly and beneficially with one another. *Philoponus* adds, that *Plato* expounded this Problem to his Disciples, who writ much upon this Subject, tho' nothing thereof be extant. Of the Ancients, laboured in this Problem besides *Plato*, *Archytas* the Tarentine, *Menæchmus*, *Erastosthenes*, *Philo of Byzantium*, *Hero*, *Apollonius Pergæus*, *Nicomedes*, *Diocles* and *Sporus*. * *Valerius Maximus* saith, that *Plato* remitted the Overseers of the sacred Altar to *Euclid* the Geometrician, as submitting to his Science and Profession; but this is an Er-

ror, because *Euclid* the Geometrician was much later than *Plato*, and the other *Euclid*, *Plato's* Contemporary, nothing eminent in Mathematicks, as hath been before me observed by Sir * *Henry Savile*.

That *Plato* invented many other Things in the Mathematicks, (more than appears from those Writings of his that are extant) and was most eminent therein, may be argued from the three Books of *Theon Smyrenæus*, the first *Arithmetick*, the second, *Harmonicks*, the last, (not yet published) *Astronomy*. Those Books contained many Things, singular and Choice, not to be met with elsewhere. The Design is acknowledged by the Author, to be as an Introduction necessary to the understanding of *Plato's* Writings.

There are also divers Words of which he is esteemed to be the first Author, * as *Antipodes*, a Word by him first introduced into Philosophy, to signify those People whose Feet are diametrically opposite.

* *Στοιχεῖον*, *Element*, until his Time was confounded with *ἀρχή*, *Principle*, by all Philosophers from *Thales*. *Plato* distinguished them thus, *ἀρχή*, *Principle*, is that which hath nothing before it whereof it might be generated; *στοιχεῖον*, *Element*, are compounded.

* The Word *Poem* also, tho' since very trivial, was not used by any before him.

* He first used this Term, *τετραπλῆ τὸν πολλαπλῆ*, *oblong Number*, [in *Theatetus*] thereby signifying the Product of a greater Number multiplied by a lesser.

* He also first introduced the Word *Ἐπιφανεία*, *Superficies*, for which before was used *ἐπιπλάσις* a *Plane*. Thus *Laertius*, tho' * *Proclus* implies, that neither *Plato* nor *Aristotle* use the Word, but for it, *ἐπιπλάσις*. Divine *Plato*, saith he, calls *Geometry* the *Contemplatrix of Planes*, opposing it to *Stereometry*, as if *Plane* and *Superficies* were the same. So likewise doth *Aristotle*. But *Euclid*, and those who succeeded him, make *Superficies* the Genus, *Plane* a Species thereof.

* *Θεὸς ἀγορεύσας*, *Divine Providence*, a Word since much used by Christians, was first the Expression of *Plato*.

* He first of Philosophers wrote against *Lyfias*, Son of *Cephalus*, in *Phædro*.

* He first considered the Force and Efficacy of Grammar.

* He first wrote against all that were before him, whence it is wondered at, that he never mentions *Democritus*.

CHAP. VIII.

His Distinctions.

OF his Distinctions *Aristotle* made this Collection in some Pieces not extant, cited by *Laertius* *.

* Lib. 13. u De 11 Delphi. w In Anal. post. lib. 1. cap. 7. e Ibid. d Ibid. e In Euclid. lib. 2. f Laert. 3. 24. g Ibid.

* x 13. y Prel. 1. z Laert. 3. 24. a Ibid. b Ibid. c Laert. 3. 31, &c.

Good is threefold. { *In the Soul*, as Justice, Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, and the like.
 In the Body, as Beauty, good Habit.
 External, as Friends, Prosperity of our Country, Wealth.

Friendship is threefold. { *Natural*, which Parents bear to their Children, and Kindred to one another; which Kind also is amongst Beasts.
 Sciable, begotten by Conversation, without any Relation of Kindred; such as was that betwixt *Pylades* and *Orestes*.
 Hospitable, towards Guests, or wherewith we affect Strangers, even upon Letters of Recommendation.
 Some add a fourth Kind, *Amatory*.

Government is of five Kinds. { *Democratical*, a Democracy is that wherein the People rules, and have Power to make Magistrates and Laws.
 Aristocratical, an Aristocracy is that wherein neither Rich nor Poor nor Nobles govern, but the best Persons of the whole City.
 Oligarchical, an Oligarchy is when Governors are elected by the Votes of Magistrates, for they are fewer than the Poor.
 Regal, { *Elective by Law*, as that of the *Carthaginians*, for it is Civil.
 Successive in a Family, as that of the *Lacedæmonians* and *Macedonians*, who confine themselves to a certain Race.
 Tyrannical, Tyranny is that wherein Men are brought to Subjection either by Fraud or Force.

Justice is threefold. { *Towards the Gods*, they who sacrifice as the Law requires, and perform the divine Rites, are just towards the Gods.
 Towards Men, they who restore what was lent or committed to their Trust, are just towards Men.
 Towards the Dead, they who take Care of Sepulchres are just towards the Dead.

Science is threefold. { *Practice*, as playing on the Flute, Lute, and the like, which affect nothing visible.
 Mechanick, as Architecture of Houses, Ships, or the like, which produceth a visible Effect.
 Theoretick, as Geometry, Harmonick Astronomy, which act not, neither produce any Thing. The Geometrician considers the Proportion of Lines to one another, Harmonick Sounds: Astronomy, Stars, and the World.

Medicine is of five Kinds. { *Pharmaceutick*, cureth Diseases by Application of Medicine.
 Chyrurgick, by Incision or cauterising.
 Dietetick, by Diet.
 Noſogomenick, discerns Diseases.
 Œothetick, removeth Diseases.

Law is twofold. { *Written*, such are those by which States are governed.
 Not written, grounded upon Custom; as that no Man shall go naked into the *Forum*, habited like a Woman, is not forbidden by any written Law, but foreborn because of the unwritten.

Speech is of five Kinds. { *Political*, used in Orations by such as govern States.
 Rhetorical, used by Lawyers in Pleading, either to confirm, praise, dispraise or accuse.
 Vulgar, used by People in common Discourse.
 Dialectical, used by such as discourse in short Questions and Answers.
 Artificial, used by Tradesmen in their several Professions.

Musick is threefold. { *Of the Voice only*.
 Of the Voice and Hands, as singing to the Lute.
 Of the Hand only, as the Harp.

Nobility is of four Kinds.

- If the Predecessors were upright, just and honest.
- If the Predecessors were Rulers of Princes.
- If the Predecessors acquired Honours, as the Command of an Army, or were crown'd in publick Games, those who are descended from such as we call Noble.
- If a Man be endued with a generous Mind; this is the best Kind of Nobility.

Beauty is three-fold.

- Commendable, as a fair Form.
- Useful, as an Instrument, House, or the like.
- Beneficial, as all that belongs to the Institution of Laws.

The Soul hath three Parts.

- Rational, the Principle whereby we judge, discourse, and the like.
- Concupiscible, whereby we desire Meat, Coition, and the like.
- Irafcible, whereby we are emboldened, joyed, grieved, enraged.

Perfect Virtue hath four Kinds.

- Wisdom, the Principle of doing Things right.
- Justice, the Principle of doing Things equal in private Conversation and publick Affairs.
- Fortitude, the Principle of not flying Danger through Fear, but meeting it.
- Temperance, the Principle of subduing Desires, and yielding to no Pleasures, but living moderately.

Government is of five Kinds.

- By Law, those who are chosen Magistrates in a City governed by Law.
- By Nature, the Males not only of Mankind, but of most other Creatures are predominant over the Females by Nature.
- By Custom, as that which Masters have over their Disciples.
- By Descent, as the Lacedæmonian Kings, who succeed out of one Family; and in Macedonia they use the same Custom.
- By Force, as those who rule a Kingdom against the Will of the People.

Of Rhetorick are six Kinds.

- Adhortation, as when we perswade a War against any.
- Dehortation, as when we dissuade from War.
- Accusation, when we declare that we have been injured by one whom we prove Cause of our Misfortune.
- Defence, when a Man proves he did not any Injury or Offence.
- Encomium, when we speak well of another.
- Vituperation, when we declare a Man to be wicked.

Of right Speaking are four Kinds: when we speak

- What is requisite; those Things which will benefit both the Hearer and Speaker.
- As much as is requisite; if we speak neither more nor less than concerns the Business.
- To those to whom it is requisite; as when we speak to old Men that have done amiss, in such Terms as are fit for old Men; or to young, as becomes young.
- When it is requisite; neither too soon, nor too late; for if that be not observed, nothing can be spoken aright.

Beneficence is of four Kinds.

- In Wealth; when we relieve the Wants of any, according to our Means.
- In Body; when we succour those who are beaten.
- In Knowledge; when we instruct, cure, teach any Good.
- In Speech; he who pleadeth in Defence of another, helpeth him in Words.

The End of Things is of four Kinds.

- Legal; imposing an End to Things by Decree.
- Natural; such as Days, Years, and Hours have.
- Artificial; as the building of a House.
- Accidental; by Chance, unexpected.

Of Powers are four Kinds.

- One in the Mind, to think and conjecture.
- Another of the Body, to walk, give, receive, and the like.
- A third, consisting in a Multitude of Soldiers, and store of Wealth; in which Respect Princes are called Powerful.
- The fourth, as to suffer Good or Evil to be done to us; as to be capable of Sickness, Learning, Health, or the like.

- Of Humanity are three Kinds. { *In Calling*; as those who call all they meet, and salute them, taking them by the Hand.
In relieving; in relieving the Misfortunes of another willingly.
In Feasting and Conversation.
- Felicity is divided into five Parts. { *Prudent Counsel*; acquired by Learning and Experience.
Soundness of Senses; consisting in the Parts of the Body; as to see with the Eyes, to hear with the Ears, to smell and taste.
Prosperity of Affairs; when those Things which a Man intendeth, he performeth fully.
Good Reputation, among Men; when a Man is well spoken of.
Plenty of Riches, and Things necessary to Life, so as to be able to supply Friends, and to perform Works of publick Magnificence. He who hath all these five Kinds is perfectly happy.
- Arts are of three Kinds. { The first diggeth out Metals, and sells Wood.
The second gives Variety of Shape to Things, as Wood-work and Iron-work.
The third maketh use of these; as Horsemanship of Bridles, Soldiery of Arms, Musick of Instruments.
- Good is of four Kinds. { One, as when we call a Man good, from his proper Goodness.
A second, as we call Virtue and Justice itself good.
A third, as we say, Food, Exercise, and Medicines are beneficial.
The fourth Good we call the Act of playing on Musick, or acting in a Play.
- Of Things, some are { *Ill*, always capable to do Hurt; as Ignorance, Imprudence, Injustice, and the like.
Good, the contrary to the former.
Indifferent, which sometimes may benefit, sometimes hurt; as walking, sitting, eating; or cannot do Hurt at all, being neither good nor bad.
- Good Government is three-fold. { If the Laws be good.
If the Laws be well kept.
If without Laws the People live orderly by Custom.
- Ill Government is three-fold. { If the Laws be bad for Natives and Foreigners.
If the Laws in Being are not observed.
If there are no Laws at all.
- Contraries are of three Kinds. { *Good to Ill*; as Justice to Injustice, Wisdom to Imprudence, and the like.
Ill to Ill; as Prodigality to Avarice, unjust Torments to just.
Neither to neither; as heavy to light, swift to slow, black to white.
- Good is of three Kinds. { Some we have, as Justice and Health.
Of some we participate; as Good itself cannot be had, but may be participated.
Some are fixed, which we can neither have, nor participate; as, to be virtuous and just.
- Consultation is threefold. { *From the Past*, by Example; as what befel the *Lacedaemonians* through overmuch Confidence.
From the Present, as considering the Timorousness of Men, Weakness of Walls, Scarcity of Provision, and the like.
From the Future; as that Ambassadors should not be injured upon Suspicion, lest it cast Infamy upon all *Greece*.
- Voice is { *Animate*, of living Creatures.
Inanimate, Sounds and Noise.
- { *Articulate*, of Men.
Inarticulate, of Beasts.

Things are

Divisible, compounded as Syllables, Symphonics, living Creatures, Water, Gold.
Indivisible, compounded of nothing; as a Point, Sound.

Homogeneous, consist of similar Parts, differing from the whole only in Number; as Water, Gold, and all Liquid Things.
Heterogeneous, consist of dissimilar Parts.

Things are

Absolute, requiring nothing else to express them; as, a Man, a Horse, and other Creatures.
Relatives, which imply another Thing; as greater (than others) swifter, fairer, and the like; for what is greater relates to something lesser, and the like.

These, according to *Aristotle*, were *Plato's* Division of first Things.

C H A P. IX.

His three Voyages to Sicily.

PLATO made three Voyages to Sicily; the first to see the fiery Ebullitions of *Ætna*,^m and to improve the Knowledge of States and Philosophy, which he got by his other Travels. This was about the 40th Year of his Age,^l at what Time *Dionysius* the elder, Son of *Hermocrates*, reigned in *Syracuse*; ^o *Plutarch* saith, he was led thither by Providence, not Fortune, and that some good Genius, designing afar off the Liberty of the People of *Syracuse*, brought him acquainted with *Dion*, then very young, who entertained him as his ^p Guest. He much disliked the Luxury of that Place, Feasting, Nocturnal Lucubrations, and the like; conversed frequently with *Dion*; discoursed with him of those Things which were best in Man, and with his best Arguments exhorted him thereto; by which he seemed to lay Grounds for the Subversion of that Tyranny which afterwards happened. ^q *Dion*, tho' young, was the most ingenious of all *Plato's* Followers, and most eager in Pursuit of Virtue, as appears as well by the Testimony of *Plato*, as by his own Actions. Though he had been brought up by the King in an effeminate luxurious kind of Life; yet, as soon as he tasted of Philosophy, the Guide to Virtue, his Soul was inflamed with Love thereof; and from his own Candour and Ingenuity, was persuaded that *Dionysius* would be no less affected therewith; and therefore desired him, when he was at Leisure, to admit and hear *Plato*. Hereupon, the Tyrant sent for him; at that Meeting, all their Discourse was concerning Fortitude. *Plato* affirmed none was further from that Virtue than a Tyrant; and proceeding to speak of Justice, asserted the Life of the just to be happy; of the Unjust, miserable. *Dionysius* was displeased at this Discourse (as reflecting upon himself) and with the Standers-by for approving it; at last, much exasperated, he asked *Plato*, why he came into Sicily? *Plato* answered, To seek a good Man. It seems, replied *Dionysius*, you have not yet found him. *Laertius* saith, ^r *Plato* dis-

puted with him concerning Tyranny, affirming, that is not best which benefits ourselves, unless it be excellent also in Virtue; whereat *Dionysius* incensed, said to him, *Your Discourse savours of Old Age: And yours, answered Plato, of Tyranny.* *Dionysius*, enraged, commanded him to be put to Death. *I will have*, said he, *your Head taken off.* At which Words, *Xenocrates* being present, answered, *He that doth it must begin with mine.* But *Dion* and *Aristomenes* wrought with him to revoke that Sentence. *Dion* thinking his Anger would have proceeded no farther, sent *Plato* away at his own Request in a Ship which carried *Polis* (whom *Laertius*¹ calls *Polis*, *Ælian*, *Pölis*) a *Lacedæmonian* Captain (who at that Time had been sent Embassador to *Dionysius*) back to Greece. *Dionysius* secretly desired *Polis* to kill him whilst he was on Ship board; or if not, by all means to sell him, alledging, it would be no Injury to *Plato*, for he would be as happy in Bondage as at Liberty, as being a just Man. Some affirm, the Occasion of *Dionysius* his Anger was, because, that when he asked what was the best Brass, *Plato* answered, *That whereof the Statues of* ¹ *Aristogiton* and *Harmodius* were made. Others, that it was because he was over-master'd in Learning. But *Tæzetes* rejecting these as idle Fictions of Philosophers, and Falsifiers, affirms the true Reason to have been, that he perceived he advised *Dion* to possess himself of the Kingdom. *Polis* transported him to *Ægina*; there *Charmander*, Son of *Charmandrites*, accused him, as meriting Death, by a Law they had made, that the first *Athenian* that should come to that Island, should, without being suffered to speak for himself, be put to Death. Which Law, as *Phavorinus* affirms, he himself made. One that was present, saying in Sport, *He is a Philosopher*, they set him at Liberty. Some say, they brought him to the publick Assembly, to plead for himself, where he would not speak a Word, but underwent all with a great Courage. Then they altered their Intent of putting him to Death, and agreed to sell him for a Slave. *Plutarch* saith, that upon a Decree of the

^l Laert. 3. 12. ^m Plat. Epist. ⁿ Laert. ibid. ^o In Dion. ^p Plat. Epist. 3. & 7. ^q Plat. in Dion. ^r Laert. 3. 12.
¹ Laert. 4. 11. ^t Who slew Hipparchus, Brother of Hippias the Tyrant of Athens; upon which the Philistines were expelled.

Aginetæ, that all the *Athenians* taken in that Island, should be sold for Slaves, *Pollis* told him there. *Anniceris*, a *Cyrenaick* Philosopher, being accidentally present, redeemed him for twenty, or as others, thirty *Minæ*, and sent him to *Athen* to his Friends. They immediately returned the Money to *Anniceris*, but he refused it, saying, They were not the only Persons concerned in *Plato's* Welfare. Some say, *Dion* sent the Money, which he would not accept, but bought therewith a little Orchard in the Academy. *Pollis* was defeated by *Chabrias*, and afterwards drowned in *Eice*. The Report goes, that an Apparition told him, he suffer'd those Things for the Philosopher's sake. *Dionysius* understanding what had happened, writ to *Plato*, to desire him not to speak ill of him; *Plato* returned Answer, that he had not so much Time vacant from Philosophy, as to remember *Dionysius*. To some Detractors who upbraided him, saying, *Dionysius* hath cast off *Plato*: No, faith he, but *Plato* *Dionysius*.

Dion continued to live, not according to the ordinary Luxury of the *Sicilians* and *Italians*, but in Virtue, until *Dionysius* died, for which he was maligned by those who lived after Tyrannical Institutions. Then considering, that these Documents were not practised by himself alone, but by some others, tho' few, he entertained a Hope, that *Dionysius* the younger, who succeeded his Father in the Government, might become one of those, to the extraordinary Happiness of himself, and the rest of the *Sicilians*. To this End he used many Exhortations to invite him to Virtue, intermixed with some Sentences of *Plato*, with whom *Dionysius*, upon this Occasion, became extremely desirous to be acquainted. To that Effect, many Letters were sent to *Athen* to him; some from *Dionysius*, others from *Pythagoreans* in *Italy*, desiring *Plato* to go to *Syracuse*, who, by prudent Counsel, might govern the young Man, transported by his own Power to Luxury. *Plato*, as himself affirmeth, fearing to be thought a Person only of Words, and not willing to engage in Action, and withal, hoping, by purging one principal Part, to cure the Disease of all *Sicily*, yielded. **Laertius* saith, upon a Promise made to him by *Dionysius*, of a Place and People that should live according to the Rules of his Commonwealth, which he made not good. Hence *Athenæus* accused *Plato* of Ambition. In the mean time, the Enemies of *Dion* fearing a Change in *Dionysius*, perswaded him to call home from Banishment *Philiſtus* (a Person very rational, but educated in tyrannical Principles) as an Antidote against *Plato's* Philosophy; but *Dion* hoped, the coming of *Plato* would regulate the licentious Tyranny of *Dionysius*.

**Plato*, at his Arrival in *Sicily*, (placed by *A. Gellius*, betwixt the Beginning of *Philip's* Reign, four hundred Years from the building of *Rome*, and

the *Chærmus* Fight) was received by *Dionysius* with much Respect. One of the King's magnificent Chariots stood ready to receive him as soon as he landed, and carried him to the Court. The King offered Sacrifice to the Gods for his coming, as a great Blessing upon his Government. The Temperance of their Feasts, Alteration of the Court, Meekness of the King, gave the *Syracusians* great Hopes of Reformation. The Courtiers addicted themselves to Philosophy so much, that the Palace was full of Sand (wherein they drew Geometrical Figures.) Not long after *Plato's* coming, at a Sacrifice in the Castle, the Herald, according to the usual Manner, made a solemn Prayer, that the Gods would long preserve the Kingly Government. *Dion* standing by, said, *Will you never give over praying against me?* This troubled *Philiſtus* and his Friends, who feared *Plato* would insinuate into the Favour of *Dionysius* so much, as that they should not be able to oppose him; since in so short Time, he had effected so great an Alteration in him. Hereupon they all jointly accused *Dion*, that he wrought upon *Dionysius*, by the Eloquence of *Plato*, to resign his Government, that it might be transferred to the Children of his Sister, to quit his Command for the Academy, where he should be made happy by Geometry, resigning his present Happiness to *Dion*, and his Nephews. With these and the like Instigations, *Dionysius* was so incensed, that he caused *Dion* to be unexpectedly carried on Shipboard in a little Bark; giving the Mariners Order to land him in *Italy*. This happened four Months after *Plato's* coming. *Plato*, and the rest of *Dion's* Friends, feared to be put to some Punishment, as Partakers of his Offence. A Report was raised, that *Plato* was put to Death by *Dionysius*, as Author of all that happened; but, on the contrary, *Dionysius* doubting lest something worse might happen from their Fear, treated them all kindly, comforted *Plato*, bid him be of good Cheer, and intreated him to stay with him. * He caused him to be lodged in his Castle, in the Orchards adjoining to his Palace, where not the Porter himself could go out without *Dionysius's* Leave; thus cunningly, under Pretence of Kindness, he watch'd him, that he might not return into *Greece*, to give *Dion* Notice of the Wrong done to him. *Dionysius*, by frequent Conversation with *Plato*, (as wild Beasts are tamed by Use) fell into so great liking of his Discourse, that he became in Love with him; but it was a tyrannical Affection, for he would not that *Plato* should love any but him; offering to put the Power of the Kingdom into his Hands, if he would value him above *Dion*. With this Passion, troublesome to *Plato*, *Dionysius* was sometimes so far transported, as Men jealous of their Mistresses, that he would upon the sudden fall out with him, and as

w Laert. 3. 21.

x Lib. 17. 21.

y Plat. Epist. ad Dion.

z Plotarch. in Dion.

a Plat. Epist. 7.

suddenly be reconciled, and ask him Pardon. He had indeed a great Desire of *Plato's* Philosophy; but a great Respect likewise on the other Side for those who dissuaded him from it, telling him, that it would ruin him to be too far engaged therein. ^b In the mean Time, that happening a War, he sent *Plato* home, promising, that the next Spring (as soon as there was Peace) he would send back for him and *Dion* to *Syracuse*; but he kept not his Promise, for which he desired *Plato* to excuse him, protesting the War to be the Occasion thereof, and that as soon as it were ended, he would send for *Dion*, whom he desired in the mean Time to rest satisfied, and not attempt any thing against him, nor to speak ill of him to the *Grecians*. This *Plato* endeavoured to effect; he intrusted *Dion* in Philosophy, in the Academy. *Dion* lay in the City at the House of *Calippus*, with whom he had been long acquainted. He purchased a Country-House for Pleasure, whither he sometimes went; this he bestowed afterward, at his Return to *Sicily*, upon *Speusippus*, with whom he conversed most intimately, as being so advised by *Plato*, who knew the cheerful Humour of *Speusippus* to be a fit Divertisement for the reserved Disposition of *Dion*. *Plato* had undertaken the Expence of some Plays and Dances by some Youths; *Dion* took the Pains to teach them, and paid the whole Charge. By this Liberality which *Plato* suffered him to confer upon the *Athenians*, he gained more Love than *Plato* Honour.

In the mean Time, *Dionysius*, to acquit himself of the Disesteem he had gained among Philosophers in *Plato's* Cause, invited many learned Men; and in a vain Ostentation of Wisdom, applied improperly the Sentences he had learned of *Plato*. Hereupon he began to wish for *Plato* again, and to blame himself for not knowing how to use him well when he had him, and that he had not learned so much of him as he might; and being, like a Tyrant, transported with uncertain Passions and Changes, a sudden vehement Desire came upon him of seeing *Plato* again. ^c The Peace being now concluded, he sent to *Plato* to come to him (but not, as he had promised, to *Dion*) writing to him, that he would have him to come immediately, and that afterwards he would send for *Dion*. Hereupon, *Plato* refused to go, notwithstanding the Intreaties of *Dion*; alledging for Excuse, his old Age, and that nothing was done according to their Agreement. In the mean Time, *Archytas*, whom, with others of *Tarentum*, *Plato*, before his Departure, had brought into the Acquaintance of *Dionysius*, came to *Dionysius*. There were also others there, Auditors of *Dion*. *Dionysius* being refused upon a second Invitation, thought his Honour deeply concerned,

and thereupon sent the third Time a Galley of three Banks of *Oars* (^d trimmed with Fillets) and other Ships; and with them *Archidemus*, whom he conceived *Plato* most affected of all his Friends in *Sicily*, and some *Sicilian* Noblemen. ^e He had by all Means obliged *Archytas* the *Pythagorean*, to let *Plato* know, he might come without Danger, and that he would engage his Word on it. ^f As soon as they came to *Plato*, they all protested, that *Dionysius* was much inclined to Philosophy, and delivered an Epistle from him to this Effect.

Dionysius to Plato.

(After the accustomed way of Preface.)

Nothing (saith he) should you do sooner, than come to *Sicily* at my Request. First, as concerning *Dion*, all shall be done as you will; for I think you will only moderate Things, and I will condescend. But, unless you come, you shall not obtain any Thing which you desire for *Dion*, nor in any Thing else; not in those which chiefly concern your own particular.

^g Other Epistles were sent from *Archytas*, and other *Italians* and *Tarentines*, praising *Dionysius* for his Love of Learning; adding, that if *Plato* came not, it would reflect upon his Friends, as well as on himself. ^h Many Letters and Intreaties were sent to *Dion* from his Wife and Sister. ⁱ To these were joined the Importunities of some Friends of *Plato's* at *Athens*, ^k inasmuch that *Dion* brought it to pass, that *Plato* (^l left he should desert him and the *Tarentines*) yielded to *Dionysius*, without any Excuse; and, as he writeth himself, was driven the third Time to the *Sicilian* Straits,

Once more Charybdis' Dangers to essay.

At his Arrival in *Sicily*, *Dionysius* met him with a Chariot, drawn by four white Horses, ^m whereinto he took him, and made him sit, whilst himself plaid the Coachman. Whereupon, a facetie *Syracusan*, well versed in *Homer*, pleased with the Sight, spoke these Verses out of the *Iliads*, with a little Alteration.

*The Chariot groan'd beneath its Weight,
Proud that the best of Men there sat.*

And as *Dionysius* was much joyed at his coming, so were the *Sicilians* put in great Hopes; being all desirous, and endeavouring, that *Plato* might supplant *Philistus*, and subvert Tyranny by Philosophy. The Ladies of the Court entertained *Plato* with all Civility. But above all, *Dionysius* seemed to repose more Confidence in him than in any of his Friends; for whereas he was jealous of all others,

^b Plat. Epist. ^c Plat. Epist. 3. ^d Plin. Nat. Hist. 7. 31. ^e Plut. in Dion. ^f Plat. Epist. 7. ^g Plat. Epist. ^h Plutarch. libid. ⁱ Plat. Epist. ^k Plut. libid. ^l Plat. Ep. ^m *Ælian*, var. Hist. 4. 18.

he had to great Respect for *Plato*, that he suffered him only to come to him unsearch'd (* though he knew him to be *Dion's* intimate Friend) and offer'd him great Sums of Money, but *Plato* would not accept of any. (* yet *Orestes* saith, he received eighty Talents of him, wherewith enriched, he purchased the Books of *Philolaus*) whence *Aristippus* the *Cyrenæan*, who was at the same Time in the Court, said, *Dionysius bestowed his Bounty on sure Grounds; he gives little to us who require much, and much to Plato who requireth nothing.* And being blamed that he received Money of *Dionysius*, *Plato* Books; *I want Money*, saith he, *Plato* Books. So untrue it is, as *Xenophon* asperseth him, that he went thither to share in the *Sicilian* Luxury. Or, as *Tzetzes*, that he studied the Art of Cookery, and lived with *Dionysius* as his Pensioner and Parasite. So far was he from any forbid Compliance, that at a Feast, *Dionysius* commanding every one to put on a Purple Gown, and dance, he refused, saying,

*I will not with Female Robe disgrace
Myself, who am a Man, of manly Race.*

Some likewise ascribe this to him, which others to *Aristippus*, that *Dionysius* saying,

*Whether comes to a Tyrant, he
A Servant is, though he came free.*

He answered immediately,

No Servant is, if he came free.

* *Plato*, after a while, began to put *Dionysius* in mind of the City he had promised him to be governed by his Rules; but *Dionysius* retracted his Promise. He moved him also in the Behalf of *Dion*. *Dionysius*, at the first, delay'd him; afterwards fell out with him, but so secretly, that none saw it, for he continued to confer as much Honour on him as he could possibly, thereby to make him forsake his Friendship to *Dion*. *Plato*, from the Beginning, perceived there was no Trust to be reposed in what he said or did, but that all was Deceit; yet conceal'd that Thought, and patiently suffered all, pretending to believe him. Thus they dissembled with each other, thinking they deceived the Eyes of all Men besides. *Halican* of *Cyzicum*, a Friend of *Plato*, foretold an Eclipse of the Sun, which falling out according to his Prediction, the Tyrant much honoured him, and gave him a Talent of Silver. Then *Aristippus* jesting with other Philosophers, said, *He could tell them of a stranger Thing that would happen.* They desiring to know what that was: *I foretell*, saith he, *Plato and Dio-*

nysius will be at Differences, ere long; that it cannot pass. *Dionysius* detained *Dion's* Retra, which he used to send yearly to him to *Peloponnesus*, pretending he kept it for his Nephew, *Dion's* Son, *Plato* discontented heretofore, desired he might go home, saying, he could not stay, *Dion* being used to ignominiously. *Dionysius* spoke kindly to him, desiring him to stay. He thought, it not convenient to let *Plato* go so soon to divulge his Actions; but being not able to prevail with him, he told him, he would provide a Means for his Passage. *Plato* had designed to go with the Passage-boats: *Dionysius* seeing him bent upon his Voyage, the next Day spoke thus kindly to him, *That the Differences betwixt Dion and me may be composed, I will for your Sake condescend thus far; Dion shall receive his Revenues living in Peloponnesus, not as a banished Person, but as one that may come thither when he will, and you his Friends, shall think convenient. The Trustees for this Business shall be yourself, and your and his Friends who live here; Dion shall receive his Rents, but through your Hands, otherwise I shall not dare to trust him; in you and yours I have more Confidence; stay for this Reason a Year here, and then you shall carry along with you his Money, wherein you will do Dion a great Courtesy.* To this *Plato*, after a Day's Deliberation, consented; and writ to that Effect to *Dion*; but as soon as the Ship were gone, that *Dionysius* saw he had no Means to get away, forgetting his Promise, he made Sale of *Dion's* Estate.

* At this Time happened a Mutiny amongst the Soldiers of *Dionysius*, of which *Heraclides*, a Friend of *Plato's*, was reported the Author. *Dionysius* laid out to take him, but could not light on him. Walking in his Garden he called *Theodotes* to him; *Plato* being accidentally walking there at the same time; after some private Discourse with *Dionysius*, *Theodotes* turning to *Plato*, *Plato*, saith he, *I persuade Dionysius that I may bring Heraclides to him to answer the Crimes wherewith he is charged, and then, if Dionysius will not suffer him to live in Sicily, that he at least permit him to take his Wife and Children along with him to Peloponnesus, and live there, and whilst he shall not plot any Thing against Dionysius, that he may there enjoy his Revenues. With this Assurance I have sent to Heraclides, and will send again to him to come thither; but if he come either upon the first or second Notice, I have made an Agreement with Dionysius, and obtained a Promise from him, that he shall receive no Harm, either in or within the City; but, if he be so resolved, that he send him away beyond the Confines of this Country, until he shall be better satisfied with him; Do not you, Dionysius, consent hereto, shall he? I do, answered Dionysius, neither if he*

n *Ælian*, var. Hist. 4. 18. o *Laert.* 3. 9. p *Epist.* ad *Alcibi.* q *Chilias.* r *Laert.* var. *Alcibi.* s *Plat.* *Epist.* 7. t *Plat.* *Epist.*

he in your House, shall be receive any Prejudice. The next Day, (about twenty Days before Plato left Sicily) came Euribius and Theodotes to Plato in much Haste and Trouble; Plato, said Theodotes, you were Yesterday present at the Agreement betwixt Dionysius and me, concerning Heraclesides. I was so, answered Plato, but since, continues Theodotes, he hath sent out Officers to apprehend him, and I fear he is somewhere very nigh; therefore go along with us to Dionysius, and let us use our utmost Endeavour with him. They went; when they came before him, Plato (the rest standing silent by, and weeping) began thus, *These Men, Dionysius, are afraid lest you should do something against Heraclesides contrary to the Agreement you made Yesterday, for I suppose he is come near herabouts.* Dionysius at this grew angry, his Colour often changed with Rage; Theodotes fell at his Feet, and taking him by the Hand, besought him not to do any such Thing: Plato continuing his Speech; *Be of good Cheer*, saith he, Theodotes, for Dionysius will not do any Thing contrary to the Promise he made Yesterday. Dionysius, looking severely upon Plato, *To you*, saith he, *I made no Promise; Yes, by the Gods*, answered Plato, *you promised not to do those Things which Theodotes now beseecheth you not to do.* Archidemus and Aristocritus being present, he told Plato, (as he had done once before, when he interceded for Heraclesides) that he cared for Heraclesides and others more than for him; and asked him before them, whether he remembered that when he came first to Syracuse, he counselled him to restore the Grecian Cities? Plato answered he did remember it, and that he still thought it his best Course, and withal asked Dionysius whether that were the only Counsel he had given him? Dionysius returned an angry contumelious Reply, and asked him, laughing scornfully, whether he taught him those Things as a School-boy? To which Plato answered, *You will remember. What*, replies he, *as a Master in Geometry, or how?* Plato forbore to reply, fearing it might occasion a Stop of his Voyage, but immediately went away. Dionysius resolved to lay wait for Heraclesides; but he escaped to the Carthaginian Territories.

From this Displeasure against Plato, Dionysius took Occasion to forbear to send for *Dion's* Money; and first sent Plato out of his Castle, where, till then, he had lain next the Palace, pretending that the Women were to celebrate a Feast ten Days in the Gardens where he dwelt: For that time he commanded Plato to live without the Castle with Archidemus, during which Time Theodotes sent for him, and communicated to him of Dionysius's Proceedings. Dionysius, having Information that Plato had gone to *Archidemus*, took a new Occasion of Displeasure against him, and sent one to him, who

asked him whether he had gone to Theodotes. Plato acknowledged that he had, then, saith the Messenger, *Dionysius* had me tell you, you do not well to prefer *Dion* and his Friends before him. Never from that Time did he send for Plato to the Court, looking upon him as a profest Friend to Theodotes and Heraclesides, and his profest Enemy. * Plato lived without the Castle amongst the Soldiers of the Guard; who, as Dionysius well knew, had born him ill-will long, and fought to murder him, because he counselled Dionysius to give over the Tyranny, and live without a Guard. † Some, who came to visit him, gave him Notice that Calumnies were spread against him amongst the Soldiers, ‡ as if he excited *Dion* and Theonides to restore the Island to Liberty, and that some of them threatened, when they could light upon him to kill him. Hereupon Plato began to think of some Means of Escape, which he effected in this Manner; he sent to Archytas at Tarentum, and to other Friends, advertising them of the Danger wherein he was; they, under Pretence of an Embassy in the Name of the Country, sent Lamiscus (whom Laertius calls Lamiscus) one of their Party, with a Gallies of three Banks of Oars to redeem Plato, declaring that his coming to Syracuse was upon the Engagement of Archytas. His Letter was to this Effect.

Archytas to Dionysius, Health.

WE all, Plato's Friends, have sent Lamiscus and Photides to redemand the Man according to your Agreement with us: You will do well to consider with what Importunity you prevailed with us to invite Plato to you, promising to yield to all Things, and to give him Liberty to go and come at his Pleasure; remember how much you prized his coming, and preferred him before all others. If there hath happened any Difference betwixt you, it will best you to treat him courteously, and restore him safe to us. This if you do, you will do justly, and oblige us.

* Dionysius, to excuse himself, and to shew he was not angry with Plato, feasted him magnificently, and then sent him home with great Testimonies of Affection: One Day, amongst the rest, he said to him, *I am afraid*, Plato, *you will speak ill of me when you are amongst your Friends.* The Gods forbid, answered Plato smiling, *they should have such Scarcity of Matter in the Academy, as to be constrained to discourse of you.* Dionysius at his Departure desired him to find out whether *Dion* would be much displeased if he should dispose of his Wife to another; there being at that Time a Report that he did not like his Match, and could not live quietly with his Wife. Plato in his Return came to Peloponnesus, at what Time the Olympick Games were celebrated; where the Eyes of all the

Grecians were taken off from the Sports, and fixed upon him as the more worthy Object. Here he found *Dion* beholding the Exercises, to whom he related what had happened. *Dion* protested to revenge the Discourtesy of *Dionysius* towards *Plato*, from which *Plato* earnestly dissuaded him. Being come home to *Athens*, he wrote to *Dionysius*, and gave him a plain Account of every Thing, but that concerning *Dion's* Wife, he set it down so darkly, that he alone to whom the Letter was directed could understand him; letting him know that he had spoken with *Dion* about the Business which he knew, and that he would be very much displeased if *Dionysius* did it. So that at that time, because there was great Hopes of Reconciliation between them, the Tyrant forbore a while to dispose of his Sister *Arete*, *Dion's* Wife, as soon after, when he saw the Breach irreconcilable, he did, marrying her against her Will to one of his Friends named *Timocrates*. *Dion* thenceforward prepared for War against *Plato's* Advice, who endeavoured to dissuade him from it, as well for Respect of *Dionysius's* good Reception of him, as for that *Dion* was well in Years; tho' *Eliah* saith, ^b he put *Dion* upon that War, which *Plutarch* imputes to the Insigations of *Speusippus*.

C H A P. X.

His Authority in Civil Affairs.

AT home he lived quietly in the Academy, ^c not engaging himself in publick Affairs; (tho' he was a Person very knowing therein, as his Writings manifest) because the *Athenians* were accustomed to Laws different from his Sense.

^d His Fame spreading to the *Arcadians* and *Thebans*, they sent Ambassadors earnestly to request him to come over to them, not only to instruct their young Men in Philosophy, but which was of higher Concernment, to ordain Laws for *Megalopolis*, a City then newly built by the *Arcadians*, upon Occasion of the great Defeat given them by the *Lacedaemonians*, in the first Year of the 103d Olympiad. *Plato* was not a little pleased at this Invitation, but asking the Ambassadors how they stood affected to a Parity of Estates, and finding them so averse from it, as not to be by any Means induced thereto, he refused to go; but sent *Aristonimus* his familiar Friend.

^e The *Cyrenaeans* likewise sent to him, desiring him to send them Laws for their City, but he refused, saying, it was difficult to prescribe Laws to Men in Prosperity.

Yet to several People upon their Importunities he condescended.

To the *Syracusians* he gave Laws upon the Ejection of their King.

To the *Cretans*, upon their building of *Magnisia*, he sent Laws digested into twelve Books.

To the *Eleans* he sent *Phormio*; to the *Pyrrhæniads*, *Mededimus* (his familiar Friends) upon the same Design.

This is enough to justify him against those who accuse ^f him of having written a Form of Government which he could not persuade any to practise, because it was so severe: And that the *Athenians*, who accepted the Laws of *Draco* and *Solon*, derided his.

C H A P. XI.

His Virtues and Moral Sentences.

HE lived single, yet soberly and chastly, inso-much as in his old Age (in Compliance with the vulgar Opinion) he sacrificed to Nature, to expiate the Crime of his Continence. So constant in his Composure and Gravity, that a Youth brought up under him, returning to his Parents, and hearing his Father speak aloud, said, *I never found this in Plato*. He eat but once a Day, or if the second time, very sparingly; he slept alone, and much discommended the contrary Manner of Living. Of his Prudence, Patience, Magnanimity, and other Virtues, there are these Instances.

^g *Antimachus* a *Colophonian*, and *Niceratus* a *Hæcætes*, contending in a poetick Panegyrick of *Lyfander*, the Prize was bestowed upon *Niceratus*: *Antimachus* in Anger tore his Poem. *Plato*, who at that Time was young, and much esteemed *Antimachus* for his Poetry, comforted him, saying, Ignorance is a Disease proper to the Ignorant, as Blindness to the Blind.

^h His Servant having offended him, he bad him put off his Coat, and expose his Shoulders to be beaten, intending to have corrected him with his own Hand; but perceiving himself to be angry, he stooped his Hand, and stood fix'd in that Posture; a Friend coming in asked him what he was doing, punishing an angry Man, saith he.

ⁱ Another Time being displeased at his Servant for some Offence, *Do you* (saith he to *Speusippus*, or as *Laertius* ^k, to *Xenocrates*, accidentally coming in) *beat this Fellow, for I am angry*. And another Time to his Servant he said, *I would beat thee if I were not angry*. ^l Feasting to exceed the Limits of Correction, and thinking it unfit the Master and Servant should be alike faulty.

^m *Chabrias* the General being arraigned for his Life, he alone threwed himself on his Side, not one of the Citizens else appearing for him. *Crabylus* the Sycophant met him, accompanying *Chabrias* to the Tower, and said unto him, *Do you come to help others, you know not that the Person of Socrates is reserved for you?* *Plato* answered, *When I fought for*

^b Var. Hist. 3. 17. ^c Laert. 3. 23. ^d *Ælian*, var. hist. 2. 47. ^e *Plutarch* ad princip. *Therost.* ^f *Athen.* 12. ^g *Plat.*
^h *Lyfand.* ⁱ *Senec.* de ira. 3. 12. ^j *Senec.* ibid. ^k *Laert.* 3. 38. ^l *Val. Max.* 4. ^m *Laert.* 3. 23.

my Country I hazarded my Life, and will now in Duty to my Friend.

At the Olympick Games, he fell into Company with some Strangers, who knew him not, upon whose Affections he gained much by his affable Conversation, dining and spending the whole Day with them, not mentioning either the Academy or Socrates, only saying, his Name was Plato. When they came to Athens, he entertained them courteously. Come, Plato, said the Strangers, shew us your Namesake, Socrates his Disciple; bring us to the Academy, recommend us to him, that we may know him. He smiling a little, as he used, said, I am the Man; whereat they were much amazed, having conversed so familiarly with a Person of that Eminence, who used no Boasting or Ostentation; and shewed, that besides his Philosophical Discourse, his ordinary Conversation was extremely winning.

When he went out of the School, he always said, See (Yeuths) that you employ your idle Hours usefully.

At a Feast he blamed those that brought in Musicians to hinder Discourse.

Seeing a young Man play at Dice, he reproved him; he answered, What, for so small a Matter? Custom (replies Plato) is no small Thing.

Being demanded, whether there should be any Record to Posterity of his Actions or Sayings, as of others before him? First, saith he, we must get a Name, then many Things will follow.

Getting on Horseback, he immediately lighted again, saying, he feared, lest he should be carried away *inverrobia* by a high wilful Conceit, a Metaphor taken from a Horse.

He advised drunken and angry Men to, look in a Glass, and it would make them refrain from those Vices.

He affirmed, that to drink to the Excess of Drunkenness was not allowable at any Time, unless upon the Festival of that God who gives Wine.

Sleep also much displeased him, whence he said in his Laws, No Man sleeping is worth any Thing.

That Truth is more pleasing to all than any feigned Story, so of Truth he saith, *de legibus*: Truth, O *Gæst*, is an excellent Thing and durable, but to this we are not easily persuaded.

Being told that Xenocrates had spoken many unjust Things against him, he presently rejected the Accusation; the Informer persisting, asked why he would not believe him? He added, it was not probable, that he whom he loved so much should not love him again. Finally, the other swearing it was thus; he, not to argue him of Perjury, affirm-

ed, that Xenocrates would never have said so, but that there was Reason for it.

He said, No wife Man punisheth in respect of the Fault past, but in Prevention of the future.

Seeing the *Aggrintines* magnificent in Building, luxurious in Feasting, These People (saith he) build as if they were to live for ever, and eat as if they were to die instantly.

Hearing a wicked Person speak in the Defence of another, This Man, saith he, carries his Heart in his Tongue.

Being told that some spake Ill of him, he answered, 'Tis no Matter, I will live so that none shall believe them.

Seeing a young Man of a good Family, who had wasted all his Means, sitting at the Door of an Inn, feeding upon Bread and Water, he told him, If you had dined so temperately, you would never have needed to sup so.

To *Antisthenes*, making a long Oration, You know not, saith he, that Discourse is to be measured by the Hearer, not the Speaker.

Seeing a Youth over-bold with his Father, Young Man, saith he, will you undervalue him who is the Cause you overvalue yourself?

To one of his Disciples who took too much Care of his Body, he said, Why do you labour so much in building your own Prison?

Of a Prisoner, fettered, he said, That Man is dead in his own Body, he lives in another.

He said, That whosoever neglected himself for another, was the most happy of all Persons, for he enjoyed neither.

One *Leo*, an eminent Citizen, being blamed for loud and immoderate Clamour in the Senate, This is, saith he, to be a Lyon indeed.

His Disciples wondering, that Xenocrates, severe all his Life-time, had said something that was pleasant, Do you wonder, saith he, that *Roses* and *Lillies* grow among *Thorns*?

Xenocrates, by Reason of his severe Conversation, he advised to sacrifice to the Graces.

He used to say, Prefer Labour before Idleness, unless you esteem Rust above Brightness.

He exhorted the young Men to good Life thus: Observe the different Nature of Virtue and Pleasure; the momentary Sweetness of the World is immediately followed by eternal Sorrow and Repentance, the short Pain of the other by eternal Pleasure.

He said, That it was a great Matter in the Education of Youth, to accustom them to take Delight in good Things; otherwise, he affirmed Pleasure to be the Bait of Evil.

He affirms Philosophy to be the true Help of the Soul, the rest Ornaments; that nothing is more plea-

^a *Ælian*, var. *Hist.* 4. 9. ^b *Lært.* 3. 39. ^c *Ibid.* 3. 38. ^d *Ibid.* 3. 39. ^e *Ibid.* 3. 38. ^f *Ibid.* 3. 38. ^g *Ibid.* 3. 38. ^h *Ibid.* 3. 38. ⁱ *Ibid.* 3. 38. ^j *Ibid.* 3. 38. ^k *Ibid.* 3. 38. ^l *Ibid.* 3. 38. ^m *Ibid.* 3. 38. ⁿ *Ibid.* 3. 38. ^o *Ibid.* 3. 38. ^p *Ibid.* 3. 38. ^q *Ibid.* 3. 38. ^r *Ibid.* 3. 38. ^s *Ibid.* 3. 38. ^t *Ibid.* 3. 38. ^u *Ibid.* 3. 38. ^v *Ibid.* 3. 38. ^w *Ibid.* 3. 38. ^x *Ibid.* 3. 38. ^y *Ibid.* 3. 38. ^z *Ibid.* 3. 38.

sing to a sound Mind, than to speak and hear Truth, than which nothing is better or more lauding.

To some, who demanded what Kind of Possessions were best to be provided for Children? *Those, saith he, which fear neither Storms, nor Violence of Men, nor Jove himself.*

To Demonicus asking his Advice concerning the Education of his Son; *The same Care, saith he, that we have of Plants, we must take of our Children; the one is Labour, the other Pleasure. But we must take Heed that in this we be not too secure, in that too vigilant.*

To Philedonius, who blamed him that he was as studious to learn as to teach, and asked him how long he meant to be a Disciple? *As long, saith he, as I am not ashamed of growing better and wiser.*

Being demanded, *What Difference there is betwixt a learned Man and an unlearned?* The same, saith he, as betwixt a Physician and a Patient.

He said, *Princes had no better Possessions than the Familiarities of such Men who could not flatter; That Wisdom is as necessary to a Prince, as the Soul to the Body; That Kingdoms would be most happy, if either Philosophers rule, or the Rulers were inspired with Philosophy; for nothing is more pernicious than Power and Arrogance, accompanied with Ignorance; That Subjects ought to be such as Princes seem to be; That a Magistrate is to be esteemed a publick, not a private Good; That not a Part of the Commonwealth, but the whole, ought to be principally regarded.*

Being desirous to take off *Timotheus* Son of *Conon*, General of the *Athenians*, from sumptuous military Feasts, he invited him into the Academy to a plain moderate Supper, such as quiet pleasing Sleeps succeed, with a good Temper of Body. The next Day *Timotheus* observing the Difference, said, *They who feasted with Plato were the better for it the next Day; and meeting Plato said unto him, Your Supper, Plato, is as pleasant the next Morning as over Night, alluding to the excellent Discourse that had past at that Time.*

Hence appears the Truth of the Poet's Saying, who being derided for acting a Tragedy, none being present but *Plato*, answered, *but this one Person is more than all the Athenians besides.*

CHAP. XII.

His Will and Death.

Thus continuing a single Life to his End, not having any Heirs of his own, he bequeathed his Estate to young *Adimantus* (probably the Son of *Adimantus* his second Brother) by his Will; thus recited by *Laertius* ¹.

These Things Plato hath bequeathed and disposed;

the Hephestdian Grounds bordering North on the High-way from the Cepheidian Temple, South on the Heracleum of the Hepheidiades, East on Archestratus the Phrearian, West Philip the Cholidian; this let it not be lawful for any Man to sell or alienate, but let young Adimantus be Possessor thereof in as full and ample Manner as is possible. And likewise the Eneirisiadzean Farm which I bought of Callimachus, adjoining on the North to Eurymedon the Myrrinufian, on the South to Demoftratus Xypeteron, on the East to Eurymedon the Myrrinufian, on the West to Cepheissus; three Minæ of Silver; a golden Cup weighing 160 Drachms, a Ring of Gold, and an Ear-ring of Gold, both together weighing four Drachms and three Oboli; Euclid the Stone-cutter oweth me three Minæ; Diana I remit freely; I leave my Servants, Ticho, Bidas, Apolloniades and Dionysius, the Goods whereof Demetrius keepeth an Inventory. I owe no Man any Thing. I appoint Executors, Sothenes, Speusippus, Demetrius, Hegias, Eurimedon, Callimachus, Thrasiippus.

^a If this Will be not forged, that of *Apuleius* is false, who avers, the Patrimony he left was a little Orchard adjoining to the Academy, two Servants, and a Cup wherein he supplicated to the Gods; Gold no more than he wore in his Ear when he was a Boy, an Emblem of his Nobility.

¹ He died in the 13th Year of the Reign of Philip King of Macedon, in the first of the 108th Olympiad, the 81st (according to *Hermippus*, *Cicero*, *Seneca*, and others) of his Age (not as *Athenæus* the 82.) which Number he completed exactly, dying that very Day whereon he was born; For which Reason the Magi at *Athens* sacrificed to him, as conceiving him more than Man, who fulfilled the most perfect Number, nine multiplied into itself.

^b He died only of Age, which *Seneca* ascribes to his Temperance and Diligence; *Hermippus* saith, at a Nuptial Feast; *Cicero* saith ¹, as he was Writing; they therefore who affirm he died (as *Phocylides*) of Lice, do him much Injury; upon his Tomb these Epitaphs ^m.

The first.

*Whose Temperance and Justice all envies,
The sam'd Aristocles here buried lies;
If Wisdom any with Renewal endued,
Here was it most, by Evoy not purfued.*

The second.

*Earth in her Bosom Plato's Body hides,
His Soul amongst the deathless Gods resides.
Aristo's Son whose Fame to Strangers spread,
Made them admire the sacred Life he led.*

¹ Plot. Sympos. 6. p. 168. *Ælian*, var. hist. 2. 18. ² *De Senect.* in *Laert.* 3. 40.

³ *Laert.* 3. 42.

⁴ *Dogm. Plat.*

⁵ *Laert.* 3. 40.

⁶ *Laert.* 3. 42.

Another later.

*Eagle, why art thou perch'd upon this Stone,
And gazest thence on some Gods starry Throne ?
I Plato's Soul to Heaven flown represent,
His Body buried in this Monument.*

Phavorinus saith, that *Mithridates* the Persian set up *Plato's* Statue in the Academy with this Inscription ;

*MITHRIDATES SON OF RHODOBATES,
THE PERSIAN, DEDICATED THIS IMAGE
OF PLATO, MADE BY SILANION, TO THE
MUSES.*

CHAP. XIII.

His Disciples and Friends.

THE Fame of this School attracted Disciples from all Parts: Of whom were

^a *Speusippus*, an *Athenian*, *Plato's* Sister's Son, whom he is said to have reformed by the Example of his own Life.

^b *Xenocrates*, a *Chalcedonian*, *Plato's* beloved Disciple, an Imitator of his Gravity and Magnanimity: *Athenæus* saith, he was first the only Disciple of *Eschines*, and Relief of his Poverty, seduced from him by *Plato*.

^c *Aristotle*, a *Stagyrite*, whom *Plato* used to call a Colt, foreseeing that he would ungratefully oppose him, as a Colt, having suck'd, kicks at his Dam: *Xenocrates* was slow, *Aristotle* quick in Extremity, whence *Plato* said of them; *What an Ass have I, and what a Horse to yoke together !*

^d *Philippus*, an *Opuntian*, who transcribed *Plato's* Laws in Wax ; to him some ascribe *Epinomis*.

^e *Hestæus* a *Perinthian*.

^f *Dion* a *Syracusan*, whom *Plato* exceedingly affected, as is evident from his Epigrams ; seeing him in the Height of Honour, all Mens Eyes fix'd upon his noble Actions, he advised him to take Heed of that Vice, which makes Men care only to please themselves ; a Consequent of Solitude.

^g *Amyclus* (or, as *Eliau*, *Amyclas*) a *Heracleote*.

^h *Eraftus* and *Coriscus*, *Sceprians*.

ⁱ *Timolaus* a *Cyzicene*.

^j *Euæmon* a *Lampfacene*.

^k *Pithon*, whom *Aristotle* calls *Paron*, and *Heraclides*, *Enians*.

^l *Hippobates* and *Calippus*, *Athenians*.

^m *Demetrius* of *Amphipolis*.

ⁿ *Heraclides* of *Pontus*.

Two Women, *Lasthenia* a *Mantinean*, and *Axiotbia* a *Pbliafian*, who went habit'd like a Man.

Theophrastus, as some affirm.

Orators, ^o *Hyperides*, *Lycurgus*, *Demosthenes*, *Lycurgus* (saith *Philistus*) was a Person of great Parts, and did many remarkable Things, which none could perform, who had not been *Plato's* Auditor. *Demosthenes*, when he fled from *Antipater*, said to *Archias*, who counsell'd him to put himself into his Hands, upon Promise to save his Life; *Far be it from me to choose rather to live ill, than to die well ; having heard Xenocrates and Plato dispute of the Soul's Immortality.*

^p *Meneſſtratus* a *Tbaſian*.

To these reckoned by *Laertius*, ^q add *Aristides*, a *Locrian*.

^r *Eudoxus* a *Gnidian*, who, at a great Feast made by *Plato*, first found out the Manner of sitting in a circular Form.

^s *Hermodorus*, of whom the Proverb ; *Hermodorus trafficks in Words.*

^t *Heraclides*, to whom *Demosthenes* writing, reprehends him, that having heard *Plato*, he neglected good Arts, and lived disorderly.

^u *Euphrates*, who lived with *Perdiccas* King of *Macedonia*, in so great Favour, that he, in a manner, shared Command with him.

^v *Euagion* of *Lampsacum*.

^w *Timæus* of *Cyzicum*.

^x *Charon* of *Pellene*.

^y *Isocrates* the Orator, with whom *Plato* was very intimate. *Praxiphanes* published a Discourse they had together, in a Field of *Plato's*, who at that Time entertain'd *Isocrates* as a Guest.

^z *Aster*, *Phædrus*, *Alexis*, *Agato*, young Men, whom *Plato* particularly affected, as appears by his Epigrams.

^{aa} *Aristonymus*, *Phormio*, *Mededimus*, his familiar Friends, already mentioned.

CHAP. XIV.

His Emulators and Detractors.

AS *Plato's* eminent Learning gained on one Side many Disciples and Admirers, so on the other Side, it procured him many Emulators, especially amongst his Fellow Disciples, the Followers of *Socrates* ; amongst these,

^{bb} *Xenophon* was exceedingly disaffected towards him ; they emulated each other, and writ both upon one Subject, a Symposium ; *Socrates* his Apology, Moral Commentaries: One writ of a Commonwealth, the other, the Institution of *Cyrus* ; which Book ^{cc} *Plato* notes as commentitious, affirming *Cyrus* not to have been such a Person as is there ex-

^a Laert. 3. 4. ⁿ Laert. 5. 2. ^o See also Stob. lib. 13. ^p Lucian Demosthen. Encom. ^q Laert. 8. 86. ^r Zenob.
^s Athen. deipn. lib. 11. ^t Ibid. ^u Ibid. ^w Ibid. ^x Laert. 3. 8. ^y Cap. 10. ^z Laert. 3. 33. ^{aa} De legib. l. 3.

press'd. Though both writ much concerning *Socrates*, yet neither makes mention of the other, except *Xenophon* once of *Plato*, in the third of his Commentaries.

Antisthenes being about to recite something that he had written, desired *Plato* to be present; *Plato* demanding what he meant to recite, he answered, *That to contradict is not lawful. How came you, faith Plato, to write upon that Subject?* And thereupon demonstrating that he contradicted himself, *Antisthenes* writ a Dialogue against him, entitled, *Saths*.

Aristippus was at Difference with him; for which Reason (in *Phaedon*) he covertly reproves *Aristippus*,^b that being near at *Agina* when *Socrates* died, he came not to him. He writ a Book of the Luxury of the Ancients. Some ascribe the amatory Epigrams to his Invention, his Design in that Treatise being to detract from eminent Persons; amongst the rest, from *Socrates* his Master, and *Plato* and *Xenophon* his Fellow-Disciples.

Æschines and *Plato* also disagreed. Some affirm, that when *Plato* was in Favour with *Dionysius*, *Æschines* came thither very poor, and was despised by *Plato*, but kindly entertain'd by *Aristippus*.^c But the Epistle of *Æschines*, put forth by *Allatius*, expresth the contrary. The Discourse which *Plato* relates, betwixt *Crito* and *Socrates* in Prison, *Idomeneus* faith, was betwixt *Socrates* and *Æschines*; by *Plato*, out of Ill will to *Æschines*, attributed to *Crito*. But of *Æschines* he makes not any mention in all his Works, except twice slightly; once in *Phædon*, where he names him amongst the Persons present at *Socrates* his Death; and again in his Apology, speaking of *Lyfanius*'s Father.

Phædo, if we credit the Detractions of *Athenæus*, was so much malign'd by *Plato*, as that he was about to frame an Indictment against him, to reduce him to that Condition of Servitude, out of which, by the Procurement of *Socrates*, he had been redeemed; but his Design being discovered, he gave it over. Besides his Disciples,

Diogenes the Cynick derided his Laws, and Assertion of Ideas. Concerning the fitt, he asked if he were writing Laws; *Plato* assented. *Have you not writt'n already a Commonwealth*, faith *Diogenes*? *Yes*, answered *Plato*. *Had that Commonwealth Laws*, faith *Diogenes*? *Plato* affirm'd it had. Then, replied *Diogenes*, *what need you write now?* Another Time, *Diogenes* saying, *He could see the Things of the World, but not Ideas*: *Plato* answer'd, *That is no Wonder; for you have and use those Eyes, which behold such Things; but the Blind, which only can see the other, you use not.*

Milon, in Detraction from him, said, *It was not strange Dionysius should be at Corinth, but that Plato should be at Sicily.*

From these private Differences arose many scandalous Imputations, *spread* and spread abroad by such as envied or maligned him; as, ^a That he profess'd one Thing, and practis'd another; That he loved indifferently *Men*, *Dion*, *Phædrus*, *Menis*, *Agasib*, and *Archimachus*, a Courtisan of *Gelpho*; That he was a Calumniator, envious, proud, a gluttonous Lover of Figgs; That he was the worst of Philosophers, a Parasite to Tyrants; and many other Accusations, alike improbable. From these the Comic Poets, and others, took Liberty to abuse him. ⁱ *Theopompus* in *Autochares*.

— for One is none,
And Two (as *Plato* holds) is hardly One.

Anaxandrides in *Theæo*;

When Olives be (as *Plato*) doth devour.

Timon.

As *Plato* seigns, in framing Wonders skill'd.

Alexis in *Meropide*,

Aply thou comest, I walking round could meet
(Like *Plato*) nothing wise; but tir'd my Feet.

And in *Achillione*.

Thou speak'st of Things thou understand'st not; go
To *Plato*, thence Nuts and Onions know.

Amph. in *Amphicrate*.

What Good from hence you may expect to rise,
I can no more than *Plato*'s Good comprise.

And in *Dexidemide*.

Plato, thou nothing know'st, but how
To look severe, and knit the Brow.

Cratylus in *Pseudobolymæo*.

A Man thou art, and hast a Soul, but this
With *Plato* not sure, but Opinion is.

Alexis in *Olympiodoro*.

My Body mortal is given dry,
My Soul turn'd Air, that cannot die;
Taught *Plato* this Philosophy?

And in *Parasito*.

Or thou with *Plato* must dine.

^b Laert. vit. Aristip. ^c In Ep. Socratic. ^d Athen. 11. ^e Laert. vit. Digr. ^f Laert. 3. 34. ^g Senc. de vit. bel.
^h Laert. 3. 31. ⁱ Athen. 11. ^k Treas. Chilian. 10. ^l Laert. 3. 26.

"*Epiphus* in *Naufragio* objects to *Plato*, and some Friends of his, *That, corrupted with Money, they detrached from many Persons; that they went proudly habited; and they took more Care of their outward Beauty, than the most luxurious.* See *Athenais*, Lib. 11.

C. H. A. P. XV.

His Writings.

THE Writings of *Plato* are by way of Dialogue. Of the Invention of Dialogue we have already spoken; now of the Nature thereof.

A Dialogue is composed of Questions and Answers, Philosophical or Political, aptly expressing the Characters of those Persons that are the Speakers in an elegant Style. Dialectick is the Art of Discourse, whereby we confirm or confute any Thing by Questions and Answers of the Disputants.

Of *Platonick* Discourse there are two Kinds, *Hyphegetick*, and *Exegetick*, subscribed thus;

<i>Hyphegetick</i> ,	{	<i>Theoretick</i> ,	{	<i>Logick</i> ,
		<i>Practick</i> ,	{	<i>Physick</i> ,
				<i>Ethick</i> ,
				<i>Politick</i> .

<i>Exegetick</i> ,	{	<i>Gymnastick</i> ,	{	<i>Majeustick</i> ,
		<i>Agonistick</i> ,	{	<i>Physick</i> ,
				<i>Endeistick</i> ,
				<i>Anatreptick</i> .

* We know there are other Divisions of Dialogues; as, into Dramatick Narrative mix'd. But that Division is more proper to Tragedy than to Philosophy.

Of *Plato's* Dialogues are

<i>Physick</i> ,	{	<i>Timæus</i> .
<i>Logick</i> ,	{	<i>The Politick</i> ,
		<i>Cratylus</i> ,
		<i>Parmenides</i> ,
		<i>The Sophist</i> .
<i>Ethick</i> ,	{	<i>Apology of Socrates</i> ,
		<i>Crito</i> ,
		<i>Phædo</i> ,
		<i>Phædrus</i> ,
		<i>Symposium</i> ,
		<i>Menexenus</i> ,
		<i>Clitophon</i> ,
		<i>Epistles</i> ,
		<i>Philebus</i> ,
		<i>Hipparchus</i> ,
<i>The Rivals</i> .		

<i>Politick</i> ,	{	<i>The Commonwealth</i> ,
		<i>The Laws</i> ,
		<i>Mines</i> ,
		<i>Epinomis</i> ,
		<i>The Atlantick</i> .

<i>Majeustick</i> ,	{	<i>Alcibiades</i> ,
		<i>Theages</i> ,
		<i>Lyfius</i> ,
		<i>Laches</i> .

<i>Pixastick</i> ,	{	<i>Euthyphron</i> ,
		<i>Menon</i> ,
		<i>Ion</i> ,
		<i>Charmides</i> ,
		<i>Theætetus</i> .

<i>Endeistick</i> ,	{	<i>Protagoras</i> .
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<i>Anatreptick</i> ,	{	<i>Euthydemus</i> ,
		<i>Hippias</i> 1.
		<i>Hippias</i> 2.
		<i>Gorgias</i> 1.
		<i>Gorgias</i> 2.

* It being much controverted (continueth *Laertius*) whether *Plato* doth dogmatize, some affirming; others denying it; it will be necessary to say something thereupon. *dogmatize*, to dogmatize, is to impose a Doctrine; as *repudiate*, to impose a Law; a Doctrine is taken two Ways, either for that which is decreed, or the Decree itself; that which is decreed is a Proposition, the Decree itself an Imposition. *Plato* expounds those Things which he conceiveth true; confutes those which are false; suspends his Opinion in those which are doubtful. He asserts what he conceiveth true under one of these four Persons; *Socrates*, *Timæus*, an Athenian Guest, an *Ælian* Guest. The Guests are not, as some conceive, *Plato* and *Parmenides*, but imagined nameless Persons; as what *Socrates*, *Timæus* speak, are the Decrees of *Plato*. Those whom he argueth of Falshood, are *Thrasymachus*, *Callicles*, *Polus*, *Gorgias*, *Protagoras*, *Hippias*, *Euthydemus*, and the like.

* In Argument he often used Induction of both Sorts. Induction is a Discourse, which from certain Truths collects, and inferreth a Truth like to those. Of Induction there are two Kinds; one from Contraries, another from Consequents: From Contraries, as when he who is questioned, answereth in all Things contrary to himself, as thus; *My Father is either the same with yours, or not the same; if therefore thy Father be not the same with mine, he is not my Father.* And again, *If a Man be not a living Creature, he is Stone, Wood, or the like; but he is neither Stone nor Wood; for he hath a Soul,*

and moveth himself, therefore he is a living Creature; if a living Creature, a Dog and an Ox. This Kind of Induction by Contraries, serves not for Assertion, but Confutation. Inductions by Consequents are two-fold; one, when a singular being sought, is concluded from a Singular, the first proper to Orators, the second to Logicians; as in the first, the Question is, Whether such an one were a Murderer, it is proved from his being bloody at the same Time. This Induction is rhetorical, for Rhetorick is conversant in Singulars, not in Universals; it enquireth not after Justice, but after the several Parts thereof. The other is Dialectick, whereby Universals are concluded from Singulars, as in this Question; Whether the Soul be immortal, and whether the Living are of the Dead?

which is demonstrated in his Book of the Soul, by a general Maxim, that Contraries proceed from Contraries; this being general, is proved by Singulars, as waking succeeds sleeping, the greater the lesser, and so on the contrary. Thus he useth to confirm what he asserts.

Thrasylus saith, he published his Dialogues according to the tragick Tetralogy. His genuine Dialogues are fifty six; his Commonwealth divided into ten, they make nine Tetralogies, reckoning his Commonwealth one Book, his Laws another. The first Tetralogy hath a common Subject, declaring what is the proper Life of a Philosopher. Every Book hath a two-fold Title; one from the principal Person, the other from the Subject.

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|--------------|---|--|
| The First, | { | <i>Euthypron</i> , or of Piety. <i>Pirastick</i> .
<i>Socrates</i> his Apology. <i>Ethick</i> .
<i>Crito</i> , or of that which is to be done. <i>Ethick</i> .
<i>Phædo</i> , or of the Soul. <i>Ethick</i> . |
| The Second, | { | <i>Cratylus</i> , or, of right naming. <i>Logick</i> .
<i>Theætetus</i> , or, of Science. <i>Pirastick</i> .
<i>The Sophist</i> , or, of Ens. <i>Logick</i> .
<i>The Politick</i> , or, of a Kingdom. <i>Logick</i> . |
| The Third, | { | <i>Parmenides</i> , or, of Ideas. <i>Logick</i> .
<i>Philebus</i> , or, of Pleasure. <i>Ethick</i> .
<i>The Symposium</i> , or, of Good. <i>Ethick</i> .
<i>Phædrus</i> , or, of Love. <i>Ethick</i> . |
| The Fourth, | { | <i>Alcibiades 1.</i> or of Human Nature. <i>Majeutick</i> .
<i>Alcibiades 2.</i> or, of Prayer. <i>Majeutick</i> .
<i>Hipparchus</i> , or, the Covetous. <i>Ethick</i> .
<i>The Rivals</i> , or, of Philosophy. <i>Ethick</i> . |
| The Fifth, | { | <i>Theages</i> , or, of Philosophy. <i>Majeutick</i> .
<i>Charmides</i> , or, of Temperance. <i>Pirastick</i> .
<i>Laches</i> , or, of Fortitude. <i>Majeutick</i> .
<i>Lysis</i> , or, of Friendship. <i>Majeutick</i> . |
| The Sixth, | { | <i>Euthydemus</i> , or, the Litigious. <i>Anatreptick</i> .
<i>Protagoras</i> , or, the Sophist. <i>Endeictick</i> .
<i>Gorgias</i> , or, of Rhetorick. <i>Anatreptick</i> .
<i>Menon</i> , or, of Virtue. <i>Pirastick</i> . |
| The Seventh, | { | <i>Hippias 1.</i> or, of Honest. <i>Anatreptick</i> .
<i>Hippias 2.</i> or, of False. <i>Anatreptick</i> .
<i>Io</i> , or, of Illias. <i>Pirastick</i> .
<i>Menexenus</i> , or, the Funeral Oration. <i>Ethick</i> . |
| The Eighth, | { | <i>Clitophon</i> , or, the Exhortation. <i>Moral</i> .
<i>The Commonwealth</i> , or, of Just. <i>Politick</i> .
<i>Timæus</i> , or, of Nature. <i>Physick</i> .
<i>Critias</i> , or, the Atlantick. <i>Ethick</i> . |

The Ninth,

Alcibiades, or, of Law. *Politick*.*Lysis*, or, of Legislation. *Politick*.*Epinomis*, or, the Nocturnal Convention; or, the Philosophers. *Politick*.*Epistles* thirteen, *Etbick*; in the Inscriptions whereof he useth *ἑπτὰ*. *Clean. χαλκοι*.To *Aristodemus* one; to *Architas* two; to *Dionysius* four; to *Hermias*, *Erasmus*, and *Coriscus* one; to *Leodamus* one; to *Dion* one; to *Dion's* Friends two. Thus *Tbrassyllus*.Others, of whom is *Aristophanes* the Grammarian, reduce his Dialogues to Trilogies, placing inThe First, { *The Common-wealth*.
Timæus.
Critias.The Second, { *The Sophist*.
The Politick.
Cratylus.The Third, { *Lysis*.
Minos.
Epinomis.The Fourth, { *Theætetus*.
Euthyphron.
Apology.The Fifth, { *Crito*.
Phædo.
Epistles. The rest single, without Order.

Some, as we said, begin with *Alcibiades Major*, others from *Theages*, others from *Euthyphron*, others from *Clitippon*, others from *Timæus*, others from *Phædrus* (which they say was the first Dialogue he wrote, as the Subject itself seemeth to confirm, which favours of Youth; and therefore *Dicæarchus* condemns it as too light. To which Censure *Cicero* agreeth, as conceiving he ascribed too great a Power to Love), others begin with *Theætetus*, many with his *Apology*.

He mentions not himself in all his Writings, except once in his *Phædo*, and another Time in his *Apology* for *Socrates*. At the Recital of his *Phædo*, all but *Aristotle* rose, and went away. The Efficacy of that Dialogue which treats of the Immortality of the Soul, is evident from *Cleombrotus* of *Ambracia*, who, as soon as he had read it, was so disaffected to Life, that he threw himself from a high Wall into the Sea; upon whom thus *Callimachus*;

*Cleombrotus cries out, Farewell this Light;
And headlong throws himself int' endless Night.
Not that he sought had done, descending Death;
But Plato read, and weary grew of Breath.*

The Dialogues generally noted as spurious (not to say any thing of his *Epinomis*, tho' some ascribe it to *Philippus* the Opuntian) are these,

Midon, or the Horse-courser,
Erixias, or *Erasistratus*,
Alcyon.

Acephali, or the *Sisyphi*.*Axiachus*.*Phæaces*.*Demodochus*.*Chelidon*.*The seventh*.*Epimenides*.

Of these *Alcyon* is ascribed by *Phavorinus* to *Leon*. His Style, *Aristotle* saith, is betwixt Prose and Verse. He useth Variety of Names, that his Works may not easily be understood by the Unlearned. He conceiveth Wisdom properly to be of Intellectual Things, Knowledge of real Beings conversant about God, and the Soul separate from the Body. Properly, he calleth *Philosophy* Wisdom, being the Appetition of Divine Knowledge; but, commonly, he calleth all Skill Knowledge, as an Artificer, a wife Man. He likewise used the same Names in divers Significations; *φῶλα*, which properly signifies Evil, he useth for of simple; as *Euripides* in his *Lycimnius* of *Hercules*,

φῶλον ἀκούει τὰ μέγιστα ἄγανθον.

s Cicero. Tusc. quest. 2. s Epigr.

The same Words *Plato* sometimes takes for *Honesty*, sometimes for *Little*. He likewise useth divers Names to signify the same Thing. *Idea* he useth both for Species and Genus; Exemplar, both Principle and Cause. Sometimes he useth contrary Expressions to signify the same Thing. Sensible he calleth a Being and no Being; a Being, as having been produced; no Being, in respect of its continual Mutation. *Idea* neither moveable nor permanent, the same both one and many. The like he useth often in other Things.

The Method of his Discourse is three-fold; first, to declare what that is which is taught; then for what Reason it is asserted, whether as a principal Cause, or as a Comparison; and whether to defend the Tenent, or oppose the contrary. Thirdly, whether it be rightly said.

The Marks which he usually affixed to his Writings, are these.

Denotes *Platonick* Words and Figures.

ἡ ἀλήθεια, Doctrines and Opinions proper to *Plato*.

εὐκταίωμα, choice Expressions.

ἐκκαὶ ἀποκαταστάσεις, Corrections.

ἀβυσσὸς περιεργασίας, Things superfluous.

ἀντιρροπία περιεργασίας, Double Signification or Use.

ἀκατάστατον, Philosophical Institution.

ἀρετή, Agreement of Opinions.

ἡ ἀβυσσὸς, Improbation. Hitherto *Laetius*.

There are two Epistles under *Plato's* Name, besides those in his Works already mentioned, one in *Laetius* his Life of *Architas*.

Plato to *Architas*. ἡ ἐπιστολή.

THE Commentaries which came from you, we received with extraordinary Content, infinitely admiring the Writer, who appears to us a Person worthy of those ancient Predecessors; for those Men are said to be *Myraens* of those *Trojans* which were banished in the Time of *Laomedon*; good Men, as Tradition speaks them. Those Commentaries of mine, concerning which you write, are not yet polished; however, as they are, I have sent them to you. In the keeping of them we agree both, so as I need not give you any Directions. Farewell.

Another published by *Leo Allatius*, amongst the *Socratic* Epistles.

^t Laet. 3. 65. ^u Laet. 8. 81. ^w Laet. 3. 5. ^x *Ellian*, Var. Hist. 2. 30. ^y In vita *Solon*. ^z Laet. 3. 29. *Antisthenes*.

^a Laet. ibid.

^w Laet. 3. 5.

^x *Ellian*, Var. Hist. 2. 30.

^y In vita *Solon*.

^z Laet. 3. 29. *Antisthenes*.

I Had not any of those Things to send to *Syracuse*, which *Architas* desired to receive by you; as soon as possible I will send to you. Philosophy hath wrought in me, I know not whether good or bad, a Hatred of conversing with many Persons; justly, I think, since they are in all kind of Folly, as well in private as publick Affairs; but if unjustly, yet known I can hardly live and breathe otherwise. For this Reason I have fled out of the City, as out of a Den of Wild Beasts, living not far from the *Ephesiades*, and the Places thereabouts. I now see, that *Timon* hated not Men; he could not affect Beasts, therefore he lived alone by himself; perhaps, not without Danger. Take this as you please; my Resolution is to live far from the City, now and for ever hereafter, as long as God shall grant me Life.

^v In Poetry he writ,

^x *Dithyrambs*.

An *Epic* Poem.

Four Tragedies, all which (as we said) he burnt.

^y The *Atlantick* Story, of which thus *Plutarch*: *Solon* began the *Atlantick* Story (which he had learnt of the Priests of *Sais*, very proper for the Athenians) but gave it over by Reason of his old Age and the largeness of the Work. *Plato* took the same Argument, as a waste Piece of fertile Ground fallen to him by hereditary Right: He manured it, refined it, enclashed it with large Walls, Porches and Galleries, such as never any Fable or Poem had before; but because he undertook it late, he was prevented by Death. The more Things written delight us, the more their not being perfected is a Loss to us. For as the Athenian City left the Temple of *Jupiter*, so *Plato's* Wisdom, amongst many excellent Writings, left the *Atlantick* alone imperfect.

Epigrams, of which these are extant in *Laetius*, *Athenæus*, *Aulus Gellius*, and the Anthology.

Upon one named *Aster*.

^v The Stars, my Star, thou viewest; Heaven I would be,
That I with thousand Eyes might gaze on thee.

Upon his Death.

^v A Phosphor 'mongst the Living, late wert thou,
But shin'st among the Dead a Hesper now.

Epitaph on *Diem*, engrav'd on his Tomb at *Syracuse*.

*Old Hecuba the Trojan Matron's Years
Were interwoven by the Fates with Tears;
But thee with blooming Hopes my Dion deck'd,
Gads did a Trophy of their Power crest.
Thy honour'd Reliques in their Country rest,
Ah Dion! whose Love rages in my Breast.*

On Alexis.

*Fair is Alexis, I no sooner said,
When every one his Eyes that Way convey'd:
My Soul (as when some Dog a Bone we show,
Who snatcheth it) left me no Phædrus fo?*

On Archæanassa.

*To Archæanassa, on whose furrow'd Brow
Love sits in Triumph, I my Service vow;
If her declining Graces shine so bright,
What Flames felt you who saw her Noon of Light?*

On Agathon.

*My Soul, when I kiss'd Agathon, did start
Up to my Lip, just ready to depart.*

To Xantippe.

*An Apple I (Love's Emblem) at thee throw,
Thou in Exchange thy Virgin-zone bestow.
If thou refuse my Suit, yet read in this,
How short thy Years, how frail thy Beauty is.
I cast the Apple, loving those love thee,
Xantippe yield, for soon both old will be.*

On the Eretrians vanquish'd by the Persians.

*We in Eubœa, born Eretrians are
Buried in Susa from our Country far.*

Venus and the Muses.

*Virgins (said Venus to the Muses) pay
Homage to us, or Love shall wound your Hearts:
The Muses answer'd, take these Toys away,
Our Breasts are Proof against his childish Darts.*

Fortune exchanging'd.

*One finding Gold, in Change, the Halter quits,
Missing his Gold, t'other the Halter knits.*

On Sappho.

*He, who believes the Muses nine, mistakes,
For Lesbian Sappho ten their Number makes.*

Time.

*Time all Things brings to pass, a Change creates
In Names, in Forms, in Nations and in States.*

Death.

*That is a Ploughman's Grave, a Sailor's this;
To Sea and Land alike Death common is.*

On one ship-wreck'd.

*The cruel Sea, which took my Life away,
Forbore to strip me of my last Array:
From this a covetous Man did not refrain,
Alting a Crime so great for so small Gain;
But let him wear it to the Shades, and there
Before great Pluto in my Cloaths appear.*

Another.

*Safely (O Sailors) press the Land, and Wave
Yet know, ye pass'd a ship wreck'd Person's Grave.*

On the Statue of Venus.

*Paphian Cythera swimming cross the Main,
To Gnidus came her Statue there to see;
And from on high, surveying round the Plain
Where could Praxiteles mope? (saith she)
He saw not what's forbidden mortal Eyes,
'Twas Mars's Steel that Venus did incize.*

Another.

*Not carv'd by Steel, or Praxiteles's sam'd Hand:
Thus naked before the Judges didst thou stand.*

Love sleeping.

*Within the covert of a shady Grove
We saw the little red-cheek'd God of Love.
He had not Bow nor Quiver, those among
The neighbouring Trees upon a Bough were hung:
Upon a Bank of tender Rys-buds laid
He (smiling) slept; Bees with their Noise invade
His Rest, and on his Lips their Honey made.*

Pan piping.

*Dreell awful Silence on the shady Hills,
Among the bleating Flocks and purling Rills,
When Pan the Reed doth to his Lip apply,
Inspiring it with sacred Harmony,
Hydriads and Hamadryads at that Sound,
In a well order'd Measure beat the Ground.*

b Leart. ibid. Anthol. 4. 33. 26. c Ibid. 3. 33. 44. d Leart. 3. 30. e Ibid. f Ibid. g Anthol. 7. h Herod.
ib. 6. i Leart. 3. 30. h Leart. ibid. j Leart. ibid. Anthol. 24. 1. m Anth. 2. 67. 13. n Anth. 1. 30. o Anth.
3. 23. 3. p Ibid. 3. 22. 4. q Ibid. 3. 23. 7. r Ibid. 4. 12. 8. s Ibid. 4. 12. 9. t Ibid. 4. 12. 56. u Ib. 4. 12. 76.

On the Image of a Satyr in a Fountain, and Love
sleeping.

* *A skilful Hand this Satyr made so near
To Life, that only Breath is wanting here :
I am Attendant to the Nymphs ; before
I fill'd out purple Wine, now Water pour ;
Whoe'er thou art com'st nigh, tread softly, lest
You waken Love out of his pleasing rest.*

Another.

* *On horned Lyæus I attend,
And pour the Streams these Nymphs lend,
Whose Noise Love's Slumber doth befriend.*

v Anth. 4. 12. 92.

x Ibid. 4. 12. 93.

y Ibid. 4. 12. 98.

z Ibid. 4. 13. 6.

Another.

* *This Satyr Diodorus did not make,
But charm asleep ; if prick'd he will awake.*

On a Seal.

* *Five Oxen grazing in a flowry Mead,
A Jasper Seal done to the Life doth hold,
The little Herd away long since had fled,
Wer't not inclin'd within a Pale of Gold.*

T H E D O C T R I N E O F

P L A T O ;

Delivered by

A L C I N O U S.

C H A P. I.

Of Philosophy, and how a Philosopher must be qualified.

SUCH a Summary as this may be given of the Doctrine of Plato. *Philosophy* is the Desire of Wisdom, or Solution of the Soul from the Body, and a Conversion to those Things, which are true and perceptible by Intellect. *Wisdom*, σοφία, is the Science of Things divine and human. A *Philosopher* is he who takes Denomination from Philosophy, as a Musician from Musick. He who is to be a Philosopher, must be thus qualified : First, He must have a natural Capacity of all such Learning as is able to fit and bring him to the Knowledge of that Essence which is perceptible by Intellect, not of that which is in continual Fluxion or Mutation. Then he must have a natural Affection to Truth, and an Aversion from receiving Falshood ; and besides this, temperate in a manner by Nature ;

for those Parts which use to be transported with Passions, he must have reduced to Obedience by Nature. For whosoever hath once embraced those Disciplines which are conversant in Consideration of such Things as truly exist, and hath addicted all his Study thereunto, little valueth corporeal Pleasure. Moreover, a Philosopher must have a liberal Mind, for the Estimation of mean Things is contrary to a Man who intendeth to contemplate the Truth of Things. Likewise, he must naturally love Justice, for he must be studious of Truth, Temperance and Liberality. He must also have an acute Apprehension, and a good Memory, for these inform a Philosopher ; those Gifts of Nature, if improved by Discipline and Education, make a Man perfect in Virtue, but neglected are the Cause of the worst

work like. *These* Plato used to call by the same Names with the *Virtues, Temperance, Fortitude and Justice.*

CHAP. II.

That Contemplation is to be preferred before Action.

WHEREAS Life is twofold, *Contemplative and Active*, the chief Office of the Contemplative consisteth in the Knowledge of Truth, as of the Active, in the Practice of those Things which are dictated by Reason. Hence the Contemplative Life is first, after which as necessary followeth the Active. That it is so, may easily be proved thus. Contemplation is an Office of the Intellect, in the understanding of Intelligibles. Action is an Operation of the rational Soul, performed by Mediation and Service of the Body. For the Soul, when it contemplateth the Divinity and the Notions thereof, is said to be best affected. This Affection is called *wisdom*, which is nothing else but an Assimilation to the Deity. This therefore ought to be esteemed the first and principal, as being most expetible and proper to Man; for there are no Impediments that can hinder it from being within our Power, and it is Cause of our proposed End. But active Life, and the Practice thereof, chiefly making Use of the Mediation of the Body, are many Times obstructed; whereof those Things which the contemplative Life considers in order to the Reformation of the Manners of Men, a Philosopher, as often as Necessity requireth, shall transfer to Action. Then shall a good Man apply himself to the Administration of civil Affairs, when he seeth them ill managed by others. He must look upon the Leading of an Army, Administration of Justice and Embassies, as Things necessary. The Institution of Laws, ordering the Common-wealth, the Compressure of Seditions, Education of Youth in Discipline, are the chiefest, and, amongst those Things which relate to Action, of greatest Consequence. Hence it is manifest, that a Philosopher must not only be perseverant in Contemplation, but also cherish and increase it, sometimes giving himself to Action as an Attendant upon Contemplation.

CHAP. III.

The three Parts of Philosophy.

THE Study of a Philosopher seemeth, according to Plato, to be conversant chiefly in three Things, in the *Contemplation* and Knowledge of Things, in the Practice of Virtue, and in *Disputation*. The Science of Things that are, is called *Theoretick*; of those which pertain to Action, *Practical*; the disputative Part *Dialectick*.

Dialectick is divided into *Division, Definition, Induction and Syllogism*; *Syllogism* into the *Apodictick*, which concerneth necessary Ratiocination;

and *Rhetorical*, which concerneth *Enthymeme*, called an imperfect Ratiocination; and lastly into *Sophisms*. This the Philosopher must look upon, not as the chiefest but a necessary Part.

Of *Practical* Philosophy, one Part is conversant about *Manners*, another orders *Families*, the last takes Care of a *Common-wealth*. The first called *Ethick*, the second *Oeconomick*, the third *Politick*.

Of *Theoretick* Philosophy, one Part enquires into Things immutable and divine, and the first Causes of Things; this is called *Theology*; another the Motion of the Stars, the Revolution and Restitution of Coelestial Bodies, and the Constitution of the World. This is called *Physick*. That whereby we enquire geometrically, and those other Disciplines which are called *mathematica*, is termed *Mathematick*.

Philosophy being thus divided, we must first, according to Plato, speak of the *Dialectick* Part, and in that, first of the *Judiciary*.

CHAP. IV.

DIALECTICK.

Of the Judiciary Part.

WHEREAS there is something that judgeth, something which is judged, it is necessary also that there be something which is made of both these, properly called *Judgment*. This Judgment may not unfitly be termed *Judiciary*, but more commonly that which judgeth. This is twofold; one, *from which*, another *by which* Judgment is made. That is Intellect; this the natural Organ accommodated for Judgment; primarily of *true* Things; secondarily of *false*; neither is it any Thing but natural Reason. To explain this more fully, of Things which are, a Philosopher who judgeth the Things themselves, may be called a *Judge*; Reason likewise is a *Judge*, by which Truth is judged, which even now we called an Organ.

Reason is twofold, one *incomprehensible* and true; the other is *never deceived* in the Knowledge of those Things which are. The first is in the Power of God, not of Man; the second in that of Man also. This likewise is twofold, the first *Science*, and Scientifick Reason; the second *Opinion*. The first hath *Certainty* and *Stability*, as being conversant in Things certain and stable. The second *Similitude of Truth* and *Opinion*, as being conversant in Things subject to Mutation. Of Science in Intelligibles, and Opinion in Sensibles, the Principles are *Intellection* and *Sense*.

Sense is a Passion of the Soul by the Mediation of the Body, first, declaring a passive Faculty; when through the Organs of Sense, the Species of Things are impressed in the Soul, so as they are not defaced by Time, but remain firm and lasting, the Conservation thereof is called *Memory*.

Opinion is the Conjunction of Memory and Sense;

Sense; for, when some Object occurth, which can first move the Sense, thereby Sense is effected in us, and by Sense, the Memory. Then again is the same Thing objected to our Sense, we join the precedent with the consequent Sense, and now say within ourselves, *Socrates*, a Horse, Fire, and the like: This is termed Opinion, when we join the precedent Memory with the late Sense; when these agree within themselves, it is a *true Opinion*, if they disagree, a *false*; for, if a Man, having the Species of *Socrates* in his Memory, meet with *Plato*, and think, by Reason of some Likeness betwixt them, he hath met *Socrates* again, and afterwards join the Sense of *Plato*, which he took, as it were, from *Socrates*, with the Memory which he preserved of *Socrates*, there will arise a false Opinion.

That wherein Sense and Memory are formed, *Plato* compareth to a *Tablet of Wax*, but when the Soul by Cogitation reforming these Things, which are conceived in Opinion by Memory and Sense, locketh upon these as Things from which the other are derived; *Plato* sometimes calleth this a *Picture and Phantasy*. Cogitation, he calleth the *Soul's Discourse within herself*. Speech, that which floweth from the Cogitation through the Mouth by Voice. *Intellection* is an Operation of the Intellect, contemplating first Intelligibles. It is two-fold, one of the Soul, beholding Intelligibles before she cometh into the Body; the other of the same, after she is immers'd in the Body: The first is properly called *Intellection*; the other, whilst she is in the Body, is termed *Natural Knowledge*, which is nothing but an Intellection of the Soul confined to the Body. When we say, Intellection is the Principle of Science, we mean not this latter, but the other, which is competent to the Soul in her separate State, and as we said, is then called Intellection, now natural Knowledge. The same *Plato* termeth *simple Knowledge the Wing of the Soul*; sometimes *Reminiscence*.

Of these simple Sciences consisteth *Reason*; which is born with us, the efficient of natural Science; and as Reason is two-fold, Scientifick, and Opinionative, so Intellection and Sense. It is likewise necessary that they have their Objects, which are *Intelligibles and Sensibles*: And for as much as of *Intelligibles*, some are *Primary*, as Ideas, others *secondary*, as the Species that are in Matter, and cannot be separated from it. *Intellection* likewise must be two-fold, one of *Primaries*, the other of *Secondaries*. Again, for as much as in *Sensibles*, some are *primary*, as Qualities, Colour, Whiteness, others by *Accident*, as white coloured, and that which is concrete, as Fire: In the same Manner is *Sense*, first of *Primaries*, second of *Secondaries*. Intellection judgeth primary Intelligibles, not without scientifick Knowledge, by a certain Comprehension without Discourse. Secondaries the same scientifick Reason judgeth, but not without Intellection.

Sensibles, as well primary as secondary Sense, judgeth, but not without opinionative Reason. That which is concrete, the same Reason judgeth, but not without Sense. And since the intelligible World is the primary Intelligible, the sensible something concrete, the first Intellection judgeth with Reason; that is, not without Reason; the other opinionative Reason not without Sense, whereas there is both Contemplation and Action; right Reason discerneth not in the same Manner those which are subject to Contemplation, and those which are subject to Action: In Contemplation, it considereth what is true, what false; in Things that belong to Action, what is proper, what improper, what that is which is done. For having an innate Knowledge of that which is good and honest, by using Reason, and applying it to those natural Notions, as to certain Rules, we judge whether every Thing be good or bad.

CH A P. V.

The Elements and Office of Dialectick.

OF Dialectick, the first and chiefest Element, according to *Plato*, is, first to consider the *Essence* of every Thing; next the *Accidents* thereof. What a Thing is, it considers, either from its Superiors, by *Division* and *Definition*, or contrarywise by *Analysis*. *Accidents* which adhere to Substances, are considered, either from those Things which are contained by *Induction*, or from those which do contain by *Syllogism*.

Hence the Parts of *Dialectick* are these, *Division, Definition, Analysis, Induction, Syllogism*.

Of *Divisions*, one is a Distribution of the Genus into Species, and of the whole into Parts; as when we divide the Soul into the rational Part and the irrational; and the latter, into the concupiscible and the irascible. Another is of a Word into divers Significations, when the same may be taken several Ways. A third of Accidents, according to their Subjects; as when we say of Good, some belong to the Soul, some to the Body, some are external. The fourth of Subjects, according to their Accidents; as of Men, some are good, some ill, some indifferent. Division of the Genus into its Species, is first to be used, when we examine the *Essence* of a Thing, this cannot be done but by Definitions.

Definition is made by Division in this Manner, we must take the Genus of the Thing to be defined, as that of Man, living Creature; that we must divide by the next Differences, descending to its Species, as rational and irrational, mortal and immortal. Thus, by adding the first Difference to the Genus, is made the Definition of Man.

Of *Analysis* there are three Kinds, one by which we ascend from Sensibles to primary Intelligibles; another, whereby we ascend by *Demonstrates* and *Subdemonstrates*, to indemonstrable immediate Propositions.

positions. The last, which from Supposition proceedeth to those Principles which are taken without Supposition.

The first Kind is thus; as if from that Beauty which is in the Body, we should proceed to that of the Mind, from that to another conversant in the Offices of Life, thence to that of Laws, and so at last to the vast Ocean of Beauty, that by these Steps, as it were, we may arrive at the Sight of the supreme Beauty.

The second Kind of *Analysis* is thus; we must suppose that which we seek, and consider those which are precedent, demonstrating them by Progression, from Inferiors to Superiors, until we arrive at that which is first and generally granted. From which, beginning anew, we return synthetically to that which was sought. As for Example, I enquire whether the Soul be immortal, and supposing it to be so, I enquire whether it be always moved. This being demonstrated, I again enquire, whether that which is always moved, is moved by itself, which being again demonstrated, we examine, whether that which is moved by itself, be the Principle of Motion. Lastly, whether a Principle is ingenerate; this, as most certain, is admitted by all. That which is ingenerate, is also incorruptible; whence, as from a Thing most certain, we collect this Demonstration. If a Principle be ingenerate and incorruptible, that which is moved by itself, is the Principle of Motion; but the Soul is moved by itself, therefore the Soul is incorruptible, ingenerate and immortal.

The third Kind of *Analysis* upon Supposition, is this; he who enquireth after a Thing, first supposeth that Thing, then observes what will follow upon that Supposition. If a Reason for the Supposition be required, assuming another Supposition, he enquireth, whether that which was first supposed, follow again upon another Supposition: This he always observeth, until he come at last to that Principle, which is not taken upon Supposition.

Induction is every Method by Reason, which proceedeth either from like to like, or from Singulars to Universals: It is of great Efficacy to excite natural Notions.

CHAP. VI.

Of Propositions and Argumentations.

OF that Speech which we call *Proposition*, there are two Kinds; *Affirmation* and *Negation*; *Affirmation*, as *Socrates* walketh; *Negation*, as *Socrates* walketh not.

Of affirmative and negative Propositions, some are universal, others particular; a particular *Affirmative* is thus, Some Pleasure is good; a particular *Negative* is, Some Pleasure is not good; an universal *Affirmative*, All dishonest Things are ill; an universal *Negative*, No dishonest Thing is good.

Of Propositions, some are *Categorical*, some *Hypothetical*; the *Categorical* are simple, as every just Thing is good; *Hypothetical* import Consequence or Repugnance.

Syllogisms are used by *Plato*, either to confute or demonstrate; to confute what is false by Interrogation, to demonstrate what is true by Declaration. *Syllogism* is a Speech, wherein some Things being laid down, another Thing besides those which are laid down, is necessarily inferred from them.

Of *Syllogisms*, some are *Categorical*, some *Hypothetical*, some *mix'd*: *Categorical* are those whose Sumptions and Conclusions are simple Propositions. *Hypothetical* are those which consist of *Hypothetical* Propositions; *Mix'd*, which conclude both.

Plato useth *demonstrative* Arguments in those Dialogues, wherein he explaineth his own Doctrine; *probable*, against Sophists and young Men; *litigious* against those who are properly called *Eristicks*, as *Euthydemus* and *Hippias*.

Of *Categorical Syllogisms* there are three *Figures*; the first is, that wherein the common Extreme is first the Predicate, then the Subject. The second, when the common Extreme is predicate in both; the third wherein the common Extreme is subject in both. *Extremes* are the Parts of a Proposition, as in this, a *Man* is a living Creature, *Man* and *living Creatures* are the Extremes. *Plato* often argueth in the first, second, and third *Figures*; in the first, as in *Alcibiades*;

Just Things are honest,
Honest Things are good,
Therefore *just Things* are good.

In the second, as in *Parmenides* as,

That which hath no Parts is neither straight nor crooked,
But whatsoever hath Figure is either straight or crooked,
Therefore, whatsoever hath not Parts, hath not Figure.

In the third thus, in the same Book,

Whatsoever hath Figure is qualitative,
Whatsoever hath Figure is finite,
Therefore, whatsoever is qualitative is finite.

Likewise by *Hypothetical Syllogism*, *Plato* often disputeth, chiefly in *Parmenide* thus:

If one hath not Parts, it hath neither Beginning, End nor Middle.
But if it have neither Beginning, End, nor Middle, it hath no Bound, and if no Bound, no Figure,
Therefore, if one hath no Parts, it hath no Figure.

In

In the second Hypothetical Figure, ordinarily called the third, wherein the common Extreme is subject in both, he argueth thus :

*If one hath not Parts, it is neither straight nor crooked,
If it hath a Figure, it is either straight or crooked,
Therefore, if it hath no Parts, it hath no Figure.*

In the third Figure, by some called the second, wherein the common Extreme twice precedes the other two, he thus argues, in *Phædon*,

If having the Knowledge of Equality we forget it not, we know, but if we forget it, we have Recourse to Remembrance, &c.

Mind's Sollogisms, which conclude by Consequence, he useth thus ;

*If one is whole and finite, that is, having Beginning, Middle and End, it hath Figure also ;
But the Antecedent is true,
Therefore the Consequent.*

Of those also which overthrow by Consequence, the Differences may be gathered out of *Plato*.

Thus, when a Man hath diligently understood the Faculties of the Mind, the various Differences of Men, the several Kinds of Reasoning which may be accommodated to this or to that, and to what Persons such and such Reasons are to be used, he, meeting with an Opportunity suiting with his Purpose, will become a perfect Orator.

The Reasons of *Sophisms* and captious Arguments are, if we observe narrowly, expressed by *Plato* in *Euthydemus* ; for there is declared which are in Words, which in Things, and how they are to be solved.

The ten *Prædicaments* are touched by *Plato* in *Parmenides*, and in his other Dialogues ; the Place of Etymologies is fully set down in *Cratylus*. To conclude, he was singularly admirable for Division and Definition, wherein the greatest Force of Dialectick consisteth.

The Sum of that which he saith in *Cratylus*, is this. He enquireth whether Names are by the Power and Reason of Nature, or by Imposition. He concludeth, that the Rectitude of Names is by a certain Imposition, not temerarious, or casual, but seemingly to follow the Nature of the Things themselves ; for Rectitude of Names is nothing but an Imposition consonant to the Nature of the Thing. Hence every Imposition of Names is not sufficient for Rectitude ; neither the Nature nor first Sound of the Voice, but that which is composed of both ; so as every Name is conveniently and properly applied to the Thing. For any Name applied to any Thing will not signify rightly ; as if we should im-

pose the Name of Horse upon Man. To speak is a kind of Action : Not he that speaketh any way speaketh rightly, but he who speaketh so the Nature of the Thing requireth. And so far as Expression of Names is a Part of Speaking, as Noun is a Part of Speech, to name rightly, or not rightly, cannot be done by any Imposition of Names, but by a natural Affinity of the Name with the Thing itself. So that he is a right Imposer of Names who can express the Nature of the Things in their Names ; for a Name is an Instrument of the Thing ; not every inconsiderate Name, but that which agreeth with its Nature. By this Benefit we communicate Things to one another ; whence it followeth, that it is nothing else but an Instrument accommodated to the teaching and discerning of a Thing, as a Weaver's Shuttle to his Web. It belongeth therefore to a Dialectick to use Names aright ; for, as a Weaver useth a Shuttle rightly, knowing the proper Use thereof, after it hath been made by the Carpenter ; so the Dialectick rightly useth that Name which another hath made. And as to make a Helm, is the Office of a Ship-wright, but to use it rightly, of a Pilot ; so he who frameth Names, shall impose them rightly, if he do it as if a Dialectick were present, who understandeth the Nature of those Things which are signified by the Names. Thus much for Dialectick.

CHAP. VII.

Of Theoretick Philosophy.

WE come next to *Theoretick Philosophy*, whereof one Part is *Theologic*, another *Physick*, a third *Metaphysick*. The End of *Theology* is the Knowledge of primary Causes. Of *Physick*, to understand the Nature of the Universe, what kind of Creature Man is, what Place he holdeth in the World, whether there be a Divine Providence over all Things, to which there are other Gods subordinate ; how Men are in respect of them. The End of *Mathematicks* is, to know the Nature of a Superficies and a Solid ; and to consider the Motion and Revolution of Celestial Bodies ; the Contemplation whereof must first be proposed in brief. Thus *Plato* used to confirm the Acuteness of the Mind ; for it sharpeneth the Understanding, and rendereth it more ready towards the Contemplation of Divine Things. That which considereth Numbers, being likewise a Part of Mathematicks, conferreth not a little to the understanding of Things that are ; it frees us from the Error and Ignorance which attend sensible Things, and conduceth to the right Knowledge of the Essence of Things. It likewise renders a Man expert in Military Affairs, especially towards the ordering of an Army by the Science of *Tactics*. *Geometry* also conferreth much towards the understanding of Good itself, if a Man pursue it not only for mechanical Dimensions, but that he may, by the

Help thereof, ascend to Things which are not; busying himself about those which are in continual Generation and Motion. *Stereometry*, likewise, is exceeding useful; for, after the second Accretion, followeth this Contemplation, which holdeth the third Room. *Astronomy* also is useful, as a fourth Discipline, whereby we consider the Motions of the Heavens and the Stars, and the Author of Night and Day, Months and Years. Thus, by a familiar kind of Way, finding out him who made all these; and by these Disciplines, as from certain Rudiments or Elements, proceeding to Things more sublime. Likewise *Musick* is to be learnt, which relateth to hearing; for, as the Eyes are created for Astronomy, so are the Ears for Harmony. And as when we apply ourselves to Astronomy, we are led from visible Things, to the divine invisible Essence; so when we receive the Harmony of Voice in at our Ears, from audible Things, we ascend by Degrees to those which are perceived by Intellect. Unless we pursue Mathematical Disciplines to this End, the Contemplation thereof will be imperfect, unprofitable, and of no Value. We must therefore presently proceed from those Things which are perceived by the Eyes and Ears, to those which Reason only discerneth; for Mathematick is only a Preface to divine Things. They who addist themselves to Arithmetick and Geometry, desire to arrive at the Knowledge of that which is; which Knowledge they obtain no otherwise than as by a Dream, but really they cannot attain it, because they know not the Principles themselves, nor those Things which are compounded of the Principles. Nevertheless, they conduce to those Things which we mentioned; wherefore *Plate* will not have such Disciplines to be called Sciences. Dialectick Method proceeds in such Manner, that by Geometrical Hypotheses, it ascendeth to first Principles, which are not taken upon Hypothesis. For this Reason he calleth *Dialect* a Science; but neither Mathematick, nor Opinion, because it is more perspicuous than sensible Things; nor a Science, because 'tis more obscure than first Intelligibles. But the Opinion of Bodies, the Science of Primaries, the Contemplation of Mathematicks.

He likewise asserteth *Faith* and *Imagination*. *Faith*, of Things subject to Sense; *Imagination* of Images and Species.

Because *Dialectick* is more efficacious than Mathematick, as being conversant about Divine Eternal Things, therefore it is put before all Mathematicks, as a Wall and Fortification of the rest.

CHAP. VIII.

Of First Matter.

WE must next give a brief Account of *Principles*, and those Things which belong to *Theology*, beginning at the first, and from thence descending

to the Creation of the World, and Contemplation thereof, whereby, at last, we come to the Creation and Nature of Man.

To begin with *Matter*; this he calleth the *Receptacle*, *Nurse*, *Mother*, *Place*, and *Subject* of all Images; affirming that it is touched without Sense, and comprehended by an adulterate Kind of Reason. The Property thereof is to undergo the Generation of all Things, and to cherish them like a Nurse, and to admit all Forms; being of her own Nature expert of all Form, Quality, and Species. These Things are imprinted and form'd in her as in a Table, and she admitteth their Figures, not having of herself any Figure or Quality. For, she could not be fit to receive the Impressions of several Forms, unless she were wholly void of all Quality, and of those Forms which she is about to receive. They who make sweet Unguents of Oil, make Choice of that Oil which hath the least Scent; they who would imprint any Figures in Wax, first smooth and polish the Matter, defacing all former Figures. It is requisite that Matter, capable of all Things, if it must receive all Forms, must not have the Nature of any one of them, but must be subjected to all Forms, without any Quality or Figure; and being such, it is neither a Body, nor incorporeal, but a Body potentially; as Brass is potentially a Statue, because then it becomes a Statue, when it puts on the Form thereof.

CHAP. IX.

Of Ideas.

WHEREAS Matter is a Principle, *Plato* likewise introduceth other Principles beside Matter. One as an *Exemplar*, Ideas; another *Paternal*, God, the Father and Author of all Things. *Idea*, as to God, is the *Notion* of God, as to us, the *primary Intelligible*; as to Matter, a *Manner*; as to this sensible World, an *Exemplar*; as to itself, *Essence*. For whatsoever is made with Understanding, must necessarily be referred to something, as if something be made from another; as my Picture from me, the Exemplar thereof must be presupposed; and if there be nothing Eternal, every Artist conceiveth it first within himself, then transferreth the Forms thereon into Matter.

They define *Idea* an Eternal Exemplar of Things which are according to Nature; for the greater Part of Platonists will not allow an *Idea* to be of Things that are made by Art, as of a Shield, or Lute; nor of Things that are preternatural, as of a Fever, or unnatural Choler; nor of Singulars, as of *Socrates* or *Plato*; nor of vile subject Things, as of Filth, or Straws; nor of Relatives, as of greater and longer: For *Idea*'s are the Eternal Notions of God, perfect in themselves.

That there are *Idea*s, they prove thus. Whether God be limited or something intelligent, he must

have his Intelligibles, and those Eternal and Immoveable; if so, there are *Idea's*. For if Matter itself be in itself void of Measure, it is necessary that it receive Measure from some Superior, that is wholly remote from Matter: But the Antecedent is true, therefore the Consequent; and if so, there are *Idea's*, certain Measures void of Matter. Again, if the World were not made by Chance, it must not only be made of something, but by something; and not only so, but after the Likeness of something; but, that after whose Likeness it was made, what is it but an *Idea*? Whence it followeth, that there are *Idea's*. Again, if Intellect differ from true Opinion, that which is Intelligible differeth from that which is Opinionable; and if so, there are Intelligibles distinct from Opinionables, wherefore there are first Intelligibles, as well as first Sensibles, whence we conclude there are *Idea's*.

CHAP. X.

Of God.

WE come next to speak of the third Principle, which *Plato*, though he think it almost ineffable, conceiveth may be expressed in this Manner. If there are Intelligibles, and those neither Sensibles, nor coherent with Sensibles, but adherent to first Intelligibles, then are there first simple Intelligibles, as there are first Sensibles; the Antecedent is true, therefore the Consequent. But Men subject to Perturbation of Sense, when they would contemplate something intelligible, presently fall upon the 'Thought of something sensible, whereby at the same Time they imagine Magnitude, or Figure, or Colour, and therefore cannot understand this sincerely. But the Gods being void of corporeal Mixture, understand purely and sincerely. Now because the Intellect is better than the Soul, and that Intellect which is always in Act, and at once understandeth all Things, is better than that Intellect which is in Power; and of these, that is most excellent which is the Cause of the other, and superior to all. This can be nothing else but God, whom we call the First, as being the Cause that the Intellect of the World always acteth. He, being himself immoveable, acteth upon the Intellect of the World, as the Sun upon the Eye, when it turneth towards him. And as that which is desired moveth the Appetite, itself remaining immoveable; so doth this Intellect move the Intellect of all Heaven. Now this first Intellect being most fair, must have the most fair Intelligible; but nothing is fairer than itself, therefore it always understandeth itself, and its own Notions, which Act is called Operation.

Moreover, *God is first, eternal, ineffable, perfect in himself; that is, needing none; and ever perfect; that is, absolute in all Times, and every way perfect; that is, absolute in every Part, Divinity, Essence, Truth, Harmony, Good.* Neither do we so

name these, to distinguish one from the other, but rather by them all to understand one. He is said to be *Good*, because he bestoweth his Benefits upon all according to their several Capacities, and so is the Cause of all good *Fair*, because he is in his Essence both more and equal. *Truth*, because he is the Principle of all Truth, as the Son of all Light, and *Father*, as being Cause of all Things, and adorning the Mind of Heaven, and Soul of the World, after his own Exemplar and Notions. For according to his own Will he filled all Things with himself, exciting the Soul of the World, and converting it to himself; for he is Cause of that Intellect, which being adorned by the Father, adorneth also the Nature of all this World. He is likewise *ineffable*, and, as we said, can only be perceived by the Mind; for he is neither Genus nor Species, nor Difference; neither can any Accident be applied to him. He is *not Ill*, for that it were Impiety to affirm; *nor Good*, for so he should be termed if he were meanly or highly participant of Goodness, *Nor Difference*, for that cannot be made according to the Notion of him; *nor* qualified, for he is not made that which he is by Quality, *nor* perfected thereby; *nor* void of Quality, for he is not deprived of any Quality that appertaineth to him; *nor* Part of any Thing, *nor* as a whole constituted of Parts; *nor* as the same, or divers, for nothing can happen to him whereby he may be distinguished from others; neither doth he *move*, or is he *moved*.

Hence the first Apprehension of him is by *Abstraction* from these Things, as we understand a Point by Abstraction from Sensibles; considering first a Superficies, then a Line, then a Point. The second is by *Analogy* in this Manner. As the Sun is to Sight and visible Things, himself not being Sight, yet affording the one to see, the other to be seen; so is the first Intellect to that Intellect which is in our Soul, and to those Things which it understandeth. For itself is not the Intellect, yet it perfecteth in these the Act of Intellection, to those it affordeth that they are understood, enlightening that Truth which is in them. The third Way to understand him is thus: When a Man beholdeth that Beauty which is in Bodies, he proceedeth to that which is in the Soul, then to that which is in Offices and Laws: Lastly, to the vast Ocean of Beauty; after which, he considereth that which is good itself, amiable itself, expetible itself, which shineth like a Light, and meeteth the Soul, that which ascends unto it by these Degrees. By this he comprehendeth God himself through Reason of that Excellence, which consisteth in Adoration of him. He considereth God void of Parts; for nothing was before him a Part, and that of which something consisteth is precedent to that whereof it is Part; for a Superficies is before a Body, and a Line before a Superficies. Moreover, God not having many Parts, can neither be locally moved, nor

nor altered by Qualities; for if he be altered, it must be done by himself, or some other; if by some other, that other must be of greater Power than he; if by himself, it must be either to better or to worse, both which are absurd.

From all these it followeth, that *God is incorporeal*, which may likewise be proved thus. If God were a Body, he should consist of Matter and Form, for every Body consisteth of Matter, and its Form joins to that Matter, which is made like unto the *Idea's*, and in an ineffable Manner participant of them; but that that should consist of Matter and Form is absurd; for then he could not be either simple or a Principle; therefore he is incorporeal. Again, if he be a Body, he consisteth of Matter, and consequently is either Fire or Air, or Earth or Water, or something made out of these; but none of these is Principle by itself; besides, he must then be later than Matter, as consisting of it, which being absurd, it is necessary that God be incorporeal. Moreover, if he were a Body, it would follow, that he must be generable, corruptible, mutable, which to affirm of God were intolerable.

CHAP. XI.

Of Qualities.

THAT Qualities are incorporeal, may be proved thus. Every Body is a Subject; Quality is not a Subject, but an Accident, therefore Quality is not a Body. Again, no Body is in a Subject; every Quality is in a Subject, therefore Quality is not a Body. Again, Quality is contrary to Quality, but no Body as no Body is contrary to a Body; therefore Qualities are not Bodies. To omit, that is most agreeable to Reason, that as Matter is void of Quality, so Quality should be void of Matter; and if Quality be void of Matter, it must likewise be void of Corporeity: For, if Qualities were Bodies, two or three Bodies might be together in the same Place, which is absurd.

Qualities being incorporeal, the Maker of them must be incorporeal also. Moreover, there can be no Efficient, but in Corporeals; for Bodies naturally suffer, and are in Mutation, not continuing always in Manner, nor persevering in the same State. For whenever they seem to effect any Thing, we shall find that they suffer it long before. Whence as there is something which wholly suffereth, so must there be something which wholly acteth; but such only is incorporeal.

Thus much concerning Principles, as far as they relate to Theology; we proceed next to Physical Contemplations.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Causes, Generation, Elements, and Order of the World.

Forasmuch as of sensible and singular Things there must of Necessity be some Exemplars, viz.

Idea's, of which are Sciences and Definitions (for besides all particular Men, we conceive a Man in our Mind, and besides all particular Horses a Horse, and likewise besides all living Creatures, a living Creature immortal and unbegotten. As from one Seal are made many Prints, and of one Man there may be many Pictures, of all which, the *Idea* itself is Cause that there are such as itself is) 'tis necessary that this Universe, the fairest Fabrick of God's making, be so made by God, that in the making thereof he looked upon an *Idea* as its Exemplar, whilst by a wonderful Providence and most excellent Design, God applied himself to the building of this Frame, because he was good.

God therefore made it of all Matter, which being before the Generation of Heaven, disorderly scattered; he from a deformed Confusion reduced to beautiful Order, and adorned every Way the Parts thereof with fit Numbers and Figures, until at last he so distinguished them, as now they are; Fire and Earth to Air and Water, of which there were then only the Footsteps, and a certain Aptitude to admit the Power of Elements, and so without any Reason or Order, they justified Matter, and were justified again by Matter.

Thus God framed the World of four entire Elements, of whole Fire and Earth, Water, and Air; omitting no Power or Part of any of them. For, he saith, it must be corporeal and generated, and subject to Touch and Sight; but without Fire and Earth nothing can be touched or seen; wherefore justly he framed it of *Fire and Earth*, and because it was requisite there should be some Chain to unite these, there is a divine Chain, which according to the Proportion of Reason, maketh one of itself, and those Things which are united to it, and the World could not be plain (for then one Medium would have served) but Spherical, therefore there was need of two Mediums to the Constitution thereof. Betwixt Fire and Earth, by the Prescription of this Reason, is interposed *Air and Water*, that as Fire is to Air, so is Air to Water, and as Air is to Water, so is Water to Earth: And again, as Earth is to Water, so is Water to Air; and as Water is to Air, so is Air to Fire.

There being nothing remaining beyond the World, God made the World one, conformable to this *Idea*, which is one. He likewise made it such, as that it is *incapable of Sicknes or Age*. For, besides that nothing can befall it whereby it may be corrupted, it is so sufficient to itself, that it hath not need of any exterior Thing. He bestowed upon it a *Spherical Figure*, as being the fairest, the most capacious and aptest to Motion, and because it needeth not Hearing or Sight, or the rest of the Senses, he gave it not any Organs of Senses. He denied all kinds of Motion to be competent to it, except the circular, which is proper to the Mind and to Wisdom.

C H A P. XIII.

Of the Convenience of Figures, with the Elements and World.

THE World thus consisteth of two Parts, a Soul and a Body; this visible and corruptible, that neither subject to Sight nor Touch. The Power and Constitution of each is different, the Body consisteth of Fire, Earth, Water, and Air; which four, the Maker of the Universe (there being until then nothing more confused than the Elements) formed in a *Pyramid*, a *Cube*, an *Octaedron*, and an *Isofaedron*; but chiefly in a *Dodecaedron*. Matter, as far as it put on the Figure of a *Pyramid*, became *Fire*, and mounted upward: For, that Figure is the most apt to cut and to divide, as consisting of fewest Triangles; and therefore is the rarest of all Figures. As far as it is an *Octaedron*, it took the Quality of *Air*; where it took that of an *Isofaedron*, it became *Water*; the Figure of a *Cube* *Earth*, as being the most solid and stable of all the Elements; the Figure of a *Dodecaedron*, he used in the Fabrick of the *Universe*; *Superficies* come nigher the Nature of Principles than all these, for they are before Solids. Of its Nature, the two Parents (as it were) are two *Triangles* most fair and rectangular; one a *Scalenum*, the other an *Isoceles*; a *Scalenum* is a Triangle having one Right-angle, the other of two Thirds, the last of one Third. A *Scalenum* therefore is the Element of a *Pyramid*, and an *Octaedron*, and an *Isofaedron*. A *Pyramid* consisteth of four Triangles, having all Sides equal to one another, each whereof is divided, as we said, into six scalenous Triangles. The *Octaedrons* consist of eight like Sides, whereof each is divided into six *Scalenums*. The *Isofaeders*, of twenty in the same Manner; but the Element of a *Cube* is an *Isoceles Triangle*, for four such Triangles concurring make a Square, and six Squares a *Cube*. God made Use of a *Dodecaedron* in the Construction of the Universe, whence there are twelve Figures of living Creature in the *Zodiack*, whereof each is divided into thirty Parts. Likewise in a *Dodecaedron*, which consisteth of twelve *Pentagons*, if each be divided into five Triangles, there are in every one six Triangles, so that in the whole *Dodecaedron*, there will be 360 Triangles, as many as there are Degrees in the *Zodiack*.

When Matter was put into those Figures by God, first it was moved rudely without Order, until at last he reduced it to Order, each being conjoined to one another, and composed in due Proportion. Neither are these distinct in Place, but are in perpetual Motion, which they give likewise into Matter. For being straitened by the Compass of the World, and agitated by mutual Influxings, they are driven, the Rare always into the Region of the Solid, whence nothing is left vacuous, nothing void

of Body. The Inequality which remaineth amongst them causeth Convulsion, for Matter is agitated amongst them, and they reciprocally by Matter.

C H A P. XIV.

Of the Soul of the World, the Spheres and Stars.

FROM Bodies he alloweth that we collect the Powers of the Soul; for seeing that we discern all Things by the Soul, he justly placed the Principles of all Things therein, that whatsoever should occur, we might contemplate it by that which is of Kin and Neighbour unto it, and attribute an Essence thereunto consonant to the Functions. Then therefore he called one Substance intelligible and indivisible; he placed another divisible amongst Bodies, to signify that the Knowledge as well of the one as of the other may be had by Intellect. And knowing that in Things intelligible and sensible, there is Identity and Diversity, he fitly composed the Soul out of all these. For, either the like is known by the like, as the *Pythagoreans* hold; or as *Heraclitus the Naturalist*, unlike always by unlike.

That he would that the World should be generate, we must not so understand as if there shall be any Time wherein the World is not, but in as much as it always perisheth in Generation, and declareth, that there is some more excellent and principal Cause of its Essence.

The Soul of the World which was from all Eternity, was not made by God; but only adorned by him, in which respect he is sometimes said to have made it, for that he exciteeth it, and converteth the Mind thereof, as out of a profound Sleep, unto himself, that beholding his Intelligibles, and affecting his Notions, it should from thence receive Species and Form; whence it is manifest, that the World was endued by God, both with a Soul and Mind. For intending it to be the best, he must have made it animate and intelligent, since an animate Thing is more excellent than an inanimate, and an intelligent than an unintelligent; perhaps the Mind also could not subsist without a Soul.

This Soul, being diffused from the Center of the World to the Extremes, comprehends the whole Body of the World, so as it is extended throughout the Universe, and in that Manner joineeth and conserveth the whole. The external preside over the Internal, for they are not divided, but these are divided into seven Circles, from the first distributed according to double and triple Intervals. That which is comprehended by the indivisible Sphere is correspondent to it, that which is divided to the other. For the Motion of Heaven, which comprehends all Things, being not uncertain, is one and ordinate, but that of the Thing within it, is changeable, varied by rising and setting, whence called *Planetary*. The outermost Sphere moveth to the Right-Hand from East to West,

West, the innermost contrariwise, to the Left-Hand from West to East, meeting the World.

God framed also the Stars and Constellations; some fixed for the Ornament of Heaven and night, very many in Number. The *Erratick* are seven, severing for Number and Time, and the Illumination of all Things; for Time is an Interval of the Motion of the World, as an Image of Eternity, which is the Measure of the State of the eternal World. The Planets are not of equal Power, the Sun is the Leader of all, who illuminateth, and sheweth all Things to the Eye. Next the Moon, which in respect of her Power hath the second Place. The rest of the Planets each according to their several Proportions. The Moon maketh the Measure of a Month, in that Space compleating its Circle, and overtaking the Sun. The Sun measureth the Year, for running through the Circle of the Zodiack, he compleateth the Seasons of the Year. Of the other Stars each hath its proper Revolution, with which all Men are not acquainted, but only the Learned. By all those Revolutions, the absolute Number of Time is compleated, when coming all to the same Point, they are in such Order, as if we should imagine a right Line to be drawn from the Sphere of fixed Stars to the Earth, the Centers all would be seen in that Line.

There being seven Orbs in the planetary Sphere, the Maker of the World framed in them seven conspicuous Bodies of Matter for the most Part fiery, and inserted them into the Spheres belonging to the other *Erratick* Circle. The Moon he placed in that Circle which is next the Earth, the Sun in the second, the *Morning Star*, and the sacred Star of *Mercury*, in that Orb which is equal in Swiftness with the Sun; the rest higher, each in its proper Sphere. That of *Saturn*, the slowest of all, he placed in that Orb which is next to the fixed Stars. Second to this is that which they call the Sphere of *Jupiter*, next that of *Mars*; the eighth, which is the *supreme Power*, includeth all. These are all living intelligent Creatures, and Gods endued with a Spherical Figure.

CHAP. XV.

Of Demons and Elements.

There are other *Demons* also, which we may call intelligent Gods, in each of the Elements, partly visible, partly invisible, in the *Aether*, Fire, Air and Water, that there be not any Part of the World void of Soul, or of an animate Creature, more excellent than human Nature. Below these are all earthly sublunary Things; God is Maker of the World, of all Gods and *Demons*. This Universe, by his divine Will shall not be dissolved. Over the rest his *Sons* preside, who by his Command and Example order whatsoever they do. By these *Lets*, *Natural Vision*, *Dreams*, *Graces*,

and whatsoever Men refer to Divination, is artificially wrought.

The Earth is fixed in the Midst of all, round about the Axle-tree, which passeth through the Midst of the World. It is the Observer of Night and Day, the most ancient of all Gods in Heaven. Next the Soul of the World, it affordeth us most Nutriture; about it the Heavens move, and itself is a Kind of Star: It remaineth in its proper Place, which by Reason of its even Weight is the Centre; the *Aether* exterior is divided into the Sphere of fixed Stars, and that of Planets. Next to these is the Air, in the midst of the Earth with its Humidity.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the younger Gods, Makers of Men.

After that all these were framed, there remained three Kinds of living Creatures, which were to be mortal, *Volatile*, *Aquatile*, and *Terrestrial*; the Generation whereof he committed to his Son, lest if he himself had begotten them, they should have been immortal as well as the rest. They borrowing some little Parts from first Matter for a certain Time, formed mortal living Creatures, and because of Mankind, as being next to the Gods, both the Father of all Things, and his Sons likewise, have a particular Care, the Maker of all Things sent down himself their Souls into the Earth, equal in Number to the Stars, and having imposed each one his proper Star, as a *Vebiculum*, like a Law-giver, he pronounced Decrees unto them, that he himself might be inculpable, which was that there should arise mortal Affections from the Body, first Senfes, next Pleasure, then Grief, and Fear and Anger, which those Souls that should overcome, and not suffer themselves to be transported by them, should justly be accounted Victors, and at the last return to their proper Star, though they which should be transported by Injustice, should in the second Generation undergo the Lives of Women, wherein, if they ceased not from their Wickedness, they should at last transmigrate into the Nature of Brute Beasts, the End of these Labours shall then be, when they have overcome the innate Affections of the Body, and then return to their proper Habit.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the Body, and Parts of Man, and Powers of the Soul.

The Gods first formed Man of Earth, Fire, Air, and Water, borrowing some Parts from Matter (to be restored in their due Time) which they so connected to one another by secret Ties, as that of all these they framed one Body. The most excellent Part of the Soul that was sent down from Heaven, they placed in the *Head*, for which, as a

managed

manured Field they prepared the *Brain*. About the Face they disposed Organs proper for Sense; *Marrow* they made of smooth straight Triangles, of which the Elements were formed, that it should be the Origin of prolific Seed. *Bones* they formed of Marrow and Earth, the Earth moistened, and often dipt in Water and Fire. *Flesh* is compounded of Salt and sharp, as of a Kind of Ferment. Marrow they enclosed with *Bones*, Bones with *Sinews* instead of Chains, that by these Inflexions the knitting of the Joints might be pliant. Over these as a Cover is extended the *Skin*, partly white partly black, for Beauty and Use. Of these likewise consist the internal *Bowels*, and the Belly, and the Intestines every where rolled about it. And from the Mouth, above the *Apera Arteria* and the *Æsophagus*, of which one cometh down to the Stomach, the other to the Lungs. Meat is digested in the Belly by Spirit and Heat, and thence distributed to the whole Body according to their several Constitutions. The two Veins passing along the Spine of the Back, meet, and cross at the Head, where they spread into many Parts.

Thus, when the Gods had made Man, and given him a Soul as the Mistress of his Body, they placed the principal Part of that Soul to which Reason appertaineth, in the Head. Whence is derived Marrow and Sinews, and by the different Affection of this, the Mind likewise is altered. Moreover, they gave him Senses, as the Attendants of Reason, and the Power of judging and contemplating with Reason. Those Parts of the Soul, which are moved by meaner Affections, they seated in lower Places; the intractable Part in the Heart, the conspicuous about the Belly, and the Parts next to the Navel, of which hereafter.

C H A P. XVIII.

Of Sight.

AFTER that the Gods had placed the Eyes (Conduits of Light) in the Face, they included in them a fiery Light, which being smooth, and in some Manner thick, they conceived of Kin to diurnal Light. This breaketh forth every where at the Eyes, but chiefly through the Eye-calls, as being there most pure and clear. This agreeing with the external Light, as like with like, affordeth the Sense of Sight, whence in the Night, when the Light vanisheth and is obscured, this Ray of ours no longer mingleth with the immediate Air, but, on the contrary, withdrawing itself inward, smooths and diffuses the Motions that are in us, and so bringeth on Sleep, whereby the Eye-lids are shut. If it bring much Rest, the Sleep is little disturbed with Dreams, but if there remain any Motions behind, we are troubled with many Illusions. In this Manner, Phantasies, whether true or false, arise. Of the same Nature are Images, which we see in Glas-

ses, or other smooth pellucid Bodies, which exist only by Reflection. For, as the Glass is concave or convex, or oblong, the Object is differently represented to the Beholder. The Light being reflected to other Parts, those which are dispersed in Convex meet in the Concave, for in some, the right and left Sides seem quite inverted, in others alike; in others, those which are upwards seem downwards, and on the contrary, those which are downwards, upwards.

C H A P. XIX.

Of the rest of the Senses.

Hearing is given for the Perception of Voice, it ariseth from a Motion made about the Head, and setteth in the Liver. Voice is that which passeth through the Ear, Brain, and Blood, to the Soul. A sharp Voice is that which is moved swiftly, deep which slowly, great which much, small which little.

Next followeth the Sense proper to the Nostrils, perceptible of Odour. Odour is an Affection which passeth from the Veins of the Nostrils to the Parts of the Navel. The Species thereof have no Name, except the two that are most common, pleasant and unpleasant, commonly called sweet and stinking. All Odour is more thick than Air, more thin than Water; for Odour is properly said to be of these Things which have not yet received perfect Mutation, but consist of a Communion of Air and Water, as Smoke and Mists. For, by the Resolution of these into one another, the Sense of Smelling is made.

Taste was made by the Gods to be Judge of different Savours. Hence are Veins extended to the Heart, by which several Savours are examined. These Veins, by dilating or contracting themselves severally, according to the Savors presented to them, discern the Differences. The Differences of Savors are seven, sweet, sharp, sour, piquant, salt, acid, bitter; the Nature of sweet Sapor is contrary to all the rest, for by its Power it sootheth and pleaseth the Moisture of the Tongue, whereas of the rest, some disturb and dispel it, as acute Savors; some heat and fly upwards, as the Hot; others being abstersive, dissolve it; as the Bitter; others are by Degrees purgative and abstersive, as the Salt. Of these some contract the Passages; they which do it more roughly are called acid, they which more gently, austere.

The Sense of Touching was formed by the Gods, to discern hot and cold, soft and hard, light and heavy, smooth and rough, and to judge the Differences of each of these; yielding Bodies we call those which yield to the Touch; resisting, those which yield not; this proceedeth from the Bases of Bodies: Those which have large Bases are firm and solid, these which have narrow Bases are yielding.

soft and easily changed : Rough is that which is uneven and hard, smooth ; that which is plain and thick ; as warm and cold Qualities are most opposite, so they proceed from the most different Causes. That which cutteth by the Acuteness and Roughness of its Parts, begetteth a hot Affection, that which is more thick in Penetration, a cold, whilst the more rare are expelled, and the more dense compelled to penetrate into their Room. Thence ariseth a Concussion and Trepidation, and (an Affection which is from hence begotten in Bodies) Rigor.

C H A P. XX.

Of Heavy and Light.

Heavy and Light ought not to be defined by higher or lower Place, nothing is high or low ; for Heaven being absolutely round, and its convex Extremity even, we cannot term any Thing higher or lower, yet we may call that heavy, which is hardly drawn to a Place different from its Nature ; Light which easily, or Heavy is that which consisteth of most Parts, Light of fewest.

C H A P. XXI.

Of Respiration.

WE breathe after this Manner ; the external Air compasseth us round about, and passeth in at our Mouth, Nostrils, and invisible Pores of the Body, where being warmed, it floweth back again to the external Air, by that Part out of which it flowed, it again thrusteth the external Air to the interior. Thus there is an unintermitted Succession of Inspiration and Expiration.

C H A P. XXII.

Of the Causes of Diseases.

OF Diseases Plato alledgeth many Causes. The first is Defect, or Excess of the Elements, and a Change of Places which agree not with their Nature. The second a preposterous Generation of homogeneous Parts, as when of Flesh is made Blood, or Choler, or Phlegm ; for all these are nothing but Colliquation, or Putrefaction. Phlegm is a new Colliquation of Flesh ; Sweat and Tears are a Kind of Serum of Phlegm. Phlegm intercepted in the outward Parts, begetteth Scurf and Leprosy, in the inward being mingled with Melancholly, it causeth the Falling-sickness. Sharp and salt Phlegm engender those Affections which consist in Rigour, for all Bodies that are enflamed with Choler must suffer that. A World of various Diseases are engendered by Choler and Phlegm. As concerning Fevers, Plato conceived that a continual Fever proceedeth from Excess of Fire, a Quotidian from Excess of Air, a Tertian from Excess of Wa-

ter, a Quartan from Excess of Earth. It remaineth that we here begin to speak of the Soul, tho' not without some Danger of repeating the same Things.

C H A P. XXIII.

Of the three principal Powers of the Soul.

THE Gods, the Makers of mortal Creatures, having received from the first God the Soul of Man immortal, added unto it two mortal Parts ; yet left the immortal Divine Part might be infected with mortal Extravagances, they seated as Prince of all in the Tower, as it were of the Body, the Head, in Figure resembling the Universe. The rest of the Body they appointed as a Vehiculum to serve this. To each mortal Part they assigned its proper Habitation, placing the irascible in the Heart, the concupiscible in the Midst betwixt the Navel and the Diaphragma, binding it there as a furious savage Beast. They framed the Lungs in respect of the Heart, soft, bloodless, hollow and spongy, that the Heart being somewhat heated with Anger, might thereby be refrigerated and asswaged ; the Liver to excite and allay the concupiscible Part, having both Sweetness and Bitterness, as likewise for the clearing of Divinations which are given by Dreams ; for as much as in it by Reason of its Smoothness, Shining and Brightness, the Power which proceedeth from the Mind doth shine forth. The Spleen was made for the Benefit of the Liver, to purge and cleanse it ; so that those Corruptions, which by some Diseases, are contracted about the Liver, retire thither.

C H A P. XXIV.

Of the Distinction of the Parts of the Soul.

THAT the Soul and Parts thereof, according to their proper Faculties are three-fold ; every Part appointed by Reason their several Places, is manifest from hence. Those Things which are separated by Nature, are divers ; passionate and reasonable are separated by Nature ; this being conversant in Intelligibles, that in Things sad or joyful, to omit the passive Part, which is common likewise to Brute Beasts. Now these two being distinct by Nature, must likewise be distinguished by Place, because for the most Part they disagree, and are repugnant to one another ; but nothing can be repugnant to itself, neither can those Things which are contrary to one another consist together in the same. In Medea Anger seemeth to contest thus with Reason ;

*I know what Fintend is ill,
But Anger over-rules my Will.*

In Lais when he ravished Chrysis, Concupiscence contested with Reason ; for so he saith,

Alas

*Men to this Crime the Gods confound,
To know the Ill that they decline.*

That the rational Power is different from the passive, is evident from this, that they are ordered by several Means, one by Discipline, the other by habitual Practice.

CHAP. XXV.

Of the Immortality of the Soul.

THAT the Soul is immortal *Plato* proveth by these Arguments: The Soul to every Thing, wherein it is, conferreth Life, as being naturally innate in herself, but that which conferreth Life to others, never admitteth Death, but what is such is immortal.

The Soul being immortal, is likewise incorruptible, for it is an incorporeal Essence, which cannot be changed substantially, and is only perceptible by the Intellect, not by the Eyes, and is uniform. Hence it must be simple, neither can be at any Time dissolved or corrupted. The Body is contrary, for it is subject to Sight and other Senses, and as it is compounded, so shall it again be dissolved, and it is multiform. When the Soul adhereth to those Things which are perceptible by Intellect, it acquiesceth: Now, to that by whose Presence she is disturbed, she cannot possibly be like, wherefore she is more like to those Things which are perceptible by Intellect; but what is such, is such by Nature, incorruptible and perishable.

Again, the Soul doth naturally preside over the Body, not the Body over the Soul, but that which by Nature ruleth and commandeth is of Kin to Divinity, wherefore the Soul being next unto God, must be immortal, not subject to Corruption.

Again, Contraries which have no Medium, not by themselves, but by some Accident are so ordered by Nature, that they may be mutually made of one another. But that which Men call Life is contrary to that which they call Death; as therefore Death is a Separation of the Soul from the Body, so is Life a Conjunction of the Soul with the Body, pre-existent to the Body. But if she be pre-existent, and shall subsist after the Body, it followeth that she be sempiternal, for there cannot any Thing be imagined whereby she may be corrupted.

Again, if Learning be Reminiscence, the Soul must be immortal, but that it is Reminiscence we prove thus. Learning cannot otherwise consist than by Remembrance of those Things we formerly knew. For, if from *Singulars* we understand *Universals*, how could we discourse by *Singulars* which are Infinite? Or how from a few perceive *Universals*? We should therefore necessarily be deceived, as if we judged that only to be a living

Creature which breatheth: Or how could the Nations themselves have the Reason of Principles? By Reminiscence therefore, from some few which we have conceived in our Mind, we understand the rest, and from some occurrent Particulars we remember those which we knew long before, but were then given over to Oblivion, when the Soul first descended into the Body.

Again, if the Soul be not corrupted by its own proper Ill, neither can it be destroyed by that or any other, nor simply by any Ill, and being such, shall remain uncorrupted.

Again, that which is moved in itself, as being the Principle of Motion in those Things which are moved, is always moved; that which is such is immortal; but the Soul is moved of itself; that which is moved of itself is the Principle of all Motion and Generation; and a Principle is expert of Generation and Corruption, wherefore the Souls of Men, and of the Universe itself are such, for both partake of the same Mixture. He affirmeth the Soul to be moveable in herself, because it hath an innate Life, always operating by its Power.

That rational Souls are immortal, may clearly be asserted out of *Plato*; but whether the irrational be such seemeth doubtful; yet is it probable, that being guided only by Phantasy, not ended with Reason or Judgment, neither do they contemplate any Thing, or discern, or collect from it; nor can they discern Ills, but generally understand nothing, nor are of the same Nature with those Souls which have Intellect and Reason, but are capable of dying, and being corrupted. Forasmuch as they are immortal, it followeth, that they are put into Bodies, being planted into the formed Nature of Embrios, and transmigrate into several Bodies, as well human as others, either according to some certain Numbers which they expect, or by the Will of the Gods, or for Intemperance of Life, or for Love of the Body. For the Body and Soul have a Kind of Affinity, as Fire and Brimstone.

Moreover, the Souls of the Gods have a judicative Faculty, called Gnostick, and impulsive to some Action, called Parastick; which Faculties being likewise in human Souls, become changed as soon as they come into the Body; the Assistent into the Concupiscible, the Impulsive into the Irrascible.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Fate and Free-will.

Concerning *Fate*, *Plato* held thus. All Things are in Fate, yet all Things are not decreed by Fate. For *Fate*, though it be like a Law, yet it useth not to speak in this Manner, that this Man shall do thus, and to that Man, that shall befall (which were to proceed into infinite, there being an infinite Generation of Men, and infinite Accidents happening daily to them; besides that this would

take away our Free-will, our Praise or Dispraise, and whatsoever is of that Kind) but rather thus: Whatsoever Soul chooseth such a Life, and doth such Things, these shall follow, the Soul therefore is free, and it is left within its Power to do or not to do, without any Compulsion or Necessity. But that which followeth the Action is performed by Fate. As from *Paris's* ravishing of *Helene* (which it is within his Power to do, or not to do) shall follow that the *Grecians* contend with the *Trojans* about *Helene*. Thus *Apollo* foretold *Laius*;

If thou beget a Son, that Son shall kill thee.

In the Oracle are comprehended both *Laius*, and the begetting of a Son; that which shall follow upon the begetting of the Son depends on *Plato*.

That which may be done is of a middle Kind, betwixt true and false; and being so indefinite by Nature. That which is in our Power, is carried on as it were unto it. That which is done by our Election, is presently either true or false. That which is in Power is different from that which is said to be in Habit and Act. That which is in Power, declareth an Aptitude in that Thing, wherein the Habit is not yet perfect. So a Boy may be said to be a Grammarian, a Musician, a Carpenter in Power. He is in Habit of one or more of these when he hath acquired that Habit. He is said to be in Act, when he operateth according to that acquired Habit. That which we call possible to be done, is none of these. Indeterminate is that which is in our Power, and to which Part forever it inclineth, will be true or false.

CHAP. XXVII.

ETHICK.

Of the chief Good, and of Virtues.

WE must next give a short Account of *Plato's Ethicks*. That which is worthy of all Honour, and is the Supreme Good, he conceived not easy to be found; and if found, not safe to be declared. For this Reason, he communicated the Contemplation of the chief Good to very few, and those of his most intimate Acquaintance, of whom his Judgment made Choice for this Purpose. But our Good, if we examine his Books diligently, we shall find he placed in the Knowledge of the first Good, which may rightly be called God, and the first Mind. For all Things which Men call Good, he conceiveth to be called Good in this Respect; so far as they derive something from that Good, as all sweet and hot Things are termed such from some Participation of the first sweet, and the first hot. Of those Things which are in us, only the Mind and Reason have a Similitude of the first Good. Wherefore he calleth our Good, Fair, Venerable, Amiable, Proportionate, and lastly, Beati-

tude. Of those which are commonly called good, as Health, Beauty, Strength, there is none good, unless it be employed towards the Practice of Virtue. For being separated from Virtue, they are like Matter only; and to those who make ill Use of them, only ill. Yet these *Plato* sometimes calleth mortal Goods. Beatitude he reckoneth not amongst human Goods, but amongst the Divine and Immortal. Whence he asserteth that the Souls of true Philosophers are replenished with vast admirable Goods, and after the Dissolution of their mortal Body, are admitted to the Table of the Gods, and with them walk over and survey the Field of Truth, because they did see they used the utmost Endeavours of their Souls to know it, and esteemed it the most precious of all Things, by the Benefit whereof they illustrated, and excited their Mind as a lost or blinded Sight, preferring the Conservation thereof before many corporeal Eyes. Foolish Men are like those who lead all their Life in some Cave under Ground, where they never saw the Light of the Sun, but only some empty thin Shadows of such Bodies as are with us upon the Earth, which seeing, they think they see true Bodies. As these, if ever they should be brought out of Darkness into the clear Light, would questionless despise all Things which they saw before, and themselves much more, as having been absolutely deceived; so they who rise up out of the Darkness of this Life, to those Things which are divine and fair, in all Likelihood, will condemn what before they most esteemed, and love more vehemently this Contemplation. Thus it appeareth, that only what is good is honest, and that Virtue sufficeth to Felicity.

Moreover, that good and fair consist in Knowledge of the first Good, he declareth in whole Volumes. As concerning those which are good by Participation, he speaketh thus in his first Book of Laws. Good is two-fold, Human and Divine, &c. If any Thing be disjoined from the first Good, and void of the Essence thereof, that is called Good by the Foolish, which in *Enthydema*, he affirmeth to be a greater Ill to the Possessor.

That he conceiveth the Virtues to be eligible in themselves, is manifest; inasmuch as he affirmeth that only to be Good which is Honest; which he demonstrateth in many Dialogues, particularly in those of the Commonwealth.

Hence he conceiveth that Man to be most happy and blessed, who hath attained the Science we mentioned; yet not in Respect of the Honours which attend such a Person, nor of any other Reward; for though he be unknown to all Men, and such Things as are commonly accounted Ills, as Dishonour, Banishment, and Death happen unto him; he is notwithstanding happy. On the contrary, a Man who wants this Knowledge, though he possess all Things commonly esteemed good, Riches, Power, Health,

D d

Strength,

Strength, and Beauty, he is, nothing the more happy.

He asserteth an ultimate End, conformable to all these which is to be made like unto God, as far as Humanity is capable of being such. This he expounds variously; sometimes, as in *Theatetus*, he affirms our Resemblance to God to consist in being Prudent, Just, and Holy; wherefore we must endeavour to fly with all possible Celerity from hence to those. This Flight is the Resemblance to God, as much as is possible. The Similitude consisteth in Prudence, Justice, and Sanctity; sometimes in Justice only, as in his last Book of the Commonwealth. For a Man is never deserted by God, whilst he endeavoureth to be just, and by the very Act of Virtue, as much as a Man is capable of, he is render'd like unto God. In *Phaedon* he asserteth, that this Resemblance to God is acquired by Temperance and Justice, thus. *Are not they blessed and happy, and from hence shall go into the best Place, who have practised the popular civil Virtue which they call Temperance and Justice?* Again, sometimes he affirmed, that the End of Life is to be like unto God, sometimes to follow God, as when he saith, God indeed, according to the old Saying, *containing the Beginning, Middle, and End of all Things*, &c. Sometimes he joineth both together, as when he saith, *The Soul following God, and being rendered like unto him*, &c. The Principle of Utility is good itself; but this is said of God, therefore the End, conformable to the Principle, is to become like unto God, to the Celestial, or rather Supercelestial God, who hath not Virtue, but is more excellent than all Virtue. Wherefore it is rightly said, that *κακοδαιμονία*, Misery, is a Perversity of the Genius, *ευδαιμονία*, Beatitude is a good Habit of the Genius.

This Similitude to God we shall obtain, if we enjoy convenient Nature in our Manner, Education and Sense, according to Law, and chiefly by Reason and Discipline, and Institution of Wisdom; withdrawing ourselves as much as possible from human Affairs, and being conversant in those Things only which are understood by Contemplation. The Way to prepare, and, as it were, to cleanse the Daemon that is in us, is to initiate ourselves into higher Disciplines, which is done by Music, Arithmetick, Astronomy, and Geometry; not without some Respect of the Body, by Gymnastick, whereby it is made more ready for the Actions, both of War and Peace.

C H A P. XXVIII.

The Definition and Kinds of Virtue.

Virtue being divine, is the perfect and best Affection of the Soul, which adorneth a Man, and rendereth him more excellent and ready, as

well for Speech as Action, whether he do it alone, or with others.

Of the Virtues, some are placed in the rational Part, some in the irrational. For whereas the Nature of the rational Part is one, that of the irascible another, that of the concupiscible another, the Perfection of these must likewise be different. That of the rational is *Prudence*; of the irascible, *Fortitude*; of the concupiscible, *Temperance*.

Prudence is the Science of Things, good, bad, and betwixt both.

Temperance is an apt Moderation of Desires and Appetites; when we call Temperance a Moderation and Obedience, we mean only this, that it is a Faculty causing all Appetites to be subjected unto it, in decent Order and submit Obedience to be commanded by Nature. This is the rational Part.

Fortitude is a lawful Observation of Command, difficult, or not difficult; that is, it is a Faculty which keepeth a lawful Precept.

Justice is an Agreement amongst all these, which causeth that the three Parts of the Soul agree with one another, and that each be worthily conversant in those Things which are proper, and belong unto it.

Thus it is a common entire Perfection of these three Virtues, *Prudence, Fortitude, and Temperance*, in such manner that Reason commandeth, and the rest of the Parts each according to its several Property, are restrained by Reason, and obey it.

Hence it followeth that the Virtues are mutually consequent to one another; Fortitude being the Conservation of a lawful Precept, it is likewise conservative of right Reason. Right Reason proceedeth from Prudence; Prudence cohereth with Fortitude, for it is the Knowledge of good Things; but no Man can discern that which is good, if he be distracted by Fear, or involved in the like Troubles. In like Manner, neither can any Man be wise and intemperate, for then he is overcome by Affections. If a Man do something contrary to Reason, *Plato* affirmeth he doth through Ignorance and Imprudence, so that none can be prudent that is intemperate or fearful. Whence it followeth, that the perfect Virtues cohere to one another, and are inseparable.

C H A P. XXIX.

Of Virtues, Vices, and their Differences.

THE Gifts of Nature and Progress in them are called Virtues also, by Reason of their Similitude with the perfect Virtues, assuming the same Name. In this Sense we call all Soldiers stout, and sometimes call imprudent and rash Persons stout, when we speak not of the perfect Virtues, for the perfect neither increase nor decrease; but Vices are intended and remitted. One Man is more improve

imprudent and more unjust than another, neither do all the Vices follow one another, for they are certain Contraries which are not competent to the same. Such is Fury to Cowardice, and Prodigality to Covetousness, nor can there be any Man at once possessed of all Vices, no more than a Body tormented by all Diseases.

Moreover, there is a mean Affection which inclineth not plainly either to Vice or Virtue, for it is not necessary that all Men must be good or bad; they are such, who have arrived at the Height of these; for it is not easy to pass suddenly from Virtue to Vice, because betwixt Extremes there is a great Interval and Distance.

Of Virtues some are principal, others concomitant; principal are those which are in the rational Part of the Soul, and by which the other Virtues are perfected. Concomitant are those which are in the other Part which are subject to Affections. These act honest Things according to Reason, not that which is in them, for they have none, but that which they receive from Prudence, which is confirmed in them by Custom and Exercise.

Now, for as much as neither Science nor Art consisteth in any Part of the Soul, but in the Rational, those Virtues which are in the other Part, that is subject to Affections, cannot be taught, because they are neither Arts nor Sciences, neither have they a peculiar Doctrine. Prudence is a Science, which prescribeth unto every one what is proper to him, as a Pilot, or Master of a Ship, to inferior ignorant Sailors. The like in a common Soldier and a General.

For as much as Ills are intended and remitted, Offences cannot be equal, but some must be greater, others lesser, for which Reason, they who make Laws, punish some more gently, others more severely. And tho' Virtues are certain Heights, as being perfect, and like unto that which is right, yet in another Respect they are called Mediocrities, because all or the most of them are placed betwixt two Vices, whereof one sinneth in Excess, the other in Defect; as on one Side of *Liberality* is *Covetousness*, on the other *Prodigality*. For in Affections we recede from the Mean, when we relinquish that which is placed in Virtue, either by Excess or Defect. But neither he, who beholding his Parents wronged is nothing moved thereat, nor he who is incensed at the smallest Matters, void of Passion, or moderate, but the quite contrary. He who at the Death of his Parents grieveth not, is void of Passion; he who destroyeth himself with grieving is over passionate and immoderate; he who grieveth moderately is moderately passionate. In like manner, he who feareth upon all Occasions, and more than needs, is timorous; he who feareth nothing is rash; he only is stout that can keep a Mean betwixt Fear and Rashness; the like in all the rest. And for as much as that which is mean in Affec-

tions is likewise best, and Mediocrity is nothing but a Mean betwixt Excess and Defect, there are these Virtues termed Mediocrities, because in human Perturbations and Passions they affect us a middle Kind of Way.

CHAP. XXX.

That Virtue is voluntary, Vice involuntary.

Virtue being chiefly of those Things which are in our Power, not compulsive (for it could not deserve Praise, if it came either by Nature or divine Decree) it followeth, that Virtue is voluntary, begotten by a fervent, generous, and firm Impulsion.

From this, that Virtue is voluntary, it followeth that Vice is involuntary. For, who, in the most excellent Part of himself would ever voluntarily choose that which is the greatest of all Ills? When a Man is carried on to Vice, he first inclineth to it, not as if it were ill, but good, and if he fall into Ill, doubtless he is deceived with thinking, that this Way, by a lesser Ill, he may arrive at a greater Good, and goeth in this Manner unwillingly to it. For, it is not possible a Man should pursue Ill as it is Ill, without any Hope of Good, or Fear of a greater Ill. All ill Things therefore, which an ill Man doth, are involuntary; for Injustice being involuntary, to act unjustly is so much more involuntary, as the Action of Vice is beyond the idle Habit thereof. Yet, tho' wicked Actions are involuntary, the Wicked nevertheless ought to be punished, and that not after one Manner, but according to the Variety of Hurt which they do to those they wrong. That which is involuntary consisteth in Ignorance of Perturbations, all which may be diverted, either by Reason, or civil Custom, or Diligence.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Love and Friendship.

Friendship, properly so termed, is made by a mutual reciprocal Benevolence. This is, when either is as much concerned for the Happiness of the other, as of his own, which Equality is preserved only by Similitude of Manners: For, the like is Friend to its like, if they be both moderate; but the Intemperate cannot agree, either with themselves or the Moderate.

There are other Things which are thought Friendships, but are not such, in which there appeareth some Shew of Virtue. Of these, is the natural Good-will of Parents to their Children, and of Kindred one to another, as also that which is called civil and sociable; these are not always accompanied with mutual Benevolence. Likewise, the amatory Art is a Kind of Friendship. That which is honest is proper to a generous Soul, dishonest

ness to a perverse, mean-to one meanly affected. For, as the Habit of the rational Soul is threefold, Right, Dishonest and Mean, so many different Kinds are there of Love, which appeareth most clearly in the Difference of the Ends they propose unto themselves. The Dishonest aims only at corporeal Pleasure, and therefore is absolutely brutish. The Honest considereth the Mind only, as far as Virtue appeareth in it. The Mean desireth both the Beauty of the Soul and of the Body; of which Love, he who is worthy is mean likewise; that is, neither absolutely Honest nor Dishonest. Hence that Love which aimeth only at the Body, ought to be termed a *Demon* (rather than a Deity, which never descendeth to an human Body) transmitting divine Things to Men, and human to God.

Of the three Kinds of Love, that which is proper to a good Man, being remote from vicious Affections, is artificial, whence it is placed in the rational Part of the Soul. The Contemplations thereof are these, to discern who is worthy of Love, and to contract Friendship with him, and enjoy it. This Discernment is made from his Aims or Desires, whether they are generous, and directed to a good End, or violent and fervent. The Contraction, or Acquisition of Friendship, is made, not by wanton excessive Praise, but rather by Reprehension, shewing him, that it is not convenient he should live in that manner he doth; when he enjoyeth the Love of him whom he affects, he must always exhort him to those Things, by Exercise whereof, he may arrive at perfect Habit. Their End is that of Lover and Beloved, they may at last become Friends.

C H A P. XXXII.

Of Passions.

Injustice is so great an Ill, that it is better to suffer Wrong than to do wrong; for one belongeth to a wicked Man, the other to a weak Man; both are dishonest, but to do wrong is worse, by how much it is more dishonest. It is as expedient that a wicked Man be punished, as that a sick Man should be cured by a Physician; for all Chastisement is a Kind of Medicine for an offending Soul.

Since the greater Part of Virtues are conversant about Passions, it is necessary that we define Passion. Passion is an irrational Motion of the Soul, arising out of some good or ill; it is called an irrational Motion, because neither Judgments nor Opinions are Passions, but Motions of the irrational Parts of the Soul. For in the irrational Part of the Soul, there are Motions, which tho' they are done by us, are yet nothing the more in our Power. They are often done therefore contrary to our Inclination and Will; for sometimes it falleth out, that though we know Things to be neither pleasing nor unpleasing, expectible nor avoidable, yet we are

drawn by them, which could never be, if such Passions were the same with Judgment. For we reject Judgment when we disapprove it, whether it ought to be so or otherwise. In the Definition is added, arising from some Good or some Ill, because of that which is mean or indifferent betwixt these, no Passion is ever excited in us. All Passions arise from that which seemeth good or ill. If we see Good present, we rejoice, if future, we desire. On the contrary, if Ill be present, we grieve, if imminent, we fear.

The simple Affections, and, as it were, Elements of the rest, are two; *Pleasure* and *Grief*; the rest consist of these. Neither are Fear and Desire to be numbered among the principal Passions, for he who feareth is not wholly deprived of Pleasure, nor can a Man live the least Moment, who despaireth to be freed or eased of some Ill. But it is more conversant in Grief and Sorrow, and therefore he who feareth, sorroweth. But he who desireth, like all those who desire or expect something, is delighted, inasmuch as he is not absolutely confident; and having not a firm Hope he is grieved. And if Desire and Fear are not principal Passions, it will doubtless follow, that none of the other Affections are simple; as Anger, Love, Emulation and the like; for in these, Pleasure and Grief are manifest, as consisting of them.

Moreover, of Passions, some are rough, others mild; the Mild are those which are naturally in Men, and if kept within their Bounds, are necessary and proper to Man, if they exceed vicious. Such are Pleasure, Grief, Anger, Pity, Modesty; for it is proper to Man to delight in those Things which are according to Nature, and to be grieved at their Contraries. *Anger* is necessary to repel and punish an Injury. *Mercy* agreeth with Humanity. *Modesty* teacheth us to decline fard Things. Other Passions are rough and preternatural, arising from some depraved or perverse Custom. Such are excessive Laughter, Joy in the Misfortunes of others, Hatred of Mankind. These, whether intense or remiss, after what Manner soever they are, are always erroneous, and admit not any laudable Mediocrity.

As concerning Pleasure and Grief, *Plato* writeth thus. These Passions are excited in us by Nature. Grief and Sorrow happen to those who are moved contrary to Nature; Pleasure to those who are restored to the proper Constitution of their Nature. For he conceiveth the natural State of Man to consist in a Mean betwixt Pleasure and Grief, not moved by either, in which State we live longest. He asserteth several Kinds of Pleasure, whereof some relate to the Body, others to the Soul. Again, of Pleasures some are mix'd with Grief, some are pure. Again, some proceed from the Remembrance of Things past, others from Hope of Things to come. Again, some are dishonest, as being intemperate and

and unjust ; others *moderate*, and joyned with Good, as Joy for good Things, and the Pleasure that followeth Virtue. Now, because most Pleasures are naturally dishonest, he thinks it not to be disputed whether Pleasure can be simply and absolutely a Good, that being to be accounted poor, and of no Value, which is raised out of another, and hath not a principal primary Essence ; for Pleasure cohereth even with its contrary Grief, and is joyned with it : which could not be, if one were simply good, the other simply ill.

C H A P. XXXIII.

Of the Forms of Common-Wealths.

OF the Forms of Common-wealths ; some are supposed only, and conceived by Abstract from the rest : These he delivers in his Book of a Common-wealth ; wherein he describeth the first Concordant, the second Discordant ; enquiring which of these is the most excellent, and how they may be constituted ; he also divideth a Common-wealth, like the Soul, in Three Parts, *Keepers, Defenders, and Artificers*. The Office of the First is to counsel, to advise, to command ; of the Second, to defend the Common-wealth, upon Occasion, by Arms, which answereth to the Irascible Power : To the last belong Arts and other Services. He will have Princes to be Philosophers, and to contemplate the first Good, affirming, that so only they shall govern rightly : For Mankind can never be freed from ill, unless either Philosophers govern, or they who govern be inspired with Philosophy after a Divine Manner. A Common-wealth is then governed best, and according to Justice, when each Part of the City performeth its proper Office ; so that the Prince give Laws to the People ; the Defenders obey them, and fight for them ; the rest willingly submit to their Superiors.

Of a Common-wealth he asserteth five Kinds ; the first, *Aristocracy*, when the Best rule ; the second, *Timocracy*, when the Ambitious ; the third, *Democracy*, when the People ; the fourth, *Oligarchy*, when a few ; the last, *Tyranny*, which is the worst of all.

He describeth likewise other supposed Forms of Common-wealth, as that in his Book of Laws ; and, that which reformeth others, in his Epistles, which he useth for those Cities that in his Book of

Laws he saith are sick : These have a distinct Place, and select Men out of every Age, as according to the Diversity of their Nature and Place ; they require different Institution, Education, and Arms. The Maritime People are to study Navigation and Sea-fight ; the Island fighting on Foot ; those in mountainous Countries to use light Armour, those on the Shore heavy ; some of these to exercise fighting on Horse-back : In this City he alloweth not a Community of Women. Thus is Politick a Virtue, conversant both in Action and Contemplation ; the End whereof is to constitute a City good, happy, and convenient to itself. It considers a great many Things ; amongst the rest, whether War be to be waged or not.

C H A P. XXXIV.

Of a Sophist.

Hitherto we have spoken of a *Philosopher*, from whom a *Sophist* differeth ; in *Manners*, because he teacheth young Men for Gain, and desireth rather to seem than to be good. In *Matter* ; for a Philosopher is conversant in those Things which always are, and continually remain in the same manner ; but a Sophist in that which is not ; for which Reason he seeketh Darknes, that he may not be known to be what he is. To Things that are, that which is not, is not opposed as contrary ; for it neither existeth, nor is participant of any Essence, nor can be understood ; so that if any Man endeavour to express it in Words, or comprehend it by Thought, he is deceived, because he putteth together Things contrary and repugnant ; yet that which is not, as far as it is spoken, is not a pure Negation of that which is, but implieth a Relation to another, which in some manner is joyned to *Ens* ; so that unless we assume something from that which is, to that which is not, it cannot be distinguished from other Things ; but thus, as many Kinds as they are of *Ens*, so many are there of *Non-Ens*, because that which is not an *Ens* is a *Non-Ens*.

Thus much may serve for an Introduction into *Plato's* Philosophy ; some Things, perhaps, are said orderly ; others dispersedly, or confusedly ; yet is all so laid down, that by those which we have delivered, the rest of his Assertions may be found out and contemplated.

After

After so serious a Discourse, it will not be amiss to give the Reader a Poetical Entertainment upon the same Subject :

BEING A

Platonick DISCOURSE,

Written in ITALIAN

By JOHN PICUS Earl of Mirandula,

In Explication of a SONNET,

By HIERONIMO BENIVIENTI.

THE FIRST PART.

SECTION I.

IT is the Principle of the Platonists, that every created Thing hath a three-fold Being; Casual, Formal, Participated. In the Sun there is no Heat, that being but an Elementary Quality, not of Cælestial Nature; yet is the Sun the Cause and Fountain of all Heat. Fire is hot by Nature, and its proper Form. Wood is not hot of it self, yet is capable of receiving that quality by Fire. Thus hath Heat its casual, being in the Sun; its formal in the Fire, its participated in the Fuel. The most noble and perfect of these is the Casual, and therefore Platonists assert, That all Excellencies are in God after this manner of being; that in God is nothing, but from him all things; that Intellect is not in him, but that he is the original Spring of every Intellect. Such is Plotinus's Meaning, when he affirms, a God neither understands nor knows; that is to say, after a formal Way, as Dionysius Areopagita, God is neither an intellectual nor intelligent Nature, but unpeakably exalted above all Intellect and Knowledge.

SECT. II.

Platonists distinguish Creatures into three Degrees; the first comprehends the Corporeal and Visible, as Heaven; Elements, and all compounded of them: The last the Invisible, Incorporeal, absolutely free from Bodies, which properly are called Intellectual (by Divines Angelical) Natures: Betwixt these is a mid Nature, which tho' incorporeal, invisible, immortal, yet moveth Bodies, as being obliged to that Office, called, the Rational Soul; inferior to Angels,

superior to Bodies, subject to those, regent of those, above which is God himself, Author and Principal of every Creature, in whom Divinity hath a casual Being; from whom, proceeding to Angels, it hath a formal Being, and thence is derived into the rational Soul by Participation of their Lustre: Below which, no Nature can assume the Title of Divine.

SECT. III.

THAT the first of these three Natures cannot be multiplied, who is but one; the Principal and Cause of all other Divinity is evidently proved by Platonists, Peripateticks, and other Divines. About the second, (viz. the Angelick and Intellectual) Platonists disagree. Some (as Proclus, Hermias, Syrianus, and many others) betwixt God and the rational Soul, place a great Number of Creatures; part of these they call *νοητά ρήσα*, Intelligible, part Intellectual; which Terms Plato sometimes confoundeth, as in his Phædo. Plotinus, Porphyrius, and generally the most refined Platonists, betwixt God and the Soul of the World, assign only one Creature, which they call the Son of God, because immediately produced by him. The first Opinion complies most with Dionysius Areopagita, and Christian Divines, who assert the Number of Angels to be in a manner Infinite. The Second is the more philosophick, best suiting with Aristotle and Plato, whose Sense we only purpose to express; and therefore will decline the first Path (tho' that only be the Right) to pursue the latter.

SECT. IV.

WE therefore, according to the Opinion of Plotinus, confirmed not only by the best Platonists, but even by Aristotle, and all the Arabians, especially Avicenna, affirm, that God, from Eternity, produced a Creature of incorporeal and intellectual Nature, as perfect as is possible for a created Being; beyond which he produced nothing; for, of the most perfect Cause, the Effect must be most perfect; and the most perfect can be but one: For, of two or more, it is not possible but that should be more or less perfect than the rest, otherwise they would not be two, but the same. This Reason for our Opinion, I rather choose, than that which Avicenna alledges, founded upon this Principle, that from one Cause, as one, can proceed but one Effect. We conclude therefore, that no Creature, but this first Mind, proceeds immediately from God; for, of all other Effects issuing from this Mind, and all other second Causes, God is only the mediate Efficient. This by Plato, Hermes, and Zoroaster, is called the Daughter of God, the Mind, Wisdom, Divine Reason, by some interpreted the Word; not meaning (with our Divines) the Son of God, he not being a Creature, but one Essence, co-equal with the Creator.

SECT. V.

ALL understanding Agents have in themselves the Form of that which they design to effect; as an Architect hath in his Mind a Figure of the Building he undertakes, which, as his Pattern, he exactly strives to imitate. This Platonists call the Idea, or Exemplar, believing it more perfect than that which is made after it; and this manner of Being, Ideal, or Intelligible, the other Material and Sensible. So that when a Man builds a House, they affirm there are two, one Intellectual in the Workman's Mind; the other sensible, which he makes in Stone, Wood, or the like; expressing in that Matter the Form he hath conceived. To this Dante alludes.

— None any Work can frame,
Unless himself become the same.

Herupon they say, tho' God produced only one Creature, yet he produced all, because in it he produced the Ideas and Forms of all, and that in their most perfect Being, that is, the Idea; for which Reason, they call this Mind, the Intelligible World.

SECT. VI.

After the Pattern of that Mind, they affirm this sensible World was made; and the Exemplar being the most perfect of all created Things, it must follow, that this Image thereof be as perfect as its

Nature will bear. And since Animate Things are more perfect than the Inanimate; and of those, the Rational than the Irrational; we must grant, this World hath a Soul perfect above all others. This is the first Rational Soul, which, tho' Incorporeal, and Immaterial, is destined to the Function of governing and moving Corporeal Nature. Not free from the Body, as that Mind whence from Eternity it was derived, as was the Mind from God. Hence Platonists argue, the World is eternal; its Soul being such, and not capable of being without a Body, that also must be from Eternity. As likewise the Motion of the Heavens, because the Soul cannot be without moving.

SECT. VII.

THE ancient Ethnick Theologians, who cast Poetical Veils over the Face of their Mysteries, express these three Natures by other Names. Cœlum they call God in himself; he produced the first Mind, Saturn; Saturn, the Soul of the World, Jupiter. Cœlum implies Priority and Excellence, as in the Firmament, the first Heaven. Saturn signifies Intellectual Nature, wholly employed in Contemplation. Jupiter, active Life; consisting in moving and governing all subordinate to it. The Properties of the two latter agree with their Planets. Saturn makes Men contemplative, Jupiter imperious. The Speculative bused about Things above them, the Practick beneath them.

SECT. VIII.

Which three Names are promiscuously used upon these Grounds. In God we understand first his Excellence, which, as Cause, he hath above all his Effects; for this he is called Cœlus. Secondly, the Production of those Effects, which denotes Conversion towards Inferiors; in this respect he is sometimes called Jupiter; but with an Addition, Optimus Maximus. The first Angelick Nature hath more Names, as more Diversity. Every Creature consists of Power and Act; the first, Plato in Phædo, calls infinite; the second, finite. All Imperfections in the Mind are by reason of the first, all Perfections, from the latter. Her Operations are threefold. About Superiors, the Contemplation of God; about the Knowledge of herself; about Inferiors, the Production and Care of this sensible World: These three proceed from Act. By Power she descends to make inferior Things; but in either Respect is firm within herself. In the two first, because Contemplative, she is called Saturn; in the third, Jupiter, a Name principally applied to her Power, as that Part from whence is derived the Act of Production of Things. For the same Reason is the Soul of the World, as she contemplates herself or Superiors, termed Saturn; as she is employed in ordering worldly Things, Jupiter; and since the Government of the World belongs properly to her; the Contemplation to

the Mind; therefore is the one absolutely called Jupiter, the other Saturn.

SECT. IX.

THIS World therefore (as all other Creatures) consisteth of a Soul and Body. The Body is all that we behold, compounded of the four Elements. These have their casual Being in the Heavens (which consist not of them, as sublunary Things; for then it would follow, that these inferior Parts were made before the celestial; the Elements in themselves being simple, by Concurrence causing such Things as are compounded of them: Their former being from the Moon down to the Earth; their participate and imperfect under the Earth, evident in the Fire, Air, and Water, Experience daily finds there; evinced by Natural Philosophers: To which the ancient Theologians anigmatically allude by their four infernal Rivers, Acheron, Cocytus, Styx, and Phlegeton.

It may divide the Body of the World into three Parts; celestial, mundane, infernal. The Ground why the Poets feign the Kingdom of Saturn to be shared betwixt his three Sons, Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto; implying only the three-fold Variation of this corporeal World, which as long as it remains under Saturn, that is, in its Ideal Intellectual Being, is one and undivided, and so more firm and potent; but falling into the Hands of his Sons, that is, changed to this material Being, and by them divided into three Parts, according to the triple Existence of Bodies, is more infirm, and less potent, degenerating from a Spiritual to a Corporeal Estate. The first Part, the Heavenly, they attribute to Jupiter, the last and lowest to Pluto; the middle to Neptune. And because in this Principality is all Generation and Corruption, the Theologians express it by the Ocean, ebbing or flowing continually; by Neptune understanding the Power or Deity that presides over Generation. Yet must we not imagine these to be different Souls, distinctly informing these three Parts; the World herself being one, can have but one Soul; which as it animates the subterranean Parts, is called Pluto; the sublunary, Neptune; the celestial, Jupiter. Thus Plato in Philebo, avers by Jove, is understood a Regal Soul, meaning the principal Part of the World which governs the other. This Opinion, tho' only my own, I suppose is more true than the Exposition of the Grecians.

SECT. X.

Next that of the World, Platonists assign many other rational Souls. The eight principal are those of the Heavenly Spheres, which, according to their Opinion, exceeded not that Number; consisting of the seven Planets, and the Starry Orb. These

are the nine Muses of the Poets; Calliope (the universal Soul of the World) is first, the other Eight are distributed to their several Spheres.

SECT. XI.

PLATO asserts, 'That the Author of the World made the mundane, and all other rational Souls, in one Cup, and of the same Elements; the universal Soul being most perfect, ours least; whose Parts we may observe by this Division. Man, the Chord that ties the World together, is placed in the midst; and as all Mediums participate of their Extremes, his Parts correspond with the whole World; thence called Microcosmus. In the World is, first, Corporeal Nature, eternal in the Heavens; Corruptible in the Elements, and their Compound; as Stones, Metals, &c. Then Plants. The third Degree is of Beasts. The fourth, rational Souls. The fifth, Angelical Minds. Above these is God, their Origin. In Man are likewise two Bodies, one eternal, the Platonist's Vehiculum Cœleste, immediately informed by the rational Soul; the other corruptible, subject to Sight, consisting of the Elements: Then the vegetative Faculty, by which generated and nourished. The third Part is Sensitive and Motive. The fourth, Rational; by the Latin Peripateticus believed the last and most noble Part of the Soul: Yet, above that is the Intellectual and Angelick, the most excellent Part whereof we call the Soul's Union, immediately joining it to God, in a Manner resembling him; as in the other Angels, Beasts, and Plants. About these Platonists differ; Proclus and Porphyry only allow the rational Part to be immortal; Zenocrates and Speusippus the sensitive also; Numenius and Plotinus, the whole Soul.

SECT. XII.

IDEAS have their casual Being in God, their Formal in the first Mind, their Participated in the rational Soul. In God they are not, but produced by him in the Angelick Nature; through this communicated to the Soul, by whom illuminated, when she reflects on her intellectual Parts, she receives the true Forms of Things, Ideas. Thus differ the Souls of Men from the celestial; those in their bodily Functions recede not from the Intellectual, at once contemplating and governing, Bodies ascend to them, they descend not. Those employed in Corporeal Office are deprived of Contemplation, borrowing Science from Sense, to this wholly inclined, full of Errors. Their only Means of Release from this Bondage, is, the obligatory Life; which by sensible Beauties, exciting in the Soul a Remembrance of the Intellectual, raises her from this terrene Life, to the eternal; by the Flame of Love refined into an Angel.

The Second PART.

S E C T. I.

THE apprehensive Faculties of the Soul are employed about Truth and Falshood ; assenting to one, dissenting from the other. The first is Affirmation, the second Negation. The Desiderative converse in good and ill, inclining to this, declining to that. The first is Love, the second Hate. Love is distinguished by its Objects ; if of Riches, termed Covetousness ; of Honour, Ambition ; of heavenly Things, Piety ; of Equals, Friendship : These we exclude, and admit no other Signification, but the Desire to possess what in itself, or at least in our Esteem is fair ; of a different Nature from the Love of God to his Creatures, who comprehending all, cannot Desire or want the Beauty and Perfections of another, and from that of Friends which must be reciprocal. We therefore with Plato define it, ὁρᾷς τὴν καλῶν, the Desire of Beauty. Desire is an Inclination to real or apparent Good. As there are divers Kinds of Good, so of Desire. Love is a Species of Desire, Beauty of Good. Desire is natural or knowing. All Creatures have a particular Perfection by Participation of the divine Goodness. This is their End, including that Degree of Felicity whereof they are capable, to which Centre they tend. This Desire we call natural ; a great Testimony of divine Providence, by which they are unwittingly (as an Arrow by the Archer) directed to their Mark. With this all Creatures desire God, as being the original Good imprinted, and participating in every Particular. This is in every Nature, as more or less capable ; addressed to Ends more or less noble ; yet, is the ultimate End of all the same, to enjoy God, as far as they may : Thus, as the Psalmist, Every Thing worships and praiseth God ; like Suppliants, turning and offering themselves up to him, saith Theodoret :

Sect. II.

THE other Species of Desire is employed only about Things known, given by Nature, that to every apprehensive Faculty, there might be a desiderative ; to embrace what it judgeth good, to refuse what it esteemeth evil ; in its own Nature inclined to good. None ever desires to be miserable ; but the apprehensive Virtue many Times mistaking evil for good, it oft falls out that the desiderative (in itself blind) desires evil. This in some Sense may be said voluntarily, for none can force it ; in another Sense, not voluntarily, deceived by the Judgment of its Companion. This is Plato's Meaning, when he saith, " No Man Sins willingly.

a In Timæo, καλὴν αἰσὶν ὁρᾷς ἀπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ

Sect. III.

IT is the Property of every desiderative Virtue, that he who desires, possesseth in Part the Thing he desires, in Part not ; for, if he were wholly deprived of its Possession, he would never desire it : This is verified two Ways. First, nothing is desired unless it be known ; and to know a Thing is in some Part to possess it. So Aristotle, ^b The Soul is all, because it knows all. And in the Psalmist God saith, All Things are mine, I know them. Secondly, there is always some Convenience and Resemblance betwixt the Desirer and Desired ; every Thing delights and preserves itself by that, which by natural Affinity is most conformable to it ; by its Contrary is grieved and consumed. Love is not betwixt Things unlike ; Repugnance of two opposite Natures is natural Hate ; Hate is a Repugnance with Knowledge. Hence it followeth, that the Nature of the Desired, is in some manner in the Desirer, otherwise there would be no Similitude betwixt them ; yet imperfectly ; else it were vain for it to seek what it intirely possesseth.

Sect. IV.

AS Desire generally follows Knowledge, so several Knowings are annexed to several desiring Powers. We distinguish the Knowing into three Degrees, Sense, Reason, Intellect, attended by three desiderative Virtues, Appetite, Election, Will. Appetite is in Brutes, Election in Men, Will in Angels. The Sense knows only corporeal Things, the Appetite only desires such ; the Angelick Intellect is wholly intent on Contemplation of spiritual Conceptions, not inclining to material Things, but when dressed of Matter, and spiritualiz'd, their Will is only fed with temporal spiritual Good. Rational Nature is the Mean betwixt these Extremes ; sometimes descending to Sense, sometimes elevated to Intellect ; by its own Election complying with the Desires of which she pleaseth. Thus it appears, that corporeal Objects are desired, either by sensual Appetite, or Election of Reason inclining to Sense ; Incorporeal by Angelick Will, or the Election of Reason, elevated to intellectual Height.

Sect. V.

Beauty in general, is, a Harmony resulting from several Things proportionably concurring to

b De anima, 3. 9.

constitute a Third. *In respect of which Temperament, and Mixture of various Natures, agreeing in the Composition of one, every Creature is fair; and in this Sense no simple Being is beautiful, not God himself; this Beauty begins after him, arising from Contrariety, without which is no Composition; it being the Union of Contraries, a friendly Enmity, a disagreeing Concord; whence Empedocles makes Discord and Concord the Principles of all Things; by the first understanding the Variety of the Natures compounding; by the second, their Union; adding, that in God only there is no Discord, he not being the Union of several Natures; but, a pure uncompounded Unity. In these Compositions the Union necessarily predominates over the Contrariety, otherwise the Fabric would be dissolved. Thus in the Fictions of the Poets, Venus loves Mars; this Beauty cannot subsist without Contrariety; she curbs and moderates him, this Temperament allays the Strife betwixt these Contraries. And in Astrology, Venus is placed next to Mars, to check his destructive Influence; as Jupiter next Saturn, to abate his Malignity. If Mars were always subject to Venus (the Contrariety of Principles to their due Temper) nothing would ever be dissolved.*

SECT. VI.

THis is Beauty in the largest Sense, the same with Harmony; whence God is said to have framed the World with mystical harmonious Temperament. But Harmony properly implies a melodious Agreement of Voices; and Beauty in a strict Acceptation relates to a proportionable Concord in visible Things, as Harmony in audible. The Desire of this Beauty is Love; arising only from one knowing Faculty, the Sight; and that gave Plotinus, (Ennead. 3. lib. 5. 3.) occasion to derive this Love, from *ὄρασις* Sight. Here the Platonist may object, If Love be only of visible Things, how can it be applied to Ideas, invisible Natures? We answer, Sight is twofold, corporeal and spiritual; the first is that of Sense, the other the intellectual Faculty, by which we agree with Angels; this Platonists call Sight, the corporeal being only an Image of this. So Aristotle, Intellect is that to the Soul which Sight is to the Body. Hence is Minerva (*Πρόνοια*) by Homer called *γλαυκῶπις*, Bright-eyed. With this Sight Moses, St. Paul, and other Saints, beheld the Face of God; this Divines call intellectual, intuitive Cognition, the beatific Vision, the Reward of the Righteous.

SECT. VII.

AS Sight, so Beauty (its Object) is twofold, the two Venus's celebrated by Plato [Sympos.] and our Poet scribble, called *Vulgar Venus*. Intellectual in Ideas (which are the Object of the Intellect, as Colour of Sight) named *Celestial Venus*. Love also

is twofold, *Vulgar and Celestial*; for as Plato saith [Sympos.] There must necessarily be as many Lovers as Venus's.

SECT. VIII.

Venus then is Beauty, whereof Love is generated; properly his Mother, because Beauty is the Cause of Love, not as productive Principle of this Act, to love, but as its Object; the Soul being the efficient Cause of it, as of all his Acts; Beauty the material. For in Philosophy, the efficient is assimilated to the Father, the material to the Mother.

SECT. IX.

Celestial Love is an intellectual Desire of ideal Beauty: Ideas (as we said before) are the Patterns of Things in God, as in their Fountain; in the Angelick Mind, essential; in the Soul by Participation, which with the Substance partakes of the Ideas and Beauty of the first Mind. Hence it follows, that Love of celestial Beauty in the Soul, is not celestial Love perfectly, but the nearest Image of it. Its truest Being is with the Desire of ideal Beauty in the first Mind, which God immediately adorns with Ideas.

SECT. X.

Love (saith Plato) was begot on Penia, by Poros (the Son of Metis) in Jupiter's Orchard, being drunk with Nectar, when the Gods met to celebrate Venus's Birth. Nature in itself inform, when it receives Form from God is the Angelick Mind; this Form is Ideas, the first Beauty; which in this Descent from their divine Fountain, mixing with a different Nature, become imperfect. The first Mind, by its Opaciously eclipsing their Lustre, desires that Beauty which they have lost; this Desire is Love; begot when Poros the Affluence of Ideas mixed with Penia, the Indigence of that inform Nature we termed Jupiter, (1. 8.) in whose Garden the Ideas are planted, with those the first Mind adorned, was by the Ancients named Paradise; to which contemplative Life and eternal Felicity Zoroastres inviting us, saith, Seek, seek Paradise. Our Divines transfer it to the Caelum Empyreum, the Seat of the happy Souls, whose Blessedness consists in Contemplation and Perfection of the Intellect, according to Plato. This Love begot on Venus's Birth-day, that is, when the ideal Beauty, tho' imperfectly, is infused into the Angelick Mind; Venus yet as a Child, not grown to Perfection. All the Gods assembled at this Feast, that is, their Ideas, (as by Saturn we understand both the Planet and his Idea) an Expression borrowed from Parmenides. These Gods then are those Ideas that precede Venus (she is the Beauty and Grace resulting from their Variety.) Invited to a Banquet

Banquet of Nectar and Ambrosia. Those whom God feasts with Nectar and Ambrosia, are eternal Beings, the rest not; these Ideas of the Angelick Mind, are the first Eternals; Porus was drunk with Nectar, this ideal Affluence fill'd with Eternity; other Ideas were not admitted to the Feast, nor ended with Immortality.

Orpheus upon the same Grounds saith, Love was born before all other Gods, in the Bosom of Chaos: Because Nature full of indistinct imperfect Forms (the Mind replenish'd with confused Ideas) desires their Perfection.

Sect. XI.

THE Angelick Mind desires to make these Ideas perfect, which can only be done by Means opposite to the Causes of their Imperfection, these are Recession from their Principle, and Mixtion with a contrary Nature. Their Remedy, Separation from the unlike Nature, and Return and Conjunction (as far as possible) with God. Love, the Desire of this Beauty, excites the Mind to Conversion and Re-union with him. Every Thing is more perfect as nearer its Principle; this is the first Circle. The Angelick Mind, proceeding from the Union of God, by Revolution of intrinsecal Knowledge, returneth to him. Which with the Ancients is Venus adulta, grown to Perfection. Every Nature that may have this Conversion, is a Circle; such alone are the Intellect and Rational, and therefore only capable of Felicity, the obtaining their first Principle, their ultimate End and highest Good. This is peculiar to immortal Substances, for the material (as both Platonists and Peripateticks grant) have not this Reflection upon themselves or their Principle. These (the Angelick Mind and rational Soul) are the two intelligible Circles; answerable to which in the corporeal World are two more; the tenth Heaven immovable Image of the first Circle; the celestial Bodies that are moveable, image of the second. The first Plato mentions not, as wholly different and irrepresentable by corporeal Nature. Of the second in Timæo he saith, That all the Circles of this visible Heaven (by him distinguished into the fixed Sphere and seven Planets) represent as many Circles in the rational Soul.

Some attribute the Name of Circle to God; by the ancient Theologists called Cœlus; being a Sphere which comprehends all, as the utmost Heaven includes the World.

In one respect this agrees with God, in another not; the Property of beginning from a Point and returning to it, is repugnant to him, who hath no Beginning, but is himself that indivisible Point from which all Circles begin, and to which they return. And in this Sense it is likewise inconsistent with material Things, they have a Beginning, but cannot return to it.

In many other Properties it agrees with God; he

is the most perfect of Beings, this of Figures; neither admit Addition. The last Sphere is the Place of all Bodies, God of all Spirits. The Soul (say Platonists) is not in the Body, but the Body is in the Soul, the Soul in the Mind, the Mind in God, the utmost Place; who is therefore named by the Cabalists, *ΩPD*.

Sect. XII.

THE three Graces are Handmaids to Venus; Thalia, Euphrosyne, Aglaia; Viridity, Gladness, Splendor; Properties attending Ideal Beauty. Thalia is the Permanence of every Thing in its entire Being; thus is Youth called green, Man being then in his perfect State, which decays as his Years increase, into his last Dissolution. Venus is Proportion, uniting all Things; Viridity, the Duration of it. In the Ideal World, where is the first Venus, is also the first Viridity; for no Intelligible Nature recedes from its Being by growing old. It communicates this Property to sensible Things, as far as they are capable of this Venus, that is, as long as their due Proportion continues. The two other Properties of Ideal Beauty are Illustration of the Intellect, Aglaia; Repletion of the Will with Desire and Joy, Euphrosyne.

Of the Graces, one is painted looking toward us: The Continuation of our Being is no reflex Act. The other two with their Faces from us, seeming to return; the Operations of the Intellect and Will are reflexive. What comes from God to us, returns from us to God.

Sect. XIII.

VENUS is said to be born of the Sea. Matter, the Inform Nature whereof every Creature is compounded, is represented by Water, continually flowing, easily receptable of any Form. This being first in the Angelick Mind, Angels are many Times express'd by Water, as in the Psalms, The Waters above the Heavens praise God continually, so interpreted by Origen; and some Platonists expound the Ocean (stiled by Homer, Father of Gods and Men) this Angelick Mind, Principle, and Fountain of all other Creatures; Gemistius, Neptune; as Commander of all Waters, of all Minds, Angelical and Human. This is that living Fountain, wherof he that drinketh shall never thirst; these are the Waters whereon (David saith) God hath founded the World.

Sect. XIV.

PORUS (the Affluence of Ideas proceeding from God) is stiled by Plato the Son of Metis, (Counsel) in Imitation of the Scripture; whence our Saviour, by Dionysius Areopagus, is termed the Angel of Counsel, that is, the Messenger of God the Father. So Avicenna calls the first Cause conciliative, the Mind not having Ideas from itself, but from God, by whose

Counsel she receiveth Knowledge and Art to frame this visible World.

Sect. XV.

L O V E, ^a according to Plato, is Youngest and Oldest of the Gods. They, as all other Things, be a two-fold Being, Ideal, and Natural. The first God in his natural Being was Love, who dispensed theirs to all the rest; the last in his Ideal. Love was born in the Descent of the Ideas into the Angelick Mind, which could not be perfect 'till they, its Essence, were made so by Love's Conversion to God. The Angelick Mind owing its Natural Being to Love, the other Gods who succeeded this Mind, necessarily are younger than He in their natural Being, though they precede him in their Ideal, as not born 'till these Ideas, though imperfectly, were joined to the informed Nature.

Sect. XVI.

T H E Kingdom of Necessity is said to be before that of Love. Every Creature consists of two Natures, Material, the imperfect, (which we here understand by Necessity) and Formal, the Occasion of Perfection. That whereof it most partakes is said to be predominant, and the Creature to be subject to it. Hence is Necessity (Matter) supposed to reign when the Ideas were imperfect, and all Imperfections to happen during that Time. All Perfections after Love began his Reign; for, when the Mind was by him converted to God, that which before was imperfect in her, was perfected.

Sect. XVII.

V E N U S is said to command Fate. The Order and Concatenation of Causes and Effects in this sensible World, called Fate, depends on the Order of the Intelligible World, Providence. Hence Platonists place Providence (the ordering of Ideas) in the first Mind, depending upon God, its ultimate End, to which it leads all other Things. Thus Venus, being the Order of those Ideas, whereon Fate, the World's Order, depends, commands it.

Fate is divided into three Parts, Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos. That which is one in Providence, indivisible in Eternity, when it comes into Time and Fate, is divisible into Past, Present, and Future. Others apply Atropos to the fixed Sphæra, Clotho to the seven Planets, Lachesis to sublunary Things.

Temporal, Corporeal Things only are subjected to Fate; the Rational Soul being Incorporeal, predominates over it, but is subjected to Providence, to serve which is true Liberty; by whom the Will (obeying its Laws) is led to the Acquisition of her desired End. And as often as she endeavours to loose herself from this Servitude, of Free, she becomes a Servant and

Slave to Fate, of whom before she was the Mistress. To deviate from the Laws of Providence, is to forsake Reason to follow Sense and Irrational Appetite, which being corporeal, are under Fate. He that serves these, is much more a Servant than those he serves.

Sect. XVIII.

A S from God Ideas descend into the Angelick Mind, by which the Love of Intellectual Beauty is begun in her, called Divine Love; so the same Ideas descend from the Angelick Mind into the Rational Soul, so much the more imperfect in her, as she wants of Angelical Perfection. From these springs Human Love. Plato discourseth of the first, Plotinus of the latter; who by the same Argument whereby he proves Ideas not Accidental, but Substantial in the Angelick Mind, evinceth likewise the special Reason, the Ideas in the Soul to be substantial, terming the Soul Venus, as having a specious splendid Love, in Respect of these special Reasons.

Sect. XIX.

Vulgar Love is the Appetite of sensible Beauty through corporeal Sight. The Cause of this Beauty is the visible Heaven by its moving Power. As our motive Faculty consists in Muscles and Nerves (the Instruments of its Operation) so the Motive Faculty of Heaven is fitted with a Body proper for Circular Semipternal Motion; through which Body the Soul (as a Painter with his Pencil) changeth this inferior Matter into various Forms. Thus vulgar Venus (the Beauty of material Forms) hath her casual Being from the moving Power of the Heaven, her Formal from Colour, enlighten'd by the visible Sun, as Ideas by the Invisible: her Participate in the Figure and just Order of Parts communicated to Sight by Mediation of Light and Colour, by whose Interest only it procures Love.

Sect. XX.

A S when the Ideas descend into the Mind, there ariseth a Desire of enjoying that from whence this Ideal Beauty comes, so when the Species of sensible Beauty flow into the Eye, there springs a two-fold Appetite of Union with that, whence this Beauty is derived, one sensual, the other rational, the Principles of bestial and humane Love. If we follow Sense, we judge the Body wherein we behold this Beauty, to be its Fountain, whence proceeds a Desire of Coition, the most intimate Union with it. This is the Love of irrational Creatures. But Reason knows, that the Body is so far from being its Original, that it is destructive to it, and the more it is severed from the Body, the more it enjoys its own Nature and Dignity. We must not fix with the Species of Sense

in the Body, but refine that Species from all Reliques of corporeal Infection.

And because Man may be understood by the Rational Soul, either considered apart, or in its Union to the Body. In the first Sense, humane Love is the Image of the Celestial; in the second, Desire of sensible Beauty; this being by the Soul abstracted from Matter, and (as much as its Nature will allow) made Intellectual. The greater Part of Men reach no higher than this; others more perfect, remembering that more perfect Beauty which the Soul (before immersed in the Body) beheld, are inflamed with an insurmountable Desire of reviewing it; in Pursuit whereof, they separate themselves as much as possible from the Body, of which the Soul (returning to its first Dignity) becomes absolute Mistress. This is the Image of celestial Love, by which Man ariseth from one Perfection to another, till his Soul (wholly united to the Intellect) is made an Angel. Purged from material Drifts, and transformed into spiritual Flame by this Divine Power, he mounts up to the Intelligible Heaven, and happily rests in his Father's Bosom.

SECT. XXI.

Vulgar Love is only in Souls immersed in Matter, and overcome by it, or at least hindered by Perturbations and Passions. Angelick Love is in the Intellect, eternal as it. Yet but infer'd, the greater Part turning from the Intellect to sensible Things, and corporeal Cares. But so perfect are these celestial Souls, that they can discharge both Functions, rule the Body, yet not be taken off from Contemplation of Superiors. These the Poets signify by Janus with two Faces, one looking forward upon sensible Things, the other on intelligible. Less perfect Souls have but one Face, and when they turn that to the Body, cannot see the Intellect, being deprived of their Contemplation; when to the Intellect, cannot see the Body, neglecting the Care thereof. Hence those Souls that must forsake the Intellect, to apply themselves to corporeal Government, are by Divine Providence confined to caducue, corruptible Bodies; loosed from which, they may in a short Time, if they seek not themselves, return to their Intellectual Felicity. Other Souls, not hindered from Speculation, are tied to eternal incorruptible Bodies.

Celestial Souls then (designed by Janus as the Principles of Time, Motion intervening) behold the Ideal Beauty in the Intellect, to love it perpetually; and inferior sensible Things, not to desire their Beauty; but to communicate this other to them. Our Souls, before united to the Body, are in like manner double-faced; but are then, as it were, cleft asunder, retaining but one, which, as they turn to either Object, sensual or intellectual, is deprived of the other.

Thus is vulgar Love inconsistent with the celestial; and many, ravished at the Sight of intellectual Beauty, become blind to sensible; implied by Callimachus,

Hymn 5. in the Fable of Tyresias, who viewing Pallas naked, lost his Sight; yet, by her, was made a Prophet, closing the Eyes of his Body, she opened those of his Mind, by which he beheld both the present and future. The Ghost of Achilles, which inspired Homer with all Intellectual Contemplations in Poetry, deprived him of corporeal Sight.

Though celestial Love liveth eternally in the Intellect of every Soul, yet only those few make use of it, who declining the Care of the Body, can, with St. Paul, say, Whether in the Body, or out of the Body they know not. To which State a Man sometimes arrives, but continues there but a while, as we see in Ecclesiastes.

SECT. XXII.

Thus in our Soul (naturally indifferent to sensible or intelligible Beauty) there may be three Loves; one in the Intellect, Angelical; the second Human; the third Sensual. The two latter are conversant about the same Object, corporeal Beauty; the sensual fixeth its Intention wholly in it; the human separates it from Matter. The greater Part of Mankind go no further than these two; but they whose Understandings are purified by Philosophy, knowing sensible Beauty to be but the Image of another more perfect, leave it, and desire to see the celestial, of which they have already a Taste in their Remembrance, if they persevere in this mental Elevation, they finally obtain it; and recover that, which tho' in them from the Beginning, yet they were not sensible of, being directed by other Objects.

The Sonnet.

I.

Love, (whose Hand guides my Heart's strict Reins,
Nor, tho' he govern it, disdains
To feed the Fire with pious Care
Which first himself enkindled there.)
Commands my backward Soul to tell
What Flames within her Bosom dwell;
Fear would persuade her to decline
The Charge of such a high Design;
But all her weak Reluctance fails,
'Gainst greater Force no Force avails.
Love to advance her Flight will lend
Those Wings by which he did descend
Into my Heart, where he to rest,
For ever, long since built his Nest:
I, what from thence he dictates, write,
And draw him thus by his own Light.

II.

Love, flowing from the sacred Spring
Of uncreated Good, I sing;
When born; how Heaven he moves; the Soul
Informs, and doth the World controul;

How closely lurking in the Heart,
 With his sharp Weapons subtle Art
 From heavy Earth he Man unties,
 Enforcing him to reach the Skies.
 How kindled, how he flames, how burns,
 By what Laws guided now he turns
 'To Heav'n, now to the Earth descends,
 Now rests 'twixt both, to neither bends.
Apolls, thee I invoke,
 Bowing beneath so great a Weight.
 Love, guide me through this dark Design,
 And imp my shorter Wings with thine.

III.

WHEN from true Heaven the sacred Sun
 Into th' Angelick Mind did run,
 And with enliven'd Leaves adorn,
 Bestowing Form on his First-born ;
 Inflaming by innate Desires,
 She to her chiefest Good aspires ;
 By which Rev-rsion her rich Breast
 With various Figures is imprest ;
 And by this Love exalted turns
 Into the Sun for whom she burns,
 'This Flame, rais'd by the Light that shin'd
 From Heaven into th' Angelick Mind,
 Is eldest Love's religious Ray,
 By Wealth and Want begot that Day,
 When Heav'n brought forth the Queen, whose
 Hand
 The *Cyprian* Sceptre doth command.

IV.

THIS born in amorous *Cypis* Arms,
 The Sun of her bright Beauty warms.
 From this our first Desire accrues,
 Which in new Fetters caught, pursues
 The honourable Path that guides
 Where our eternal Good resides.
 By this the Fire, through whose fair Beams
 Life from above to Mankind streams,
 Is kindled in our Hearts, which glow
 Dying, yet dying greater grow ;
 By this immortal Fountain flows,
 Which all Heaven forms below, bestows ;
 By this descends that Shower of Light
 Which upwards doth our Minds invite ;
 By this th' eternal Sun inspires,
 And Souls with sacred Lustre fires.

V.

AS God doth to the Mind dispense
 Its Being, Life, Intelligence,
 So doth the Mind the Soul acquaint
 How t'understand, to move, to paint ;
 She thus prepar'd the Sun that shines
 In the eternal Breasts Designs,
 And here what she includ'd fuses,
 Exciting every Thing that uses

Motion and Sense (beneath her State)
 To live, to know, to operate.
Inferior Venus hence took Birth ;
 Who shines in Heaven, but lives on Earth,
 And o'er the World her Shadow spreads :
 The elder in the Sun's Glafs reads
 Her Face, through the confused Skreen
 Of a dark Shade obscurely seen ;
 She Lustre from the Sun receives,
 And to the other Lustre gives ;
 Celestial Love on this depends,
 The younger, vulgar Love attends.

VI.

FORM'd by th' eternal Look of God,
 From the Sun's most sublime Abode,
 The Soul descends into Man's Heart,
 Imprinting there with wondrous Art
 What Worth she borrow'd of her Star,
 And brough in her celestial Car ;
 As well as human Matter yields,
 She thus her curious Mansion builds ;
 Yet all those Flames from the divine
 Impression differently decline :
 The Sun, whose figur'd here, his Beams
 Into another's Bosom streams ;
 In whose agreeing Soul he stays,
 And gilds it with his virtuous Rays,
 The Heart in which Affection bred,
 Is thus by pleasing Error fed.

VII.

THE Heart where pleasing Error reigns,
 'Tis Object as her Child maintains,
 By the fair Light that in her shines
 (A rare celestial Gift) refines ;
 And by Degrees at last doth bring,
 To her first Splendors sacred spring :
 From this divine Look, one Sun passes
 Through three refulgent Burning-glasses,
 Kindling all Beauty, which the Spirit,
 The Body, and the Mind inherit.
 The rich Spoils, by th' Eye first caught,
 Are to the Soul's next Hand-maid brought,
 Who there resides : She to the Breast
 Sends them ; reform'd but not express'd :
 The Heart from Matter Beauty takes,
 Of many one Conception makes ;
 And what were meant by Nature's Laws
 Distinct, she in one Picture draws.

VIII.

THE Heart by Love allur'd to see
 Within herself her Progeny ;
 This, like the Sun's reflecting Rays
 Upon the Water's Face surveys ;
 Yet some divine, tho' clouded Light
 Seems here to twinkle, and invite

The pious Soul, a Beauty more
 Sublime, and perfect to adore,
 Who sees no longer his dim Shade
 Upon the Earth's vast Globe display'd,
 But certain Lustre of the true
 Sun's truest Image now in View.
 The Soul thus entering in the Mind,
 There such Uncertainty doth find,
 That she to clearer Light applies
 Her Aims, and near the first Sun flies:
 She by his Splendor beauteous grows,
 By loving whom all Beauty flows

Upon the Mind, Soul, World, and all
 Included in this spacious Ball.

IX.

BUT hold! Love stops the forward Course
 That me beyond my Scope would force.
 Great Power! If any Soul appears
 Who not alone the Blossoms wears,
 But of the rich Fruit is possessor,
 Lend him thy Light, deny the rest.

THE THIRD PART.

TO treat of both Loves belongs to different
 Sciences; vulgar Love to natural or moral
 Philosophy; divine, to Theology or
 Metaphysics. *Solomon* discourseth excellently
 of the first in *Ecclesiastes*, as a natural Philosopher; in
 his *Proverbs* as a moral; of the second in his *Canticles*,
 esteemed the most divine of all the Songs in
 Scripture.

Stanza I.

The chief Order established by divine Wisdom
 in created Things, is, that every inferior Nature
 be immediately governed by the superior, whom,
 whilst it obeys, it is guarded from all Ill, and led,
 without any Obstruction, to its determinate Felicity;
 but, if through too much Affect on to its own
 Liberty, and desire to prefer the licentious Life be-
 fore the profitable, it rebel from the superior Nature,
 it falls into a double Inconvenience. First,
 like a Ship given over by the Pilot, it lights some-
 times on one Rock, sometimes on another, without
 Hope of reaching the Port. Secondly, it loseth
 the Command it had over the Natures subjected to
 it, as it hath deprived its Superior of his. Irrational
 Nature is ruled by another, unfit for its Im-
 perfection to rule any. God by his ineffable Ex-
 cellence provides for every Thing, himself needs
 not the Providence of any other. Betwixt the two
 Extremes, God and Brutes, are Angels and rational
 Souls, governing others, and governed by others.
 The first Hierarchy of Angels immediately illumi-
 nated by God, enlighten the next under them; the
 last (by *Platonists* termed *Dæmons*, by the *Hebrews*
Mal'achim, as *Guardians of Men*) are set over us as we
 over Irrationals. So *Psal. viii.* Whilst the Angels
 continued subject to the divine Power, they retain-
 ed their Authority over other Creatures; but when
Lucifer and his Companions, through inordinate
 Love of his own Excellence, aspired to be equal
 with God, and to be conserved, as he, by their
 own Strength, they fell from Glory to extreme
 Misery; and when they lost the Privilege they

had over others, seeing us freed from their Empire,
 enviously every Hour insidiate our Good. The
 same Order is in the lesser World, our Soul: The
 inferior Faculties are directed by the Superior, whom
 following they err not. The imaginative corrects
 the Mistakes of outward Sense; Reason is illumi-
 nated by the Intellect, nor do we at any Time mis-
 carry, but when the imaginative will not give Cre-
 dit to Reason, or Reason, confident of itself, resists
 the Intellect. In the Desiderative the Appetite is go-
 verned by the Rational, the Rational by the Intel-
 lectual, which our Poet implies, saying,

[*Love, whose Hand guides my Heart strict Reins.*]

The Cognitive Powers are seated in the *Head*,
 the Desiderative in the *Heart*. In every well or-
 dered Soul, the Appetite is governed by intellectual
 Love, implied by the Metaphor of *Reins*, borrowed
 from *Plato* in his *Phædrus*.

[*Love to advance my Flight, will lend
 The Wings by which he did ascend
 Into my Heart——*]

When any superior Virtue is said to *descend*, we
 imply not that it leaves its own Height to come
 down to us, but draws us up to it self; its descend-
 ing to us, is our ascending to it; otherwise such
 Conjunction would be the Imperfection of the Vir-
 tue, not the Perfection of him who receives it.

II.

[*Love flowing from the sacred Spring
 Of uncreated Good——*]

From the Fountain of Divine Goodness into our
 Souls, in which that Influx is terminated.

[*When born, &c.*]

Tho-

The Order, Participation, Conversion of Ideas.
See Part 2. Sect.

[—how Heaven he moves, the Soul
Informs, and doth the World controul.]

Of these three Properties, Love is not the Efficient. God produceth the Ideas in the Angelick Mind, the Mind illustrates the Soul with ideal Beauty ; Heaven is moved by its proper Soul ; but without Love, these Principles do not operate ; he is the Cause of the Mind's Conversion to God, and of the Soul's to the Mind ; without which the Ideas would not descend into the One, nor the specifick Reasons into the Other ; the Soul not illuminated by these, could not elicit this sensible Form out of Matter by the Motion of Heaven.

III.

When the first Emanation from God (the Plenty of Ideas) descended into the Angelick Mind, she, desiring their Perfection, reverts to God, obtaining of him what she covets ; which the more fully she possesseth, the more fervently she loves. This Desire (Celestial Love) born of the obscure Mind and Ideas, is explained in this Stanza :

[—true Heaven—]

God who includes all created Beings, as Heaven all sensible, *lib.* 2. Sect. only spiritual Things, according to *Platonists*, are true and real, the rest but Shadows and Images of these.

[—the sacred Sun—]

The Light of Ideas streaming from God.

[—enlivened Leaves—]

The Metaphor of *Leaves* relates to the Orchard of *Jupiter*, where these Ideas were planted, 2. 10. *Enlivened*, as having in themselves the Principle of their Operation ; Intellection, the noblest Life, as the Psalmist, *Give me Understanding, and I shall live* ; so the *Cabalist* to the second *Sephira*, which is *Wisdom*, attributes the Name of *Life*.

[—adorn bestowing Form—]

To *Adorn* denotes no more than accidental Perfection ; but Ideas are the Substance of the Mind ; and therefore he adds *bestowing Form* ; which, tho' they come to her from without, she receives not as Accidents, but as her first intrinsic Act ; which our Author implies, terminates her *Desires innate*.

[And by this Love exalted turns
Into the Sun, for whom she burns.]

Love transforms the Lover into the Thing loved,

[—Wraith and Want—]

Porus and Penia, 2. 10.

IV.

The Properties of Celestial Love are in this Stanza discovered.

[—In new Fetters caught—]

The Soul being oppress'd by the Body, her Desire of Intellectual Beauty sleeps ; but awakened by Love, is, by the sensible Beauty of the Body, led at last to their Fountain, God.

[—which glow
Dying, yet glowing greater grow.]

Motion and Operation are the Signs of Life, their Privation Death ; in him who applies himself to the intellectual Part, the Rational and the Sensitive fail ; by the Rational he is Man, by the Intellectual communicates with Angels ; as Man he dies, revived an Angel. Thus the Heart dies in the Flames of Intellectual Love ; yet consumes not, but by this Death grows greater, receives a new and more sublime Life. See in *Plato* the Fables of *Alceste* and *Orpheus*.

V.

This Stanza is a Description of Sensible Beauty.

[The Elder in the Sun's Glass reads
Her Face thro' the confused Screen
Of a dark Shade obscurely seen.]

Sensible Light is the Act and Efficacy of Corporeal ; spiritual Light, of Intelligible Beauty. Ideas in their Descent into the inform Angelick Mind, were as Colours and Figures in the Night. As he who by Moon-light seeth some fair Object, desires to view and enjoy it more fully in the Day ; so the Mind, weakly beholding in herself the Ideal Beauty dim and opacous (which our Author calls the *Screen of a dark Shade*) by reason of the Night of her Imperfection, turns, like the Moon, to the eternal Sun, to perfect her Beauty by him ; to whom, addressing herself, she becomes intelligible Light, clearing the Beauty of celestial *Venus*, and rendering it visible to the Eye of the first Mind.

In Sensible Beauty we consider first the Object in itself, the same at Midnight as at Noon. Secondly, the Light, in a manner the Soul thereof. The Author supposeth, that as the first Part of the Sensible Beauty (corporeal Forms) proceeds from the first Part of Intellectual Beauty (ideal Forms) so sensible Light flows from the Intelligence descending upon Ideas.

VI, VII, VIII.

Corporeal Beauty implies, first, the material Disposition of the Body, consisting of Quantity in the Proportion and Distance of Parts; of Quality in Figure and Colour. Secondly, a certain Quality, which cannot be express'd by any Term better than Gracefulness, shining in all that is fair. This is properly *Venus*, Beauty, which kindles the Fire of Love in Mankind; they who affirm it results from the Disposition of the Body, the Sight, Figure, and Colour of Features, are easily confuted by Experience. We see many Persons exact and unaccustomable, in every Part, destitute of this Grace and Comeliness; others less perfect in those particular Conditions, excellently graceful and comely. Thus *Catullus*: Epig. 87.

*Many think Quintia beautiful, fair, and tall,
And straight she is, albeit I grant her all;
But altogether beautiful I deny;
For not one Grace doth that large Shape supply.*

He grants her Perfection of Quality, Figure and Quantity; yet not allows her handsome, as wanting this Grace. This then must, by consequence, be ascrib'd to the Soul; which when perfect and lucid, transfuseth even into the Body some Beams of its Splendor. When *Moses* came from the Divine Vision in the Mount, his Face did shine so exceedingly, that the People could not behold it, unless veiled. *Porphyrius* relates, that when *Plotinus's* Soul was elevated by Divine Contemplation, an extraordinary Brightness appeared in his Looks. *Plotinus* himself avers, that there was never any beautiful Person wicked; that this Gracefulness in the Body is a certain Sign of Perfection in the Soul. Prov. xvii. 24. *Wisdom shineth in the Countenance of the Wise.*

From Material Beauty, we ascend to the first Fountain by six Degrees. The Soul, through the Sight, represents to herself the Beauty of some particular Person, inclines to it, is pleas'd with it; and while she rests here, is, in the first, the most imperfect material Degree. 2. She reforms, by her Imagination, the Image she hath received, making it more perfect as more spiritual; and separating it from Matter, brings it a little nearer Ideal Beauty. 3. By the Light of the Agent Intellect, abstracting this Form from all Singularity, she considers

the Universal Nature of Corporeal Beauty by itself. This is the highest Degree the Soul can reach, whilst she goes no further than Sense. 4. Reflecting upon her own Operation, the Knowledge of Universal Beauty; and, considering that every thing founded in Matter is particular, she concludes this Universality proceeds not from the outward Object, but her intrinsic Power; and reasons thus: If, in the dim Glass of material Phantasm, this Beauty is represented by virtue of my Light, it follows, that beholding it in the clear Mirror of my Substance, divested of those Clouds, it will appear more perspicuous. Thus turning into herself, she finds the Image of Ideal Beauty communicated to her by the Intellect, the Object of Celestial Love. 5. She ascends from this Idea in herself, to the Place where celestial *Venus* is, in her proper Form; who in Fulness of her Beauty, not being comprehensible by any particular Intellect, she, as much as in her lies, endeavours to be united to the first Mind; the chiefest of Creatures, and general Habitation of Ideal Beauty, obtaining this, she terminates and fixeth her Journey. This is the sixth and last Degree. They are all imply'd in the 6th, 7th, and 8th *Stanzas*'.

[Form'd by th' eternal Look, &c.]

Platonists affirm some Souls are of the Nature of *Saturn*, others of *Jupiter*, or some other Planet; meaning, one Soul hath more Conformity in its Nature with the Soul of the Heaven of *Saturn*, than with that of *Jupiter*, and so on the contrary; of which there can be no internal Cause assigned. The External is God, who (as *Plato* in his *Timæus*) soweth and scattereth Souls; some in the Moon, others in other Planets and Stars, the Instruments of Time.

Many imagine the rational Soul descending from her Star, in her *Vehiculum Cæleste*, of herself forms the Body; to which, by that Medium, she is united. Our Author, upon these Grounds, supposeth, that into the *Vehiculum* of the Soul, by her endued with Power to form the Body, is infused from her Star a particular formative Virtue, distinct, according to that Star. Thus the Aspect of one is *Saturnine*, of another *Jovial*, &c. in their Looks were read the Nature of their Souls.

But because inferior Matter is not ever obedient to the Stamp, the Virtue of the Soul is not always equally express'd in the visible Effigies. Hence it happens, that two of the same Nature are unlike; the Matter whereof the one consists being less disposed to receive that Figure than the other; what in that is complete, is in this imperfect. Our Author infers, that the Figures of two Bodies being formed by Virtue of the same Star, this Conformity begets Love.

[From the Sun's most sublime Abode.]

The Tropick of Cancer, by which Souls, according to the Platonists, descend, ascending by Capricorn. Cancer is the House of the Moon, who predominates over the vital Parts; Capricorn, of Saturn, presiding over Contemplation.

[The Heart in which Affection's bred
Is thus by pleasing Error fed]

Frequently, if not always, the Lover believes that which he loves more beautiful than it is; he beholds it in the Image his Soul hath formed of it; so much fairer, as more separate from Matter, the Principle of Deformity. Besides, the Soul is more indulgent in her Affection to this Species, considering it is *her own Child*, produc'd in her Imagination.

[———one Sun passes
Thro' three resurgent Burning-Glasses.]

One Light flowing from God, beautifies the Angelick, the Rational Nature, and the Sensible World.

[——the Soul's first Hand-maid——]

The Imaginative.

[——to the Breast.]

The Breast and Heart here taken for the Soul because her nearest Lodging; the Fountain of Life and Heat.

[Reform'd, but not express'd.]

Reform'd, by the Imagination, from the Deformity of Matter, yet not reduc'd to perfect Immateriality; without which, true Beauty is not express'd.

S P E U S I P P U S.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

Speusippus^a was an *Athenian*, born at *Mirrhyneus* [which belonged to the *Pandionian* Tribe] his Father named *Eurymedon*, his Mother *Potone*, Sister to *Plato*.

^b He was brought up in the domestick Documents of his Uncle *Plato*; ^c who (as he used to say) reformed *Speusippus's* Life after the Pattern of his own.

^d *Plato* had four Kinswomen, Daughters of his Nieces; the Eldest of these he married to *Speusippus*, with a small Portion, thirty *Minæ*, which *Dionysius* had sent him. To this Sum, *Chio*, glad of the Occasion, added a Talent, which *Speusippus* earnestly refused; until at last he was overcome by the just Importunities of the other, to receive it; alledging, that he gave it not as Money, but as Kindness; that such Gifts were to be entertained; for they encreased Honour, the rest were dishonourable; that he ought to accept of the Good-will, tho' he despised the Money. The rest of those Virgins were married richly to *Athenians*, only *Speusippus*, who best deserved, was poor. With these Arguments *Speusippus* was induced to accept of *Chio's* Gift; whereat *Chio* much congratulated his own good Fortune, as having laid hold of an

Occasion, such as, perhaps, faith he, *I shall not meet again in all my Life*.

^e When *Dion* came to *Athens*, *Speusippus* was continually in Company with him, more than any other Friend there, by *Plato's* Advice, to soften and divert *Dion's* Humour, with a facile Companion, such as he knew *Speusippus* to be; and that withal, he knew discreetly how to observe Time and Place in his Mirth; whence *Timon* (in *Scillis*) calls him a good Jester.

The last Time that *Plato*, upon the Importunity of *Dionysius*, went to *Sicily*, *Speusippus* accompanied him. Whilst they lived at *Syracuse*, *Speusippus* kept more Company with the Citizens than *Plato* did; and insinuating more into their Minds, at first they were afraid to speak freely to him, mistrusting him to be one of *Dionysius's* Spies. But, within a while, they began to confide in him, and all agreed in this, to pray *Dion* to come to them, and not to take Care for Ships, Men, or Horses, but to hire a Ship for his own Passage; for the *Sicilians* desired no more, than that he would lend them his Name and Person against the Tyrant.

Speusippus, at his Return to *Athens*, persuaded *Dion* to War against *Dionysius*, and deliver *Sicily*

a Laert. 4. 1.

b Apul. dogm. Plat.

c Plut. de adulat. & amici discrim.

d Chio, Epist. 3.

e Plut. vit. Dion. from

from the Bondage of Tyranny; assuring him, the Country would receive him gladly. *Dion*, upon this Information, receiv'd such Encouragement, that he began secretly to levy Men. The Philosophers much advanc'd his Design. When he went to *Sicily*, he bestow'd a Country-house, which he had purchased since his coming to *Athens*, upon *Speusippus*.

C H A P. II.

His Profession of Philosophy.

PLATO dying in the first Year of the 108th Olympiad, *Theophilus* being Archon, *Speusippus* succeeded him in the School of the Academy, & whom he followed also in his Doctrine.

He first, as *Theodorus* affirms, look'd into the Community, and mutual Assistance of Mathematical Disciplines, as *Plato* did into that of the Philosophical.

He first, according to *Cenaus*, declared those Things, which *Isocrates* conceived not to be divulged; the same, perhaps, which *Cicero* calls *apophthegms of Isocrates*.

He affirmed, that the Mind was not the same, either with *Good* or *One*, but of a peculiar Nature proper to itself.

He set up in the School, which *Plato* had built, the Images of the Graces.

He exacted Money of his Disciples, contrary to the Custom of *Plato*.

The two Women, who were *Plato's* Auditors, *Lothemia* the *Mantinean*, and *Axiotea* the *Philasion*, heard *Speusippus* likewise.

Having continued *Master* of the School eight Years, he, at last, by reason of his infirm Disposition, much debilitated by the Palsy, sent to *Xenocrates*, desiring him to come and take from him the Government of the School, which *Xenocrates* did.

C H A P. III.

His Writings.

He wrote many Things, chiefly in Philosophy, Commentaries and Dialogues, of which were,

Aristippus the *Cyrenaick*.

Of Riches 1.

Of Pleasure 1.

Of Justice 1.

Of Philosophy 1.

Of Friendship 1.

Of the Gods 1.

The Philosopher 1.

To Cephalus 1.

Cephalus 1.

Clitomachus, or *Lyfias* 1.

The Citizen 1.

Of the Soul 1.

To Gryllus 1.

Aristippus 1.

The Confutation of Arts 1.

Commentary Dialogues.

Artificial 1.

Dialogues of Likeness in Things 10.

Divisions and Arguments to Things like.

Of the Genus's and Species of Examples.

To Amarturus.

Encomium of Plato.

Epistles to *Dion*, *Dionysius*, *Philip*.

Of Law.

The Mathematician.

Mandrobolus.

Lyfias.

Definitions, of all these Writings the only extant.

Orders of Commentaries.

Verfes.

Phavorinus, in the second of his Commentaries, saith, That *Aristotle* paid three Talents for his Books.

C H A P. IV.

His Death.

HE was (as *Timotheus* saith) very infirm of Body, inasmuch that he was fain to be carried up and down the Academy in a Kind of a running Chair. Riding in this Manner, he one Day met *Diogenes*, whom saluting, he said, Joy be with you: But not with you, answered *Diogenes*, who can endure to live, being in that Condition. At length he died willingly through Grief, as *Laertius* affirms, who elsewhere citing *Plutarch*, in the Lives of *Lyfander* and *Scylla*, saith, he died of the *Phthiriasis*; but there is no such Thing extant in *Plutarch*.

Tho' he followed *Plato* in his Opinions, yet he did not imitate his Temper; for he was austere, cholerick, and had not so great Command over his Pleasures. In Anger he threw a Dog into a Well, and indulging to Pleasure, he went to the Marriage of *Cassander* in *Macedonia*. He was also so great a Lover of Money, that some Poems which he had written, not very good, he sung publicly for Gain; for which Vices, *Dionysius* writing to him, thus derides him: And we may learn *Philosophy* from our *Arcadian She-Scholar*. *Plato* took no Money of his Scholars, *who exact it whether they are willing or not*. *Athenæus* cites the same Epistle, after he had reproached him for Avarice and Voluptuousness, he

¹ Laert. 4. 1. ² Ibid. 4. 2. ³ Ibid. ⁴ Epist. ad At. 2. 1. ⁵ Stob. Phys. 1. 2. ⁶ Laert. 4. 1. 2. ⁷ Ibid. 4. 3. ⁸ Laert. 4. 1. ⁹ Ibid. ¹⁰ Ibid. ¹¹ Laert. 4. 3. ¹² Ibid. ¹³ Deigen. lib. 7.

objects his Collections of Money from many Persons; his Love to *Lysippos* the Sardinian Courtezan; after all this adding, *Why do you accuse us of Avarice, who yourself admit not any sordid Way of Gain? Did not you, after Hermias's Debt was satisfied, make Collections in his Name amongst his Friends, to your own Use?*

To a rich Man in love with a deformed Person; *What need you her, saith he, for ten Talents you may have a handsomer?*

To him *Simonides* wrote Histories, wherein he related the Actions of *Dion* and *Bion*.

There was another *Speusippus*, a Physician of *Alexandria*.

t Laert. 4. 4.

X E N O C R A T E S.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, and living with Plato.

Xenocrates was of Chalcidon, Son of * *Agatho*, or * *Agathenor*. From the Years of his Life 82, which in all Probability ended when *Polemo* succeeded in the School, the first Year of the 116th Olympiad. It may be gathered, that he was born in the fourth Year of the 95th Olympiad. He heard *Plato* from his Childhood. He was dull of Apprehension; whence *Plato* comparing him *Aristotle*, said *One needs a Spur, the other a Bridle; what an Ass and what a Horse have I to yoke together!* He was severe, and had a sad Look, for which Reason *Plato* oft said to him, *Xenocrates, Sacrifice to the Graces*, which was an usual Phrase to melancholly People. * Another Time *Plato* sharply reprehended the Roughness of his Disposition, which he took quietly and unmoved, saying to one that infligated him to reply in his own Defence, *No, this is an Advantage to me.*

† He accompanied *Plato* in his Voyage to *Sicily*, where † at a drinking Feast, with *Dionysius*, being honoured with a Wreath of Gold, instead of a Garland of Flowers, which were bestowed upon the Guests upon such Occasions, when he went away, he put it upon the Statue of *Mercury*, where they used to leave their ordinary Garments.

* When *Dionysius* fell out with *Plato*, and threatened to find one that should cut off his Head, *Xenocrates* made Answer, *not before he hath cut off this*, shewing his own.

† *Ælian* saith, that *Xenocrates* having taken a Journey into his own Country, *Aristotle* with his Disciples came to *Plato*. *Speusippus* was at that Time sick, and therefore could not be with *Plato*. *Plato* being fourscore Years old, (which falls upon the fourth Year of the 107th Olympiad, the Year before his Death) his Memory through Age much decay'd, *Aristotle* fell upon him with subtle sophistical Questions, whereupon *Plato* gave over walking

in publick, and retired with his Friends to his own House. At the End of the three Months *Xenocrates* returning from his Travel, finds *Aristotle* walking where he had left *Plato*, and seeing that he and his Friends, when they went out of the School went not to *Plato*, but to some other Part of the City, he asked one there present, what was become of *Plato*, thinking he had been sick; the other answered, he is not sick, but *Aristotle* hath molested him, and driven him out of the School, so that now he teacheth Philosophy in his own Garden. *Xenocrates* bearing this, went immediately to *Plato*, whom he found discoursing to his Disciples, Persons of great Worth and Eminence. As soon as he had ended his Discourse, he saluted *Xenocrates*, as he used, very kindly, and *Xenocrates* him. When the Company was dismiss'd, *Xenocrates*, without speaking a Word of it to *Plato*, getting his Friends together, after he had chid *Speusippus* for permitting *Aristotle* to possess the School, made a Head against *Aristotle*, and opposed him with his utmost Force, until as last he re-instat'd him in the School. Thus *Ælian*. But this Story, which he acknowledgeth to have taken upon no better Authority than vulgar Report, disagrees with many Circumstances of *Aristotle's* Life, supported by far more credible Testimonies.

CHAP. II.

His Profession of Philosophy.

After *Speusippus* had held the School eight Years, finding himself not able to continue that Charge any longer, he sent to *Xenocrates*, intreating him to take it upon him, which *Xenocrates* did † in the second Year of the 110th Olympiad, *Lyfimocheides* being Archon, not without Emulation and Dissention with the Peripateticks, for † *Aristotle*, at his

u Laert. 4. 6.

w Suid.

x *Ælian*, 14. 9.

y Laert. 4. 1.

z *Ath. Deips.*

a Laert. 4. 11.

b *Vit. Arist.* 3. 19.

c Laert. 4. 3. d Laert. vit. *Arist.*

Return out of Macedonia, finding *Xenocrates* possessed of the Academy, instituted a School in Opposition to him, in the *Lycæum*, saying,

*Silent to be now most disgraceful were,
And see Xenocrates possess the Chair.*

* Some affirm, that *Alexander* falling out with *Aristotle*, to vex him, sent a Present to *Xenocrates* of thirty Talents, whereof *Xenocrates* took but 3000 Atticks, and sent back the rest, saying, *That he needed it most that was to maintain so many.* Or as *Stobæus* relates it, having entertained the Messenger after his usual Fashion, *Go and tell Alexander, saith he, that after the Rate I live, I shall not need fifty Talents in all my Life.* ^b The Money being brought back to *Alexander*, he asked, if *Xenocrates* had not any Friend, adding, that as for his own Friends, the Wealth of *Darius* was too little for them.

¹ He asserted *Unity and Duality* to be Gods; the first as it were Masculine, in the Nature of a Father, reigning in Heaven, whom he called also *Jupiter, the Odd, and the Mind.* The other, as it were female, and the Mother commanding all Things under Heaven. This he called the Mind of the Universe. He likewise asserts Heaven to be divine, and the fiery Stars to be Olympian Gods, the rest sublunary invisible Deities, which permeate through the Elements of Matter, whereof that which passeth through the Air is called *Juno*, that which through the Water *Neptune*, that which through the Earth *Ceres*. This the Stoicks borrowed from him, as he the former from *Plato*.

* He continued Master of the School twenty five Years, until the first Year of the hundred and sixth Olympiad; then his Disciple *Polemo* succeeded him. During that Time, he lived very retired in the Academy; and if at any Time he went into the City, all the Tradesmen and other People thronged to see him.

C H A P. III.

His Virtues and Apotegms.

AMONGST his other Virtues; he was very remarkable for his Continence, of which there is this Instance: *Phryne*, a famous *Athenian* Courtesan, having laid a Wager with some young Men his Disciples, that he could not resist her Enticements, stole privately into his Bed. The next Morning being questioned and laughed at by his Disciples, she said, the Wager they laid was of a Man, not of a Stone. To this End he used to mortify himself by Incision, and cauterising of his Flesh.

* His Wisdom and Sanctity was much revered

by the *Athenians*; for being to give his Testimony, and to swear, as the Custom was, that he spoke nothing but Truth, the Judges all rose up, and cried out, that he should not swear, indulging that to his Sincerity which they did not allow to one another.

* Being sent with others to *Philip* on an Embassy, the rest received Gifts from him, and went to treat in private with him; *Xenocrates* did neither, and for that Part was not invited by him. The Ambassadors returning to *Athens* said, that *Xenocrates* went along with them to no Purpose: Whereupon the *Athenians* were ready to impose a Muft upon him; but when they understood by him, that they were at that Time to consider chiefly concerning the Commonwealth, *Philip* having corrupted the rest with Gifts, and that he would not accept any, they bestowed double Honours upon him. *Philip* said afterwards, that of those who came to him, only *Xenocrates* would not take any Gifts.

Being sent in the Time of the *Lamiack War* (which was about the second Year of the hundred and fourth Olympiad) Ambassador to *Antipater*, about the Redemption of some *Athenian* Prisoners, *Antipater* invited him to sit down to Supper, where-to he answered in the Words of *Ulysses* in *Homer*:

*O Circe, what Man is there that is good,
Before his Friends are freed, can think of Food.*

Antipater was so pleased with the ingenious Application of these Verses, that he caused the Prisoners immediately to be set at Liberty.

* His Clemency, saith *Ælian*, extended not only to Men, but, often to irrational Creatures; as once, when a Sparrow, pursued by a Hawk, flew to his Bosom, he took it, much pleased, and hid it till the Enemy were out of Sight; and when he thought it was out of Fear and Danger, opening his Bosom, he let it go, saying, that he had not betrayed a Suppliant.

* *Dion* deriding him, he refused to make any Answer in his own Defence; for, a Tragedy, saith he, being mocked by a Comedy, needs not a Reply.

To one, who tho' he neither had learned Music, Geometry, nor Astronomy, yet desired to be his Disciple; *Away*, saith he, *you have not the Handles of Philosophy.* Some affirm he said, *I teach not to card Wool.*

Antipater coming to *Athens*, met and saluted him; which Salute he returned not, until he had made an End of the Discourse he was about.

* He was nothing proud. He assigned a particular Business to every Part of the Day; a great Part thereof to Meditation; one Part to Silence.

* Laert. vit. Arist. f Laert. vit. Xen. g Ethic. Serm. 37. h Stob. Eth. Serm. 74. i Stob. Eth. Phys. §8. k Laert. 4. 14. l Laert. 4. 7. Val. Max. 4. 3. m Val. Max. 2. 10. Cic. ad Attic. 2. 16. n Laert. 4. 8. o ÆL. var. lib. 30. 3. Laert. p Laert. 4. 10. q Laert. ibid. Stob. Eth. 23.

Whensoever he pierced a Vessel of Wine, it was soured before he spent it, and the Broths that were made for him, were often thrown away the next Day; whence proverbially was used, *the Cheese of Xenocrates*, of Things that last well, and are not easily consumed.

Holding his Peace at some detraactive Discourse, they asked him why he spoke not? Because, saith he, I have sometimes repented of speaking, but never of holding my Peace.

Yet this Man, saith *Laertius*, because he could not pay the Fine imposed upon Aliens, the *Athenians* sold. *Demetrius Phalerius* bought him, contenting both Parties, the *Athenians* with their Tribute, *Xenocrates* with his Liberty.

CHAP. IV.

His Writings.

HE left many Writings, Verses, Exhortations, and Orations, their Titles these.

Of Nature 6 Books.
Of Wisdom 6.
Of Riches 1.
Areas 1.
Of Indefinite 1.
Of a Child 1.
Of Continence 1.
Of Profitable 1.
Of Free 1.
Of Death 1. which some conceive to be the same with that which is extant amongst the spurious *Platonick* Dialogues, under the Title of *Axiobus*.
Of Voluntary 1.
Of Friendship 2.
Of Equity 1.
Of Contrary 2.
Of Beatitude 2.
Of Writing 1.
Of Memory 1.
Of False 1.
Callicles 1.
Of Prudence 2.
Oeconomick 1.
Of Temperance 1.
Of the Power of Law 1.
Of a Common-wealth 1.
Of Sanctity 1.
That Virtue may be taught 1.
Of Ens 1.
Of Fate 1.
Of Passions 1.
Of Lives 1.
Of Concord 1.
Of Disciples 2.
Of Justice 1.

Of Virtue 2.
Of Species 1.
Of Pleasure 2.
Of Life 1.
Of Fortitude 1.
Of One 1.
Of Ideas 1.
Of Art 1.
Of Gods 2.
Of the Soul 2.
Of Science 1.
Politick 1.
Of Scientificks 1.
Of Philosophy 1.
Of Parmenides's Opinions 1.
Archidemus, or of Justice 1.
Of Good 1.
Of Things which pertain to Intellect 8.
Solutions concerning Speech 1.
Physical Auscultation 6.
A Summary 1.
Of Genus and Species 1.
Pythagorean Assertions 1.
Solutions 2.
Divisions 8.
Positions 3.
Of Dialectick 14, & 15, & 16.
Of Disciplines concerning Distinctions 9.
Concerning Ratiocination 9.
Concerning Intelligence 4.
Of Disciplines 6.
Concerning Intelligence 2.
Of Geometry 5.
Commentaries 1.
Contraries 1.
Of Numbers 1.
Theory of Arithmetick 1.
Of Intervals 1.
Astrologick 6.
Elements, to Alexander concerning a Kingdom 4.
To Artybas.
To Hephæstion.
Of Geometry 2.
Verses 345.

CHAP. V.

His Death.

HE died in the 82d Year of his Age, by a Fall in the Night into the Basin (wherein he was drowned) probably in the first Year of the 116th Olympiad, for in that Year *Polemo* his Successor took upon him the School.

Laertius saith, there were six more of his Name, but mentions only five. One, very ancient, skilful in Tactics; another of the same City and Family with this Philosopher, Author of the Oration

upon the Death of *Arifnoe*; the fourth, faith he, a Philosopher, who writ in Elegiack Verfe, but not happily, perhaps the fame, who, *Suidas* faith, was

nothing inferior to this *Xenocrates* for Continence; the fifth, a Statuary; the fixth a Writer of Songs, as *Ariftoxeus* affirms.

P O L E M O.

POLEMO was an *Athenian* of *Oea*, (a Town belonging to the *Oenian* Tribe) his Father *Philoftratus* who (according to *Antigonus Corythius*) was a Citizen of great Account, and kept a Chariot and Horfes.

Polemo, in his Youth, was very intemperate and diffolute. He frequently took a Sum of Money, and hid it in a private Corner of fome Street, to fupply his Extravagancies upon Occafion. Even in the Academy were found three *Oboli*, which he had hid under a Pillar, upon the fame Account. This Wildnefs caufed Difcontent betwixt him and his Wife, who, thinking herfelf not well-ufed by him, accused him *as uxorious & idle*.

Neither did he delight (faith *Valerius Maximus*) in Luxury only, but even in the Infamy thereof. On a Time, coming from a Feaft, not after the fetting but rifing of the Sun; and feeing the Door of *Zenocrates* the Philosopher open, full of Wine, fmelling sweet of Unguents, crowned with Garlands, richly attired, he rufhed into his School, which was filled with a Crowd of learned Perfons. Not contented with fo rude an Intrufion, he fat down alfo, intending to make Sport at his excellent Eloquence, and prudent Precepts. Hereupon, all were offended as the Affront deferved; only *Zenocrates*, continuing the fame Countenance and Gesture, fell from the Difcourfe in which he was, and began to fpeak of Modesty and Temperance; with the Gravity of whole Difcourfe, *Polemo* being reduced to Repentance, firft took his Garland off from his Head, and flung it on the Ground. Soon after, he withdrew his Arm within his Cloak; next, he laid afide the Cheerfulnefs of that Look which he had formerly, when he affected Feafting. Laftly, he wholly diverted himfelf of Luxury, and being thus cured by the wholefome Medicine of one Difcourfe, he, from an infamous Prodigal, became a moft excellent Philosopher; being from that Time forward fo addicted to Study, that he fupaffed all the reft, and fucceeded *Zenocrates* in the Government of the School, which he began in the fifth Year of the 116th Olympiad.

After he began to ftudy Philofophy, he had fuch a conftant Behaviour, that he retained always the fame Countenance, and kept the fame Tone in all

his Speech, whereby *Crantor* was taken with him. A mad Dog having bit him by the Knee, he alone of all the Company feem'd to be unconcerned in it, and a Tumult happening thereupon in the City, he asked, without any Difurbance, what was the Matter? In the Theatres alfo, he was nothing moved. When *Nicoftratus* the Poet, firnamed *Chytemneftes*, recited fomething to him and *Crates*, *Crates* was much taken therewith, but he made no more Show than as if he had heard nothing, and was altogether fuch as *Melanbrius* the Painter, in his Books of Picture, hath defcribed him; for he faith, in his Actions was expreffed a Stubbornnefs and Hardnefs.

Polemo ufed to fay, we ought to exercife ourfelves in Things, not in Dialeftick Difciplines, left, fatisfying ourfelves with the Tafte and Meditation of the fuperficial Parts of Science, we become admired for Subtily in Difcourfe, but contradict ourfelves in the Practice of our Life.

He was facete and ingenious, flunning that which *Ariftophanes* imputes to *Euripides*, Sowernefs and Harfhnefs. He taught, not fitting, but walking. The *Athenians* much honour'd him for his great Integrity. He took great Delight in Solitude, whence (for the moft Part) he dwelt in a Garden, about which his Difciples built themfelves little Lodges, near to his School. He was a ftudious Imitator of *Xenocrates* (who, *Arifippus* faith, much loved him) always remembering his Innocence, Severity, and Gravity; to which, like a Dorick Meafure, he conform'd his own Steps.

Antigonus Corythius faith, that from the thirtieth Year of his Age to his Death, he drank nothing but Water.

He held, that the World is God.

He much affected *Sophocles*, chiefly in thofe Places where (to ufe the Phrafe of the Comick Poet) a *Moleftian Dog* feemeth to have written together with him. And whereas *Phrynicius* faith he was

Not fweet, nor flat, but gently fmooth; he faid, that *Homer* was an Epick *Sophocles*, *Sophocles* a Tragick *Homer*.

He died very old of a Confumption, and left behind him many Writings. *Laertius* hath this Epigram upon him.

u Lect. 4. 16. x Lect. 4. 27. y Lect. lib. s 6. 7.

z Lect. 4. 16.

b Ath. Deipn. lib. 2.

c Stob. Phys. 1. 3.

*Wert thou not told, that Polemo lies here,
On whom slow Sickness (Man's worst Plague) prey'd?
No, 'tis the Robe of Flesh he us'd to wear,
Which, e'er to Heaven he mounted, down he laid.*

Of his Disciples are remember'd, *Crates*, *Zeno*
the Stoick, and *Arcefilaus*.

C R A T E S.

C R A T E S was a *Thriasian*, Son of *Antigenes*. He was an Auditor of *Polemo*, and loved by him. He succeeded him in the Government of his School. They both profited so much by one another, that, living, they not only followed the same Institutes, but, even to their last Ends, were alike; and, being dead, were buried in the same Sepulchre. Upon which Occasion, *Antagorus* writ thus upon them both.

*Whoe'er thou art, say, e'er thou possesst by,
Crates and Polemo here buried lie.
Both for their mutual Love no less admir'd,
Than for their Eloquence, by which inspir'd,
O'th' Wisdom they profess'd the Age was proud,
Yet gladly to their sacred Precepts bow'd.*

Hence *Arcefilaus*, when he went from *Theophrastus*, and applied himself to them, said, *They were Gods, or certain Reliques of the Golden Age.*

They were nothing popular, but what *Dionysiodorus*, an ancient Musician, was wont to say, may be applied to these, when he boasted, that none had ever heard him sing, as they had *Ismenius*; nor had ever seen him in a Ship, or at the Fountains. *Antigonus* saith, that he sojourn'd-at *Crantor's*,

d Lect. 4. 21.

C R A N T O R.

C R A N T O R was of *Soli*, much admired in his own Country. He came to *Athens*, where he heard *Xenocrates*, and studied with *Polemo*.

He writ Commentaries, 3000 Verses, whereof some ascribe Part to *Arcefilaus*.

Being asked how he came to be taken with *Polemo*, he answered, from the Tone of his Speech, never exalted nor depressed.

Falling sick, he went to the Temple of *Esculapius*, and walked there; where many resorted to him from several Parts, not thinking he stay'd in

when he and *Arcefilaus* lived most friendly, and that *Arcefilaus* dwelt with *Crantor*, *Polemo* with *Crates*, together with *Lyficles*, who was one of the Citizens; and truly, *Polemo*, as is before mentioned, loved *Crates*; *Crantor*, *Arcefilaus*. But *Crates* dying, as *Apollodorus* in the third of his Chronicle, left Books which he had written, partly of Philosophy, partly of Comedy; Orations suited for publick Pleading, or Embassy.

He had many eminent Disciples; of whom was *Arcefilaus*, and *Bion* the *Boristhenite*, afterwards called a *Theodorean*, from that Sect.

There were ten of this Name. The First an ancient Comick Poet.

The Second, an Orator, of the Family of *Iscrates*.

The Third, an Engineer, that went along with *Alexander* in his Expeditions.

The Fourth, a Cynick.

The Fifth, a Peripatetick.

The Sixth, this Academick.

The Seventh, a Grammarian.

The Eighth writ of Geometry.

The Ninth, an Epigrammatick Poet.

The Tenth, of *Tarfis*, an Academick Philosopher.

respect of his Sickness, but that he meant to erect a School in that Place. Amongst the rest came *Arcefilaus*, whom, tho' he loved him very much, he recommended to *Polemo*, whom he himself, after his Recovery, heard also, and was extremely taken with him.

He bequeathed his Estate, amounting to twelve Talents, to *Arcefilaus*, who asking him where he would be buried, he answered,

In Earth's kind Bosom happy 'tis to lie.

e Lect. 8. 24.

He is said to have written Poems, and to have deposited them, sealed up in his own Country, in the Temple of *Minerva*. Of him thus *Theætetus*.

*Pleasant to Men, but to the Muses more,
Crantor too soon of Life was dispossess'd;
Earth his cold Body we to thee restore;
That in thy Arms he peacefully may rest.*

Crantor, above all, admired *Homer* and *Euripides*, saying, It was hard, in proper Language, to speak at once tragically and passionately; and quoted this Verse out of his *Bellerophon*.

*Alas, yet why alas,
Through such Fate Mortals pass.*

Antagoras the Poet alledgeth these Verses, as written by him.

† Read 'Εν δὴν μοι θυμὸς, ὦρε, &c. as Callimachus, hymn. 7. 'Εν δὴν μάλα θυμὸς, ἐπὶ γόνυ ἀμφοτέρω, one doubtless imitating the other, which both the Interpreters not observing, have strangely rendered this Place.

*'My Soul's in Doubt, for doubtless is his Race,
Whether I Love first of all Gods shall place;
Which drew from Erebus their old Descent,
And Night beyond the Ocean's vast Extent:
Or whether to bright Venus, or to Earth,
Thou ow'st thy double Form, and sacred Birth.*

He was very ingenious in imposing apt Names. He said of an ill Poet, that his Verses were full of Moths; and of *Theophrastus*, that his Theſes were written in a Shell.

He wrote a Treatise concerning Grief, which was generally much admired, as *Cicero* and *Laertius* attest.

He died before *Polemo* and *Grates*, of the Dropsy.

A R C E S I L A U S.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, Teachers.

Arcesilaus (whom *Cicero* calls *Aceſilas*) was a *Pitanean* of *Æolis*. His Father, according to *Apollodorus*, in the third of his Chronologicks, named *Scuthus*, or, as others, *Scythus*. He was the youngest of four Brethren, two by the same Father, only the other by the same Mother; the eldest was named *Pylades*. Of those who had the same Father, the eldest was *Mareas*, Guardian to his Brother *Arcesilaus*.

He was born, by Computation from his Death, (which was in the fourth Year of the ^h hundred thirty and fourth Olympiad, the seventy fifth of his Age) in the first Year of the hundred and sixteenth Olympiad.

He first heard *Autolychns* the Mathematician, his Countryman, before he came to *Athens*, with whom he travelled to *Sardis*.

Next he heard *Xanthus* an *Athenian*, a Master of *Musick*.

He heard also *Hipponicus* the Geometrician, who, excepting his Skill in that Art, was otherwise a gaping dull Fellow; for which *Arcesilaus* deriding him, said, *Geometry flew into his Mouth as he gaped*. Of *Hipponicus* falling mad, he took so great Care, that he brought him to his own House, and kept him there until he was quite cured.

He likewise, by the Compulsion of his Brother, studied Rhetorick, and being by Nature vehement in Discourse, and of indefatigable Industry, he addicted himself likewise to Poetry. There is an Epigram of his extant upon *Attalus*, to this Effect.

*For Arms and Horses oft hath been the Name
Of Pergamus through Pifa spread by Fame;
But now shall (if a Mortal may divine)
To future Times with greater Glory shine.*

There is another Epigram of his upon *Menodorus*, Son of *Eudemus*.

*Far hence is Thyatire, far Phrygian Earth,
Whence Menodore thou didst derive thy Birth.
But down to Acheron unpierc'd by Day,
From any Place thou knew'st the ready Way.
To thee this Tomb Eudemus dedicates,
Whom Love hath wealthy made, tho' poor the Fates.*

Although his Brother *Mareas* would have had him profess Rhetorick, yet was he naturally more inclined to Philosophy; to which End, he first became a Hearer of *Theophrastus*; in which Time, Crantor being much taken with him, spoke that Verse of *Euripides* to him, out of his *Andromeda*.

Maid, if I save thee, wilt thou thankful be ?

He answered in the following Verse.

Stranger, for Wife or Slave accept of me.

From thence forward they lived in intimate Friendship; whereat *Theophrastus* troubled, said, *He had lost a Youth of extraordinary Wit, and Quickness of Apprehension.*

He emulated *Pyrrho*, as some affirm, and studied Dialectick, and the Eretrick Philosophy, whence *Aristo* said of him;

*Pyrrho beyond, Plato before,
And in the Middle Diodore.*

And *Timon*,

*Next leaden Menedemus he pursues,
And Pyrrho doth, or Diodorus choose.*

And soon after maketh him say thus;

I'll swim to Pyrrho, and crook'd Diodore.

He was a great Admirer of *Plato*, whose Books he had.

CHAP. II.

Upon what Occasion he constituted the Middle Academy.

CRATES dying, *Arcefilaus* took upon him the Government of the School, which was yielded to him by *Socrates*. Being possessed of that Place, he altered the Doctrine and Manner of Teaching, which had been observed by *Plato* and his Successors, upon this Occasion.

Plato and his Followers, down to *Arcefilaus*, held, (as was said) That there are two Kinds of Things, some perceptible by *Sense*, others perceptible only by *Intellect*. That from the latter ariseth *Science*, from the former *Opinion*. That the *Mind* only seeth that which always is simple, and in the same Manner, and such as it is, that is, *Ideas*. But that the *Senses* are all dull and slow, neither can they perceive those Things which seem subjected to *Sense*, because either they are so little, that they cannot fall beneath *Sense*, or so moveable and transient, that not one of them is constant, or the same, but all are in continual Lapse and Fluxion. Hence they called all this Part of Things *Opinionable*, affirming that *Science* is no where, but in the Notions and Reasons of the *Mind*.

Yet did they profess against those who said, the Academy took away all *Sense*; for they affirmed

not, that there was no such Thing as Colour, or Taste, or Sapor, or Sound; but only maintained, there was no proper Mark of true and certain in the Senses, there being no such any where.

Hence they allowed, that we make Use of the Senses in Actions, from the Reason that appeareth out of them; but, to trust them as absolutely true and infallible, they allowed not.

Thus held the *Academicks* down to *Polemo*, * of whom *Arcefilaus* and *Zeno* were constant Auditors; but *Zeno* being older than *Arcefilaus*, and a very subtle Disputant, endeavoured to correct his Doctrine; not that, as *Theophrastus* saith, he did enervate *Virtue*, but, on the contrary, he placed all Things that are reckoned among the Good, in *Virtue* only; and this he called *Honesty*, as being simple, sole, one Good. Of the rest, though neither Good nor Evil, he held that some were according to *Nature*, others contrary to *Nature*, others mediate. Those which are according to *Nature*, he held to be worthy *Estimation*, the contrary contrary; the Neutral he left between both, in which he placed no Value. Of those which are eligible, some were of more *Estimation*, some of less; those which were of more he called *preferred*, those of less *rejected*. And as in these he did not change so much the Things themselves as the Words, so betwixt a *Rectitude* and a *Sin*, an *Office* and a *Præter-Office*. He placed some Things mediate, holding that *Rectitudes* consisted only in good Actions, *Sins* in Evil; but *Offices* either performed or omitted, he conceived mediate Things. And whereas the Philosophers of the old Academy did not hold all *Virtue* to consist in Reason, but some *Virtues* to be perfected by *Nature* or Custom; *Zeno*, on the contrary, placed all *Virtue* in Reason: And whereas the *Academicks* held, (as we said in the Life of *Plato*) That all those *Virtues* may be separated, *Zeno* maintained that could not be, averring, that not only the Use of *Virtue* (as the *Academicks* held) but the Habit thereof was excellent in itself, neither had any one *Virtue*, who did not always make Use of it. And whereas the *Academicks* took not away *Passion* from Man, affirming that we are subject to *Compassion*, *Desire*, *Fear*, and *Joy*, by *Nature*; but only contracted them, and reduced them within narrower Limits; *Zeno* affirmed, that from all these, as from so many Diseases, a wise Man must be free. And whereas they held, that all *Passions* were natural and irrational, and placed in one Part of the Soul, *Concupiscence*, in the other Reason. Neither did *Zeno* herein agree with them, for he asserted, that *Passions* are voluntary, that *Opinions* are taken up by Judgment, that immoderate Intemperance is the Mother of all *Passion*. Thus much for *Ethicks*.

* As to *Physick*, he did not allow that Fifth *Nature*, besides the Four Elements, of which the *Academicks* held *Sense* and *Mind* to be effected;

i. LECT. 4. 32.
b. Cic. libid.

k. Cicero Acad. quest. lib. 1. 8.

l. Cic. Acad. quest. 4. 32.

m. Phil. cont. Colot.

n. Cic. Acad. quest. 1. 10.

for he asserted Fire to be that Nature which begetteth every thing, both Mind and Sense. He likewise dissented from them, in that he held, Nothing can be made by a Thing which hath no Body (of which Nature *Xenocrates*, and the old *Academicks*, thought the Soul to be) and that whatsoever made any Thing, or was of itself made, must, of Necessity be a Body.

He likewise asserted many Things in the *Third Part of Philosophy*; wherein he asserted those Things new of the Senses themselves, which he conceived to be joined by a certain extrinsecal Impulsion, which he call'd *Phantasy*. To these Phantasies, received by the Senses, he added *Assent* of the Mind, which he held to be placed in us, and voluntary. He did not allow all Phantasies to be faithful, and worthy Credit, but only those which have a proper Declaration of those Things which they seem; which Phantasy, when it is seen, is call'd *Comprehensible*; when received and approved, he calleth it *Comprehension*. That which was comprehended by Sense, he calleth *Sense*; and if it were so comprehended, that it could not be pulled away by Reason, *Science*; if otherwise, *Ignorance*; of which kind was Opinion, infirm, and common to false or unknown Things. Betwixt Science and Ignorance he placed that *Comprehension* we mentioned, not reckoning it among the Good, nor the Bad, but affirming that only was to be credited; whence he likewise attributed Faith to the Senses, for as much as he conceived the *Comprehension* made by the Senses to be true and faithful; not that it comprehended all Things that are in Being, but that it omits nothing that can fall beneath it; as also, because Nature hath given it as a Rule of Science and Principle of itself; whence Notions are afterwards imprinted in the Mind; from which, not only Principles, but certain larger Ways, towards the Invention of Reason, are found out. Error, Timerity, Ignorance, Opinion, Suspicion, and, in a Word, whatsoever is not of firm and constant Assent, he took away from Virtue and Wisdom. In these Things consisteth almost all the Change and Dissention of *Zeno* from the old *Academicks*.

Zeno thus maintaining many Things contrary to *Plato*, as, that the Soul is mortal, and that there is no other World but this, which is subject to Sense. *Arcefilaus* perceiving this Doctrine to spread, and take much, prudently concealed the Doctrine of the Academy, lest the Mysteries of *Plato* being divulged, and made too common, should become despisable; and therefore (saith *St. Augustine*) he thought it fitter to untouch the Man that was not well taught, than to teach those whom, by Experience, he found not to be docile enough.

Hereupon *Arcefilaus* undertook to oppose and contest with *Zeno*, not out of any Pertinacity or Desire of Glory, but led thereunto by that Obscurity of Things, which had brought *Socrates* to a Confession of his own Ignorance; as likewise *Democritus*, *Anaxagoras*, *Empedocles*, and almost all the ancient Philosophers; who affirmed, That nothing could be understood, nothing perceived, nothing known. That the Senses are narrow, our Minds weak, our Lives short, and Truth (as *Democritus* saith) drowned in an Abyss. That all Things are held by Opinion and Institution, nothing left to Truth; and finally, That all Things are involved in Darknes.

Thus *Arcefilaus* deny'd there is any thing that can be known, not so much as that which *Socrates* reserved, [that he knew nothing] conceiving all Things to be hid in such Darknes, that there is nothing which can be seen or understood: For these Reasons we ought not to profess or affirm any thing, or to approve any thing by Assent; but always to refrain and with-hold our Hastiness from Error, which then proveth great, when it approveth a Thing false or unknown; neither is there any thing more vile, than by Assent and Approbation, to prevent Knowledge and Perception.

He did, as was agreeable to this Tenet, dispute against all Assertions and Doctrines; and having found, that in the same thing the Reasons of two Opinions, directly opposite, were of equal Weight, he thence inferred, that we ought to with-hold our Assents (*ἐπιτρέχειν*) from both. [This *Laertius* means, when he saith, that he took away Propositions, by reason of the Repugnance of Speech, and was the first that taught to argue on both Sides.] And that neither the Senses nor Reason are to be credited. He therefore praised that Apophthegm of *Hesiod*.

The Gods all Knowledge have conceal'd from Men.

But this, *St. Augustine* affirms, was only done to conceal mysteriously the Meaning of *Plato*; but they nevertheless had and held his Doctrines and Decrees, which they used to unfold to those who liv'd with them till they were old.

He likewise, as *Laertius* saith, first altered the Manner of Disputing which *Plato* delivered, and made it more litigious by Question and Answer; of which thus *Cicero*; *Socrates* used to find out, by Question and Answer, the Opinions of those with whom he discoursed; that if there were Occasion, he might say something upon that which they answered. This Custom, not retained by his Successors, was taken up by *Arcefilaus*; who instituted, that they who would learn of him, should not question him, but themselves tell him what they

^a Cic. libid.
^b Contra Acad.

^c Contra Acad. lib.
^d De finib. l. 2.

^e Cic. Acad. quest. 1.

^f Cic. libid.

^g Cic. libid.

^h Euseb. Prep. 14. 4.

thought; which, when they had done, he disputed against it; but his Auditors were to maintain their own Opinion as much as they could possibly. This Course took *Arcefilaus*, contrary to all other Philosophers; amongst whom, he that would learn held his Peace; which Course, saith *Cicero*, is at this Time held in the Academy, where, he that will learn, speaks in this manner: Pleasure seems to be the chief Good; whereupon, in a long Oration, it is disputed against it, whereby may easily be understood, that they who say a Thing seemeth to me to be so, are not really of that Opinion, but desire to hear the contrary maintained.

This School, constituted by *Arcefilaus*, was call'd the *Second Academy*, in relation to its Descent from *Plato*, or the *Middle Academy*, in respect to the new one, which was afterwards set up by *Carnades*; tho' *Cicero* seemeth to make no Distinction between this and that, but calleth this the New Academy. But tho' 'tis likely that it was not at first so call'd, yet upon the Introduction of a newer, it was afterwards more generally known by the Title of the *Middle*, or *Second Academy*.

These *Academicks* differ from the *Scepticks*, in as much as tho' they affirmed, that nothing can be comprehended; yet they took not away true or false from Things. On the contrary they held, that some Phantasies were true, others false; but the *Scepticks* hold, that they are both indifferent, alike defensible by Reason. The *Academicks* assert some Things to be wholly improbable, some more probable than others; and that a wise Man, when any of these occur, may answer *Yes* or *No*, following the Probability, provided that he withhold from assenting. But the *Scepticks* hold all Things to be alike indifferent, not admitting Judgment, nor allowing that either our Senses or Opinions can perceive true or false; and therefore no Faith is to be given to them; but we ought to persist firm and unmoveable, without Opinion, or saying of any thing that it is, any more than that it is not.

C H A P. III.

His Virtues and Apophthegms.

HE preferred *Homer* above all Writers; of whom he constantly read some Piece before he went to Bed, and as soon as he rose in the Morning. When he went to read any thing in him, he said he went to his *Mistress*.

Pindar also, he said, was proper to raise the Voice, and give us supply of Words.

He was sententious and succinct in Speech, often using Expressions of doubtful Meaning. He used to reprehend, and chide sharply, and freely; whence *Timon* saith of him,

When thou chid'st young Men, think thou once wert young.

In this kind *Laertius* influences his Sayings to a young Man, speaking confidently, &c. to an immodest young Man, &c.

Emo a *Chian*, who, tho' very deformed, thought himself very handsome, asking him, as he put on a rich Cloak, Whether he thought a wife Man might not love? *Arcefilaus* answered, Do you mean if he be as handsome, and as fine as you.

To an effeminate Person, upbraiding him, as it were, of Pride, he spoke this Verse,

Shall we demand, Great Sir, or silent be?

He immediately answered,

Woman, why speakest thou these harsh Words to me?

Being troubled with the Talk of an inconsiderable mean Person, he said,

The Sons of Slaves intemperately speak.

Of another, who talk'd impertinently and loudly, he said he had a peevish Nurse; for some he would make no answer at all.

To an Usurer, who said there was something he knew not, he answered in these Verses, out of *Sophocles's Oenomaus*,

*The Course of Storms bid from the Bird doth lie,
Until the Time that she must lay draw nigh.*

To a Dialectick Philosopher of *Alexinus's* School, who was not able to say any thing worthy *Alexinus*, he related what *Philoxenus* did to a Maker of Bricks, who over-hearing him sing his Verses false, trod upon his Bricks and broke them, saying, *As you spoil mine, so I yours.*

He was angry at those who learned not the liberal Sciences in due Time.

In Dispute he used this Word, *I say, and will not such a one* (naming the Person) *assent to this?* which many of his Disciples affected to imitate, as also his manner of Speaking and Gesture.

He was most acute in answering appositely, and converting his Discourse to the present Subject, and fitting it for every Time.

He was very efficacious in Persuasion, whence many Disciples resorted to him, tho' sometimes he sharply touched them, which they took patiently.

He was very good, and much excited Hope in his Auditors.

As to the Necessaries of Life, he was liberal and communicative, ready to do good, and much endeavouring to conceal it, avoiding all that kind of vain Glory. Visiting *Ctesibus*, who was sick, and perceiving him to be poor, he privately put a Purse under his Pillow, which, when he found, *This*, saith he, is the Sport of Arcesilaus. Another Time he sent him 1000 Drachms. ^b *Plutarch* relates this as done to *Apelles* the Chian Painter, whom *Arcesilaus*, besides many other Testimonies of Kindness, coming to visit as he lay sick, and perceiving how poor he was, departed; and returning soon after, bringing twenty Drachms with him; then sitting close to *Apelles's* Bed-side, *Here is nothing*, saith he, *besides Empedocles's* Four Elements, *Fire, Water, Earth, and Æther mounting high; but stillinks you lie not at your Ease;* and, with that, taking Occasion to remove his Pillow, he convey'd the Purse privately under it; which, when the old Woman that tended him found, and wondering, shew'd to *Apelles*, he laughing said, *This is one of Arcesilaus's Thefts.*

He recommended *Archias*, an *Arcadian*, to *Eumenes* King of *Pergamus*, by whom he was exalted to great Dignity.

He was very liberal, and free from Covetousness, as appeared by his Utensils of Silver, and vying with *Asiaticates* and *Callicrates*. He had many Vessels of Gold, which he lent unto many, upon Occasion of Feasting. These Silver Vessels a certain Man borrowed to entertain his Friends withal; *Arcesilaus*, knowing him to be poor, would never send for them back; others report he lent them to him on purpose; and when he brought them back, because he was poor, he freely bestowed them on him.

He had a fair Estate at *Pitane*, from which *Pylades*, his Brother, continually supplied him. *Eumenes* also, Son of *Phileterus*, gave him many large Presents; whence to him only, of all Kings, he apply'd himself.

When *Antigonus* was much followed, and many Persons throng'd to his House, he forbore declining his Acquaintance. He was intimate with *Hierocles*, the Governor of *Municipia* and *Pireum*, and constantly, on Holidays, went thither to visit him. *Hierocles* often entreated him to visit *Antigonus*, but he refused, and went along with him as far as the Door, and there parted with him. After *Antigonus's* Fight at Sea, many writing Consolatory Epistles to him, *Arcesilaus* was silent. Being sent by his Country on an Embassy to *Antigonus* at *Demetrias*, he return'd frustrate of his Design.

He lived the greatest Part of his Time in the Academy, avoiding to meddle with publick Business; but sometimes went to the *Pireum*, as we said, out of Love to *Hierocles*; for which some reproved him.

He was very magnificent (indeed a second *Aristippus*) in the Entertainment of his Friends. He openly profess'd Love to *Theaetete* and *Philota*, Curtezans of *Elis*, for which being reprehended, he rehearsed the *Chorias* of *Aristippus*. He was very amorous, and much affected the Company of young Men, whence *Aristo*, of *Chios*, a Stoick, call'd him a Corrupter of Youth, temerarious, and impudent. Of those whom he affected are mention'd, *Demetrius* and *Leobares*. *Demochares*, Son of *Laches*, and *Pythacles*, Son of *Bugerus*, much affected him.

For these Things he was much inveighed against at the House of *Hieronymus* the *Peripatetick*, who had invited his Friends to celebrate the Birth-day of *Alyceus*, Son of *Antigonus*; for the Keeping of which Feast, *Antigonus* sent yearly much Money. At this Feast *Arcesilaus* would not dispute amidst the Cups; and when *Aridelus* propounded a Question to him, requiring, that he would say something to it, he answer'd, *It is the best Property of a Philosopher to know the Seasons of all Things.*

But he was so free from Pride, that he counsel'd his Disciples to go and hear other Masters; and when a certain Chian Youth of his School declared, that he was not pleas'd with what he said, so much as with the Discourses of *Hieronymus*, he took him by the Hand and led him to the Philosopher, desiring him to cherish him according to his Quality.

To one that ask'd, Why Men went from other Sects to the *Epicureans*, but never from the *Epicureans* to other Sects. *Because*, saith he, *of Men, some are made Eunuchs, but of Eunuchs never any are made Men.*

^a He said, *Where there are many Medicines, and many Physicians, there are most Diseases; and where there are many Laws, there is most Iniquity.*

^c He advis'd to shun *Dialectick*, because it turneth all Things upside down.

^d He compar'd Logicians to Gamesters that play at Dice, who take Delight whilst they are cosen'd.

^e He affirm'd, that Poverty is rugged as *Ithaca*, but good to bring up a Child, in that it inureth to Frugality and Abstinence, and is generally a good School of Virtue.

CHAP. IV.

His Death.

When he drew ^b nigh the End of his Life, he bequeath'd all his Estate to his Brother *Pylades*; to which End, *Mareas* not knowing it, he sent him first to *Chios*, and from thence sent him back again to *Athens*. He sent three Copies of his Will, one to *Amphicritus* at *Eretria*, another to some Friends of his at *Athens*, the third to *Thaumastias* his near Kinsman, to be kept by them; with the last he sent this Letter.

^b Quom. differe. adal. ab amic.
 ^c Laet. 4. 34.

^d Laet. 4. 34.
 ^e Stob. Ser. 243.

^f Stob. Ser. 212.

^g Stob. Ser. 473.

^h Stob. Ser. 95.

Arcefilaus to Thaumastus, Health.

I Gave Diogenes my Will to bring to you, for being often sick and infirm of Body, I thought fit to make my Will, lest if any sudden Accident should befall me, I should depart this Life with some Injury done to you, whom I have found so bountiful towards me. I desire that you, the most faithful of all my Friends, will take it into your Custody. Approve your self just to that extraordinary Trust which I have reposed in you, that it may appear I have made a right Choice.

He died, as *Hermippus* saith, in a Kind of Phrenzy, after he had drunk much Wine, 75 Years old, in the fourth Year of the 134th Olympiad, as may be conjectured from the Succession of *Lacydes*, in the School which began at that Time. The *Athenians* buried him with such Solemnity as never was any before.

He took not any Women into the House with him, neither had he any Children. He flourished, according to *Apollodorus*, in the 120th Olympiad.

There were three more of this Name, one an ancient comick Poet, the second an elegiack Poet, the third a Statuary.

L A C Y D E S.

Lacydes succeeded *Arcefilaus*; he was a *Cyrenean*, (his Father named *Alexander*) a Person of much Gravity, and had many Emulators. He was from his Youth much given to Study, poor, but pleasing to all Company, and of a delightful Conversation.

As concerning his managing his Household Affairs, it is reported that when he took any Thing out of the Place where he kept his Provisions, he locked the Door, and threw the Key in at a Hole, that none might steal ought from him; which his Servants observing, frequently took it, and opening the Door, carried away what they thought good, and then put it into the same Place again, in which Fact they were never discovered.

But the most pleasant Part of the Story is, that (as *Numenius* affirms) he was thereby persuaded to be of the Opinion of the middle Academicks; that nothing is comprehended by Sense, arguing thus; *Why should I think that Sense can comprehend any Thing certainly, when I know that my own Senses are so often deceived; for when I go abroad, I think that I see with my Eyes those Things which I leave in my Storehouse, when I return I find none of them; which could not be, unless our Senses were fallible and uncertain.*

Lacydes upon the Death of *Arcefilaus*, being made Master of the School in the fourth Year of the 134th Olympiad, taught in the Academy, in the Gardens which were made by *Attalus* the King, which from him were called the *Lacydean Gardens*. *Laertius*, and, from him, *Suidas*, make him Instructor of the new Academy; but erroneously. He continued this Charge 26 Years, at the End whereof he resigned it, whilst he was yet alive, to *Tele-*

cles, *Evander*, and *Phocian* his Disciples, in the second Year of the 141st Olympiad.

Attalus sending for him to come to him, he returned him Answer, *That Pictures make the best Shew at a Distance.*

Studying Geometry in his old Age, one said to him, *Is it now Time?* He answered, *When, if not now?*

Athenæus saith, *That Lacydes and Timon Philosophers, being invited by one of their Friends to an Entertainment of two Days, and desirous to suit themselves to the Company, drank very freely. Lacydes went away first, half drunk, and perceiving Timon to steal away too, said out of Homer,*

To our great Glory *Hector* we have slain.

The next Day meeting Timon again at the same Place, and seeing him not able to take off his Caps at once, made a Pause when he put it to his Mouth the second Time, he said out of another Place of Homer,

Those are unhappy who contest with me.

Ælian likewise numbers these two amongst the great Drinkers, and perhaps not unjustly, for by Excess of Wine he fell into the Palsy, of which he died in the second Year of the 141st Olympiad.

He wrote Philosophicks, &c. of Nature.

In the School he was succeeded, as is said by *Evander*; *Evander* by his Disciple *Egefinus*, whom *Clemens Alexandrinus* calleth *Hegesilaus* of *Perge-mus*; *Egefinus*, by *Carneades*.

C A R N E A D E S.

C H A P. I.

His Country, Parents, Time, Masters.

Carneades (Successor of Egefinus) was of Cyrene¹, whence Cicero saith, he was an acute Person, as being an African. He was Son of Epicurus, or Philocomus. Apollodorus, as cited by Laertius, affirmeth he died in the 162d Olympiad; but there is a Mistake in the Text; for the Words of Apollodorus relate doubtless to the Time of his Birth, which upon that Authority, we may affirm to have been in the first Year of the 162d Olympiad. Florus (cited by Plutarch) adds, he was born on the seventh Day of Thargelion, at what Time the Carnean Festivals were celebrated at Cyrene, whence perhaps he took his Name.

This Time falling after the Callippical Period, we shall compute it according to Petavius's Method, which, altho' it be not exempt from Question, yet it is better than that of Scaliger, whose Method is not reconcilable to Ptolemy's Observations.

The 4th of the 164th Olympiad was Of the Julian Period	4585
Epoque of the Callippical Period	4383
Which subducted, there remains	202
Subduct two Periods more	152
Remains	50

The Year propounded therefore is the 50th of the third Period. The Neomenian of Hecatombæon, June 26. which is 177th Day of the Julian Year; the 7th of Thargelion (according to Petavius) at that Time was the 302d of the Attick Year.

To	177
add	302
Sum	479
Subduct	365
Remains	114

The 114th Day of the Julian is the 24th of April, on which fell the 7th of Thargelion; which, the Dominical Letter being B. fell on Sunday, prophetically taken.

¹ He was Disciple to Egefinus the Academick, and

learned Logic of Diogenes the Stoick, whence in arguing he would many Times say, *If I have concluded right, the Cause is my own; if not right, Diogenes must return the Mina he had of me; which was the Price the Dialectick Philosophers took.*

C H A P. II.

How he constituted the new Academy.

He succeeded Egefinus in the School, and is by Cicero reckoned the fourth from Arcefilaus, (who constituted the middle Academy, introducing a Suspension of Assent, grounded upon the Uncertainty of Things) Carneades constituted the new Academy, maintaining the same Kind of Suspension with no less Eagerness; yet upon more moderate Grounds: * For he held, that the Incomprehensibility of Things proceeded not from the Nature of the Things themselves, as Arcefilaus maintained; for as much as every Thing really existeth in itself, and if any Thing be affirmed or denied of another, it is true or false as to the Thing itself; but the Things themselves remaining firm, we derive from them a Phantasy and Similitude, which for the most Part, like false Messengers lie and deceive us. To all true Things there are some false adjoined, and those so like, that there is no certain Note of Judication and Assent, whereof we cannot perceive any Thing to be true.

But he was nothing less rigid as to the Academical Suspension, for he denied that any Thing could be perceived, not so much as that very Maxim, *Nothing can be perceived*; arguing thus: All Phantasms are of two Kinds; the first included the perceptible and imperceptible; the second Kind, the probable, and the improbable. Those which are contrary to Sense and Evidence pertain to the former Division; against the latter we ought not to say any Thing. Wherefore there is no Phantasy followed by Perception, but by Approbation many; for it were contrary to Nature that nothing should be probable.

More fully Sextus Empiricus. Carneades, saith he, did not only oppose the Stoicks, but all that went before him, as to Judgment. His first and common Argument against all, is that by which he sheweth absolutely, that there is nothing from which Truth can be judged; not Reason, not Sense, nor Phantasy,

¹ Laert. 4. 62. ² Acad. quest. 4. ³ Sympol. quest. 6. 7. ⁴ Doctr. temp. ⁵ Laert. 4. 62. ⁶ Cic. Acad. quest. 4.

⁷ Cic. quest. 4. 6. ⁸ Numen. apud Euseb. Prep. 14. 8. ⁹ Cic. Acad. quest. 4. 31. ¹⁰ Adv. Mathem.

nor any Thing, for all these, in a Word, deceive us. His second Argument is that whereby he shews, that altho' there be something that doth judge, yet it cannot exist without an Affection from Evidence. For an Animal differeth from inanimate Things by the sensitive Faculty, it apprehendeth thereby both itself and external Things; but Sense remaining immovable, impassible, and immutable, is not Sense, nor apprehendeth any Thing, but being changed, and after some Manner affected by Incurfion of Evidences, then it declareth Things. In that Affection therefore of the Soul which ariseth from Evidence, we are to seek that which judgeth. This Affection is declared when that appeareth from which it proceedeth, which Affection is nothing else but Phantasy. Phantasy therefore is a certain Affection in an Animal, which sheweth both itself and some others, as when we see any Thing, our Sight is affected in some Manner, so as it was not before that Act of seeing. By this Alteration we apprehend two Things: First, the Alteration itself, that is the Phantasy; secondly, that from which this Alteration proceeds, the Thing visible. The like in the rest of the Senses. As therefore Light manifesteth itself and all Things in it, so Fancy being the chief Guide of Knowledge in an Animal, must like unto Light, manifest both itself, and that evident Object which effecteth it. But because it doth not always shew that which is true, but often erreth, and differeth from the Thing whence it proceedeth, like ill Messengers, it necessarily followeth that all Phantasies cannot leave a Judgment of Truth, but only if it be true. Again, because there is no Phantasy so true, but it may be false; and of all Phantasies that seem true, there are some false, which differ little from them; that which judgeth must consist in common Phantasy of true and false. But the common Phantasy of these comprehendeth not, and if it comprehendeth not, neither is there any Thing that judgeth. And if Phantasy have not a judicative Power, neither can Reason judge, for that is derived from Phantasy and justly; for that whereof it judgeth, ought first to appear unto it, but nothing can appear but through Sense void of Reason, nor Reason itself is that which judgeth.

Thus disputeth Carneades against all other Philosophers, to shew there is not any Thing that judgeth. But being demanded what judgeth, as to the leading of Life, and Acquisition of Beatitude, he hath Recourse to probable Phantasy; and together with probable, undistracted and circumcurrent, their Differences these: Phantasy is the Phantasy of something, viz. of that which it is made, and of that in which it is made: That of which it is made is the external sensible Object; that in which, the Man. It hath two Relations, one to the Object manifested, the other to the Phantasm derived from that Object. From the Relation to the Object, it is either true or false; true, when it agreeth with the Object; false, when it disagreeeth. From its

Relation to the Phantasm, there is one which seemeth true, another false. That which seemeth true is by the Academicks called *Emphasis* and *Probability*, and *probable Phantasy*; that which seemeth not true, is called *Aemphasis*, *Improbability*, and *not-probable Phantasy*. For, neither that which seemeth false, and is such; nor that which is true, and seemeth not such, have any Thing in their Nature persuasive. But, of these Phantasies, that which is manifestly false, and seemeth not true, limiteth the Judicatory, but is not that which judgeth, as likewise produceth from that which is, but differs from it, such as was that of the Fury proceeding from *Eletra* to *Orestes*. Of that which seemeth true, one Kind is *tenuious*, as that which is in a Thing so little, as that it is not visible, either because it takes not up Room enough, or by Reason of the Weakness of Sight, which receiveth Things confusedly and not distinctly. The other is that which hath this common Property with the true, that it seemeth to be very true. Now, of these, the tenuious, loose remiss Phantasy cannot be that which judgeth; for that which cannot clearly manifest itself, nor the Thing that effected it, cannot attract us, nor invite Assent; but that which seemeth true, and is manifest enough, that, according to Carneades, is the Judge of Truth.

This being that which judgeth, it hath a great Latitude, and being extended into another Species, hath a more probable and vehemently affected Phantasy. Probable is taken three Ways; first, for that which is true, and seemeth true; secondly, for that which is false and seemeth true; thirdly, for that which is true, common to both. Whence that which judgeth must be that Phantasy which seemeth true, which the Academicks call *probable*. Sometimes the false incurreth; so that it is necessary to use the common Phantasy of true and false; yet not because that more seldom incurreth, I mean that which imiteth the Truth, we are not to give Credit to that which is for the greater Part true, whereby it happeneth, our Judgment and Actions are for the most Part directed.

That which first and commonly judgeth, Carneades held to be this. But so far as Phantasy sometimes is not of one Kind, but like a Chain, one dependeth on another, there must therefore be a second Judge, which is *probable* and *undistracted* Phantasy. As he who receiveth the Phantasy of a Man necessarily receiveth the Phantasy of such Things as are about him, and without him; of the Things about him, as Colour, Magnitude, Figure, Motion, Speech, Clothing, Shoes; of Things without him, as Air, Light, Day, Heaven, Earth, Companions, and the like. When therefore none of these Phantasies seem false, but all agree in seeming true, we credit it the more. That such a one is *Socrates* we believe, because he hath all those Things which *Socrates* useth to have, as Colour, Mag-

Magnitude, Figure, Gesture, Cloak, in none of these disagreeing with itself. And as some Physicians argue a Man to be in a Fever, not from one Symptom, as from a high Pulse, or great Heat, but from the Concurrence of that Heat with the Pulse, as also from ulcerous Touch, Redness, Thirst, and the like, all agreeing together. So the *Academick* maketh a Judgment of Truth, from a Concurrence of Phantasies, and when none of all his Phantasies that join in the Concurrence retract him as false, he saith that which incurrerth is true.

That there is a credible *undistracted* Concurrence, is manifest from *Menelaus*: Having left in his Ship an Image of *Helen* which he had brought from *Troy*, as if it had been *Helen* herself, landing at the Island *Pharos*, he there met with the true *Helen*, and from her attracted a true Phantasy, but would not believe that Phantasy, being distracted by the other, which told him that he had left *Helen* in the Ship. Such is *undistracted* Phantasy therefore, which likewise seemeth erroneous, so far as much as there are some more *undistracted* than others. Of *undistracted* Phantasies, that is most credible and perfect which maketh a Judgment.

Moreover, there is a *circumcurrent* Phantasy, the Form whereof is next to be declared. In the *undistracted* we only enquire whether none of those Phantasies which join in Concurrence, attract us as false, but that they all seem true, and not improbable. But in that which is made by Concourse, which useth *Circumcurrent*, strictly examines every Phantasy which is in that Concurrence; as in Assemblies, when the People take Account of every particular Person that stands for the Magistracy, whether they deserve that Power and Right of judging. In the Place of Judgment, there is that which judgeth, and that by which the Judgment is made, the Distance and Interval, Figure, Time, Manner, Affection, and Operation, each of which we examine strictly. That which judgeth, whether the Sight be dim; for if it be, it is too weak for Judgment; that which is judged, whether it be not too little; that through which whether the Air be obscure; the Distance, whether it be too great; the Medium, whether confused; the Place, whether too wide and vast; the Time, whether too sudden; the Affection, whether not phrenetic; the Operation, whether not unfit to be admitted. For if all these be in one, that which judgeth is *probable* Phantasy, and together, *probable, undistracted, and circumcurrent*. Wherefore, as when in Life we enquire concerning some little Thing, we examine of Witnesses; when we enquire into something of greater Consequence, we examine more; but when of a Thing most necessary, we examine each of the Witnesses by the joint Testimony of all. So, saith *Carnades*, in light inconsiderable Matters we make use

of *probable* Phantasy, only for Judgment; in Things of some Moment, of *undistracted* Phantasy; in Things that concern well and happy living, *circumcurrent* Phantasy.

And as in Things of great Moment they take divers Phantasies, so in different Circumstances they never follow the same; for they say, they attend only *probable* Phantasy in such Things wherein the Circumstance of Time alloweth not a strict Examination; as for Instance. The Enemy pursues a Man; he coming to a Cave, takes a Phantasy, that there are some Enemies there lying in wait: Transported by this Phantasy, as *probable*, he shunneth and flieth from the Cave, following the Probability of that Phantasy, before he accurately and diligently examine whether there really be any Enemies in Ambush in that Cave, or no. *Probable* Phantasy is followed by *circumcurrent*, in those Things in which Time allows a curious Examination of each Particular, to use Judgment upon the incurring Thing. As a Man coming into a dark Room, and seeing a Rope rolled up, thinking it to be a Serpent, he flies away; but afterwards returning, he examines the Truth, and perceiving it not to stir, begins to think it is not a Serpent; but withal considering, that Serpents are sometimes frozen or nummed with the Cold, he strikes it with his Staff. And having thus by *Circumcurrent* examined the Phantasy which incurred to him, he assenteth that the Phantasy he had taken of that Body as a Serpent, is false. And again, as I said, when we manifestly behold, we assent that this is true, having first over-run in our Thoughts that our Senses are all entire, and that we behold this waking, not in a Dream; that the Air is perspicuous, and a convenient Distance from the Object. Hereby we receive a creditable Phantasy, when we have Time enough to examine the Particulars concerning the Thing seen. It is the same in *undistracted* Phantasy, which they admit, when there is nothing that can retract us, as we said of *Menelaus*. Hitherto *Sextus*.

* Yet though nothing can be perceived, a wise Man may consent to that which is not perceived; that is, he may *opinionate*; but so as he knoweth himself to opinionate, and that there is nothing which can be comprehended and perceived.

* He asserted the ultimate End to be the Enjoyment of Natural Principles, which, saith *Cicero*, he maintained, not that he really thought so, but in Opposition to the *Stoicks*.

* He read the Books of the *Stoicks* very diligently, and disputed against them with so good Success, that it gave him Occasion to say; If *Chrysippus* had not been, I had not been.

* *Clitomachus* used to say of him, he could never understand what he really held; for he would sometimes argue on one Side, sometimes on the other;

a Cic. Acad. quest. 4. 12.

b De sen. lib. 2. 22.

c Laert. 4. 62.

d Cic. Acad. quest. 4. 45.

and by the *Calumny* of his Wit, faith *Cicero*, many Times deride the best Causes. Of the *Sorites* used by him, see *Sextus Empiricus*.

CHAP. III.

Upon what Occasion he was sent on an Embassy to Rome.

THE *Athenians* being fined by the *Romans* about 500 Talents, at the Suit of the *Oropians* and *Sicyonians*, for destroying *Oropus*, a City of *Boeotia*, sent three Philosophers on an Embassy to the *Roman Senate*, to procure a Mitigation of this Fine, which had been imposed upon them without hearing their Defence *Carneades*; the *Academick*, *Diogenes* the *Stoick*, and *Critolaus* the *Peripatetick*. About the Time of this Embassy, there is much Disagreement amongst Authors. *A. Gellius* faith, they came after the second *Punic War*, and maketh *Ennius* later than their coming, which *Petauius* justly conceiveth to be false; forasmuch as *Ennius* died in the 585th Year from the building of the City. But *Cicero* affirmeth this Embassy to have been when *P. Scipio* and *M. Marcellus* were Consuls, which was the 599th Year. *Pausanias* reckoneth it upon the 603d Year of the City, which *Casaubon* approveth.

Each of these Philosophers, to shew his Learning, made Choice of many eminent Parts of the City, where they discoursed before great Multitudes of People, to the Admiration of all. The Eloquence of *Carneades* was violent and rapid; that of *Critolaus*, neat and smooth; that of *Diogenes*, modest and sober. *Carneades*, one Day, disputed copiously concerning Justice, before *Galba* and *Cato*, the greatest Orators of that Time. The next Day, he subverted all he had said before, by contrary Arguments, and took away that Justice which he had so much commended. This he did the better to confute those that asserted any Thing. That Dispute whereby he overthrew Justice, is recorded in *Cicero*, by *L. Furius*.

To these three Philosophers resorted all the studious young Men, and frequently heard and praised them. Chiefly the Sweetness of *Carneades*, which was of greatest Power, and no less Fame than Power, attracting eminent and benign Hearers, filled the City with Noise like a great Wind; and it was reported, that a *Grecian* Person, qualified to Admiration, attracting all, had infused a serious Affection into the young Men, whereby forgetting other Diversions and Pleasures, they were carried on as it were with a Kind of Madness to Philosophy. This pleased all the *Romans*, who gladly beheld their Sons instructed in *Greek Learning* by such excellent Men. Only *Cato*, at the first Noise of Admiration of the *Greek Learning*, was troubled, fearing the young

Men should apply themselves that way, and so prefer the Glory of Eloquence before Action and Military Discipline. The Fame of Philosophers increasing in the City, and *C. Atilius* (whom *A. Gellius* and *Macrobius* call *Cecilius*) an eminent Person, having, at his own Request, been the Interpreter of their first Oration to the Senate; *Cato* (who was then very old) under a fair Pretence, moved, that these Philosophers might be sent out of the City, and coming into the Senate-House, blamed the Magistrates, that they had so long suffered such Ambassadors to continue amongst them without any Answer, who were able to persuade them to any Thing. Wherefore he first desired that something might be determined concerning their Embassy, that they might be sent back again to their own Schools, and instruct the Sons of *Grecians*, and that the *Roman* Youth might, as they did before, apply themselves to the Observance of their own Laws and Magistrates. This he did, not out of Anger to *Carneades*, as some thought, but out of an ambitious Emulation of the *Greek Humanity* and Literature.

CHAP. IV.

His Virtues and Aposthegms.

HE was a Person infinitely industrious, less conversant in Physick than Ethick, and so studious, that he neglected to cut his Hair and Nails. *Valerius Maximus* faith, he was so studious, that when he lay down at Meals, his Thoughts were so fixed, that he forgot to put his Hand to the Table; and that *Melissa*, who lived with him as his Wife, was fain to put him in mind thereof, and help him.

He was so eminent for Philosophy, that the Orators themselves would many Times break up their Schools, and come and hear him.

He had a great and loud Voice; whereupon the *Gymnasiarch* sent to him not to speak so loud; whereto he answering, *Send me the Measure by which I should speak*; the other wisely and apostrophically replied, *You have a Measure, your Hearers*.

He was sharply invective, and in Argument almost invincible. He avoided Feasting, out of the Reason we mentioned, his great Studiousty.

One named *Mentor*, a *Bithynian*, as *Phavorinus* faith, who had endeavoured to seduce a Mistress that he kept, coming into the School, he presently jest at him, in turning these Words of *Homer*.

*Hitherto comes one oppress'd with heavy Tears,
Like Mentor in his Voice and Looks appears,
Who from the School I charge you turn away.*

The other rising up, replied;

He thus proclaim'd, the rest did strain their

Being to dispute with *Chrysepus*, he purged himself by white Hellebore, to sharpen his Wit, lest any corrupt Humours in his Stomach might oppress the Vigour and Constancy of his Mind.

¹ He compared *Dialectick* to the Fifth Polypus, which when its Claws grow long, bites them off; so Logicians, growing subtle, confute their own Assertions.

² He advised Men in their greatest Prosperity to be mindful of a Change, for that which is unexpected is most grievous.

³ He said, *The Sons of Rich Men and Kings learn nothing well but Riding, for their Masters flatter them; they who contest with them, willingly yield to them, but a Horse considers not whether a private Man or a Prince, a poor Man or a rich, be on his Back; but if he cannot rule him, he throws his Rider.*

⁴ He seemed to be extremely averse from Death; whence he often said, *The same Nature which hath put us together will dissolve us; and hearing that Antipater died by drinking Poison, he was a little animated by his Constancy in Death, and said, Then give me too; they asking what; Wine, saith he.*

⁵ In the midst of the Night he was struck blind, and knew not of it; but waking, bid his Servant bring a Light; the Servant did so, telling him he had brought one; Then, said he, read you.

CHAP. V.

His Death and Writings.

HE lived, according to *Laertius*, 85 Years, or, according to *Cicero*, 90. The Words of *Apol-*

loderus, that he died in the fourth Year of the 162d Olympiad, which falleth upon the 626th Year from the building of *Rome*, may easily be evinced to be false, by the greatest Part of the Circumstances of his Life; particularly from this; that *Antonius* in *Cicero* saith, when he went Pro-consul into *Asia*, he found *Carneades* the *Academick* at *Athens*, who opposed all in Dispute, according to the Manner of his Sect. The Year of *Antonius*'s Pro-consulship was the 652d Year from the building of *Rome*. But this Account, as we said before, is to be applied to the Time of his Birth, from which the 85th falleth upon the first Year of the 184th Olympiad, the 90th upon the second of the 185th.

Laertius saith, At his Death there was a great Eclipse of the Moon, which some interpreted to proceed from a Sympathy with his Loss. Upon this Eclipse I conceive *Petavius* grounded his Computation of *Carneades*'s Death, when he saith, *It was upon the first Year of the 163d Olympiad. May 2. fer. 2. hora 5. 46. at Athens.* But there being a Mistake of the Year, there is consequently a greater in the Account of the *feria* and Hour.

Carneades, as *Cicero* saith, wrote four Books of *Suspension of Assent*. He wrote likewise *Epistles* to *Ariarathes*, King of *Cappadocia*, the only Monument left behind him, extant in *Laertius*'s Time. Whatsoever else went under his Name, ¹ *Laertius* saith, was written by his Disciples, of whom he had many, the most eminent *Clitomachus*.

There are remembered two more of this Name, one a Philosopher, Disciple to *Anaxagoras*, mentioned by *Suidas*, the other an *Epigrammatick* Poet, mentioned by *Laertius*.

¹ Stob. Ser. 31. ² Plot. de transq. anim. ³ Plot. de soul. & An. dif. ⁴ m Laert. 4. 64. ⁵ n Laert. 4. 66. ⁶ o Laert. 4. 65.
⁷ Doct. temp. ⁸ q Laert. 4. 63.

C L I T O M A C H U S.

Clitomachus was a *Carthaginian*, Son of *Diagenes*. He was first call'd *Asdrubal*, as ¹ *Plutarch* and *Laertius* affirm, and professed Philosophy in his own Country, and native Language. Being forty Years old, he went to *Athens*, and heard *Carneades*, who being much taken with his Industry, instructed and exercised him in Philosophy. With *Carneades*, *Cicero* saith, he lived until he was old, and succeeded him in the School, and chiefly illustrated his Doctrines by his Writings, the Number of which Books being above four hundred, were a sufficient Testimony of his Industry, and that he had no less Wit, than *Carneades* of Eloquence.

He was well versed in three Sects, the *Academick*, *Peripatetick*, and *Stoick*.

Of his Books are remembered by *Cicero*, one ² *Of Consolation* to his Captive Countrymen, *Carthage* being then subdued by the *Romans*; another to ³ *Caius Lucilius* the Poet; wherein he explained and defended the *Academick* Suspension of Assent, having written before of the same Things to *L. Censorinus*, who was Consul with *M. Manilius*. The Sum of which Discourse was this;

⁴ *The Academicks hold, there are such Dissimilitudes of Things, that some seem probable, others on the contrary. But this is not Ground enough to say,*

¹ Laert. 4. 67. ² De Pictura Alex. ³ Laert. Ibid. ⁴ Cic. Acad. Qu. 1. 4. Laert. Ibid. ⁵ Cic. Tull. Qu. 3. 22.
⁶ Cic. Acad. Qu. 4. 32. ⁷ Cic. Acad. 4. 32.

That some Things may be perceived, others cannot; because there are many false that are probable, but no false can be perceived and known. Those therefore extremely err, who affirm, the Academicks to take away Sense, for they say not, there is no Colour, Sapor, or Sound, but dispute, That there is no proper inherent Note in these of true and certain; (which having expounded, he adds) *A wise Man suspends Assent two Ways; one, when [as we know] he absolutely refuseth to assent to any Thing; another, when he withholdeth from answering, either in Approbation or Improbation of something; so that he neither denieth nor asserteth it. In the first Way, he assents to nothing, in the Second he will follow Probability, and according as he finds it, or not, answers Yes or No. He who withholdeth his Assent from all Things, is yet moved, and asserteth something. He reserves, therefore, these Phantasies by which we are excited to Action; and those of which being questioned, we may answer on either Part, only as of a*

Thing that seemeth to us so, but without Assent; neither are all such Phantasies approved, but only those which are not obstructed by any Thing.

² In asserting Good, he joined Pleasure with Honesty, as *Gallipho* also did.

³ He was a great Enemy to Rhetorick, as *Critolaus* the Peripatetic, and *Charmidas* were also. Arts they did not expel out of Cities, knowing them to be very profitable to Life, no more than they would drive *Oeconomick* out of Houses, or Shepherds from their Flocks; but they all persecuted, and every where ejected the Art of Speaking, as a most dangerous Enemy.

⁴ He compared Dialectick to the Moon, which is in continual Encrease or Decrease.

⁵ Falling sick, he was taken with a Fit of a Lethargy; out of which he no sooner came, but he said, *Love of Life shall flatter me no longer; and thereupon, with his own Hands, ended his Life.*

a Cic. Tusc. quæst. 5. 30.

a Sext. Empir. adv. Math.

b Stob. Ser. 80.

c Stob. Ser. 160.

P H I L O.

¹ *PHILO* was of Larissa, he heard *Clitomachus* many Years, and is nam'd by *Sextus Empiricus* as Constitutor of a Fourth Academy; but *Cicero* affirms he disallowed the Distinction of Academies, and wrote expressly to prove the first and the new Academy to be both one. ² Whilst he lived, the Academy wanted not a Patron. ³ The Romans admir'd him, as *Plutarch* affirms, above all *Clitomachus's* Scholars, for his excellent Discourse, and loved him for the Sweetness of his Disposition. *Cicero* no sooner went out of the first Schools, and Rudiments of Learning, but he became an Auditor of *Philo*, as he acknowledgeth himself.

Amongst other excellent Things (saith *Stobæus*) he gave this Division of Philosophy: He compared Philosophy to a Physician. As the Office of a Physician is, first to persuade the sick Person to permit himself to be cured; next, to confute the Reasons of his Adversary; so is it of a Philosopher, both which consist in Exhortation. Exhortation is a Discourse inciting to Virtue; whereof one Part explaineth its great Use, the other refelleth Adversaries, or such as any way calumniate Philosophy. The Comparison holds, in a second Manner, thus: As the Part of a Physician, after he hath persuaded the Patient to admit of Cure, is to apply the Means thereof, as

well to remove the Causes of the Distaste, as to induce and settle Health; so is it in this Science. After Exhortation, he endeavourerth to apply the Cure, by removing false Opinions, wherewith the Soul is infected, and by substituting true. In the second Place therefore, it treats of Good and Evil, for the Sake of which, the Exhortation was made. Thirdly, the Comparison holds thus: As all Medicines refer to one End, Health, so all Philosophy to Beatitudes. That Part which treats of Ends, is joined with another, which treats of Life; for, as in Medicine, it is not sufficient to restore Health, unless it likewise deliver Rules by which it may be preserved; so in Life, some Precepts are required for Conservation of the End; and this Part also is two-fold, Private or Common. One considers the Affairs of particular Persons; as, Whether a wise Man should manage a Common-wealth? whether he may live with Princes? whether he may marry? The other considers the Business of all in general; as, What Common-wealth is best? How Magistrates are to be chosen? This Common Part is called Politick, and is treated of distinctly by itself, as being of greatest Latitude. Now, if all were wise Men, there would be no need of more Places, for the more subtle Divisions would emerge from the Precedent. But because there must likewise be a Care of the middle Sort of Men, who

d Stob. Eclog. Ethic. 164.

e Cicero. Acad. quæst. 4. 6.

f Plut. vit. Cic.

g Eclog. Ethic. 160.

canon

cannot apply themselves to long Disputations, either thro' want of Time, or Diversion of Business, there must not be omitted a Treating of Precepts, which delivereth short Rules concerning the Use of each.

^b As to the Stoical Judicatory, *Comprehensive Phantasy*, he held all Things to be Incomprehensible; as to the Nature of Things themselves, *Comprehensive Phantasy* asserted by Zeno.

^c He held that to be a good Connex, which beginneth from true, and endeth in false; as (if it be Day, and I dispute) this, *If it is Day, I dispute*. According to which Tenet, there may be true Axioms three Ways, a false, only one Way; for,

h Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 1. 33.

i Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 2. 11.

k Tusc. Qu. 1. 2. 3.

when it beginneth from true, and endeth in true, it is true; as, *If it is Day, it is Light*. And when it beginneth from false, and endeth in false, it is true; as, *If the Earth flies, the Earth hath Wings*. Likewise, if it beginneth from false, and endeth in true, it is true; as, *If the Earth flies, it is Earth*. That which is false, is that which beginneth from true, and endeth in false; as, *If it is Day, it is Night*; for, the Antecedent, *it is Day*, is true; but the Consequent, *it is Night*, is false.

^k He appointed, that the Precepts of Orators should be delivered at one Time, those of Philosophers at another.

A N T I O C H U S.

Antiochus was an *Ascalonite*, ¹ Brother of *Aristus*, Disciple of *Philo*. He lived with L. ^m *Lucullus* the Quæstor and General; he was also a great Friend to ⁿ *Atticus*, whom he invited to the Academy. He is named by ^o *Sextus Empericus*, as Constitutor of a *Fifth Academy*; for, as ^p *Plutarch* saith, he fell off from the Sect of *Carneades*, either moved by the Evidence of Sense, or, as some thought, by Ambition, and Dissention with the Disciples of *Clitomachus* and *Philo*; so that with some little Alteration, he made use of the Doctrines of the *Stoicks*; and ^q tho' he were called an *Academick*, he had been, but for some Alterations, an absolute *Stoick*; ^r whence it was said of him, *He taught the Stoical Philosophy in the Academy*; for he manifested, that the Doctrines of the *Stoicks*

were in *Plato*. In his old Age, saith ^s *Cicero*, he betook himself to the *Old Academicks*, forsaking the *New*, ^t and diligently enquiring into the Opinion of the *Antients*, ^u endeavoured to follow *Aristotle* and *Xenocrates*, professing, that the *Stoicks* and *Peripateticks* agreed in the Thing, and differed only in Words. To which Effect *Cicero* mentions a Book which he sent to *Balbus*; he wrote also another against his Master *Philo*, intitled, *Sesius*. ^v *Cicero* being at *Athens*, heard him, and was much taken with the Eloquence and Volubility of his Discourse, (^w declaring him to be the most polite and acute of all Philosophers in his Time) ^x but not with the new Doctrine which he introduced.

Thus far there is a continued Series of the *Academick Philosophers*.

1 Plut. vit. Cicero. m Cic. Ac. qu. 1. 3. n Acad. Qu. 4. 43. o Cic. de Leg. lib. 2. p Vit. Cicero. q Cic. Acad. quest. 4. 43.
r Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. Hypot. 1. 33. s Acad. quest. 4. 22. t Cic. de finib. lib. 5. u Acad. quest. 4. 45. w Cic. de nat. Deor.
l 2. x Cic. Acad. quest. 4. y Plut. vit. Cicero. Cic. Acad. quest. 4. 4. z Plut. in vit. Cicero.

THE
H I S T O R Y
O F
P H I L O S O P H Y.
THE SIXTH PART,
Containing the *Peripatetick* Philosophers.

A R I S T O T L E.

C H A P. I.

His Country, Parents, and Time of his Birth.

UPON the Death of *Plato*, his Disciples separated themselves into two Sects. The first continued in the same School, where he taught, the *Academy*: The other possessed the *Lyceum*. The first was known by the general Name of *Academicks*, or *Peripateticks of the Academy*; the other by the general Name of *Peripateticks*, or more particularly, *Peripateticks of the Lyceum*. Of the first we have discoursed already; we come now to the other, of which *Aristotle* was the Head.

^b *Aristotle* was born at *Stagira*, a City of *Thrace*, according to ^c *Herodotus*, ^d *Thucydides*, ^e *Pausanias*, and *Suidas*, by others placed in *Macedonia*, to take from him the Imputation of a Barbarian. It was seated upon *Strymon*, a River which parts those two Countries, having a Haven called *néæres*, and a little Island of the same Name belonging to it. This Place, to which *Aristotle* owed his Birth, he afterwards requited with extraordinary Gratitude.

^f His Father was named *Nicomachus*, descended from *Nicomachus*, Son of *Machaon* (whose Skill in Medicine is celebrated by *Homer*) Son of *Æsculapius*, from whom *Nicomachus*, *Aristotle's* Father,

derived not only his Pedigree, but his Art also, for he was a Physician. *Suidas* saith, he wrote six Books of Medicine, and one of Physick. ^g *Galen* alledgeth a Plaister of one *Nicomachus*, either this or the elder. This *Nicomachus* (whom some affirm to have been Grandson to *Hippocrates* the Physician) lived in the Time of *Amintas* King of *Macedonia*, (Father of *Philip*) a Prince (as ^h *Justin* witnesseth) eminent for all Royal Virtues. To him *Nicomachus* was not only Physician, but Friend and Favourite. ⁱ *Tzetzes* forgot these Relations of *Aristotle* (as *Nunnesius* observes) when he affirmed that he was called an *Æsculapian* figuratively, in respect of his Skill in Medicine, tho' it be true also that he did profess that Art.

His Mother, *Laertius* and *Suidas* name *Phæstis*, *Dionysius* ^k *Halicarnassæus* and *Ammonius*, *Phæstis*. *Ammonius* saith, she also was descended from *Æsculapius*, alledging in Testimony thereof this Epigram,

*His Mother Phæstis, Sire Nicomachus,
Defended both from Æsculapius.*

^a *Ammon*. sub finem. comment. in poem. *Porphyr.*
mon, ^g *De compos. medicam.*

^b *Iust.* 7. 4.

^c *Chiliad.*

^d *Lib. 4. & 5.*
^e *Polymn.*
^f *Epist.* ad *Ammonium*.

^g *Elinc.*
^h *Vit. Arist.* if he were the Author.

ⁱ *Laert. Amm.*
But

But *Diomysius Halicarnassæus* saith, she was Daughter of a *Chalcidian*, one of the Colony which was sent from *Chalcis* to *Stagira*. Her Picture, *Aristotle*, in Piety to her Memory, caused to be made by *Protagenes*, an eminent Painter of that Time, which Picture *Pliny* reckons amongst the choicest Pieces of that Master.

Aristotle (as *Suidas* affirms) had a Brother named *Arimnestas*, and Sister *Arimnestē*. His Brother died before him without Issue, as appears by his Will.

Aristotle was born, according to the Testimonies of *Apollodorus*, *Diomysius Halicarnassæus* and others, in the first Year of the 99th Olympiad, at what Time *Diastrophes* was Archon at *Athens*, 44 Years after the Birth of *Plato*, as *Athenæus* accounts more justly than *Ammonius* and *Suidas*, who reckon but 42 before the Birth of *Demosthenes*, three Years. *Agellius* affirms, he was born the seventh Year after the Recovery of the City of *Rome* from the *Gauls* by *Camillus*; ¹ but because (as *Plutarch* saith) it is hard to find out on what Year the City was taken, it will be hard also to find upon what Year it was recovered. The Recovery was seven Months after its Taking, but in the following Year, for it was taken in *July*, recovered in *February*. If therefore as *Valerius Flaccus*, *Agellius*, and *Cassius Hemine* account, the Taking of the City was in the 363d Year from the Building thereof, it was recovered in the 364th. Thus *Aristotle* was born in the first Year of the 99th Olympiad, the 370th from the Building of *Rome*.

But, if as *Livy* affirms, the taking of *Rome* was in the 365th Year from the Building thereof, and its Recovery in the 366th, *Aristotle*, according to that Account must have been born in the third Year of the 99th Olympiad, in the 372d Year from the Building of the City. Again, if the City were taken in the 364th Year after the Building thereof, and recovered in the 365th Year, as *Varro*, *Pliny*, *Diomysius Halicarnassæus* account, whom *Scaliger* followeth, *Aristotle* must have been born in the second Year of the 99th Olympiad, the 371st from the Building of the City, reckoning always ten Months for a Year, and not casting them off, as *Pliny* and others seem to do, and beginning immediately the next Year, which Months being reckoned, the Account will agree with ours; hitherto *Nannæus*.

CHAP. II.

His first Education and Studies.

Nicomachus ¹ and *Phæstis* the Parents of *Aristotle* being both dead, he was brought up by *Proxenus* an *Atarnean*, during which Time, being yet very young, he learned the liberal Sciences, as ap-

peareth, saith *Ammonius*, from those Writings of his which partly concern Poetry, partly the Poets themselves, as likewise from his *Homericall Questions*, and several Books concerning the Art of *Rhetorick*.

² In Gratitude for this Care taken by *Proxenus* in his Education, *Aristotle* afterwards, not only bred up in like Manner *Nicanor*, the Son of *Proxenus*, in all Kinds of Learning, but adopted him his Son, and with his Estate bequeathed his Daughter to him. ³ He likewise caused the Statues of *Proxenus* and his Wife to be made and set up in Honour of them, as is manifest by his Will.

⁴ *Athenæus* (citing an Epistle of *Epicurus*) and *Eliau* ⁵ relate, that having consumed the Inheritance left by his Father in Prodigality and Luxury; he betook himself to the Wars, wherein having ill Success, he professed Medicine, and by Chance coming into *Plato's* School, and hearing their Disputes, being of a Wit far beyond the rest, he addicted himself to Philosophy, and became famous therein. But this agrees not well with the Circumstance of his Story, as related by Authors of greater Credit, and less Prejudice.

CHAP. III.

How he heard Plato.

HAVING attained the Age of seventeen Years, he went (in Obedience to the *Pythian Oracle*, which advised him to addict himself to Philosophy) to *Athens*, *Laertius* saith (out of *Apollodorus*) that he was then but seventeen Years old, in which Year *Nausigenes* was Archon, *Diomysius Halicarnassæus* saith, it was the Year following, at what Time *Polyzelus* was Archon, perhaps it was upon *Nausigenes's* going out of his Office, whom *Polyzelus* succeeded. But ⁶ *Eumenius* is much mistaken, who saith, he was thirty Years old when he came first to *Plato*, perhaps (as *Nunnesius* conjectures) because he had read in *Plato*, that *Dialectick* ought not to be studied till the thirtieth Year. And no less err *Ammonius*, (if he be Author of that Life) and *Olympiodorus*, who affirm, that *Aristotle* coming to *Athens* in the seventeenth Year of his Age, heard *Socrates* three Years, whereas *Socrates* was put to Death when *Laches* was Archon, thirty two Years before *Nausigenes*, under whom *Aristotle* was seventeen Years old.

Being recommended to *Plato*, he became his Disciple, and so continued twenty Years, as an Epistle of his to *Philip* (cited by the old Interpreter of his Life) did testify.

Plato much loved him, and admired his Acuteness of Apprehension, and Diligence in Study; for which (*Philoponus* ⁷ saith) *Plato* used to call him

¹ Lib. 3. c. 9. ² Laert. 5. 11. ³ Epist. ad Ammæum. ⁴ Deign. lib. 5. ⁵ Lib. 17. cap. 22. ⁶ Nunnes. in vit. ⁷ Laert. rep. at Schottens in vit. comparat. Arist. & Demosth. ⁸ Ammon. vit. Arist. ⁹ Ibid. ¹⁰ Laert. in Testam. Arist.

¹¹ Deign. l. 8. ¹² Vaz. hist. 5. 9. ¹³ Ammon. vit. Arist.

¹⁴ Laert. 5. 6.

¹⁵ De mundi generat.

C H A P. IV.

How he lived with Hermias.

Plato ^y dying in the first Year of the 108th Olympiad, and *Speusippus* his Nephew succeeding in the School, *Aristotle* went to *Hermias* the Eunuch, King of *Atarna*, a City of *Mysia* in *Asia*, who heretofore had been his Fellow-Disciple under *Plato*, and had a particular Kindness for him. *Hermias* received him with great Testimonies of Love and Respect. With him he lived three Years [^z instructing him in Philosophy] at the End whereof, *Hermias* was (as *Strabo* saith) surpris'd by *Memnon* a *Rhodian*, and sent to *Artaxerxes*, King of *Persia*, who put him to Death. *Pythais* his Sister, a Woman of extraordinary Virtue, (whom *Hermias*, having no Children, had designed his Heir) being upon this Accident reduced to great Extremities and Afflictions, *Aristotle*, in a pious Gratitude to the Memory of his Friend, (as his own ^b Letter to *Antipater* attesteth) took her to Wife, and ^c set up the Statue of *Hermias* in the Temple of *Delphi*, with this Inscription.

*This Man the Persian King against all right
A Sacrifice to his fierce Anger made;
Not like a Fox by martial Arms in Fight;
But as a Friend by Shew of Love betray'd.*

He wrote likewise a Hymn to *Virtue*, in Memory of his Friend, to this Effect:

*Virtue, whom we all obtain
With much Labour, but more Gain,
For your Sake to die would please,
Toil and Torments were but Ease.
You direct Men in Pursuit
Of immortal sacred Fruit,
Richer far than Gold refin'd,
Soft as Sleep, as Parents kind;
Great Alcides for your Sake
Labours vast did undertake:
Leda's valiant Twins made known
More your Glories than their own;
Ajax and Achilles too
Only dy'd for Love of you;
Ah! for you *Atarna's* Pride,
Hermias untimely dy'd.
But his Name we will revive,
That our Muse shall keep alive,
Paying hospitable Jove
Pious Thanks for a Friend's Love.*

There wanted not those who cast many Aspersions and Calumnies upon this virtuous Friendship. Some affirm that *Hermias* lov'd *Aristotle* inordinate-

ly (an Imputation not well suiting with an Eunuch) and that for this Reason he gave him *Pythais* to Wife, whom *Suidas* and the *Greek* Etymologist affirm to have been his Daughter, either by Nature or Adoption, *Demetrius Magnesium's* Niece, *Aristippus's* Concubine, so little do they agree in their Relation. They add, that *Aristotle* was so passionately in love with her, that he sacrificed to her after the same Manner as the *Athenians* to *Ceres* at *Eleusis*. This *Laertius* relates as done whilst she was alive; but *Lyco*, first Author of this Calumny, that it was after her Death. Moreover that *Aristotle* in a thankful Acknowledgment of his Bounty, wrote a *Pæan* in Praise of *Hermias*, meaning the Hymn last mentioned, which ^d *Athenæus* proveth against the Calumniation of *Demophilus*, not to be a sacred Hymn or *Pæan*, but a Scholion or Festival Song. Hence *Theocritus* the *Chian* derides him in this Epigram.

*To the Slave Eunuch who Atarna sway'd
An empty Tomb empty Aristotle made,
Who from the Academy did retire
To wallow in vain Pleasure's faithless Mire.*

In answer to these Calumnies (first raised by *Lyco*, dispersed further by *Aristippus*, and continued by those that malign the Memory of *Aristotle*) *Apelleis* writ certain Books wherein he accurately confutes those who durst in this Manner impudently blaspheme (such are his Words) the Name of *Aristotle*; so much Prejudice and Malice being in the Accusation, as might easily argue the Falseness thereof.

^e Upon the Death of *Hermias*, *Aristotle* (with *Xenocrates*) fled from *Atarna* to *Mytelene*, as *Apolodorus* and *Dionysius Halicarnassæus* affirm, in the fourth Year of the 108th Olympiad, *Eubulus* being Archon.

C H A P. V.

How he lived with Philip and Alexander.

ABOUT this Time *Philip* King of *Macedonia*, Father of *Alexander*, taking Care for the Education of his Son, now growing towards Man's Estate, and unwilling (saith ^f *Plutarch*) to commit his Education to Professors of Music, or any other of the liberal Sciences, as knowing him fit for higher Designs, sent to *Aristotle*, the most famous and learned of Philosophers, to come and instruct him. *Agellius* ^g recites his Epistle, which was to this Effect.

Philip to Aristotle, Health.

KNow that I have a Son, I render the Gods many Thanks: Not so much for his Birth as that he

^y Laert. 5. 4. ^z Suid. ^a Lib. 13. ^b Euseb. cont. Philos. ^c Laert. ^d Deipn. 1. 15. ^e Laert. ibid. ^f Suid. ^g Vit. Alex. ^h Lib. 9. c. 2.

was born in your Time, for I hope that being educated and instructed by you, he will become worthy both of us, and the Kingdom which he shall inherit.

Aristotle at this Request of *Philip*, went to *Macedonia* to him, in the 4th Year of the 308th Olympiad, as *Apollodorus* and *Dionysius Halicarnassensis* affirm, at what Time *Alexander* was fifteen Years old.

^k He lived there infinitely esteemed and beloved of *Philip* and *Olympia* his Wife, *Alexander's* Mother. They caused his Statue to be made, and set up in honour of him. *Philip* had a Kindness for particular for him, that he allowed him, in a manner, an equal Share in the Government of the Kingdom; which Interest, *Ammonius* saith, he employed to the Advantage, as well of private Persons as of the Publick, as appeareth (saith the *Latin* Interpreter of his Life) by his Epistles to *Philip*. ^m *Plutarch* affirms, that *Philip*, as a recompence to *Aristotle*, re-edified the Town where he was born, *Stagira*, which he had before laid waste. He likewise assigned him a School and Study near *Mieza*, a Town of *Macedonia*, not far from thence, where, unto this Day (saith *Plutarch*) they shew the stony Seats and shady Walks of *Aristotle*.

ⁿ He instructed *Alexander* in the deepest Parts of Learning, not only in *Ethicks* and *Politicks*, but his most reserved and solid Doctrines, call'd *Acroestick* and *Epoptick*, never communicated to the Vulgar.

That he taught him likewise the *Art of Medicine*, *Plutarch* argueth, forasmuch as *Alexander* was not only exceedingly delighted with the Theory thereof, but practis'd it successfully upon many of his Friends, to whom he prescribed Receipts and Diets, as appeareth, saith he, by his Epistle.

^o Perceiving *Alexander* to be much taken with *Homer's* Iliads, as conceiving, and calling it, *The best Institution of Military Virtue*, he took much Pains in correcting and restoring the Text, and then gave it to *Alexander*, which Copy he infinitely prized.

He writ a Book to *Alexander*, entitled, *Of a Kingdom*, mentioned by *Laertius* and *Ammonius*, wherein he instructed him how to rule.

^p So much did he incline the Mind of *Alexander* to do good, that he us'd to say, if any Day pass'd, wherein he had not conferr'd some Benefit, *I have not reigned to Day*.

^q *Alexander* so much affected him, that he profess'd he admir'd and lov'd him no less than his Father; because his Father, he said, only gave him being, but *Aristotle* well-being.

The Love which *Philip* and *Alexander* bore him was so great, that *Theocritus* the *Cybian* cast the same Affection upon it, as he did on his Friendship with *Hermias*.

In the first Year of the 111th Olympiad, *Pythodorus* being Archon, *Philip* died, and was succeeded by his Son *Alexander*, whose active Spirit, soon after his coming to the Crown, designed an Expedition against the King of *Persia*. Hereupon, *Aristotle* leaving now liv'd with *Alexander* eight Years, tho' *Justin* saith but five, which some interpret of the Time before *Philip's* Death, but not without some Violence (for that was above seven) preferring the Quiet of a Contemplative Life before the Troubles of War, took Leave of him, return'd to *Arbens*, leaving in his room *Calisthenes* an *Olynthian*, his Kinsman (Son of his Cousin *Hero*) and Disciple, whom, before his Departure, observing to speak with too much Liberty and Obstinacy to the King, he reprov'd in these Words,

Son, if thou thus employ thy Tongue,
Thy Thread of Life cannot be long.

And so it came to pass, not long after, upon this Occasion. *Hermolaus*, Son of *Sopilis*, a Youth of a Noble Family, that study'd *Philosophy* under *Calisthenes*, hunting the Wild Boar with *Alexander*, prevented the King, by casting his Dart first at him; for which he was, by the King's Command, punish'd with many Stripes. Troubled at the Ignominy thereof, he conspired with *Sistratus*, Antipater, and some other Companions of his, to murder *Alexander*; which Treason being discover'd by *Epimeus*, one of the Conspirators, they were all put to Death. *Aristobolus*, and *Ptolemaeus*, Son of *Lagus*, affirm, they accus'd *Calisthenes* as him who instigated them to this Attempt. Hereupon *Calisthenes* was put into an Iron Cage, and to carry'd up and down in a miserable fordid Condition; and at last, as *Laertius* relates, (tho' others otherwise) thrown to the Lions and devour'd.

CHAP. VI.

His School and Manner of Teaching.

THUS *Aristotle* having liv'd eight Years with *Alexander*, returned to *Athens*, as *Apollodorus* and *Dionysius Halicarnassensis* affirm, in the second Year of the hundred and eleventh Olympiad, *Pythodorus* being Archon, where he found *Xenocrates* teaching in the Academy, which Place was resign'd unto him by *Speusippus* in the fourth Year of the hundred and ninth Olympiad.

Hence it appeareth, that *Hermippus* erreth, in affirming, that *Xenocrates* took upon him the School of *Plato*, at what Time *Aristotle* was sent by the *Athenians* on an Embassy to *Philip*; for, as *Patricius* hath observed, it can no way agree in Time, it being certain, as *Laertius* attests, that *Speusippus* succeeded *Plato* in the School, in the first Year of the hundred and eighth Olympiad, immediately

ⁱ Laert. 5. 10. ^k Ammon. ^j Vet. Interp. ^m Vit. Alex. ⁿ Plat. lib. ^o Plat. lib. ^p Vet. Interp. ^q Plat. lib.
 Alex. ^r Laert. 5. 5. ^s Laert. 5. 10. ^t Epist. ad Ammon. ^u Laert. 5. 2. ^v Diffut. Perip. T. 1. ^w Plat. lib.

upon *Plato's* Death, and continued therein eight Years, that is, to the End of the hundred and ninth Olympiad; in the second Year of which Olympiad, *Aristotle*, as we said, went to *Philip*, not on an Embassy, but upon his Invitation, to educate *Alexander*.

Neither is the Author of *Aristotle's* Life less mistaken, who saith, *That upon the Death of Speusippus*, the Athenians sent to *Aristotle*, and that both of them, *Aristotle* and *Xenocrates*, took upon them *Plato's* School, *Xenocrates* in the Academy, *Aristotle* in the Lyceum. But this Error is easily detected by the same Computation; for, at the Time of *Speusippus's* Death, *Aristotle* was with *Alexander*, nor did he leave him until six Years after; all which Time *Xenocrates* professed *Philosophy* in the Academy.

* The Academy being prepossessed by *Xenocrates*, *Aristotle* made choice of the Lyceum, (a Place in the Suburbs of Athens, built by *Pericles* for the Exercising of Soldiers.) Here he taught and discours'd of *Philosophy* to such as came to him, walking constantly every Day till the Hour of Anointing, which the Greeks usually did before Meals, whence he and his Followers are call'd *ἀντὶ τῆ περπατήσεως*, from walking, *Peripateticks*. Others say, he was call'd *Peripatetick*, from walking with *Alexander*, newly recover'd of a Sickness; in which Manner he used to discourse of *Philosophy* with him.

* The Number of his Auditors encreasing very much, he gave over Walking, and taught Sitting, saying,

*New to be silent most disgraceful were,
And see Xenocrates possess the Chair.*

Tho' *Cicero* and *Quintilian* affirm he used this Verse against *Socrates*, in Emulation of whom, he taught *Rhetorick* to his Disciples every Morning. So many Disciples resorted to him, that he made Laws in his School, as *Xenocrates* did in the Academy, creating Archons that ruled ten Days.

The Discourse and Doctrine which he deliver'd to his Disciples was of two Kinds; One he call'd *Exoterick*, the other *Acroatick*. *Exoterick* were those who conducted to *Rhetorick*, Meditation, nice Disputes, and the Knowledge of Civil Things. *Acroatick*, those in which more remote and subtle Philosophy was handled, and such Things as pertain to the Contemplation of Nature and Dialective Disquisitions. *Acroatick* Discipline he taught in the Lyceum in the Morning, not admitting every one to come and hear them, but those only of whose Wit and Principles of Learning, and Diligence and Study he had before made Trial. His *Exoterick* Lectures were in the Afternoon and Evenings; these he communicated to all young Men, without any Distinction, calling the latter his Evening Walk, the former his Morning Walk.

z Laert. 5. to. y Said. z Laert. ibid. a Laert. ibid. b Agel. lib. 21. cap. 5. c Vit. Ar. d Ammon. v. Ar. e Dialectic. Peripat.

CHAP. VII.

His Philosophy.

IN *Philosophy* (saith *Ammonius*) he seems to have done more than Man; for there's not any Part of *Philosophy*, whereof he treated, but he doth it most accurately; and many Things he himself (such was his Sagacity and Acuteness) finding out, compleated and finished.

* In *Logic* it was his Invention, that he separated the Precepts of Disputation from the Things themselves of which we dispute, and taught the Manner and Reason of Disputation; for, they who went before, tho' they could demonstrate, yet they knew not how to make a Demonstration; as they who cannot make Shoes, but only wear 'em. *Alexander Aphrodisiæus* affirms, that he first reduced Syllogisms to Mood and Figure. *Philoponus*, that he invented all *Dialectick* Methods, whence *Theodorus* calls him both Inventor and Perfecker of *Logic*, which he indeed, in a manner, challengeth (but modestly) to to himself, in the last Chapter of his *Elenchi*, affirming, nothing had been done in that Kind before, but what the *Eristicks* and *Sophists* taught. As for the *Categories*, the Invention whereof some ascribe to the *Pythagoreans*, it is much more probable that they were wholly his own; for those Books intitled, *καθόλου λόγος*, under the Name *Archytas*, from which some conceive *Aristotle* to have borrow'd much; the Particulars whereof are instanced by * *Patricius*, *Themistius* affirms to have been written, not by the *Pythagorean* (neither hath *Laertius* made mention of any Writings of his, for the *Pythagoreans*, at that Time, wrote but little; the first that wrote any thing being *Philolaus*) but by some *Peripatetick*, who thought his Work might pass with greater Credit, if published in the Name of so ancient a Philosopher.

In *Physick*, the Fifth Essence, whereof Celestial Bodies consist, distinct from the Four Elements, is generally ascrib'd to his Invention, only *Simplicius* citeth the Authority of *Xenocrates*, in his Book of the *Life of Plato*, that *Plato* constituted Five simple Bodies, Heaven and the Four Elements, asserting, they differ no less in Nature than in Figure; for which Reason he assigned the Figure of a *Dodecadron* to Heaven, offering from the Figure of the Four Elements. But these, as the learned *Nannius* observes, seem to be rather Symbolical and *Pythagorical*, than the true Meaning of *Plato*. For *Plato*, in his *Timæus*, expressly avers, *That the Heavens are, of their own Nature, dissolute, but by the Divine Will, are kept together, as it were, by a Tie from being dissolved*. *Xenarchus*, a Philosopher, wrote against the Fifth Essence, introduced by *Aristotle*, whom *Alexander Aphrodisiæus* exactly answereth. *Theodorus* calleth *Aristotle* the Perfecker of

Physick, adding, that only his Writings upon that Subject were approved by following Ages, who rejected whatsoever others had written in the same Kind, as appeareth by their Loss. What *Epicurus* and others have objected against him as a Fault, *That he enquired with such Diligence into the minute, and meanest Things of Nature*, is a sufficient Testimony of his Excellence and Exactness in this Study.

In *Ethick*, whereas *Polyænus* placed Felicity in external Goods, *Plato* in those of the Soul only, *Aristotle* placed it chiefly in the Soul, but affirmed it to be defiled and streightned, if it want exterior Goods, properly using these Terms: For those Things which are defiled, have the same Beauty within, but their Superficies only is hidden; and those which are streightned have the same real Magnitude.

In *Metaphysick*, which he calleth *First Philosophy* and *Wisdom*, and (as the more ancient Philosophers before him) *Theology*,^a tho' there be not any Invention of his extant, yet he perfectly went thro' all the Parts thereof; for he was not only acquainted, as some falsely imagine, with Terrestrial Things, and those which belong to this World, but even with those Things which are above this World, as may appear from the Eighth Book of his *Physick*, where he saith, *That the first Cause is not subject to Motion, neither in itself, nor by Accident*; in which Words he declareth, *That God is not a Body, nor any way passible*. And in his Twelfth Book of *Wisdom*, or *Metaphysics*, he discourseth accurately of *God and Intelligences*, in a rational clear Way, not involved in Fables, or Pythagorical Symbols, but founding his Assertion upon Reason and Demonstration, as much as the Subject and human Reason alloweth.^b *Patricius* labours much to prove, that whatsoever he had in this kind, excellent, he borrowed from *Hermes Trismegistus*. But,^c as we have already said, Mr. *Cajaubon* hath fully evinced that Book to have been imposed upon the World by some later Writer.

What is added by the ancient *Latin* Interpreter, concerning *Aristotle's* Sentence of that *Visual Hexagonal Pyramid*, (which^d a learned Person hath observed to be chosen as a middle Way betwixt the Sentence of those who made the *Optick Pencil* a *Pyramid* of a *Quadratick Base*, and those who made it of a *Conick Figure*) is very obscure, and hardly admits of an Interpretation worthy so great an Author.

CHAP. VIII.

His Correspondence with Alexander.

WHILST *Aristotle* taught Philosophy at *Athens*, his Disciple *Alexander* was employ'd in an Ex-

pedition to *Asia*, against *Darius King of Persia*, incited thereunto by the Principles of Honour which were infused into him by *Aristotle*, particularly from the Precedents of *Achilles*, *Ajax*, and other Heroes celebrated by *Homer*, whose *Iliads* *Aristotle* had so carefully recommended unto him. He began this Expedition in the third Year of the 11th Olympiad, at which Time *Ctesicles* was Archon at *Athens*, immediately after the Departure of *Aristotle*, who (it is probable) came only for this Reason from him, as preferring a quiet and studious Life before the Troubles of War.

The first Thing that *Alexander* did, was to visit the Tomb of *Achilles* in the *Sigæum*; at the Sight whereof he broke forth into these Words; *O fortunate young Man, that hadst a Homer to celebrate thy Praise! For, had it not been for his Iliads*, adds^e *Cicero*, in the same Tomb where *Achilles's* Body lay, his Name also would have been buried. He took with him the *Iliads* of *Homer*, corrected by *Aristotle*, and made it his constant Companion, in so much that he laid it every Night with his Dagger, under his Pillow. And in a Victory over *Darius*, having taken a Casket of Unguents, of extraordinary Value amongst the Spoils of *Darius*, beset with Pearls and precious Stones, (as^f *Pliny* describes it) his Friends telling him how many Uses it might be put to, because Unguents did not become a Soldier; *Yes*, saith he, *it shall serve to keep the Books of Homer, that the most precious Work may be kept in the richest Case*. Hence was this correct Copy called, as *Plutarch* saith, *in τῷ ραβδῶν*.

Whilst he was in *Asia*, engaged in the Wars against *Darius*, in the midst of his continual Victories and Business, hearing that *Aristotle* had published his *Acroamatic Books* of Natural Philosophy, he sent this Letter to him.

^g *Alexander to Aristotle, Health.*

YOU have not done well in publishing your *Acroamatic Discourses*; for wherein shall we exult others, if this Learning wherein we have been instructed, be made common to all? As for me, I had rather excell others in Knowledge than in Power. Farewell.

To which *Aristotle* returned this Answer.

^h *Aristotle to Alexander, Health.*

YOU wrote to me concerning my *Acroamatic Discourses*, that they ought not to have been communicated, but kept secret. Know, that they are made publick, and not publick; for none but they who have heard us can understand them. Farewell.

f Vet. Interp. g Ammon. h Ammon. i Dissert. Peripat. k In the Life of Plato. cap. l Nicomachus Vat. Arist. m Pm Arch. n Lib. 29. o Plat. vit. Alex. p Agell. 20. 5. Plat. vit. Alex. q Agell. 20. 5. Epist. Genec.

Thus, notwithstanding *Alexander* was busied in the Wars, yet he forgot not his Master *Aristotle*, but kept a friendly Correspondence with him. So constant was he in his Love to Learning, and particularly so much enflamed, (as *Pliny* saith) with a curious Desire of understanding the Natures of living Creatures, that he sent Thousands of Men, throughout all *Asia* and *Greece*, to procure all kinds of living Creatures, Birds, Beasts, and Fishes, at an excessive Charge; ¹ *Athenæus* saith, 800 Talents, which according to ² *Budæus's* Account, is 840000 Crowns. These Men he sent with what they took to *Aristotle*, that he might not be ignorant of any Thing that any Nation afforded; by which Information, he composed, as *Pliny* affirmeth, fifty excellent Volumes, of *Living Creatures*, of which ten are only left, unless we put into the same Number, those Books of his which have some near relation to this Subject: As, *Of the going of living Creatures*. 1. *Of the Parts of living Creatures, and their Causes*. *Of the Generation of living Creatures*. If this were done by *Alexander*, as *Pliny* and *Athenæus* attest, (though ³ *Ælian* ascribe it to *Philip*) it must necessarily have been whilst he was in his *Asiatick* Expedition. For *Aristotle*, as hath been already proved, staid but a very short Time with him after the Death of his Father.

Aristotle made the same Use of his Correspondence with *Alexander*, as he had done of the Interest he before had with *Philip*, the Advantage not only of particular Persons, but of whole Cities.

This the City of *Stagira*, the Place of his Birth, did acknowledge, which, at the Suit of *Aristotle*, *Alexander* caused to be re-edified, and re-peopled, and restored to its former State, having before, by *Philip*, been laid level with the Ground. For, tho' *Plutarch* relate this as done in the Time of *Philip*, *Laertius*, *Ammonius*, *Dion*, *Chrysostome*, *Ælian*, and others hold, that it was done by *Alexander*, to which *Valerius Maximus* adds, that it was not long before *Aristotle's* Death. In Memory of which Benefit, the People of *Stagira* used to celebrate a yearly Festival, which they called the *Aristotelian Feast*, naming the Month in which it fell, *Stagiritis*.

⁴ *Ereus* likewise, the Country of *Theophrastus*, which *Alexander* determined to punish very severely; by the Mediation of *Aristotle*, was pardon'd.

That he benefited many particular Persons is evident, saith *Ammonius*, from his Epistles to the King, yet extant, wherein he recommends several Persons to him.

Hence it is manifest, that the Author of his Life is mistaken, when he affirms, that in *Alexander's* *Asiatick* Expedition, *Aristotle* accompanied him to the *Brachmanes*, where he writ that noble Piece of

the *Laws and Institutions of 255 Cities*; that likewise he travelled over all *Persia* with *Alexander*, where, during the War, *Alexander* died, and *Aristotle* returned into his own Country. This Relation agrees not with the other Circumstances of *Aristotle's* Life. *Alexander* died in the fourth Year of the hundred and thirteenth Olympiad, two Years before *Aristotle's* Departure from *Athenes*.

But as it is apparent, that this Mistake proceeded only from Ignorance (yet that so great, that ⁵ *Patricius* argues from thence neither *Ammonius* nor *Philoponus* to be Authors of his Life) so are there some other Errors, which no less manifestly appear to have proceeded from Malice, raised, it is likely, by the Authors of the other Scandals and Imputations, wherewith they sought to blast his Memory.

⁶ Some affirm, that *Alexander*, upon the Treason of *Calisthenes*, took a great Displeasure against *Aristotle*, for having recommended him to him. For tho' at first, writing to *Criterus*, *Attalus*, and *Alcetas*, immediately upon this Accident, he sent them Word, that the Youths had confessed the Plot proceeded only from themselves, not by the Instigation of any other. ⁷ Yet afterwards, in an Epistle to *Antipater*, he imputes the same Crime to *Calisthenes*, not without this sharp Reflection upon *Aristotle*; *The Youths*, said he, *were stoned to Death by the Macedonians, but as for the Sophist, I will punish him myself; and those who sent him, and those who entertain in their Cities such as are Traitors to me*. Hereupon they interpret the Bounty of *Alexander* to *Xenocrates*, and Favour to *Anaximenes*, as not proceeding from the Magnificence of his Disposition, ⁸ but from the Displeasure he had conceived against *Aristotle*, whom he endeavoured to vex, by obliging his Adversaries and Emulators.

Upon this supposed Displeasure was grounded another Report, that ⁹ *Aristotle* conspiring with *Cassander* against *Alexander*, sent him, by *Antipater*, some of the Water of *Styx*, wherewith he poisoned *Alexander*. But the Relators hereof differ not a little amongst themselves. *Diodorus Siculus* and *Suidas* affirm, that *Alexander* was poisoned by *Cassander* Son of *Antipater*; *Arianus* by *Jolla* his younger Son. *Porphyrius* saith, That nothing but the Horn of an As, such as the Ases of *Scythia* had, would contain the Poison. *Justin* and *Pausanias*, the Hoof of a Horse; *Pliny* and *Arrian*, of a Mule; *Plutarch* and *Zonaras*, of an Ais. They differ no less about the Place whence the Water was fetch'd. Neither indeed can it be expected there should be a better Harmony amongst the Relators of this Fable, when there is so great Dissention and Variety of Relations concerning the Occasion and Manner of his Death. But the most credible is that of *Ephippus*,

¹ Lib. 8. 17. ² Lib. 9. ³ De off. lib. 2. 29. ⁴ Lib. 4. 29. ⁵ Ammon. vit. Arist. ⁶ Dissert. Peripet. 1. 2. ⁷ Laert. 5. 11. ⁸ Plut. vit. Alex. ⁹ Laert. 8. 12.

(cited by *Athenaus*) ^a *Orosius*, ^b *Justin*, and others, who aver, that *Alexander* died of a Fever, caused by Excess of Drinking.

CHAPTER IX.

Upon what Occasion he left Athens, and went to Chalcis.

^c **T**WELVE Years *Aristotle* professed Philosophy in the *Lyceum*, not molested by any; for tho' his Eminence in Learning procured him many Emulators and Enemies, yet the Favour he had with *Alexander*, while he lived, averted them so much, that they durst not make any Discovery of the Ill-will they bore him. No sooner was *Alexander* dead (according to *Dionysius Halicarnassensis*) but some of them conspired against his Life; to which End, *Eurymedon*, a Priest, or (according to *Phavorinus*) *Demophilus*, accused him of Impiety; That he introduced some Philosophical Assertions, contrary to the Religion of the Athenians; that he celebrated *Hermias* as a God, with a Hymn, and had caused his Statue to be set up in the Delphian Temple, with an honourable Inscription. Some affirm hereupon, he made an Oration in Defence of himself, at the Court of *Areopagus*, wherein he openly pronounced this Verse, made out of two in *Homer*. ^d

Pears upon Pears, and Figs on Figs grow here.

By *σύνταξις σύνταξις* (*Figs on Figs*) reflecting upon the Multitude of Sycophants which sprung up every Day in the City. Hence *Phavorinus* saith, he was the first Philosopher that pleaded for himself, and there was an Oration to that Purpose went about many Years after under his Name. But, of the Truth hereof, ^e *Athenaus* maketh Question.

^f Others affirm, that *Aristotle* perceiving the Conspiracy that was against his Life, stole privately out of *Athens*, and went to *Chalcis*, where he spent the rest of his Days; returning to his Friends, who demanding the Reason of his going, made this Answer; ^g *We left Athens, that we might not give the Athenians an Occasion to commit again the same Wickedness* ^h they committed against *Socrates*, that they might not be guilty of a double Crime against Philosophy. To *Antipater* he wrote the forementioned Verse;

Pears upon Pears, and Figs on Figs grow here.

Giving him to understand how dangerous it was for him to live in *Athens*, since the *Athenians* were wholly addicted to Sycophantism and Calumny. This Departure of *Aristotle* from *Athens*, *Dionysius Halicarnassensis* placeth in the second Year of the

14th Olympiad; *Apollodorus* a Year later, perhaps less rightly.

ⁱ Being near sixty two Years of Age, very sickly, and without Hope of living much longer, the whole Company of his Followers came to him, and besought him to make Choice of a Successor, whom after his Death they might look upon as the Perfecter of those Studies whereinto he had brought them. There were, at that Time many excellent Scholars in his School, but especially two, *Theophrastus* and *Menedemus*, or rather, as *Patricius* reads, *Eudemus*. These excelled the rest in Wit and Learning. The first was of *Lesbos*, *Eudemus* of *Rhodes*. *Aristotle* answer'd them, *He would do as they requested, when he saw it convenient*. Soon after, the same Persons being present who had made this Request to him, he complain'd, *the Wine he then drank did not agree with his Health, but was unwholesome and harsh, and therefore desired they would send for other Sorts, both Rhodian and Lesbian; saying, He would make use of that which he should find best for him*. They go, seek, find, bring. *Aristotle* first calls for the Rhodian, tastes it, *A strong Wine, saith he, and pleasant*; then calls for the Lesbian, which having tasted, *Both, saith he, are good, but this is sweeter*, the Lesbian is the sweeter; whereby every one understood that his Choice was not of the Wine, but of his Successor, which was *Theophrastus* of *Lesbos*, a Man of extraordinary Sweetness in Discourse and Conversation; whence, not long after, as soon as *Aristotle* was dead, all his Disciples applied themselves to *Theophrastus*.

CHAPTER X.

His Apophthegms.

^j **O**F his Apophthegms are remembered these.

^k Being demanded what a Man got by Lying, he answered, *Not to be believed when he spoke Truth*.

He was often used to say, *He that hath many Friends, hath none*; which is likewise extant in the seventh Book of his *Ethicks*.

^l He said, *When Things happen not as we would, we must will as they happen*.

^m Seeing a Youth very self-conceited, and withal ignorant; *Young Man*, saith he, *I wish I were what you think yourself, and my Enemies, what you are*.

ⁿ Seeing a young Man proud of a fine Cloak, *Why boast you, saith he, of a Sheep's Fleece?*

^o He said, *They who demonstrate plain Things, light a Candle to see the Sun*.

^p Being reviled by an impudent Person; *Thou, saith he, who art versed to bear all Things, speakest them with Delight; I who am not used to speak them, take no Delight in hearing them*.

^c Deip. 10. 11.

^d Lib. 3. c. 21.

^e Lib. 12. 23.

^f Laert. 5. 5.

^g Odyf. 11.

^h L. 15.

ⁱ Laert. 5. 5.

^k *Alim.*

var. hist. 3. 36.

^l Origen. contr. Celsum. lib. 2.

^m Augell. 23. 6.

ⁿ Laert. 5. 17.

^o Sub. Ser. 35.

^p Sub. Ser.

^q Ser. ibid.

^r Ibid.

^s Ser. 36.

^t Ser. 29.

Being demanded why he who taught others to speak, himself held his Tongue; *A Whetstone*, faith he, cannot cut, yet it sets an Edge upon Swords.

Being asked who can keep a Secret, *He*, faith he, that can hold a glowing Coal in his Mouth.

Seeing a young Man very neatly drest'd; *Are you not ashamed*, faith he, when Nature hath made you a Man, to make yourself a Woman?

A handsome young Man, much courted, said to him, *If I were hated of the Citizens as you are, I would hang myself; And I*, replied he, *would hang myself, if I were loved by them as you are.*

Being demanded how a Man should come to be rich, he answered, by being poor in Desire.

It repented him of three Things; *That he had ever committed a Secret to a Woman; that he had rid when he might have gone on Foot; that he had lived one Day, not having his Will made.*

CHAP. III.

His Will and Death.

From that Speech of *Aristotle* last mentioned, may be gather'd how careful he was to make his Will, but more from the exact Form thereof, which was thus:

BE all well; but if it happen otherwise, thus *Aristotle* maketh his Will. Be Antipater my sole Executor during the Minority of Nicanor. Let Aristomenes, Timarchus, Hipparchus, Dioteles, (as if he please, and have Leisure) Theophrastus, be Guardians of the Children and of Herpylis, and all that I leave. I will, that my Daughter, as soon as she shall be marriageable, be given Nicanor to Wife. If any Thing happen otherwise (which God forbid) before she be married, or after she be married before she hath any Children, let Nicanor have the ordering of my Son, and the Disposal of all other Things, for his Reputation and mine. Let therefore Nicanor take Care of the Maid Pythias, and my Son Nicomachus, and order their Estates according to their Conditions, as a Father and a Brother. If in the mean time any Thing shall happen to Nicanor (which God forbid) either before my Daughter be married, or if married, before she hath any Children; if he make any Will, as be appointeth, let it be. Otherwise, if Theophrastus approve of it, let him marry the Maid, and have the same Power that Nicanor should have had. Otherwise, let the Estates as well of the Maid as the Boy be disposed with the joint Consent of the Guardians, and Antipater, as they shall think fit. Let likewise the Executors of Nicanor take Care to remember us and Herpylis, since that she hath been faithful to me, and if she will take a Husband, that such a one be given

unto her as may be no Disparagement unto us. Let them give her out of my Estate, besides what is already mentioned, a Talent of Silver, three Maid-servants, if she so please, and the Hand-maid which she hath, and the Boy Pyrrheus. And moreover, if she will dwell at Chalcis, let her have that Habitation which joineth to the Garden; if at Stagyræ, our Patrimonial Seat; which howsoever Herpylis shall choose, let the Executors furnish it, as they shall think convenient and proper for Herpylis. Let likewise Nicanor take Charge of the Boy Mirmax, that he may be restored honourably, as becometh us, unto his own, with all his Goods which we delivered to our Trust. Let likewise Ambracis be a free Woman, and have bestowed upon her at her Marriage, fifty Drachms, and the Girl which she hath. I will likewise, that to Thales be given, besides the Hand-maid he hath bought, a thousand Drachms, and another Handmaid. Likewise to Simo, besides that Money which he hath already received to buy a Servant, let another Servant be bought, or the like Sum be given again, wherewith he may purchase one. As soon as my Daughter shall be married, let Tycho, Philo, Olympias and his Son be free Men. Of those Boys which served me, let none be sold, but let my Heirs make Use of their Service, and when they come to Age let them be manumitted. Let the Executors take Care of those Statues of Nicanor, and his Mother, and Proxenus, which I give Order for to Gryllus, as soon as they are perfected, be set up. Let likewise the Statue of Arimnestus be set up, that this Monument may remain of him, since he died without Children. I will likewise that the Statue of my Mother be consecrated to Ceres, in the Numæan Temple, or where else shall be thought fitting. Wherefore my Body is buried by the Executors, thither let the Bones of Pythias, according as she desired, be brought and laid with mine. Let likewise Nicanor, if he continue well in Health, dedicate at Stagyræ, to Jupiter Soter, and Minerva Sotira, Statues of Brass, of Stone of four Cubits, in Performance of the Vow which we vowed for him.

He died at Chalcis, in the third Year of the 114th Olympiad, Philocles being Archon, in the 63d and great Climacterical Year of his Age (not as *Eumelus*, 70 Years old) as appeareth by the Computation of *Apollodorus* and *Dionysius Halicarnassæus*; thus,

	Years.
He came to Athens at	18
Heard Plato	20
Lived with Hermias	3
With Philip and Alexander	8
Taught in the Lyceum	12
Lived at Chalcis	2
In all	63

^a Stob. Ser. 93. ^b Ibid. ^c Ibid. ^d Ibid. ^e Sermon. 120. ^f Ibid. ^g Lect. 5. 11. Sec. ^h Lect. 5. 9. ⁱ A. Phil. cunct.

The Manner of his Death is variously related, *Strabo* ⁴, *Hesychius Illustris*, and from him *Suidas*, relate that he drank Hemlock, either being condemn'd thereunto by the *Athenians*, as *Socrates* was, or to prevent their Judgment.

⁵ *Justin Martyr*, ⁶ *Gregory Nazianzen*, ⁷ *Cælius Rhodaginus*, the Greek Etymologist *Nonnus*, and others, follow the common Report, that a Question was propos'd to him of the wonderful Nature of *Euripus*, an Arm of the Sea, coming into *Chalcis* (as *Lucian* avers) which ebbeh and floweth seven Times in twenty four Hours. Not being able to resolve it, he died of Shame and Anxiety. Some affirm, that as he sat on the Bank, having considered long upon it, he at last threw himself headlong into the River, saying, *Since Aristotle could not take Euripus, Euripus take thou Aristotle*.

But the Authors of greatest Credit, ⁸ *Apollodorus*, *Dionysius* ⁹ *Halicarnassæus*, ¹⁰ *Censorinus*, *Laertius* and others affirm, that he died of a Pain in his Stomach, caused by over-watching, and Excess of Study. For *Laertius* affirms he was a most indefatigable Student, and when he went to Bed, he held a brazen Ball in his Hand, that when he fell asleep, the Noise of it falling into a Basin set under it for that Purpose, might awake him, which *Alexander* his Disciple imitated. To this Pain of his Stomach he was very subject, and sometimes assuaged it by applying a Bottle of hot Oil to his Breast. *Notwithstanding this natural Infirmary of his Stomach*, saith *Censorinus*, and the frequent Indisposition of a sickly Constitution, he preserved himself a long Time through his Virtue and Temperance; for it is much more strange that he attained the Age of 63 Years, than that he lived no longer.

The Author of the Book de *Pomo*, affirmeth, that when he was dying, he said to his Disciples, standing about him, *It was not without Reason that Homer said* ¹, *the Gods came down to Earth to relieve Mankind*. ² *Cælius Rhodaginus* adds, from the same Author, That when he felt the Pangs of Death to come upon him, weeping between Grief and Hope, he often repeated these Words, *Thou Cause of Causes have Mercy on me*. And his Disciples, when they saw he was departing, said, *He who receiveth the Souls of Philosophers, may be take thine likewise, and lay it up in his own Treasury, as the Soul of a right and perfect Man, as we have known thee to be*. Of this there is no Testimony more ancient than that of the Author of the Book de *Pomo*, who (as *Patricius* clearly observes from his Writings) was a Christian.

³ The *Stagirites* fetch'd his Body from *Chalcis* to *Stagira*, where they buried it with much Solemnity, building a magnificent Tomb for him, and erecting an Altar to his Memory.

CHAP. XII.

His Person and Virtues.

AS concerning his Person, he was slender, having little Eyes, and a small Voice. When he was young, *Laertius* and *Plutarch* affirm, he had a great Hesitation in his Speech. ¹ He went in a rich Habit, and wore Rings; his Beard was shaven, his Hair cut short; he had a high Nose, if we credit the Head put up by *Fulvius Ursinus*, found at *Rome*, at the Bottom of the *Quirinal Hill*. He was of a sickly Constitution, troubled with a natural Weakness of Stomach, and frequent Indispositions, which he overmastered by his Temperance.

St. Hierom affirmeth, he was the Prince of Philosophers, an absolute Prodigy, and great Miracle in Nature, into whom seemeth to have been infused whatsoever Mankind is capable of.

He was extremely pious towards God and Man, upon which Subject *Fortunus Licetus* hath lately written two Books.

² *Eusebius*, *Cassiodorus*, and others affirm, that many Persons, eminent for Sanctity, especially Followers of School-Learning, have, through the Means of *Aristotle's* Philosophy, been carried on to Inspection into the highest Doctrines of true Faith; as, that there is one God, &c.

As concerning his Gratitude to Men, besides those Instances already mentioned, to *Proxenus* and his Son, to *Hermias* and his Sister, to his Master *Plato*, to his own Mother, Brother, and Country, and infinite others; many Philosophers, whose Opinion he takes Occasion to alledge, he mentions with their due Praise; of which were his Master *Plato*, (of whom we have already spoken) whom, as we have said, he sometimes mentioned honourably, and sometimes concealeth his Name, where he preferreth his own Opinion. Amongst others, of whom he maketh honourable Mention, are observed *Democritus* in his first Book, de *Generative*; *Diogenes*, *Apollonates*, in the same Book; *Anaxagoras*, in the first of his *Metaphysics*.

For that he was very moderate, the Interpreter of his Life confirms, in stancing in his Book of Categories, where he saith, *We ought not to determine any Thing hastily; but to consider often, and in doubt of every Thing, is not unuseful*. And again, in his Book of Good, *We must remember, being Men, not only that we are happy, but that we ought to be able to prove it by firm Reason*. And again, in his Ethics to *Nicomachus*; *Man is our Friend, Truth our Friend; but above all, we ought to honour Truth*. And in his Meteorologicks: *As concerning thos, we doubt of some of them, others we touch superficially*. And in the same, not once or twice, but in-

d Lib. 4. e Parm. ad gent. f Solenut. 1. g Ant. lect. 19. 8. h Leant. 5. 4. i Epist. ad Amm. k De sensib. 1. Ant. lect. m 13. 31. n Vet. insep. o Leant. 5. 1. p *Alphab. var. lib. 3. 29.* q *Euseb. Prep. 1. 15.*

nite Times, *Men do happen upon the same Opinions, therefore we ought not to be proud of our own Wisdom, in any Thing whereof we conceive ourselves to be the Inventors.*

The common Report therefore (grounded upon no Authority) that he collected the Books of the ancient Philosophers, and having taken out of them what he intended to confute, burnt them, is manifestly false; for any one that reads *Cicero*, will find, they were most of them extant in his Time.

CHAP. XIII.

His Wives and Children.

HE had two Wives, the first *Pythais*, Sister to *Hermias*, the Eunuch, Tyrant of *Atarna*, and his adopted Heir. Of the Scandals that were cast upon him by this Marriage, *Aristotle* fully acquits himself in his Epistles to *Antipater*, where he professeth, that he married her only out of the Good-will which he bore unto *Hermias*, and out of a Compassion for the great Misfortunes that had happened to her Brother; adding, that she was a Woman endowed with extraordinary Modesty, and all other Virtues.

His second Wife was named *Herpyllis*, a Woman of *Stagira*, whom *Apellico* (cited by *Euseb.*) and (perhaps from him) *Suid.* affirm, he married after the Death of *Pythais*. With her he lived to his End, as *Hermippus*, cited by *Athenæus*, and *Timæus*, by *Laert.* affirm. *Timæus*, a profess'd Calumniator of *Aristotle* faith, she was his Concubine, and that *Aristotle* lived with her, following the Counsel of *Hesiod* in his *Georgicks*; from which Calumny *Hesiod* is fully vindicated by *Proclus*.

By *Herpyllis* he had one Son, as *Apellico* affirmeth, whom he named after his own Father, *Nicomachus*. To him he dedicated his *great Morals*, which *Cicero* thinks to have been written by *Nicomachus* himself: *For I see not, faith he, why the Son might not be like the Father.*

This *Nicomachus* was a Disciple of *Theophrastus*, and much beloved by him; under whom he profited exceedingly in Philosophy, and arrived at much Eminence therein. *Suidas* faith, he writ eight Books of Physick, four of Ethics. *Cicero* compares him both with his Tutor and Father. *Aristoteles*, cited by *Eusebius*, affirmeth he was bred up an Orphan, by *Theophrastus*, afterwards died young in the Wars; which Relation agreeth not with *Aristotle's* Will, nor with *Suidas* or *Cicero*, who aver, that he writ Books out of which *Laertius* brings a Citation in *Eudoxo*.

He had a Daughter also called *Pythais*, who, as *Seutonius Empiricus* affirms, was thrice married. First to *Nicanor* the *Stagirite*, second to *Aristotle*. Secondly, to *Procles*, who traced his Pedigree from

Demaratus King of *Lacedæmonia*. By him she had two Sons, *Procles* and *Demaratus*, who studied Philosophy under *Theophrastus*. Her last Husband was *Metrodorus*, Disciple of *Chrysippus* the *Cnidian*, Master of *Erasistratus*. By him she had a Son, named after her Father, *Aristotle*. Of this *Aristotle* there is mention in the Will of *Theophrastus*, where he is called the Son of *Midias*, not *Metrodorus*. *Suidas* affirms he died before his Grandfather.

CHAP. XIV.

His Disciples and Friends.

THE Disciples of *Aristotle* were so many and so eminent, that *Nicanor* of *Alexandria* wrote an express Book upon that Subject, which had it been extant, would doubtless have given us an exact Account of them, whereas now we must rest satisfied with an imperfect Catalogue.

To omit the three Princes that were his Disciples, *Hermias*, *Alexander*, (of whom already) and *Antipater*, Successor to *Alexander* in *Macedonia* (who, amongst other Things, wrote two Books of *Epistles*, in one whereof he related the Death of *Aristotle*) in the first Place is mentioned.

Theophrastus of *Ereus*, a City of *Lesbos*, the most eloquent of his Disciples. Him he appointed to succeed him in the School.

Phanias of *Ereus* also. He wrote many Books often cited by *Athenæus*; among the rest, *Ammonius* cites his *Categorics*, *Analytics*, and of *Interpretation*.

Eudemus of *Rhodes*, esteemed by *Aristotle* in the second Place next to *Theophrastus*. His Life was written by *Damias*, as *Simplicius* affirms, who often mentions him. He wrote *Analyticks*, and a *Geometrical History* (both cited by *Simplicius*) and some other Histories cited by *Laertius*, wherein he said, the *Magi* were of Opinion, that Men should rise again after Death. He survived *Aristotle*.

Eudemus of *Cyprus*, who died in *Sicily*, where he took *Dion's* Part, as appeareth from *Plutarch*.

Aristotle in Honour of him, called his Dialogue of the Soul, after his Name.

Pasiceutes, Brother of *Eudemus* the *Rhodian*. To him some ascribe the first lesser Book of *Metaphysics*, as *Philoponus* affirmeth.

Theodectes; to him *Aristotle* dedicated some Books of Rhetorick, mentioned by *Valerius Maximus*, which he afterwards retracted. *Patricius* conceives he was rather a Companion than a Disciple of *Aristotle*, because he mentions him seven Times in his Rhetorick; which he is never observed to have done of any Disciple.

Clearchus of *Soli*. He wrote many Books often cited by *Athenæus*.

Dicaearchus, Son of *Phidias* of *Messena* in *Sicily*,

a Philosopher, Orator, and Geometrician, as *Suidas* affirmeth. He is cited by *Cicero*, mentioned often by *Plutarch* amongst the best Philosophers.

Aristoxenus, Son of *Mnesias*, a Musician of *Tarentum* in *Italy*, who going to *Mantinia*, there studied Philosophy and Musick. He heard his Father, and *Lamprus* an *Erythraean*, and *Xenopholus* a *Pythagorean*, and last of all *Aristotle*, whom after his Death he calumniated and wronged much, because he had left *Theophrastus* his Successor in the School, whereas himself was in great Esteem amongst the Disciples. Thus *Suidas*.

Nicanor, mentioned in his Will.

Philo, who wrote against one *Sophocles*, who caused the Philosophers to be voted out of *Attica*.

* *Plato* the younger, mentioned by *Laertius* and *Philoponus*.

* *Socrates* a *Pythianian*, mentioned by *Laertius*.

Anaxim, a *Phocian*, mentioned by *Eliau* as one of those who assisted *Aristotle* in the Ejection of *Plato* out of the Academy. *Galen* likewise mentions him as Author of some medicinal Writings ascribed to *Aristotle*.

Phrasidemus, a *Phocian*, mentioned by *Laertius*, as a Peripatetick Philosopher. It is likely he was a Disciple of *Aristotle*, for he was contemporary with *Theophrastus*.

Palaeophatus, of *Abydas*, an Historian much beloved of *Aristotle*.

Calisthenes, an *Olynthian*, *Aristotle's* Sister's Son, of whom already.

Hipparchus, a *Stagirite*; of Kin to *Aristotle*. He wrote, as *Suidas* affirmeth, of the Distinctions of Sexes amongst the Gods, of Marriage, and the like.

Leon, a *Byzantine*, a Peripatetick Philosopher and Sophist. Some affirm he was a Disciple of *Aristotle's*. He was so excessively fat, that coming to *Athens*, upon an Embassy, the People laugh'd at him; to whom he said, *Do you laugh to see me thus fat? I have a Wife a great deal fatter; yet when we agree, one Bed will hold us both, but when we disagree, not the whole House*. The People suspecting him of Confederacy with *Philip*, upon a Letter of his, came in a Tumult to his House, whereupon fearing to be stoned, he strangled himself.

Eschiron of *Mytilene*, an Heroick Poet, loved much by *Aristotle*, as *Suidas* saith.

Calippus an *Athenian*, who also heard *Plato*.

Satyrus, whose Books of *Lives and Characters* are cited by *Athenaeus*.

Hieronymus the *Rhodian*, eminent in Philosophy. That he was *Aristotle's* Disciple is acknowledged by *Athenaeus*.

Heraclides of *Pontus*, a great Philologist.

To these add of less Note, *Echecratides* a *Mebymnean*, and *Adrastus* a *Macedonian*, both men-

tioned by *Stephanus*. *Euxitibius*, mentioned by *Plutarch*. *Clitus* a *Milethan*. *Menon* the *Hippiatan*. *Dioteles* and *Timarchus*.

CHAP. XV.

His Detractors.

AS the Friends and Followers of *Aristotle* were more in Number than those of any other Philosopher, so were also his Detractors, of whom having already had Occasion to make some Mention, we shall not need to give any further Account than this of *Aristotle's*, alledged by * *Eusebius*.

How then is it possible, that what *Epicurus* relates of *Aristotle* can be true, that when he was a young Man, he wasted prodigally all the Means his Father left him, whereby he was necessitated to betake himself to the Wars; but therein being unfortunate, he set up an Apothecary's Shop, and *Plato* keeping open School, amongst the rest admitted him?

And who will credit *Timaeus* the *Tauromentis*, who writes, that being come to riper Years, he shut up his poor Shop, and gave over his mercenary Profession?

Who can be persuaded to believe what *Aristoxenus* the Musician saith in the Life of *Plato*, that when he was from home, some Strangers rose up, and set up a School in Opposition to him, which Words some interpret of *Aristotle*, but erroneously; for *Aristoxenus* always commended *Aristotle*; [yet *Suidas*, as we said, avers the contrary.]

Who does not esteem the Commentaries of *Alexander* ridiculous? For he bringeth in *Alexander* as a Youth talking with his Father *Philip*, slighting the Instructions of *Aristotle*, but approving those of *Nicagoras*, surnamed *Hermes*.

Eubulides manifestly falsifies in the Book he wrote against *Aristotle*. For first, he bringeth in some dull Poems as written by others, upon his Marriage and Affinity with *Hermias*; then he saith, that he injured *Philip*; that he was not present with *Plato* at his Death; and that he corrupted his Writings.

As for the Accusation of *Demochares* against Philosophers, it is not worth the Mention; for he asperseth not only *Aristotle*, but all the rest; and whoever looks upon his Calumnies will say they are trivial; for he affirms, that some Letters of *Aristotle's* against the City of *Athens* were intercepted and discovered; that he betrayed his own Country, *Stagira* to the *Macedonians*; that when *Olynthus* was taken, he informed *Philip* upon the Sale and Ransom of the Goods and Prisoners, which were the most wealthy of the *Olynthians*.

No less foolishly doth *Cephisodorus*, Disciple of *Iscrates*, calumniate him as an effeminate Person

and a Glutton, with many other Aspersions of the same Kind.

But of all, the most foolish is that of *Lyco*, who professed himself a *Pythagorean*, for he saith, that *Aristotle* sacrificed to his Wife after she was dead, as the *Athenians* to *Ceres*; and that using to bathe himself in warm Oil, he afterwards sold it; and that when he went to *Chalcis*, those who bought his Goods, found in one Bark 75 Brafs Pots. Indeed near to many were the Calumniators of *Aristotle*, from whom sprung up others, some in the same Age, others a little after, all Sophists, litigious Persons and Orators; of whose Names and Books no more remains than of their Bodies.

As for those who flourished after these; some repeat only what these had said before, and therefore we need not take any Notice of them, much less of those, who not lighting upon those Books, have framed some Inventions of their own; such as they, who affirm he had 300 Pots, for there was not any Author of that Time who made Mention thereof but *Lyco*, and he saith, there were found only 75 Pots.

And not only from Computation of Time, and from the Persons who assert these Calumnies, may any Person perceive all they say to be but false; but also from this, that not any two of them lay the same Thing to his Charge, but every one hath a particular Calumny different from the rest. But, if any one of these had been true, *Aristotle* should have heard of it, not only once from them, but a thousand Times.

It is manifest therefore, the same Thing befel *Aristotle* which happened to many others, that as well for the Respect and Friendship he had with Princes, as for the Excellency of his Dissertations, the Envy of the Sophists of that Age persecuted him. But such as are ingenious ought not to mind Calumniators, but those who have praised and imitated him, whom they will find to fall nothing short of the others, either for Number or Worth. Hitherto *Aristocles*.

CHAP. XVI.

His Writings.

Lærtius hath given a large Catalogue of his Writings, as a Testimony of his Excellency in all Kinds of Learning. Their Titles, as reduced to their several Heads, by *Patricius*, are these.

LOGICK.

THE Sophist 1.
Of Sciences 1.
Sophistical Distinctions 4.
Of *Eristick* 2.
Of *Eristick Solutions* 4.
Of Genus and Species 1.
Of *Proprium* 1.

Epichirematick Commentaries 1.

Instances 1.

Of those which are said many Ways, as according to the *Propositum* 1.

For Science 1.

Distinctions 17.

Dialecticks 1.

Of Interrogation and Answer 2.

Propositions 1.

Eristick Propositions 4.

Syllogisms 1.

First Analyticks 9.

Second Analyticks 2.

Of Problems 1.

Methodics 6.

Terms Antetopical 7.

Syllogisms 2.

Syllogistical and Terms 1.

Ante-Topics 1.

Topics to Terms 1.

Dialectick 1.

Definitions 13.

Argumentations 2.

Propositions 1.

Epichirematick Theses 25.

Methodic 1.

Of Speech 1.

Categories 1.

Of Interpretation 1.

PHYSICK.

Of the Soul 1.

Of Suffering and being Passive 1.

Of Elements 3.

Of Motion 1.

Theses of the Soul 1.

Of Nature 3.

Physick 1.

Of Animals 9.

Anatomy 7.

Anatomick Selections 1.

Of compound Animals 1.

Upon not Generating 1.

Of Plants 2.

Physiognomick 1.

Signs of Tempest 1.

Physicks by Elements 38.

Perspectiv Problems 2.

Of Stars 1. In all 75.

ETHICK.

Of Justice 4.

Of Philosophy 3.

Politicks 2.

Of Riches 1.

Of Nobility 1.

Of Pleasure 1.

Alexander; or, of *Colenies* 1.
Of a Kingdom 1.
Of Education 1.
Of Good 3.
Oeconomick 1.
Of Friendship 1.
Propositions concerning Virtue 3.
Of the Passions of Anger 1.
Ethicks 4.
Of the Better 1.
Of Eligible and Accident 1.
Of Pleasure 1.
Of Voluntary 1.
Of Fair 1.
Amicable Theses 2.
Politicks 2.
Laws 4.
Constitutve Law 1.
Politick Auscultation 8.
Of Just 2.
Of Consultation 1.
Jurisdicktions 1.
Passions 1.
Governments of Cities 158.
Proper Democracies.
Oligarchicks.
Aristocraticks.
Tyrannicks. In all 217.

METAPHYSICK.

OF Contraries 1.
Of Principle 1.
Of Idea 1. In all 3.

MATHEMATICK.

Mathematicks 1.
Of Magnitude 1.
Of Unity 1.
Astronmick 1.
Optick 1.
Of Musick 1.
Mechanicks 1. In all 7.

PHILOLOGICK.

OF Poets 3.
Gryllus of Rhetorick.
Works of Rhetorical Art 2.
Collection of the Theodesick Art 1.
Rhetorical Enthymemes 1.
Homericall Difficulties 6.
Poeticks 1.
Comparisons 1.
The Olympionice 1.
Pythionick Musick.
Pythick 1.
Pythionick Elenchs 1.

The Dionysack Victories 1.
Of Tragedies 1.
Poems 3. So *Hermias to Democritus.*
Elegies. In all 27.

UNCERTAIN OF EXTRAORDINARY.

N *Erinthus* 1.
Menexenus 1.
Erotick 1.
Symposium 1.
Protreptick 1.
Of Prayer 1.
Collection of Arts 12.
Art 1.
Another Art 1.
Collection 2.
Of fabulous living Creatures 1.
Medicine 2.
Memorials 1.
Encyclicks 2.
Inordinate 12.
Expounded by their Genus 14.
Doctrines 1.
Proverbs 1. In all 46.

EPISTLES.

T *O Philip and Alexander* 4.
To Antipater 3.
To Mentor 1.
To Aristo 1.
To Olympias 1.
To Hæphestion 1.
To Themistagoras 1.
To Philoxenus 1. In all 19.

Against the ancient Philosophers.

O *UT of Plato's Laws* 2.
Out of Plato's Commonwealth 2.
Out of Timæus and Archytas their Writings 1.
Problems out of Democritus 2.
Against Melissus 1.
Against Alcmeon 1.
Against Gorgias 1.
Against Xenophanes 1.
Against Zeno 1.
Of the Philosophy of Archytas 3.
Of the Philosophy of Speusippus and Xenocrates. 1.
 In all 19.

The Sum of all these Books, excepting the Epistles, is 513. *Laertius* reckons them to be near 400, perhaps accounting the several Books that are upon the same Subject for one. But of these the greatest Part is lost, and of many that are extant, the Titles altered. Of the extant there are only these.

LOGICK.

- Categories* 1.
Of Interpretation 1.
First Analyticks 2.
Second Analyticks 2.
Topics 8.
Elenchi 1.

PHYSICK.

- Of Natural Auscultation* 8.
Of Heaven 4.
Of Generation and Corruption 2.
Of Meteors 4.
Of the World 1 *suspected*.
Of the Soul 3.
Of Sense and Sensibles 1.
Of Memory and Reminiscence 1.
Of Sleep and waking 1.
Of Dream 1.
Divination by Dreams 1.
Of the Motion of living Creatures 1.
Of the Length and Shortness of Life 1.
Of Youth and Age, Life and Death 1.
Of Respiration 1.
Of the Going of Animals 1.
Of Breath 1.
Of the Generation of Animals 5.
Of the Parts of Animals 4.
The History of Animals 10.
Of Colours 1.
Of Physiognomy 1.
Spurious 2.

ETHICK.

- Ethick*, to Nicomachus 10.
Great Ethick 2.
Ethick to Eudemus 7.
Of Virtues 1.
Oeconomick 2.
Politick 8.

METAPHYSICK.

- Metaphysick* 14.
Of the abstruse Part of Divine Wisdom, according to the Egyptians; translated out of Arabic, but reported to be spurious, 14.

MATHEMATICKS.

- Mathematicks* 2.
Mechanick 1.
Of inescapable Lines.

PHILOLOGICKS.

- Rhetorick* 3.
Rhetorick to Alexander 1.
Politick 1.

Extraordinary.

- Problems* 38.
Wonders 1.
Of Zenophanes, Zeno and Gorgias 1.

Besides these, there are many other Books cited for his, under these Titles.

- Magick*, Laert. Proem.
Epitome of Orators, Laert. Aristip.
Of Beans, Laert. Pythag.
Of Mixtion, Aristot. de sensu. cap. 3.
Of Sapers, Arist. de sensu. cap. 4.
Physical History, Arist. de incess. Animal. cap. 2.
Of Nutriment, Arist. de Somno, cap. 3.
Selection of Contraries, Arist. Metaph. lib. 3. cap. 2.
Division of Contraries, Arist. Metaph. lib. 10. c. 3.
Of Opposites, Simplic. in cap. de Opposit. Comm. 8.
Collection of Pythagorick Opinions, Simplic. in lib. 2. de Cælo. Com. 4.
Of Ideas, Alexand. in lib. 1. Metaphys.
Comm. 59. where he cites the Fourth Book, tho' Laertius, but one, as if there were no more.
Of Enunciation, Alexand. in lib. 4. Metaphys. Com. 25. & 44.
Homericall Difficulties, 6.
Of Platonic Assertions, Plut. contra Colot.
Eudemus, Plut. Consol. ad Apollon.
Of Drunkenness, Plut. Sympotiac. 3. *Athenæus* cites the Tenth Book hereof.
Animal, or of Fishes, Athen. Deipn. 7.
Of living Creatures, and of Things pertaining to living Creatures, Athen.
Of the Manners of living Creatures, Athen.
Of Phœasants, Athen.
Of Consanguinity, Athen.
Of wonderful Luxury, Athen.
Apology, Athen.
Histories, Athen.
Barbarous Jurisdictions.
Of Audibles, Porphy. Comm. in Ptol.
Mus. Proclus in Timæum Plat.
The Cohabitant, Proclus. Proæm. in Repub. Platon.
Θεογονία, Macrob. Saturnal. lib. 1.
Of Nature, Clem. Alexandrin. Strom. lib. 6.

We shall not add the *Peplus* cited by * *Nicephorus*, and the *Chriæ* by *Stobæus*, under his Name, since it is manifest they belong not to the same *Aristotle*, as *Patricius* hath evinced.

These Books *Aristotle* gave to *Theophrastus* when he made him his Successor in the School, as *Strabo* affirmeth; adding, *That Aristotle was the first we knew of that made a Library, which the Egyptian Kings learned of him to do. Theophrastus* bequeathed all his Books to *Nælius*, a *Scæphan*, who carried them to *Scæphis*, and dying, left them to his Heirs,

Men of no Learning, who only kept them confusedly lock'd up. And when they understood what Care was taken by the *Attalick* Kings (in whose Jurisdiction *Scopis* was to make a Library in *Pergamus*, they hid them in a Hole under Ground [where they continu'd about 130 Years] by which Means they receiv'd some Injury by the Wet and Worms. At last, some that were descended from *Aristotle* and *Theophrastus*, sold them to *Apellico*, a *Titan*, [who, according to *Athenæus*, was made free of the City of *Athens*, a Person very rich, who, besides many other Libraries, bought this of *Aristotle*, being himself a Lover of *Peripatetick* Philosophy] for a great Sum of Money. This *Apellico* was more a Lover of Books, than of Learning; so, that because they had received some Injury, he caus'd them to be transcribed, supplying the Defects not rightly, and by that Means put them forth full of Faults. The ancient *Peripateticks*, that succeeded *Theophrastus*, wanting Books, as having but very few, and those *Exoterick*, could not treat exactly upon Part of Philosophy: They that lived later, after that these Books were published, had much greater Helps to Philosophy, and the Imitation of *Aristotle*, although, by reason of the infinite Faults, they were forced to say many Things by guess. Hereunto *Rome* conducd not a little; for (soon after the Death of *Apellico*, *Sylla* taking *Athens*, in the fourth Year of the 173d Olympiad, seiz'd upon his Library, and causing it to be carried to *Rome*, *Tyrannio*, a *Grammarians*, a Person studious of *Aristotle*, obtained Leave of the Library-Keeper to be permitted the Use of them) the Book-sellers not having good Writers, and not comparing well the Copies, it occasion'd many Faults, as well in those Books that were at *Rome*, as in those transcribed and sold into *Alexandria*. *Plutarch* adds, that from this Tyrannio, *Andronicus* the *Rhodian* had them, who first made them publick, setting forth those Volumes, which, saith he, we have.

Thus *Strabo* and *Plutarch*. *Athenæus* saith, that *Nelius* sold them to *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*, by whom they were translated to *Alexandria*, where how long they lay hid is uncertain; which Library was afterwards burn'd by *Julius Cæsar*.

CHAP. XVII.

His Commentators.

NO sooner were the Writings of *Aristotle* communicated to the World, but they were entertained with general Approbation, which some expressed, by employing themselves in Commenting upon them; whose Example was followed by many in all following Ages. To omit *Papiscrates* the *Rhodian*, Brother of *Eudemus*, who wrote, as *Galen* affirmeth, upon the Book of *Categories*, we shall name, in the first Place,

Andronicus, the *Rhodian*, who first published *Aristotle's* Writings, put forth a Paraphrase or Comment upon the greatest Part of them.

Next, his Disciple *Boethius*, a *Sidonian*, took much Pains in the Exposition of *Aristotle*, whence he is often mentioned honourably by *Ammonius* and *Simplicius*.

Aristo, a *Coan*, Disciple also to *Andronicus*, as *Strabo* affirms, living in the Time of *Nicias*, Tyrant of *Coos*, is reckoned, by *Simplicius*, amongst the old Commentators upon *Aristotle's* *Categories*.

Nicholaus Damascenus, who lived in the Time of *Augustus*, by whom much loved, is cited by *Simplicius* and *Averroes*, as an Expoliter of *Aristotle*.

Athenodorus of *Tarsis*, a *Stoick*, who lived also under *Augustus*, as *Plutarch* affirms, is cited by *Simplicius*, as having written upon *Aristotle's* *Categories*, but rather by way of Confutation than Interpretation; as did likewise *Alexander Aegæus*, *Nero's* Tutor, mentioned by *Simplicius*; *Cermetus*, who lived at the same time, cited by *Porphyrus* and *Simplicius*; *Lucius* and *Nicostratus*, a *Macedonian*, who lived under *Antonius*.

Sotion of *Alexandria*, and *Abacius*, seem to have written upon the *Categories*, being often cited by *Simplicius* upon that Subject.

Taurus, the *Berisan*, a *Platonick* Philosopher, living under *Antoninus*, wrote first concerning the Difference between the Doctrines of *Plato* and *Aristotle*.

Adraustus, the *Aphrodisæan*, wrote a Comment on *Aristotle's* *Categories*, and of his *Physick*, and a Book, concerning the Method of his Philosophy.

Aspasius wrote a Comment on all *Aristotle's* Works, taking particular Care to restore the Text; to which End he is often quoted by *Simplicius* and *Boethius*. There is a Comment upon some Books of the *Ethicks* extant under his Name.

Herminius, somewhat later, seems to have written upon all, or the greater Part of *Aristotle's* Works, cited by all the *Greek* Commentators that are extant, and by *Boetius*.

Alexander, the *Aphrodisæan*, who lived under *Antonius* and *Severus*, wrote upon the *Analytick*, *Topicks* and *Elenchis*, whence styled by the latter Interpreters *Εξήγηται* the *Expositor*.

Galen, who lived at the same time, wrote three Books upon *Aristotle* of *Interpretation*, four Books upon the First of the first *Analytick*, four upon the Second of the First, six upon the First of the second *Analytick*, five upon the second.

Atticus, a *Platonick* Philosopher, besides seven Books, wherein he proved *Plato* and *Aristotle* to be of the same Sect, contrary to the Assertion of *Taurus*; he wrote likewise a *Dialogue* upon the *Categories* extant, seven Books upon the *Categories*, cited by *Simplicius*, a Comment upon the Book of

Interpretation, cited by *Boetius*; nor to mention what he wrote upon *Aristotle de Anima*, since it appears from *Suidas*, that it was rather by way of Opposition than Exposition, which *Theodoret* likewise confirms.

Jamblicus, of *Calpis* in *Cæloſyria*, Master to *Julian* the Emperor, wrote in an abstruse Way upon the Book of *Categories*.

Desippus, by some thought to be the Son of *Jamblicus*, wrote a *Dialogue* on the *Categories* extant.

Maximus, a *Byzantine*, Disciple of *Jamblicus*, wrote Commentaries on the *Categories*, and other Books of *Aristotle*, as *Simplicius* and *Suidas* affirm.

Plutarch, the younger Son of *Nestorius*, flourishing under *Valentinian* the First, *Gracian* and *Theodossius* the First, according to *Suidas* and *Philoponus*, wrote Commentaries upon some Books of *Aristotle*.

Syrrianus, surnamed the Great, of *Alexandria*, a Philosopher, who flourished under *Arcadius*, *Honorius*, *Theodossius* the Second, and *Valentinian* the Second, wrote Commentaries upon *Aristotle's* Books of *Nature*, of *Motion*, of *Heaven*, and upon the *Categories*, cited by *Simplicius* and *Philoponus*; likewise upon the Second, Fifth and Sixth Book of *Metaphysics*, which are extant.

Olympiodorus, an *Alexandrian*, who derived himself from *Ammonius Saccus*, and was Contemporary to *Plutarch* and *Syrrianus*, wrote upon *Aristotle's* *Meters*, extant. He was later than that *Olympiodorus*, who writ upon *Plato*.

Themistius, living, according to *Suidas*, under *Julian* and *Jovian*, wrote a Paraphrase upon *Aristotle's* *Physick*, Eight Books; a Paraphrase on the *Analyticks*, Two Books; upon his Books, *Of the Soul*, Seven Books. *Of the Scope and Title of the Book of Categories*, One Book.

Proclus, Disciple of *Syrrianus*, wrote Two Books concerning *Motions*; wherein he made an Abstract of *Aristotle's* Second Book of *Motion*: That he wrote also upon his Book of *Heaven*, and the *Elements*, may be conjectured from the frequent Citations of *Simplicius*.

Marinus, who succeeded *Proclus* in the School, seemeth to have written something upon *Aristotle's* Book of *the Soul*, being often cited upon that Subject by *Philoponus*.

Ammonius Hermæus wrote upon *Aristotle's* *Categories*, and upon his Book of *Interpretation*, both which are extant; as likewise upon the Books of *the Soul*, cited by *Philoponus*.

Damascius, a *Platonick* Philosopher, Disciple to *Ammonius*, besides what he wrote in Confutation of *Aristotle*, concerning *Time*, epitomized the Four First, and the Eighth Book of his *Physick*, and the First Book of *Heaven*. To these add,

Philoponus and *Simplicius*, and *Asclepius*, Disciple to *Ammonius*.

Johannes Damascenus, whose *Compendium of Aristotle's* *Logic* and *Physick* are extant; he lived about the Year 770.

Eustrathius wrote upon some of the *Nicomachian Ethics*, and *Eustratius* upon his Book concerning *Demonstration*.

Michael Psellus, about the Year 800, and *Michael Ephesus* upon the *parva naturalia*.

Magentinus upon the *Categories*, and the Book of *Interpretation*.

Nicéphorus Blemmydes (under *Johannes Duca*.) upon the *Logic* and *Physick*.

Georgius Plachymerius, and *Theodorus Metochita* lived about the Year 1080, and wrote *Epitomes* extant.

Of Arabic Commentators were *Avicenna* and *Averroes*, about the Year 1216.

The later Writers it will be unnecessary to mention, there being a Catalogue of them annexed to *Aristotle's* Works, of the *Paris* Edition.

ARISTOTLE's Epistles.

To Philip 1.

THEY who undertake a Command for the Good of their Subjects, not preferred thereunto, either by Fortune or Nature, trust not in their own Power, which they know subject unto Chance, but grow great in Virtue, whereby they order the Commonwealth wisely. For there is nothing amongst Men so firm and solid, but the rapid Motion of the Sun changeth it ere the Evening. Nature, if we enquire into the Truth, varieth all Lives, interweaving them, like the Action of a Tragedy, with Misfortunes. Men, like Flowers, have a set Time wherein they flourish and excel others. Wherefore behave not yourself towards *Greece* tyrannically or loosely, for one argues Petulance, the other Temerity. Wise Princes ought not to be admired for their Government but Governance; so that tho' Fortune change, they shall have the same Praise. As for the rest, do all Things well, preferring the Health of your Soul, by Philosophy, that of your Body by Exercise.

To Philip 2.

MOST Philosophers assert Beneficence to be something equal to God. To speak the Truth, the whole Life of Mankind is comprised in conferring and returning Benefits; so as some bestow, others receive, others return. Hence it is just to commiserate all that are in Adversity, for Pity is the Sign of a mild Soul, Sternness of a rude, it being dishonest and impious to neglect Virtue in Mis-

fortunes.

fortunes. For this I commend our Disciple *Theophrastus*, who saith, we never repent of doing good; it brings forth good Fruit, the Prayers and Praises of the Obliged. Wise Men therefore must study to oblige many, thinking, that besides the Praise, there may some Advantage accrue from hence in the Change of Affairs, and if not all, at least some one of those to whom he hath done good, may be in a Capacity to requite him. For this Reason, endeavour to be ready in doing good, but give not Way to your Passions, for that is kingly and civil, this barbarous and odious. As you see Occasion, practise and neglect not this useful Advice.

To Philip 3.

THE most excellent Princes, whose Honour toucheth the Stars, have conferred most Benefits, and not accommodating their Sway only to the present, but considering the Instability of Fortune, have treasured up good Deeds as useful in either Condition. In Prosperity it procures them Honour, for Honour is proper to Virtue; in Adversity Relief, for Friends are much better tried in bad Fortune than in good. The Sight of benevolent Persons are like to that of Land to Men in a Storm. All Fortune apt to desert us, is the true Scope which they propose to themselves, who war, or do unjustly, or comply dishonestly, only the Clearness of virtuous Persons is not unacquainted with the Instability of Fortune, but, by Reason sustaining all Accidents, and being, as *Plato* saith, above them, they are never disordered. Take Heed therefore of the rapid Motion of Things; look upon them as a Circle which reverts into itself; cast up the Accounts of Life, for Chance imposeth many Things upon Life, and maketh our Inclinations follow it. Pardon those that offend ignorantly; be ready to acquit those that do good. This, if you perform not once, but continually, your Court will be fe-

cure from all Danger. This, considering the greatness of the Things I have said, is but little, but considering the Person to whom I write, all.

To Alexander 4.

I Am in doubt how to begin, for upon whatsoever I reflect, all seems great and wonderful, not fit to be forgotten, but proper for Remembrance and Exhortation, not to be defaced by Time. Good Precepts and Exhortations of Masters have Eternity for their Spectator. Endeavour to make Use of your Power, not to oppress but to oblige others, than which nothing can be greater in Man's Life. Mortal Nature, which often yieldeth, and is overcome by Fate, obtaineth eternal Memory by the greatness of such Works. Consider this well; you are not unreasonable as some are, who think good Advice ridiculous. Your Descent is honourable, your Kingdom hereditary, your Learning sound, your Glory admirable; and as much as you exceed others in the Goods of Fortune, so ought you to be excellent among the Good in Virtue. In fine, do that which is profitable, and finish what you design.

To Theophrastus 5.

A Sudden Injury is better than a slow Benefit, for the Remembrance and Harm of that lasts but a while, but this groweth old, as if it hated to build a Work to Perpetuity, and many Times deferring what we intend to bestow upon another, he means with a Calm elsewhere, which allays the Tempest of his Mind. Wherefore I say, mutual Society ought not only to do no Wrong, but if any be received, to be ready to forgive it, for perhaps to do no Wrong is above the Power of Man. As for him who hath erred, to make Use of Reproof, is the Property of a good well-seated Judgment.

THE DOCTRINE OF ARISTOTLE.

The FIRST PART.

CHAP. I.

Of Philosophy in general, and particularly of DIALECTICK.

THE Philosophy of Aristotle is well known; many Abstracts thereof have been published, many are read daily in Universities by publick Professors: Yet it will be requisite to our Design to give a short Account thereof, that it may appear wherein the Doctrine and Method of the Peripateticks is different from that of the Academicks and Stoicks.

Philosophy, according to Aristotle, is twofold, *Practick* and *Theoretick*. To the *Practick* belongs *Ethick* and *Politick*: This, concerning the well-ordering of a City; that, of a House. To the *Theoretick* belongs *Physick* and *Logick*; but *Logick* is not properly a Part thereof, but a most expedient Instrument.

Of *Logick* he asserted two Ends, *probable* and *true*; for each he makes Use of two Faculties, *Dialectick* and *Rhetorick* for the *probable*; *Analytick* and *Philosophy* for the *true*, omitting nothing towards *Invention*, *Judgment* and *Use*. For *Invention*, his *Topics* and *Methodicks* afford a plentiful Supply, out of which may be taken *Problems* for *probable Arguments*. For *Judgment*, his *first* and *second Analytics*: In the *first Propositions* are examined; in the *second*, he treats *exactly* of their *Composition*, and the *Form* of *Syllogism*. To *Use* belongs his *Agonistics*, and his *Books* concerning *Interrogation*, and his *Eristicks*, and his *Sophistick Elenchs*, and of *Syllogisms*, and the like. Hitherto *Laetius*.

Of his *Logick* we have only these Books remaining, of *Categories*, of *Interrogation*, *Analyticks*, *Topics*, and *Sophistick Elenchs*. The first considers *simple Terms*; the second *Propositions*; the rest *Syllogisms*, *Demonstrative*, *Dialectick*, and *Sophistick*. The *Categories* are placed first by the general Con-

sent of all Interpreters; neither is it to be doubted, but that the rest are disposed according to the genuine Method of Aristotle. For, in the Beginning of his *Analyticks*, he saith, *We must speak of Syllogism before we come to speak of Demonstration, because Syllogism is the more general*. And in his *Elenchs*; of *Didascalick* and *Demonstrative Syllogisms*, we have spoken already in the *Analyticks*; of the *Dialectick* and *Pyraistick*, in the Book immediately preceding these. We come now to speak of the *Agonistick* and *Eristick*.

CHAP. II.

Of Terms.

Terms¹ are of three Kinds, *Homonymous*, *Synonymous*, and *Paronymous*. *Homonymous*, whose Name only is common, their Essence divers. *Synonymous*, whose Name and Definition are common to either. *Paronymous* have Denomination from the same Thing, but differ in Case or Termination.

Synonymous (or *Univocal*) Terms, are reduced to ten general Heads, called *Categories*.

1. *Substance*, of two Kinds: *First*, which is most properly Substance, is neither predicated of nor inherent in a Subject. *Second*, *Substances* are Species and Genus's, which subsist in the first. The Properties of first Substances are, 1. Neither to be in, nor predicated of a Subject. 2. To be all Substances equally. 3. To signify this particular Thing. 4. To have no Contrary. 5. To admit no Degrees of more or less. 6. To be susceptible of Contraries.

2. *Quantity*, of two Kinds; *Discrete*, as Number; *Continuous*, as a Line. Their Properties

¹ *Laet. p. 24.* ² *Id. c. 1.* ³ *Id. c. 2.*

⁴ *Id. c. 3.* ⁵ *Id. c. 4.* ⁶ *Id. c. 5.*

1. To have no Contraries. 2. To admit no Degrees of more or less. 3. To denominate Things equal or unequal.

3. *Relatives*, whose whole Being is in some Manner effected towards one another; their Properties. 1. To have Contraries, as Father and Son. 2. To admit Degrees of more and less, as in Kindred. 3. To follow one another mutually. 4. To be naturally together.

4. *Quality*, from which Things are denominated *Qualified*. It hath four Kinds. 1. *Habit* and *Disposition*. 2. *Natural Power* and *Impotence*. 3. *Possible Qualities* and *Passions*. 4. *Form* and *Figure*. The Properties, 1. To have Contraries, as black and white. 2. To admit Intension or Remission. 3. To denominate Things, like or unlike.

5. *Action*. 6. *Passion*. Their Properties are, to admit Contraries, to admit Degrees of Intension or Remission.

7. *When*. 8. *Where*. 9. *Position*. 10. *Habit*. These admit not Contraries, nor Degrees of Intension or Remission.

Of those which cannot be reduced to any certain Category, are, 1. *Opposites*, and 2. *Precedents*. 3. *Coequals*. 4. *Motion*. 5. *Possession*.

Of *Oppositions* there are four Kinds, *Relatives*, *Contraries*, *Extremes* in the same Kind, as black and white. *Privatives*, as Privation and Habit, Light and Darknes. *Contradictories*, which affirm and deny, as learned, not learned.

CHAP. III.

Of Proposition.

VOICE is a Sign of the Notions of the Mind; as in the Mind are two Kinds of Intellection, one simple, expert of Truth and Falsity, the other either true or false. So in Voice, some is simple, some complex.

A *Noun* is a Voice signifying according to Institution, whereof no Part is significant by itself.

A *Verb* is a Voice implying Time, whereof no Part is significant by itself.

A *Speech*, *λογος*, is a Voice signifying according to Institution, whose Parts are significant separate.

Of Speech, the enunciative only (called Proposition) belongs to Philosophy, the precatory and imperative, to Rhetorick, Poetry, &c.

Propositions are divided four ways; into *simple* and *complex*, into *affirmative* and *negative*; into *universal*, *particular*, *indefinite*, and *singular*; into *pure* and *modal*; the modal is either *necessary*, *possible*, *contingent*, or *impossible*.

Propositions have three Accidents, *Opposition*, *Consistency*, *Conversion*.

Opposition is either contradictory of a Particular to an Universal; or contrary, of an Universal to an Universal; or sub-contrary, of a Particular Negative to a particular Affirmative.

Consistency, (*εὐλογία*) or *Aquipollens*, is the Consideration of those Affections of a Proposition, in respect whereof, two Propositions signify together the same Thing, and are together true or false.

Conversion is a Transposition of the Terms, preserving the Affirmation, Negation, and Verity of the Proposition. It is either Absolute, which reserves the same Quantity, but alters the Quality; or Partial, which reserves not the same Quantity.

CHAP. IV.

Of Syllogism.

A *Syllogism* is a Speech, in which some Things being laid down, another necessarily follows. *Perfect Syllogism* is that which requireth no other to shew its Power, Clearness, and Efficacy. *Imperfect* requires another to that Purpose, by Conversion, or Transposition of the Propositions.

The Matter of Syllogism is three Terms, the *Form* is the right Disposition of the Matter, according to Figure and Mood.

Figure is an apt Disposition of the Medium with the Extremes, apt for concluding aright. *Mood* is a Disposition of Propositions, according to Quantity and Quality. There are three Figures.

The first, when the Medium is first *subject*, then *predicate*. It hath nine-Moods, four Useful, five Useless and Illegitimate. Of the Useful, two are universal, two particular.

The First. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Every A is B.} \\ \text{Every C is A.} \\ \text{Therefore every C is B.} \end{array} \right.$

The Second. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{No A is B.} \\ \text{Every C is A.} \\ \text{Therefore no C is B.} \end{array} \right.$

The Third. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Every A is B.} \\ \text{Some C is A.} \\ \text{Therefore some C is B.} \end{array} \right.$

The Fourth. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{No A is B.} \\ \text{Some C is A.} \\ \text{Therefore some C is B.} \end{array} \right.$

In the second Figure, the Medium is predicated of both the Extremes. It hath 16 Moods, 4 true, 12 false and illegitimate. Of the true, two are universal, two particular.

- The First. $\begin{cases} \text{No M is N.} \\ \text{Every O is N.} \\ \text{Therefore no O is M.} \end{cases}$
- The Second. $\begin{cases} \text{Every M is N.} \\ \text{No O is N.} \\ \text{Therefore no O is M.} \end{cases}$
- The Third. $\begin{cases} \text{No M is N.} \\ \text{Some O is N.} \\ \text{Therefore some O is not N.} \end{cases}$
- The Fourth. $\begin{cases} \text{Every M is N.} \\ \text{Some O is not N.} \\ \text{Therefore some O is not M.} \end{cases}$

In the third Figure, the Medium is subjected to both Extreams. It hath 16 Moods, false and illegitimate; 6 legitimate, which conclude particularly.

- The First. $\begin{cases} \text{Every P is R.} \\ \text{Every P is S.} \\ \text{Therefore some P is S.} \end{cases}$
- The Second. $\begin{cases} \text{No P is R.} \\ \text{Every P is S.} \\ \text{Therefore some S is not R.} \end{cases}$
- The Third. $\begin{cases} \text{Some P is R.} \\ \text{Every P is S.} \\ \text{Therefore some S is R.} \end{cases}$
- The Fourth. $\begin{cases} \text{Every P is R.} \\ \text{Some P is S.} \\ \text{Therefore some S is R.} \end{cases}$
- The Fifth. $\begin{cases} \text{Some P is not R.} \\ \text{Every P is S.} \\ \text{Therefore some S is not R.} \end{cases}$
- The Fifth. $\begin{cases} \text{No P is R.} \\ \text{Some P is S.} \\ \text{Therefore some S is not R.} \end{cases}$

Every Syllogism ought to be framed in one of these three Figures; but those of the second and third being imperfect, ought to be reduced to the first, which is the most absolute and perfect.

There are six other Forms of Argument, Conversion of Terms, Induction, Example, Abduction, Instance, Enthymem. All these have their Efficacy from the Power of Syllogism, and are reducible to Syllogism.

As concerning the Invention, Power, and Conversion of Syllogism, he is exact and curious to Admiration.

ALL discursive Knowledge is made by a Prænotion of the Things themselves whereof we discourse; for Ratiocination is not concerning Things unknown. Demonstration is a discursive Knowledge, and therefore requireth three Præcognitions. First, that the Subject is, and what it is in a rude confused Manner. Secondly, what the Prædicate is, and what it signifieth. Thirdly, that the Principles are true.

To know, is to understand that a Thing is, that this is Cause thereof, and that it cannot be otherwise. Demonstration is a scientifick Syllogism. Demonstrative Science is from true, first, immediate, more known Causes of the Conclusion First, as having none precedent, and being adequate to, and convertible with the Effect. Immediate or concomitant, as having no Term betwixt to join them. More known, as being Premises to the Conclusion, not to be demonstrated by any thing.

Demonstrative Science is of a Thing necessary, whence the Demonstration itself consists of necessary Propositions; which Necessity requireth Explication of that which is predicated, of all by itself, and which is universal.

Of all, is that which is attributed to every one, and at all Times, as a living Creature to a Man.

By itself, as being of Essence, proper, competent per se, and competent to itself, for itself.

An universal Attribute is that which is in every one by itself, inasmuch as it is itself.

Demonstration is of Conclusions of eternal Truth, for they are universal Propositions; whence it followeth, that neither Demonstration nor Science are of perishable Things; neither are Definitions of such, which are the Principles of Demonstration.

That there is Demonstration, it is not necessary to have Recourse to Plato's Ideas separate from Singulars; it is enough that there are common Natures which are in Singulars, and are predicated of them.

It is one Thing to know that a Thing is so, another to know why it is so. Hence there are two kinds of Demonstration, *quia*, and *propterea*; the first is the true, and most perfect, of which hitherto.

The other kind of Demonstration, *viz.* *propterea*, is more imperfect; it is made two ways in the same Science: First, when the Cause is demonstrated by the Effect, thus; Stars which do not twinkle are nearest to the Earth; but the Planets do not twinkle, therefore they are nearest to the Earth. Secondly, when the Effect is proved by a Cause remote, and not reciprocal, or by an Effect of the remote Cause, as this; every Thing that breatheth is a living Creature; but no Wall breatheth, therefore no Wall is a living Creature.

a Cap. 6. b Cap. 23. c Anal. Prior. lib. 2. c. 22, &c. d Analyt. poster. lib. cap. 1. e Cap. 2. f Cap. 4. g Cap. 4.
h Cap. 11. i Cap. 13.

To know *Men*, is proper to subalternate principal Sciences, as Geometry and Arithmetick, which contemplate the first proper Causes. To know *Men*, is the subalternate and inferior, as Optick and Musick.

Of all Figures, the first is most accommodated to Knowledge, for that only concludes with an universal Affirmative, and therefore in that only is a demonstrative *Men*.

Thus far concerning Science; the opposite to Science is *Ignorance*, which is two-fold; One of pure Negation, as when a Boy, or ignorant Fellow, knows not that the Sun is greater than the Earth, because he is ignorant of Astrology; the other, of *disproved Disposition*, as when an Astrologer, or ignorant Optick, believes that Things are as they seem; this is Error, which erroneous Ignorance is in false Propositions, or in a Syllogism through a false Medium.

Defect of Sense causeth Ignorance of pure Negation; for if any Sense be wanting, it is necessary that some Science of Sensibles be likewise wanting; for we learn all Things either by Induction or Demonstration. Induction is made of Singulars perceived by Sense; Demonstration is of Universals, which are declared by Induction; wherefore the Beginning of Science is from Singulars, which are Sensibles. Hence it is impossible for a Man born blind to have the Science of Colours. Yet no Science is next and immediately from Sense, for Sense is of Singulars, which are here, and now; but Science and Demonstration is of Universals, which are every where, and ever, not subject to Sense. Yet, Sense conduceth to Science and Demonstration; for as much as an Universal is collected from Particulars known by Sense.

CHAP. VI.

Of *Dialectick Syllogism*.

Dialectick Syllogism is that which concludes from Probables; Probables are those Things which appear such to all, or to most, or only to the Wise and most Eminent.

Dialectick is a Conjectural Art, as *Rhetorick* and *Medicine*; therefore (like those) it attaineth not always its End; it is enough for a *Dialectick* that he omit nothing of his Art for concluding probably.

All Disputation is of Things controverted, either by Problem or Proposition; a Problem questions both Parts, as a *living Creature*, is it the *Genius of Man* or not? a Proposition questions but one Part, as, Is not *living Creature* the *Genius of Man*? Every Proposition and Problem is either *Genus*,

(under which is contained the Difference) *Definition*, *Proprium*, or *Accident*.

Definition is a Speech, signifying what a Thing is. *Proprium* is that which declareth not what a Thing is, but is in it only, and reciprocal with it. *Genus* is that which is predicated, in *quid*, of many that differ specifically. *Accident* is that which is neither *Definition*, nor *Genus*, nor *Proprium*, and may be, or not be, in its Subject.

Dialectick Proposition is a probable Interrogation, received by all, or many, or the most excellent; yet so as it is not wholly alienate from the common Opinion.

Dialectick Problem is threefold, *Practick* or *Moral*, pertaining to Election or Repulse; *Totterick*, pertaining to Science; *Neutral*, which conduceth to the rest, *viz. Logick*.

Thesis is a Paradoxal Sentence of some eminent Philosopher, contrary to the vulgar Opinion.

Dialectick Argument is two-fold, *Induction* and *Syllogism*.

Arguments are gained by Four Instruments, 1. *Choice of Propositions*. 2. *Distinction of Equivokes*. 3. *Invention of Differences*. 4. *Confutation of Similitudes*.

Problems are either universal or particular; the same Places which confirm or confute one, confirm or confute the other. From *Proprium*, *Genus*, and *Definition*, is immediately and simply made *Demonstration*, but not from *Accident*, because that is external, not necessarily and intimately inherent in the Subject. We shall not here say any thing of the Multitude of Places he hath invented, which are more necessary to those that will learn the Art, than suitable to this Abridgement.

The Disputant must first find out a Place (or Medium) secondly, dispose and question it within himself; thirdly, propose it to his Adversary.

In Disputation against the Learned, *Syllogism* is to be used against the Vulgar Induction.

The Office of the *Opponent* is to compel his *Respondent* to this incredible and absurd Consequent from his *Thesis*; of the *Respondent*, to take Care that nothing absurd be collected from his *Thesis*.

CHAP. VII.

Of *Sophistick Syllogism*.

An *Elench* is a *Syllogism* which contradicts the Conclusion asserted by the *Respondent*. Of *Elenchs*, some are true, some are false; that proper to a *Sophos*, whose Office is to pursue and defend Truth, and to discover and confute Falshood.

This to a *Sophist*, who from seeming Wisdom, acquireth Gain, and had rather seem, than be.

* A *Sophist* hath five Ends, whereto he endeavoureth to reduce his Adversary; the first is *Elench* or *Redargution*, of which there are two kinds; one in the *Word*, the other out of the *Word*.

Sophisms in the *Word*, are six. 1. *Homonymie*, as, that ill is good, for τὰ δεινά are good, but ill is τὰ δεινά. The Fallacy consists in the Word τὰ δεινά, which signifies sometimes necessarily inevitable, sometimes beneficial.

2. By *Amphibolie*, as, βέλαια λαβὼν καὶ τὰς πολέμους, which signifies, either that the *Enemies* would take me, or that I would take the *Enemies*.

3. By *Composition*, as, τὸ διναδαι καθύμινον βελίον, that he who sits can walk, which is true in a divided Sense, not in a Compounded.

4. By *Division*, as, Five are Two and Three, therefore even and odd.

5. By *Ascend*, which is not so easily done in *Logic* as in *Poetry*.

6. By *Figure of the Word*, when Things which are not the same, are interpreted in the same manner, as, a Male for a Female.

* *Sophisms* out of the *Word*, are Seven; 1. From *Accident*, when that which is demanded is equally competent to the Thing, and to the Accident; for whereas many Things are competent to the same, it is not necessary that they be all in the Subject and Predicate, as, if Coriscus differs from a Man, he differs from himself, for he is a Man.

2. From that which is Simple, or κατὰ μέρος, when that which is said in part is taken of all, as, if that

which is not, is imaginative, that which is not, is.

3. From Ignorance of the *Elench*, when not understanding the true Nature of a Contradiction, they think that to be an absolute Contradiction which is none, omitting either the same Respect in the Thing, or the same Respect of the same Thing, or the Simplicity, or the Time. To this all *Sophisms* may be reduced.

4. Of the *Consequent*, when we allow those to be true reciprocal Consequences which are not such, as, it is yellow, therefore it is Honey; and the contrary, it is not yellow, therefore it is not Honey.

5. Of *Petition of the Principle*, neither by requiring that to be granted, which was to be proved, or proving the same by the same, the Terms only changed; as, the Soul is immortal, because it is not subject to Death.

6. Of a not Cause as a Cause, as, when that is taken to be the Cause of the Thing, or Conclusion, which is Cause of neither; as, Arms disturb Peace, therefore they are to be taken away.

7. Of *Plurality of Interrogations* as one, when many Things are ask'd in one; as, Justice and Impiety, are they Virtues or not?

Hitherto of *Elenchs*; the Four other Ends, whereto a *Sophist* endeavours to reduce his Adversary are, *Falsity*, *Paradox*, *Solæcism*, and *Tautology*.

Sophisms are solved, either by *Distinction* or *Negation*.

Thus much may serve for a slight View of his *Logic*, whereof we have but few Books left, in respect of the many which he wrote upon that Part of Philosophy.

z Cap. 2.

y Cap. 3.

z Cap. 4.

The SECOND PART.

CHAP. I.

Of Physick.

CHAP. II.

Of the Principles of Natural Bodies.

* THE Principles of Natural Bodies are not one, as *Parmenides* and *Melissus* held; nor *Homoimerias*, as *Anaxagoras*; nor *Atomes*, as *Leucippus* and *Democritus*; nor *Sensible Elements*, as *Thales*, *Anaximander*, *Anaximenes*, *Empedocles*; nor *Numbers*, or *Figures*, as the *Pythagoreans*; nor *Ideas*, as *Plato*.

* That the Principles of Things are contrary (privately opposite) was the joint Opinion of the Ancients, and is manifest in Reason; for Principles are those which neither are mutually of one another, nor of others, but of them are all Things;

p Metaphys. 5. 2.

b Physic. lib. 1. cap. 3. 4.

c Cap. 5.

such

NOT to question the Method of *Aristotle's* Books of *Physick*, much less their Titles (as some, to make them better agree with *Latinius's* Catalogue, have done) and least of all their Authority with *Patricius*, we shall take them in that Order which is generally received; according to which, next *Logic* is placed *Physick*.

* *Physick* is a Science concerning that Substance which hath the Principle of Motion and Rest within itself.

The Physical Books of *Aristotle*, that are extant, treat of these Nine General Heads: Of the Principles of Natural Things; Of the common Affections of Natural Things; Of Heaven; Of Elements; Of the Motion and Passion of Elements; Of Exhalation; Of Plants; Of Animals; Of the Soul.

such are, first, *Contraries*; as, *being first, they are not of any other*; as *contrary, not of another*.

^a Hence it follows, that being *contrary*, they must be *more than one*, but *not infinite*; for then Natural Things would not be comprehensible by Reason; yet *more than two*; for, of *Contraries*, only nothing would be produced, but that they would rather destroy one another.

^c There are therefore *Three Principles of Natural Bodies*; *Two contrary, Privative and Form*; and *One common Subject of both, Matter*. The Constitutive Principles are *Matter and Form*; of *Privation Bodies* consist not, but *accidentally*, as it is competent to *Matter*.

ⁱ Things are made of that which is *Ens* potentially, *Materia Prima*, not of that which is *Ens* actually, nor of that which is *Non ens* potentially, which is pure nothing. ^h *Matter* is neither generated nor corrupted; it is the first infinite Subject of every Thing, whereof it is framed primarily in itself, and not by *Accident*, and into which it at last resolveth. To treat of *Form* in general, is proper to *Metaphysics*.

CHAP. III.

Of Nature, and the Causes of Natural Bodies.

^b *OF* Being, some are by Nature; as, Plants; others from other Causes; those have, in themselves, the Principle of their Motion, these have not. Nature is a Principle and Cause of the Motion and Rest of that Thing wherein it is, primarily, by itself, and not by Accident. *Material Substances* have Nature; *Natural Properties* are according to Nature: Nature is two fold, Matter and Form; but Form is most Nature, because it is in *Act*.

ⁱ Of Causes, are Four Kinds; the Material, of which a Thing is made; the Formal, by which a Thing is made, or Reason of its Essence; the Efficient, whence is the First Principle of its Mutation or Rest, as a Father; the Final, for which End it is made, as Health is to walking. Causes are immediate or remote, principal or accidental, actual or potential, particular or universal.

^k Fortune and Chance are Causes of many Effects; Fortune is an accidental Cause in those Things which are done by Election, for some End; Chance is larger; an Accidental Cause in Things which are done for some End, at least that of Nature. They are both Efficient.

^l Nature acts for some End; not temerarioussly, or casually; for those Things which are done by Nature, are always, or for the most Part, done in the same Manner, yet sometimes she is frustrated of her End, as in Monsters, which she intends not.

^m Necessity is twofold; absolute, which is from

Matter; conditional, which is from the End and Form. Both Kinds are in natural Things.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Affections of natural Bodies, Motion, Place, Time.

*M*otion is of a Thing which is not such, but may be such, the Way or Act by which it becometh such, as curing of a Body which is not in Health, but may be in Health, is the Way and Act by which it is brought to Health. Neither is it absurd, that the same Thing should be both in Act and Power, as to different Respects; for the Thing moved, as Water in warming is in Act, as to the Heat which it hath, in Power, as to the greater Heat which it is capable of.

ⁿ Infinite, is that which is pertransible without End, such an infinite in *Act* there is not; not amongst simple Bodies, for the Elements are confin'd to certain Number and Place; neither amongst mix'd Bodies, for they consist of the Elements which are finite. But, there are Things infinite potentially, as in Addition; Number, which may be augmented infinitely, in Division; Magnitude, which may be divided infinitely in Time, and continued Succession of Generation.

^p The Properties of Place are, that it contains the Thing placed; that it is equal to, and separable from the Thing placed; that the Place and the Thing placed are together; that it hath upwards or downwards, and the like Difference; that every Physical Body tends naturally to its proper Place, and there resteth.

Place is the immediate immoveable Superficies of a continent Body. Those Things which are contained by another Body are in Place; but those which have not any other Body above or beyond them, are not properly in Place. Bodies rest in their natural Places, because they tend thither as a Part torn off from the whole.

^q Vacuum is Place void of Body; such a Vacuum there is not in Nature, for that would destroy all Motion, seeing that in Vacuum there is neither upwards nor downwards, backwards nor forwards. Nor would there be any Reason, why Motion should be to one Part more than to another. Moreover it would follow, that it were impossible for one Body to make another recede, if the triple Dimension, which Bodies divide, were vacuum. Neither is the Motion of rare Bodies upwards caused by Vacuity, for that Motion is as natural to light Bodies, as to move downwards is to heavy.

^r Time is the Number of Motion by before and after. Those two Parts of Time are conjoined by (τὸ νῦν) the present, as the Parts of a Line are by a

d Cap. 6. e Cap. 7. f Cap. 8. g Cap. 7. h Phys. lib. 2. cap. 2. i Cap. 3. k Cap. 4. de. l Cap. 4. m Cap. 9. n Physic. lib. 3. cap. 2. o Cap. 7. p Lib. 4. cap. 3. q Cap. 3. r Cap. 10, 12. Point.

Point. Time is the Measure of Rest as well as of Motion; for the same Measure which serves for the Privation, serves for the Habit. All Motion and Mutation is in Time; for in every Motion there is Swiftness or Slowness, which is defined by Time. The Heavens, Earth, Sea, and other Sensibles are in Time, for they are moveable.

Time being a *numerate* Number, exists not without a *Numerant*, which is the *Soul*. The Measure of Time and other Things, is that which measureth the first and most equal Motion; this is the Motion of the *Primum mobile*, for the first in every Kind is the Measure of the rest.

CHAP. V.

Of the Kinds and Properties of Motion.

Motion appertains to three Categories, to Quantity, *Accretion* and *Diminution*; to Quality, *Alteration*; to Where, *local Motion*.

Rest is a Privation of Motion in a Body, when, where, and how it is apt for Motion.

As all Magnitude is primarily, and *per se*, continuous and divisible into infinite, so is all Motion, by Reason of Magnitude, and Time itself. For whatsoever is not composed of Indivisibles, is divisible into infinite; but no continuous Thing is composed of indivisible Things, for it is quantitative, whereas Indivisibles having no Extremes or Parts, can neither be conjoined by continuous nor contiguous Motion.

Yet it followeth not, that if there be infinite Magnitude, there can be no Motion; for it is not infinite in Act, but in Power, as are likewise Time and Motion.

Neither is there any Motion in the Instant, *νν*, for nothing is moved or resteth, but in Time.

Motion therefore is divisible, as well in respect to the Time wherein it is made, as in respect to the Thing wherein it inheres; as both these are always indivisible, so may Motion itself be divided according to these.

Whatsoever is changed, as soon as it is changed, must necessarily be in the (next) Term *to which*, for it leaveth the State or Form in which it was, and assumeth that to which it tendeth; yet tho' in Motion, there is a first Motion of Perfection, wherein we may truly say, the Mutation is made, yet there is no first Motion of Inception.

Whatsoever is moved in any whole Time, is necessarily moved in every Part of that Time.

All Motion is finite, for it is in Time, which is finite.

Whatsoever is thus proper to Motion, is to be applied also to Rest and Quiescence.

CHAP. VI.

Of the first Mover.

Whatsoever is moved must necessarily be moved by another, either external or internal. But lest this Progression be into infinite, we must of Necessity at last come to one first Mover, which is not moved by another. This first Mover, the Cause and Origin of all Motion, is *immoveable*, *one*, *eternal*, and *indivisible*, *void of all Quantity*.

Immoveable, for whatsoever Things are moved, are either immediately moved by a first immoveable Mover, or by some other which is likewise moved by another, until at last we come to some first Mover, for nothing can move itself unless there be a first Mover; but of Infinities there is no first.

One, for he is most perfect, as being Author of the most perfect and most simple Motion, that of the *primum mobile*. Besides, the best in every Kind is one; for good is simple, ill multiplicitous.

Eternal, for Motion itself is eternal, as appears thus: The Mover and the Moveable must either be from Eternity, or have had Beginning in some Time; if they began at any Time, it must have been by Motion, and consequently before the first Motion there was another, by which the Mover and Moveable began, which were absurd. Again, if they were eternal, yet without Motion, it must be either by Reason of the Inaptitude of the Moveable, or of its Remoteness from the Mover. But neither could the Moveable be made more apt, or brought nigher to the Mover except by the Motion, whence would follow, that there was a Motion before the first Motion. Again, Time, the Measure of Motion, is eternal, therefore Motion itself is such. That Time is eternal (besides that it is the general Agreement of Philosophers) is thus proved; it cannot be conceived without *νν*, the Instant, which is intermediate betwixt the past and future, both the End of one and the Beginning of the other; but, if Time had a Beginning, this *νν* would have been only a Beginning, not End; if Time should have an End, this Instant would be only an End, not a Beginning, both which are repugnant to the Nature of a Moment.

Indivisible, void of Quantity; the Proof whereof is grounded upon three Theorems. 1. That no finite Mover can move in infinite Time, therefore the first Mover is infinite. 2. That there cannot be infinite Power in finite Quantity; therefore the first Mover is incorporeal. 3. That there cannot be finite Power in that which is infinite, therefore the first Mover is infinite in Power. Hence may be collected, that it is impossible the first Mover should be divisible, corporeal, or affected with

1 Cap. 14. 2 Phys. lib. 5. cap. 2. 3 Lib. 6. cap. 1. 4 Cap. 2. 5 Cap. 3. 6 Cap. 4. 7 Cap. 5. 8 Cap. 6. 9 Cap. 7. 10 Lib. 8. cap. 10.

Quantity ; for if he had any, it would either be infinite, of which kind actual there is none ; or finite, wherein could not consist his infinite Power.

CH A P. VII.

Of Heaven.

HAVING treated of the Principles, Causes, and Affections of natural Bodies in general, he proceeds next to Particulars.

^a The World is perfect, because it consists of Bodies which are perfect, and comprehendeth all Perfection, itself not being comprehended by any other.

^b Of Bodies, some are *simple*, others *compounded of the simple*. All natural Bodies are moveable locally *per se*. There is a twofold *local Motion*, *simple*, which is competent to simple Bodies ; and *mix'd*, which is to the mix'd. Hence it followeth, that there are so many Kinds of simple Bodies, as Variations of simple Motion ; for of one simple Body there is one proper Motion. Simple, local Motion is twofold ; *circular*, about the Centre, and *right* ; the Right is either upwards from the Centre, or downwards to the Centre, and both these either simply, or *κατὰ τὸ*. This fourfold Variation of right Motion, evinceth that there are four simple Bodies called *Elements*. Circular Motion must be proper to some other first Essence, different from the Constitutions of the other four simple Bodies, more divine and precedent to all the rest. This is *Heaven*.

^c Heaven hath neither Gravity nor Levity ; this is manifest from its Motion, which is circular, not from the Centre, which is proper to light Things, nor to the Centre, as is proper to heavy, but about the Centre.

Heaven is void of Generation and Corruption, and consequently of Accretion, Diminution and Alteration, for it hath no contrary ; it is therefore the first Body, not to be confuted by Time and Age.

^d No Body can be infinite, therefore the World itself is not infinite, neither is there any Body beyond it infinite, nor intelligible or mathematical.

^e There is but one World, for if there were more, the Earth of one would move to the Earth of the other (as being of one Kind) and ascend out of its proper Place.

^f The World is eternal ; whatsoever is eternal is ingenerate and incorruptible. Plato therefore erred, in affirming the World to be generated, but incorruptible. If he meant, that as it was generated, it is by Nature corruptible, yet shall never be actually dissolved, because of the eternal Cause of its Conservation, God, be erret also ; for then there would be something that should be always, and yet could not be always.

• Heaven is void of Labour (*δυσκολον*) for it hath no Contrary to retard its Motion.

^g Heaven hath the *threefold Difference of Position*, upwards and downwards, backwards, right and left, for these are proper to all animate Things which have the Principle of Motion within themselves. The right Side of Heaven is the *East*, for thence begins its Motion ; the left Side the *West* ; and consequently the Arctick Pole is lowermost, the Antartick uppermost ; forwards our Hemisphere, backwards the other.

^h Heaven *naturally moveth circularly*, but this circular Motion is not uniform throughout all Heaven, for there are other Orbs which move contrary to the *Primum Mobile* ; that there may be a Vicissitude in sublunary Things, and Generation and Corruption.

ⁱ Heaven is *spherical*, for to the first Body the first Figure is most proper. If it were quadrangular, triangular, or the like, the Angles would sometimes leave a Space without a Body, and occupy another Space without a Body. The Motion of Heaven is circular, as being the Measure of all other, therefore most compendious and swiftest.

^j The Motion of the *Primum Mobile* is equable and uniform, for it hath neither Beginning, Middle, nor End ; the *Primum Mobile* and first Mover being eternal in both, and subject to no Variation.

^k Stars are of the same Body with that wherein they are carried, but more thick and compact ; they produce Warmth and Light in inferior Things, through Friction of the Air by their Motion ; for swift Motion fires Wood, and melts Lead, yet the Spheres themselves are not heated, but the Air only, and that chiefly by the Sphere of the Sun, which by his Accession towards us, increaseth the Heat, his Beams falling more directly, and with double Force upon us.

^l The Stars being infixed in the Heavens, are moved, not by themselves, with a proper Motion, as Fishes in the Water, and Birds in the Air, but according to the Motion of their Orbs. Otherwise those in the eighth Sphere would not be always equidistant from one another ; neither would the Stars have always the same Side turning towards us, as we see the Moon hath.

The *Primum Mobile* is carried about with the swiftest Motion : The seven Orbs of Planets under it, as they are nearer to it, are carried so much the more swiftly about by the Motion thereof ; and as they are further distant, more slowly. Whence by how much the nigher they are to the *Primum Mobile*, so much the slower is their proper Motion, because it is contrary to that of the *Primum Mobile*, as being from *East to West*.

The Stars are round, for that Figure is most unapt for Self-Motion. We see the Moon is round

^a De Caelo. lib. 1. cap. 1. ⁱ Cap. 2. ^k Cap. 3. ^l Cap. 5. ^m Cap. 8. ⁿ Cap. 12. ^o Lib. 2. cap. 3. ^p Cap. 4. ^q Cap. 3. ^r Cap. 4. ^s Cap. 6. ^t Cap. 7. ^u Cap. 8. ^v Cap. 11.

by her Orbicular Sections; therefore the other Stars are so likewise, for the Reason is the same in all.

* The Centre of Heaven is the Earth, round, seated immovable in the midst; which, together with the Sea, makes up one Globe.

C H A P. VII.

Of Elements.

* THE Element of Bodies is a simple Body, into which other Bodies are divided, in which it is either actually or potentially; as in Flesh, Wood, and the like, there is Fire and Earth potentially; for in these they are segregated, but actually they are not; for then should the Flesh and Wood be segregated.

Whereas every natural Body hath a proper Motion. Motions are partly simple, partly mixed; the mixed proper to mixed Bodies, the simple to simple. It is manifest that there are simple Bodies, for there are simple Motions; the circular proper to Heaven, the right to the Elements.

* The Elements are not eternal; for they are dissolved with reciprocal Mutations, and perish, and are mutually generated of one another.

* The motive Qualities of the Elements are Gravity and Levity. Heavy is that which is apt to be carried downwards to the Center or Midst of Heaven; Light is that which is apt to be carried upwards towards the Extremities of Heaven. These are either simple or comparative. Simply heavy is that which is below all, as the Earth; Simply light is that which is above all, as the Fire; comparatively, heavy and light, are those in which are both these; above some, below others, as Air and Water. From these have mixed Things, Gravity and Levity, the heavy are carried downwards to a definite Medium, the light upwards to a definite Extremity; for nothing tends to infinite. Whence it followeth, that two Elements are extremely contrary, simply heavy, and simply light, Fire and Earth, which tend to contrary Places. Betwixt these are two Means, participating of the Nature of each Extremity, Air and Water. Those Elements which are biggest and lightest, are most perfect, and have the Nature of Forms in respect of the inferior, because these are contained by those. To be contained, is the Property of Matter; to contain, of Form.

* Hence it followeth, that there are four Kinds of particular second Matter, differing by the accidental Differences of Heat, Cold, Humidity, Siccity, Levity and Gravity, (simple and comparative) though there be but one common Matter of them all; for they are made mutually of one another. The mean Elements are heavy in their proper Places; for Earth being taken away, Water tending downwards, succeeds in its Room; Air descends into the Place of Water, but not contrariwise; for Water ascends not into its Place of Air, unless by Force. In the Extremity it is either

wife; for the Air being taken away, the Fire will not descend into its Place, nor the Earth ascend into the Place of Water or Air; for Fire is not heavy, nor Earth light in their natural Place, because they are extremum Elements.

* Figure conduceth to the Swiftness or Slowness of Motion either upwards or downwards, but is not simply, and in itself the Cause of Motion; so an acute Figure cuts the Medium swiftly, a broad obtuse Figure slowly. Hence a thin Plate of Lead or Iron will swim on Water, because it comprehends much of the subjected Body, which it cannot easily divide or penetrate.

C H A P. VIII.

Of Generation, Corruption, Alteration, Augmentation, and Diminution.

* THERE is a perpetual Succession of Generation, as well simple as accidental, which proceeds from two Causes; Efficient, the first Mover, and the Heavens, always moving, and always moved; and Material, the first Matter, of which, being non-ens actually, ens potentially, all Things generable and corruptible consist. This is incorruptible in itself, susceptible of all Forms, whereby the Corruption of one natural Substance becometh the Generation of another, whatsoever Matter remaineth upon the Corruption, being assumed towards the Generation of another.

Generation and Corruption are two-fold, simple; of a Substance, κατὰ τὴν, of an Accident, Generation of the less noble Substance is called Generation κατὰ τὴν, in respect of the more noble, as that of Earth in respect of Fire.

Corruption always succeedeth Generation, because the Term, to which of Corruption (viz. non-ens) is the Term from which of Generation; and the Term to which of Generation (viz. ens in Act) is the Term from which of Corruption. The Matter of that which is generated, and that which is corrupted, is the same; so far as they are, and may be made reciprocally of one another, as Air of Water, Water of Air; but differently disposed.

* Alteration and Generation are different Mutations; in Alteration the Subject remaineth entire, the Affections only are changed, as of sick, sound; in Generation the whole is changed, not any sensible Subject remaining. Alteration is a Mutation according to Quality; Augmentation and Diminution, according to Quantity; Local Motion, according to Place.

* Augmentation and Diminution differ from other Mutations; first, in the Object, Generation and Corruption concerns Substances; Alteration, Quality, Iation, Place; Augmentation and Diminution, Quantity. Again, in the Manner, that which is generated, or corrupted, or altered, not necessarily changeth Place, but that which augments or diminisheth, in some manner changeth Place, for it is bigger or lesser.

x Cap. 13. 14. y De Caelo. lib. 3. cap. 3. z Cap. 5. a Lib. 4. cap. 2. b Cap. 5. c Cap. 6. d De gener. et corrupt. lib. 1. cap. 3. e Cap. 4. f Cap. 5.

Augmentation is an Addition to pre-existent Quantity; Diminution a Detraction. Whatsoever is augmented or decreased, is augmented or decreased according to every Part thereof, by Reception of something throughout all Parts; Detraction on the contrary. The animate Body encreaseth, but not the Aliment, for the living Creature remaineth, the Aliment is converted into the Substance of the living Creature. Hereupon, that which is augmented is like unto that which is altered, for both of these remain. All Parts of a living Creature are augmented; the similar first, as Bones and Flesh; then the dissimilar, as consisting of the others.

Augmentation is made by Accession, or something according to Form, not according to Matter; for by it the whole is augmented and made more such. Accession of Parts, according to Matter, is not Augmentation; for by Materials only (destitute of that Form, which the Parts to be augmented have) the whole living Creature cannot encrease. Aliment therefore, whereby the living Creature is augmented, must be the same potentially which the Thing augmented is in Act. At first, it is contrary, and dissimilar, being in Power the Part of a living Creature; in Act something else: At last, it becometh assimilate to the living Creature, taking the Form of a Part (by ageneration) through the digestive Power of the animate Body, which changeth the Aliment into its own Substance.

For this Reason Augmentation presupposeth Nutrition. Nutrition is, when the Aliment as Substance is converted into the same Substance of the living Creature. Augmentation, when the same Aliment, as quantitative, is added to the Quantity of the living Creature. Hence a living Creature, as long as it is found, is always nourished, but not always augmented. As that which is added is potentially quantitative Flesh, so it can augment Flesh; as it is potentially Flesh only, so it nourisheth; which when it can only do (as when so much Wine is poured into Water that it turns all into Water) then there is a Diminution of the Quantity, but the Form remaineth.

CHAP. X.

Of Action and Passion.

^c Contact is of several Kinds, Mathematical, by Contiguity; Physical, when the Extrems of several Bodies meet, and mutually act and suffer; Virtual, by Power, and metaphorical.

^b The mutual Action and Passion of Physical Contact is betwixt Things, partly unlike as to their Form, partly like as to their Genus (for they are Contraries) Matter; each endeavouring to reduce the Patient to his own Likeness, as Fire, Wood,

Every Physical Agent in acting, suffers from the Patient, for both the Agent and Patient are active, endued with Forms Elementary, susceptible of Con-

traries. But as the first Mover is immovable, ^a is the first Agent impassible.

¹ Every Thing acts, as it is such, actually; suffers, as it is such, potentially. The Conditions of Action and Passion are five; 1. What the Agent is in Act, the Patient is in Power. 2. The Patient is such according to each Part. 3. That which is more disposed, suffers more, and so on the contrary. 4. Every Patient is continuous, and not actually divided. 5. The Agent must necessarily touch the Patient, either immediately or mediately.

CHAP. XI.

Of Mixtion and Temperament.

^k Mixtion is not Generation, for the Matter is not fixed with the Form; nor Alteration, for the Quality is not mixed with the Subject; nor Augmentation, for Aliment, the Matter of Augmentation, is not mixed with, but converted into the animate Body. Conjunction of small Bodies is not true Mixtion, but co-acervation, for those Bodies remain actually in the same, according to their Forms, not composing one third according to every Part. Things which have not the same Matter, are not mix'd, because they cannot be active and passive reciprocally.

Those Things which are properly said to be mixed, must have one common Matter, they must mutually act upon, and suffer one from another; they must be easily divisible; yet so, as that one be not excessive in respect of the other, for then it is not Mixtion, but Mutation into the more predominant, as a Drop of Wine into a great Quantity of Water.

¹ The Principles and Differences of Elements (sensible tactile Bodies) are tactile Qualities, inasmuch as by such Qualities, sensible Bodies, as such, are constituted and differ. Of tactile Qualities there are seven Orders, Hot, Cold, Moist, Dry, Heavy, Light, Hard, Soft, Viscous, Arid, Rugged, Smooth, Thick, Thin. From the two first Orders are derived the Differences of Elements; for by Heat and Cold, Humidity and Siccity, they act and suffer, and are mutually changed by alterative Passions. Of these first Qualities two are active, Heat and Cold; two passive, Humidity and Siccity. Heat is that which congregates homogeneous Things; Cold, that which congregates heterogeneous Things; Humid, that which is not easily contained in its own Bounds; Dry, the contrary.

^m As there are Four Elements, there must be Four Conjunctions of the primary Qualities, from each of which the Elements are severally collected. The first Conjunction is of hot and dry, whence proceedeth Fire; the Second, hot and moist, whence Air; the Third, of moist and cold, whence Water; the Fourth, of cold and dry, whence Earth.

In each of these, one Quality is predominant, *Earth* is more dry than cold, *Water* more cold than moist, *Air* more moist than hot, *Fire* more hot than dry.

All these Elements may be mutually transmuted into one another; the *Symbolical*, which agree in one primary Quality, are more easily transmuted into one another, than the *Affymbolical*, because it is less difficult to change one than many. This Transmutation is not a Generation, but a kind of Alteration, whence it is manifest, one Element cannot be the Principle of another.

^a *Mixtion*, whereby the Elements concur to the Composition of a Mix'd Body, is made by Co-ervation, as *Empedocles* held; but after such a Manner, that their contrary Qualities remain in the Mixt, not potentially only, nor simply actually in their Height, but in a mean kind of Way, their Extremities being reduced to some Temper. From this Contemplation come Mix'd Bodies, differing according to the various Proportion of the Temperament; and, as they are compounded of the Elements, so they resolve into the same.

^a All these mix'd Bodies consist of all the Elements; of *Earth*, for every Thing participates of the Nature of that Thing whereof it is produced; of *Water*, because every mix'd Thing must be concrete and terminated, which Properties *Water* best affordeth to *Earth*; of *Air* and *Fire*, because every perfect mix'd Body is made by Temperament of Contraries, such is *Air* to *Earth*, *Fire* to *Water*. Hence, the Nature of all Mix'd Bodies, as well animate as inanimate, as to Mixture, is the same; but that the Animate consists of all the Elements is manifest, in that they are nourished by them.

^f The Causes and common Principles of Mix'd Bodies are three, *Material*, *Formal*, *Efficient*. The *Material*, is the Power to be, and not to be; by which, Elementary Things are generated and corrupted. The *Formal*, is the Reason of the Essence of every Thing. ^g The *Universal Efficient*, is the circular Motion of Heaven, not only as being Eternal, Continual, and before Generation, but chiefly because it bringeth nigh to us, and carrieth far from us, that which hath the Generative Power of all Things; that is, the *Sun*, and the other *Stars*; which by their Accession and Recession are the Causes of Generation and Corruption.

ⁱ All these are so disposed, according to the Order of *Nature*, that, because no Natural Being can be permanent in the same individual State, they may be at least preserved by a continual Succession of many Individuums of the same Species; whence the Natural Cause of Generation is only Conservation of the Species.

C H A P. XII.

Of imperfect Mix'd Bodies.

¹ *MIX'D* Bodies are two-fold, *imperfect* and *perfect*; *Meteors* are imperfect mix'd Bodies, produced according to Nature, but after a less orderly and constant Manner; the general *Matter* thereof are the Elements; the *Efficient*, the Caelestial Bodies which act upon Inferiors, by a kind of Coherence; ^a *Heaven* is highest; next *Heaven* the Element of *Fire*; next *Fire*, *Air*; under *Air*, *Water* and *Earth*. Clouds are not generated in the Sphere of *Fire*, nor in the Region of the *Air*, partly by reason of the Heat which is there, partly by reason of the Motion of the Heavens, which carrieth along with it the Element of *Fire*, and the upper Region of the *Air*; by which Motion, Heat is produced in inferior Bodies; for, the *Air* being carried along by the *Heaven*, is heated by that Motion, and by the Proximity of the *Sun* and of the Element of *Fire*.

² *Flames* that appear in the upper Part of the *Air*, are made thus: The *Sun* by his Warmth extracteth a kind of Breath out of the *Earth*, which, if hot and dry, is called *Exhalation*, and if hot and moist, *Vapour*. Exhalation ascends higher, as being higher, and being got into the upper Region of the *Air*, is there enkindled by the Motion of the *Air*, and Proximity of the *Fire*. Hence come those they call *Fire-brands*, *Goats*, *Falling Stars*, and the like. ³ Hence are also *Phasmes*, such as are called *Gulfs*, *Chasms*, *bloody Colours*, and the like; the Exhalation being variously coloured by Reflection of the Light, but chiefly seeming Purple, which Colour ariseth from the Mixture of *Fire* and *White*.

⁴ The efficient Cause of Comets are the *Sun* and *Stars*; the material, an Exhalation, hot, dry, condensed, and combustible; so as it burns not much, nor is soon extinguished. It is called a *Comet*, or *airy Star*, when it is alike on every Side; a *Pogonia*, or *bearded Star*, when it hath a long Train. That it consists of *Fire*, is manifest, because at the same Time, there is commonly great Wind and Drought. It appears seldom, and then single, and beyond the Tropicks; because *Stars*, especially the *Sun*, dissipate the Matter whereof it consists.

⁵ The *Galaxy* is not the Light of many Stars together, as *Anaxagoras* held, but an Exhalation hot and dry, kindled by the Motion of many great Stars, which are in that Part where the *Galaxy* appeareth.

⁶ We come next to those *Meteors* which are in the middle and lower Region of the *Air*; they are there kept so long, until they are condensed by the Cold of that Place, into Drops of *Water*, which if

ⁿ Cap. 7. ^o Cap. 8. ^p Cap. 9. ^q Cap. 10. ^r Cap. 11. ^s Meteor. lib. 1. cap. 1. ^t Cap. 2. ^u Cap. 3.
^x Cap. 4. ^y Cap. 5. ^z Cap. 6, 7. ^a Cap. 8. ^b Cap. 9.

they come down very small, are called *misting*; if greater, *Rain*. This thick Vapour, which is seen suspended in the Air, and changeth from Air to Water, is a Cloud. *Mist* is the Superfluity of a Cloud, condensed into Water.

^c Vapour attracted by a small Heat not much above the Earth, and descending more condensed by the nocturnal Cold, becometh either *Dew*, or *Frost*; *Frost*, when it congealeth before it resolves into Water; *Dew*, when it turns into Water, so as the Warmth cannot dry it up, nor the Cold freeze it.

^d *Snow* is a congealed Cloud; *Rain*, *Dew*, *Frost*, and *Snow*, differ almost only in Bigness and Smallness.

^e *Hail*, tho' it be of the same Nature as Ice, yet is seldom produced in Winter, as being caused by *Antiperistasis*.

^f As the Air above the Earth condensed, becometh Vapour, and Vapour by Cold becometh Water, so doth it also in the Caverns and Receptacles of the Earth, by a continual Mutation: First it turns into little Drops, then those little into greater. Hence come all Springs and Heads of Rivers, abundantly flowing out at one Part of the Earth. Hence great Rivers and Fountains commonly flow from great Hills, which have greatest Caverns.

^g The Parts of the Earth are in continual Mutation; sometimes humid, sometimes dry, sometimes fertile, sometimes desert, by new Eruptions or Defections of Rivers, or Access or Receds of the Sea, according to certain Periods of Time. Thus have the Parts of the Earth their Youth and Age, as well as Plants and living Creatures, by the Heat and Conversion of the Sun. *Time* and the *World* are eternal, but *Nilus* and *Tanais* were not always, for those Places whence they first issued, were once dry Grounds.

^h The proper Place of Water is the concave Surfaces of the Air. This Place the Sea, compassing the Earth, possesseth; for the swift and more rare Water is drawn upwards by the Heat of the Sun; the salt, more thick and terrene, setteth downwards. For this Reason all Waters tend to the Sea, as to their proper Place. Yet, hereby the Sea is not enlarged, for the Sun draweth out of it, by reason of its Expansion, as great a Quantity of Water, as it receiveth from Rivers.

ⁱ The Sea is, as the World, eternal. The Saltiness thereof proceedeth from Admixture of some terrene, adust Exhalation. From the Top of the Sea is drawn up a fresh Vapour; from the Bottom, heated by the Sun, an Exhalation, which passeth through the Sea, and cometh up with the Vapour; but falling back into the Sea, bringeth that Saltiness with it, as Water passed often through Ashes.

^k *Winds* are produced by the Sun and Stars, of a hot, dry Exhalation, which ascending, is driven

down again by the Coldness of the middle Region of the Air, and by reason of the Lightness of its Nature, cannot go directly to the Bottom, but is carried by the Air up and down. We call it a hot and dry Exhalation, as being more dry than humid. Wind is weakest in the Beginning, but gaineth Strength, by taking along with it other light Exhalations, which it meets with by the Way.

^l Winds are laid by Heat and Cold; excessive Heat consumeth the Exhalations, as soon as it cometh out of the Earth; excessive Cold binds up the Pores of the Earth, so as it cannot pass.

^m *Earthquake* is a trembling of the Earth, caused by an Exhalation hot and dry, inclosed in the Bowels of the Earth, which striving to get forth, as its Nature requireth, and not able, by reason of the Solidity of the Earth, to pass, maketh the Earth shake, forcing a Way through it, and bearing down whatsoever opposeth it. The more hot this inclosed Spirit is, the more vehement.

Of the same Nature is *Lightning*, *Thunder*, and the like. *Thunder* is, when an Exhalation inclosed in a thick cold Cloud, rolleth it up and down, and at last breaketh through it with more or less Noise, according to the Thickness of the Cloud. By this Eruption it acquireth a rare kind of Heat and Light, which is *Lightning*, subsequent to the Noise of the Eruption; yet seen before the other is heard, by reason of the Quickness of the Sight beyond the Hearing.

ⁿ As of dry Exhalations, the rare and dispersed produce Thunder and Lightning; so of the great and condensed is made *ισχυρία*, *τις*, *αερας*, and Thunder-bolts.

^o Of *lucid Meteors* appearing in the Clouds, are *Halo's*, *Rain-Bow's*, *Parasels*, and *Streaks*: All these are caused by Refraction, but differ according to the Objects from which they are reflected. A *Halo* appeareth about some Star, when there happeneth a Cloud to be, the middle Part whereof, by reason of its Rarity, being dissipated, the rest of the Parts about, by Reflection, represent the Colour of the Star. *Rainbow* is a Refraction of the Sun's Beam upon a humid Cloud, ready to dissolve into Rain. In like manner are caused *Parasels* and *Streaks*.

^p There are likewise imperfect mix'd Bodies, under, or within the Earth, and these also of two kinds; some caused by Exhalation, called *Minerals*; others by Vapour, called *Metals*, fusile or ductile.

C H A P. XIII.

Of perfect mixed Bodies.

^q **T**HE common Affections of perfect mix'd Bodies, are those which proceed from the primary Qualities of the Elements, whereof two are

active, Heat and Cold; two passive, Humidity and Siccity. The natural Effect of these is *Generation*, when Heat and Cold overcome the Matter; otherwise it is *Iniquation* and *Inconcoction*. The opposite to simple Generation is *Putrefaction*; every Thing, unless violently dissolved, putrifieth. Hence those Things that putrify, become first humid, then dry; for the external Heat expelleth the internal, and at last consumeth it. All Things therefore putrify, except Fire, for Putrification is the Corruption of the natural Heat in every humid Body, by the external. For this Reason, Things are less subject to putrify in Cold or in Motion, and the hotter or greater they are; as a Part of the Sea may putrify, the whole cannot.

Out of putrid Things are bred living Creatures; for the natural Heat, whilst it is separating, endeavourth as much as possible, that what is taken asunder, and segregated by Corruption, may gather together in some small Parts, which afterwards, by help of the Sun, receive Life. Thus are Worms, Beetles, Gnats, and other Insects bred.

Concoction is the Effect of Heat, *Inconcoction* of Cold. *Concoction* is a Perfection caused by natural Heat of the opposite passive Qualities, which are mixed with the Matter, as being passive. The End of *Concoction* in some Things is Mutation of the Essence, as when Food is converted into Flesh and Blood; in others only a Mutation according to Quantity or Quality, as in Fruits that ripen. *Inconcoction* is an Imperfection in the opposite passive Qualities, proceeding from Defect of Heat.

Concoction is three-fold, *παρασις*, *ἡμεσις*, *ὑπερσις*. *Inconcoction* is also three-fold, *ἀμύσις*, *μεινύσις*, *ἐκλείψις*.

Παρασις is the *Concoction* of that Element which is in Fruits; it is perfect, when the Seeds that are within the Fruit are capable of producing their Like, hereto is opposite, *ἀμύσις*, the *Incoction* of Fruits not able through want of Heat to overcome the Humidity.

ἡμεσις is a *Concoction* of an humid interminate by external Humidity and Heat; hereto is opposite *μεινύσις*, the *Inconcoction* of a humid interminate, caused by Defect of external Humidity and Heat.

ὑπερσις is a *Concoction* by dry and external Heat, yet not excessive, for then it were Adustion; to this is opposed *ἐκλείψις*, an *Inconcoction* caused through Defect of Heat and Fire, or Excess of Humidity in the Subject.

As concerning the two passive Qualities, Things are humid and dry, either actually or potentially. Those Things which are mix'd of humid and dry, are terminate, for these Qualities mutually terminate one another, whence Bodies consist not without Earth and Water, this humid, that dry. And for

this Reason, Animals can only live in Earth and Water, which are their Matter.

The first Affections of terminate Bodies are Hardness and Softness; hard is that which yields not to the Touch; soft the contrary. Both these are such, either absolutely, or relatively. They are made such by Concretion, which is a Kind of Exiccation.

Exiccation is of Things that are Water, or of the Nature of Water, or have Water in them, either naturally insite, or adventitious. It is done principally by Heat, accidentally by Cold. Humectation (its contrary) is the Concretion of a Vapour into Water, or liquefaction of a solid Body, as Metal. *Concretion* is, when the Humidity being removed, the dry is reduced together, and condensed, either by Cold, as in Generation of Stones; or by Heat, as in Segregation of Salt from Water. To *Concretion* is opposite, *Resolution*, which is effected by its Contraries. Those Things which are condensed by Heat only, are resolved by Cold only, and so on the contrary.

Besides these principal Affections, there are others secondary, chiefly competent to homogenous Bodies, some passive, some active.

Of passive Qualities in mix'd Bodies, there are eighteen Differences, *Concreteile*, *Eluquabile*, *Mollificabile*, *Humectabile*, *Flexible*, *Frangible*, *Impreficibile*, *Formable*, *Compressibile*, *Traçtile*, *Ductile*, *Fissile*, *Sesile*, *Unitious*, *Friabile*, *Condensabile*, *Combustibile*, *Exhalabile*, and their Contraries. From these are thus denominated, *Homimerious* mix'd Bodies, as Metals, Gold, Brass, Silver, Stone, and the like; and whatsoever is made out of these; as likewise similar Parts in Animals and in Plants, as Flesh and Bone, whereof some are more cold, which consist most of Water, others more hot, which consist most of Earth and Air.

CHAP. XIV. Of Plants and Animals.

AT the End of his *Meteors* he proposeth to speak of similar Parts, as Blood, and the like; what they are, and to what End, their Matter and Reason, but especially whence they have their Motion; next to proceed to dissimilar Parts; and lastly, to speak of those which consist thereof, as Men, Plants, and the like. Hence Patricius conjectures, that his Books of the Parts of living Creatures, did immediately succeed those of the *Meteors*, wherein he treateth (as he proposeth) of similar Parts unto the tenth Chapter of the second Book, and from thence of the Dissimilar. But to reduce his Books of living Creatures to this Method, is the less certain, for as much as many of these (besides those which treated particularly of Anatomy) have been lost, of which perhaps

were some which might better have cleared the Series; for in the Books themselves concerning Animals, there is nothing to ground it upon.

For the same Reason, it is uncertain where his Books of Plants ought to have been placed, which are lost; perhaps they might precede those of Animals; for he asserts that Plants have Souls, (contrary to the Stoicks) endued with vegetative Power; that they live, even tho' cut asunder, as Insects, whereby two or more are made of one; that the Substance they receive by Aliment and the ambient Air, is sufficient for the Preservation of their natural Heat.

As concerning Animals, we have, Of their governing, one Book. Of their History, ten Books. Of their Parts, four Books. Of their Generation, five Books. So exquisitely hath he treated upon this Subject, as cannot well be expressed by an Abridgment, and therefore we shall omit it; the rather because little or nothing was done herein by the Academicks or Stoicks, a Collation with whom is the principal Design of this Summary.

CHAP. XV.

Of the Soul.

THE * Knowledge of the Soul conduceth much to all Truth, and especially to Physick, for the Soul is as it were the Principle of animate Things. Animate Things differ from inanimate chiefly by Motion and Sense.

† Whence the ancient Philosophers defined the Soul by these; Democritus, the Pythagoreans, Anaxagoras by Motion; Empedocles and Plato by Knowledge; others by both; others by Incorporiety, or a rare Body; Thales, something that moveth; Diogenes, Air; Heraclitus, Exhalation, an immortal Substance; Hippo, Water; Critus, Blood.

‡ The Soul doth not move itself, as Democritus held; for whatsoever is moved, is moved by another. Again, if the Soul were moved *per se*, it would be in Place, and it were capable of being moved violently, and it would be of the same Nature with the Body, and might return into the Body after the Separation. Neither is the Soul moved by itself, but from its Objects; for if it were moved essentially, it might recede from its Essence. The Soul therefore is not moved *per se*, but by Accident only, according to the Motion of the Body.

§ The Soul is not Harmony, (a proportionate Mixture of Contraries) for then there must be more Souls in the same Body, according to the different Constitution of its Parts. But tho' we commonly say, the Soul grieveth, hopeth, feareth, &c. we are not to understand that the Soul is moved, but only that these are from the Soul in the Body that is moved; some by local Motion of the Organs, others by Alteration of them. To say, the Soul is

angry, is no more proper than to say the builds; for it is the Man that is angry by the Soul, otherwise the Soul were liable to Age, Decay, and Infirmary, as well as the Organs of the Body.

¶ Neither is the Soul a rare Body, consisting of Elements, for then it would understand nothing more than the Elements themselves; neither is there a Soul diffused through all Things, as Thales held, for we see there are many Things inanimate.

Some from the different Functions of the Soul argue, that there are more Souls than one in Man, or that the Soul is divisible, the supreme intellectual Part placed in the Head, the irascible in the Heart, concupiscible in the Liver: But this is false, for the Intellect is not confined to any Part of the Body, as not being corporeal, nor organical, but immaterial and immortal.

• The Soul is the first Entelechy of a natural organical Body, having Life potentially. *First, Entelechy.* Entelechy is twofold, the first is the Principle of Operation, as Science; the second, the Act itself. *Of a Natural,* [not of an artificial Body, as a Tower or Ship. *Organical Body.*] that is, endued with Instruments for Operation, as the Eye for Seeing, the Ear for Hearing; even Plants have simple Organs. *Having Life potentially* as it were in itself, for potentially is less than actually; actually, as in him that wakes; potentially, as in him that is asleep.

The Soul is otherwise defined, that by which we first live, feel, and understand; whence appeareth, there are three Faculties of the Soul, nutritive, sensitive, intellectual; the inferior comprehended by the superior potentially, as a Triangle by a Quadrangle.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the nutritive Faculty.

THE † first and most common Faculty of the Soul, is the Nutritive; by which Life is in all Things, the Acts and Operation thereof are to be generated, and to take Nourishment.

Nutritment is received either towards Nutrition or Augmentation. Nutrition is the Operation of the nutritive Faculty, conducing to the Subsistence itself of the animate Being, Augmentation is the Operation of the nutritive Faculty, whereby the animate Body increaseth to perfect Magnitude. In Nutrition are considered, the Soul nourishing, the Body nourished, and the Food by which the Nourishment is made; hereto is required a natural Heat, which is in all living Creatures. The Aliment is both contrary, or unlike, and like to the Body nourished; as it is undigested, we say Nourishment is by the contrary; as altered by Digestion, like is nourished by its like.

C H A P. XVII.

Of the sensitive Faculty.

THE *sensitive* Faculty of the Soul is that by which Sense is primarily in Animals. Sense is a Mutation in the Organ caused by some sensible Object. It is not sensible of itself, nor of its Organ, nor of any interior Thing. To reduce it to act, is requisite some external sensible Object, for Sense cannot move itself, being a passive Power, as that which is combustible cannot burn itself.

Of sensible Objects there are three Kinds. *Proper*, which is perceived by one Sense without Error, as Colour in respect of Sight. *Common* which is not proper to any one, but perceived by all. *Accidental*, which, as such, doth not affect the Sense.

Sense is either *external* or *internal*, the external are five, *Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Touching, Tasting*.

The Object of *Seeing* is Colour, and something without a Name that glitters in the dark, as the Scales of Fish, Glow-worms, and the like. Colour is the Motive of that which is actually perspicuous; nothing therefore is visible without Light. Perspicuous is that which is visible, not by itself, but by some other Colour or Light, as Air, Water, Glass. Light, in the Act of a perspicuous Thing, as it is perspicuous. It is not Fire, nor a Body, for then two Bodies would be in the same Place.

To Sight and all other Senses is requisite a *Medium* and convenient Distance. The Object first effects the *Medium*, then the Organ.

The Object of *Hearing* is sound. Sound is made by Collision of two Bodies, hard, smooth, and hollow, in a *Medium*, as Air or Water, swiftly and vehemently before the *Medium* be dissipated.

Echo is a reflex Sound, when the Air, gathered together and forced into a Vessel, or some Place which hindereth its Diffusion and Progress, reverts as a Bale against a Wall. Sound is always reflected, tho' not always perceptibly, as Light also, otherwise all Places would be dark, which were not directly opposite to the Sun, or some lucid Body.

Sound is made by that which moveth the Air, and continually stirreth it, till it arrive at the Organ, wherein there is an insite, connatural, animate, immoveable Air, which being moved by the external Air, yieldeth the Sense of *Hearing*. Hence it cometh, that we can hear under Water, for the Water cannot get into this Air, because of the winding narrow Passages in the Ear; if it do get in, or the Membrane which containeth this Air be otherwise broken, it causeth Deafness.

Voice is the Impulsion of Air attracted by Respiration, and forced against the vocal Artery by the Soul, which is in the Lungs, with some Intent

of Signification. Voice therefore is not proper to all Animals, but to such only as have Blood and Breath. Fishes therefore have not Voice.

The Object of *Smelling* is Odour. This Sense is not so perfect in Men as in other Creatures, whence Men perceive not Odours, unless with Delight or Dislike, when they are so strong as to excite one of these. This Defect proceedeth from the Organ of Smelling, which in us is more obtuse. The *Medium* of Smelling is Air and Water, for Fishes smell. Hence all living Creatures smell not after the same Manner; they which breathe, smell by drawing in the Air, the rest not so, because of the different Accommodation of the Organ. Those therefore which smell by drawing in the Air, cannot smell under Water. *Odour* consists generally in dry, as *Sapor* in humid. The Organ of Smelling is dry potentially, as the Object is actually.

The Object of *Taste* is *Sapor*. Whatsoever is gustable, is tactable, and humid, either actually, or at least potentially. Dry Things are subject to Taste, as they are potentially humid, and melt as Salt. The Taste perceiveth that which is gustable and that which is ingustable, as the Sight, Darknes, the Hearing, Silence; for every Sense perceiveth the Presence and Absence of its Object. That which is potable is perceived by the Touch, as humid by the Taste, as having *Sapor*. The Tongue tastes not that which is dry, because the Organ of Taste must be such potentially, as the Object is actually; but without Humidity nothing is gustable. The Kinds of *Sapors* are sweet and bitter; to sweet are referred unctuous; to bitter salt. The mean are sharp, piccant, acid, acute; gustable is that which moveth the Taste, and reduceth it to act.

The Objects of *Touch* are the primary Qualities, the Organ is that Part which is potentially that which the Object is in act; for that which is like, cannot suffer from its like. We feel not Things of equal Heat, Cold, Hardness, or Softness. The Flesh is the *Medium*; the first Sensory is something more internal. Herein Touch and Taste differ from the other Senses, whose Objects are at greater Distance. Touch perceiveth Things tactile and not tactile.

All these Senses receive sensible Species without Matter, as Wax the Impression of a Seal without the Gold. The Organ or Sensory is that in which the sensitive Faculty primarily exists; a vehement Object destroyeth the Organ.

That there are no more external Senses than these five, is manifest, in that there are no more in perfect Animals; neither is there any Need of a sixth Sense to perceive common Objects, which every Sense discerns by Accident, as Motion, Figure.

The Act of the Object, and the Act of the Sense

itself, as Sonation and Audition, are really the same, differ only intentionally. This Act is generally in the Sensitive, not in the Subject.

* Sensible Qualities are finite, as being bounded by Extremes and their Contraries, divisible by Accident into infinite, according to the Division of their continuous Subject.

† In Sensibles, some are potentially sensible, as a Part joined to the whole; others actually, as the Whole itself, or a Part separated from the whole. But of separate Parts some are so little, that Sense cannot actually perceive them, by Reason of their want of due Magnitude.

‡ Sounds and Odours are successively generated in the Medium, and by Degrees deduc'd to the Organ; but Light is produced in an Instant in the Medium, not carried through it by local Motion.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Common Sense.

EVERY external Sense perceiveth the Differences of its own Object, as Sight judgeth of black and white; but the Differences of divers Objects cannot be perceived by the same Sense; there is therefore a *common Sense*, which judgeth the Actions of external Sense, and the Differences of sensible Objects. The Judgment being of a sensible Object, must be done by Sense, and by one Sense only; for, if there were more, one would object one Object apart, the other another, and consequently could not judge between them. For that which judgeth must have Knowledge of all that whereof it judgeth, which no exterior Sense can afford, as being confined to its proper Object.

Common Sense judgeth contrary or different Sensibles in the same Instant, for it discerneth together sweet and black, bitter and sweet. Hence it is like the Centre of a Circle, which in divers Respects is called one, and many. It is one, as all the external Senses are united in it; many, as it is the Fountain and Judge of them.

§ Sense differs from Intellect; for Sense is in all living Creatures; Intellect in few. Sense erreth not about its proper Object, but is always true; Intellect often erreth by false Opinions and Habits.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Phantasy and Cogitation.

FROM Sense is derived *Phantasy* and *Cogitation*. *Phantasy* differs from *Sense* and *Intellect*, tho' it exist not without a previous Knowledge of *Sense*, as neither doth *Cogitation*, which is in Action of the *Intellect*, comprehending *Science*, *Opinion*, and *Prudence*.

The Act of *Phantasy* differs from *Cogitation*, for

we fancy Things false, and at our own Pleasure; but we think only what is true, and like unto Truth, and that not as we please our selves, but as the Thing seemeth. Moreover, when we think that Things are ill or good, we are moved with Fear, Joy, Hope; but when we fancy, only without Application of Judgment, we are not moved no more than we are frightened at a Picture.

Phantasy is not properly *Sense*; *Phantasy* is in him that sleepeth, *Sense* doth not; *Sense* was with us from our Birth, *Phantasy* not; *Sense* is in all Animals, *Phantasy* is not; *Sense* is true, *Phantasy* often false; *Sense* is only of Things present, *Phantasy* of the Absent likewise.

Phantasy is not *Science* or *Intellect*, for that is always of Things true and real, *Phantasy* often is of Things false; *Phantasy* is not *Opinion*, for *Opinion* is followed by Faith, *Phantasy* is not.

Phantasy is a Motion in Animals from *Sense* in act, by which Motion they are variously affected, and conceive Things sometimes true, and sometimes false. The Error of *Phantasy* ariseth from the Error of the *Senses*; *Phantasy*, therefore, is of near Affinity with *Sense*; for, tho' it be not *Sense*, yet it exists not without *Sense*; or in Things that have no *Sense*. It is derived *ἐκ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς* from Light; for Sight, the most excellent of Senses, cannot act without Light.

Many Things are done by Animals, according to *Phantasy*, either because they have not *Intellect*, as Beasts, or that *Intellect* is obscured in them.

CHAP. XX.

Of Memory and Reminiscence.

FROM *Phantasy* proceed *Memory*, which is of Things past, as *Sense* is of the present Opinion of the Future. *Sense* and *Intellection* are necessarily previous to *Memory*. Hence those Animals only, which have Sense of Time, remember as Horses and Dogs, yet *Memory* is not without *Phantasy*, even not that *Memory* which is of intelligible Things; for he that remembereth, is sensible that he first saw, heard, or learned what he remembereth. *Memory*, therefore, is reducible *per se* to *Phantasy*, as being of *Phantasms*, to *Intellect* only by Accident. Hence, in the same Part of the Soul, wherein *Phantasy* exists, resideth likewise *Memory*, for if it were placed only in the *Intellectual Faculty*, it would not be competent to Beasts, which we see it is.

Memory is made by Impression of some Image by the *Sense* upon the Soul. Hence they, who retain not the Image and Figure of Sense, either by continual Motion, or excessive Humidity, as Children, or Drought, as old Men, remember not. To *Memory*, therefore, is required a moderate Temperature of the Brain, yet more inclined to dry.

o De sensu. cap. 6.

p Ibid.

q Ibid.

r Lib. 3. cap. 2.

s De Anima, lib. 3. cap. 3.

t Cap. 1.

u Lib. de Memor. & Rem. cap. 1.

* *Reminiscence* is not a Resumption or Assumption of *Memory*, but differs specifically from both these, for *Beasts* have not *Reminiscence*, tho' they have *Memory*, *Reminiscence* being made by Discourse and diligent Disquisition collecting one Thing from another by a continued Series and Order, until at last we call that to Mind which we had forgotten.

C H A P. XXI.

Of Sleep and Waking.

TO *Sense* belongeth *Sleep* and *Waking*; for those animate Things which want *Sense*, neither sleep nor wake, as *Plants*. *Sleep* is an Immobility, and *Band*, as it were, of *Sense*; *Waking* is a Solution and Remission of *Sense*.

The chief Seat of *Sleep* is the *Common Sense*, which being bound up by *Sleep*, all the exterior Senses, whereof this is the common Centre, are bound up likewise, and restrained for the Rest and Health of the Animal, which is the End of *Waking* also.

Every Impotence of *Sense* is not *Sleep*, but only that which is caused by Evaporation of the Aliment. Hence we are most subject to *Sleep* after Meat, for then much humid Vapour ascends, which first maketh the Head heavy by Consistence there, then descends and repels the Heat, whereby is induced *Sleep*. That *Sleep* is made in this manner, is evident from all foporiferous Things, as *Popp*, which causeth Heaviness in the Head, by sending up Vapours. Labour produceth *Sleep*, by dispersing the Humours, whence produceth Vapour. Drunken Men and Children are subject to sleep much, melancholy Persons little, for they are so cold within, that the Vapour exaleth not, especially they being of a dry Constitution. *Sleep*, therefore, is a Recession of the Heat inward, with a natural kind of Circumobistence.

C H A P. XXII.

Of Dreams.

Dreaming is an Affection of the sensory Part, in as much as it is Fantastick; a *Dream* is an Apparition or Phantasm seen in Sleep.

After the Functions of the external Senses, there remain their Motions and Similitudes induced by their Objects into their Organs; these occurring in Sleep, cause *Dreams*, but not at all Times, nor at every Age, for their Species shew not themselves, but upon Cessation of the Humours. Hence *Dreams* are not immediately after *Sleep*, nor in Infants soon after their Birth, for then there is too great Commotion, by reason of the Alimentary Heat. As therefore in troubled Water no Image appeareth, or if any, much distorted; but when it is calm

the Image is rendered clearly; so when there is a Tumult and Agitation of the Humours, there are no Images presented, or those dreadful, such as are the Dreams of melancholy and sick Persons; but when the Blood passeth smoothly, and the Humours are settled, we have pure and pleasing Dreams; a Dream therefore is a Phantasm, caused by Motion of Sensibles already perceived by *Sense*, occurring to Animals in Sleep.

C H A P. XXIII.

Of the Intellective Faculty.

THE third Faculty of the Soul is the *Intellective*, proper to Man. *Intellect* is that Part of the Soul whereby it knoweth and understandeth. It is two-fold, *Patient* and *Agent*. *Patient Intellect* is that by which *Intellect* becometh all Things, for Intellection is like *Sense*; *Sense* is by Passion from a sensible Object, *Intellect* from an Intellectual. The Properties of *Patient Intellect* are these; *It is void of Corruptive Passion*; it is apt for Reception of Species, it is that Species potentially; it is not mix'd with the Body; it hath no Corporeal Organs; it is the Place of Species.

That there is also an *Agent Intellect*, is manifest; for in whatsoever kind, there is something that is potentially all of that kind, there is something likewise which is the efficient Cause of all in that kind; this is the *Agent Intellect*, a Cognoscentive Power which enlighteneth Phantasms and the *Patient Intellect*. The Properties thereof are, that it is separable from the Body, Immortal and Eternal; that it is not mix'd with the Body; that it is void of Passion; that it is ever in Act; but the *Patient Intellect* is mortal, which is the Cause of Forgetfulness.

The Action of the *Intellect* is two-fold; one, *Intellection of Indivisibles*, in which is neither Truth nor Falshood, as all simple Apprehensions; the other *Complex*, when we compound and unite Notions by Affirmation or Negation. This is always either true or false, the other neither. The Simple is Precedent to the Complex.

Intellect in Act is either *Practick* or *Theoretick*. As a sensible Object reduceth the sensible Faculty from Power to act, so doth an intellectual Faculty, and as the Operation of *Sense* is threefold, *Simple Apprehension*, Judgment if it be good or ill, and lastly, *Appetition* or *Aversion*, according to that Perception; so likewise is the Operation of the *Practick Intellect* three-fold; First, it is moved by Phantasms, as *Sense* is by external Sensibles. Secondly, it judgeth the Object to be good or ill, by Affirmation or Negation. Thirdly, it moveth the Will to pursue or shun it, whence it is call'd *Practick*. This *Practick Intellect* is moved as well when the sensi-

w Cap. 4.

x Lib. de Som. & Vigil. cap. 1.

y Cap. 2.

z Cap. 3.

a Lib. de infom.

b De Anim. lib. 3. cap. 4.

c Cap. 5.

d Cap. 6.

e Cap. 8.

ſible Object is abſent, as when it is preſent, only excited by the Phantaſy. The Object of the Theoretick Intellect is true or falſe; of the Practick, good or ill.

The Rational Soul, in ſome manner, is every Thing; for that which actually knoweth, is in ſome manner the ſame with the Thing known.

C H A P. XXIV.

Of the Motive Faculty.

BEſides the nutritive, ſenſitive, and intellective Faculties, there is alſo a motive Faculty in animate Creatures. That it is not the ſame with the nutritive is manifeſt, inasmuch as it proceeds from Imagination and Apprehenſion, which Plants had not, neither have they Organs fit for Motion, which Nature would have given them if they have this Power. That it is not the ſame with the ſenſitive, appears, in that ſome Animals which have Senſe, have not the Power, as Zoophytes, which have not the Organs fit for this Motion. Neither is it the ſame with the Theoretick Intellect, for that judgeth not as to Action: But progreſſive Motion is the Action of an Animal flying Ill, or purſuing Good.

The Principles of local Motion in Animals, are the practick Intellect (under which is comprehended Phantaſy) and Appetite. Theſe two direct and impel the Motive Faculty to Action: Intellect and Phantaſy by directing what is to be ſhunned, what to be embraced; Appetite by ſhunning or embracing it. Appetite is the chief Principle thereof; for that may move without Intellect, as in Beaſts, and many times in Men, who deſert their Reaſon to follow their Pleaſure: But Intellect never moveth without Appetite, that is, Will; for Appetite is the Principle of all Motion, Honelt and Diſhoneſt; Intellect only of honeſt Motion.

In Man, Appetite is two-fold; Will, which followeth the Judgment of Reaſon; and ſenſual Appetite, iraiſible or conſcupiſcible, which followeth Senſe and Phantaſy.

In the Motion of Animals, three Things are conſidered; Firſt, that which moveth, and that is two-fold; the Appetible Object, which moveth the Appetite as a final Cauſe, not as an efficient; and the Appetite itſelf, which being moved by the appetible Object, moveth the Animal. Secondly, by what it moves, which is the Heart of the Animal, by which Inſtrument the appetible Object moveth it. Thirdly, that which is moved, the Animal itſelf, perfect.

Inſects are moved locally, as perfect Animals are, and conſequently by the ſame Principles, Appetite and Phantaſy: But this Phantaſy is imperfect, diffuſed through the whole Body, as appeareth by their uncertain Motion only towards preſent occurrent Ob-

jects. That they have Appetite is manifeſt, inasmuch as they are ſenſible of Pain and Pleaſure.

Beaſts have ſenſitive Phantaſy only; Rational Creatures, deliberative, which compareth many things conducing to ſome foreknown End, and chooſeth the moſt expedient. Yet ſometimes the Senſitive Appetite in Man overſwayeth the Rational; but by the Order of Nature, the Will, which is Rational, ought, as being the Superior to it, to overſway the Senſitive. Thus there are three Motions, one of the Will commanding, another of the Senſitive Appetite reſiſting, and a third of the Body obeying. But when the ſenſitive over-ruleth, there are only two Motions, for the Will reſiſts not, but is deceived.

C H A P. XXV.

Of Life and Death.

Generation and Diſſolution are common to all living Creatures, though all are not produced and diſſolved in the ſame Manner.

The Generation of a living Creature is the firſt Conjunction of the nutritive Soul with the natural Heat.

Life is the Permanence of that Soul with the ſaid Heat.

Youth is the Encreaſe of the firſt Refrigerative Part, Age the Decrease thereof, *ἀγών*, the conſtant and perfect Life which is betwixt both.

As long as an animate Creature liveth, it hath natural Heat within itſelf; and as ſoon as that faileth, dieth. The Principle of this Heat is in the Heart. If it be extinguished in any other Part, the Animal may live; but if in the Heart, it cannot.

This Heat is extinguished two Ways; Firſt by Conſumption, when it faileth of itſelf; Secondly, by Extinction, from ſome contrary, as in violent Death, the Cauſe is the ſame in both, Defect of Aliment, which in the living Creature is its Vital Moiſture, as Fire wanting Refrigeration, groweth more violent, and ſoon conſumeth the Humidity, which being gone, itſelf muſt of Neceſſity go out.

Refrigeration therefore is neceſſary to the Conſervation of the natural Heat. Plants are refrigerated by the ambient Air, and by Aliment: Their natural Heat is extinguished by exceſſive Cold, and dried up by exceſſive Heat. Animals which live in the Air, or in the Water, are refrigerated by the Air or Water; ſome by breathing, others without.

Death, according to the Extinction of natural Heat, is two-fold, violent or natural; violent, when the Cauſe is extrinſical; natural, when the Principle thereof is in the animate Creature. For that Part whereon Life dependeth (the Lungs) is ſo ordered by Nature, that it cannot perform its Office for ever. Death therefore cometh from Defect of Heat, when,

through want of Refrigeration, the Radical Humidity is consumed and dried up. Refrigeration faileth naturally, when by Progress of Time, the Lungs in Creatures that have Breath, the Gills in Fishes grow so hard, that they are unapt for Motion.

Old Men die easily, as having but little natural Heat; and without Pain, because their Dissolution comes not from any violent Affection.

The Lives of living Creatures, as well of the same, as of divers Species, differ in Length; the longest Life, most commonly, is that of some Plants, as the Palm and Cypress; that of Creatures which have Blood, rather than the Bloodless; that of Terrestrial Creatures rather than the Aquatile; that of those which have great Bodies, as of Elephants, rather than those of little.

The Causes of long Life are, First, the Quantity and Quality of the vital Moisture; if it be much and fat, not easily dried up nor congealed. Secondly, Natural Heat, which suffereth not that Humour to be congealed. Thirdly, a due Proportion betwixt this Heat and that Moisture. Fourthly, fewness of Excrements, for Excrements are contrary to Nature,

and sometimes corrupt Nature itself, sometimes a Part.

Salacious Creatures, or laborious, grow soon old, by reason of Exsiccation. For the same Reason Men are shorter lived than Women, but more active.

In hot Countries animals Creatures are larger and live longer than in cold. Those Animals which have little or no Blood, either are not at all produced in the Northern Parts, or soon die.

Both Plants and Animals, if they take not Aliment, die; for the natural Heat, when the Aliment faileth, consumeth the Matter itself wherein it is, the Vital Moisture.

Aquatile Creatures are shorter lived than the Terrestrial, and the Bloodless than those that have Blood, because their Humidity is more waterish, and consequently more apt to be congealed and corrupted.

Plants live long, as having less of waterish Moisture, which therefore is not so apt to be congealed. The Largeness of the upper Parts, as well in Plants as Animals, is a Sign of long Life, because it argues much natural Heat. The upper Part of a Plant is the Root, not the Boughs.

The THIRD PART.

CHAP. I.

ETHICK.

WE come next to the Moral Part of Philosophy, including *Ethick*, *Oeconomick*, and *Politick*. Of the first, we have ten Books of Aristotle's, written to his Son *Nicomachus*; two Books, called his *great Ethick*; one of *Virtues*. Of *Oeconomick*, two Books; of *Politick* eight. We shall not have Recourse to these for an Account of his Doctrine in this kind, being furnished by *Stobæus* with a Summary of what he, and the rest of the Peripateticks affirmed in Morality.

Ethick (saith he) is so called *ἔθος*, from *Custom*, for those Things, the Principles and Seeds whereof we receive from Nature, are to be perfected by Custom and right Institution. Hence *Ethick* pertaineth only to living Creatures, and particularly to Man; for the rest acquire Custom, not by Reason, but Necessity, Man by Reason.

Of the Soul, one Part is *Rational*, the other *Irrational*; the rational Part is *Judicative*, the irrational *Appetitive*; of the rational that which is *Theoretical*, conversant in divine Things, is called *Science*; that which is *Practick*, conversant in human Actions, is called *Counsel*. Of the latter, one Part is *concupiscible*, another *irascible*.

In like manner *Virtue* is two-fold, rational and irrational, consisting in Theory and Practice. E-

thick *Virtue* consisteth not in Science, but in Election of Goods.

Virtue is perfected by three Things; *Nature*, *Custom*, and *Reason*. For a Man differing from other Creatures, both in Body and Mind, as being a Species placed between divine Essences and irrational Creatures, hath some Affinity to both; in what is rational, and agrees with the Soul, he is allied to the Divinity; in what is irrational, proper to the Body, he agrees with the irrational. Both these desire Perfection by Reason; and First, he desireth to be, for this is naturally insite in him. Hence he affecteth Things that are according to Nature, and is averse from Things contrary to his Nature. He endeavoureth to preserve *Health*, *Pleasure*, *Life*, these being according to Nature, expetible in themselves, and good. On the contrary, he shunneth *Sickness*, *Pain*, and *Death*, as being repugnant to Nature, and therefore ill, and to be avoided. We love our own Bodies, we love our own Souls, their Parts, their Faculties, their Acts. The Principle of Appetite, Office, and Virtue, is a providential Care of these. If Error did not happen concerning Things expetible and avoidable, but that we lived continually participant of Good, and void of Ill, we should not enquire in these for a true

a Cap. 23. o Lib. de km. & levit. cap. 4.

p Cap. 5. q Cap. 6.

r Eclog. Ethic.

N n 2

Election.

Election. But being Things expetible and avoidable, through Ignorance often deceived, sometimes rejecting the Good, sometimes admitting the Ill for Good, we necessarily have Recourse to *Conscience of Judgment*, which having obtained convenient to Nature, we call it, from the Excellency of its Function, *Virtue*, admiring and honouring it above all Things. For Actions, and those which are called Offices, proceed from Election of Things according to Nature, and Rejection of Things repugnant to Nature. Herein consist *right Actions* and *Sins*; even on these dependeth almost the whole Reason of *Election*, as we shall triefly demonstrate.

That Children are expetible to Parents, not only for Use or Benefit, but also in *themselves*, is most evident. There is no Man so cruel and savage, who doth not rather desire his Children after his Death should live happily and well, than otherwise. By this Affection dying Persons make Wills, providing even for the unborn, choosing Tutors and Guardians to assist them. And as *Children* are loved for themselves, so likewise we love *Parents, Brethren, Wife, Kindred, Acquaintance, Countrymen*, for themselves, as having some Interest in them by Nature. For, Man is a sociable communicative Creature; and tho' of Friendships some are more remote than others, it is nothing to the Purpose, for all Friendship is for its own Sake, and not for Use only. And if Friendship with Countrymen be expetible in itself, it will likewise be expetible in itself with all Men; for all those who benefit others, are so affected towards them, that they do most Actions for the Office Sake. Who will not free any Man from a wild Beast, if he be in his Power? Who will not direct a Man that is out of his Way? Who will not relieve a Man that is ready to starve, or direct a Man in a Desert to a Spring? Who desires not to be well spoken of after Death? Who abhors not these Speeches as unnatural?

*When I am dead, let Earth be mix'd with Fire,
I care not, so I now have my Desire.*

It is manifest therefore, that we have a natural Good-will and Friendship towards all Mankind, as a Thing being expetible in itself, and consonant to Reason.

*The Race of Gods and Men is one,
From Nature both alike begun.*

Love of all Mankind being thus common to us, much more evidently it is expetible in itself towards those whom Conversation hath made our Friends. A Friend, Friendship, and Good-will, are expetible in themselves.

In like manner, *Praise* is expetible in itself; for we contract Society with those who praise us; and if Praise, *Glory* likewise, which is nothing but the Praise of many Persons.

Now seeing that *external Goods* are expetible in themselves, much more are the Goods of Soul and Body expetible in themselves. For, if Man be expetible

in himself, the Parts of Man must likewise be expetible in themselves. The Parts of Man in general are *Soul* and *Body*; the *Body* therefore is expetible in itself. Why should the *Body* of another Person be dear to us, and not our own? Or why should our *Body* be dear to us, and not the Parts and Functions thereof? *Health* therefore, *Strength*, *Beauty*, *Swiftness*, *sound Sense*, and the rest, are expetible in themselves; for none of ordinary Capacity would chuse to be deformed or maimed, tho' no Inconvenience would happen thereupon; so that Deformity, even without any Inconvenience, seemeth justly avoidable. And if Deformity be avoidable in itself, *Beauty* is expetible, not for Use only, but in itself. For, that Beauty pleaseth is manifest, in as much as all have a natural Inclination (besides that of Conversation) to such as are beautiful, and endeavour to confer Benefits on them, so as it seemeth to procure Benevolence. In this respect therefore Beauty is judged expetible in itself, Deformity avoidable in itself. It is the same in *Health* and *Sickness*, *Strength* and *Weakness*, *Activity* and *Inactivity*, *Sense* and *Privation of Sense*.

And if *corporeal Goods* are expetible in themselves, and their contrary Evils avoidable, the Parts and Virtues of the Soul must necessarily be expetible also. For *Virtue* beginning, as we said, from the *Body*, and *external Goods*, and reflecting upon itself, and considering how much more near Relation it hath to the Soul, contracteth a nearer Affinity with it. So that the Virtues of the Soul are much to be preferred before those of the *Body*, which is easily collected from what hath been said. For, if *corporeal Health* be expetible in itself, much more is *Temperance*, which freeth us from the Fury of the Passions. And if *corporeal Strength* ought to be numbered amongst Goods, much more ought *Magnanimity*, by which the Soul is strengthened. And if *corporeal Beauty* be expetible in itself, much more is that of the Soul, *Justice*.

In like manner is it with the Virtues. For, there are three Kinds of *Goods*, which tho' different have some Kind of Analogy. That which in the *Body* is called *Health*, in the Soul is called *Temperance*, and in *Externals*, *Riches*. What in the *Body* is *Strength*, in the Soul is *Magnanimity*, in *Externals* *Power*. What in the *Body* is *Vigour of Sense*, in the Soul is *Prudence*, in *Externals*, *Felicity*. What in the *Body* is *Beauty*, in the Soul is *Justice*, in *Externals* *Friendship*.

There are three Kinds of Goods expetible in themselves, those concerning the *Soul*, those concerning the *Body*, and the *External*; but especially those of the Soul, for the Soul is more excellent than the *Body*.

Yet tho' corporeal and external Virtues be inferior to those of the Soul, they are not to be neglected, partly, as being expetible in themselves, partly, as conducing to civil, sociable and contemplative Life; for

for Life is defined by civil, sociable and contemplative Actions; *Virtus* (according to this *Sect*) not being a Lover of itself, but communicative and civil. For when we say, *Virtue* is nearest allied to itself, the Desire of the Knowledge of Truth necessarily followeth it, so as wise Men may rightly part with their Life, and Fools rightly preserve theirs; since that to those who are perfect, it is an equal Thing to depart this Life or not.

The Excellency of *Virtue* is much increas'd by corporeal and external Goods; yet, the End cannot any Way be completed by them. The Function therefore of *Virtue* is *Beatitude*, by successful Actions. Corporeal and external Goods are said to be efficient of *Beatitude*, for as much as they confer something thereto, not that they complete it; for *Beatitude* is Life. Life consists of Actions, but those can neither be reckoned amongst Actions nor Functions.

Hereupon comes in *Benevolence, Grace, Humanity, Love of Children and Brethren*, of our Country, Parents, *Benevolence of Kinsfolk, Friendship, Equality*, and the whole Company of Virtues; which who neglect, manifestly sin, as to expetible Goods, and avoidable Evils; and also in the Acquisition and Use of Goods, they sin in Election, by Judgment; in Acquisition, by the Manner; in Use, by Ignorance; in Election they sin, as desiring that which is not good, or preferring the lesser Good, as most prefer *pleasant* before *profitable, profitable* before *best*. In Acquisition, as not considering whence, nor in what Manner, nor how far it ought to be acquired. In Use, for as much as all Use being referred either to itself or some other, in the former they observe no Moderation, in the latter no Decency.

In these Things, tho' the Wicked sin, yet do the just behave themselves uprightly, following *Virtue* as their Leader.

In all Virtues there is *Judgment, Election* and *Action*; there is no *Virtue* without these; *Prudence* hath the first Place, the rest follow.

Virtue is called the *best Affection*, which may be collected from Induction. The *Virtue* of a Shoemaker is that by which he knoweth how to make Shoes; and of an Architect, that by which he knoweth how to build a handsome House. *Virtue* therefore is the best of Affections.

Of *Virtue* there are two Principles, as it were, *Reason* and *Passion*, which sometimes agree, sometimes disagree; for Pleasure or Grief, where Reason gets the Mastery, is called *Temperance*, when Passion, *Intemperance*; the *Harmony* and Concord of both is *Virtue*, one rightly commanding, the other obeying.

Expetible is that which attracteth the Appetite to itself; avoidable, that which repelleth it, Reason consenting thereto. Expetible and good were by the Ancients esteemed the same; for they affirmed Good to be that which all desire.

Of Goods, they say some are expetible for themselves, some for others; the first are either *honest* or *necessary*. Honest are the *Virtues* and their Functions; necessary, *Life*, and those Things which pertain unto it, as the Body with its Parts and Uses; and those which are called external Goods; as *Riches, Peace, Glory, Liberty, Friendship*, for each of these conferreth to the Use of *Virtue*.

Beatitude consisteth of good and successful Actions; wherefore it is wholly good, as playing upon Pipes is wholly artificial; for the Use of the Matter doth not take away the Goodness from *Beatitude*, as the Use of Instruments taketh not away from the Art of Medicine. Such Things as are made Use of towards this Perfection, are not to be reckoned as Parts; for they, without which the Action cannot be, are not rightly Parts thereof; for Parts conduce to the whole, the rest conduce to the End.

Good is divided into *Honest, Profitable*, and *Pleasant*; these are the Scopes of all Actions. *Beatitude* consists of all these. It is the Use of perfect *Virtue, in perfect Life, with prosperous Success*; and the Function of perfect *Life according to Virtue*; and the Use of *Virtue according to Nature, without any Impediment*.

Tho' some assert that the End is to be happy, and *Beatitude* the Scope, as Riches are good, and to be rich that which is behoveful; yet is it better to follow the Ancients, who assert the End to be that for whose Sake all Things are, itself not being for the Sake of any other, or the ultimate of Things expetible, or Life according to *Virtue*, in corporeal and external Goods, either in all or the most principal.

This being the greatest Good, useth the Ministry of the rest; for as those Things which confer hereunto are to be esteemed Goods, so those Things which resist it are Indifferents; for every good Action doth not effect *Beatitude*.

They assert *Beatitude* to be the Use of perfect *Virtue*, as holding some Virtues to be perfect, others imperfect. The Perfect are *Justice* and *Integrity*; the Imperfect are *Ingenuity* and *Progression*. The perfect agreeth with the perfect, so as the End thereof is the Function of that *Virtue* whereof no Part is wanting.

They added perfect *Life*, to shew that *Beatitude* is in Men of full Age, for a young Man is imperfect, and so is his Life. *Beatitude* therefore is in perfect Time, the longest that is appointed for us by the Gods. As one Verse makes not a Poem, nor one Step a Dance, nor one Swallow a Summer; so neither doth a short Time confer *Beatitude*, for *Beatitude* is perfect, and requireth a perfect Man and Time.

They added successful *Function of Virtue*, because the Goods of Nature are necessarily requisite to *Beatitude*; for a good Man may exercise *Virtue* in

Misery, but cannot be happy. For as *Virtue* is the only Efficient of *honest* Actions, so is *Beatitude*, of *honest*, *good* and *excellent*. Neither doth it abide amongst ill or unhappy Things, but enjoyeth the Good, nor is deprived of the Contemplation of Good, or the Conveniencies of Life.

Beatitude being the most pleasant and fairest of Things, increaseth like an Art by the Multitude of its Instruments. It is not the same in God and Man, neither is it equal amongst good Men, for it may sometimes be taken away by Oppression of Miseries. Hence it is to be doubted, whether a Man may be termed happy as long as he is alive, considering the Uncertainty of Fortune; whence *Solon* said, *Consider the End of a long Life, whether it be happy*.

Those who sleep are not participant of Beatitude, but after some Manner, as the Function of the Soul is capable of awaking.

Lastly, they added *Nature*, because every Waking of good Men is not the Use of perfect Virtue, but only that which is according to Nature, that is, free from Madness; for Madness, as well as Sleep, depriveth Men of Use, and of this Reason, and maketh them like Brutes.

As Beatitude is said to be the Use of Virtue, so is Misery of Vice; yet not so, that as this sufficeth to Misery, so that doth to Beatitude.

Life is made four and unpleasant to the Good by excessive Adversity, to the Ill even in Prosperity, because they sin more, nor can rightly be termed happy.

Having asserted Beatitude to be the chief Good, it followeth that we expound how many Ways it is taken.

Good is understood three Ways. First, for that which is the Cause of Preservation to all Beings; next, for that which is predicated of every good Thing. Lastly, for that which is expetible in itself. The first is *God*; the second the *Genus* of Goods; the third, the *End*, to which all are referred, Beatitude.

That which is expetible in itself, is said three Ways, either that for which something is done; or, for which all Things are done; or, some Part of these.

Again, of these, some are *final*, some *efficient*: Final, are the Actions proceeding according to Virtue; efficient, the Materials of expetible Things.

Of Goods, some are *Honourable*, some *Laudable*, some *Faculties*, some *Profitable*. Honourable, as *God*, our *Prince*, *Parent*. Laudable, as *Riches*, *Empire*, *Liberty*. Profitable, the Efficient, as *Health*.

Again, of Things good and expetible, some are expetible *in themselves*, some *for others*; in themselves, as the *Honourable*, *Laudable*, and *Faculties*; for others, as the *Profitable*, which effect and conserve other Things.

Again, of Things good in themselves, some are *Ends*, others *not Ends*; Ends, as *Justice*, *Virtue*, *Health*, and whatsoever consisteth of these; not Ends, as *Ingeniuty*, *Memory*, *Learning*.

Again, of Goods, some are *wholly* perfect, others *not*; of the first are *Virtue* and *Prudence*, which benefit all; of the latter, *Riches* and *Power*, which require to be used by a good Man. The same Things whereof a good Man maketh right Use, a wicked Man abuseth, as the same which a good Musician useth well, he who is ignorant of Music useth amiss. Whosoever maketh ill Use of any Thing, is hurt thereby; as, a good Horse, which is a Help to him that knoweth how to ride, hurts the unskilful Rider.

Again, of Goods, some are in the *Soul*, some in the *Body*, some *external*; in the *Soul* are *Ingeniuty*, *Art*, *Virtue*, *Wisdom*, *Prudence*, *Pleasure*; in the *Body*, *Health*, *Soundness of Sense*, *Beauty*, *Strength*, *Soundness of Limbs*, and all *Parts*, with their *Faculties* and *Functions*. External are *Riches*, *Glory*, *Nobility*, *Powers*, *Friends*, *Kindred*, *Country*. The Goods of the Soul are either conferr'd by Nature, as *Wit* and *Memory*; or acquir'd by *Diligence*, as the *Liberal Sciences*; or fall into Perfection, as *Prudence*, *Justice*, and lastly, *Wisdom*.

Again, of Goods, some may be both obtained and lost, as *Riches*; some obtain'd, but not lost, as *Felicity* and *Immortality*: Some lost, but not obtained, as *Sense* and *Life*; some neither obtain'd nor lost, as *Nobility*.

Again, of Goods, some are *only* expetible in themselves, as *Pleasure* and *Indolence*, some efficient *only*, as *Riches*; some *both* efficient and expetible in themselves, as *Virtue*, *Friends*, *Health*.

Goods are divided more Ways than these, as not belonging all to one *Genus*, but to all the ten Categories.

These Things laid down, we come next to speak more accurately concerning Virtue, which they place in both Parts of the Soul. In the *Rational Part*, *Integrity*, *Prudence*, *Wisdom*, *Memory*, and the like. In the *Irrational Part*, *Temperance*, *Justice*, *Fortitude*, and other Virtues. These (say they) may be extinguished by Excess, which they prove by Testimony of the Senses, as Things obscure by manifest. For, as by Excess or Defect of Exercise, *Health* is corrupted, but by moderate Exercise is preserved. In like manner is it in *Temperance*, *Fortitude*, and other Virtues. For, as we do call him who feareth the Thunder, mad, not valiant; so, on the contrary, he who feareth Shadows is a Coward. But he is valiant who neither feareth all Things, nor nothing. These Things encrease or extinguish Virtue; being moderate, they increase Courage; being too great, or too little, they extinguish it.

In like manner are all other Virtues extinguished by Excess or Defect, increased by *Mediocrity*.

Neither

Neither is Virtue only limited by these, but by *Pleasure* and *Grief* likewise; inasmuch as for *Pleasure* we commit Wickedness, and for *Grief* shun Good. To explain this more fully, they unfold the Nature of the Soul, wherein are seen three Things, *Passions, Faculties, Habits*. *Passions*, as *Anger, Fear, Hate, Love, Emulation, Pity*, and the like. To which is subsequent *Pleasure* or *Grief*. *Faculties*, by which we make use of *Passions*, and are angry, do emulate, and the like. *Habits* are those from which the Functions of these proceedeth rightly, or otherwise. If any Man be so disposed, that he is any upon any Occasion, he hath the Habit of *Anger*; if so, as to be angry upon no Occasion, he hath the Habit of *Stupidity*, both which are blameable. The laudable Habit is that of *Meekness*, by which we are angry in due Time and Place. Virtues therefore are Habits, by which the Functions of Passions become laudable.

All Virtue consisteth in Action; all Action is continuous. Whatsoever Things are continuous, like Magnitude, have Excess, Defect, and Mediocrity, either in relation to one another, or to us. The mean, relating to us, is in all the best, (this is not quantitative, but qualitative, and therefore is perfect; whereas the Extreams, Excess, and Defect, being contrary, are repugnant to one another, and to the Mean. But the Mean is to both Extreams (as Quality is to Inequality, greater than the least, less than the greatest. Virtue therefore is a deliberative Habit, consisting in Mediocrity, relating to ourselves.

Theophrastus having laid down some Qualities, (following his Master) endeavoureth to conclude from each of them. The Examples he alledgeth are these; Temperance, Intemperance, Stupidity, Meekness, Wrath, Indolence, Fortitude, Boldness, Timidity, Justice, Liberality, Prodigality, Avarice, Magnanimity, Pusillanimity, Arrogance, Magnificence, Ostentation. For of these Habits, some are ill, through Excess or Defect; others good, through Mediocrity. He is not temperate who desireth nothing, nor he who desireth all Things; one, like a Stoue, desireth not even natural Expetibles; the other, thro' excessive Desire, becometh intemperate. He only is temperate, who desireth honest Things with Reason, in due Time and Measure. He is not meek who is angry upon all Occasions, nor he who is angry upon none; but he who is endued with the mean Habit. He is not valiant who feareth nothing, nor God himself; nor he who feareth all Things, even his own Shadow: Nor just, who either assumeth or derogateth too much from himself, but who observeth Equality. He is not liberal who giveth away all, nor he who giveth nothing; nor magnanimous, who esteemeth himself worthy all great Things, nor he who esteemeth himself worthy none; but he who observeth a Decorum. He is not magnificent who is splendid every

where, nor he who no where; but who observeth due Time and Place.

Thus the Genus of Virtues is placed in *Mediocrity*, and mutually consequent in itself; yet, not alike in all, for Prudence is consequent to the rest in its own proper Nature; the rest are consequent to it by Accession; for he who is just, must necessarily be wise, but not on the contrary.

Of Passions and Appetites, some are good, some bad, some mean; the good are *Friendship, Benevolence, Indignation, Shame, Confidence, Compassion*; the bad, *Envy, Malevolence, Contumely*; the mean, *Grief, Fear, Anger, Pleasure, Desire*.

Every Passion is conversant in Pleasure and Grief, for which Reason, the Virtues depend upon them; but *Love of Money, Love of Pleasure, Love-Melancholy*, and the like, are Habits distinct from Vices.

Of *Love*, one kind is of *Friendship*, another of *Conjunction*, the third of both. The first is good, the second bad, the third mean.

Of *Friendship* there are four kinds; *Sodality, Affinity, Hospitality, Erotick*. Whether that of *Benevolence*, and that of *Admiration* be to be added to these, is doubtful. The first is derived from *Conversation*, the second from *Nature*, the third from *Cohabitation*, the fourth from *Affection*, the fifth from *Good-Will*, the last from some *Faculty*. Of all these, there are in general three Ends, honest, profitable, and pleasant. All Persons that are studious of *Friendship* aim at one or more of these Ends. The first *Friendship* is that which every Man hath to himself; the next to his Parent; the rest to his Friends and Neighbours: Whence Excess in the first, and Defect in the rest, ought to be avoided; that being esteemed *Self-Love*, this *Reservedness*.

Xæus is taken three ways, for a profitable Benefit, or for the profitable Return of a Benefit, or for the Remembrance of a Benefit. It is placed likewise in the Face and Speech, whence a Man is termed *gracious, luxurious, witty*.

A good Man must lead a Life conjoin'd with Virtue, whether according to the Necessity of the Times, he execute the Office of a Magistrate, or cohabit with Princes, or impose Laws, or govern some other Part of the Common-wealth. If he be not busied in any of these, he must addict himself to a popular Life, either by Contemplation, or Action, or (which is between both) Instruction: For, tho' he ought to follow the Action and Contemplation of excellent Things, yet if the Time will not allow him to use both, he may make Choice of one, and prefer the contemplative Life, yet not neglecting the Common-wealth. He shall therefore marry, to the End he may have Issue, and addict himself to chaste Love, and as Occasion requireth, drink Wine freely, and finally maintain his Life by due Observance of Virtue, and be ready to resign it, if there be Necessity, taking Care to be buried in his own Country, according to the Rites thereof.

Thus

Thus there are three kinds of Life; the *Active*, and *Contemplative*, and that which consists of *both*. As the Voluptuous is esteem'd beneath the Dignity of a Man, so is the Contemplative preferred before the rest. A good Man shall addict himself to the Government of the Common wealth, by Choice not Chance; for the Active Life is conversant in Civil Affairs. *That* Life is best which is led according to Virtue and Nature; the next is *that* which is a mean Condition, as to both; these are both expetible. But the Life which is conjoined with Vice is to be avoided. A *happy* Life differs from a *Good* in this. *The Happy is always consonant to Nature, the Good sometimes repugnant to Nature.* To the first, *Virtue only is not requisite*, to the other, *it is requisite*. A mean Life is that which is placed in Mediocrity, not destitute of Offices. *Rectitudes* in Life are according to Virtue, *Sins* according to Vice; *Offices* in the mean kind of Life.

To these Things thus declared, we must add, that Virtue is a Habit desiring mean Pleasures and Grievs, pursuing that which is honest, as it is honest. Vice is the Opposite hereto.

Wisdom is the Science of the first Causes.

Prudence a Habit examining and acting good Things, as they are good.

Fortitude a Habit betwixt Boldness and Fear.

Meekness is a mean betwixt *Wrath* and *Stupidity*.

Liberality is a mean betwixt *Prodigality* and *Penuriousness*.

Magnanimity is in the mean betwixt *Arrogance* and *Pusillanimity*.

Magnificence is the mean betwixt *Ostentation* and *Sordidness*.

Indignation is the mean betwixt *Envy* and *Malevolence*.

Gravity is the mean betwixt *Affentation* and *Contrediction*.

Modesty is the mean betwixt *Impudence* and *Baseness*.

Urbanity is the mean betwixt *Surrility* and *Rusticity*.

Friendship is the mean betwixt *Dotage* and *Enmity*.

Truth is the mean betwixt *Detraction* and *Boastfulness*.

Justice is the mean betwixt *Excess* and *Defect*.

There are other Virtues, part ranked by themselves, part under the former. As under Justice are, *ἐπιείκεια*, *δυσίτης*, *χρηστότης*, *ἐλευθεριότης*, *ἐυσυνταξία*, under Temperance *ἐννομήσια*, *ἐνσώφεια*, *αὐταξία*, *ἐν-λοχία*, *φιλιππία*, defined thus.

Εὐσιβία, is a Habit of worshipping the Gods and Demons, a mean betwixt *Atheism* and *Superstition*.

Ὀσιότης, a Habit of observing Right towards the

Gods and the Dead, a mean betwixt *ἀνοσιότης*, and something that wants a Name.

Χρηστότης, a Habit of doing well voluntarily for their own Sakes; a mean betwixt *πρόημία*, and something that wants a Name.

Ελευθεριότης, a Habit, rendering Men grateful in Society, a mean betwixt *ἀλευθεριότης*, and something that wants a Name.

Εὐσυνταξία, a Habit avoiding Injustice in Contracts; a mean betwixt *ἀσυνταξία*, and something that wants a Name, which pertaineth to *extream Right*.

Εὐνομία, a Habit of observing Order, a mean between *ἄταξία*, and something that wants a Name.

Ἀυτάρκεια, a Habit literally content with the present, a mean betwixt *πλεονεία*, and *πονηρία*.

Εὐφροσύνη, a Habit of sustaining grievous Things unconquered, a mean betwixt *ἀφροσύνη*, and *ἀεμαρτία*.

Φιλοπονία, a Habit performing excellent Things indefatigably, a mean betwixt *μαλακία*, and *μέλας-ποία*.

Lastly, *Probity* is a Virtue consisting of all the rest; it is perfect, as well because it rendereth good Things honest and profitable, as for that it desireth honest Things for their own Sake.

CHAP. II.

OECONOMICK.

HAVING thus explained the Virtues and the chief Heads of *Ethick*, it remaineth that we speak of *Oeconomick* and *Politick*, for as much as Man is by Nature a *Civil Creature*. The first Commonwealth is the lawful Congression of Man and Woman, for Procreation of Children, and Society of Life. This is call'd *Ὀμῶς*, a *Family*, it is the Ground and Beginning of a City. A Family seemeth to be a little City, for Marriage being contracted, and Children growing up one under another, and joy'd one to another, there is deduced another Family, and so a third, and a fourth. Of these is constituted *Neighbourhood* and a *City*, for many Neighbourhoods make up a City. Thus as a Family hath in it the Seeds of a City, so likewise of a Commonwealth, for in a Family there are prints of *Monarchy*, an *Aristocracy*, and a *Democracy*. The Society between Parents and Children represents a *Monarchy*; that betwixt Man and Woman an *Aristocracy*, as being contracted for Issue, mutual Comfort and Assistance. To these is added a *Servant*, appointed to be such by Nature, able for Service; but not to live of himself, requiring therefore a Master to govern him. Of all these reduced to a Community is constituted a *Family*.

^a For the Text doubtless is defective, and thus to be supplied, *μεγαλοπρεπείας δι' αὐτῶν* [ἐπινοίας] δι' μεγαλοπρεπείας, *ἐπὶ αὐτῶν* *ἐπὶ αὐτῶν* *ἐπὶ αὐτῶν*. See Arist. Nicom. 4. 2. and Meg. ino. 1. 2.

^c But Arist. otherwise placing Friendship betwixt Arrogation and Derogation.

The Government of a Family is, by Nature, given to *Men*, for the Counsel of *Women* is weaker; *Children* are not yet arrived to it, *Servants* never can. The whole Ordering therefore of a Family depends upon the Man; the whole Prudence of *Oeconomy* therefore is in Man. This is partly *Paternal*, partly *Nuptial*, partly *Herile*, partly *Acquisitive*. For, as an Army requirith *Provision*, a City, *Merchandize*; Art, *Instruments*; to a Family Necessaries, as well for common Life as Convenience. Of these the Master of the Family takes the first Care, how honestly to encrease his Revenues, and moderate his Expences. He, as being the Head of the Family, ought to be skilful in many Things, as in *Agriculture*, *Grafting*, *Metals*, whereby he may advantage himself without doing Injury to others. Of *Acquisition*, there are two kinds, one better than the other; that by *Nature*, this by *Art*.

CHAP. V. POLITICK.

THUS much concerning *Oeconomick*. We come next to speak in short of *Politick*.

First then, *Cities* are constituted as well for the natural Propensity of Man to Society, as for Utility. A City is the most perfect Society. A Citizen is he who is concern'd in the Magistracy. A City is a compleat Number of such Persons, which proceedeth so far, as that it be not a Disagreeing within itself, nor contemptible, but may conveniently provide for Life, and defend itself against Enemies.

Oeconomical Prudence is one kind, *Legislative* another, *Political* a third, *Military* a fourth.

A City is governed either by one Man, or some few, or all; and each of these either rightly, or unjustly; rightly, when the Princes respect the Common Good; unjustly, when they consider their own Private Interest. The Right are, *Monarchy*, *Aristocracy*, *Democracy*; the Unjust, *Tyranny*, *Oligarchy*, *Ochlocracy*. There is also a mix'd Government, consisting of the good Kinds. And whereas a Common-wealth is often changed into better or worse; that is best, which is guided according to

Virtue; that worst, which is according to Vice.

They who command, or advise, or judge, in *Democracy*, are taken out of all, either by Suffrage or Lot. In *Oligarchy*, out of the Richer; in *Aristocracy*, out of the Best.

Sedition in Cities, is either according to Reason or Interest; the First, when *Equals* are reduced to unequal Extremities; the Second, for Honour, Power, or Gain.

Common-wealths are overthrown, either by Force or Fraud. They last longest which respect the publick Utility.

Courts of *Judicature*, *Processes*, *Pleas*, and *Magistracies*, are ordered according to the Forms of every Common-wealth. The most general Commands are *Priesthood*, *Generalship*, *Admiralty*, *ναυαρχία*, *ἀρχιεπισκοπή*, *γενναρχία*, *πολιτονομία*, *ἐκκλησία*, *ἀγορά*, *τμήσις*, *πολιτονομία*, *ἐκκλησία*, whereof some relate to Cities, others to Havens and Traffick.

The Office of a Common-wealths-man, is to reform a Common-wealth, which is much harder than to erect one; and to divide the Common People into two Parts, one for necessary Offices, the other for Convenient. *Mechanicks*, *Husbandmen*, and *Merchants*, are for the necessary sort, continually serving the Common-wealth; but *Soldiers* and *Counsellors*, who are Servants for Virtue, and perform noble Things, are the more excellent.

Old Men are most proper to be Counsellors, and also Priests to perform the sacred Rites; young Men for War. This Order is exceeding ancient, first constituted by the *Egyptians*, who, amongst other Things excellently disposed, appointed the Temples of the Gods to be built in the highest Places, and the Lands of private Persons to be disposed, partly at the Confines of the Country, partly near the City, whereby both Parts of the Country should meet in Tribute and Tax. They likewise well ordered the Institution of *Sodalities*, and a publick Care for the Education of Children, and that those who are too young or too old, should not marry, to prevent their having weak Children. Likewise, that nothing mix'd be taken away, nothing perfect exposed, Abortion not procured. Thus much of *Politicks*.

The FOURTH PART.

CHAP. I. Of METAPHYSICKS.

THE Fourth and last Part of Philosophy, which treateth of *Ess* in general, is, by *Aristotle*, termed sometimes, *First Philosophy*, sometimes *Wisdom*, sometimes *Theology*, by his Followers and Interpreters called *Metaphysicks*, from the Order thereof, as *Alexander Aphrodisiensis*, and *Philoponus* affirm; being placed after *Physick*,

as treating of a less known, and more noble Object.

Upon this Subject there are fourteen Books of *Aristotle* extant, which, saith *Alexander Aphrodisiensis*, by the Method of the Discourse and Style, are easily evinced to be his.

^a *Metaphysick* considereth *Ens* as it is *Ens*, and the primary Cause thereof. *Ens* is Analogous, predicated primarily of Substance, which is one Essence; of Accidents, not simply, but in regard of their common Attribution to Substance. *Ens* thus being analogically, the Science thereof is one likewise; but it treateth chiefly of Substance, because it is the first Essence upon which the rest depend, and from which they are denominated.

CHAPTER II.

Of the First Principle.

THE first most common Axiom, or Complex Principle is this, ^a *It is impossible that the same thing should be, and not be, in the same, and according to the same respect.*

^x To this Principle, all Demonstrations and Opinions are reduced. It is itself indemonstrable, as being the first; or otherwise there would be an infinite Progression in Demonstration. There is nothing more known by which it may be proved, no greater Absurdity than the Denial of it, that an Adversary can be reduced to.

^y With the first Negative Principle, the first Affirmative hath a near Affinity. *It is necessary, that every Thing be predicated affirmatively or negatively of another.* It is not true in Matter of a future Contingent determinately, but only indeterminately. This Affirmative Principle therefore is not absolutely the first, yet it is true; neither can there be a Medium betwixt contradictory Propositions, no more than betwixt even and uneven Number; every Proposition either affirms or denies, therefore every Proposition is either true or false; between these there is no Medium.

CHAPTER III.

Of Substance and Accident.

^a OF *Ens* in general there are three Divisions; first, by Accident and *per se*; secondly, Potentially and Active; thirdly, Intentional and Real.

Of *Ens* by Accident, there is no Science, for it is in a manner Non *ens*, it hath no Cause *per se*, it is not generated or corrupted *per se*; it is not always, nor for the most part, nor necessary, whereas Science is of Things contrary to these.

^a *Ens per se*, is divided into ten Categories. The first is Substance, and the first *Ens*, and consequently the first Category, for it is predicated in *quid* of the first Subject, whereas Accidents are predicated *in quale* or *quantum*. Again, Substance only is *Ens per se*, Accidents are *Ens*, as they are Affections of Substance. Substance is the first *Ens*, by Reason or Definition, because Accidents are defined by Substance. By Knowledge, because the Knowledge of

Accidents depends on the Knowledge of Substance. By Time, for there is some Substance without Accident, as God and Intelligences, but there is no Accident without a Substance. Likewise material Substances are precedent in Time, at least to some Accidents, which arrive unto them after they have some Time generated. And lastly, by Nature, for the Subject is, by Nature, before that which inbereth in it. Hence this Part of Physick treateth only of Substance.

^b Subject or Substance is threefold; Matter, Form, Compositum. The two latter are more *Ens* than Matter, tho' Matter be truly Substance, as being the first and last Subject which remaineth, tho' all the Affections of a Body be taken away. This is first Matter, which in itself is neither complete Substance, nor quantitative, nor in any other Category. Neither is it first Substance, for that is separable, and may exist by its own Power without others. That is likewise a determinate, perfect, singular Substance; but Matter cannot be separated from Form, neither is it singular or determinate.

^c Form is that which the Thing itself is said to be, *per se*, τὸ τί ἦν ἑαυτοῦ, The Being of a Thing what it was, the whole common Nature and Essence of a Thing, answerable to the Definition. Compound sensible Substances have a proper Definition; but *Ens* by Accident, consisting of Subject and Accident, hath not, tho' it may be by Accident described and explained. Even Categorical Accidents being one *per se*, and of one Nature, have a Quiddity and Definition, not simple, as Substances, but after their own Manner.

^d Matter and Form are not properly generated, but the whole Compositum, whereto Ideas [separate Substances] confer nothing, neither as efficient, nor exemplary Causes.

^e The common substantial, or formal Parts of the Thing defined, are to be put into the Definition of the whole; but the material Parts of the Individuum itself, must not.

CHAPTER IV.

Of Power and Act.

NEXT Substance, we come to Power and Act.

Power is either active or passive: Active Power is the Principle of changing other Things, or acting on another, in as much as it is, another. Passive Power is in a Manner the same with active, for the Motion of Passion and Action is really the same, neither can one be without the other, tho' simply they are diverse, being in different Subjects, passive in the Patient, active in the Agent.

^f Of Powers, some are void of Reason, as the Power of warming; some rational, as Arts. The rational are of Contraries, as Medicine is of Health

^a Metaphys. 3. 1. 5. 1. 6. 1.

^b Cap. 3. ^c Cap. 4. ^d Cap. 8. ^e Cap. 10.

^w Cap. 3. c. 4.

^x Cap. 4. 3.

^f Lib. 9. cap. 1.

^y Cap. 7.

^g Cap. 2.

^h Lib. 6. cap. 2. ⁱ Lib. 7. cap. 2.

and Sick; the Irrational of one only, as Heat produ-
ceth Heat.

The Power (contrary to the *Megarick* Philoso-
phers, Followers of *Zeno*) remains, altho' not re-
duced to *Act*; for we call a Man *Architect*, tho'
he be not actually employed in *Building*. Again,
Animals have Sense, even when they are not in *Act*.
Thirdly, it were impossible any Thing could be,
which were not actually. *Possible* is that whose
Power, if it were reduced to *Act*, would not imply
any Impossibility.

They are mistaken, who think there is any
Thing possible, which shall never actually be, or
that there are Powers whose *Acts* are impossible;
for hence it would follow, that all Things should
be possible, nothing impossible. *Possible* is that
which doth or may follow from some Power; if it
never followeth, or cometh out of that Power, it is
impossible. That which is possible therefore, must
at some Time or other be in *Act*.

Of Powers there are three Kinds, some *natural*,
as Senses; some *acquired by Custom*, as playing on
a Pipe; some by *Discipline*, as Arts. The two
last require previous Operations, the natural do not.
Natural and irrational Powers are necessarily re-
duced to *Act*, when the Agent and Patient are at a due
Distance, and there is nothing betwixt to hinder
them. The rational Powers are not so, for they
are free to act or not to act as they please.

Act is, when the Thing that is in Power is
otherwise than when it was in Power.

All *Act* is before Power, and before all Nature
which is contained under Power, by *Reason*, *Es-
sence* and *Time*. By *Reason*, because Power is de-
fined by *Act*. By *Time*, because tho' Power be
temporal before *Act* in the same numerical Object;
for a Man may first be learned, before he actually
be such; yet, in different Things of the same Spe-
cies, *Act* is ever before Power in Time; for no-
thing can be made or reduced from Power, unless
by an Agent actually existent.

Lastly, *Act* is before Power in *Essence*; first,
because it is later in Generation; for Generation
beginneth from the imperfect State of a Thing, and
proceedeth to the perfect. Now all Generation
proceedeth from Power to *Act*. Secondly, *Act* is
the End of Power; but the End, as it is later in
Generation, so it is more perfect by Nature, and
first in Intention.

CHAP. V.

Of true and false.

THE first Division of *Ens* is into *Intentional* and
Real. The *Intentional* is either *true* or *false*.
The *Intellect* ascertains *truth*, if its Judgment be con-

formable to the Thing; *false*, if not conformable;
for there is Composition and Division in the Things
themselves, as well as in the Intellect. Whence if
the Intellect compound Things by Affirmation, as
they are really compounded, or divide them by
Negation, as they are really divided, it ascertaineth
truly, otherwise *false*. True and false are in the
simple Apprehension of Things, but simply, not
enunciatively, so as that Truth is nothing but a
simple Perception of the Object; Falshood a Non-
perception or Ignorance thereof, tho' Ignorance be
not properly Falsity. Whence *simple* Apprehension
may be true in itself, false it cannot be, for Falsity
requireth Composition.

Complex Truth and Falshood may be of the
same separate Substances.

He cannot be deceived in the Knowledge of
Things *immoveable*, whosever hath once conceived
them *immutable*; for either he will judge always
Truth, or always err, because Things *immoveable*
are always in the same Manner. The Vicissitude
and Deception, and true and false Judgment, is on-
ly in Things contingent and mutable.

CHAP. VI.

Of one, the same, and divers.

ONE is an Affection of *Ens*, not a Substance as
Pythagoras and *Plato* affirmed, but a Catego-
reme, predicated of every Thing as it is *Ens*.
To one is opposite many, by privative Opposition,
and therefore one is manifested by many, as Indi-
visible by Divisible, the Privation by the Habit.
For Divisible is more known to Sense than Indi-
visible, and Multitude than Unity. To one are re-
ferred the same, equal, like; to many, divers, un-
equal, unlike.

Things are divers, either by *Genus* or *Species*;
by *Genus*, those which have not the same Matter,
or a mutual Generation; or whereof one pertains
to corruptible Substance, the other to incorruptible.
By *Species*, those which have the same *Genus*. *Ge-
nus* is that wherein those Things that are divers, are
said to be the same according to Substance.

CHAP. VII.

Of Immortal, Eternal, and Immoveable Substances.

SUBSTANCE is threefold, two Kinds, *natural*, where-
of one is corruptible, as *Animal*; the other *sem-
ipiternal*, as Heaven. The third is *immoveable*.

That there is a perpetual *immoveable* Substance,
is proved thus. Substances are first *Ens*, therefore
if all Substances are corruptible, all Things like-
wise must be corruptible; which is false, for there
is an eternal local Motion, circular, proper to Hea-

1 Cap. 3. 2 Cap. 4. 3. k Cap. 5. 1 Cap. 6. m Cap. 8. n Lib. 6. cap. 2. o Lib. 9. cap. 10. p Lib. 2.
q Cap. 3. r Lib. 12 or 14. cap. 6.

ven, which it is not possible should have had a Beginning, or shall have a Dissolution, no more than Time. If therefore Time be eternal, as Motion, there must necessarily be some incorruptible and eternal Substance, not only that wherein that eternal Motion exists, the Heaven itself; but one Substance, which so moveth, that tho' it remain its self moveable, yet it moveth others from Eternity to Eternity, not only having only the Power of Moving, but being continually in the Act of Motion. For *Plato* and the rest, who conceived God to have done nothing for a great While, err, because that Power were fruitless, which were not reduced to act. Besides, Motion would not have been eternal, unless the Moving Substance were not only eternal, and in perpetual actual Motion; but such likewise, that it could not but it must move always, as being a pure Act void of Power.

Hence the Substances which cause eternal Motion are void of Matter, for they move from an eternal Act, and are void of all Power.

In Things that sometimes are, sometimes are not, Power is precedent to Act, but simply and absolutely Act is precedent to Power. For, neither Things natural or artificial are reduced from Power to Act, but by something that actually exists. Now, if the same Thing always return by a circular Motion, it necessarily followeth, that there is something eternal, which remaineth ever the same, and operateth in the same Manner. Such an eternal first moving Substance is the first Heaven. The Vicissitude of *Generation and Corruption* is not caused by the first Heaven, for that moveth always in the same Manner, but by the inferior Orbs, especially the Sun, which by his Accession bringeth Life, by his Recession Death to all Things mortal.

Thus is the first Heaven eternal, for it is moved with eternal Motion; besides which there is something which always moveth, and is never moved itself, and is *Eternal, and Substance and Act*.

CHAP. VIII. Of GODS.

THIS *first Mover*, moveth in the same Manner as Things appetible and intelligible, that is, it so moveth others, as itself remaineth immovable. The Motion of the first Agent, as it is the first efficient Cause, consisteth in that Influence thereof, whereby it concurrerh effectively with the inferior Intelligences in moving its own Orb. Wherefore, the Efficiency of the first Mover is an Application of the Powers of the inferior Movers to their proper Works, wherein he concurrerh with them actively and independently. Thus the Intelligences move the Heavens, not for the Generation of inferior Things (for the End must be more noble than

the Means) but for that chief and amiable God, whereunto they endeavour to be like, as their ultimate End.

The first Mover is void of *Mutation*, an *End*, wholly and simply necessary, and consequently the Principle of all. Upon this first Principle depend Heaven and Nature, because without him, their ultimate End and first Efficient, nothing can be, or be operated.

This first Mover, God, enjoyeth the most perfect Life; perpetual and most pleasant, which absolute Felicity is proper to him; for as much as he understandeth and contemplateth himself with infinite Delight. For, as we are happy in Contemplation that lasts but a little while, so is God most happy, in the infinite and most perfect Contemplation of himself, who is of all Things most admirable.

God is an eternal living Being, the best of Beings, an immovable Substance, separate from sensible Things, void of corporal Quantity, without Parts, and indivisible; for such must that Principle or Substance be which moveth in infinite Time. Nothing finite hath infinite Power. All Magnitude must be either finite or infinite. Finite Magnitude cannot move in infinite Time; infinite Magnitude there is not, as we proved in the *Physick*.

God is impossible, not subject to Alteration; the first local Motion, which is the circular, not being competent to God, because he is immovable, it followeth, that other Motions that induce Passion or Alteration, and are later than local Motion, cannot likewise be competent to him.

CHAP. IX. Of Intelligence.

BESIDES this first Substance, the Mover of the first Heaven, there must likewise be other Substances separate from Matter, eternal and immovable, president over the Motions of the inferior Orbs; so that after what Number and Order those Orbs are disposed, according to the same are these external moving, and immovable Substances order'd.

From the Number of the Motions may be collected the Number of the Spheres, and consequently of the Substances moving, which, according to *Aristotle*, are 47.

Heaven is numerically One, because the first Mover is One. It is an ancient Tradition, that these first Substances that move the Heavens are Gods. This Opinion is truly Divine; but what is added, that they had the Shape of Men, or some other Animal, was only invented for Persuasion of the common People, for the use of Laws, and the Convenience of Life. Thus much may serve for a short View of his *Metaphysics*.

THEOPHRASTUS.

CHAPTER I.

His Country, Parents, Masters.

Theophrastus succeeded *Aristotle*. He was born at *Eretria*, (as *Plutarch*, *Laertius*, and others affirm) a Sea-Town of *Lesbos*, seated upon a Hill, as *Strabo* describes it, distant from *Sigrium* eighteen *Stadia*.

His Father was named *Melantes*, as *Apollodorus* affirmeth, according to others, *Leo*, by Profession a Fuller. *Theophrastus* was first called *Tyrtaeus*. He heard *Leucippus* in his own Country, afterwards went to *Plato*, and lastly, became an Auditor of *Aristotle*, who changing the Roughness of his Name, called him, as *Suidas* saith, *Euphrastus*, afterwards *Theophrastus*, from the divine Eloquence of his Speech; wherein (as *Cicero*, *Pliny*, *Laertius*, *Sirobo*, and others aver) he excelled all the rest of his Disciples.

He was likewise so quick of Apprehension, that what *Plato* had said of *Aristotle* and *Xenocrates*, *Aristotle* applied to him and *Calisthenes*. *Theophrastus* was acute to Admiration, ready to apprehend every Thing that he taught; *Calisthenes* was dull: So that one needed a Bridle, the other a Spur.

CHAPTER II.

His Profession of Philosophy, and Disciples.

Aristotle retiring to *Chalcis*, in the 2d Year of the 114th Olympiad, being importuned by his Disciples to appoint a Successor, made Choice of *Theophrastus* (as hath been already related in the Life of *Aristotle*) who thereupon undertook the Government of the School, and *Aristotle* dying, lived in his Garden, *Demetrius Phalerus* cohabiting with him. This Time wherein *Theophrastus* flourished, is reckon'd by *Pliny* to be about the 440th Year from the building of *Rome*; 390 Years, as *Salmasius* rightly reads, before that Time wherein *Pliny* wrote.

Hermippus saith, he went at certain Hours to the School, neatly dress'd, and there sitting down, discoursed in such manner, that he omitted no Gesture suitable to the Argument whereupon he treated; so that once, to express a Glutton, he licked his Lips.

In the fourth Year of the 118th Olympiad, *Xenippus* being Archon, *Sophaeles*, Son of *Amphiclitides*, procured a Law to be made, forbidding all

Philosophers to keep publick Schools, unless such only as the Senate and People should think fit to license; if any did otherwise, he should be put to Death. By this Decree, saith *Athenæus*, he banished all the Philosophers out of the City; amongst the rest *Theophrastus*, who the Year following return'd, when as *Philo*, a Disciple of *Aristotle*, accused *Sophaeles* for having done contrary to Law. Whereupon the *Athenians* reversed the Decree, fined *Sophaeles* five Talents, and called home the Philosophers; by which means *Theophrastus* returning, was reinstated in the School.

Laertius saith, there came to hear him 2000 Disciples. *Suidas* saith, (if there be no Mistake in the Number) 4470; of whom were *Strabo*, his Successor, *Demetrius Phalerus*, *Nicomachus*, Son of *Aristotle*, whom *Arifippus* saith, he much affected; *Erasistratus* the Physician, as some affirm, and *Menander* the Comick Poet.

CHAPTER III.

His Virtues and Apophthegms.

HE was exceeding Learned and Studious, as *Pamphila* affirmeth.

He was very liberal in conferring Benefits, and a great Cherisher of Learning.

He made Collections of Money for the Conventions of Philosophers, not for Luxury, but for Temperance, and Learned Discourses.

He twice freed his Country, being under the Oppression of Tyrants.

Cassander Son of *Antipater*, much esteemed him; and *Ptolemy* the first wrote Letters to him.

He was so much honour'd by the *Athenians*, that *Agonides* accusing him of Impiety, very hardly escaped from being fined himself.

Of his Apophthegms are remember'd these. He said, *It is more safe trusting to an unbridled Horse, than intemperate Speech.*

To a young Man at a Feast, silent: *If you bold your Peace, saith he, because you are foolish, then you are wise; but, if you are wise, you do foolishly in balking your Peace.*

He used to say; *Of all Things that are spent, Time is the most precious.*

a De Erit. w Lib. 13. x Laert. 5. 36. y Suid. s Pref. lib. 1. a Lib. 13. b Laert. 5. 38. c Laert. 15. 8.
d Lib. 15. cap. 1. e Plin. 19. 5. f Exerc. c. Plinius, pag. 350. g Athen. lib. 1. h Laert. 5. 38. Athen. 13. design.
i s. 37. k Laert. 5. 36. m Athen. lib. 5. n Plut. adv. Colet. o Laert. 5. 36. p Laert. 5. 36. q Laert.
r Laert. 5. 40.

Being demanded, as *Aristo* saith, what he thought of *Demosthenes*, he answered; *He is worthy of this City; of Demades; He is above the City.*

To *Philip*, Son of *Cassander*, he saith; *I wonder your Eyes do not make Musick, the Pipe of your Nose coming so directly upon them.*

To prove that Riches are not to be loved and admired, he instanced *Callias*, a rich Athenian, and *Ismenias* a Theban: *These, saith he, use the same Things as Socrates and Epaminondas.*

He saith, *We must not love Strangers, to the End we may make Trial of them; but make Trial of them, to the End we may love them.*

He said, *The Soul paid a dear Rent for her Habitation in the Body.*

He said, *Falshood raised from Calumny and Envy, endureth a little while, but soon perissheth.*

Seeing a young Man blush, Be of good Comfort, saith he, that is the Complexion of Virtue.

He used to say, *Stand in Awe of thyself, and thou shalt not be ashamed before others.*

He said, *The Good need but few Laws, for Things are not accommodated to Laws, but Laws to Things.*

The Envious are more unhappy than others in this respect, that they are troubled not only at their Misfortunes, but also at the good Fortunes of others.

Being demanded what preserved Human Life, he said, *Beneficence, Reward, and Punishment.*

He said, *Honours are to be acquired, not by Conversation and Favour, but by Action.*

Being demanded what Love is, he answered, *The Passion of an idle Soul.*

He said, *A Woman ought not to be seen herself, nor behold others richly attired, for both are Enticements to Dishonesty.*

He said, *Love is an excessive Desire of something irrational, the Entrance thereof easy, the Disengagement difficult.*

CHAP. IV.

His Will and Death.

His Will is thus delivered by *Lucretius*.

BE all well; but if any thing happen otherwise, thus we give Order. All those Goods which belong to the House, I bequeath to *Melantes* and *Pancreon* Sons of *Leo*. These which are set apart for *Hipparchus*, I Will be thus disposed. First, That the Study and Ornaments belonging thereto be perfected, and if any Thing may be added more to beautify them, that it be done. Next, that the Statue of *Aristotle* be set up in the Temple, and the other Do-

naries which were before in the Temple. Moreover, that the little Walk, which is near the School, be built now, not worse than it was before; and that the Maps of the World be placed in the lower Walk. That an Altar likewise be built, wanting nothing of Perfection and Splendor. I Will, that the Statue of *Nicomachus*, as big as the Life, be finished; it is in *Praxiteles* Hand, let him go on with it. Let it be placed whereforever they shall think good, who have the Disposal of the rest, and are named in my Will. Thus much for the Temple and Donaries. My Land at *Stagira* I bequeath to *Callinus*, all my Books to *Neleus*. The Garden and Walk, and all the House belonging to the Garden, I bequeath to my Friends hereafter named, that they may exercise themselves, and study Philosophy therein; for Men cannot always be abroad. But with Condition, that they do not alienate it, nor pretend any Propriety thereto, but esteem it a Thing sacred in common Possessions, making use of all Things therein as becometh just and loving Friends. The Persons to whom I Will that this be in common, are, *Hipparchus*, *Neleus*, *Strato*, *Callinus*, *Demotimus*, *Demaratus*, *Callisthenes*, *Melantes*, *Pancreon*, and *Nicippus*. Let also *Aristotle*, Son of *Midias* and *Pythias*, if he desire to study Philosophy, partake likewise of the same Privilege; and let the most ancient of the Overseers take great Care of him, that he be instructed as well as is possible in Philosophy. Let us be buried in that Part of the Garden which they shall think most convenient; not erecting a Monument, or any Thing that is sumptuous over our Graves. Thus let all Things be ordered according as is said; the Temple, Monument, Garden, and Walk repair'd: Let *Pompylus*, who dwelleth in them, take Charge of them, and of other Things as he did heretofore; for whose Pains therein, let the Possessors thereof consider him. As for *Pompylus* and *Threpta*, who have been long since manumitted, and done us good Service, if there be any Thing which we have bestowed upon them, or they themselves have required, as also the 2000 Drachms which I appointed to be given to them and *Hipparchus*, let them firmly possess it all, as I have often expressed to *Melantes* and *Pancreon*, who assisted therunto. Moreover, I bestow on them *Somatales*, and the Girl. Of my Servants, I manumit *Molon* and *Cimon*, and *Parmenon*; as for *Manes* and *Callias*, whom they shall have lived four Years in the Gardens, discharging their Office blameably, I Will they be set at Liberty. Of the domestick Utensils, let the Overseers bestow on *Pompylus* as many as they think fit, and sell the rest. To *Demotimus* I give *Cario*; to *Neleus*, *Donax*; let *Eubius* be sold. Let *Hipparchus* give to *Callinus* 3000 Drachms. And for *Melantes* and *Pancreon*,

a Plut. vit. Demost.

c Symp. l. 2.

d Plut. de Adv.

e Plut. de frat. amor.

f Plut. de sanct. tutor.

g Stob. 12.

h Stob. Ser. 79.

i Ser. 37.

k Ser. 144.

l Ser. 62.

m Ser. 403.

n Ser. 144.

o Ser. 72.

p Ser. 12.

q Lucan. p. 61.

if we did not look upon Hipparchus, as having here-
 tofore been very beneficial to us, and now quite Ship-
 wreck'd in his Fortunes, we should have appointed
 him a joint Estate with Melantes and Pancreon.
 But because I conceive it were not easy for them to be
 join'd in the ordering of one Family with him, and
 that it would be more to their Advantage to receive
 something certain from Hipparchus, for these Reasons
 let Hipparchus give to each of them, Melantes and
 Pancreon, a Talent. Let him likewise duly furnish
 the Overseers with all Charges necessary for the Per-
 formance of the forementioned Works; which done,
 let Hipparchus be free, and discharged from all Debts
 and Covenants to me. If any Benefit come to Hip-
 parchus from Chalcis on my Behalf, let him wholly
 enjoy it as his own. Be these the Overseers of those
 Things contained in my Will; Hipparchus, Neleus,
 Strabo, Callinus, Demotimus, Cakithenes, Cte-
 tarchus.

Copies of the Will of Theophrastus, signed with
 his Ring, are kept; the first by Hegesias Son of Hip-
 parchus. Witnesses, Callippus a Pelenean, Phila-
 melus an Eucomean, Lyfander an Hybæan, Phi-
 lion an Alopecian. The second Olympidorus bath
 attested by the same Persons. The third is in the
 Hands of Adimantus, delivered to his Son Androk-
 henes. Witnesses, Aimnestus Son of Cleobulus;
 Lyfistratus Son of Phidion, a Thasian; Strabo Son
 of Archelaus, a Lampfacene; Thefippus Son of
 Thefippus, of Potters-Street; Dioforides, Son of
 Dionysius, an Epicephian. Thus (saith Laertius)
 was his Will.

He died old, having lived Eighty-five Years,
 his Spirits being wasted, as Suidas affirms, with
 continual Writing; and upon the Marriage of one
 of his Disciples, giving himself some Interruption
 and Rest, it occasion'd his End.

As he lay upon his Death-bed, Cicero saith, He
 blamed Nature for giving Harts and Crows so long
 Life, that could do no Good thereby; and to Man,
 who could do most Good, so short; whereas if Man
 had been allowed longer Time, his Life might have
 been adorned with the Perfection of Arts and Learn-
 ing. Thus he complain'd, that as soon as he came
 within the View of these, he was taken away.

His Disciples came to him, and asked him, if he
 had any thing to say to them; Nothing, saith he,
 but that the Life of Man loseth many Pleasures only
 for Glory. When we begin to live, then we die.
 Nothing is more unprofitable than the Desire of Glory.
 But be happy, and either give over Study; for it is
 very laborious, or go perfectly idle, for it is
 of great Glory. The Vanity of Life is much greater
 than the Benefit thereof. But I have not Time to
 advise you what to do; do you consider at Leisure

what is best for you. In saying which Words, he
 expired. The whole People of Athens followed his
 Body on Foot to the Grave.

CHAP. V.

His Writings.

HE left many Writings; whereof, saith Laer-
 tius, because they are full of all kind of Learn-
 ing, I thought good to give this Catalogue.

- First Analyticks 3.
- Later Analyticks 7.
- Of the Analyticks of Syllogisms 1.
- Epitome of Analyticks 1.
- Places of Deduction 2.
- Agonisticks, concerning the Theory of Eristick Ar-
 guments.
- Of the Senses 1.
- To Anaxagoras 1.
- Of Anaxagoras 1.
- Of Anaximenes 1.
- Of Archelaus 1.
- Of Salt, Nitre, Allom 1.
- Of Combustibles; or, as the other Edition, of Things
 that may be petrified, 2.
- Of indivisible Lines 1.
- Of Auscultation 2.
- Of Winds 1.
- The Differences of Virtue 1.
- Of a Kingdom 1.
- Of the Discipline of a King 1.
- Of Lives 3.
- Of old Age 1.
- Of the Astrology of Democritus 1.
- Of Sublime Things 1.
- Of Apparitions 1.
- Of Humour, Colour, Flesh 1.
- Of the Description of the World 1.
- Of Man 1.
- A Collection of the Doctrines of Diog. 1.
- Of Definition 3.
- Erratick 1.
- Another of Love 1.
- Of Felicity 1.
- Of Species 2.
- Of the Epilepsy 1.
- Of Divine Inspiration 1.
- Of Empedocles 1.
- Epichirems 18.
- Instances 3.
- Of Voluntary 1.
- Epitome of Plato's Commonwealth 2.
- Of the Diversity of Voice in Creatures of the same
 Kind 1.
- Of Subitaneous Apparitions 1.
- Of Biting and Blows 1.

Of Animals that are said to have Wisdom 7.

Of those which dwell in dry Places 1.

Of those which change Colour 1.

Of those which dwell in Caves 1.

Of Animals 7.

Of Pleasure, according to Aristotle 1.

Of Pleasure, another 1.

Theses 24.

Of hot and cold 1.

Of Dizziness and Dimness 1.

Of Sweat 1.

Of Affirmation and Negation 1.

Calisthenes, or of Grief 1.

Of Labours 1.

Of Motion 3.

Of Stones 1.

Of Pestilence 1.

Of Fainting 1.

Megarick 1.

Of Melancholy 1.

Of Metals 1.

Of Honey 1.

Of the Collections of Metrodorus 1.

Sublime Discourse 2.

Of Drunkenness 1.

Of Laws Alphabetically 24.

Epitome of Laws 10.

To Definitions 1.

Of Odours 1.

Of Wine and Oil.

First Propositions 18.

Legislative 3.

Politick 6.

Politick according to several Occasions 4.

Politick Customs 4.

Of the best Commonwealth 1.

Collection of Problems 5.

Of Proverbs 1.

Of Congelation and Liquefaction 1.

Of Fire 2.

Of Winds 1.

Of the Palsy 1.

Of Suffocation 1.

Of Madness 1.

Of Passions 1.

Of Signs 1.

Sophisms 2.

Of the Solution of Syllogisms 1.

Topics 2.

Of Punishment 2.

Of Hair 1.

Of Tyranny 1.

Of Water 3.

Of Sleep and Dreams 1.

Of Friendship 3.

Of Ambition 2.

Of Nature 3.

Of Physick 17.

Of the Epitome of Physicks 2.

Physicks 8.

To Natural Philosophers 1.

Of Natural Histories 10.

Of Natural Causes 1.

Of Chyles 5.

Of false Pleasure 1.

Of the Soul 1. *Thesis.*

Of undoubted Faith 1.

Of simple Dubitations 1.

Harmonicks 1.

Of Virtue 1.

Of Occasions or Contradictions 1.

Of Sentence 1.

Of Ridiculous 1.

Meridians 2.

Divisions 2.

Of Differences 1.

Of Injuries 1.

Of Calumny 1.

Of Praise 1.

Of Experience 1.

Epistles 3.

Of Casual Animals 1.

Of Selection 1.

Encomiums of the Gods 1.

Of Festivals 1.

Of Prosperity 1.

Of Entymemes 1.

Of Invention 2.

Moral Disputes 1.

Moral Descriptions 1.

Of Tumult 1.

Of History 1.

Of the Judgment of Syllogisms 1.

Of Flattery 1.

Of the Sea 1.

To Cassander, of a Kingdom 1.

Of Comedy 1.

Of Meteors 1.

Of Speech 1.

Collection of Words 1.

Solutions 1.

Of Musick 3.

Of Meteors 1.

Megacles 1.

Of Law 1.

Of Things contrary to Law 1.

A Collection of the Doctrines of Xenocrates.

Confabulations 1.

Of an Oath 1.

Rhetorical Precepts 1.

Of Riches 1.

Of Poetry 1.

Problems, Politick, Esbick, Physick, Ernetick 1.

Proverbs 1.

Collection of Problems 1.

Of Physical Problems 1.

Of Example 1.

Of Proposition and Narration 1.

Of Poetry, another 1.

Of the wife Men 1.
 Of Advice 1.
 Of Solecisms 1.
 Of the Art of Rhetorick 1.
 Of Rhetorical Arts, 71 Kinds.
 Of Hypocrisy 1.
 Aristotelick, or Theophrastic Commentaries 6.
 Natural Sentences 16.
 Epitome of Physics 1.
 Of Gratitude 1.
 Ethick Characters.
 Of Falshood and Truth 1.
 Of the History of Divinity 5.
 Of the Gods 3.
 Geometrical Histories 4.
 Epitome of Aristotle concerning Animals 6.
 Epichirems 2.
 Theses 3.
 Of a Kingdom 2.
 Of Causes 1.
 Of Democritus 1.
 Of Calumny 1.
 Of Generation 1.
 Of the Prudence and Manners of Animals 1.
 Of Motion 2.
 Of Sight 4.
 To Definitions 2.
 Of being given 1.
 Of Greater and Lesser 1.
 Of Musick 1.
 Of the Divine Beatitude 1.
 To those of the Academy 1.

Protreptick 1.
 How a City may be best inhabited 1.
 Commentaries 1.
 Of the Fiery Ebullition in Sicily 1.
 Of Things granted 1.
 Of the Ways of knowing 1.
 Of the Lying Argument 3.
 Ante-Topic 1.
 To Æschylus 1.
 Astrological History 6.
 Arithmetical Histories of Increase 1.
 Acicharus 1.
 Of Judicial Orations 1.
 Epistles concerning Alcyon to Phanias and Nicanor.
 Of Piety 1.
 Euais 1.
 Of Opportunities 2.
 Of seasonable Discourses 1.
 Of the Institution of Children 1.
 Another, different 1.
 Of Institution, or of Virtues, or of Temperance 1.
 Protreptick 1.
 Of Numbers 1.
 Definitions of Syllogistick Speech 1.
 Of Heaven 1.
 Politick 2.
 Of Nature 2.
 Of Fruits and Animals. All which, saith Laertius, amount to 1182 Divisions: These Books, as Theophrastus had ordered in his Will, were delivered to Neleus. What afterwards became of them, hath been related in the Life of Aristotle.

S T R A T O.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

STRATO¹ was Successor to Theophrastus. He was of ² Lampacum, his Father ³ Arcefilaus, or, as some, ⁴ Arcestus, mentioned in his Will. He was a Person of great Worth, eminent, saith Laertius, in all Kinds of Philosophy, but especially, in that which is called Physick, the most ancient and solid Part, ⁵ wherein he introduced many Things new, ⁶ dissenting not only from Plato, but from his Master Aristotle. ⁷ From his Excellency herein he was called the Natural Philosopher: ⁸ He prescribed all divine Power to Nature. ⁹ Ethick he touched but little. ¹⁰ He took upon him the Government of the School, according to Apollodorus,

in the third Year of the 123 Olympiad, and continued therein eighteen Years. He instructed Ptolemy the Son of Philadelphus, who bestowed eighty Talents upon him.

CHAP. II.

His Will and Death.

His Will, saith Laertius, was to this Effect.

THUS I order, against the Time that I shall die, All these Things which are in my House, I bequeath to Lampyrion and Arcefilaus. Out of the

¹ Laert. 5. 38. ² Cic. Acad. quest. 4. 38. ³ Laert. ibid. Suid. ⁴ Suid. ⁵ Cic. de fin. 5. ⁶ Cic. de fin. 5. ⁷ Laert. ⁸ Cic. de Nat. deor. ⁹ Ibid. Laert. ¹⁰ Cic. de Nat. deor.

Money which I have at Athens, let my Executors first defray the Charges of my Funeral, and the solemn Rites after my Interment, doing nothing superfluously nor niggardly. The Executors of these Things I appoint in my Will to be these; Olympicus, Aristides, Mnesigenes, Hippocrates, Epicrates, Gorgylus, Diocles, Lyco, Athanes. I leave the School to Lyco, for the rest are either too old, or otherwise employed. All the rest shall do well if they confirm this Choice that I have made. I bequeath likewise all my Books unto him, except those which are written by our own Hand, besides all Utensils, Carpets and Cups for Feasting. Let the Executors give 500 Drachms to Epicrates and one of the Servants, which Arcefilaus shall think good. Let Lampyrion and Arcefilaus discharge all the Debts which Daipus undertook for Hircæus. Let nothing be owing either to Lampyrion, or to the Heirs of Lampyrion, but let him be discharged of all, and the Executors bestow on him 500 Drachms, and one of the Servants, as Arcefilaus shall think good; that having taken much Pains with us, he may have sufficient for Food and Raiment. I manumit Diophantus and Diocles, and Abus. I give Simmias to Arcefilaus. I manumit Dromo. When Arcefilaus shall come, let Hircæus with Olympicus and Epicrates, and the rest of the Executors, cast up the Accounts of the Charges of my Funeral and other Things; whatsoever is over and above, let Arcefilaus take it of Olympicus, not pressing him upon the Day of Payment. Let Arcefilaus discharge the Covenants which Strato made with Olympicus, and Aminias, which are in the Hands of Philocrates Son of Tisamenus. As for my Tomb, let it be ordered as Arcefilaus, and Olympicus, and Lyco shall think good.

This was his Will, preserved by *Aristo* the Chian. He was of so thin and low a Constitution, that he felt not any Pain at his Death.

Of his Name *Laertius* reckons eight.
 The first a Disciple of *Isocrates*.
 The second, this Philosopher.
 The third, a Physician, Disciple of *Erasistratus*.
 The fourth an Historian, who wrote the Wars of *Philip* and *Perseus* with the Romans.
 The fifth is wanting.
 The sixth, an Epigrammatick Poet.
 The seventh, an ancient Physician.
 The eighth, a Peripatetick, who lived at *Alexandria*.

C H A P. III.

His Writings.

Suidas * saith, he wrote many Books; *Laertius* gives this Catalogue of them.

Of a Kingdom 3.
 Of Justice 3.
 Of God 3.
 Of Good 3.
 Of Principles 3.
 Of Lives.
 Of Felicity.
 Of Philosophy.
 Of Fortitude.
 Of Vacuum.
 Of Heaven.
 Of Breath.
 Of Human Nature.
 Of the Generation of Animals.
 Of Mixtions.
 Of Sleep.
 Of Dreams.
 Of Sight.
 Of Sense.
 Of Pleasure.
 Of Colour.
 Of Diseases.
 Of Judgments.
 Of Faculties.
 Of Metallick Machines.
 Of Hunger and Offuscation.
 Of Light and Heavy.
 Of Divine Inspiration.
 Of Time.
 Of Aliment and Augmentation.
 Of uncertain Animals.
 Of Fabulous Animals.
 Of Causes.
 Solutions of Questions.
 Poems of Places.
 Of Accident.
 Of More or Less.
 Of Unjust.
 Of Priority and Posteriority.
 Of Priority of Genus.
 Of Proprium.
 Of Future.
 Consultations of Inventions.
 Commentaries, which are suspected.
 Epistles, beginning thus; *Strato to Aristeus*,
 Health.

* *Laert.* 5. 58.

L Y C O.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

Strato, faith Laertius, was succeeded by Lyco, Son of *Affanax* of *Troas*, an eloquent Person, and excellent for Education of Children. He heard also *Panthædus* the *Dialectick*.

He said, that as *Horses* need both *Bridle* and *Spur*, so in Children there must be joined both *Modesty* and *Ambition*. Of his florid Expression is alleged this Instance. Of a poor Maid he said, Βασὶ γὰρ ἐγγὺν παλσι κερν διασπῶνι σπῆνδε ἐλπίσιν αὖτις ἀκρίαν τὴν ἡδυσίαν. A Maid is a heavy Burden to her Parents when she outruns the flowery Season of her Youth for want of a Dowry. Whence *Antigonus* said of him, That as the Fragrancy and Pleasantsness of an excellent Apple will not admit Transplantation, so whatsoever he said was to be heard only from himself. For this Sweetness of Discourse some added the Letter γ to his Name, calling him Γαλκων, which implieth Sweetness. So * *Plutarch*.

In Style he was very different from himself.

Upon those who were sorry they had not learned when Time was, and with'd it might be recall'd, he jested thus; he said, that they who endeavoured to make Amends by a late Penitence for their past Negligence, were conscious of the Impossibility of their Wishes. And of those that sought to bring it to pass, he said, they had lost all Reason, in applying the Nature of a Strait Line to a crooked Ruler, or beholding their Face in troubled Water, or a confused Mirror.

He said, that to the Wreath of publick Games in the Forum many aspired, to the Olympick few or none.

He many Times, by his Counsel, much advantaged the Athenians.

In his Garments he affected Neatness so much, that, as *Hermippus* faith, he wore an upper Garment very precious and fine.

He was very expert in all Exercises, active and well made for a Wrestler, being thin-car'd and well set, as *Antigonus Carystius* affirmeth; whence in his own Country he practised the *Elean Games*, and played at Ball.

He was intimate with *Eumenes* and *Attalus* beyond all Men, who supply'd him with many Things. *Antiochus* also would have had him lived with him, but could not get him.

He was so great an Enemy to *Hieronymus* the *Peripatetic*, that upon a solemn Day (of which already in the Life of *Arcefilaus*) he only forbore to come to him.

He compared Orators to Frogs, those, faith he, croak in the Water, those by the Water of an Hour-Glass.

He was Master of the School forty Years, succeeding *Strato* in the 127th Olympiad, as he had given Order by his Will.

CHAP. II.

His Will and Death.

Laertius produceth a Will of his to this Effect.

THUS * I dispose of my Estate, if I shall not recover of this Sickness. All that is in my House I bequeath to the Brethren *Altyanax* and *Lyco*, out of which is to be paid whatsoever I owe at Athens to any Man, as also the Charges of my Funeral and Exequies. What is in the City, and *Ægina*, I bestow upon *Lyco*, because he is of our Name, and hath lived long with us, to our great Content, as one that deserved the Place of a Son. The *Peripatium* I leave to those Friends that will make use of it, as *Bulo*, *Callinus*, *Aristo*, *Amphio*, *Lyco*, *Pytho*, *Aristomachus*, *Heraclius*, *Lycomedes*, *Lyco*, my Kinsman. Let them put him in that Place who they conceive will persevere in it, and discharge it best, which let the rest of my Friends confirm for my Sake, and the Places. My Funeral and the Burning of my Body be so ordered by *Bulo* and *Callinus*, it be not prodigal nor niggardly. Out of my Estate at *Ægina*, let *Lyco*, after my Death, give to the young Men as much Oyl as will serve their Turns, that thereby the Memory of me and him that honours me, may be justly preserved. Let them set up my * Statue, and chuse a fit Place for the setting up of it, wherein let *Diophauntus* and *Heraclides*, Son of *Demetrius* assist them. Out of my Rents in the City, let *Lyco* pay all that I have named after his Departure; in the next Place let *Bulo* and *Callinus*, and the Expenses of my Funeral be discharged. Let that Household Stuff be taken away which I have left as common betwixt them. Let likewise the Physicians *Pasithemis* and *Midas* be honoured and rewarded for their Care of me, and for their Skill. To the Son of *Callinus* I leave a Couple of Thriceclean Pots; and to his Wife a Couple of Goblets, and a fine Carpet, and a shaggy Carpet, and a Coverlet, and two Couch-Beds; the best that are left, that we may not seem unmindful of their due Respect towards us. As for those that served me, I order thus: *Demetrius*, who hath been

y Laert. 5. 65.

z De Exilio.

a Laert. 5. 69.

* For Wrestling and other Exercises.

long a Free-man, I forgive the Price of his Redemption, and bestow upon him five Minæ, and a Cloak and a Coat; and as having undergone many Labours with me, let him be decently supplied with Necessaries. Crito the Chelcidonian, I forgive the Price of his Redemption, and bestow further on him four Minæ. Micrus also I manumit, whom let Lyco bring up, and six Years hence let him instruct him. In like manner, I manumit Chares, whom let Lyco also bring up; I give him two Minæ, and my Books that have been published; the rest that have not been published, let them be given to Callinus, and let him take diligent Care for the Publishing of 'em. To Syrus the Free-man, I give four Minæ, and Menodora, and if he oweth me any thing, I forgive it him. To Philara I give five Minæ, a shaggy Coverlet, two Couch-Beds, a Carpet, and which Bed he shall chuse. I manumit likewise the Mother of Micrus and Noemones and Dion, and Theon, and Euphranor, and Hermias; as also Agatho, after he hath served two Years more; as also Ophelio and Possidonius, the Bearers of my Litter, after they have served four Years more, I will that they be set at Liberty. I give, moreover, to Demetrius, Crito,

and Syrus, to each a Bed and Coverlet, such as Lyco shall think fit. This I bestow on them, for as much as they have expressed themselves faithful in the Performance of such Things as were committed to their Charge. As for my Burial, whether Lyco will have it here or at home, let it be as he will; for I persuade myself he will do what is fitting, no less than if I had done it myself. When he shall have faithfully performed these Things, let the Bequests of my Will remain firm. Witnesses, Callinus an Hermiæan, Aristo the Chian, Euphronius a Pœæian.

Thus, saith Laertius^b, having wisely managed all Things appertaining to Learning and Humanity, his Prudence and Diligence extended even to the Making his Will; so that in that respect also he deserveth studiously to be imitated.

He died 74 Years old, of the Gout.

There were Four of his Name.

The first, a Pythagorean, mentioned in the Life of Aristotle.

The second, this Peripatetick.

The third, an Epic Poet.

The fourth, an Epigrammatick Poet.

b Laert. 5. 74.

A R I S T O.

ARISTO succeeded Lyco. He was of the Island Cos, famous for a Law, That whosoever exceeded 60 Years of Age, should be put to Death, that there might be no want of Provision for those that were more serviceable. In former time, saith Strabo, it had four Cities, now there remain but two, *Julis* and *Carthæa*, into which the rest were transferred. *Paceffo* into *Carthæa*, *Careffus* into *Julis*. In *Julis* Aristo was born; he was an Auditor of Lyco, and succeeded him in the Government of the Peripatetick School, as *Cicero*, *Plutarch*, and *Clemens Alexandrinus* affirm.

He was a great Imitator of *Bion* the *Boristhenite*. *Cicero* saith, he was neat and elegant. He wrote a Treatise of *Nilus*, cited by *Strabo*, and *Amatory Similies*, frequently cited by *Athenæus*.

In the second Book of his^a *Amatory Similies*, he saith, that *Polemo* the *Academick* advised to provide such Entertainment at Feasts as should be pleasant not only at the present, but also on the Morrow.

^c In the same Book of his *Amatory Similies*, of an Athenian well in Years, named *Dorus*, who would be thought handsome, he apply'd the Words of *Ulysses* to *Dolo*,

*Rich Presents sure may lead away,
And thy too easy Soul betray.*

^e In the Second of his *Amatory Similies* he saith, the Ancients first bound their Heads, conceiving it good against the Pain caused by the Vapours of the Wine, afterwards, for more Ornament, they used Garlands.

Laertius,^g upon the Testimony of *Panætius* and *Sofiscrates* affirmeth, That all the Writings ascribed to Aristo of Chios the Stoick (except the Epistles) belong to Aristo the Peripatetick. Their Titles these,

Protrepheicks 2.

Of Zeno's Doctrine: *Scholastick Dialogues* 6.]

Of Wisdom, Dissertation 7.

Erotick Dissertations.

Commentaries upon Vain Glory.

Commentaries 15.

Memorials 3.

Cbrysa's 11.

Against Orators.

Against Alexinus's Oppositions.

To the Dialecticks 3.

To Cleanthes, Epistles 4.

^c Strabo l. 10.

^d Athen. deipn. 10.

^e Athen. deipn. 12.

^f Deipn. l. 15.

^g Laert. 7. 165.

C R I T O L A U S.

C R I T O L A U S^a was, according to *Plutarch*, of *Phaselis*, an eminent Sea Town of *Lycia*, described by ¹ *Strabo* as having three Havens and a Lake belonging to it. He was an Acceptor of *Aristotle*, and succeeded him in the School, as *Cicero*, ² *Plutarch*, and *Clement Alexandrinus* affirm.

He went to *Rome* on an Embassy from the *Athenians* in the 534th Year from the Building of the City, which falleth upon the 2d Year of the 140th Olympiad.

¹ He condemned *Rhetorick*, as being used rather as an *Artifice* than an *Art*.

^b *Plot. de Exilio.*

ⁱ *Lib. 14.*

^k *Clem. Strom. 2.*

^l *Scit. Emper. adver. Mathem. l. 2.*

D I O D O R U S.

D I O D O R U S^m was Disciple to *Critolaus*, and succeeded him in the School, as is manifest from *Clement Alexandrinus*, who adds, that in his Assertion concerning our chief End, he joyned

Indolence with *Honesty*. He is mentioned by ⁿ *Cicero*; how long he taught, or who succeeded him, is unknown. Thus far we have an uninterrupted Account of the *Peripatetick* School.

^m *Strabo l. 2. Strom. 2.*

ⁿ *Acad. Quest. 4.*

T H E

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE SEVENTH PART,
Containing the *Cynick* Philosophers.

ANTISTHENES.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

THE *Cynicks* are derived from *Antisthenes*, Disciple of *Socrates*, who, being most pleased with those Discourses of his Master, which treated of Tolerance and Laboriousness, instituted this Sect. * He was born at *Athens*, his Father an *Athenian*, named *Antisthenes* also, his Mother a *Thracian*, or, as *Plutarch*, a *Phrygian*, in whose Defence, to those who reproached him that she was a Foreigner, he answered, *Cibele, the Mother of the Gods was a Phrygian*. He likewise derided the *Athenians* for boasting of their being Natives, saying, they were nothing more noble than Snails and Locusts. ^b Neither did *Socrates* the less esteem him; but on the contrary, hearing that he had behaved himself valiantly at the Fight at *Tanagra*, he said of him, *I knew two Parents, both Athenians, could not beget so excellent a Person*. He first heard *Gorgias* the Orator, whence his Dialogues are written in a Rhetorical Style, consisting chiefly in Verity and Exhortation. *Hermippus* saith, at the *Isthmian* Meeting, he used to make Orations in Praise and Dispraise of the *Athenians*, *Thebans*, and *Lacedemonians*, before all the Assembly. But seeing many of the Citizens come thither, he refrained.

Next, he applied himself to *Socrates*, and profited so much under him, that he counselled his Scholars to become his Fellow-Disciples under that Ma-

ster. He lived in the *Piræum*, and went every Day 40 *Stadia* to hear *Socrates*.

He affected, even whilst he was Disciple to *Socrates*, to go in poor Habit, and once having turned the torn Part of his Garment outermost, *Socrates* spying it, said, *I see Vain-glory through a Hole*; or, as *Ælian*, *Do you use this Ostentation before us also?*

^c Upon the Death of *Socrates* he was the Occasion of Banishment to *Anytus*, and of Death to *Melitus*; for *Melitus* meeting with some young Men of *Pontus*, invited to *Athens* by the Fame of *Socrates*, he brought them to *Anytus*, telling them he was wiser than *Socrates*; whereupon the Standers by in Indignation turned them both out of the City; of which already in the Life of *Socrates*.

CHAP. II.

His Institution of a Sect.

Socrates ^e being Dead, of whom he learned Tolerance and Apathy, he made Choice of *Cynsarges*, a Gymnasium at *Athens*, just without the Gates, as of the fittest Place in which he might discourse of Philosophy. ^f It was so called upon this Occasion. *Didymus* the *Athenian* sacrificing in his own House, a white Dog that was by, snatch'd the Victim, and running away with it, laid it

a Lect. 6. 1.

b Ibid. vit. Socr.

c Lect. ibid.

d Ælian. var. Hist. 9. 36.

e Lect. 6. 10.

f Ibid. 6. 13.

g Said down

down in another Place; *Dydimus* much troubled thereat, consulted the Oracle, which enjoined him to erect a Temple in that Place where the Dog had laid down the Victim, and to dedicate it unto *Hercules*, which was called *Cynosarges*, ἡ κυνὸς ἀγῶν σάβη, *The Temple of the white Dog*. Hence *Antisthenes* and his Followers were called *Cynicks*, and by those that disapproved their Institution, *Dogs*; *Antisthenes* himself being termed *Ἀσκησιώτης*, the sincere Dog.

He first doubled his old fordid Cloak, and wore it alone (without a Coat) as *Diocles* affirmeth; he carried likewise a Staff and Satchel. *Neantes* saith he first used a single Cloak. *Sococrates* in the third of his *Successions*, saith, *Diodorus* the *Appendian* wore a long Beard, and carried a Staff and Wallet.

His Assertions are these, *That Virtue may be acquired by Teaching*; and those Persons noble who are virtuous. *That Virtue was self-sufficient to Felicity, not needing any Thing but a Socratick Courage*. *That Virtue consisteth in Actions, not requiring many Words nor much Learning, and is self-sufficient to Wisdom*; for all other Things have a Reference thereto. *That Infamy is good and equal to Labour*, and that a wise Man ought not to govern the Commonwealth according to the Laws in Force, but according to Virtue. *That a wise Man, to have Issue, may make Choice of beautiful Women, and Love, for a wise Man only knoweth what ought to be loved*.

Diocles addeth these; *That nothing is new to a wise Man. That a good Man deserveth Love*. *That virtuous Persons are Friends. That we ought to get Assistance in War, valiant and just. That Virtue is an Armour that never can be taken from us. That it is better with some few good Men to oppose all the Wicked, than with many wicked Men to contend with few Good. Observe your Enemies, for they first find out your Faults. Esteem a just Man more than a Neighbour. The same Virtue belongeth to Man and to Woman. Those Things are good which are honest, ill which are dishonest. All Things esteem strange. Wisdom is the safest Fortification, for it will neither fall away, nor can be betrayed. In these inexpugnable Things, we ought to build Forts by Meditation*.

Agellius saith, *He esteemed Pleasure the greatest Ill*; whence he used to say, *I had rather be mad, than be addicted to Pleasure*.

As to the Opinion of the *Cynicks* in general (not estimating them, saith *Laertius*, a mere Form and Institution of Life, but a true *Sect* of Philosophy) they were these.

They took away, with *Aristo* the *Chian*, *Dialectick* and *Physick*, and only admitted *Ethick*; whence what some said of *Socrates*, *Diocles* applied to *Diogenes*, affirming he used the same Expressions. That we ought to enquire,

*What Good and Ill
Our Houses fill.*

They likewise rejected the Liberal Sciences; whence *Antisthenes* said, those who have acquired Temperance, ought not to study any Learning, lest by other Things they be diverted. *Geometry* likewise, *Musick*, and the like, they wholly took away. Whence *Diogenes*, to one that shewed him a Watch, *It is an excellent Invention*, saith he, *against supping too late*. And to one that entertained him with *Musick*,

*Wisdom the greatest Cities doth protect,
But Musick cannot one poor House direct.*

They likewise, as the *Stoicks*, affirmed to be happy to live according to Virtue, as *Antisthenes* in his *Hercules*; for there is a Kind of Affinity betwixt these two Sects, whence the *Stoicks* asserted *Cynism* to be the nearest Way to Virtue, and so lived *Zeno* the *Cittiean*.

Their Diet was slender, their Food only such as might satisfy Nature; their Cloaks fordid; they despised Riches, Glory, and Nobility: Some of them fed only on Herbs and cold Water, living under such Shelters as they could find, or in Tubs, as *Diogenes* did, who affirmed, it was proper to the Gods to want nothing, and that those who stand in Need of fewest Things come nearest to the Gods.

They held also, according to *Antisthenes* in his *Hercules*, that Virtue may be acquired by Learning, and that it cannot be lost; that a wise Man deserves to be loved, and never sinneth, and is a Friend to such as are like him, and trusteth nothing to Fortune.

They took away, with *Aristo* the *Chian*, all Things between Virtue and Vice.

C H A P. III.

His Apothegms.

OF his *Apothegms* are remember'd these: He proved Labour to be good, by the Examples of *Hercules* and *Cyrus*, one a *Grecian*, the other a *Barbarian*.

He first defin'd Speech thus, *Speech is that which declareth that which is or was*.

To a young Man of *Pontus*, that came to be his Disciple, and ask'd him what he must bring with him, he answer'd, *Βιβλακίου κατὰ, καὶ γραμματίου κατὰ, καὶ τραπεζίου κατὰ*, a new Book, a new Pen, and a new Tablet, where the Word *κατὰ* is equivocal, and signifieth divided (divided *κατὰ*) *Wis*.

To one, demanding what kind of Wife he should take, *If a fair one*, saith he, *she will be common; if foul, a Torment.*

Hearing that Plato spoke ill of him, *It is King-like*, saith he, *to do well, and be ill spoken of.*

Being initiated into the *Orphick Solemnities*, the Priest telling him, that they who were initiated into those Rites, were made Partakers of many excellent Things in the next World. *Why then*, said he, *do you not die?*

To one that reproacheth him that both his Parents were not free; *Neither*, saith he, *were they both Wrestlers*, and yet *I am a Wrestler.*

Being demanded why he had few Disciples, *I beat them away*, said he, *with a Siker Staff.*

Being demanded why he rebuk'd his Disciples so sharply, *So*, saith he, *do Physicians the Sick.*

Seeing an Adulterer running away, *Unhappy Man*, said he, *how much Danger might you have escaped for one Half-penny.*

He said, according to Hecaton, *It is better to fall among Crows than Flatterers*, for *those only devour the Dead, these the Living.*

Being demanded what was most happy for Man, he answer'd, *To die in Prosperity.*

To a Friend, complaining he had lost his Notes, *You should have writ them in your Mind*, saith he, *and not in your Book.*

As Rust consumeth Iron, so *Envy*, saith he, *consumeth the envious Man.*

Those who would never die, saith he, *must live piously and justly.*

He said, *Cities were then perishing, when they could not distinguish the Good from the Bad.*

Being commended by some wicked Men, *I am troubled*, saith he, *to think what Ill I have done.*

He said, *The Cohabitation of Concorning Brethren is firmer than any Wall.*

He said, *We ought to carry such Provision along with us*, as if we should happen to be *Ship-wreck'd*, we might swim away with.

To those who reproach him for conversing with wicked Men, *So do Physicians with the Sick*, saith he, *yet are not sick themselves.*

He said, *It is absurd to separate Corn from the Weeds, and in War to reject the unserviceable Person; yet in a Common-wealth, not to extirpate the Wicked.*

Being demanded what he had gained by Philosophy, he answer'd, *That I can converse with myself.*

At a Feast, to one that said to him, *Sing*; he reply'd, *Do you then Pipe.*

Diogenes demanding a Coat, he had him double his Cloak.

Being demanded what Learning was most necessary, *that*, saith he, *which unlearneth Ill.*

He advis'd those who were provoked by Revil-

ings, to bear it with greater Fortitude, than if Stones were cast at them.

He derided *Plato*, as being proud; and seeing at a Show a Horse going loftily, turning to *Plato*, *Metabinks*, said he, *you would have acted the Part of this Horse very well.* This he said, because *Plato* at the same time had commended the Horse.

Another Time visiting *Plato* as he lay sick, and looking into the Basin whereinto he had vomited, *I see here*, saith he, *the Cholera, but not the Pride.*

He advis'd the *Athenians* to love Asses as well as Horses, which they conceiving absurd; and yet, saith he, *you chuse those for Generals, who know nothing, but how to stretch out the Hand.*

To one that said to him, *Many praise thee*; why, saith he, what Ill have I done?

To one that demanded (as *Panias* saith) what he should do to be a good and an honest Man; *If you learn*, saith he, *of knowing Persons, that the Vices which you have, are to be avoided.*

To one that praised a Life full of Delicacies, *Let the Sons of my Enemies*, saith he, *live delicately.*

To a young Man who desired his Statue might be made handsomer than himself, *Tell me*, saith he, *if the Brass itself could speak, what you think it would boast of?* the other answer'd, *of its handsome Figure.* Are you not ashamed then, reply'd he, to be proud of the same that an inanimate Creature would be?

A young Man of *Pontus* promised to supply him as soon as his Ship came home laden with Salt Fish; hereupon he took him to a Meal-woman, and filling his Satchel, departed; she calling to him for Money, *This young Man*, saith he, *will pay you as soon as his Ship comes home.*

When at any Time he saw a Woman richly dressed, he went to her House, and had her Husband bring out his Horse and Arms, that if he were so provided, he might allow her those Freedoms, being better able to justify the Injuries it occasion'd; otherwise, that he should take off her rich Habit.

He said, *Neither a Feast is pleasant without Company, nor Riches without Virtue.*

He said, *Those Pleasures which come not in at the Door, must not go out by the Door, but by Incision or Purging with Hellebore, or by Starving, so to punish those Surfeits which we have incurred for short Pleasure.*

He said, *Whosoever feareth others, is a Slave, tho' he know it not himself.*

He said, *No covetous Man can be a good Man, or a King, or a Free-man.*

Being demanded what a Feast is, he answer'd, *The Occasion of Surfeits.*

He said, *We ought to aim at such Pleasures as follow Labour, not at those which go before Labour.*

He said, *Common Executioners are better than*

Sicily; but if, as some report, you are in love with Pleasure, and aim at such Things, as becom nat wife Persons, go to Anticyra and cure yourself by drinking Hellebore, for that is much better for you than the Wine of Dionysius; this causeth Madnes, that asswageth it: So that as Health and Discretion differ from Sicknes and Folly, so much shall you be better, than you are in these Things which you now enjoy. Farewel.

The Answer to this Epistle, see in the Life of Arrippus.

CHAP. V.

His Death.

HE died, ^a saith *Laertius*, of Sicknes. As he lay on his Death bed, *Diogenes* came to him, and

^d *Laert.* 6. 18.

asked him if he wanted a Friend. Another Time he came to him with a Dagger, *Antisthenes* crying out, *Who will free me from this Pain?* He shew'd him the Dagger, saying, *This shall.* *Antisthenes* reply'd, *I say from my Pain, not from my Life;* for he bore his Sicknes somewhat impatiently thro' Love of Life.

Theopompus commends him above all the Disciples of *Socrates*, as being of such acute and sweet Discourse, that he could lead any Man to what he would.

There were three more of this Name, one a *Heraclitean* Philosopher, the Second of *Ephesus*, the Third of *Rhodes*, an Historian.

D I O G E N E S.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, Time, Banishment.

Diogenes ^a was of *Sinope*, a City of *Pontus*. His Father's Name was *Isesius*, or, as others, *Ietes*; by Profession a Money-changer.

He was born (as appears by Computation from his Death, which was in the 90th Year of his Age, in the first Year of the 114th Olympiad, *Hegesias* being *Archon*) about the third Year of the 91st Olympiad. *Suidas* saith, he was first called *Cleon*.

Diocles saith, his Father trading publicly in Exchange of Money, was surprized coining false Money, and thereupon fled: But *Eubulides* saith, *Diogenes* himself did it, and fled together with his Father; even *Diogenes* in his *Podolus*, acknowledgeth as much. Some affirm, that being made Overseer, he was persuaded by the Workmen to go to *Delphi* or *Delus*, the Country of *Apollo*, to enquire of the Oracle if he should do that whereto he was advised, *μαχαράζει τὸ νόμισμα*, which is of ambiguous Signification, implying to alter the Course of Life, and to coin false Money. The Oracle assented. *Diogenes* not understanding it in the Civil Sense, betook himself to Coining, and being taken in the Act, was banished, or, as others say, fled for Fear: Some affirm, he adulterated the Money he received from his Father, for which the Father was cast into Prison, and there died; the Son fled, and coming to *Delphi*, enquired of the Oracle by what Means he should become eminent, whereupon he received that Answer.

When he left his Country, one of his Servants followed him, named *Manes*, who not enduring his Conversation, ran away from him; some persuaded *Diogenes* to enquire after him, who answered, Were it not a Shame, since *Manes* doth not need *Diogenes*, that *Diogenes* should need *Manes*? The Fellow wandering up and down, came at last to *Delphi*, where he was torn in Pieces by Dogs.

CHAP. II.

How he lived at Athens.

Coming to *Athens*, saith *Laertius* ^c, he applied himself to *Antisthenes*, following the Cynical Philosophy instituted by him. ^d *Antisthenes* having invited many to hear him, and but few coming, at last in Anger would not suffer any to come to him, and therefore bad *Diogenes* be gone also. *Diogenes* continuing to come frequently, he chid and threatened him, and at last struck him with his Staff. *Diogenes* would not go back, but persisting still in his Desire of hearing him, said, *Strike if you will, here is my Head, you cannot find a Staff hard enough to drive me from you, until you have instructed me.* *Antisthenes*, overcome with his Perseverance, admitted him, and made him his intimate Friend. From that Time forward he heard him.

Some affirm, saith *Laertius* ^e, he first wore a double Cloak, upon which he used to say [at Night]

^a *Laert.* 5. 20.

^b *Idem.* var. *Hist.* 23. 28.

^c *Laert.* 5. 28.

^d *Idem.* var. *Hist.* 23. 16.

^e *Laert.* 6. 93.

He likewise carried a Wallet, wherein was his Meat. He made Use of all Places for all Things, dining, sleeping, and discoursing in any Place, insomuch, that pointing to *Jupiter's* Walk, and the *Pompaum*, two publick Places at *Athens*, he said, the *Athenians* built them for his Dwelling. Falling once sick, he walked with a Staff, which afterwards he continually used, as likewise a Wallet, not in the City, but when he travelled. He wrote to one to build him a little House, which the other not doing so soon as he required, he made Use of a Tub in the *Metraum* to live in, as he declareth in his *Epistles*. In Summer he used to roll in the burning Sand; in Winter to embrace Statues covered with Snow, acquainting himself continually to Sufferance. A *Lacedæmonian* seeing him in this Posture in the Depth of Winter, asked him if he were not a cold; *Digenes* said, he was not: What you do then, replied the other, is no great Matter.

At first he used to beg, of which there are many Instances: He one Time begg'd of a Man thus, *If you have given to others, give also to me. If to none, begin with me.*

Another Time he begg'd of a Statue, whercof being demanded the Reason, *That I may the better, faith he, bear a Refusal.*

He requested something of a covetous Person, who delaying to give; *Man, faith he, I ask you is repaid in his rapine, Food, not a Grave.*

He requested something of a Person very obdurate, who answered, Yes, if you can persuade me to it; *Nay, replied he, if I were able to persuade you to any Thing, it should have been to have hanged yourself.*

Of a Prodigal he begged a *Mina*; the other asked why he begged a *Mina* of him, and of others but an *Obolus*: *Because, faith he, I hope to receive of others again; but whether I shall ever have any more of you, the Gods know.*

Being reproached that *Plato* begged not, but he begged; *Yes, faith he, he beggeth too; but*

*Close in your Ear,
Let others hear.*

Having received some little Money from *Diarmus* the *Carifian*, he said,

*The Gods afford thee thy Desire,
A Man and House —*

Alluding to his Effeminacy.

For this Reason he said, the Imprecations of Tragedians concurred in him, for he was without any City, without a House, deprived of his Country, a Beggar, a Vagabond, having his Livelihood only from Day to Day. And yet, adds *Ælian*,

he was more pleased with this Condition, than *Alexander* with the Command of the whole World, when having conquered the *Indians*, he returned to *Babylon*.

Seeing a Mouse, as *Theophrastus* saith, running up and down, he thence took Occasion of Comfort, considering it a Creature that looked not for Lodging, and was not displeased with Darknes, nor nice as to Diet.

He walked in the Snow bare-foot, and tried to eat raw Flesh, but could not.

He said, he imitated Singing-Masters, who raise their Voice too high, thereby to teach others the just Tone.

The *Athenians* loved him much; for a Youth having bored Holes in his Tub, they punished him, and gave *Digenes* a new one.

He used to perform the Offices of *Ceres* and *Venus* in publick, arguing thus; *If it be not absurd to dine, it is not absurd to dine even in the Market-place; but it is not absurd to dine, therefore it is not absurd to dine even in the Market-place.*

Keeping in the publick Forum; *I would, faith he, I could as easily satisfy my Hunger.*

As he dined in the Forum, some that were present called him Dog; *Nay, faith he, you are Dogs that stand about me when I am at Dinner.*

Being reproached for feeding in the open Forum, *In the Forum, faith he, I grew hungry.*

Being reproached that he drank in a Victualing-House; *And in a Barber's Shop, faith he, I am shaved.*

He lived without any Servant. Being demanded by one whether he would have a Maid-Servant, or a Man; he said, neither; Who then, answered the other, shall carry you out to your Grave when you die? *Digenes* replied, *he that wants a House.*

C H A P. III.

How he lived at Corinth.

IN his old Age he took a Voyage to *Ægina*, but was by the Way taken by some Pirates, the Name of whose Captein was *Scirpalus*. They carried him to *Crete*, and there exposed him to Sale; they asked him what he could do; he answered, *he could command Men*; and to the Cryer, he said, *If any Man wants a Master, let him buy me.* Offering to sit down, they would not suffer him, (it being the Custom of such as were to be sold for Slaves, to leap up and down) *'Tis no Matter for that, faith he, Fishes are sold whithersoever they lie*; adding, he wondered that Men, being to buy a Pot or Vessel, examine it curiously on the Inside; but if a Man, they are satisfied with his Look, and Outside. Pointing to a *Corinthian* richly attired that

f Plat. Apoth. Lac. g Laert. 6. 49. h Ælian. var. hist. 6. 27. i Laert. 6. 38. k Var. hist. 3. 29. l Laert. 6. 22.
a Laert. 6. 22. explained by Plutarch, de Rep. Stoic. n Laert. ibid. o Ibid. 6. 24.

passed by, named *Xeniades*, *Sell me*, saith he, *to that Man, for he wants a Master.* To *Xeniades*, as soon as he had bought him, he said, *Be sure you do as I command you*, he answered in the common Proverbial Verse,

The Springs of Rivers upwards run.

Diogenes replied, if being sick you had bought a Physician, would you obey his Advice, or would you say as before, *The Springs of Rivers upwards run.*

His Friends, according to *Cleomenes*, offered to redeem him; but he told them they were Fools, for Lyons were not Slaves to their Keepers, but the Keepers to the Lyons, for the Property of Servitude is to fear, and Men fear Beasts.

Xeniades having bought him, carried him to *Corinth*, & asked him what he would do; he answered, he knew how to command free Persons. *Xeniades* wondering at his Answer, set him at Liberty, and delivered his Sons to his Charge, saying, *take them my Children, and command them.*

He put the Government of his Family also into his Hands, which he acquitted himself of excellently well in every Thing, inasmuch that *Xeniades* said, *he had brought a good Genius into his House.*

He did not suffer the young Men that were under his Charge, to exercise themselves as Wrestlers, but only till they were warm, and for their Health's Sake. He taught them many Sayings of Poets by Heart, and some of his own; and that they might more easily remember the full Sum of Learning, he made a brief Collection thereof. He taught them at home to minister, using thin Diet, and drinking Water, to go negligently in Habit, shaven, without Coats, without Shoes, and silent, looking upon themselves as they went. He brought them up likewise to hunting. On the other Side, they took great Care of *Diogenes*, and recommended him to their Parents.

When *Alexander* was upon his Expedition against the *Persians*, many Philosophers came to salute him; the same Duty he expected from *Diogenes*, who was at that Time at the *Craneum*, a *Gymnasium* in *Corinth*, where he lived idly, not minding *Alexander*. *Alexander* therefore went and found him out, sitting in the Sun; he rose a little to look upon the great Crowd of People that came along with *Alexander*, who saluting him, asked *Diogenes* what he would desire of him; he answered, *that you would stand aside a little from betwixt me and the Sun.* Hezeat *Alexander* was so surprised, and so much admired his high Mind, that his Attendants in returning laughing thereat; but I, said he, were I not *Alexander*, would choose to be *Diogenes*.

CHAP. IV.

His Philosophy.

AND concerning Opinions, he said, there is a twofold *Exercitation*, one *spiritual*, the other *corporeal*; if in the first of these we employ ourselves constantly, frequent Phantasies will occur, which facilitate the Performance of Virtue; the one cannot be without the other, a good Habit and Strength being necessary, both in respect of the Soul and the Body.

That Virtue is easily acquired by Exercitation, he argued, in as much as in the Mechanick Arts and others, that Artifts by Practice quickly arrive at an extraordinary Readiness therein, and Wrestlers and Musicians excel one another according to the continual Pains they take therein, one more than another; and if they should have taken the same Pains about their Souls, it would not have been unprofitably and imperfectly employed.

He said, Nothing in Life can be rightly done without Exercitation; and that Exercitation could master any Thing; for whereas Men should chuse natural Labours, whereby they might live happily; they on the contrary make Choice of the unprofitable, and through their own Folly are in continual Misery. For even the Contempt of Pleasure, if we accustom ourselves thereto, will be most pleasant; and as they, who inure themselves to a voluptuous Life, cannot be taken off it without much Trouble and Grief; so they who exercise themselves in a contrary Manner, with as great Ease contemn even the Pleasures themselves.

He ascribed not so much to Law as to Nature; he affirmed that he followed the same Course of Life with *Hercules*, preferring nothing before Liberty.

He asserted that all Things belong to the Wife; arguing thus; *All Things belong to the Gods, the Gods are Friends to wise Persons; all Things are common amongst Friends; therefore all Things belong to the Wife.*

As concerning Law, he held that without it a Commonwealth could not be ordered; for, saith he, *Without a City there cannot be any Profit of civil Things; a City is a civil Thing; of Law without a City there is no Profit, therefore Law is civil.*

He derided *Nobility*, *Glory*, and the like, saying, they were the Ornaments or Veils of Wickedness, and that only a right Commonwealth ought to be honoured.

He held that there ought to be a Community of Women, conceiving Marriage to be nothing, and that every Man and Woman might enjoy one another as they pleased themselves, and consequently, that all Children should be in common.

He held that it was not unlawful to take any

Thing out of a Temple, or to feed upon living Creatures; neither was it impious to eat Man's Flesh, as appeared by the Practice of other Nations; adding that all Things are in all and by all: In Bread there is Flesh, in Flesh Bread; the Remainers of Flesh and Bread being insinuated by occult Passages into other Bodies, and evaporating in like Manner. This *Laertius* cites out of a Tragedy of his, named *Thyestes*, if, saith he, that Tragedy belongs to him, and not rather to *Philiscus* or *Pasiphaon*. *Musick, Geometry, Astronomy*, and the like, he rejected as unprofitable and unnecessary.

C H A P. V.

His Apophthegms.

HE was very acute, saith *Laertius*, in deriding others. He said *Euclid's* School was not *εὐχολα*, not *χολα*, not a School, but *Anger*, for the Diabecticks affected litigious Dispute. He said *Plato's* School was not *διδασκαλία*, but *κατασκαλία*, not Exercise, but Consumption.

He said, when, he look'd upon *Pilots, Physicians* and *Philosophers*, Man was the wisest of all Creatures; but when he looked upon *Interpreters* of Dreams, *Prophets*, or Persons puffed up with Wealth or Honours, nothing is more foolish than Man.

He said, that he often found it convenient in Life to have ready an Answer, or a Rope.

At a great Feast, seeing *Plato* eat Olives; Why saith he, you being a wife Man, and going to *Sicily* for such Entertainments, did you not enjoy them? He answered, By the Gods, *Diogenes*, I fed upon Olives there likewise, as well as upon other Things. *Diogenes* replied, why then needed you to have gone to *Syracuse*, were there no Olives at that Time in *Attica*? This *Phavorinus* ascribes to *Aristippus*, adding, that as he was eating Figs, he met him, and said, Taste; the other taking and eating; I bad you, saith he, taste, and not devour.

In the Presence of some Friends of *Plato*, sent to him by *Dionysius*, *Diogenes* trod under Foot *Plato's* Robe, saying, I tread under Foot *Plato's* Pride: But *Diogenes*, answered *Plato*, how proud are you yourself, when you think you contemn Pride? *Sextim* relates this as said to the *Cynick* by *Plato*.

Diogenes sent to *Plato* for Wine and Figs, he sent him a large Vessel of Wine and Figs; whereupon *Diogenes*, As you, saith he, being demanded how much two and two are, answer twenty, so you neither grant what I request, nor answer what I demand, thus censuring his Verbosity.

Being demanded in what Part of *Greece* he had seen good Men: *Men*, saith he, *no where*, but good Boys at *Lacedemon*.

Making a serious Discourse, and perceiving that no Man came to hear him, he began to sing, whereat a great many gathered together, whom he reproached for coming to Trifles, being so backward to serious Things.

He said, Men contested in undermining or kicking, but none about Goodness.

He wondered at Grammarians, who enquiring after the Misfortunes of *Ulysses*, forgot their own; and at Musicians, who whilst they tune their Instruments, have discordant Affections in their Souls; and at the Mathematicians, that gazing upon the Sun and Moon, neglecting what was just at their Feet; and at Orators, who studied to speak just Things, and neglected to act them; and lastly, at covetous Persons, for dispraising Money, which they loved above all Things.

He reprehended those, who tho' they commended just Men for thinking themselves to be above Money, yet esteemed the Rich happy.

* He was angry at those, who when they sacrificed to the Gods for their Health, feasted at the same Time contrary to their Health.

He wondered at Servants, who seeing their Masters eat excessively, did not take away their Meat.

He praised those, who being about to marry, would not marry; who being about to go to Sea, would not go to Sea; who being about to undertake some publick Office, would not undertake it; and who being about to bring up Children, forbore to bring them up; and who would compose themselves to live with great Men, yet never went to them.

He said, when we stretch out our Hand to our Friend, we should never clutch our Fist.

One bringing him into a new House, and forbidding him to spit, he spit in his Face, saying, he could not find a worse Place. Some ascribe this to *Aristippus*.

Crying out upon a Time, *Men come hither*, a great many flocked about him, whom he fell upon with his Stick, and beat them, saying, *I called Men, not Varlets*. This *Hecaton* in his *Chria* relates.

Alexander said, If he had not been born *Alexander*, he would have desired to have been born *Diogenes*.

He said, They were not maimed who were dumb and blind, but they who had not a Wallet.

Going once half thaven to a Feast of young Men, as *Metrales* relates, they beat him, whereupon he took their Names, and setting them down in a Parchment-Roll, he wore it at his Brest, whereby being known, they were reviled and beaten. He said, he was the Dog of the praised, but none of the Praisers durst go a hunting with him.

To one saying, At the Pythian Games I overcame Men; No, saith he, *I the Men, you the Slaves.*

To those who said to him, You are now old, take your Ease; *What, saith he, if I were to run a Race, should I give over when I were almost at the End, or rather contest with greater Courage?*

Finding Demosthenes the Orator at Dinner in a common Victualling-house, who ashamed would have stolen away; Nay, saith he, you are now the more popular. *Ælian* relates it thus, *Diogenes* being at Dinner at a common Victualling-house, and seeing *Demosthenes* pass by, invited him in, *Demosthenes* refusing; Do you think it, saith *Diogenes*, a Disparagement to dine here, when your Masters dine here every Day? meaning the common People, to whom Orators are but Servants.

To some Strangers, who were desirous to see *Demosthenes*, pointing to him with his middle Finger, *This, saith he, is he that leads the Athenians.*

In reproof to one who had thrown away his Bread, and was ashamed to take it up again, he tied a String about the Neck of a Bottle, and dragged it after him thro' the *Cerameick*.

He said most Men were mad *præter digitum*, all but the Finger; if any Man should walk pointing with his middle Finger, he will be thought mad; if his fore Finger, not so.

He said the most precious Things were sold cheapest, and so on the contrary; for a Statue will cost 3000 Pieces of Silver, a Peck of Wheat, two Pieces of Brafs.

To one who came to him to study Philosophy, he gave a Fish, and bid him follow him; the other ashamed, threw it away, and departed. Not long after, meeting the same Person, he laughing, said, *The Friendship betwixt you and me was broke off by a Fish.* *Diocles* relates it thus; One saying to him, *Command me*, *Diogenes*; he gave him a Pennyworth of Cheese to bring after him, the other refusing to carry it, *Our Friendship*, saith he, *a Pennyworth of Cheese hath dissolved.*

Seeing a Boy drink Water in the Hollow of his Hand, he took his little Cup out of his Wallet and threw it away, saying, *The Boy out-went him in Frugality.* He threw away his Dish also, seeing a Boy that had broken his, supping up his Broth in the same manner.

Seeing a Woman prostrate herself unhandfomly in Prayer, and desirous to reprove her Superstition, as *Zoilus* the *Pergæan* reports, came to her, and said, *Are you not ashamed, Woman, that God who stands behind you (for all Things are full of him) should see you in this undecent Posture?*

He said, such as beat others, ought to be consecrated to *Æsculapius*, the God of Chirurgery.

He said, *Against Fortune we must oppose Courage; against Nature, Law; against Passion, Reason.*

In the *Craneum*, *Alexander* standing by him, as the Sun shone, said to him, *Ask of me what thou wilt;* he answer'd, *Do not stand between me and the Sun.*

One reading a long tedious Discourse, and coming at last near a blank Leaf at the End of the Book, *Be of good Courage, Friend*, saith he, *I see Land.*

To one proving, by the horned Syllogism, that he had Horns, he feeling on his Forehead, *But I, saith he, feel none.* In like manner, another maintaining, *there was no such Thing as Motion*, he rose up and walked. To one disputing concerning Meteors, *How long is it, saith he, since you came from Heaven?*

A wicked Man having written over the Door of his House, *Let no ill Thing enter here.* *Which Way then, saith he, must the Master come in?*

He anointed his Feet with sweet Unguents, saying, *The Scent went from the Crown of his Head into the Air, but from his Feet to his Nostrils.*

To some *Athenians*, that persuaded him to be initiated into some religious Mysteries, alledging, that such as were initiated had the chiefest Places in the other World. *It is ridiculous, saith he, if *Agæsilæus* and *Epaminondas* live there among Bogs, and the common People that are initiated, live in the blessed Island.* Or, as *Plutarch*, hearing these Verses of *Socrates*,

—*Thrice happy they
Who do these Mysteries survey:
They only after Death are blest'd,
All Miseries pursue the rest.*

*What, saith he, shall *Patrocion* the Thief be in better Condition (because he was initiated) than *Epaminondas*?*

Mice coming to him as he was at Dinner, *See, saith he, *Diogenes* also maintaineth Parasites.*

Diogenes being present at a Discourse of *Plato's*, would not mind it; whereat *Plato* angry, said, *Thou Dog, why mindst thou not?* *Diogenes* unmoved, answered, *Yet I never return to the Place where I was sold, as Dogs do, alluding to *Plato's* Voyage to Sicily.*

Returning from a Bath, one ask'd him, *If there were many Men there?* He said, *No.* The other asking him, *if there were much Company?* He said, *there was.*

Plato defining Man a two-footed Animal without Wings, and this Definition being approved, *Diogenes* took a Cock, and plucking off all its Feathers, turned it into *Plato's* School, saying, *This is *Plato's* Man;* whereupon to the Definition was added, *Having broad Nails.*

To one, demanding at what Time he should

ance, *If thou art rich, faith he, when thou wilt ; if poor, when thou canst.*

At Megara, seeing their Sheep with thick Fleeces, and their Children almost naked, *It is better, faith he, to be the Sheep of a Megarean, than his Son.*

To one, who hitting him with the End of a long Pole, bade him take heed, *Why, faith he, do you mean to hit me again?*

He said, *the Orators were the Servants of the Multitude ; Crowns, the Boils of Glory.*

He lighted a Candle at Noon, saying, *I look for a Man.*

He stood in the Rain without any Shelter ; some that were present pitying him, *Plato, who was there likewise, said, If you will show yourselves pitiful to him, go away, reflecting upon his Vain-glory.*

One giving him a box on the Ear, *O Hercules, faith he, I knew not that I should have walked with a Helmet.*

Medias giving him many Blows with his Fist, saying, *There are three thousand Drachms [alluding to the Fines imposed upon such Outrages] ready counted for you upon the Table.* The next Day he got a Cassis, and beat him with it, saying, *There are three thousand Drachms ready counted for you.*

Lycias, an Apothecary, ask'd him, *if he thought there were many Gods.* How, faith he, *can I think otherwise, when I take you to be their Enemy ?* Others ascribe this to Theodorus.

Seeing one that had besprinkled himself with Water, *O unhappy Man, faith he, dost thou not know that the Errors of Life are no more to be wash'd away by Water, than Errors in Grammar ?*

He rebuked those who complained of Fortune, saying, *They did not request what was good, but that which seemed good to them.*

Of those who are terrified with Dreams, he said, *You never are concerned for the Things you do waking, but what you fancy in your sleep you make your greatest Business.*

At the Olympick Games, the Cryer proclaiming, *Diexippus hath overcome Men ; He Slaves, faith he, but I Men.*

Alexander sending an Epistle to Antipater at Athens, by one whose Name was Attilias, Diogenes being present said, *Attilias from Attilias, by Attilias to Attilias, alluding to the Name, which implieth Mijery.*

Perdiccas threatening him with Death, unless he would come unto him ; *that is no great Matter, faith he, for a Cantharides or Spider may do as much ; you should rather have threatened, that you would have lived well without me.*

He often said, *the Gods had given to Men an easy Life, but that it was hidden from those who used choice Diet, Unguents, and the like ; whence to one*

whose Servant put on his Cloaths, *You will not be truly happy, faith he, until he wipe your Nose also, that is, when you have left the Use of your Hands.*

Seeing some that had the Charge of the Things belonging to the Temple, leading a Man to Prison, who had stolen a Cup out of the Treasury, the great Thieves, faith he, *lead Prisoners the lesser.*

To a young Man that was throwing Stones at a Gibbet, *Well done, faith he, you will be sure to hit the Mark.*

To some young Men that coming about him, said, *Take heed you do not bite us.* Fear not Boys, faith he, *Diogenes eats not Beets [for so he termed effeminate Persons.]*

To one Feasting, clothed in a Lion's Skin, *Do not, faith he, defile Virtue's Livery.*

To one extolling the Happiness of Callisthenes, in that living with Alexander he had plenty of all Things. Nay, faith he, *he is not happy, for he dines and sups when Alexander pleases.*

When he wanted Money, he said he went to redemand, not borrow of his Friends.

Seeing a young Man going along with some great Persons to a Feast, he took him from them, and carried him to his own Friends, bidding them to look to him better.

To one neatly dressed, who had ask'd him some Question, *I cannot answer you, faith he, unless I know whether you were a Man or a Woman.*

Of a young Man playing at Cottabus in a Bath, *By how much the better, faith he, so much the worse.*

At a Feast, one threw a Bone to him as to a Dog, which he, like a Dog, took up, and lifting his Leg, *συνέσπευον αὐτοῖς*

Orators, and all such as fought Glory by Speaking, he called *τρεῖς ἀνθρώπων*, thrice Men, instead of *τρίσβητος*, thrice wretched.

He called an unlearned rich Man a Sheep with a Golden Fleec.

Seeing written upon the Gates of a Prodigal's House, *To be Sold, I knew, faith he, being so overcharg'd with Wine, it would vomit up the Owner.*

To a young Man, professing himself much displeased at the many Persons that courted him, *Let him see, faith he, that you are displeased, by casting off your Effeminacy.*

Of a foul Bath, where, faith he, *shall they be washed that wash here ?*

A big Fellow that play'd on the Harp, tho' by all others discommended for playing ill, he praised ; being ask'd why, *Because, faith he, being an able Fellow, he chooseth rather to play on the Harp than to steal.*

A certain Harper who play'd so ill, that the Company always went away and left him, he faluted thus, *Good-morrow, Cock ; the other askin-*

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why, *because, faith he, your Musick maketh every one rise.*

Seeing a young Man doing something, which tho' 'twere ordinary, he conceiv'd to be unseemly, he filled his Bosom with Beans, and in that Manner walked thro' the People, to whom gazing upon him, *I wonder, faith he, you look at me, and not at him.*

Hegesias desiring to lend him some of his Writings, *You are a Fool, faith he, Hegesias, who eat Figs not painted, but real; yet neglect true Exercise, and seek after the written.*

Seeing one that had won the Victory at the Olympick Exercises, feeding Sheep; *you have made haste, faith he, good Man, from the Olympick Exercises to the Nemæan, the Word alluding to the Feeding of Simeon.*

Being demanded how it cometh to pass that Wrestlers are for the most Part stupid Fellows, he answered, *because they are made chiefly of the Skins of Oxen and Swine.*

To a Tyrant, demanding of him what Brass was best, he answered, *that whereof the Statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton were made.* This others ascribe to *Plato*.

Being asked how *Dionysius* useth his Friends, as *Vessels*, faith he, *emptying the full, and throwing away the empty.*

A young Man newly married, having written upon his House, *The Son of Jupiter, Hercules, Callinicus dwelleth here, let nothing ill enter;* he added, *Assistance after a Defeat,* implying it was too late, he being already married.

He said Covetousness is the Metropolis of all Evil.

Seeing one that had wasted all his Means, eating Olives, *If you had used to dine so,* said he, *you would not have suppd' so.*

He said, *Good Men are the Images of the Gods, Love is the Business of idle Persons.*

Being asked what is the most miserable Thing in Life, he said, *an old Man in want.*

Being demanded, the Bittings of what Beasts were most dangerous; *of wild Beasts, faith he, a Flatterer; of Tame, a Flatterer.*

Beholding a Picture of two Centaurs very ill painted, he said, *Which of these is Chiron?* The best consisteth in the Greek Word, which signifieth worse, and was also the Name of a Centaur, Tutor to *Achilles*.

He said, *the Discourse of Flatterers is a Rope of Honey.* He called the Billy the *Charybdis of Life*.

Hearing that *Didymo*, an Adulterer was taken; he deserves, faith he, *to be put out of his Name* (meaning emasculated.)

Being asked why Gold looks pale; *because, faith he, many lie wait for it.*

Seeing a Woman carried in a Litter; *that is not, faith he, a fit Cage for such a Beast.*

Seeing a Servant that had run away from his Master, sitting upon the Brink of a Well: *Young Man, faith he, take Heed you do not fall in: Alluding to the Punishment of fugitive Servants.*

Seeing one that used to steal Garments in the Bath; he said, *ἐν ἀποκαλύψει ἢ ἐν ἄλλο ἰσχυρίσῃ. Do you come for Unguents, or for another Garment?*

Seeing some Women hanged upon an Olive-tree; I would, faith he, *all Trees bore the same Fruit.*

Seeing a Thief that used to rob Tombs, he spoke to him in that Verse of *Homer*,

— *What now of Men the best,
Com'st thou to plunder the Deceas't?*

Seeing a handsome Youth all alone asleep, he awaked him, saying in the Words of *Homer*, *A wake.*

Μὴ τίς σοι ἰδὼνς μισανγῶν ἐν δόμῳ κίχῃ.

To one that feasted sumptuously, he said that Verse of *Homer*.

Sen thou hast but a little Time to live.

Plato discoursing concerning *Ideas*, and naming *ταμνίζῃς*, and *καθίζῃς*, as if he should say, *Tableity and Cuppeity*, he said, *I see Plato, the Table and the Cup, but not the Tableity and Cuppeity.* *Plato* answered, *It is true indeed, you have Eyes by which the Table and Cup are seen; but not an Intellect, by which Tableity and Cuppeity are seen.*

Being demanded what he thought *Socrates*; he answered, *mad.* Being demanded at what Time a Man should marry; *a young Man, faith, not yet; an old Man not at all.*

To one that asked, what he should give him to let him strike him, he answered, *a Helmet.*

To a young Man dressing himself neatly; *'if this, faith he, be for the Sake of Men, you are unhappy, if for Women, you are unjust.*

Seeing a young Man blush; *Take Courage, faith he, that is the Colour of Virtue.*

Hearing two Men plead against one another, he condemned both, saying, *One had stolen, the other had not lost.*

Being demanded what Wine he thought most pleasant, he answered, *That which is drunk at another's Cost.*

To one that said, many deride thee; he answered, *but I am not derided: As conceiving,*

faith *Plutarch*, * those only to be derided, who are troubled at such Things.

To one who said, Life is an ill Thing: *Life*, faith he, *is not an ill Thing, but an ill Life is an ill Thing.*

* As he was dining upon Olives, they caused a Tart to be set before him, which he threw away, saying,

Stranger, when Kings approach, withdraw.

The Words of *Laius's* Officers to *Oedipus*.

Being asked what Kind of Dog he was, he answered, *When he was hungry, a Spaniel; when his Belly was full, a Mastiff; one of those which many commend, but dare not take Abroad with them a hunting.*

Being demanded whether wife Men might eat Dainties; *all Things*, faith he, *as well as others.*

Being demanded why Men gave to Beggars, and not to Philosophers; *because*, faith he, *they are afraid they may be lame or blind, but are not afraid they may be Philosophers.*

To one that reproached him as having counterfeited Money; *indeed*, faith he, *there was a Time when I was such a one as you are; but the Time will never come that you will be as I am.*

Coming to *Mindus*, and seeing the Gates very large, the City small, *Mindinians*, faith he, *shut your Gates, lest your City run out at them.*

Seeing a Thief that was taken stealing Purple, he applied that Verse of *Homer* to him,

The Purple Death, and potent Fate have seiz'd.

To *Craterus*, who invited him to come to him, he returned Answer, *I had rather lick Salt at Athens, than enjoy the greatest Delicacies with Craterus.*

Meeting *Anaximenes* the Orator, who was very fat; give us, faith he, *some of your Flesh, it will ease you, and help us.*

The same *Anaximenes* being in the Midst of a Discourse, *Diogenes* shewing a Piece of Salt-fish, diverted the Attention of his Auditors; whereat *Anaximenes* growing angry, *see*, faith he, *a hardennyworth of Salt-fish hath broke off Anaximenes's Discourse.*

Some ascribe this to him. *Plato* seeing him wash Herbs, came and whispered thus to him; if you had followed *Dionysius*, you would not have needed to wash Herbs; to whom he returned this Answer in his Ear, *If you had washed Herbs, you needed not to have followed Dionysius.*

To one that said to him, many laugh at you;

And Affes perhaps at them, faith he, *but they care not for Affes, nor I for them.*

Seeing a young Man studying Philosophy: Well done, faith he, you will teach those who love your outward Beauty, to admire your Soul.

To one that admired the Multitude of votive Offerings in *Samothracia*, given by such as had escaped Shipwreck: *There would have been far more*, faith he, *if those who perished had presented theirs.* Others ascribe this to *Diagoras* the *Melian*.

To a young Man going to a Feast, he said, You will come back *Chiron* (alluding to the Word which implieth *worse*) the young Man came to him the next Day, saying, I went and returned not *Chiron*: No, faith he, *not Chiron but Eurition.*

Returning from *Lacedæmon* to *Athens*, to one that asked him from whence he came, and whither he went: *From Men*, faith he, *to Women.*

Returning from the Olympick Games, to one that asked if there were much People there; *Much People*, faith he, *but few Men.*

He compared Prodigals to Fig trees growing on a Precipice, whose Fruit Men taste not, but Crows and Vultures devour.

Phryne the *Curtizan* having set up a golden Statue of *Venus* at *Delphi*, he wrote on it, *From the Intemperance of the Grecians.*

Alexander coming to him, and saying, I am *Alexander* the great King: *And I*, faith he, *am Diogenes the Dog.*

Being asked why he was called *Dog*: *I fawn on those that give*, faith he, *I bark at those that will not give, and I bite the Wicked.*

As he was gathering Figs, the Keeper of the Orchard spying him, told him, it is not long since a Man was hang'd upon that Tree: *And for that Reason*, faith he, *I will cleanse it.*

* Observing *Dioxippus* the Olympick Victor, to cast many Glances upon the *Curtizan*: *See*, faith he, *a common Woman leads the martial Ram by the Neck.*

To two infamous Persons stealing away from him; *Fear not*, faith he, *Dogs eat not Thieves.*

To one that asked him concerning a Youth taken in Adultery, whence he was; he answered, *Of Tegea*; *Tegea* (a City of *Arcadia*) whereto he alluded, is a publick Brothel.

Seeing one that in former Times had been an ill Wrestler, profess Medicine; *What is the Matter*, faith he, *have you a Design to cast those down that have thrown you?*

Seeing the Son of a common Woman throw Stones amongst a Crowd; *Take Heed*, faith he, *you do not hit your Father.*

To a Youth, shewing him a Sword, given him by one that loved him, he said, *ἡ μὲν μάχαιρα καλὴ ἡ δὲ λαεὶ ἀσχεδὴ.*

To some that extolled one who had bestowed something on him; *But you do not praise me, saith he, who deserve to receive it.*

To one that redemanded an old Cloak of him, *If you give it me, saith he, I must keep it; if you lent it me, I must make Use of it.*

To a supposititious Person that said to him, *You have Gold in your Cloak, I'et, saith he, and for that Reason I lay it 'under me when I go to sleep.*

Being demanded what he had gained by Philosophy, *If nothing else, saith he, at least this, to be prepared for all Fortunes.*

Being demanded of what Country he was, he answered, *A Citizen of the World.*

To one that sacrificed, praying he might have a Child, *You pray for a Child, saith he, but never trouble yourself what Kind of Child it may prove.*

At an Ordinary, being demanded Money, he answered the Master in that Verse of Homer,

Ask others, but from HecTOR hold thy Hand.

He said, *The Mistresses of Kings were Queens, for the Kings did whatsoever they would have them.*

The Athenians having decreed to stile Alexander, Bacchus; *And make me, saith he, Scapin.*

To one reproaching him for living in filthy Places, *The Sun, saith he, visits Kennels, yet is not defiled.*

Being at Supper in the Temple, they brought him coarse Bread, he threw it away, saying, *No-thing but what is pure must come within a Temple.*

To one that said, *Why do you, who know nothing, profess Philosophy?* He answered, *Tho' I should but pretend to study Philosophy, yet that were a Profession thereof.*

To one that recommended his Son to him, saying, he was very ingenious, and exceeding well educated; He answered, *If by then doth he need me?*

Those who speak good Things, but do them not, differ nothing from a Lute, for that neither learn, nor hath Sense.

He went to the Theatre, as all the People were going out; being asked why he did so, *This, saith he, is that I study all my Lifetime.*

Seeing an effeminate young Man, *Are you not ashamed, saith he, to use yourself worse than Nature hath done? She hath made you a Man, but you will force yourself to be a Woman.*

Seeing an ignorant Man tuning a Lute, *Are you not ashamed, saith he, to try to make a Lute sound harmoniously, and yet suffer your Life to be so full of Discord?*

To one that said he was unfit for Philosophy,

Why do you live, saith he, if you care not for living honestly?

To one who despised his own Father, *Are you not ashamed, saith he, to despise him who is the Cause you are so proud?*

Hearing a handsome Youth speak foolishly, *Are you not ashamed, saith he, to draw a Leaden Dagger out of an Ivory Sheath?*

Being reproached for accepting a Cloak from Antipater, he answered in those Words of Homer,

The Gifts of Gods must not be thrown away.

One that hit him with a Pole, and then bid him take Heed, he struck with his Staff, and said, *and take you Heed.*

To one that sued to a Curtesan, *What mean you, Wretch, saith he, to sue for that which is much better to miss?*

To one that smelled sweet of Unguents, *Take Heed, saith he, this Perfume make not your Life sink.*

He said, *Slaves serve their Masters, and wicked Men their Passions.*

Being demanded why Slaves are called *Ἀνδράποδα*, Footmen, because, saith he, *they have Feet like Men, but such Minds as you that ask the Question.*

Seeing an unskilful Archer going to shoot, he sat down at the Mark, *Left, saith he, he should hit me.*

He said, *Lovers are unhappy in Pleasure.*

Being demanded whether Death be ill, *How, saith he, can that be ill, whereof when it cometh we have no Sense?*

Alexander coming to him, and saying, *Do you not fear me? What, saith he, are you Good or Ill? He answered, Good; Who, replies Diogenes, fears that which is Good.*

He said, *Learning is a Regulation to young Men, a Comfort to old Men, Wealth to poor Men, and an Ornament to rich Men.*

To Didymus an Adulterer curing a Maid's Eye, *Take Heed, saith he, lest in curing the Eye you hurt not the Ball, [the Word *οφθαλμὸς* signifying both Eye ball and Virginity.]*

To one that said, his Friends lay in wait for him, *What then is to be done, if Friends and Enemies must be used alike?*

Being demanded what is best amongst Men, he answered, *Freedom of Speech.*

Coming into a School, and seeing there many Statues of the Muses, but few Auditors, *By the Help of the Gods, Master, saith he, you have many Auditors.*

To one that asked him how he might order himself best, *By reprehending, saith he, those Things in yourself which you blame in others.*

He gave good Counsel to a Person very dispo-

1 The Jest consisteth in the Allusion betwixt two Greek Words *ἐπιδιδακταί* and *ἐπιδιδακταί*.

m S:ob. Eth. Ser. 3.

n Ser. 4.

lute; being demanded what he was doing, he answered, *Washing an Ethiopian.*

He went backwards into the School of the *Sticks*, whereat some laughing, *Are you ashamed, faith he, to do that in the whole Course of your Life, for which you deride me in Walking?*

He said, *Men provide for their Living, but not for their well Living.*

He said, *It was a Shame to see Wrestlers and Singing-Masters observe temperate Diet, and moderate their Pleasures, one for Exercise, the other for his Voice, and yet no Man would do so much for Virtue's Sake.*

He said, *Pride, like a Shepherd, driveth Men whither it pleaseth.*

Seeing the high Walls of *Megara*, he said, *Unhappy People, mind not the Height of your Walls, but the Height of their Courage, who are to stand on the Walls.*

He compared covetous Men to such as have the Dropsy, these are full of Money, yet desire more; these have Water, yet thirst after more: Passions grow more intense by Enjoyment of what they desire.

Seeing a Man make Love to an old rich Widow; *This Love, faith he, is not blind but toothless.*

Being demanded what Beasts were the worst? *In the Field, faith he, Bears and Lions; in the City, Usurers and Sycophants.*

He compared Flattery to an empty Tomb, on which Friendship was inscribed.

Blaming *Antisthenes* for being too remiss in Discourse, in regard that when he spoke loudest, he could hardly be heard, and calling himself the Trumpet of Reproof; *Antisthenes* replied, *He was like a Bee, that makes no great Noise, yet stings sharply.*

He said, *Reproof is the good of others.*

A certain *Athenian* asking him why he lived not with the *Lacedaemonians*, whom he praised so much; *Physicians, faith he, tho' they study Health, converse with the Sick.*

He said, *Other Dogs bark at their Enemies, I my Friends, that I may preserve them.*

He asked *Plato*, if he were writing *Laws*; *Plato* affirmed he was. *Did you not write a Commonwealth before, faith Diogenes? I did, answers Plato. And had not that Commonwealth Laws, said he? The other answering it had; To what End, replied Diogenes, do you write new Laws?*

He said, *To give Physick to a dead Body, or advise an old Man, is the same Thing.*

To a bald Man that reviled him, *I will not return your Reproaches, faith he, yet cannot but commend your Hair, for leaving so bad a Head.*

To an Informer that fell out with him; *I am glad, faith he, of the Enmity betwixt us, for you hurt not your Foe, but your Friends.*

To one that reviled him; *No Man, faith he, will believe you when you speak ill of me, no more than they would me, if I should speak well of you.*

Alexander sent him a Dish full of Bones with this Message, it was meet for Dogs; he answered, *Yea, but not for a King to send.*

He said, *It was the same Fault to give to them that deserved nothing, as not to give to them that do.*

He said, *At Houses where there is Plenty of Meat are full of Mice, so the Bodies of such as eat much, are full of Diseases.*

At a Feast, one giving him a great Cup full of Wine, he threw it away, for which being blamed, *If I had drunk it, faith he, not only the Wine would have been lost, but I also.*

Being demanded what was hardest, he answered, *To know ourselves, for we construe most Things according to our own Partiality.*

He said, *Medea* was a wise Woman, and not a Witch, who by Labour and Exercise corroborated the Bodies of effeminate Persons, whence arose the Fable, that she could renew Age.

To one that professed himself a Philosopher, but argued litigiously, he said, *Why do you spoil the best Part of Philosophy, yet would be thought a Philosopher?*

Questioning one of those young Men that followed him, he was silent; whereupon *Diogenes*, *Do you not think, faith he, it belongs to the same Man to know when to speak, and when to hold his Peace?*

Being demanded how a Man should live under the Authority of Superiors; as we do by Fire, faith he, not too near, lest it burn; not too far off, lest we freeze.

Seeing some Women talk privately together, he said, *The Asp borrows Poison from the Viper.*

Being demanded what was the heaviest Burden the Earth bears, he answered, *An ignorant Man.*

An Astrologer in the Forum, discoursing to the People, and shewing them in a Tablet the Erratick Stars; *No, faith Diogenes, it is not the Stars that err, but these, pointing to the People.*

Being demanded what Men are the most noble; *They, faith he, who contemn Wealth, Glory, and Pleasure, and over-master the Contraries to these, Poverty, Ignominy, Pain, Death.*

Seeing the Servants of *Anaximenes*, carrying many Goods, he demanded to whom they belonged; they answered, to *Anaximenes*. Is he not ashamed, replied *Diogenes*, to have so much Household Stuff, and yet not be Master of himself?

He said, *Virtue dwelleth neither in a rich City, nor a private House.*

He said, *Poverty is a self-taught Help to Philosophy; for what Philosophy endeavours to persuade by Words, Poverty enforceth in Practice.*

o Ser. 4. p Ibid. q Ser. 64. r Ser. 7. s Ibid. t Ser. 14. u Ser. 13. w Ibid. x Ibid. y Ibid. z Ibid.
 a Ibid. b Ibid. c Ibid. d Ser. 8. e Ser. 53. f Ser. 54. g Ibid. h Ser. 67. i Ibid. k Ibid. l Ser. 69.
 m Ser. 87. n Ser. 29. o Ser. 23. p Ser. 34. q Ser. 104. & 105. r Ser. 284. s Ser. 134. t Ser. 83. u Ser.
 139. w Ser. 140. x Ser. 91. y Ser. 93.

* To a wicked Man reproaching him for his Poverty; *I never knew, faith he, any Man punished for Poverty, but many for Wickedness.*

* He called Poverty a self-instructing Virtue.

* To one that reproached him with Poverty; *What mean you, faith he? Poverty never made a Tyrant, Riches many.*

* Alexander seeing him asleep in his Tub, said, *O Tub full of Wisdom.* The Philosopher rising up, answered, *Great King,*

*One Drop of Fortune's better far,
Than Tubs replete with Wisdom are.*

To whom a Stander-by replied,

*One Drop of Wisdom, Fortune's Seas excells,
In unwise Souls Misfortune ever dwells.*

* Seeing an old Woman painted, *If this be for the Living you are deceived, faith he, if for the Dead, make Haste to them.*

* To one bewailing his own Misfortune, as that he should not die in his own Country, *Be of Comfort, faith he, the Way to the next World is alike in every Place.*

* Having a great Pain in his Shoulder which troubled him much, one said to him in Derision, *Why dost thou not die, Diogenes, and free thyself from this Misery?* He answered, *It is fit they should live, who know how to order their Life; for you who know not what to do or say, it is a convenient Time to die.*

* He used to say, Aristotle dineth when Philip pleaseth, but Diogenes when it pleaseth Diogenes.

* At Corinth, seeing Dionysius the younger, who was deposed from the Kingdom of Sicily, *This is a Life, faith he, you deserve not, you merit rather not to live here freely and without Fear, but at home in perpetual Imprisonment.*

* To some who commended Plato, he said, *What hath he done worthy Commendation, having professed Philosophy so long, yet never moved any to Grief.*

* To one demanding how he might take the greatest Revenge upon his Enemy, he answered, *By being good and virtuous yourself.*

* In commending his Master Antisthenes, he would say of him, *Of Rich, he made me Poor; and instead of a fair House, made me live in a Tub.*

C H A P. VI.

His Writings.

OF the Writings ascribed to him are these.

Dialogues.

a Ser. 93. a Ibid.

b Ser. 95.

c Ibid.

d Ser. 270.

e Ser. 96.

f Æl. var. hist. 10, 11.

g Plut. de Exil.

h Plut. quorum. ger. Resp.

i Plut. de vert. Moral.

k Plut. aud. de Poet.

l Macrob. Sat. 7. 3.

m Laert. 6. 79. var. hist. 1. 25.

*Ichthyas.
The Geay.
The Leopard.
The Athenian People.
Policy.*

*Ethick Art.
Of Riches.
Erotick.
Theodorus.
Hypias.
Aristarchus.
Of Death.
Epistles.
Tragedies, 7. viz.
Helena.
Thyestes.
Hercules.
Achilles.
Medea.
Chrysippus.
OEdipus.*

Socrates and Satyrus affirm, that none of these were written by Diogenes; the Tragedies Satyrus ascribes to Philiscus of Ægina, Socion affirmeth these only to have been written by Diogenes.

*Of Virtue.
Of Good.
Erotick.
The Poor.
The Tolerant.
The Leopard.
Cassander.
Cephalio.
Philiscus.
Aristarchus.
Sisiphus.
Ganymede.
Chrias, and Epistles.*

C H A P. VII.

His Death.

HE^m died, as Demetrius faith, at Corinth, about 90 Years old, the same Day that Alexander died at Babylon; which, according to Ælian, was the seventh of Thargelion, in the first Year of the 114th Olympiad.

The Manner of his Death is variously related. Eubulus faith, he lived to his End with Xenias, and was buried by his Sons. As he lay sick, Xenias asked him how he would be buried; he answered, with his Face downward; Xenias demanding the Reason, *Because, faith he, all Things will be turned upside down; alluding, faith Laertius, to the Greatness of the Macedonians, who not long before were a poor inconsiderable People.* Some

report, that being near Death, he gave Order that his Body should be left unburied, that the wild Beasts might partake of him, or be thrown into a Ditch, and a little Dust be cast over it; or thrown upon a Dunghill, that he might benefit his Brethren.

^a *Ælian* saith, that being sick to Death, he threw himself down from a Bridge which was near the Gymnasium, and ordered the Keeper of the *Palestra* to take his Body and throw it into the River *Ilissus*.

Others affirm, he died of a Surfeit of raw Flesh; others, that he stop'd his own Breath; others, that cutting a Cuttle-fish in Pieces to throw it to Dogs, it bit asunder a Nerve in his Foot, whereof he died.

Others affirm, he died as he was going to the Olympick Games: Being taken with a Fever, he lay down by the Way, and would not suffer his Friends to carry him; but sitting under the Shade of the next Tree, spoke thus to them; *This Night I shall be a Victor, or vanquished; if I overcome the Fever, I will come to the Games; if not, I must go to the other World, and drive it away by Death.*

Antisthenes saith ^a, his Friends were of Opinion he stop'd his own Breath; for coming, as they

^a Var. hist. 3. 14.

constantly used, to visit him in the *Cranæum* where he lived, they found him covered. They did not imagine it was Sleep, by Reason of his great Wakefulness; but immediately putting back his Cloak, perceived he was dead. Hereupon there arose a Contention amongst them who should bury him; they fell from Words to Blows; but the Magistrates and great ones of the City, came themselves and buried him by the Gate which leads to *Isthmus*. Over the Sepulchre they placed a Column, and upon it a Dog cut out of *Parian Stone*. Afterwards his own Countrymen honoured him with many brazen Statues, bearing this Inscription;

Time doth the strongest Brasi decay;

Diogenes, thou ne'er canst die,

Who to content the ready Way

To following Ages didst descry.

Laertius reckons five of this Name; the first of *Apollonia*, a Natural Philosopher.

The second, a Sicilian.

The third this.

The fourth a Stoick of *Sceleucia*.

The fifth of *Tarsis*.

^a Laert. 2. 77.

M O N I M U S.

MOnimus was a *Siracusan* ^a, Disciple to *Diogenes*; he was first Servant to a Money-changer, to whom *Xeniades*, who bought *Diogenes*, often coming, he was so taken with the Worth and Virtue of the Person, that he counterfeited himself mad, and threw all the Money from off the Table, whereupon his Master turning him away, he betook himself to *Diogenes*. He followed likewise *Crates* the Cynick, and others of that Sect, which confirm-

^a Laert. 6. 32.

ed his Master in the Opinion that he was mad. He was a Person eloquent and learned, mentioned by *Meander* in his *Hippocramus*; of so great Constancy, that he contemned all Glory for Virtue's Sake. He wrote some Things, which at first Appearance seemed ludicrous, but contained deep serious Sense; as of *Appetites*, two Books, and a *Protreptick*.

O N E S I C R I T U S.

Onesicritus ^a was of *Ægina*; or, according to *Demetrius*, an *Asypalaan*; he had two Sons; he sent the Younger, named *Androsthenes*, to *Athens*, who hearing *Diogenes*, would not depart thence. Hereupon he sent the Elder, named *Phi-*

liscus, who staid there likewise for the same Reason. Lastly, the Father himself went, and was so much taken with *Diogenes*, that he became a sedulous Auditor of him, as his two Sons were.

He was esteemed amongst the most eminent Dis-

^a Laert. 6. 24.

ciples of *Diogenes*. *Laertius* compares him with *Xenophon*; one fought under *Cyrus*, the other under *Alexander*. One wrote the *Institution of Cy-*

rus; the other the *Praise of Alexander*. Their *Stiles* also were very like.

C R A T E S.

Crates was a *Theban*, Son of *Ascondas*; he was likewise reckoned amongst the most eminent of *Diogenes*'s Disciples; yet *Hippobotus* saith, he was not a Disciple of *Diogenes*, but of *Bryso* the *Achean*.

He flourished about the 113th Olympiad. *Antisthenes*, in his *Successions*, saith, that being at a Tragedy where *Telephus* was represented carrying a Basket in a fordid Condition, he betook himself to the *Cynical Philosophy*, and selling all his Estate (for he was very rich, having gotten together above two hundred Talents) he distributed it amongst the Citizens, and was so constant a Professor of this Philosophy, that *Philemon*, the Comick Poet, takes Notice thereof in these Words,

*By him in Summer a thick Coat was worn.
In Winter time (so temperate) a torn.*

Diocles saith, *Diogenes* persuaded him to part with his Estate, and to throw all the Money he had left into the Sea; and that the House of *Crates* was from *Alexander*, that of *Hipparchia* his Wife, from *Philip*. Some of his near Friends that came to him to dissuade him from this Course of Life, he beat away, for he was of a resolute Spirit.

Demetrius the *Magnesian*, saith, he deposited some Money in the Hands of a Banker, with this Condition, that if his Sons betook themselves to any Civil Employments, it should be repaid again, but if to Philosophy, it should be distributed amongst the People, for as much as a Philosopher stands in need of nothing.

Eratosthenes relates, that having a Son named *Pasicles*, by his Wife *Hipparchia*, as soon as he arrived at Man's Estate, he brought him to the House of a young Maid that was his slave, saying, *This is a hereditary Matrimony to you; but those who commit Adultery are, according to the Tragedians, punished with Banishment or Death; those who keep Concubines were, according to the Comedians, by Luxury and Drunkenness, transported to Madness.*

Pasicles, the Disciple to *Euclid*, was his Brother.

He said, 'tis not possible to find a Man without a Fault, for in every Pomegranat there is at least one Grain corrupt.

Having displeased *Nicodromus* a *Lutinst*, he beat him black and blue; whereupon he pasted a Piece of Paper on his Forehead, wherein was written, *Nicodromus did this.*

He was exceedingly invective against common Women.

He reproved *Demetrius Phalerus* for sending Bread and Wine to him, saying, *I wish the Fountains also produced Bread*, intimating, that he lived with Water.

The *Athenian* Magistrates blamed him for wearing a long Robe; *I will shew you*, *Theophrastus*, says he, *in the same Attire*; which they not believing, he brought them to a Barber's Shop, where he was fitting to be trimm'd.

At *Thebes*, being beaten by the Master of the *Gymnasium*, or as others, at *Corinth* by *Euthykrates*, he laughed, saying,

*He by the Foot him drew,
And o'er the Threshold threw.*

Zeno in his *Chiras* saith, he sowed a Sheep-skin upon his Cloak, to appear the more deformed. He was of a very unhandsome Look, and whilst he discoursed, laughed.

He used to lift up his Hands and say, *Be of good Courage, Grecians, both for the Eyes and all other Parts, for you shall soon see these Deriders surpris'd by Sickness, and proclaiming you happy, blame their own Slothfulness.*

He said, we ought so long to study Philosophy, until the Leaders of the Army seem to be Horse-drivers.

He said, they who lived with Flatterers were forsaken Persons, living like Sheep amidst Wolves, nor with those who wish'd them well.

Perceiving he drew nigh to Death, he looked upon himself, saying,

*—And dost thou go, old Friend,
To the next World, thou whom old Age dath bend?.*

for he was crooked thro' Age.

To *Alexander*, asking, whether he would that his Country should be restored, or not; *To what End*, saith he, *seeing there will come perhaps another Alexander and depopulate it.* He said, *Contempt of Glory and Want were his Country, which were not subject to Fortune*, and that he was Countryman to *Diogenes*, not fearing any Body.

Coming into the *Forum*, where he beheld some buying, others selling, *These*, saith he, *think them-*

seives happy in Employments contrary to one another, but I think myself happy in having nothing to do either Way.

To a young Man followed by a great many Parasites, *Young Man*, saith he, *I am sorry to see you so much alone.*

He said, *we ought not to accept Gifts from all Men, for Virtue ought not to be maintained by Vice.*

Seeing at Delphi a golden Image of Phryne the Curtizan, he cried out, *This is a Trophy of the Grecian Intemperance.*

Seeing a young Man highly fed and fat, *Unhappy Youth*, saith he, *do not fortify your Prison.*

He said, *He gained Glory, not by his Riches, but by his Poverty.*

To one, demanding what he should get by Philosophy: *You will learn*, saith he, *to open your Purse easily, and give readily, not as you do now, turning away, delaying and trembling, as if you had the Palsy.*

He said, *Men know not how much a Wallet, a Measure of Lupines, and Security of Mind is worth.*

The Epittles of Crates are extant, wherein, saith Laertius, he writes excellent Philosophy, in Stile resembling Plato. He wrote *Tragedies* likewise, full of deep Philosophy.

He died old, and was buried in *Bæotia*.

t Scrm. 16.

M E T R O C L E S.

Metrocles was Disciple of *Crates*, Brother to *Hipparchia*. He first heard *Theophrastus* the *Priipatstick*, &c. afterwards apply'd himself to *Crates*, and became an eminent Philosopher.

He burnt, as *Hecaton* saith, his Writings, saying,

These are the Dreams of wild fantastick Youth.

He burnt likewise the Dictates of his Master *Theophrastus*.

Vulcan come hither, Venus needs thy Aid.

He said, *Of Things, some are purchased by Money, at Houses; some by Time and Diligence, as Learning; Riches are hurtful, if not rightly apply'd.*

He died old, he strangled himself.

Of his Disciples are remembered *Theombrutus* and *Cleomenes*. *Demetrius of Alexandria* was Auditor of *Theombrutus*; *Timarchus of Alexandria*, and *Echicles of Ephesus* were Disciples of *Cleomenes*. *Echicles* heard also *Theombrutus*, from whom came *Menedemus*, of whom hereafter. Amongst these was also *Menippus* of *Sinoppe*.

H I P P A R C H I A.

Hipparchia was likewise taken with the Discourses of those *Cynicks*; she was Sister to *Metrocles*; they were both *Maronites*. She fell in Love with *Crates*, as well for his Discourse as manner of Life, from which none of her Suitors, by their Wealth, Nobility or Beauty, could divert her, but that she would bestow herself upon *Crates*, threatening her Parents, if they would not suffer her to marry him, she would kill herself. Hereupon her Parents went to *Crates*, desiring him to dissuade her from this Resolution; which he endeavoured, but not prevailing, went away, and brought all the little Furniture of his House and shewed her *This*, saith he, *is your Husband, That the Furniture of your House; consider upon it, for you cannot be mine unless you follow the same Course of Life.* She immediately took him, and went up and down with him, and in publick, *everywhere*, and went along with him to Feasts.

At a Feast of *Lyfimachus* she met *Theodorus* the Atheist, with whom she argued thus, *If that, which if Theodorus do, be not unjustly done, neither is it unjustly done if Hipparchia do the same; but Theodorus, if he strike himself, doth not unjustly, therefore Hipparchia doth not unjustly if she strike Theodorus; Theodorus answered nothing, only plucked her by the Coat, which she wore not like a Woman, but after the manner of the Cynicks; whereat Hipparchia was nothing moved; whereupon he said,*

*Her Webb and Loom
She left at Home.*

I did, saith she, *Theodorus, and I think have not erred in chusing to bestow that Time which I should have spent in Weaving, on Philosophy.*

Much more, saith *Laertius* is ascribed to her.

n Lect. 6. 95.

MENIP.

M E N I P P U S.

Menippus was a Cynick, * a Phœnician by birth, Servant by Condition, as *Achaicus* affirms. *Diocles* saith, his Father was of *Pontus*, called *Bato*. *Menippus* for Acquisition of Riches went to *Thebes*, and was made free of that City. He wrote nothing serious, all his Books being full of Mirth, not unlike the Writings of *Meleager*. *Hermippus* saith, he was named *Hemerodanista*, the Daily Usurer, for he put out Money to Merchants upon Interest, and took Pawns; at last being cheated of all his Goods, he hanged himself.

Some say the Books that are ascribed to him were writ by *Dionysius* and *Zephyrus*, *Colophonians*, which being ludicrous, they gave to him as a Person disposed that Way; they are reckoned thirteen.

Nænia's.

Testaments.

Epistles, in the Persons of the Gods.

Two Natural Philosophers, Mathematicians and Grammarians.

Of *Epicurus*.

Laertius reckons Six of this Name. The first wrote the *Lydian* Story, and epitomiz'd *Xanthus*.

The second this.

The third, a Sophist, of *Caria*.

The fourth, a Graver.

The fifth and sixth Painters, both mentioned by *Apollodorus*.

w Laert. 6. 39.

M E N E D E M U S.

Menedemus * was Disciple of *Colotes*, of *Lamp-sacum*. He proceeded, as *Hippobotus* relates, to so great Extravagance, that he went up and down in the Habit of the Furies, declaring he was come from the World below to take Notice of such as offended, and that he was to return thither to give an Account of them.

He went thus attired, A dark Gown to his Huls, girt with a Purple Girdle; upon his Head an Arcadian Hat, on which were woven the Twelve Signs, tragick Buskins, a long Beard, in his Hand an Asps Staff. Hitherto of the Cynicks.

* Laert. 6. 108.

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE EIGHTH PART,
Containing the *Stoick* Philosophers.

Z E N O.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, first Studies.

THE Sect of *Stoicks* had its Original from the *Cynicks*, *Zeno* was the Author thereof, who having first been a Scholar of *Crates*, and afterwards a Hearer of other Philosophers, at last instituted this new Sect. ^a He was born at *Cittium*, a *Greek* Sea-town, in the Isle of *Cyprus*, with ^b a lock'd Haven, inhabited by *Phœnicians*, whence ^c he sometimes was termed the *Phœnician*. His Father was called *Mnosas*, by some *Demeas*, a Merchant, whence was objected to *Zeno* the Obscurity of his Birth and Country, as being ^d a Stranger, and of mean Parentage, whereof he was so far from being ashamed, that ^e he refused to be made a Citizen of *Athens*, as conceiving it to be an undervaluing of his own Country; inasmuch as when ^f he contributed to a Bath in *Athens*, and his Name was inscribed upon a Pillar with the Title of Philosopher, he desired they would add a *Cittiean*.

^g *Zeno* (as *Hecaton* and *Apollonius Tyrius* relate) enquiring of the Oracle what Course he should take to lead the best Course of Life, was answered, that he should converse with the Dead; whereupon he addicted himself to the Reading of ancient Authors.

^h Herein he was not a little furthered by his Fa-

ther, who, as *Demetrius* saith, trading frequently to *Athens*, brought him as yet but very young, many *Socratical* Books, which excited in him a great Affection to Learning.

ⁱ Being now seventeen (or as *Perseus* twenty two) Years old, he took a Voyage to *Athens*, carried thither as well by his particular Inclination to Philosophy, as by his Business, which was to sell some Purple that he had brought out of *Phœnicia*. He took along with him a hundred Talents, and having sold his Merchandize, applied himself to Philosophy, yet continued to lend his Money out to Merchants upon Interest, so to improve his Stock.

Some affirm his Ship was cast away in the *Piræum*, which News being brought him to *Athens*, he seemed nothing at all moved, but only said, ^j *Thou dost will, Fortune, to drive me into a Gow; or as Seneca, Fortune commands me to study Philosophy more earnestly.*

^k Others say, That being troubled at the Loss of his Ship, he went up to the City of *Athens*, and sitting in a Bookseller's Shop, read a Piece of *Xenophon's* Commentaries, wherewith being much pleased, he asked the Bookseller where such Men lived;

^a Laert. 7. 1. ^b Strab. lib. 14. ^c Suid. ^d Cic. Tusc. quest. 5. c. 22. ^e Plot. de rep. Stoic. ^f Laert. ^g Laert. 2. 2. ^h Laert. 7. 31. ⁱ Laert. 7. 2. ^k Plot. de util. esp. ex inamic. ^j Laert. ibid.

Crates by Chance passed by, the Bookfeller pointed to him, saying, *Follow that Man*, which he did, and from that Time forward, became a Disciple of *Crates*.

CH A P. II.

Of his Masters.

Zeno thus changing the Course of his Life, applied himself to *Crates*,^m being apt to Philosophy, but more modest than suited with the Cynical Sect. Which *Crates* to remedy, gave him a Pot full of Pottage to carry through the Cetamick; and perceiving him to hide it, as ashamed, with his Coat, he struck the Pot with his Stick and broke it. *Zeno* running away, all wet, *What*, said he, *are you running away, little Phœnician? No body hurt you.* He made a little hollow Cover of a Pot, in which he carried the Money of his Master *Crates*, that it might be in Readiness when he went to buy Meat. Thus he lived a while with *Crates*, during which Time he writ his Book of the *Commonwealth*, whence some jesting, said, it was written under the Dog's Tail.

At last deserting *Crates*, he applied himself to *Stilpo*ⁿ the *Megarick* Philosopher. *Apollonius Tyrinus* saith, That taking hold of his Cloak to pluck him away from *Stilpo*, he said, *O Crates, the Handles by which the Philosophers are to be taken hold of, are their Ears; lead me by those your Way, or else, tho' you constrain my Body to be with you, my Mind will be with Stilpo.* With *Stilpo* he remained ten Years.

From *Stilpo* he went to *Xenocrates*, being so well satisfied with the Instruction of these two Masters, that he said, *He made a very good Voyage when he was shipwreck'd; tho' others apply it to his living with Crates.*

^o He afterwards applied himself to *Diodorus Cronus*, as *Hippoborus* avers, under whom he studied Dialectick, to which Science he was so much addicted, that^p when a certain Philosopher of that Sect had informed him of seven Species of Dialectick, in that Fallacy which is called *the Mower*, he asked him what he was to give him for his Reward, the Philosopher demanded an hundred Pieces of Silver; *Zeno* (so much was he affected to Learning) gave him two hundred.

^q Lastly, notwithstanding that he had made a great Progress in Philosophy, he heard *Polemon*, whose Doctrine was against *Pride*; whereupon *Polemon* told him, *Zeno, I am not ignorant that you ly in Ambush, and come slyly into my Garden (as the Phœnicians use) to steal away Learning.*

CH A P. III.

His School, and Institution of a Sect.

*H*AVING been long a Hearer of others, he at last thought fit to communicate the Learning which he had received and improved. To this End he made Choice of the *stadian sea*, the painted Walk,^r so named from the Pictures of *Polygnotus*, otherwise called *Pisanactia*. Here he constantly walked and discoursed, resolving to settle there, and make the Place as full of Tranquillity as it had been before of Trouble: For, in the Time of the thirty Tyrants, near 1400 Citizens were there put to Death.

Hither resorted a great many Disciples to him, who were at first called *Zenonians*, as *Epicure* affirmeth, from their Master, afterwards from the Place where he taught, *Sticks*, as *Eratoſthenes* in his eighth Book of ancient Comedy; adding, that not long before, some Poets that lived there were called *Sticks* also, upon which Occasion the Name was very well known.

He was subtle in Disquisition and Dispute.

He disputed earnestly with *Philo* the Dialectick, and exercised himself together with him; so that *Zeno the younger* admired him no less than his Master *Diodorus*.

He first seemeth (saith ^s *Laertius*) to have set a Bound to the Looseness and Extravagance of Propositions: But of this more, when we come to speak of his Philosophy, which by Reason of its largeness, we remit to the End of his Life.

CH A P. IV.

What Honours were conferred upon him.

ZENO, by the Philosophy which he taught, and the Practice of his Life conformable to that Doctrine, gain'd so high an Estimation amongst the *Athenians*, that^t they deposited the Keys of the City in his Hands, as the only Person fit to be entrusted with their Liberties. His Name was likewise much honoured by his own Country-men, as well those at *Cyprus*, as those who lived at *Sidon*.

Amongst those who honoured and favoured *Zeno*, was *Antigonus Gonatus* King of *Macedonia*, a Prince no less eminent for his Virtue than his Greatness, much esteem'd him, and as often as he went to *Athens*, heard him. He sent many times to invite him to come to him, amongst the rest, one Letter to this Effect, alledged by *Apollonius Tyrinus*.

^m Laert. 7. 3. ⁿ Laert. 7. 2. ^o Laert. 7. 25. ^p Laert. 7. 35. ^q Laert. *ibid.* Suid. ^r Laert. 7. 6. ^s Laert. 7. 15. ^t Laert. 7. 6. &c.

King Antigonus to Zeno the Philosopher, Health.

I Think that I exceed you in Fortune and Glory; but in Learning and Discipline, and that perfect Felicity which you have attained, I am exceeded by you. Wherefore I thought it expedient to write to you, that you will come to me, assuring myself you will not deny it. Use all Means therefore to come to us, and know that you are not to instruct me only, but all the Macedonians. For, he who teacheth the King of Macedonia, and guideth him to Virtue, it is evident that he doth likewise instruct all his Subjects in Virtue; for such as is the Prince, such, for the most Part, are those who live under his Government.

Zeno answered thus,

To King Antigonus, Zeno, Health.

I Much esteem your earnest Desire of Learning, in that you aim at Philosophy; not popular, which perverteth Manners, but that true Discipline which conserveth Profit, avoiding that generally commended Pleasure which effeminates the Souls of some young Men. It is manifest, that you are inclined to Generosity, not only by Nature, but by Choice. A generous Nature, with indifferent Exercise, assisted by a Master, may easily attain to perfect Virtue. But I am very infirm of Body, by reason of my Age, for I am fourscore Years old, and therefore not able to come to you; yet I will send you some of my Con-Disciples, who, in those Things that concern the Soul, are nothing inferior to me; in those of the Body, are much superior to me; of whom, if you make use, you will want nothing conducing to perfect Beatitude.

Thus Zeno absolutely refused to go to Antigonus, but sent him his Disciple *Perseus*, Son of *Demetrius*, a Cittizen, (who flourished in the 130th Olympiad, Zeno being then very old) and *Philanides* a Theban, both mentioned by *Epicurus* in his Epistle to *Aristobulus*, as having been with Antigonus.

CHAP. V.

His Apophthegms.

OF his Apophthegms are remembered these: Of a Man very finely dress'd, stepping lightly over a Kennel, He doth not care for the Dirt, saith he, because he cannot see his Face in it.

A certain *Cynick* came to him to borrow Oyl, saying he had none left; Zeno deny'd him, and as he was going away, Now, saith he, consider which of us two are the more impudent.

Cremomides, whom he much affected, and *Cleantes* sitting down beside him, he arose; wherat *Cleantes* wondering, I have heard good Physicians say, saith he, that the best Remedy for Tumours is Rest.

Two sitting by him at a Feast, he that was next him hit the other with his Foot; Zeno hit him that was next him with his Knee, and turning him to him, What then think you, saith he, that you have done to him that sits below you.

To one that loved the Company of Boys, Neither have those Masters, saith he, any Wit, who converse always with Boys, nor the Boys themselves.

He said, that elegant Speeches were like *Alexandrian Silver*, fair to the Eye, and figur'd like *Monney*, but not a Whit of the more Value. Speeches which are otherwise, he likened to *Attick Tetradrachmes*, which had a rough Stamp, but were of greater Value.

Aristo, his Disciple, discoursing many Things foolishly, some petulantly, others confidently, It cannot be, saith he, but your Father was drunk when you were begot; whereupon him self being very concise of Speech, he called him the Talker.

To a great Eater, who left nothing for those that eat with him, he caus'd a great Fish to be set before him, and immediately to be taken away; the other looking upon him, What, saith he, do you think your Companions suffer every Day, seeing that you cannot suffer my Greediness once?

A young Man, who questioned something more curiously than suited with his Age, he brought him to a Glass, and bad him look in it, and then ask'd him, whether he thought that Question agreed with that Face?

To one that said he disliked many Things of *Antisthenes's* Writing, he brought his *Chria* of *Sophocles*, and asked him, if there were any Thing therein excellent? The other answer'd, he knew not. Are you not ashamed then (replied Zeno) if *Antisthenes* have said any thing ill, you select and remember that; but if any excellent, you are so far from remembering, as not to mind it?

To one that said the Speeches of Philosophers were short, You say very true, saith he, so should their very Syllables be, as much as is possible.

One saying of *Polemon*, that he propos'd some Things, and said others. He frowning said, If that Rate do you set upon Things that are given?

He said, that a Disputant should have the Voice and Lungs of a Comedian, but not the Loudness.

To those that speak well, he said, we should allow a Place to hear, as to skilful Artificers to see; on the other side, the Hearer must so attend to what is spoken, that he take no Time to censure.

To a young Man that spoke much, Your Ears, saith he, are fallen into your Tongue.

To a handsome Youth, who said that he thought that in his Opinion, a wife Man ought not to love, Nothing, saith he, will be more unhappy to you that are handsome.

He said, that most Philosophers are in many things Fools, in trivial and vulgar Ignorant.

He pronounced that of *Capeia*, who when one of his Disciples began to grow high, beating him, he said, *Right is not placed in great, but great in right.*

To a young Man discoursing with much Confidence, *Young Man*, saith he, *I should be loath to tell you my Thoughts.*

A Youth of *Rhodes*, handsome and rich, but refractory to him; not enduring, he bad him first sit in a dirty Seat, that he might dirty his Gown; next placed him among the Beggars, that he might converse with them and their Rags, until at last the young Man went away.

He said, that nothing is more unseemly than Pride, especially in young Men.

He said, that we must not only commit to Memory, Speeches and Words, as those who make ready some Dish of Meat, but apply it, and make Use of it in our Minds.

He said, that young Men must use all Modesty in their Walking, in their Behaviour, and in their Garments, often repeating those Verses of *Euripides* concerning *Copaneus*.

*He was not puffed up with his Store,
Nor thought himself above the Poor.*

He said, nothing was more alienate from the Comprehension of Sciences, than Poetry; and that we need nothing more than Time.

Being asked, *Who is a Friend?* he answer'd, *My other self.*

Having taken his Servant in a Theft, he beat him; the Fellow said, *It was his Destiny to steal; and to be beaten*, said he.

He said, that *Beauty is the Sweetness of the Voice*, or, according to some, he call'd it, *The Flour of Beauty*.

Seeing the Servant of one of his Companions black and blue with Stripes, *I see*, saith he, *the Fruits of your Anger.*

To one that smelt sweet of Ointments, *Who is it*, saith he, *that smells so effeminately?*

To *Dionysius* surnamed *ῥετραστής* the *Retraitor*, who ask'd him, *why be corrected all but myself?* because, saith he, *I do not believe you.*

To a young Man who spoke too freely, *For this Reason*, saith he, *we have two Ears, and but one Tongue, that we should hear much and speak little.*

He was invited to a Feast with other Philosophers, by the Ambassador of *Antigonus* (according to *Laertius* of *Ptolemy*) and whilst of the rest every one amidst their Cups made Ostentation of their Learning, he alone sat silent; whereupon the Ambassadors asking him what they should say of him to *Antigonus*, *That which you see*, saith he, *for of all Things, 'tis hardest to contain Speech.*

Being demanded how he behav'd himself when reviled, he said, *As an Ambassador dismiss'd without Answer.*

He changed the Verses of *Hesiod* thus,

*Who good Advice obeys, of Men is best.
Next, he who ponders all in his own Breast.*

For that Man (saith he) is better who can obey good Advice, and make good Use thereof, than he who finds out all Things of himself; for the latter hath only Understanding, but the other Practice also.

Being demanded how it came to pass, that being very austere, he notwithstanding was very cheerful and merry at a Feast, he answered, *Lupines, tho' in themselves bitter, being steeped, grow sweet.*

He said, it was better to slip with the Foot than with the Tongue.

He said, that to do well is no small Matter; to begin well, depended on a small Moment.

This some ascribe to *Socrates*.

One of the young Men in the Academy speaking of foolish Studies, *If you don't dip your Tongue in your Mind*, saith *Zeno*, *you will speak many other foolish Things.*

He accused many, saying, *When they might take Pleasures in Labour, they would rather go to the Cook's Shop for it.*

He said, that we should not affect Delicacy of Diet, not even in Sickness.

Being demanded by one of his Friends, what Course he should take to do wrong, *Imagine*, reply'd he, *that I am always with you.*

Being demanded whether a Man that doth wrong, may conceal it from God, *No*, saith he, *nor he who thinketh it.*

To some that excused their Prodigality, saying, that they had Plenty, out of which they did it; *Will you excuse a Cook*, saith he, *that should oversalt Meat because he hath store of Salt?*

He said that of his Disciples, some were *φιλόσοφοι* Lovers of Knowledge; others *ἀφροδίται*, Lovers of Speaking.

He compared the Arts of *Dialectick* to just Measures filled, not with Wheat or any thing of Value, but with Chaff and Straw.

He said we ought not to enquire whether *Men* belonged to great Cities, but whether they deserved a great City.

Seeing a Friend of his too much taken up with the Business of his Land, *Unless you lose your Land*, saith he, *it will lose you.*

He said, *A Man must live not only to eat and drink, but to use his Life for the obtaining a happy Life.*

Antigonus being full of Wine, went to visit him, and kissing and embracing him as a drunken Man,

z Laert. 7. 24. Stob. Serm. 33. a Laert. 7. 26. Athen. Dign. 22. b Stob. Ser. 29. c Stob. Ser. 6. d Stob. Ser. 17. citing Musonius.
f Stob. Ser. 49. g Stob. Ser. 55. h Stob. Ser. 37. i Stob. Ser. 8. k Stob. Ser. 221. l Stob. Ser. 56.
m Stob. Ser. 77. n Aelian. var. hist. 9. 26.

bad him demand whatsoever he would, swearing that he would give it him; Zenon answered, *μεγιστὸν ἔσται*, at once reproving his Vice, and taking care of his Health.

° Stretching out the Fingers of his Right Hand, he said, *such is Phantasia*; then contracting them a little, *such is Assent*; then closing them quite, and shutting his Fitt, *such is Comprehension*; then putting to it his left Hand, and shutting it close and hard, *such (saith he) is Science, of which none is capable but a wise Man.*

C H A P. VI.

His Death.

° ZENO having continued, according to *Apollonius*, Master of his School fifty-eight Years, and attained to the 98th of his Age, by the Computation of *Laertius* and *Lucian*, (for that he lived but 72 Years, as some affirm upon the Testimony of *Perseus*, seems to be a Mistake, seeing that his Letter to *Antigonus* was written in his 80th Year) ° in all which Time he was never molested by any Sickness; died upon this Occasion; going out of the School, he fell and broke his Finger, whereupon striking the Ground with his Hand, he said, as *Niobe* in the Tragedy, *I come, why do you call me? Or as others, Why do you drive me? And going out, ° some say, he immediately strangled himself; ° others, that by little and little he famish'd himself.*

° When the News of his Death came to *Antigonus*, he broke forth into these Words, *What a Spectacle have I lost!* and being demanded why he so much admired him, *Because*, said he, *tho' I bestowed many great Things upon him, he was never therewith exalted or dejected.* He sent immediately *Thraso* on Embassy to the *Athenians*, requesting that they would build him a Tomb in the *Cerameick*, which the *Athenians* performed, honouring him with this Decree.

A D E C R E E.

Arrhenides being *Archon*, the *Tribe* of *Acamantis* having the first Place in the *Phrytanæum*, the tenth Day of *Maemasterion*, the three and twentieth of the sitting of the *Phrytanæum*, the Congregation of *Presidents* decreed thus: *Hippo*, Son of *Cratistoteles* a *Xympetean*, and the rest of the *Presidents*, *Thraso*, Son of *Thraso*, an *Anacæan*, declared; *Whereas* *Zeno*, Son of *Mnæseas*, a *Cittiean*, both professed *Philosophy* many Years in this City, and in all other Things performed the Office of a good Man, encouraging those young Men, who applied themselves to him, to *Virtue* and *Temperance*, leading himself a Life suitable to the Doctrine which he professed,

a Pattern to the best to imitate; The People have thought fit (good Fortune go along with it) to do Honour to *Zeno*, Son of *Mnæseas* the *Cittiean*, and to crown him with a Crown of Gold according to the Law, in Reward of his *Virtue* and *Temperance*, and to build a Tomb for him publicly in the *Cerameick*. For the making of which Crown, and building of the Tomb, the People shall make choice of five Men of the *Athenians* to take charge thereof. This Decree the Scribe of the People shall write upon two Pillars, one whereof shall be placed in the Academy, the other in the *Lycæum*. The Charge of the Pillars, he who is Overseer of the Publick Works shall undertake to defray, by way of Rate, that all may know the *Athenian* People honour good Men both alive and dead. To take care of the building are appointed, *Thraso* an *Anacæan*, *Philocles* a *Pyrean*, *Phædrus* an *Anaplistian*, *Medon* an *Acarnæan*, *Micythus* a *Sympactean*.

° The *Athenians* caused likewise his Statue in Brass to be set up, as did also the *Cittians* his Countrymen. *Antipater* the *Sidonæan* bestowed this Epitaph upon him:

*Here Zeno lies, who tall Olympus seal'd,
Not heaping Pelion on Ossa's Head,
Nor by Herculean Labours so prevail'd,
But found out Virtue's Path which thither led.*

Another Epigram was written upon him by *Xenodotus* the *Stoick*, Disciple of *Diogenes*:

*Zeno, thy Years to hoary Age were spent,
Not with vain Riches, but with Self-content:
A stout and constant Set deriv'd from thee,
The Mother of nought-dreading Liberty:
Phœnicia, whence thou issu'dst, who can slight?
Thence Cadmus too, who first taught Greece to write.*

C H A P. VII.

His Person and Virtues.

AS concerning his Person, ° *Timotheus* saith he was wry-neck'd: *Apollonius* *Tyrius*, that he was lean, tall, and of a swarthy Complexion, whence stiled by some (as *Chrysippus*) the *Egyptian* Sprig. ° His Look was sad, grave, severe and frowning; his Constitution not strong, for which Reason *Perseus* saith, he forbore to feast much. His ordinary Diet consisted in raw Food, especially Figs both raw and dried, Bread and Honey, which he eat moderately, and a little sweet Wine.

° His Continence was such, that when *Perseus*, who cohabited with him, brought a She-Ministrall to him, he immediately sent her back.

° Not.

° Cic. Acad. quest. 4. 47. ° Laert. 7. 13. ° Lucian de Longev. ° Laert. 7. 28. ° Laert. ibid. ° Suid. ° Laert.
7. 15. ° Laert. 7. 6. ° Laert. 7. 1. ° Laert. 7. 17. ° Laert. ibid. °

^a Notwithstanding his Severity, he was very complaisant, and often feasted with King *Antigonus*, and meeting him sometimes drunk, went along with him to *Aristocles* the Musician, to nightly Banquets and Plays.

^b Popular Ostentation he avoided, by sitting in the lowest Place; whereby he freed himself from the troublesome Importunity of the other Part.

^c He never walked with more than two or three at once: *Cleanthes* saith, he many times gave Money to People that they would not trouble him, and throng about him. Being on a certain Time encompassed by a great Crowd, he shewed them a wooden Ball on the top of the Cloyster, which formerly belonged to an Altar; This, saith he, was once placed in the middle; but, because it is troublesome, it is now laid aside: I desire you would in like manner withdraw yourselves, that you may be less troublesome.

^d He was so free from being corrupted by Gifts, that *Democharis* Son of *Laches*, desiring him to let him know what Business he would have to *Antigonus*, promising to write about it, and assuring him, that *Antigonus* would furnish him with whatsoever he desired; he turned away from him, and would never after converse with him.

^e He was so humble, that he conversed with mean and ragged Persons; whence *Timon*:

*And for Companions gets of Servants Store,
Of all Men the most empty, and most poor.*

He was most patient and frugal in his Household Expence, something inclining to the Sordidness of the Barbarians. *Laertius* mentions one Servant that he had, *Seneca* avers he had none.

^f Whensoever he reprehended any, it was covertly and afar off, as may appear by many of his Apophthegms.

^g His Habit was mean, whence it was said of him,

*Him nor the Winter's rigid Frost or Rain,
The scorching Sun, or sharp Disease can pain:
Not like the common Sort of People he;
But Day and Night bent on Philosophy.*

The Comick Poets, unwittingly, intending to discommend him, praise him; as *Philemon*, in his Comedy of Philosophers,

*He Water drinks, then Broth and Herbs doth eat,
To live, his Scholars teaching, without Meat.*

This some ascribe to *Possidippus*.

His Virtues were so eminent, that they grew at last into a Proverb, *More Continent than Zeno the Philosopher*; whence *Possidippus*,

— *He e'er ten Days were spent,
Zeno in Continence outwent.*

Indeed he excelled all Men in this kind of Virtue, and in Gravity, and, by *Jove* (addeth *Laertius*) in Felicity likewise.

C H A P. VIII.

His Writings.

HE wrote several Books, wherein (saith ^h *Laertius*) he so discoursed, as no *Stoick* after him: Their Titles are these;

Of Commonwealth, written whilst he was an Auditor of *Crates*, and (as ⁱ *Plutarch* saith) much applauded; the Scope whereof was this, *That we should not live in several Cities and Towns by distinct Laws, but that we should own all Men as our Countrymen and Fellow-Citizens; that their should be one Manner of Life, and one Order, as one Flock which grazeth by equal Right in one Pasture.*

Of Appetite; or, of Human Nature.

Of Passions.

Of Office.

Of Law.

Of the Discipline of the Grecians.

Of Sight.

Of the Universe.

Of Signs.

Pythagoricks.

Universals.

Of Words.

Homeric Problems 5.

Of hearing Poetry.

The Art.

Solutions.

Consultations.

Memorials.

The Morals of Crates.

^k Some, amongst whom is *Cassius a Sceptian*, reprehended many Things in the Writings of *Zeno*: First, that in the beginning of his Commonwealth, he affirmeth, *The Liberal Sciences to be of no Use.*

Again, That all wicked Men are Enemies among themselves, and Slaves and Strangers, as well Fathers to their Children, as Brethren to Brethren. Again, That only good Men are Citizens, and Friends, and Kindred, and Children, as he affirmeth in his Book of the Commonwealth. So that according to the *Stoicks*, Parents should be Enemies to their Children, because they are not wise.

That

^a Laert. 1. ibid. ^b Laert. 7. 14. ^c Laert. ibid. ^d Laert. ibid. ^e Laert. ibid. ^f Laert. 7. 16. ^g Laert. 7. 27.
^h Laert. 7. 4. ⁱ Plut. de fortit. Alex. Mag. ^k Laert. 7. 32.

That in his Commonwealth he would have Women to be in common.

That no Temples, Courts of Judicature, nor publick Schools, should be built in a Commonwealth.

That Money is not necessary, neither for Exchange nor Traffick.

That Women should go in the same Habit as Men.

CHAP. IX.

His Disciples.

ZENO (saith Laertius) had many Disciples; the most eminent these;

PERSEUS, Son of Demetrius, a Citterian; some affirm ¹ he was Zeno's Scholar, others that he was one of the Servants which were sent by Antigenus to Zeno to transcribe his Writings; whence *Bion* seeing this Inscription on his Statue, PERSEUS OF ZENO A CITTIAN said ², The Graver mislook, for instead of *ἐκ τῆς κτῆρας*, he should have put *ἐκ τῆς οἰκίας*, a Servant.

Afterwards he returned to Antigenus King of Macedonia; Antigenus, to make a Trial of him, caused a false Report to be brought him, that his Lands were spoiled by the Enemy; whereat appearing troubled, *Do you not see*, saith Antigenus, that Riches are not to be reckoned amongst indifferent Things?

Antigenus so much favour'd him, that he preferred him to the Government of *Acrocorinthus*; on which Fort depended not only *Corinth*, but all *Peloponnesus*; in this Charge he was unfortunate; for the Castle was taken by the Cunning of *Aratus* a Sicyonian (³ *Athenæus* saith, whilst *Perseus* was feasting) who turned out *Perseus*, whereupon afterwards, to one that maintained only a wise Man is a Governor; and I, saith he, was one of the same Mind, being so taught by Zeno, but now am of another Opinion; the Sicyonian young Man, (meaning *Aratus*) hath taught me otherwise; thus *Plutarch*; but *Pausanias* saith, that *Aratus*, upon taking of the Fort, amongst others, put *Perseus* the Governor to Death.

He said, ⁴ That those were esteemed Gods who had invented some Things very useful to human Life.

He wrote these Books; Of a Kingdom, the Lacedemonian Commonwealth; of Marriage; of Impiety; Thyestes; of Love, *Protrepticks*, *Exercitationes*; *Chris* 4. *Commentaries against Plato's Laws* 7. ⁵ *Symposiack Dialogues*.

Aristo, Son of *Miliades*, a Chian, firnamed the *Syren*; when Zeno fell into a long Sickness, he left him, and went (as *Diocles* saith) to *Polemo*; he was also a Follower of *Perseus*, whom he flattered much, because of his Favour with *Antigenus*; for he was much given to Pleasure, even unto his End. Thus revolting from his Master Zeno, he asserted,

That the End consists in those mean Things which are betwixt Virtue and Vice; that is, in Indifference; not to be moved on either Side, nor to imagine the least Difference to be in these Things, but that they are all alike: For a wife Man is like a good Player, who, whether he perfonate *Agamemnon* or *Thersides*, will act either Part very well. Thus he took away the Dignity which Zeno held to be in these mean Things betwixt Virtue and Vice; holding that there is no Difference in them.

He took away *Physick* and *Logick*, affirming that one is above us, the other appertains nothing to us: *Ethick* only appertains to us; he compared *Dialectick Reason* to Cobwebs, which, tho' they seem artificial, yet are of no Use.

He introduced not on any Virtues, as Zeno; nor one called by several Names, as the *Megarick* Philosophers, but affirmed they have a Quodammodo-tative Relation to one another.

Professing these Tenets, and disputing in *Guns-farges*, he came to be called Author of a Sect; whence *Miltiades* and *Diphilus* were called *Aristonians*.

He was very persuasive, and wrought much upon the common People, whence *Timon* in *Sillis*.

One of Aristo's smooth persuasive Race.

He defended eagerly this Paradox of the *Stoicks*, That a wise Man doth not opinate, but know; which *Perseus* opposing, caused of two like Twins, first, one to give a Depositum to him, then the other to come and re-demand it; and by his doubting if it were the same Person, convinced him.

He inveighed against *Arcefilaus* [¹ calling him a Corrupter of Youth.] On a time, seeing a Monster like a Bull, but of both Sexes, he said, *Alas!* Here is an Argument for *Arcefilaus* against Energy. To an Academic, who said, he comprehended nothing, do you not see, (saith he) him who sitteth next you? which he denying, *Who struck you blind*, saith he, or took your Light away.

He wrote these Treatises, *Protrepticks* 2. Of Zeno's Doctrine. *Scholastick Dialogues* 6. Of Wisdom, *Dissertations* 7. *Erotick Dissertations*. *Commentaries upon Vain-glory*. *Commentaries* 15. *Memorials* 3. *Chris* 11. *Against Orators*. *Against Alexinus his Oppositions*. To the *Dialecticks* 3. To *Cleantes Epist.* 4. But *Panætius* and *Sossicrates* affirm the *Epistles* only to be his, the rest to be *Aristo's* the *Peripatetick*.

The Sun striking hot upon his Head (which was bald) occasioned his Death. There was another of the same Name, a *Julite*, a *Peripatetick*; another an *Athenian*, a Musician, a Tragick Poet; a fifth, an *Alean*, who writ the *Rhetorical Art*; a sixth of *Alexandria*, a *Peripatetick*.

¹ Laert. 7. 36. m Athen. l. 4. n Deign. 4. o Cic. de nat. Deor. 1. p Athen. deip. 6. Laert. 7. 37. q Laert. vit. Arcef.

* *Erillus*, (or as *Cicero*, *Herillus*) was a *Carthaginian*; when he was a Boy, he was loved and courted by many; which *Zeno*, by causing him to be shaved, diverted.

He held, that the End is Science, which is to live so, as to refer all Things to Science, joined with Life. That Science is a Habit susceptible of Phantasies, falling under Reason.

Yet, sometimes he said, there is no End; but, that the End itself is changed by the Things, and those which are joined to the Things, as Brals, of which the Statues of *Alexander* and *Socrates* is made.

That *τιδος* the End, and *αρετης* differ, one is objected to unwife Persons as well as wise, the other to wife only.

Those Things which are betwixt Virtue and Vice, are Indifferents.

His Books are written in a short Stile, consisting of few Words, but very efficacious, wherein is contained what he held contrary to *Zeno*.

His Writings these, *Of Excitation*, *Of Passion*, *Of Suspicion*, the Law-giver, *Majestick*, *Antiphron*, *The Master*, *The Preparative*, *The Directive*, *Hermes*, *Medea*, *Dialogues*, *Moral Theſes*.

His Disciples were called *Herilians*, named by *Cicero*, as a particular Sect among the *Socraticks*.

Dionysius *, Son of *Theophrastus*, an *Heracleot*, from the Change of his Opinion firnamed *μπαθιμας*, the *Refractor*. He was from the Beginning studiously addicted to Learning, and writ Poems of all Kinds; then betook himself to *Aratus*, being much pleased with him. Of Philosophers he first heard, as *Diocles* affirms, *Heraclides* his Country-man; then *Alexines* and *Menedemus*, after these *Zeno*.

Revolting from *Zeno*, he addicted himself to the *Cyreneans*; he went to common Houses, and addicted himself to other Pleasures.

He asserted the End to be Pleasure, and that by Reason of his own pur-blindness; for being much grieved therat, he durst not affirm Grief to be one of the Indifferents.

He died eighty Years old, starved.

His Writings are thus intitled, *Of Apathy* 2. *Of Riches and Favour*, and *Punishment*; *Of the Use of Men*; *Of good Fortune*; *Of the Kings of the Ancients*; *Of Things that are praised*; *Of the Customs of the Barbarians*.

Sphaerus was of *Bosphorus*; he first heard *Zeno*, then *Cleanthes*, and having made a sufficient Progress in Learning, went to *Alexandria* to *Ptolomy Philopater*, where there arising a Dispute, whether a wise Man doth opionate, and *Sphaerus* main-

taining that he doth not, the King commanded some Quinces, *Athenaus* saith, Birds of Wax to be set before him, wherewith *Sphaerus* being cozened, the King cried out, that he assented to a false Phantasy; *Sphaerus* presently answered, That he assented not that they were Quinces, but that it was probable they were Quinces; but comprehensive Phantasy differs from probable, for that is never false, but in probable Matters sometimes a Thing falls out otherwise than we imagined. * *Menesthratus* accusing him that he denied *Ptolomy* to be King, he answered, that he thought *Ptolomy*, or such a one was King.

His Writings are these; *Of the World*, of the Seed of Elements, of Fortune, of Beasts, against Atoms and Apparitions, of the Organs of Sense, upon *Heraclitus*'s five Dissertations, of moral Description, of Office, of Appetite, of Passions 2. Dissertations of a Kingdom, of the Lacedemonian Commonwealth, of *Lycurgus* and *Socrates* 3. of Law, of Divination, *Erotick Dialogues*, of the *Eretrick Philosophers*, of Things like, of Definitions, of Habits, of Contraries 3. of Reason, of Riches, of Glory, of Death, of the Art of *Dialectick* 2. of Categories, of Ambiguities, of Epistles.

Cleanthes, whom *Zeno* compared to Writing Tables, that are so hard, they will not easily admit an Impression, but having once received it, keep it long. He succeeded *Zeno*, of him therefore apart.

Philon, a *Theban*.

Callippus, a *Corinthian*.

Possidonius, an *Alexandrian*.

Athenodorus of *Soli*; there were two more of the same Name, *Stoicks*.

Zeno, a *Sidonian*.

Last, in the Catalogue of his Disciples must be remembered an *Eretrian* Youth (mentioned by *Stobaeus* *) who heard *Zeno* till he came to be a Man; then returning to *Eretria*, his Father asked him what he had learned all that Time; he answered, he would shortly let him see, and did so; for, not long after, his Father in Anger did beat him, which he took quietly, saying, *This I have learned, to bear with the Anger of a Father, and not to oppose it*.

In the Life of *Zeno*, (for as much as he is Author of that Sect) it will be requisite to give Account of the Doctrine of the *Stoicks* in general; wherein, if the Terms seem harshly rendered, it will easily be forgiven by those, who consider the *Stoicks* were no less particular in their Words than in their Doctrines.

* Laert. 7. 165.

† Ibid. 7. 166.

‡ Athen. 7.

§ Laert. 7. 277.

¶ Ethic. Sem. 77.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE STOICKS.

The FIRST PART.

CHAP. I.

Of Philosophy in general, and particularly of Diælectic.

Wisdom * is the Science of Things divine and human; *Philosophy* is the Exercitation of convenient Art. Convenient is the only and supreme Virtue. Of *Virtus* in the most general Sense there are three Kinds, *natural, moral, rational*; for which Cause *Philosophy* likewise hath three Parts, *Physick, Ethick, Logick*; *Physick*, when we enquire concerning the World, and the Things in the World; *Ethick* is employed about human Life; *Logick* is that Part which concerns Reason, which is also called *Diælectic*.^y Thus *Zeno* the *Cittiean* first divided it in his Book of *Speech*; and *Chrysippus* in his first Book of *Speech*, and in his first of *Physicks*; and *Apollodorus Ephilius* in his first Book of *Introductions into Doctrines*; and *Eudromus* in his *moral Institutions*, and *Diogenes the Babylonian*, and *Possidonius*. These Parts *Apollodorus* calleth *Places*; *Chrysippus* and *Euromus*, *Species*, others *Genus*'s.

That *Logick* is a Part of *Philosophy* distinct from the rest, (wherein all the *Stoicks* agree) is proved by two Arguments, the first this: * Every Thing which useth another, if that which the Thing using, useth, be neither Part nor Particle, nor Part of Part of any other, it must be Part or Particle of the Thing using; as *Medicine* useth the Art of prescribing Diet; which Art being neither Part nor Particle of any other, is consequently a Part or Particle of *Medicine*; of Part, as to the Cure; of Particle, as to the Practice.

* *Philosophy* is conversant about *Logick*; *Logick* therefore is either a Part or Particle of *Philosophy*; but a Particle it is not, for it is not a Part either of the Contemplative or the Active. That which is a Particle of any Thing, ought to have the same

Matter and Scope with that whereof it is a Part. *Logick* hath neither of these common with active *Philosophy*, the Matter whereof is human Things, and Moderation of Appetite, the common Scope, what in them is to be embraced or shunned; but the Matter of *Logick* is Propositions; the Scope, to demonstrate by a Composure of Propositions, that which necessarily falls out upon the Collection. Neither is *Logick* a Part of the Contemplative, the Matter whereof is Things divine; the End, Contemplation of them: Now, if it be not a Part, either of the Contemplative or the Active, it is not a Particle of *Philosophy*, but equally separate from both these, and consequently it must be a Part of it.

* The second Argument is thus. No Art frameth its own Instruments; if therefore *Philosophy* make *Logick*, it is not its Instrument, but Part thereof.

* *Philosophy*, is by some compared to a Field which produceth all Manner of Fruit; *Physick* to the Soil and tall Trees; *Ethick* to the mature pleasant Fruit, *Logick* to the strong Fence. Others liken it to an Egg; *Ethick* to the Yolk, which some affirm to be the Chicken; *Physick* to the White, which is the Nourishment of the Chicken; *Logick* to the Outside or Shell. *Possidonius*, (because the Parts of *Philosophy* are inseparable from one another, but Plants are distinct from the Fruits, as Walls from Hedges) chuseth rather to compare *Philosophy* to a living Creature, *Physick* to Blood and Flesh, *Logick* to Bones and Nerves, *Ethick* to the Soul. (Thus *Sextus Empiricus*, by whom, perhaps, *Laertius* is to be corrected, who saith, *They likened Ethick to the Flesh, Physick to the Soul*.) Lastly, they compare *Philosophy* to a City well fortified and governed according to Reason.

* Plat. de plac. Phil. 2.
* Sent. Emp. adv. Log. 2.

y Laert. 7. 39.

z Ammonius in Categ.

a Philop. in lib. 2. Anal. prior.

b Apuleius in Categ.

^a Some affirm, that none of these Parts are distinct from the rest, but all intermingled with one another, for which Reason they deliver them confusedly. The greater Part place *Logick* first, *Ethick* next, *Physick* last; because the Mind ought first to be fortified for the keeping those Things, which are committed to it, so as it be not easily expugnable. The *Dialectick* Place is a Fortification for the Mind. Secondly, to describe the Contemplation of Manners, that they may be reformed, which is safely undertaken, when the logical Power is first laid down. Lastly, to induce the Contemplation of Nature, for that is more Divine, and requirerh a more profound Attention. This Method *Platarch* affirms to have been observed by *Chrysippus*, adding that of *Physick*, the last Part, is that which treateth of God; for which Reason they call the Precepts of Religion *τὰ θεῶν*. It seems, therefore, that there is some Mistake in *Laertius*, who of those who place *Logick* first, *Physick* next, and *Ethick* last, citeth *Zeno* in his Book of Speech, and *Chrysippus*, and *Archedemus*, and *Eudromus*. But *Diogenes* the *Ptolemaean* (contineth he) begins with *Ethick*. *Apolodorus* puts *Ethick* in the second Place, *Panetius* and *Possidonius* begin with *Physick*, as *Phanias*, Companion of *Possidonius* affirms in his First of *Possidonius's* *Disquisitiones*.

^c Of *Logick*, *Cicero* assigns Six Parts, *Dialectick*, *Rhetorick*, *Ethick*, *Politick*, *Physick*, *Theologic*. Some affirm these are not Parts of *Logick*, but of *Philosophy* itself; so *Zeno* of *Tarsis*. The logical Part is by some divided into two Sciences, *Rhetorick* and *Dialectick*; some add the *definitive* Part, some divide the *Definitive* into that which concerns *Invention* of Truth (by which the Differences of Phantasies are directed) and that which concerns *Knowledge* of Truth; for Things are comprehended by Notions.

^d *Rhetorick* is the Science of well Speaking, by dilating upon the Thing comprehended. *Dialectick* is the Science of well Speaking, (that is true and consistent) or will disputing by Question and Answer. It is defined by *Possidonius*, the Science of True, False, and Neuter.

^e *Rhetorick* is of three Kinds, *Deliberative*, *Judicial*, *Demonstrative*. The Parts of *Rhetorick* are *Invention*, *Stile*, *Disputation*, *Pronunciation*; *Rhetorical Speech* is divided into *Proem*, *Narration*, *Confutation*, *Epilogue*.

^f *Dialectick* is necessary, and a *Virtue* within its Species, containing other *Virtues*; *ἀνεγκλισία*, a Science whereby we are taught when to assent, and when not; *ἀνεκείνη*, a firm Reason, whereby we resist Appearances, and are not led away by them; *ἀνεκέρεια*, a Fortitude of Reason, which keeps us from being transported with the adverse

Opinion; *ἀνακρίσις*, a Habit, directing Phantasies to right Reason.

^g *Dialectick* is a Science or certain Comprehension, or a Habit, not erring by Reason in Reception of Phantasies; but without *Dialectick*, a wise Man cannot be infallible in Reason; for by this we discern the true, false, and probable, and distinguish the ambiguous.

C H A P. II.

Of the Instruments and Rules of Judgment.

¹ IN the first Place they put the Discourse concerning Phantasies and Sense, as a Judiciary, whereby the Truth of Things is discerned.

² The Senses (according to *Zeno*, who made many Alterations in *Dialectick*, and asserted many Things of the Senses that were wholly new) are joined by a certain kind of extrinsecal Impulsion, termed Phantasy. To these Phantasies received by the Senses, is added an Assertion of the Mind, which is placed in us voluntary. The Phantasy, when seen, is comprehensible, when received and approved, Comprehension; and if so comprehended as that it cannot be plucked away by Reason, Science.

³ Judgment is a Perfection which discerneth a Thing.

⁴ That which judgeth is taken two Ways, 1. By which we say, some Things are, others are not; these are true, those are false. 2. Of Essence only, and this is understood three Ways, Commonly, Properly, and most Properly. Commonly, for every Measure of Comprehension, in which Sense, even those Things which judge naturally, have this Appellation, as Sight, Hearing, Taste. Properly, for every artificial Measure of Comprehension; thus a Cubit, a Balance, a Ruler, a Pair of Compasses, are call'd Things that judge; but Sight and Hearing, and the other common Instruments of Sense, are not. Most Properly, for every Measure of Comprehension of a Thing, uncertain, and not evident. In which Sense, those Things which belong to the Actions of Life, are not said to be Things judging, but the Logical only, and those which dogmatical Philosophers alledge for the Invention of Truth.

The Logical is subdivided into that from which, that by which, and Application or Habitude. From which, the Man; by which, the Sense; the Third is the Application of Phantasy or Sight; for, as in the Statics there are three Things which judge, the Weigher, the Balance, and Position of the Balance. The Weigher is the Judge from which, the Balance the Judge by which, the Position of the Balance, as it were a Habitude. And again, as to discern right or oblique Things, is required an Artificer, a Ruler, and the Application thereof. In

^d Laert. 7. 40.
¹ Laert. 7. 41.

^e De Ph. Phil. 1.
in Cic. Acad. 1. 21.

^f Laert. 7. 41.
² Galen. Hist. Phil. 1. 4.

^g Laert. 7. 42.
³ Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem.

^h Laert. 7. 46.
⁴ Laert. 7. 46.

ⁱ Laert. 7. 46.

^k Laert. 7. 46.
like

like manner in Philosophy are required those three Things mentioned in the Discernment of true and false; the Man from whom the Judgment is made, is like the Weigher or Artificer; to the Ballance and Ruler answer Sense and Cogitation, by which the Judgment is made; to the Habitude of the fore-named Instruments, the Application of Phantasy, by which a Man cometh to judge.

^p The Judge of Truth they affirm to be *Comprehensivè Phantasy*, that is, proceeding from that which is; so *Chrysippus* in the 12th of his Physicks, and *Antipater* and *Apollodorus*. But *Boethius* holds many Judicatories, the *Mind*, and *Sense*, and *Appetite*, and *Science*; from whom *Chrysippus* dissenting in his first Book of *Reason*, affirmeth the Judicatories to be *Sense* and *Anticipation*. *Anticipation* is a natural Notion of Universals. Others of the more ancient Stoicks (as *Possidonius* saith in his Book of Judgments) assert right Reason to be the Judicatory.

CHAP. III.

Of Sense.

Salettick ^q is derived from Corporeal Senses; for from thence, the Soul conceiveth notorious (*notoriae*) of those Things which are explained by Definition, and from thence is propagated and connexed the whole Reason of Learning and Teaching.

^r *Sense* is a Spirit, proceeding from the supreme Part of the Soul, and permeating to the Organs.

^s Whatsoever Things are comprehended, are manifestly comprehended by Sense; all Conceptions of the Mind depend upon Sense.

^t Comprehension made by the Senses is true and faithful (according to *Zeno*) for as much as Nature hath given it as a Rule for Science, and Principle of herself.

^u Nothing is more clear than this *εναργεια* Evidence, there cannot be any Speech more perspicuous.

^v Of Sensibles and Intelligibles, some are true, but not directly sensible; but, by relation to those Things which are next, as falling under Intelligence.

CHAP. IV.

Of Phantasy.

IN the first Place (saith ^x *Diocles the Magnesian*) they put the Reason concerning Phantasy and Sense, as a Judgment, whereby the Truth of Things is discerned. It is Phantasy as to its Genus, and likewise in as much as the Reason of Assent, Comprehension, and Intelligence (which is more excellent than the rest) consists not without Phantasy; for Phantasy goeth right, then the Mind endued

with Elocution, declareth by Words what it suffers from the Phantasy.

^y *Phantasy* is so called from *φανε* Light; for as Light sheweth itself, and with itself all those Things which are contained within it, so *Phantasy* sheweth itself, and that which maketh it.

^z *Phantasy* is an Impression in the Soul. *Cleanthes* adds, an Impression by Depression and Eminence, as that Impression which is made in Wax by a Seal.

Chrysippus conceives this to be absurd; For, 1. saith he, when the Soul first apprehends a Triangle and a Square, it will follow that the same Body, at the same time, must have in itself several Figures, which is absurd. Again, whereas many Phantasies are together consistent in us, the Soul must have divers Figures, which is worse than the former. He therefore conceived that *Zeno* used the Word *Impression* for *Alteration*, meaning thus: *Phantasy* is an Alteration of the Soul, whereby it is no longer absurd; that the same Body (many several Phantasies being at the same time consistent in us) should receive several Alterations. For, as the Air receiving at once innumerable different Percussions, hath presently many Alterations; so the supreme Part of the Soul, receiving various Phantasies, doth something which hath Proportion and Conformity thereto.

Some object that this Exposition is not right; because, tho' every Phantasy is an Expression and Alteration in the Soul; yet every Impression or Alteration of the Soul is not Phantasy; as, when the Finger smarts or itches, and the Hand is rubb'd, there is then an Impression or Alteration in the Soul; but it is not Phantasy, because it is not in the supreme Part of the Soul.

They answer, That in saying an Impression in the Soul, is implied as in the Soul as fully, as if we should say, Phantasy is an Impression in the Soul as in the Soul; as when we say, the White in the Eye, we imply, as in the Eye, that is, the White is in a certain Part of the Eye, which all Men have so by Nature. So when we say, Phantasy is an Impression in the Soul, we imply the Impression to be made in the supreme Part thereof.

Others more elegantly answer, that the Word Soul is taken two Ways, either the Whole, or for the principal Part; when they say, Man consists of Soul and Body, or that Death is a Separation of the Soul from the Body, we mean properly the supreme Part, wherein properly consists the Motions and Goods of the Soul. When *Zeno* therefore calleth Phantasy an Impression of the Soul, he is not to be understood of the whole Soul, but of Part thereof, as if he should say, Phantasy is an Alteration of the supreme Part of the Soul.

To this Interpretation, some object thus: *Appetition*, *Assention*, and *Comprehension*, are Alterations

^p Laert. 7. 47.
^q Acad. quest. 2. 6.

^r St. Aug. Civ. dei. 8. 7.
^s Sext. Empir. adv. Mathem.

^t Laert. 7. 52.
^x Laert. 7. 49.

^y Orig. contra Cels. lib. 7.
^z Plut. Plat. Phil. 4. 12.

^z Cic. Acad. quest. 1. 11.
^z Sext. Empir. adv. Mathem.

^u Cic.

in the supream Part of the Soul; but these differ from Phantasy, that being a certain Kind of Persuasion and Affection, whereas this is more Operation than Appetition, therefore the Definition is not good, being competent to many other Things.

They answer by Recourse to *emphases* (implicancies) that a Definition is understood to be in all. As he who saith, *Love is an Application of the Soul towards Procurement of Friendship, implieth amongst young People*; so when we say, that *Phantasy is an Alteration in the supream Part of the Soul, we imply by Persuasion*; for, *Alteration is not made by Operation*.

^a Of Phantasies there are two Kinds, some are *senfible*, others not *senfible*. *Senfible* are those which are received through one or more of the Senses: *Nst senfible* are those which are received through the Mind, as of Incorporeals, and other Things, comprehended by Reason. The *senfible* formed from Things that are, are made with Concession and Assent. There are also Apparitions of Phantasies, proceeding from Things which are.

Again, some are *Rational*, others *Irrational*; *Rational*, those of reasonable Creatures; *Irrational*, those of Unreasonable. The *Rational* are Intelligence, the *Irrational* have no Name.

Again, some are *Artificial*, others *In artificial*; for, an Image is considered by an Artist one Way; by him that is not an Artist, another way.

^b Again, some are *Probable*, others *Improbable*; the *Probable* are those which make an easy Motion in the Soul; as, it is now Day, I discourse, and the like. The *Improbable* are of a contrary Nature, averting us from Assent; as, it is Day, the Sun is not above the Earth; if it is dark, it is Day. Both *Probable* and *Improbable* are those, which, by Relation to other Things, are sometimes such as in doubtful Speeches, neither probable are improbable, nor, such as these, The Stairs are even, the Stairs are odd.

Of probable and improbable Phantasies, some are *true*, some are *false*, some are neither true nor false. *True*, are those, whose Predication is true, as, it is Day, 'tis Light: *False*, whose Predication is false; both *true* and *false*, as happened to *Croesus* in his Madness, meeting *Electra*; that he met something, it was true, for it was *Electra*; but, that it was *Fury*, was false. Neither *true* nor *false*, are those which are taken from the Genus; for the Genus is not such as the Species in all Respects: As, of Men, some are *Grecians*, some are barbarous; but Man in general is not *Grecian*, nor then all Men must be *Grecians*; neither barbarous, for the same Reason.

Of true Phantasies, some are *comprehensive*, others are *not comprehensive*. *Not comprehensive*

are those which happen through Sickness, or Perturbation of Mind; many being troubled with Frensy or Melancholy, attract a true Phantasy which is not comprehensive, even from that which extrinsically occurs casually, for which Reason, they neither assert it often, nor assent unto it. *Comprehensive* Phantasy is that which is impressed and signed by that which is, and conformable to that which is, so as it cannot be of that which is not.

To comprehensive Phantasy three Conditions are requisite: 1. That it arise from that which is; for many Phantasies arise from that which is not, as in Madmen. 2. That it be conformable to that which is; for some Phantasies are from that which is, but represents the Similitude of that which is not: As *Orestes* derived a Phantasy from that which was, viz. from *Electra*, but not according to that which was; for he thought her to be one of the Furies. Comprehensive Phantasy must be conformable to that which is, and so impressed and signed, as that it may imprint artificially all the Properties of the Thing fancied, as *Gravers* touch all the Parts of those Things which they imitate, and the Impression made by a Seal on Wax exactly and perfectly, beareth all its Characters. Lastly, That it be without Impediment; for sometimes comprehensive Phantasy is not creditable, by Reason of outward Circumstances; as when *Hercules* brought *Alceſtis* taken out of the Earth, to *Admetus*, *Admetus* drew from *Alceſtis* a comprehensive Phantasy, but did not credit it; for, he considered, that she was dead, and therefore could not rise again, but that sometimes Spirits appear in the Shape of the deceased.

^c *Phantafie*, *Phantaſton*, *Phantaſticon*, and *Phantaſm*, according to *Chrysippus*, differ thus: *Phantafie* is a Passion made in the Soul, which sheweth itself, and that which made it; as, when with our Eyes we see white, it is a Passion engendered by Sight in the Soul, and we may call this a Passion, because the Object thereof is a white Thing which moveth us: The like of Smelling and Touching.

Phantaſton is that which maketh Phantafie; as the White and the Cold, and whatsoever is able to move the Soul, that is *Phantaſton*.

Phantaſticon is a fruitaneous Attraction, a Passion in the Soul proceeding from nothing, as in those who fight with Shadows, or extend their Hands in vain: For, to Phantafie is objected *Phantaſton*, but *Phantaſticon* hath no Object.

Phantaſm is that, to which we are attracted by that fruitaneous Attraction, which happens in melancholy, or mad Persons; as *Orestes*, in the Tragedy, when he saith,

Bring

*Bring hither, Mother, I implore,
The snaky bloody Maids no more,
Whose very Looks wound me all o'er.*

This he saith in his Madness, for he saw nothing:
Wherefore *Electra* answers him,

*Al! quiet in thy Bed (unhappy) lie,
Thou seest not what thou think'st before thy Eye.*

CHAP. V.

Of True and Truth.

TRUE ^a (according to *Zeno*) is that which is impressed in the Mind from that whence it is, in such Manner, as it cannot be from that which is not: Or, as others; ^e *True* is that which is, and is opposed to something. *False* is that which is not; yet, is opposed to something also.

Truth and *True* differ three Ways, by *Essence*, by *Constitution*, by *Power*. By *Essence*, for *Truth* is a Body; but, *True* is incorporeal, for it is a dicible *ἄσπερον*, and therefore incorporeal. On the contrary, *Truth* is a Body, as being the enunciative Science of all true Things. All Science is in some Measure the supremest Part of the Soul, which supremest Part is a Body: Therefore *Truth* in general is corporeal.

By *Constitution*; *True* is conceived to be something uniform and simple by Nature; as, *It is Day, I discourse*. *Truth*, as being a Science, consisteth of many Things, by a Kind of Consecration. Wherefore as a People is one Thing, a Citizen another; a People is a Multitude consisting of many Citizens; but, a Citizen is no more than one. In the same Manner differeth *Truth* from *True*. *Truth* resembleth a People, *True*, a Citizen; for, *Truth* consisteth of many Things collected, *True* is simple:

By *Power*; for *True* doth not absolutely adhere to *Truth*: A Fool, a Child, a Madman, may speak something *True*, but, cannot have the Science of that which is *True*. *Truth* considers Things with Science, inasmuch that he who hath it, is wise; for, he hath the Science of true Things, and is never deceived, nor lieth, altho' he speak false, because it proceedeth not from an ill, but good Affection.

CHAP. VI.

Of Comprehension.

Comprehension ^c (*κατανόησις*) was first used in this Sense by *Zeno*, by a Metaphor taken from Things apprehended by the Hand; ^h which Allu-

sion he expresseth by *Action*. For, shewing his Hand with the Fingers stretched forth, he said, such was Phantasy; then bending them a little, said, such was Assent; then compressing them and clutching his Fist, such was Comprehension.

^h Comprehension is a firm and true Knowledge, Non-comprehension the contrary; for some Things we only think that we see, hear, or feel, as in Dreams and Frenzies; other Things we not only think, but truly do see, or hear, or feel. These latter, (all but the Academicks and Scepticks) conceive to fall under firm Knowledge; the other, which we imagine in Dreams or Frenzie, are false.

ⁱ Whatsoever is understood, is comprehended by the Mind, one of these two Ways, either by *evident Incurfion* (which *Laertius* calls by *Senfe*) or by *Transition from Evidence* (*Laertius*, Collection by Demonstration) of which latter there are three Kinds, by *Assimilation*, by *Composition*, by *Analogy*.

By *incurrent Evidence* is understood White and Black, Sweet and Sour.

By *Transition* from Evidents: By *Assimilation*, is understood *Socrates* by his Picture: By *Composition*, as of a Horse and Man is made a Centaur; for putting together the Limbs proper to both Species, we comprehend by Phantasy that which was neither Horse nor Man, but a Centaur compounded of both.

By *Analogy*, Things are understood two Ways; either by *Augmentation*; or, when from common ordinary Men, we by Augmentation fancy a Cyclops, who not like

*Men that with Ceres's Gifts are fed,
But, some tall Hill erects his Head.*

Or by *Diminution*, as a Pigmy. ^k Likewise the Center of the Earth is understood by Analogy from lesser Globes.

To these Kinds add, ^l Comprehension by *Transference*, as Eyes in the Breast; by *Contiariety*, as Death; by *Transference*, as Dicibles, and Place; by *Privation*, as a Man without Hands; just and good are understood *Naturally*.

CHAP. VII.

Of Assent.

THESE ^m Things being enough known, which we have already explained, let us now speak a little of *Assent*, and *Approbation*, termed *συγκατάθεσις*, not that, that is not a large Place, but the Grounds thereof have been already laid, for when we explained the Power that was in

^a St. Aug. contra Acad. Lib. 2.

^e Sext. Emp. Adv. Mathem.

^f Cic. Acad. quest. 4. 47.

^g Cic. Acad. quest. 4. 118.

^h Galen. hist. phil.

ⁱ Sext. Empir. adv. Mathem.

^k Laert. 7. 53.

^l Laert. libid.

^m Cic. Acad. quest. 4. 12.

the Senses, we likewise declared, that many Things were comprehended and perceived by the Senses, which cannot be done without *Assent*. Moreover, seeing that betwixt an inanimate and an animate Being, the greatest Difference is, that the Inanimate doth nothing, the Animate doth something; we must either take away Sense from it, or allow it assent, which is within our Power. When we will not have a Thing either to perceive or Assent, we in a Manner take away the Soul from it; for as it is necessary, that the Scale of Ballance which is laden, should tend downwards; so is it that the Soul should yield to Things that are perspicuous.

* Altho' Assent cannot be made unless it be moved by Phantasy, yet when that Phantasy hath an immediate Cause, it hath not (according to *Chrysippus*) this principal Reason; not that it can be made without any extrinsecal Excitation (for it is necessary that Assent be moved by Phantasy) but it returns to its Cylinder and Cone, which move not by Impulsion; then of their own Nature the Cylinder seems to rowl, and the Cone to turn round. As therefore he who thrust the Cylinder, gave it the Beginning of Motion, but did not give it Volubility; so the objected Phantasy imprinteth, and as it were sealeth in the Soul its Species, yet the Assent is in our Power, and that (as he said in a Cylinder) extrinsecally impelled, the Motion is continued by its own Power and Nature.

° Phantasies, wherewith the Mind of Man is presently affected, are not voluntary or in our own Power, but infer themselves by a Kind of Violence. Approbations (*συναλαβσεις*) by which these Phantasies are known and judged, are voluntary, and made according to our Arbitrement. So as upon any dreadful Noise from Heaven, or by the Fall of any Thing, or sudden News of some Danger, or the like; it is necessary that the Mind of a wife Man be a little moved, and contracted, and appalled, not through Opinion perceived of any ill, but certain rapid and inconsiderate Motions, which prævert the Office of the Mind and Reason. But presently the same wife Man approveth not *τις τοιούτων φαντασις*, those dreadful Phantasies, that is, *ὁ συναλαβήσας ὁ δὲ προσεαυτὸν κρίσας*, but rejects and refuses them; nor is there any Thing in these, which seemeth to him dreadful. Thus differ the Souls of wife and unwise Men: The unwise, when Phantasies appear cruel and difficult at the first Impulsion of the Mind, think them to be truly such as they appear, and receiving them as if they were justly to be feared, approve them by

their Assent, *ὁ συναλαβήσας*. (this Word the Stoicks use upon this Occasion :) But a wife Man suddenly changing Colour and Countenance, *ὁ συναλαβήσας*, assents not, but retaineth the State and Vigour of his Judgment, which he always had of these Phantasies, as nothing dreadful, but terrifying only with a false Shew, and vain Fear.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Notions.]

FROM Sense, the Rule of Science, Notions, are imprinted in the Soul, by which, not only Principles, but larger Ways to Reason are found out.

* A Man when he is born, hath the supreme Part of his Soul, like unto clean Paper, upon which every Notion is inscribed. The first Manner of Inscription is by the Senses; as for Example: They who perceive a Thing that is white, after it is taken away, retain the Memory thereof; but, when they have conceived many Remembrances of one Species, then they say, they have Experience, for Experience is a Multitude of Similitudes.

Of Notions, some are Natural, which are in such Manner as we have said, and without Art: Others gained by Learning and Industry; these are properly called Notions, the other Anticipations. The Reason for which we are called Rational, is said to be perfected by Anticipations in the first seven Years.

Intelligence is the Phantasm of the Intellect of a rational Creature; for Phantasm, when it lighteth upon a rational Soul, is then called *ἰννομα*, Intelligence, a Word taken from the Intellect. For to other Creatures there happen not Phantasms; to the Gods only, and to us these are incident. Those which belong to us, are Phantasms, as to their Genus; Notions as to their Species; as Dinaries and Staters, when paid for Transportation, are called Naula.

* Common Notions are planted in all Men, (in which they all agree together) one is not repugnant to another; for who holds not, that God is profitable, and ought to be chosen with utmost Endeavours? Who holds not, that what is just, is fair and well becoming? Whence then proceed Contentions and Differences? To wit, from the Application of first Notions to singular Things.

* These Notions, and whatsoever is of this Kind, which right Reason conformeth in us, being long examined, are true, and suitable to the Nature of Things.

n Cic. lib. de fato.

o Agell. 19. 1. and from him St. August.

civ. Dei. 9. 4.

p Cic. Acad. 1. 11.

q Plat. de plac. phil.

4. 11.

r Arius. Di. Epist. 1. 22.

s Sump. in Epist.

CHAP. IX. Of Science and Opinion.

THAT which is comprehended by Sense, *Zeno* called *Sense*; and if so comprehended, as not to be plucked away by Reason, *Science*, otherwise *Ignorance*; from which proceedeth Opinion, which is weak and common, to the false and unknown.

These three are joined together, *Science*, *Opinion*, and *Comprehension*, which borders upon the other two. *Science* is a firm, stable immutable Comprehension with Reason. *Opinion*, an infirm weak Assent; *Comprehension*, which cometh between both, is an Assent to comprehensive Phantasy. *Comprehensive Phantasy* is true, in such a Manner, that it cannot be false. Therefore *Science* is in wise Men only, *Opinion* in Fools; *Comprehension* is common to both, as being that by which Truth is judged; * and is for this Reason reckoned by *Zeno*, neither among the right (καταλογισμα) nor amongst the bad (ἀναλογισμα) but betwixt *Science* and *Ignorance*, affirming, that this only is to be credited.

CHAP. X. Of Voice, Speech, and Words.

THESE three are joined to one another; that which is signified, that which signifieth, and the Contingent. That which signifieth, is the Voice, as *Dion*; That which is signified, is the Thing declared by the Voice; it is that which we apprehend, and is present in our Cogitation. The Contingent is the outward Subject, as *Dion* himself.

Dialectick being conversant about that which signifieth, and that which is signified, * is divided into two Places; one, of *Significats*, the other, of *Voice*. The Place of *Significats* is divided into *Phantasies*, and *Subsistents* on *Phantasy*, *Dicibles*, *Axioms*, &c.

In the other Place, concerning *Voice*, is declared *literal Voice*, the *Parts of Speech*, the Nature of *Syllabism* and *Barbarisms*, *Poems*, *Ambiguities*, *Song*, *Musick*, and (according to some) *Definitions* and *Divisions*.

The *Phantasies* of the Mind precede Speech, (Of these therefore we have already treated) when the Mind endued with the Faculty of Speaking, declareth by Speech what it receiveth from the Phantasy: For this Reason, the Consideration of Dialectick, by the joint Consent of all, seems as if it ought to be first taken from the Place of *Voice*.

Voice is Air percussed, the proper sensible Object of Hearing, (as *Diogenes* the *Babylonian*, in his *Art of Voice*.) The Voice of a living sensitive Crea-

ture is Air percussed with Appetite; the Voice of Man is articulate, proceeding from the Mind. At his fourteenth Year it is perfected.

Speech (as *Diogenes* saith) is a literate Voice; as, it is *Day*. *Word* is a significative Voice proceeding from the Mind. *Language* is a Speech according to the Variety of Nations, whereof each useth its peculiar Dialect; as the *Attick Σχολαστα*, the *Ionick ἑρμην*. Voice and Speech differ, in that Voice is Sound, but Speech articulate only. Speech and Word differ; for Word is always significative; but Speech sometimes signifieth nothing, as *Blitiri*, which is no Word. To speak and to pronounce differ; Voices are pronounced, but Things only are spoken; * for, to speak, is to pronounce a significative Voice of a Thing that is said.

Hence *Chrysippus* saith, That he who beginneth to speak and pronounce Words, before he can put them in their right Place, doth not speak, but think that he speaks; as the Image of a Man is not a Man; so in Crows, Daws and Children, when they first begin to speak, the Words which they say are not Words. He only speaketh who knoweth to put a Word in the right Place.

They (particularly *Zeno*) * took much Pains in the Invention and Explication of Words, * where- in they distinguished very subtilly. Hence *Cicero* calleth the *Stoicks* Architects of Words. *Ammonius*, the *Grammarians*, Followers of the *Stoicks*.

The Elements of Speech are the twenty four Letters. Letter is taken three Ways; First, for the Character or Figure which is formed. Secondly, for the Element or Power. Thirdly for the Name, as *A*. Of the Elements, seven are Vowels, α ε ι ο υ ι ω, six Mutes, β γ δ ζ η θ ρ.

Of Speech there are five Parts, as *Diogenes* saith in his Book of *Voice*, and *Chrysippus*™. At first they reckoned but four, separating the *Articles* from the *Conjunctions*, afterwards the latter *Stoicks* dividing the *Appellatives* from the *Nouns*, made them five, *Noun*, *Appellation*, *Verb*, *Conjunction*, *Article*. (*Antipater* in his Book of *Speech*, added the *Medium*. *Appellation* (as *Diogenes* saith) is a Part of Speech signifying a common Quality; as, Man, Horse. *Noun* a Part of Speech denoting a proper Quality; as *Diogenes*, *Socrates*. *Verb*, (as *Diogenes* saith) a Part of Speech signifying a Thing, which is predicated of one or more Things, incomp- posed; or as some say, an Element of Speech without Cases, whereby the Parts of Speech are connected; as, I write, I speak. *Conjunction* is a Part of Speech without Cases, conjoining the Parts of Speech. *Article* is an Element of Speech, having Cases, distinguishing the Kinds and Numbers of Nouns; as, *ὁ, ὁ, το, τα, τὰ, τῶν*.

† Cicero. Acad. quest. 1. 11. u Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. w Cic. Acad. quest. 1. 11. x Sext. Emp. adv. mathem. y Laert. 7. 43. v Laert. ibid. b Ibid. 7. 49. c Ibid. d Ibid. e Sext. Emp. adv. mathem. f Varro de Ling. Lat. lib. 5. g Cicero offic. 1. 17. h Dionys. Halic. de compos. verb. i Ammon. k Laert. 7. 57. l Ibid. m Dionys. Halic. Sect. 11.

"Every Word, by Reason of that which it signifieth, called four necessary Things into Question, its *Origin, Power, Declination, Ordination*.

As concerning the first, which the *Greeks* call *Etimologia*, they conceived that Names are given by Nature; the first pronounced Voices, imitating the Things themselves, from which the Names were afterwards imposed, by which Reason they derive Etymologies, conceiving that there is not any Word, for which there cannot be given a certain Reason. They therefore studiously enquired whence Words are deduced; much Pains was taken, first by *Zeno*, then by *Cleanthes*, afterward by *Chrysippus*, to give a Reason of Commentitious Fables, and to explain the Causes of Words, why they are called so and so.

This Beginning is to be sought, until we arrive so far, as that the Thing agree in some Similitude with the Sound of the Word, as when we say, *Tinkling* of Brass, the *Neighing* of Horses, the *Bleating* of Sheep, the *Gingling* of Chains. These Words, by their Sound, express the Things which are signified by them.

But for as much as there are Things which sound not, in these the Similitude of Touching hath the same Power. As they touch the Sense smoothly or harshly, the Smoothness or Harshness of Letters in like Manner touches the Hearing, and thereby occasioneth their Names. As when we say *smooth*, it sounds smoothly; so who will not judge *Harshness* to be harsh by the very Word? It is smooth to the Ear, when we say *Pleasure*; harsh, when we say *Crux*, a *Cross*; the Things themselves make good the Sound of the Words. *Honey*, as sweetly as the Thing itself affects our Taste, so sweetly doth the Name touch our Hearing: *Sour*, as harsh in both. *Wood* and *Briars*, as the Words are to the Hearing, the Things are to the Touch. These are conceived to be the Infancy, as it were, of Words, when the Sense of the Thing concurs with the Sense of the Sound.

From hence proceeded the Licence of Naming, according to the Similitude of the Things among themselves; as when, for Example, *Crux*, a *Cross*, is therefore so called, because the Harshness of the Word concurs with the Harshness of the Pain which the Cross effecteth. But *Crura*, *Thighs*, are so called, not from Harshness of Pain, but, because in Length and Hardness, they are, in respect of other Limbs, like unto the Wood of a Cross. Hence it comes to Abuse, that the Name is usurped, not of a like Thing, but as it were near; for what Likeness is there between the Signification of *little* and *minute*, when as that may be *little*, which not only is nothing *minute*, but is somewhat grown; yet, by Reason of a certain Nearness, we say *minute* for *little*. But this Abuse of the Word is in

the Power of the Speaker; for he may use the Word *little*, and not *minute*. This Example belongs to that which we will shew, when we call that a *Fishpond* which hath no Fish in it, nor any Thing like a Fish: It is denominated from Fishes, by Reason of the Water wherein Fishes live. So the Word is used by Translation, not from Similitude, but a certain Kind of Vicinity. And if any one should say, that Men in swimming resemble Fishes, and that from thence a Fish-pond is so named, it were foolish to refuse it, since that neither is repugnant to the Nature of the Thing, and both are occult. But, this is to the Purpose, which we cannot dilucidate by one Example, how much the Origin of the Word, which is taken from Vicinity, differs from that which is derived from Similitude.

From hence there is a Progression to the contrary. *Lucus* is thought to be so named, *Quod minus luceat*; and *bellum*, *quod res bella non sit*; and *saedus*, *quod res saeda non sit*. But if we derive *parcus*, as some do a *saeditate*, it returns to that Vicinity, when that which is made, is named that by which it is made.

For this Vicinity is very large, and divided into many Parts, either by Efficiency, as this Word *porcus* à *saeditate*; from which likewise *saedus*; or by Effect, as *puteus*, so named, because the Effect thereof is *pitatio*; or by that it containeth, as *urbs* ab *orbe*, because in a Place which they liked, they first made a Tract about it with a Plough, as *Virgil* saith of *Aeneas*.

— *Urberem designat Aratro.*

Or by that which is contained, as if *horreum* were derived from *hordeum*; or by Abuse, as *hordeum* for Wheat; or the Whole from a Part, as *muco*, which is the Point, for the whole *Sword*; or a Part from the Whole, as *capillus quasi capitis pilus*. What need we go any further? Whatsoever else can be reckoned, we may fee the Origin of the Word contained, either in the Similitude betwixt Things and Sounds, or in the Similitude betwixt Things themselves, or in Vicinity or Contrariety, which Origin we cannot pursue beyond Similitude.

But this we cannot do always; for there are innumerable Words, the Reason of which lie hid. To the Infancy, or rather Stock and Seed of such Words, beyond which no Origin is to be sought, neither if a Man do enquire can he find any, they proceed in this Manner. The Syllables in which hath the Place of Consonant, as in these Words, *venter*, *vasser*, *velum*, *vinum*, *vomis*, *vultus*, have a thick, and as it were, a strong Sound, which the very Custom of speaking confirmeth, which from some Words we take them away, lest they should

burthen the Ear ; for which Reason we say *amasti*, rather than *amavisti* ; and *abit*, not *abivisti*, and innumerable of the same kind ; therefore when we say *Via*, the Sound of the Word having, as we said, a kind of Force, suiteth. Now from this Vicinity, by that which they affect, that is, because they are violent, *vincula* seem to be named, and *vimen* quod *aliquid vinciat*. Thence *vites*, because they clasp about those Things by which they grow. Hence also by Similitude, *Terence* calls a crooked old Man *Vitium*. Hence the Earth, worn into winding Paths by the Feet of Passengers, is called *Via* ; but if *Via* be so named, *quasi vi pedum trita*, the Origin returns to the Vicinity. But let us suppose it derived from the Similitude it hath with *vitis* or *vimen*, that is, from its winding ; one asketh me, why it is called *Via* ? I answer, from the *Winding* and *Crookedness* thereof, which the Ancients call'd *Vitium* ; thence the Rounds of a Wheel *Vietos*. He demands how *Vietum* comes to signify Winding ? I answer, from the Similitude of *Vitis*, a *Vine*. He requires whence *Vitis* is so named ? I say, because it doth *vincire* those Things which it comprehends. He questions whence *vincire* is derived ? We say, a *vi*. He asks, whence *vi* ? We give this Reason, because the Word in its robust and forcible Sound agreeth to the Thing which it signifieth. He hath nothing more to demand.

* In like manner in this Word *Ego* ; as *Chrysippus* observes, in pronouncing the first Syllable, we depress the under Lip, as if it were to point to our selves ; then by Motion of the Beard we point to our own Breasts ; of which *Nigidius* hath given more Instances in his Grammatical Commentaries.

The second Question concerning Words, is of their Power, *ἢ σημασιῶν, of Significant* ; whence *Chrysippus* divided Dialectick into two Parts, *ἢ σημασιῶν ἢ σημασιῶν, of Significant, and Significant*. Here they enquire, how many Ways every Thing may be said, and how many Ways a Thing said may signify ?

Here is examined the Ambiguity of Words. * *Ambiguity* (or *Amphiboly*) is a Word signifying two or more Things, naturally and properly, according to the Language of the Nation, in such manner, that many Senses may be collected from the same Words, as *αυαλὸς ὠφέλιος*, which one way signifies, the *Pot* fell thrice ; another way, the *She-Mistress* fell.

* Every Word (according to *Chrysippus*) is by Nature ambiguous, for the same may be taken two or more Ways. * Neither is that any thing to the Purpose which *Hortensius* calumniate in *Cicero*, Thus they affirm that they hear Ambiguities acute-

ly, explain them clearly. The same Persons hold, that every Word is ambiguous ; how then can they explain the Ambiguous by the Ambiguous, that were to bring a Candle not lighted into the Dark ? This is ingeniously and subtly said, but like that of *Scavola* to *Antonius*, *You seem to the Wise to speak acutely, to Fools truly*. For what else doth *Hortensius* in that Place, but by his Ingenuity and Facetiousness, as an intoxicating Cup, bring Darkeness upon the Unlearned ? For when they say, *Every Word is ambiguous*, it is understood of single Words. Ambiguities are explained by Disputation. No Man disputeth by single Words, none therefore explaineth ambiguous Words by ambiguous Words ; and yet seeing that every Word is ambiguous, no Man can explain the Ambiguity of Words, except by Words, but those conjoined and not ambiguous. As when we say, *Every Soldier hath two Feet*, it doth not follow that a whole Regiment of Soldiers that have two Feet, should have in all but two Feet. So when I say, *Every Word is ambiguous*, I do not say, a Sentence, nor a Disputation, altho' they are woven of Words. Every ambiguous Word therefore may be explained by an inambiguous Disputation.

The third Question is concerning *Declination*, *ἀνωμαλία* and *ἀναλογία*. * Some follow *Analogy*, others *Anomaly*. *Analogy* is a like Declination of like, in Latin *Proprio*. *Anomaly* is an Inequality, following the Customs of Declinations. * *Chrysippus* wrote six Books, *ἢ τῶν ἀνωμαλιῶν*, shewing, that like Things are noted with unlike Words, and unlike Things with like Words.

The last Question is concerning *Ordination*, *ὁρμηξίς*. * Upon this Subject *Chrysippus* wrote two Books (*Laertius* reckons more) whose Scope is not Rhetorical but Dialectick, as will easily appear to the Reader ; *Of the Syntax of Axioms ; Of true and false Axioms ; Of possible and impossible ; Of contingent, and transient, and ambiguous, and the like*, which confer nothing to single Speech or Pleasure, or Grace to Elocution.

* There are five Excellencies of Speech, *Propriety, Perspicuity, Succinctness, Decorum, Elegance*.

Propriety is a proper Phrase, according to Art, not ter the common Expression.

Perspicuity is, when that which is intended is deliver'd clearly.

Succinctness is, when that only is comprised, which is necessary to the Thing.

Decorum is a Conformity to the Thing.

Elegance is an avoiding of vulgar Phrase.

* Amongst the Faults of Speech is *Barbarism*, a Phrase not in use with the best Persons ; and *Solecism*, a Speech incoherently framed.

o Galen. de decret. Hipp. & Plat. lib. 2. p Agel. 10. 5. q Leert. 7. 63. r Leert. ibid. s Agel. 11. 12. t D. August. de Dialect. u Agel. 2. 20. w Varro de Ling. lat. x Dionys. Halicarn. de compo. verb. y Leert. 7. 59. z Leert. ibid.

C H A P. XI.

Of Definition and Division.

Definition^a (according to *Antipater*, in his Book of Definitions) is Speech by *Analysis* pronounced adequately, or (as *Chrysippus* in his Book of Definitions) an Answer to this Question, *What a Thing is?*

^b Those Definitions are vicious which include any of those Things which are not in the Things defined, or not in all, or not in some; so as if we should say, *A Man is a Rational Creature*, or *a mortal Grammatical Creature*, seeing that no Man is immortal, and some Men are Grammarians, the Definition is faulty.

^c We must therefore, when we take those Things which are common to the Things we wou'd define, and others, prosecute them so far until it become proper, so as not to be transferable to any other Thing, as this, *An Inheritance is Riches*, add, *which by the Death of some Person falleth to another*, it is not yet a Definition, for Riches may be held many other ways, as well as by Inheritance; add one Word, *by right of Law*; now the Thing will seem disjoynd from Community: So that the Definition is thus explained. *Inheritance is Riches, which by the Death of one Person falleth to another by Right of Law*; it is not yet enough, therefore add, *neither bequeathed by Will, nor detained by Passion*, and it is perfect.

^d Of Definition there are two kinds; one of Things *which are*; the other of Things *which are understood*. Those Things *which are*, we call such as may be seen or touched, as a *Field*, *House*, a *Wall*, and the like. On the other side, we say those Things are *not*, which cannot be touched or shewn, as Possession, Guardianship, Nation, Kindred, which have not any Body, yet there is some Conformity in the Understanding, which we call Notional, whereby in Argumentation they may be explained by Definition. This latter kind is rather called Description, a Speech, which by the exterior Figure of the Things, bringeth us to the Things themselves, or a Definition simply expressing the Power of a Definition.

^e Again, of Definitions, some are of *Partitions*, others of *Divisions*. Of *Partitions*, when the thing proposed is turn (as it were) in Pieces, as if we should say, *the Civil Law is that which consisteth in Lawyers, Senators, Things judged, the Authority of Lawyers, Edicts of Magistrates, Manners and Equity*.

The Definition of *Divisions* comprehendeth all Species which are under the Genus defined, thus; *Abolition is of that Thing which is in our Power*,

or a Deliverance of it into the Power of another; or a Concession by Law, amongst whom those Things may be by Civil Right.

^f Division is a Section of the Genus into its immediate Species, as, of *living Creatures*, some are *rational*, some *irrational*.^g This therefore is an ill Division; of *Men* some are *Grecians*, some *Egyptians*, some *Persians*, some *Indians*; for the next Species are not desperate, but opposite. We must therefore say thus; *Of Men* some are *Grecians*, some *Barbarians*; and again, by Sub-division of *Barbarians*, some are *Egyptians*, some *Persians*, some *Indians*, which likewise is in the Division of Things that are. For those which are good and bad, are different to us; those who are intermediate betwixt good and bad, are indifferent to us. The Division therefore ought not to be so, but rather thus: *Of Things that are*, some are *indifferent*, others *different*; of the *different*, some are *good*, some are *ill*; for this Division is like unto that which saith, of *Men*, some are *Grecians*, others *Barbarians*; of *Barbarians*, some are *Egyptians*, some *Persians*, some *Indians*; the other is likewise, of *Men*, some *Grecians*, some *Egyptians*, some *Persians*, some *Indians*.

Hence it followeth, that a perfect Division hath an universal Power; for he who divideth thus, of *Men*, some are *Grecians*, others *Barbarians*, saith as much as this, if there are any *Men*, they are either *Grecians* or *Barbarians*; for if there be any *Man*, who is neither *Greek* nor *Barbarian*, the Division must necessarily be ill, the Universal false. Wherefore when we say, *Of Things that are*, some are *good*, some *ill*, some *intermediate*, it is as much (according to *Chrysippus*) as this Universal; if there be any Things that are, they are either good or ill, or indifferent. But this Universal is false, if any thing false be subjected to it. For, if two Things be subjected, one good, the other ill; or, one good, the other indifferent, in this Expression of those Things which are, one kind is good, that is true; but this, these are good, is false, for they are not good; for one is good, the other ill. And again, these are ill, is false, for they are not ill, but only one of them. The like in Indifferents; for it is false that these are Indifferents, as that these are good or ill.

^h There are three Forms of Division, *Anti-division*, *Sub-division*, *Partition*. *Anti-division* is a Division of the Genus into Species by the contrary: As for Example, by Negation, as of things that are, some are good, others not good.

Sub-division is Division upon a Division; as of Things that are, some are good, others not good; of the not good, some are ill, others indifferent.

Partition is a Distribution of the Genus into

^a Laert. 7. 60.

^b Sext. Emp. adv. Log.

^c Cic. Topic. c. 6.

^d Sext. Empir. adv. Math. 10. 2.

^e Sext. Empir. adv. Math. 10.

^f Cic. Topic. c. 5.

^g Laert. lib.

^h Cic. Topic. lib.

ⁱ Laert. 7. 61.

Places (according to *Crinis*) α of Goode, some belong to the Soul, others to the Body.

C H A P. XII.

Of Genus, Species, &c.

GENUS* is a Comprehension of many Notions referred to one, as a living Creature, for this includes all living Creatures. Notion is a Phantasy of the Mind, not any Thing existent or qualitative, but as it were, something existent and qualitative; as the Notion of an Horse, no Horse being present.

Species is that which is contained under the Genus, as under living Creature is contain'd Man.

Most general is that which is a Genus, but hath no Genus; Most special, that which is a Species, but hath no Species.

To this Place of Voice belong likewise, as we said, the Consideration of Poem and Poesy. Poem (according to Possidonius, in his Introduction to Speech) is a Speech in Metre or Rhime, not Prose, as *yaia puyion*, and *Sibis diday*. Poesy is a significant Poem with Design, containing the Imitation of Things divine and human.

C H A P. XIII.

Of Things.

NOTIONS, Words, and Things, as we have said, are conjoined together. From Notions we come to Words, from Words we come now to Things themselves. By Notions Things are perceived. ¹ Those are said to be Things which are dicible. ² The Stoicks, by a new Name, call Things *νυξερσιν*. Contingents, because we desire that Things might befall us, and that we might obtain them. ³ Contingents therefore is subject itself, beyond the Notion or Word, as *Dion*.

⁴ They comprehend all Things under one common Genus. ⁵ Somewhat; ⁶ placing this Genus above all; the Reason this: In Nature some Things are, some Things are not. For, those Things which are not, but only incur in the Mind, as Centaurs, Giants, and whatsoever else is formed by false Cogitation, hath some Images, altho' it hath no Substance. Even Negatives are in being. Somewhat is therefore more general than Ens, which is understood only of Corporeals.

⁷ Things are sub-divided into four Genus's, Subjects, and Qualitatives, and Quodammodotatives in themselves, and Quodammodotatives as to others. ⁸ Thus the Stoicks treating more strictly and subtilly of these Things, convert the Predicaments into a lesser Number, taking some of those Things which they diminished, but with some Alteration.

C H A P. XIV.

Of Subjects.

THERE is not any thing besides *το υποκείμενον*. Subject. The Differences concerning this are non-subsistent.

¹ Subject is two-fold; one which is called the first Subject; such is Matter expert of all Qualities, which *Aristotle* calleth a Body potentially. ² The other, that which is effected with Quality, as *Brass*, and *Socrates*, with those Things which are in them, or predicated by them.

C H A P. XV.

Of Qualitatives.

Qualitatives ¹ have a Subsistence, and are separate from their Subjects: For Qualities (as all other Accidents) are Bodies, seeing that, according to *Zeno*, nothing can be effected by that which is incorporeal, nor can that which is incorporeal effect any thing; whatsoever effecteth is a Body. Effectivè Quality therefore is a Body. Matter is expert of Quality, but Qualities are not expert of Matter.

² Quality is the Habit of that which is qualitative. Qualitative is taken three Ways; First, for whatsoever hath Difference, whether it be Motion or Habit, and whether hardly or easily separable. In this Sense, not only he who is wise, but he who stretcheth out his Hand, are qualitative. The second Signification includes not Motions, but Habits only, which they define Qualitative, that is, which hath a Difference endued with Habit, as a wise Man, or an armed Man. Of these, some are adequate to the Measure of their Pronunciation and Consideration, others not adequate. These they omit; those which are adequate, equal, and permanent, they call Qualitative; as, a Grammarian, and a wise Man; neither of these exceeds, or falls short of his Quality. Likewise a Lover of Meat, and a Lover of Wine, being in act such as a Glutton, and a Drunkard, because they make use of those Parts which serve to this End, are so called: So that if any Man be a Glutton, he is consequently a Lover of Meat; but if he be a Lover of Meat, he is not therefore immediately a Glutton; for, being destitute of those Parts which he useth in eating, he wanteth the Act, but not the Habit. Quality is adequate to Qualitative in this last Sense.

³ All Qualities are either Causes, and they they are called Forms, or Effects, and then they are generally called *idēa*, Habituals, which Word Antipater extends as large as the common Accident, both of

* Lect. 7. 60.

¹ Lect. ibid.

² Philop. in *Avayt*, prior.

³ Sect. Empir. adv. Math.

⁴ Alex. Aphrod. in Top. 4.

⁵ Socr.

⁶ Ep. 58.

⁷ Simple. in Categ.

⁸ Simple. ibid.

⁹ Simple. in Categ.

¹⁰ Simple. ibid. Categ.

¹¹ Denig. in Categ. 2. 20.

¹² Simple. in Categ. 2. 20.

¹³ Denig. in Categ. 2. 20.

Things corporeal and incorporeal, or somewhat. Of Habituals there are four Kinds, πλεονάζουσα, that is, ἐννοούμενα, when they reside in the Mind; τελευτά, that is, ἁπλοῦς, when they fall from the Mind into the Voice; καὶ ἐννοούμενα, when by the Motion of the Mind, they are predicated of any Thing; ἀντιπαραστή, or, ἀντιπαραστή, when then happen to Subjects.

Habits are only Things united; but those which are conjoined by Contiguity, as a Ship, or by Distance, as an Army; in these there can be no Habit; nor one Thing Spiritual above all, nor one Reason, whereby they may come to subsist within one Habit.

It is common to Quality of corporeal Things to be the Difference of their Substance, not taken severally, but contracted into one Notion and Property of the Mind, nor by Time or Strength reduced to Form, but by its own Fality, according to which, the Generation of the Qualitative subsists.

Power (a Species of Quality) is that which both and giveth the Faculty of exercising many Accidents; as Prudence giveth the Faculty of walking prudently, and discoursing prudently; or according to some, Power is that which the Faculty of exercising many Accidents, and which ruleth and governeth the Acts subjected unto it. What Aristotle called natural Power, they name Aptitude.

Habits are intended and remitted. Dispositions cannot be intended or remitted. Thus the Straintness of a Wand, altho' it may easily be decomposed and bent, is a Disposition; for Straintness cannot be intended or remitted. Likewise the Virtues are Dispositions, not in respect of their Firmness and Constancy, but because they cannot admit of Degrees of more and less; but Arts must either have Firmness, or not be Dispositions. Thus Habitude is taken in the Latitude of the Species, Disposition is the chief Perfection of the Species, and in that which is the most it can be, whether it be easily alter'd (as the Straintness of a Wand) or not.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Quodammodotatives.

THE third Kind of Things are τὰ πρὸς ἑαυτὰ, Quodammodotatives. They differ from Qualitatives, because Matter is otherwise effected by Habits, otherwise by Quodammodotatives, in this or that Manner. Moreover, Qualitatives are Quodammodotatives as to Matter, and conversant therein; but properly, Quodammodotatives are conversant in Qualitatives. Again, as Habituals may be said to extend farther than Habits, so Quodammodotatives are larger than Qualitatives; for Quodammodotatives extend even to those Things which are Quodammodotatives as to others, and

include them; but Qualitatives consist only in those which make a Difference.

This Place Boethius conceives to have the Power of Habit. Habit chiefly and universally is taken three Ways: First, to be to itself, and according to itself. Secondly, in respect to another. Thirdly, of another to it. That which is considered as to itself, pertains to Quodammodotatives; as armed, for it is a Habit of ones Self, to ones Self. That which is to another, pertains to Relation; for a Father, or a right Hand, are said, according to a Habit, not of themselves to themselves, but of them to another. But that which is of another to us, as of an armed Man, being the Habit of another to us, pertains to Habit.

To this Head they reduce Quantitatives and Quantity, and their Species, Place, Time, and some Species (according to Aristotle) of Quality, Figure and Form; as also Action, Passion, Sight, Habit.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Quodammodotatives as to others.

THE last Genus of Things is τὰ πρὸς ἄλλοις, Quodammodotatives as to others. Of these there are two Kinds, Relatives and Quodammodotative-Relatives. The Relatives are opposed and distinguished from those which are by themselves, and absolute. The Quodammodotative-Relatives are opposed to those which have a Difference; as for Example, Sweet and Sower, and whatsoever is of the like Kind, are Relatives; but Quodammodotative-Relatives, are as the right Side, Father, and the like; for they have a Difference, in that they are characteriz'd by Differences, according to some Species. As therefore there is one Notion of those which are by themselves, and absolute, and another of those which are considered with Difference: So some things are Relatives, others Quodammodotative-Relatives. The Consequence of Conjunctions in these is contrary; for, with those which are by themselves, co-exist those which have a Difference; for, those which are by themselves, have some Differences, as White and Black. But those, which are by themselves, co-exist not with those which have a Difference. Sweet and Bitter have Differences, whereby they are characterized; yet they are not absolute, but Relatives. But, those who are Quodammodotative-Relatives, being contrary to those which have Differences, are likewise Relatives. For, the right Side, and a Father, besides that they are Quodammodotative, are likewise Relatives; but Sweet and Bitter being Relatives, have a Difference, whereby they are contrary, being Quodammodotative-Relatives. Those which are Quodammodotative-Relatives, it is impossible should be by themselves, and absolute, or by Difference; for they depend solely upon

y Simple, in Categ.
g Simple, in Categ.

z Ibid.

a Ibid.

b Ibid.

c Ibid.

d Plotin. 1. 10.

e Simple, in Categ.

f Simple, Ibid.

Relative Habit. *Relatives* therefore are not by themselves, for they are not absolute; yet are they according to Difference; because they are distinguished by some Character. To express this more clearly, *Relatives* are those, which by their proper Character respect another: *Quodammodotive-Relatives* are those which use to happen to another, but not without Mutation and Alteration of those Things which are about them; yet, with respect of something external. If therefore any Thing with Difference respect another, it is only *Relative*, as Habit, Science, and Sense: But if it respect another, not out of inherent Difference, but in pure Habit, it is *Quodammodotive-Relative*. For, a *Father*, and right Side, to their Consistence, require some external Things, for as much as there being no Mutation made in them, he is no longer a *Father*, his Son being dead, and the right Side is no longer, so, after he is risen, in respect of whom it was said to be such; but Sweet and Bitter will not alter, unless their Power be likewise changed. If therefore *Quodammodotive-Relatives* are changed in Habit to another, although they receive no Passion in themselves, it is manifest they have their Being in the Habit alone, not in Difference.

^b This Genus was first introduced by *Aristo*,¹ who first defined *Quodammodotive-Relatives* to be those, *whose being is the same with their Quodammodotive being to one another*: And so also *Andronicus* defines them.

C H A P. XVIII.

Of *Dicibles*.

TO the Place concerning Things and Significations, belongeth that concerning *Dicibles*, *αἰσθητὰ*, to which true and false is common. *Dicible* is that which consisteth according to rational Phantasy. ¹ *Rational Phantasy* is that, by which what is comprehended by Phantasy, may be expressed by Speech. Every Thing that may be said, ought to be said, for from thence is derived the Denomination.

^a *Dicible* is a mean betwixt Notion and Thing. *Dicibles* are Notions, that is, *νοήματα*, but not merely and simply Notions, ^a which in as much as they are the Principles of Science, and are Intelligencies, are called *πρᾶξις*, and *ἔννοιαι*, but in as much as they reside in the Mind, are called *νοήματα*, and are Genus's and Species, in which Manner, being ready for Expression, they are called *Dicibles*, and pertain to the enunciative Faculty of the Soul. For whatsoever is said, if it be considered as it is said of Something, they are *Categoricals*; if so, as it breaketh forth into Voice, and

with Voice, they are Words; if retained in the Mind, ready to break forth, they are *Dicibles*. *Dicible* therefore is a Word, and yet signifies not a Word, but that which is understood in the Word, and is contained in the Mind.

^o Of *Dicibles* there are two Kinds, the *Defective* and the *Perfect*. The *Defective* are those which have an imperfect Enunciation, not completing the Sentence, but requiring something to follow; as *writeth*, for we ask, who? To this Kind belong *Categoricals*, which are predicated of other Things.

The *Perfect* are such as have a perfect Enunciation: Of these are two Kinds: The first peculiarly called *Perfect*, which tho' they complete the Sentence, yet signify neither true nor false. Of these there are many Kinds, as *Interrogation*, *Percontation*, *Imperative*, *Adjurative*, *Optative*, *Imprecative*, or *Execrative*, *Substitutive*, *Hypothetical*, *Compellative*, like to, or *Transcending* an *Axiom*, and *Dubitative*.

Interrogation is that which is a perfect Sentence, but requirerh an Answer; as, *Is it Day?* for this is neither true nor false; so that *is it Day*, is an *Axiom*, *Is it Day?* an *Interrogation*.

Percontation is a Thing for which we cannot answer significantly, as *Interrogation*, yet; but as thus, *He dwelleth in such a Place*.

Imperative is a Thing, in speaking whereof, we command; as,

Go thou to the Inachian Flood.

^v *Adjurative*, as, *witness thou Earth.*

Optative, which we speak wishing, as,

Great Jove who dost in Ida reign,

The Victory let Ajax gain.

Imprecative, or *Execrative*, as,

As on the Ground this Wine I pour,

So may the Earth his Blood devour.

Substitutive, or *Expositive*, as, *Let this be a right Line.*

Hypothetical, as, *supposing the Earth to be the Centre of the Globe of the Sun.*

Compellative, is a Thing in Speaking, which we call another, as,

Atrides, Agamemnon, King of Men.

Like to, or *transcending* an *Axiom*, is that which hath an axiomatical Manner of Speaking; but because it superabounds in some Particle or Affection, it is not ranked amongst *Axioms*, as,

How beauteous is thy Virgin Train!

How like to Priam's Son, that Swain!

^b Laert. vit. *Aristonis*.
^a Burf. in Dial. Cic. 5. 1.

ⁱ Simplic. in Categ.

^k Laert. 7. 63.

^l Sext. Epist. Adv. Math.

^m Anthon. in poem. *Ant.*

^o Laert. 7. 63.

^p Anthon. in lib. *αἰσθητὰ*.

¹

Dubitative is a Thing different from an Axiom, which whosoever speaks, maketh a Doubt, as,

Then are not Life and Grief of Kin? All these are neither true nor false.

The other Kind of perfect *Dicibles* which complete the Sentence, affirmeth or denieth, and is either true or false. It is called *Axiom*.

CHAP. XIX.

Of *Categorems*.

Categorem * is that which is prædicated of another, or a Thing construed with one or more, or as (*Apollodorus*) a defective *Dicible*, construed with the right Case, to make an Axiom.

Whatever is prædicated of another, is prædicated of the Name of the Case; and both these are either *perfect*, as that which is prædicated, and together with the Subject sufficient to make an Axiom. Or they are *defective*, and require some Addition to make thereof a perfect Prædicate.

If that which is prædicated of a Name, make an Axiom, it is a *Categorem*, or *συμβαμα*, a Congruity, as *walketh*, for Example, *Socrates walketh*.

But if it be prædicated of the Case (whereby Transitions are made from one Person to another, wherein it is necessary that some oblique Case be likewise pronounced with the right) they are called *παρασυμβαμα*, as an Addition to the *συμβαμα*, (or as a *Priscian* renders it, *less than Congruities*) as *Cicero saved his Country*.

Again, if that which is prædicated of some Noun, require a Case of some other Noun to be added to make up the Axiom, so as the Constrution be made of two oblique Cases, they are *ἀσυνσυμβαμα*, Incongruities, or according to *Ammonius*, *less than, συμβαμα*, as, *it pleases me to come to thee*; Whether the Nouns only, or the Words require it.

Again, of *Categorems* there are four Kinds, *Right*, *Supine*, *Neuter*, and *reciprocally active*, and *passive*. *Right* are those which have a Motion tending to another, and are construed with one of the oblique Cases, for the making of a *Categorem*, as *Hearst*, *Seest*, *Discovertst*.

Supine are those which are considered from Habit to an Agent, and is construed with a passive Particle, as, *I am heard*, *I am seen*.

Neuter, as those which are neither Way, as, *to be wise*, *to walk*.

Reciprocally, Active and *Passive* are those, which seem *Supines*, but are not, for they are acts, as *κρίσας*, for therein is included *ὁ κρινόμενος*.

The *Right* (or *Nominative*) *Cases*, is so called by the Stoicks, whom the Grammarians follow, because it falleth directly from the Notion which is in the Mind. *Oblique Cases* are the Genitive, Dative, and Accusative.

CHAP. XX.

Of *simple Axioms*.

Axiom * is that which is either true or false, or a Thing perfect by itself, negative, or affirmative, as far as it extends; or, (according to *Chrysippus*, in his *Dialectick Definitions*) *Axiom* is that which affirmeth or denieth, as far as it extends; as *Dion walketh*. It is called *Axiom*, ἀξίωμα καθ'ἑαυτὸν, because Assent is either given to it or not; for he who saith, it is Day, assenteth thereunto. If it be Day, the Axiom is true; if it be not, false.

* Of *Axioms*, the first and most proper Difference is of the *Simple*, and not *Simple* (thus divided by *Chrysippus*, and *Archidemus*, and *Athenodorus*, and *Antipater*, and *Crimis*.)

* *Simple Axioms* are those which consist neither of one Axiom twice taken, nor of different Axioms, neither by one or more Conjunctions; as, *It is Day*, 'tis at Night *Socrates disputes*. * Of *Simple Axioms* there are many Kinds, *Appositive*, or *Negative*, *Arnetick*, or universally negative; *Sterckick*, or Privative; *Categorick*, or Predicative; *Categorick*, or Indicative; *indefinite* and *mediate*.

* *Negative Axioms* are those, in which a negative Particle is proposed; as, *If this is, that is not*. But if the Negation be of the latter Part of the Axiom, the other Part not being negative, then the Axiom is not negative, but predicative; as, *It happeneth to some Pleasure not to be good*. This therefore declareth what happeneth to the Thing, and therefore is predicative. * A Species of negative Axiom, is the *supernegative*, when, between the Parts connected and copulated by two Affirmations, a Preposition with a Negation is interposed, and that very Negation denied; as, *If it is Day, it is not Light*. Of the same Kind are all those, wherein Negation is proposed to Negation; as, *It is not both Day and not Day*.

* *Universally negative Axioms* are those, which consist of an universal negative Particle, and a *Categorem*; as, *no Man walketh*.

* *Privative* are those which consist of a privative Particle, and an Axiom in Power, as, *he is inhuman*.

* *Predicative* are those, which consist of a right Case and *Categorem*; as, *Dion walketh*.

* *Indicative*, or * *Definitive*, is that which con-

o Laert. 7. 64. p Ammon. in Arist. orig. lib. 2. q Lib. 2. r Laert. 7. 64. s Ibid. 7. 65. t Ibid. 7. 68. u Laert. 7. 70. v Ibid. b Ibid. c Ibid. d Sext. Emp. adv. Math.

r Laert. 7. 64. s Ibid. 7. 65. t Ibid. 7. 68. u Laert. 7. 70. v Ibid. b Ibid. c Ibid. d Sext. Emp. adv. Math.

sims of a demonstrative right Case, and a Categorematic; as, *this Man walketh*.

¹ Indefinite, is that which consists of one or more indefinite Particles; as, *a certain Man walketh*, *he is moved*.

² Intermediate are of this Kind, *a Man sitteth*, or *a Man walketh*; *a certain Man walketh*, is indefinite, for it determines no single Person; *that Man sitteth*, is definite. *Socrates sitteth*, is intermediate; for it is not indefinite, because it determines the Species; nor definite, because it is not pronounced with Demonstration, but it is intermediate betwixt both.

³ An indefinite Axiom, as *some one sitteth*, is true, when the Thing definite is true; as, *he sitteth*; but if none of the Singulars do fit, the indefinite Axiom is not true, that *some one sitteth*.

CHAP. XXI.

Of not-simple Axioms.

Not-simple^a Axioms are those, which are in a Manner double, consisting of one Axiom diversified, or of Axioms; of one Axiom diversified; as, *if it be Day, it is Day*; of Axioms, as, *if it be Day 'tis Light*.

¹ In not-simple Axioms, that which immediately followeth the Conjunction, *if*, or *whereas*, is called the Antecedent, the first, or the Beginning; the rest is called the Ending, or Consequence, or second. Notwithstanding that the Axiom be pronounced by Inversion; as, *It is Light, if it be Day*; for in this, the Ending or Consequence is, *it is Light*, altho' it be spoken first; the Antecedent, *it is Day*, altho' it be put in the second Place; for it immediately followeth the Conjunction *if*.

The Laws and Rules of Consequents are these: 1. From True followeth True; as, *if it be Day, it followeth, that it is Light*. 2. From False followeth False; as, *if this be false, that it is Night*, this is likewise, *it is dark*. 3. From False followeth True, as from this, *the Earth fieth*, followeth, *the Earth is*. 4. From True doth not follow False; for from this, *the Earth is*, it followeth not, *that the Earth fieth*.

² Of not simple Propositions there are many Kinds, Connex, Adnex, Conjunct, Casual, Declarative of the more, and Declarative of the less.

³ Connex (according to Chrysippus in his Dialectick, and Diogenes in his Dialectick Art) is that which consists of the connective Conjunction, *if*; which Conjunction declareth, that the Consequent is second to the first; as, *if it be Day it is Light*. Of a diversified Axiom, and the Conjunction *if*, consisteth this Connex, *if it be Day, it is Day*,

these are properly right Axioms. Of different Axioms; and the Conjunction *whereas*, this, *if it is Day, 'tis Light*. Connex Axioms are called also Tropical, because they turn from the Antecedent to the Consequent.

The Rules of Connex Axioms are these; ¹ That is a true Connex wherein the contrary of the Consequent is repugnant to the Antecedent, as, *if it is Day, 'tis Light*; for, *that it is not Light*, the contrary to the Consequent is repugnant to, *it is Day*, the Antecedent. A false Connex is that wherein the contrary to the Consequent, is not repugnant to the Antecedent; as this, *if it is Day, Dion walketh*; for, *that Dion walketh not*, is not repugnant to, *it is Day*.

² Adnex, (which some reckon as a Species of the Connex) according to Crinis, in his Dialectick, is an Axiom connected by the Conjunction *whereas*, beginning with an Axiom, and ending with an Axiom; as, *whereas it is Day, it is Light*, the Conjunction sheweth, that the second is a Consequent of the first, and that the first is subsistent.

The Rules of Adnex Axioms are these; ¹ That is a true Adnex, which beginneth from true, endeth in that which is consequent; as, *whereas it is Day, the Sun is over the Earth*. False is that which beginneth from False, or endeth not consequentially; as, *whereas it is Day, Dion walketh*, in this be said when it is not Day.

² A conjunct Axiom is that which is knit together by Conjunctions copulative; as, *it is both Day and it is Light*. The Rules therefore are these; That is a right Conjunction wherein all Things are true; as, *it is Day, and it is Light*. That is false, which hath something false. An Axiom which hath neither Conjunction nor Disjunction, is to be taken in the Sense of the Speaker; for Conjunction is sometimes taken for Disjunction; as, *to me, and my Heir*.

³ A disjunct Axiom is that which is disjoined by a Disjunctive Conjunction; as, *either it is Day, or it is Night*. This Conjunction sheweth, that one of the Axioms is false.

⁴ All Things that are disjoined, are repugnant to one another, and their Opposites likewise are repugnant. Of all Things that are disjoined, one must be true, the rest false, otherwise nothing at all is true, or all, or more than one are true, either those which are disjunct, will not be repugnant, or those which are opposite to them will not be contrary to one another, then the Disjunct will be false, and is called *παράδοξον*, as this is, in which the Opposites are not contrary; either thou runnest, or walkest, or standest, for they are repugnant to one another, but their Opposites are

^a Laert. 7. 70. Sext. Empir. adv. Math. ^f Sext. Empir. ibid.

^b Sext. Empir. ibid. ^g Sext. Empir. ibid.

^c Laert. 7. 7. ^h Sext. Empir. 74. ⁱ Sext. Empir. adv.

^d Laert. 7. 7. ^e Sext. Empir. 74. ^f Sext. Empir. ibid.

^g Sext. Empir. ibid. ^h Laert. 7. 73. ⁱ Sext. Empir. adv.

^j Laert. 7. 7. ^k Sext. Empir. 74. ^l Sext. Empir. ibid.

^m Sext. Empir. ibid. ⁿ Sext. Empir. ibid.

^o Sext. Empir. ibid. ^p Sext. Empir. ibid.

not repugnant, because not to walk, and not to stand, and not to run, are not contrary in themselves; for those Things are said to be contrary, which cannot be true together. But you may at the same Time neither walk, nor run, nor stand. Every Disjunction therefore is not only true, but necessary; for if of Contraries there could be a false Conjunction, no Disjunction could be true.

A *Casual Axiom* is that which is connected by this Conjunction, *because*, as, *because it is Day, 'tis Light*; for the first is, as it were Cause of the second. The Rules thereof are these: A casual Conjunction is true, when beginning from true, it endeth in the Consequent, and cannot have the Antecedent for its Consequent; as, *because it is Day, 'tis Light*; but this Axiom, *it is Light, doth not follow from the other, it is Day*.

A *False casual*, is that which either beginneth from false, or endeth in that which is not consequent, or whose Antecedent may be the Consequent, as, *because it is Night, Day walks*.

An Axiom, *declarative of the more*, is that which is construed with this Conjunction, *more*, as, *it is more Day than Night*. *Declarative of the less*, is contrary to the former, as, *it is less Day than Night*.

CHAP. XXII.

Of contrary Axioms.

Contrary Axioms * are those which are repugnant to one another, according to Truth and Falshood, whereof one affirmeth, the other denieth, as, *it is Day, it is not Day*. Only Negatives are contrary, *ἀντικειμενα*, and opposite, and repugnant, for only in Contraries one Proposition is true, the other false. The other three Kinds of Contraries alleged by Aristotle are pronounced without a Conjunction. Whatsoever is pronounced without a Conjunction, is neither true nor false, for true and false belongeth to Axiom. Axiom is a Speech which consisteth in the Conjunction of some Thing, whereas, of Aristotle's other three Kinds of Contraries, none are conjunct but simple, as Black and White, Double and Single, Sight and Blindness.

Adverse are (as likewise defined by Aristotle) those which in the same Kind are most distant. Nothing that is pronounced by Negation is adverse (*ἡντιπάρ*) to another, for then the Adverse to Virtue will be not Virtue, and to Vice not Vice, and under not Virtue will be included many other Things besides Vice, even a Stone, a Horse, and whatsoever is besides Virtue; under not Vice will be found Virtue, and all other Things. Thus all Things would be adverse to one, and the same the Adverse to Virtue and Vice. Moreover, if Virtue

were not adverse to Vice, but to the Non-vice, the Intermediate will be adverse both to Good and Bad, which is absurd.

The Rules of Contraries are these. 1. Contrariety is principally in Acts, Habits, and the like. 2. Categoremata and Qualitatives are called as it were contrary. Prudently and imprudently, in some Manner lead to Things contrary, but Contraries absolutely are in Things; and Prudence is so immediately contrary to Imprudence, not this to that.

Contraries are either *Disjunctive* or *Subdisjunctive*; *Disjunctive*, as when we say, *It is either Day or Night*. *Subdisjunctive*, are of two Kinds, either in *Wholes*, betwixt Universals, as, *Every living Creature either doth or suffereth*, no living Creature either doth or suffereth; or in *Part*, betwixt Particulars; as, *he either sitteth or walketh*, he neither sitteth nor walketh.

* The Rules of Contraries are these: Of Disjunctives one being asserted, the other is necessarily taken away; one being taken away, the other is necessarily asserted.

Of Subdisjunctives in whole, both cannot be true, both may be false; both cannot be affirmative, both cannot be negative.

Of Subdisjunctives in Part, both may be true, because they are taken in Part.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of Possible and Impossible, Necessary and Unnecessary, probable, paradoxal and reasonable Axioms.

Moreover †, of Axioms, some are *possible*, others *impossible*; some *necessary*, others *not necessary*. A *possible* Axiom is that which is susceptible of a true Predication, without Obstruction from those Things, which tho' external, are yet contingent with the Thing itself; as, *Diocles lives*. *Impossible* is that which can never be susceptible of Truth, Externals oppugning it, as, *the Earth sits*. *Necessary* is that which is so true as that it cannot any Way receive a false Predication, or, may receive it; but those Things which are extrinsecal, will not permit that it be true, as *Virtus proficitur*. *Not-necessary*, is that which may be either true or false, exterior Things not obstructing it, as *Day walks*.

* These future Repugnants, and their Parts, are according to the same Manner, as the present and the past. For if it be true that the Thing either shall be or shall not be, it must be either true or false, because Futures are determined according to these; as, if a Navy is built to-morrow, it is true to say that it shall be built; but if it be not, it is false to say that it shall be built, because it will not be; therefore it will either be, or not be, and consequently one of the two is false.

¶ Lect. 7. 73.

* Simplic. ad Categ.

† Lect. 7. 75.

* Simplic. in lib. Arist. de oppos.

Concerning Possibles and Necessaries, there is great Difference betwixt *Diodorus* and *Chrysippus*. *Diodorus* holds that only to be possible which either is, or will hereafter be. That which neither is, nor ever shall be, is impossible. As for me to be at Corinth is possible, if I ever were there, or ever shall be there; but if I never was there, nor ever shall be there, it is impossible. That a Boy shall be a Grammarian is not possible, unless hereafter he come to be one.

On the contrary, *Chrysippus* held, that those Things which neither are, nor ever shall be, are yet possible to be, as, to break a Gem, tho' it never come to be broken. Moreover that from Possibles an Impossible may follow, as in this Axiom, which is a true Connex. If Dion be dead, be (pointing to Dion) is dead. The Antecedent, if Dion be dead, is possible, because it may at some time be true that he shall be dead; but this Axiom, he is dead, is impossible: for Dion being dead, the Axiom likewise is abolish'd, that he is dead, seeing he is no longer that Man, capable of being demonstrated by the Pronoun He, for he is a Demonstration of a living Creature. If therefore Dion being not yet dead, this Word, He may be said of him, being dead, it cannot be said he is dead. So that in this Place, he is dead, is impossible. For it were not impossible, if, some time after the Death of Dion, of whom it was before predicated in the Connex whilst he lived, it might be again predicated, he is dead; but because that cannot be, it is impossible, that, he is dead, should be predicated of him.

To conclude, some held with *Diodorus*, that whatsoever is past, is true of Necessity: That to impossible there followeth not a possible, and that what cannot be done, neither is nor shall be true. Others (as *Cleanthes* and *Antipater*) that something is impossible that neither is nor shall be; that to possible followeth not impossible; and that which is past, is not true of Necessity. Others, that something is possible which is not true; that whatsoever is past, is true of Necessity, and that to possible followeth also impossible.

Furthermore of Axioms, some are *probable*, some *paradoxal*, some *reasonable*. A *probable* Axiom is that which persuadeth us by a specious Show to assent to it, as *whatsoever bringeth forth another, is a Mother*; which is false, for the Hen is not the Mother of the Egg.

Paradoxal Axioms are those which seem true only to the Wife, & contrary to the Opinion of all others. These are likewise in other Arts, besides Philosophy; for what is stranger than to prick the Eyes for the Recovery of Sight? If we say this to one ignorant of Chirurgery, will he not laugh at it? Is it not therefore strange, that such Things

as are true in Philosophy should seem Paradoxes to the Unlearned.

A *reasonable* Axiom, is that which hath many Conditions requisite to the Truth thereof, as, *I shall live To-morrow*.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of Reciprocal Axioms.

Hitherto of the Contrariety and Repugnance of Axioms. Now of their Consent and Agreement, whereby one followeth and is correspondent to another, either according to Truth or Falshood, by *justification*, *Reciprocation*.

Of *Reciprocation* there are three Kinds; the First *avayeseis*, *Perversion*, a Migration into false; the Second *anipseis*, *Conversion*, a Migration into true; the Third *isodunamia*, *Equipollence*, into the same.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Signs.

To the Place of Axioms appertain likewise Signs.

Sign is an Axiom antecedent, in a true Connex, and having Power to detect the Consequent.

Sign is taken two Ways; commonly, for whatsoever falleth under any Sense, and signifies something that proceedeth from it; and properly for that which declareth a Thing which is not manifest.

Things which are certain require no Sign, for they are comprehended of themselves; neither those which are wholly uncertain, for they can no way be comprehended; but those only which are uncertain in Time, or by Nature, may be comprehended by Signs, but not by the same. Things that are uncertain in Time, are comprehended by commemorative Signs; Things uncertain by Nature, are comprehended by demonstrative.

Of Signs therefore, some are demonstrative, others communicative. A communicative Sign is that which is so near to the Thing, that together with the Sign the Thing itself appeareth, into the Knowledge whereof the Sign bringeth us, as Smoak, which when we see, we know it proceeds from Fire. A demonstrative Sign is, that which not being observed before with an evident Sign, leads us by that to the Knowledge of the Thing; as when a Female bath Milk, we presently know that she hath brought forth.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Reasons or Arguments.

Dialektik is the Discipline of Speech, concluded by Reason. Reason, *λογος*, sometimes call'd also Argument, and Interrogation, is according to *Crinis*, and that which consists of one or more *Sumptions*, and an *Assumption*, and an *Inference*, as,

^a John. Grammat. in Arist. de opposit.

^b Cic. de fat.

^c Alex. Aphrod. in Anal. prior.

^d Epictet. 11. 19.

^e Laert. 2. 75.

^f Laert. ibid.

^g Cic. Parad.

^h Epictet. 1.

ⁱ Laert. 7. 76.

^k Laert. 7. 76.

^l Sext. Emp. hypot. 2. 1.

^m Sext. adv. Mathem.

ⁿ Sext. Emp. ibid. & Pyn. hyp. 2. 10.

^o Galen. Philof. hist.

^p Laert. 7. 77.

If it be Day it is Light. } Sumption.
 But it is Day : } Assumption.
 Therefore it is Light. } Inference.

The Reason of the Stoicks differs from the Syllogisms of Aristotle in three respects. * First, a Syllogism, according to Aristotle, cannot have less than two Propositions, a Reason may have but one; as, *Thou livest, therefore thou breathest*; which kind Antipater calls *μικρολογισμὸς*. Secondly, in Syllogisms, something besides that which is granted in the Premises; but in Reasons, the Conclusion may be the same with both, or either of the Sumptions. The first are called *διανοητικοί*, as,

If it is Day, it is Day.
 But it is Day,
 Therefore it is Day.

* The Second are called *ἀναγωγὴς πειραστικῆς*, as,

It is either Day or not Day.
 But it is not Day.
 Therefore it is not Day.

* Lastly, in Syllogisms, the Conclusion must necessarily follow by reason of the Premises, whereas there are three kinds of Reasons which have not this Property; the First, *μικρολογισμὸς*, already mentioned; the Second *ἀποδεδωκεν πειραστικῆς*, not methodically conclusive Reasons; as,

The First is greater than the Second.
 The Second greater than the Third;
 Therefore the First is greater than the Third.

This concludes necessarily, but not syllogistically, unless this Proposition be put in the first Place; *What is greater than another, is greater also than that which is less than that other*. Of the same kind is that Theorem in the First of Euclid's Elements, *This Line is equal to that, therefore this Line is likewise equal to that*, which is true indeed; but to conclude syllogistically, requires this universal Proposition, *Things which are equal to a Third, are equal to one another*.

The third kind of Reasons, from which Syllogism is fourth by this Property, are *παραπλοῦς λόγος* redundant Reasons, and those of two kinds. The first are such as have a superfluous Sumption; as,

Every just Thing is honest,
 Every honest Thing is good,
 Every good Thing is expetible in itself;
 Therefore every just Thing is good.

The Second are those in which the proper Con-

clusion is not infer'd, but something Consequent, or Accident, as that Argument of Epicurus:

Whatsoever is dissolved hath not Sense,
 Whatsoever hath not Sense pertaineth not to us.
 Therefore Death pertaineth not to us.

Whereas to conclude syllogistically, we should say, *Therefore whatsoever is dissolved pertaineth not to us*.

In a Reason or Argument the Sumption *λογικὴ* and the Assumption *πείρασμα* (term'd by Aristotle *παραπλοῦς*) are Axioms receiv'd by consent of the Adversary, for Construction of that which is called *Inference ὑπόθεσις* (by Aristotle *ἐκκατασκευαστικὴ* Conclusion) because it is infer'd from the rest.

* Of Sumption and Assumption, according to Chrysippus, there are four Differences; the first Scientific; the second Exercitative, or (as Aristotle calls it) Dialectick; the third, Probable and Rhetorical; the fourth, Sophistic.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of Conclusive Reasons.

OF * Reasons there are two kinds, *Conclusive* and *not Conclusive*. *Conclusive* Reasons are those, in which the Sumptions being granted, from the Concession thereof, the Inference seemeth to follow.

Conclusive Reasons, in respect of their Matter, are of two kinds, *true* and *false*. *True* are those which, from true Sumptions, collect a true Inference. *Not true*, the contrary.

The Laws and Rules of true and false Reasons are these: Truth is consequent to Truth; as, if it is Day, it is Light. 2. False is consequent to False, as if it be false that it is Night, it is likewise false that it is dark. 3. False is consequent to true; as Earth, if it flies is Earth. 4. False is not consequent to true; for, because it is Earth, it is not therefore consequent that it flies.

Again, of true Reasons, some are *demonstrative*, others *not demonstrative*. A *demonstrative* Reason is that which by Things that are certain, or perspicuous, collecteth that which is uncertain and less perspicuous; as if *Sweat issues thro' the Skin, we may understand Pores*; but *Sweat issues thro' the Skin, therefore we may understand Pores*.

Not demonstrative are contrary; as, if it is Day, it is Light; but it is Day, therefore it is Light. Herein the Inference, it is Light, is certain.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of Syllogistick Conclusive Reasons, or Syllogism.

CONCLUSIVE Reasons, as to their Form, likewise are of two kinds; *Syllogistically conclusive*, and *not Syllogistically conclusive*.

* Alexand. Aphrod. in anal. prior. * Alex. Aphrod. in anal. prior.
 † Not *πείρασμα*, as the learned Burhus hath observed, dial. Cic. 6. 2.
 ‡ Imper. adv. Mathematic.

* Ibid.

* Alex. Aphrod. in anal. prior. & in Topic. 2.
 † Galen. de Doctrina Hippocr. & Plat. lib. 2. ‡ Laert. 7. 71. Sect.

r *Syllogistically conclusive* Reasons (or Syllogisms) are those which either cannot be more concluded, or whereof one or more of the Sumptions are reduced to those which cannot be concluded again; as, if *Dion* walks, he is moved.

Syllogisms (by which the *Stoicks* understand only the Tropical, or Hypothetical) are of three Kinds, *Connex*, *Disjunct*, *Conjunct*.

^a A *connex* Syllogism is, when two are so connected in themselves, that one is the Antecedent, the other the Consequent, in such Manner, as, if the Antecedent be asserted, the Consequent followeth, and the Consequent being taken away, the Antecedent is likewise taken away, as, If it be Day, it is not Night, this Antecedent is true, therefore it followeth, it is Night. This King of Syllogism pertains to the first and second Moods. In the first it is called from Position of the Antecedent, to Position of the Consequent; in the Second, from Negation of the Antecedent, to Negation of the Consequent. The Laws concerning the Truth or Falshood of these Syllogisms, are the same with those of *connex* Axioms.

Of *connex* Syllogisms there are two Kinds; *Connex* in themselves, as if it is *Light*, it is *Light*; but it is *Light*, therefore it is *Light*; and *connex* by others; as, if it is *Day*, it is *Light*; but it is *Day*, therefore it is *Light*.

A *conjunct* Syllogism, is ^a when we deny something conjunct, and to these add another Negation, and of these take the first, that what remains be taken away, as ^b it cannot be that a *Legacy* is *Money*, and *Money* not a *Legacy*; but a *Legacy* is *Money*, therefore *Money* is a *Legacy*.

^c A *disjunct* Syllogism is that in which there cannot be more than one Thing true; or, that in which if one be, the other is not; or if one be not, the other is; as, *If it is either Day or Night, but it is not Night, therefore it is Day*; for one being asserted, the other is taken away, and so on the contrary. ^d The Evidence of this Syllogism *Chrysippus* conceives to be so great, that even Dogs have Knowledge thereof. For coming to a Place where are three Ways, if by the Scent they find that the Beast hath not gone in two of them, they run directly to the Third without scenting, as if they argued thus, the Beast went either this Way, or that Way, but neither this Way nor that Way, therefore that Way: The Laws of disjunct Syllogisms are the same as those of disjunct Axioms.

C H A P. XXIX.

Of Moods.

Syllogistical ^a, *conclusive* Reasons are disposed into *Moods*. Of *Moods* there are two Kinds, the first *simple*, properly called a *Mood*,

r *defin'd* a Kind of Figure of the Reason, as thus,

*If the First is, the Second is,
But the First is,
Therefore the Second is.*

(It is observable by the Way, that the *Stoicks* for Letters used Numbers:) The other compound, called *σύνθετος*, as being consistent of both Reason and Mood, as,

*If Plato liveth, Plato breatheth,
But the First,
Therefore the Second.*

This is used in a long Syntax, that it be not necessary to speak a long Assumption, or a long Inference, but they abbreviate them thus, but the First, therefore the Second.

Of *Moods* or Tropes there are two Kinds, one of *Indemonstrables*, so term'd, not that they cannot be demonstrated, but because they conclude so evidently, that they need not be reprov'd; the other of *Demonstrables*.

Of *indemonstrable Moods*, there are (according to *Chrysippus*) five, according to ^a others more or less.

The First wherein every Reason consists of a *Connex*, and an Antecedent from which beginneth the *Connex*, and the Consequent is infer'd, as,

*If the First, then the Second,
But the First,
Therefore the Second.*

The second *Indemonstrable* is, which, by the Consequent of the *Connex*, and the contrary of the Consequent, hath a Conclusion contrary to the Antecedent, as,

*If it is Day, 'tis Light,
But it is Night,
Therefore it is not Day.*

The third is that which by a negative Complication, and one of those which are in the Complication, infers the contrary to that which remains, as,

*Plato is not both dead and alive,
But Plato is dead,
Therefore Plato is not alive.*

The fourth is that which by a Disjunctive, and one of those which is in the Disjunctive, concludeth the contrary to that which remains, as,

^a *Laert. 7. 78. sec.* ^b *Simplis. in Epictet.* ^c *Cic. Topic. 1.* ^d *Cic. ibid.* ^e *Simplis. ad Epict.* ^f *Secl. hyp. 2. Pyrrh. cap. 14.* ^g *Laert. 7. 76.* ^h *Cic. Topic. c. 14. Martian. capel. Nept. Phil. 4.*

*Either 'tis the First or Second,
But it is the First,
Therefore it is not the Second.*

The fifth is that wherein the whole Reason is connected by a Disjunctive, and one of those which are in the Disjunctive of the contrary, inferreth the rest, as,

*Either it is Night, or it is Day,
But it is not Night,
Therefore it is Day.*

CHAP. XXX.

Of not-Syllogistick-conclusive Reasons.

REASONS ² *Not-Syllogistick-conclusive* (which are likewise especially called (as their Genus) conclusive in Opposition to Syllogisms) are those which conclude not by Way of Syllogism, as,

*It is false, that it is both Night and Day,
But it is Day,
Therefore it is not Night.*

And this of Chrysippus.

*Whatever is good is laudable,
Whatever is laudable is honest,
Therefore whatever is good is honest.*

These *Not-Syllogistick*, or *Categorick* Conclusions, are frequently used by the *Stoicks* (as by *Zeno* in *Cicero*) but immethodically, not reduc'd to Mood and Figure. Those they applied only to Tropical Reasons, as in which consisteth the sole Way and Order of Inference. The *Categorick* are not Syllogisms, because in them something is ever omitted, and therefore they are ἀμετέωρος πειρασμός, immethodically conclusive; as in that Argument of *Chrysippus* last mentioned, two Assumptions, and an Inference are omitted, for it ought to be thus,

*If it be good, it is laudable,
But it is good,
Therefore it is laudable.*

And again,

*If it be laudable, it is honest,
But it is laudable,
Therefore it is honest.*

Hence are derived those Reasons which are called ἐπιβαλλόνες, and ἐπιβαλλόμενα, *Adjunct* and *Adject*, consisting of Propositions continually as-

suming without Conclusions. *Adject* are those whose Conclusion is omitted; *Adjunct*, those whose demonstrative Proposition is omitted, as,

*The First of every Second,
The Second of every Third,
The Third of every Fourth;
Therefore the First of every Fourth.*

In this *Adject*, the Conclusion is omitted, which is, therefore the First of every Third.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Not-conclusive Reasons.

Not-conclusive ³ Reasons are those, whose opposite to the Inference is repugnant to the Connection of the Sumptions; ⁴ they are four Kinds, 1. By Incoherence. 2. By Redundance. 3. By being in an ill Figure. 4. By Defect.

By *Incoherence*, when the Propositions have no Conjunction or Communion with one another, nor with the Inference, as,

*If it is Day, it is Light,
But Corn is sold,
Therefore it is Light.*

For neither, *it is Day*, hath any Communion with *Corn is sold*, nor both of them together, with, *it is Light*, but each dependeth upon something else.

By *Redundance*, when something is assumed to the Proposition extrinsecal and superfluous, as,

*If it is Day, it is Light,
But it is Day, and Virtue profiteth,
Therefore it is Light.*

For *Virtue profiteth*, is superfluously assumed with the other Proposition, the Inference depending upon the other two.

By *being in an ill Figure*, as this is a right Figure,

*If the First, the Second,
But the First is,
Therefore the Second.*

But this,

*If the First, the Second,
But not the Second.*

Is not conclusive; not that in this Figure, there cannot be Reason which may collect Truth from Truth, for that it may do, as thus,

*If Three are Four, Six are Eight,
But three are not Four,
Therefore Six are not Eight.*

But because there may be some ill Reasons in it,
as this,

*If it be Day, 'tis Light,
But it is not Day,
Therefore it is not Light.*

By *Defect*, when there wants one of the collective Propositions, as,

*Riches are either ill or good,
But Riches are not good;
Therefore they are ill.*

For in the Disjunct there wanteth this, or indifferent; so that to be perfect the Sumption should be thus, Riches are ill, or good, or indifferent.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of fallacious Reasons or Sophisms.

BY Dialectick * are discerned true and false Reasons: The latter are *Sophisms*, proper to *Sophists*, who dispute for vain Glory, or Gain; as true Reasons are to *Logicians*, whose End is only to find out Truth.

Of fallacious Reasons there are many Kinds; the *Quiescent Reason*, or *Sorites*, the *Lying*, the *Inexplicable*, the *Sluggish*, the *Dominative*, the *Vailed*, *Elestra*, the *Horned*, the *Crocodile*, the *Reciprocal*, the *Nullity*, the *Defective*, the *Mower*, the *Bald*, the *Occult*, the *Negative*.

¹ *Sorites*, named from *σός*, a *Heap*, is * when some Things evidently true, by short Mutations, the Dispute is brought to Things evidently false: * *As, are not two few? Are not three so likewise, and four, and so on to ten? But, two are a few, therefore ten.* * It is called also *ινυαζών λόγος*, the *quiescent Reason*, because the Way to understand it, is by stopping, and withholding the Assent.

The *lying Reason*, *ψευδόμενος λόγος*, is a captious Argument, not to be dissolved. Of this, see the Life of *Eubulides*.

² The *inexplicable Reason*, *ἀσπός λόγος*, so called, from the intricate Nature thereof, not to be dissolved; wherefore it seems to be the same with the *lying*, and perhaps the Genus to most of those which follow.

The *sluggish Reason*, *αργός λόγος*, is manifested by this Example: * *If it be decreed that you shall recover of this Sickness, you shall recover whether you take Physick or not. Again, if it be decreed you shall not recover, you shall not recover, whether you take Physick or not, therefore it is to no Purpose to take Physick.* This Argument is justly termed *sluggish*, saith *Cicero*, because by the same Reason, all Actions may be taken away from Life.

The *Dominative Reason*, *κυριεύων λόγος*: Of this already in the Life of *Diodorus*.

The *vailed Reason*, *ἐγκυκαλυμμένος λόγος*: Of this, and *Elestra*, and the *horned Reason*, *καρτίωνος λόγος*, in the Life of *Eubulides*.

The *Crocodile*, so named from this *Egyptian Fable*: * A Woman sitting by the Side of *Nilus*, a Crocodile snatched away her Child, promising to restore him, if she would answer truly to what he asked; which was, *Whether he meant to restore him or not?* She answer'd, *Not to restore him*, and challenged his promise, as having said the Truth. He reply'd, *that if he should let her have him, she had not told true.*

The *reciprocal Reasons*, *ἀντιστοιχίαι*, such was that of * *Protagoras* the *Sophist*, against *Euathlus*, a rich young Man, his Disciple, who promised him a great Sum of Money for teaching him, whereof Half he paid in Hand, the other Half was to be paid the first Time that he should plead before the Judges, and carry the Cause. Having learned long, and attained a great Perfection in Rhetorick, he forbore to plead in Publick, that he might defraud *Protagoras*. *Protagoras* sues him, and the Cause coming to a Hearing, begins thus: *Know foolish young Man, that which Way soever the Cause goes, whether for thee or against thee, thou must pay what I demand. If against thee, it will be given me by Judgment; if for thee, thou must pay it according to our Agreement.* *Euathlus* answers: *I might have been entrapped by your Subtily, if I did not plead myself, but had employed some other to plead for me. Now I rejoyce doubly in the Victory, that I shall be too hard for you, not only in Cause, but in Argument. Know therefore, my most wise Master, that which Way soever the Cause goeth, either with me, or against me, I will not pay what you demand. If it go with me, the Judgment will acquit me; if against me, you are to have nothing by our Agreement. The Judges not able to determine it, dismissed them both.*

³ The *Nullity*, *ἄντις*, used by *Ulysses*, who called himself *ἄντις*, no Body, when he hurt *Polypheeme*, whence it came to be so named.

* Laert. 7. 32. 1 Suid. m Ulpian. 48. ad Sabini.

o Cic. Acad. quest. 4. p Augel. 9. 15.

* Laert. tho' the Example be falsely applied, as Burfos and Casaubon have observed.

q Cicero. de Fato. r Doxopatri. Apotheg. s Agel. 5. 10.

The *defective Reason* ἁλλήτης λόγος, mentioned by *Laertius* in *Zenone*: The *Mower* θερίζων λόγος, by *Lucian*. The *Bald*, φαλακρὸς λόγος, by *Laertius* in *Eubulide*. The *Occult*, σταλασθῆναι λόγος, by *Laertius* in *Eubulide*. The *Negative*, ἀποράσμων λόγος, by *Laertius* in *Chrysippe*, and by *Epictetus*. But of these enough.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

Of Method.

There are two Kinds of Disputation: * One, when the Truth itself is subtly polished in the Dispute: The other, when every Expression is accommodated to the vulgar Opinion; for, we must use popular and usual Words, when we speak of popular Opinions, which *Panaetius* in the like Manner hath done.

† The first Way was peculiar to the Stoicks, short, acute, and spinous, called likewise Logick, most worthy of Philosophy; for this useth Definition, Divisions, and the Lights which they afford, as likewise Similitudes, Dissimilitudes, and the nice acute Distinction of them.

The vulgar Way of Dispute is likewise twofold, one by continued Oration, the other by Question and Answer; the first called * *Analytick*, or *Rhetorical*; the other † *Topick*, or † *Dialectical*. † Tho' the first be delightful, yet the latter is more commodious, when we insist on Particulars, and understand what every Man granteth, what every Man denieth, what we would have concluded from Concessions, and brought to an End. For, when a Speech is carried on like a Torrent, altho' it bears many Things along with it; yet we can hold nothing, we cannot stop the rapid Course of an Oration. * The other, concluding as *Zeno* used, more shortly and narrowly, lieth more open to Reprehension. As a River in its Course, cannot at all, or very hardly be corrupted, but Water shut up, easily: So by a fluent Oration, the Faults of the Opposer are carried quite away; in a narrow Speech they are not easily defended.

But each of these Methods hath a several Use; the first is proper for Exposition of Arts and Sciences, the other for Disputation.

w *Laert.* 7. 83. x *Cic. Offic.* 2. y *Cic. de fin.* 3. z *Senec. Epist.* 14. 90.

90. c *Cic. de fin.* 2. d *Cic. ibid.*

e *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* 2. 7.

a *Cic. de fin.* 2.

b *Senec. Epist.* 14.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE STOICKS.

The SECOND PART.

CHAP. I.

Ethick, and the Parts thereof.

THE ^a moral Part of Philosophy is divided into these Places; *Of Appetite, of Good and Ill, of Passions, of Virtue, of the End, of the first Estimation, of Actions, Offices, Exhortations and Debortations.*

Thus distinguisheth Chrysippus, Archidemus, Zeno of Tarzis, Apollodorus, Diogenes (the Babylonians) Antipater and Possidonius. But Zeno the Cittiean, and Cleanthes, as being more ancient, were less accurate in their Manner of treating upon these Things.

CHAP. II.

Of Appetite.

THE Consideration of Ethick, beginneth properly from Appetite. ^b Appetite is moved by Phantasy of an Office, for it is the Impulsion of the Soul to something.

Appetite in rational and irrational Creatures is different; ^c *ἄρεσις*, is not rational Appetite, but a Species of rational Appetite. Rational Appetite is defined an Impulsion of the Intellect to the doing of something. ^d *ὁρεσις* is a Species of Practick Appetite, being an Impulsion of the Intellect to something future. Hence Appetite is taken four Ways, for rational and irrational Inclination, and for rational and irrational Aversion. To these may be added the Habit of Appetition, which is likewise called Appetite, the Origin of all appetitive Acts.

Of practick Appetite there are many Species, of which are,

1. *Προθυμία*, A Designation.
2. *Ἐπιτομή*, An Appetite before Action.

3. *Παρασκευή*, An Action before Action.

4. *Ἐγγχεσις*, An Appetite to something now existent.

5. *Ἀισις*, A Will by Ratiocination.

6. *Προαισις*, A Will before a Will.

7. *Βύλησις*, An Appetite joined with Reason.

8. *Θύλησις*, A spontaneous Will.

CHAP. III.

Of first natural Appetite.

THE ^e first Appetite of a living Creature is to preserve itself, this being from the Beginning proper to it by Nature, as Chrysippus in his first Book of Ends, who affirms that the Care of ourselves, and the Consciousness thereof, is the first Property of all living Creatures. For, Nature producing a living Creature, intended either to alienate it from itself, or to commend it unto its own Care; but the first is not likely; it followeth therefore, that Nature commendeth to every Thing the Preservation of itself, whereby it repulseth whatsoever is hurtful, and pursueth what is convenient.

^f As soon therefore as a living Creature cometh into the World, it is conciliated to itself; commended to the Conservation of itself and its own State, and to the Election of such Things as may preserve its State; but alienated from Destruction, and from all such Things as may destroy it. This is manifest, in as much as before the Accession of Pleasure or Grief, young Creatures desire those Things which conduce to their Welfare, and refuse the contrary; which would not be, if they did not love their own State, and fear Destruction.

^a Laert. 7. 34.

^b Stob. Eclog. Ethic.

^c Laert. 7. 35.

^d Cic. de fin.

Neither could they desire any Thing without having some Sense of themselves, whereby they love themselves, and what belong to them. Hence it is manifest, that the Principle of this Love is derived from themselves.

* Whereas some do hold the first Appetite of a living Creature to be that of Pleasure, that is false. The greater Part of Stoicks conceive that Pleasure is not to be placed amongst the natural Principles of Love to ourselves; for if Nature had so ordered it, many dishonest Things would have followed. Pleasure is an after Accession, when as Nature enquiring by itself into itself, receiveth those Things which are agreeable to its Constitution, after which Manner living Creatures are exhilarated, and Plants sprout forth. Nature hath thus far made no Difference betwixt Plants and living Creatures, that whereas Plants are ordered without Appetite or Sense, there is in living Creatures something according to the Nature of Plants: But, there being over and above in living Creatures an innate Appetite, whereby they go to those Things that are proper for them, the natural Part in them is governed by the Appetitive.

† That we naturally love those Things which are first proposed unto us by Nature, may be argued from hence, in that there is no Man, if both were put to his Choice, but had rather have all his Limbs able and sound, than useless and imperfect. These Comprehensions we conceive fit to be acquired for their own Sake, because they have in themselves something, as it were, complex, including Truth. This is discernible in young ones, whom we see delighted, tho' it nothing concerns them, if they themselves find out any Thing by Reason. Even the Arts we conceive to be assumed for themselves, as well because in these there is something worthy Assumption, as because they consist of Knowledge, and contain some things constituted by Reason and Power.

CHAP. IV.

Of Appetites consequent to the first.

Thus according to the first innate Principles of Nature, those Things which are according to Nature being expetible in themselves, their Contraries avoidable in themselves, the first Office is to conserve itself in the State of Nature; the next, to obtain those Things which are according to Nature.

Here beginneth good to be first understood; for it is the first Conciliation of Man to Things according to Nature. This Good, as soon as Man receiveth Intelligence or Notion thereof, and seeth the Order and Concord of Offices, he esteemeth

far above those Things which he formerly loved; and by rational Knowledge collecteth, that herein is placed the chief good of Man, laudable and expetible in itself. To this chief Good, which consisteth in Homology or Convenience, all honest Actions having Reference, Honesty itself, which is reckoned amongst the Good, tho' it rise afterward, is notwithstanding alone expetible in its own Power and Dignity. But, of those which are the first Objects of Nature, none is expetible in itself.

Now, whereas Offices proceed from the first natural Objects, they must necessarily be referred to the same; so as all Offices tend to the fulfilling of the first natural Appetites; yet, not so, as if there consisted the ultimate Good. Honest Action is in the first Conciliation of Nature, for it is consequent, and ariseth, as we said afterward; yet it is according to Nature, and much more affective than all that go before it.

And seeing that all Offices proceed from the first natural Appetites, even Wisdom itself must be derived from thence likewise. But as it often happens, that he who is recommended to another, more esteemeth him to whom he is recommended, than the Person which recommended him; so it is not strange, that we being recommended to Wisdom by the first natural Appetite, afterwards more esteem that Wisdom, than those Things whereby we arrived at it. And as our Limbs are given to us for a certain Reason of living, so the Appetition of the Soul is given, not for every Kind of Life, but for one certain Form of Living; so likewise Reason and perfect Reason. For, as Action is proper to a Player, Motion to a Dancer, yet, not any, but one certain Kind; so the Life that is to be acted, is in one certain Kind, not in any, which Kind we call convenient and consentaneous. Wisdom is not like the Art of a Pilot, or a Physician; but rather to that Action we mentioned, and to Dancing, that the Extrem, that is, the Effect of the Art be in the Art itself, and not extrinsecal. There is another Similitude betwixt Wisdom and these Arts, for in them are those Things which are done rightly; yet, are not all the Parts whereof they consist, contained therein. Things done rightly, or Rectitudes, contain all Numbers of Virtue; for, only Wisdom is wholly converted into itself, which is not in other Arts. But improperly is the Art of a Pilot and a Physician compared with the ultimate of Wisdom; for, Wisdom includeth Fortitude and Justice, and judgeth all Things that happen to Man to be below it, which happeneth not in other Arts; but none can hold these Virtues which we last mentioned, unless he affirm there is nothing that's different, but honest and dishonest.

C H A P. V.

Of Good and Ill.

Hitherto of Appetites; we come next to their Objects. * Things (according to Zeno) are whatsoever participate of Essence. Of Things, some are good, some ill, some indifferent.

* Good is several Ways defined by the Stoicks; but their Definitions tend all to one End. * Good is Profit, or that which differeth not from Profit. Profit is Virtue, and a virtuous Action; not different from Profit, is a virtuous Man, and a Friend. For Virtue being a *quodammodotative* Hegemoniack, and virtuous Action being an Operation according to Virtue, is plainly Profit. A virtuous Man and a Friend is not different from Profit; for Profit is a Part of Virtuous, as being the Hegemoniack thereof. Now the Wholes are neither the same with their Parts, for a Man is not a Hand; nor different from their Parts, for they subsist not without Parts; wherefore the whole is not different from its Parts, and consequently, a virtuous Man being the whole, in respect of his Hegemoniack, which is Profit, is not different from Profit.

* Good is by some defined, that which is expetible in itself; by others, that which assisteth to Felicity, or compleateth it; by * *Diogenes*, that which is absolute by Nature [or, * that which is perfect, according to the Nature of a rational Creature.] The Consequence thereof is a beneficent Motion, or State absolute in Nature.

Whereas Things are known, either by Use, or Conjunction, or Similitude, or Collation, by this fourth Kind, is the Knowledge of Good; for when from those Things which are according to Nature, the Mind ascendeth by Collation of Reason, then it attaineth the Notion of Good.

* Good is known and armed, not by Accession, Increase, or Comparison with other Things, but by its proper Power; for as Honey, tho' it be most sweet, yet in its proper kind of Taste, not comparative to any other, we perceive it to be sweet; so this Good of which we speak, is that which is most to be esteemed; but that Estimation consisteth in the Kind, not the Magnitude: For Estimation being neither amongst the Good nor Ill, whatsoever you apply it to, it will remain in its kind. Different therefore is the proper Estimation of Virtue, which consisteth in the Kind, not in Increase.

* To Good belongeth all Virtue, as Prudence, Justice, Temperance, Fortitude, and whatsoever participates of those, as virtuous Actions, and Per-

sons. * Accessions here are Joy, Cheerfulness, and the like.

* Ills are the contrary Vices, as Imprudence, Injustice, Intemperance, Pusillanimity, and whatsoever participate of Vice, as vicious Actions and Persons. * The Accessions hereunto are Discontent, Affliction, and the like.

* Of Goods, some, as we have said, are *Virtues*, others *not Virtues*, as Joy, Hope, and the like. In like manner of Ills, some are *Vices*, as those already mention'd; others *not Vices*, as Grief and Fear.

Again, * of Goods, some are *continual* in all the Virtues, and at all times; such as all Virtue, sound Sense, wise Appetition, and the like. Others are *intermittive*, as Joy, Hope, and prudent Counsel, which are not in all the Wise, nor at all times.

In like manner of Ills, some are continual in all, and always in the Imprudent, as all Vice, and imprudent Sense, and imprudent Appetite; others *intermittive*, as Grief, Fear, and imprudent Answer, which are not always in the Wicked, nor at all times.

* Again, of Good, there are three kinds; the first *from which* Profit cometh, as from its first Cause, such is Virtue. The Second, *by which* Profit cometh, as Virtue, and virtuous Action. The Third, *that which may* profit, as Virtue, and virtuous Actions, and a virtuous Man, and a Friend, and the Gods and good Demons. * Thus the second Signification includeth the first; and the Third, both the first and second.

* In like manner of Ills, there are three kinds: First, that from which Hurt originally proceedeth, as Vice. Secondly, that by which Hurt cometh, as vicious Actions. Lastly, and most largely, whatsoever is able to hurt.

* Again, of Goods, some are *in the Soul*, as Virtue, and virtuous Actions; some *without the Soul*, as, a true Friend, a good Country, and the like: Some *neither* within nor without the Soul; as good and virtuous Men.

In like manner of Ills, some are *within the Soul*, as Vices, and vicious Actions; some *without the Soul*, as imprudent Friends, Enemies, and the like; some *neither* within nor without the Soul, as wicked Men, and all that participate of Vice.

Of Goods *within the Soul*, some are *Habits*, some *Affections*, some neither Habits nor Affections. The *Virtues* themselves are Affections; their *Studies* Habits, not Affections; their *Acts* neither Habits nor Affections.

In like manner of Ills, some are *Affections*, as Vices; some Habits only, as Infirmities of Mind, and the like; some *neither* Habits nor Affections, as vicious Actions.

l Stob. Eccl. Eth. 1 Cic. de fin. 3.
p Laert. ibid. Stob. ibid. a Laert. ibid.
Stob. ibid. Sext. Empir. Pyrr. hypot. 3. 22.
Pyrr. hyp. 3. 23.

m Sext. Empir. Pyrr. 3. 20.
r Laert. ibid. Stob. ibid.
s Sext. Empir. ibid.

u Cic. de fin. 3.
t Laert. ibid. 1 Stob. ibid.
y Laert. ibid. Stob. ibid.

o Laert. 7. 90.
u Stob. ibid.
s Laert. ibid. Stob. ibid. Sext. Empir.

* Cic. de fin. 3.
w Laert. 7. 96.

^a Again, of *Goods*, some are *final*, some *efficient*, some *both* final and efficient. A Friend, and the Benefits arising from him, are *efficient Goods*. Fortitude, Magnanimity, Liberty, Delectation, Joy, Tranquillity, and all virtuous Actions, are *final Goods*. Both efficient and final, are all Virtues, as they perfect Felicity they are efficient, as they constitute it as Parts thereof, final.

In like manner of *Ills*, some are final, some efficient, some both. Fear, Baseness, Servitude, Stupidity, Frowardness, Grief, and all vicious Actions, are final. Participant of, are Vices, as they procure Misfortune they are efficient, as they constitute it as Parts thereof, final.

Again, of *Goods*, some are *expetible in themselves*, not desired for the Sake of any other; others are *Preparatory* to some other, call'd effectively expetible. The *Expetible* in themselves are (according to *Diogenes*) of two kinds; 1. *Ultimately expetible*, as *Beatitude*. 2. *Those which have in them the Cause of being expetible*, as every Good hath.

Again, of *Goods*, some are *necessary Beatitude*, as all Virtues and their Acts; others not *necessary*, as Joy, Delectation, and Study. In like manner of *Ills*, some are necessary to Infelicity, as all the Vices and their Acts; others not necessary thereunto, as all Passions and Infirmities of the Soul, and the Like.

Again, of *Goods*, some consist in Motion, as Joy, Delectation, and the like; some in Affection, as Quiet, Imperturbation; of those which consist in Affection, some are likewise in Habit, as the Virtues; others in Affection only, as the former. Neither consist the Virtues only in Habits, but other Acts likewise, changed by a virtuous Man, in a manner into Virtue: Of these Goods which are in Habit, are those we call Studies, as Love of Learnings, and the like; for these Arts, by their Affinity with Virtue, lead directly to our chief End.

Again, of *Goods*, some are *absolute*, as *Science*; others *relative*, as Honour, Benevolence, Friendship, and the like.

Science is a certain infallible Comprehension by Reason. It is taken three ways. *First*, for a System of Sciences conjoin'd together in a good Man. *Secondly*, for a System of artificial Sciences, having a Certainty. *Lastly*, for a demonstrative infallible Habit of Phantasies by Reason.

Friendship is a Community of Life, and consent of Studies. The kinds thereof are Six,

1. *φιλανθρωπία*. a Friendship amongst known Persons.
2. *συγγενεῖα*, amongst Familiars.
3. *ἰσμεῖα*, amongst those of the same Age.
4. *ξενία*, towards Strangers.
5. *συγγενική*, amongst Kindred.
6. *ἡρώδεια*, from Love.

Again, of *Goods*, some are *simple*, as, Knowledge; others *mix'd*, as, *ὑγίαια*, a good Use of Children conformable to Nature, as *ὑγυιαια*, good Use of old Age, conformable to Nature, *ἰσμεῖα*, a good Use of Life conformable to Nature.

Exemption from Grief, *ἀλυσία*, and *Conservation of Order*, *ἰσμεῖα* are the same with, as the Mind is with Prudence, and communion with Goodness, yet are otherwise referred, which is observable likewise in the other Virtues. Hence are the same Distinctions applicable to ill.

Every Good is *beneficial*, *opportune*, *conducible*, *useful*, *commendable*, *fair*, *helpful*, *eligible*, *just*.

Beneficial, *συμφέρον*, as conferring that whereby we receive Benefit.

Opportune, *καιρῶς*, as comprising that whereof we stand in need.

Conducible, *ἀποσφαιδίζω*, as resolving in itself the Means, as the Gain acquired by Traffick exceeds the Charge.

Useful, *χρήσιμον*, as conducing to our Profit.

Commendable, *εὐχενῶν*, from the Use.

Fair, *καλόν*, as proportioned to the Necessities of Receivers.

Helpful, *ὠφέλιμον*, as it relieves us.

Eligible, *ἀξιόητος*, as being in Reason to be preferred.

Just, *δίκαιον*, as being conformable to Law.

On the contrary every Ill is *unbeneficial*, *importune*, *inconducible*, *unuseful*, *uncommendable*, *foul*, *unhelpful*, *avoidable*, and *unjust*.

^b Perfect Good is called *καλόν*. *Fair*, because it is absolute in all Numbers required of Nature, and perfectly proportionate.

Of *Fair* (or *Honest*) there are four Species, *Just*, *Valiant*, *Temperate*, *Knowing*; in these are honest Actions consummated.

Likewise of *ἀλογον*, *Foul*, (or *Disbonest*) are four Species, *Unjust*, *Cowardly*, *Dissolute*, *Foolish*.

Honest, is called *καλόν*, *Fair*, first, because it renders those who are endued therewith, worthy of Praise. Secondly, because it is most suitable to its proper Work. Thirdly, because 'tis an Ornament; we say, a wise Man is only good and fair.

Only that which is good, is fair or honest. So *Heato* in his Third Book of Good, and *Chrysippus* of *Fair*. This is Virtue, and what participates thereof, which is all one as to say, that *whatsoever is good, is bonest likewise*; and reciprocally, *whatsoever is bonest is good*.

^c That what is honest, only is good, is proved thus; Whatsoever is good, is laudable; whatsoever is laudable, is honest; therefore whatsoever is good is honest. Again, there is no Good which is not expetible, nothing expetible which is not pleasant and amiable, therefore approvable, therefore laudable, therefore honest. Again, no Man can glory

in a Life that is miserable or not happy, therefore to glory is proper to the Happy, but to glory relateth only to that which is honest, therefore honesty is happy. And as he who is laudable, hath some eminent Mark of Renown and Glory, for which he is justly stiled happy, the same may be said of the Life of such a Man, whence, if a happy Life consist in Honesty, only that which is honest is to be esteemed good. Moreover, what Man can be termed constant, firm, magnanimous, unless we grant that Pain is not an Ill? For he who reckoneth Death amongst the Ills, cannot but fear it; so no Man in any thing can neglect and contemn that which he accounteth ill. This being granted, the next Assumption is this; he who is magnanimous and valiant, despiseth, as if they were nothing, all Things that can arrive to Man; whence it followeth, that nothing is ill which is not dishonest; and this sublime, excellent, magnanimous Person, accounting all human Things below him, confideth in himself and his own Life past and future, knowing that no Ill can happen to a wife Man; whereby we see that what is honest only is good, which is to live happily and honestly.

On the other side, nothing is good but what is honest; for, who is, or ever was, so fervently covetous, and of such disordinate Affections, that the same things, for the Attainment whereof he would perpetrate any Wickedness, he had not much attain'd unto (setting aside all Punishment) without all that wicked Means? What Advantage or Fruit do we aim at, in desiring to know those Things which are hidden from us, how they are moved, and by what Causes agitated in Heaven? Who is so savage, so obdurate to natural Studies, that he abhors Things worthy Knowledge, receives them without Pleasure, or some Benefit, and values them at nothing? Who is there, that when he heareth of the Actions, Speeches, Counsels of magnanimous Persons, eminent in all Virtue, is not affected with any Pleasure? Who is there, that being instituted in an honest Family, and ingeniously educated, is not offended at Dishonesty, tho' it bring no Hurt to him? Who is there that looks without Trouble upon such as live impurely and flagitiously? Who doth not hate sordid, vain, light, frivolous Persons? If Dishonesty were not in itself avoidable, why should Men, when they are in the Dark, or in a Wilderness, abstain from any thing that is evil, but that the very Deformity and Dishonesty thereof detests them? Nothing therefore is more clear, than that honest Things are expetible in themselves, and dishonest Things avoidable in themselves.

Hence it followeth, that what is honest is more esteemable, than those mean Things which accrue by it. And when we say, that Folly, Temerity, Injustice, and Intemperance, are avoidable, in re-

spect of those Things which are consequent to them, it contradicts not the former Assertion, that what is dishonest only is ill, because they relate not to the Hurt of the Body, but to dishonest Actions which proceed from Vice.

* All Good is equal, and every Good is highly expetible, and admits neither increase nor decrease.

* Here cometh in a great Controversy betwixt the *Stoicks* and the *Peripateticks*, which tho' *Carneades* affirms to be only verbal, *Cicero* holdeth to be more Things than Words.

† The *Peripateticks* hold, That all Goods are requisite to happy Life. The *Stoicks*, that whatsoever is worthy Estimation, comprehendeth happy Life. Those holding Pain to be an Ill, it follows, that a wife Man cannot be happy upon the Rack. These who account not Pain among the Ills hold, that a wife Man continueth happy in the midst of Torments; for, if some bear those Pains with greater Courage for their Country, or some lighter Cause, Opinion, not Nature increaseth or diminisheth the Power of the Pain. Again, the *Peripateticks* asserting three Kinds of Good, affirm a Man to be so much the more happy, the fuller he is of external corporeal Goods, or, in the *Stoicks* Expression, he who hath most corporeal Estimables, is most happy, for as much as by them Beautitude is compleated. On the contrary, the *Stoicks* hold, that those Goods which they call of Nature, make not, by their Frequency, a Life more happy, or are more expetible, or more estimable; for then Wisdom being expetible, and Health expetible, both together would be more expetible than Wisdom alone; whereas either being worthy Estimation than Wisdom alone. For the *Stoicks*, who held Health to be estimable, but place it not amongst the Goods, hold likewise, that no Estimation is to be preferr'd before Virtue. From this the *Peripateticks* dissent, asserting, that an honest Action without Pain, is more expetible than the same Action with Pain; the *Stoicks* otherwise: For, as a Taper is darkned by the Light of the Sun, and as a Drop of Water is lost in the Vastness of the *Ægean* Sea, and as in the Riches of *Græsus* the Accession of one Farthing, and one Step in the Way between this and *India*, so in that End of all Good which the *Stoicks* assert, all the Estimation of corporeal Things must necessarily be obscur'd, overwhelm'd, and perish, by the Splendor and Magnitude of Virtue. And as Opportunity *καιρὸς*, is not made any thing greater by Production of Time; for whatsoever is opportune hath its Measure; so right Affection, *κατάψυχον*, and the Good itself placed in it, that it be conformable to Nature, admitteth no Accession of increase. For, as that Opportunity, to those of which we speak, are not made greater by Production of Time, for which Reason the *Stoicks*

conceive, that a happy Life is not more to be desired, if it be long, than if it be short; and they use this Simily, *As it is the Praise of a Shoe to fit the Foot, neither are many Shoes prefer'd before two, nor the Greater before the Less*; so in those Things, whose Good is confin'd to Opportunity and Convenience, neither are the more to be preferred before the fewer, nor the longer before the shorter: Nor do they argue acutely, who say, if long Health be more to be esteemed than short, then likewise a long Life of Wisdom, more than a short; they understand not, that the Estimation of Health is judged by Space, that of Virtue by Opportunity; as if they should say likewise a good Death, or a good Labour to a Woman in Travail, is better long than short; so that they see not that some Things are more esteemed for their Shortness, others for their Length.

C H A P. VI.

Of Eupathies.

AS^r soon as any Object is presented to us, which seemeth good, Nature [as we said] drives on to the Acquisition thereof, which being done constantly and prudently, is call'd Will; imprudently and excessively, Desire.

Moreover, while we are so moved, that we are in some Good, that happeneth also two Ways, when the Soul is moved quietly and constantly according to Reason, this is called Joy; when vainly and excessively, Pleasure.

In like Manner, as we desire good Things by Nature, so by Nature we decline the Ill: This Declination, if done according to Reason, is called Caution, if without Reason, Fear. Caution is only in a wise Man, of Fear he is not capable.

Hence it appeareth, that there are three Kinds of good Affections of the Mind, call'd Eupathies, or Constancies; Joy, Caution, Will.

Joy is contrary to Pleasure, as being a rational Elevation of the Mind.

Caution is contrary to Fear, as being a rational Declination of ill.

Will is contrary to Desire, as being a rational Appetite.

These are the primary Eupathies; and as under the primary Passions are comprehended many subordinate Passions; so are there secondary Eupathies subordinate to those.

Under Joy are 1. Delectation. 2. Cheerfulness.

3. Equanimity.

Under Caution, 1. Respect. 2. Cleanness.

Under Will are, 1. Benevolence. 2. Salutation.

3. Charity.

Notwithstanding that Eupathies^a and Passions are

contrary; yet are there but three Eupathies, though there are four Passions; for there is no Eupathy contrary to Grief.

C H A P. VII.

Of Passions.

FROM^o Fallacies perceiveth a Perversity of Intellect, hence spring up several Passions, and Causes of Disorder.

Zeno defineth Passion, a præternatural Motion of the Soul, (or as Cicero renders it, a Commotion of the Soul, *averse from right Reason, against Nature.*) Others more briefly, a more vehement Appetite. More vehement they call that, which recedeth from the Constancy of Nature, and is contrary to Nature, wherefore all Passion is an excessive stupid Desire.

The Kinds of Passion arise from two opinionated Goods, and two opinionated Evils, so they are four. From the Good, *Desire and Pleasure*; Pleasure from present Good, Desire from future; from the Ill, *Fear and Grief*; Fear from the future, Grief from the present; from these Things, whose coming we fear, when they do come, grieve us. Pleasure and Desire arise from an Opinion of good Things, Desire is fervently transported to that which seemeth good, Pleasure rejoiceth when we have obtained what we desire. Thus Desire and Fear go foremost, that to apparent Good, this to apparent Ill; Pleasure and Grief follows; Pleasure, when we attain what we desire, Grief, when we incur what we fear.

All Passions arise from Judgment and Opinion, whence they are more strictly defined, (that it may appear not only how vicious they are, but also that they are in our Power) thus;

Grief is a fresh Opinion of present Ill, wherein it seemeth fit that a Mind be contracted and dejected, or a Contraction of the Soul caused by Opinion of present Ill.

Pleasure is a fresh Opinion of present Good, wherein it seemeth good that the Mind be exalted, ed, or an irrational Elevation of Mind to something that seemeth eligible.

Fear is an Opinion of eminent Ill, which seemeth to be intolerable, or a Contraction of the Soul disobedient to Reason, caused by Expectation of Ill.

Desire is an Opinion of Good to come, that if it were present, it were fit for our Use, or an Appetite disobedient to Reason, caused by the Opinion of consequent Good.

These four are, as Hecato saith, primary Passions, under each of which there are subordinate

^a Cic. Tus. quest. lib. 4. 6. ^g Cic. ibid. ^h Cic. ibid. ⁱ Cic. ibid. Laert. 7. 15. ^k Laert. ibid. ^l Cic. ibid. ^m Laert. ib. ⁿ Cic. Tus. quest. 4. 7. ^o Laert. 7. 110. ^p Laert. ibid. ^q Laert. quest. 4. ^r Laert. ibid. ^s Cic. ibid. ^t Cic. ibid. ^u Cic. ibid. ^v Cic. ibid. ^w Cic. ibid. ^x Cic. ibid. ^y Stob. ibid. ^z Cic. ibid. ^{aa} Laert. ibid. ^{ab} Cic. ibid. ^{ac} Cic. ibid. ^{ad} Stob. ibid. ^{ae} Cic. ibid. ^{af} Cic. ibid. ^{ag} Cic. ibid. ^{ah} Cic. ibid. ^{ai} Cic. ibid. ^{aj} Cic. ibid. ^{ak} Cic. ibid. ^{al} Cic. ibid. ^{am} Cic. ibid. ^{an} Cic. ibid. ^{ao} Cic. ibid. ^{ap} Cic. ibid. ^{aq} Cic. ibid. ^{ar} Cic. ibid. ^{as} Cic. ibid. ^{at} Cic. ibid. ^{au} Cic. ibid. ^{av} Cic. ibid. ^{aw} Cic. ibid. ^{ax} Cic. ibid. ^{ay} Cic. ibid. ^{az} Cic. ibid. ^{ba} Cic. ibid. ^{bb} Cic. ibid. ^{bc} Cic. ibid. ^{bd} Cic. ibid. ^{be} Cic. ibid. ^{bf} Cic. ibid. ^{bg} Cic. ibid. ^{bh} Cic. ibid. ^{bi} Cic. ibid. ^{bj} Cic. ibid. ^{bk} Cic. ibid. ^{bl} Cic. ibid. ^{bm} Cic. ibid. ^{bn} Cic. ibid. ^{bo} Cic. ibid. ^{bp} Cic. ibid. ^{bq} Cic. ibid. ^{br} Cic. ibid. ^{bs} Cic. ibid. ^{bt} Cic. ibid. ^{bu} Cic. 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Passions, several Species belonging to their proper Genus.

Under *Grief* are these Kinds,

• *Envy*, *φθόνος*, *invidentia*; a Grief at the Prosperity of others, which doth no Hurt to him that envieth, & for some Men desire to see their Neighbours suppressed, that themselves might be advanced above them. For if a Man grieve at the Prosperity of another, whereby he is damaged, he is not properly said to envy; as that of *Hector* to *Agamemnon*; but he who is nothing damaged by the Prosperity of another, yet grieveth thereat, truly envieth.

• *Emulation*, *ζήλος*, (not here taken for the Imitation of Virtue, for that is laudable) a Grief that another Man enjoyeth that which we desire and want, or as *Laertius*, a Grief for another's Felicity, which we wish to ourselves, and an Emulation thereof, as greater than our own.

• *Jealousy*, *ζηλοφύβια*, *Obtestation*, a Grief lest another enjoy what we love and possess.

• *Compassion*, *ἰσότης*, *Misericordia*, a Grief for the Misery another suffers undeservedly, for no Man compassionates the Punishment of a Parricide or Traitor.

Anguish, *ἄχος*, *Anger*, an oppressive Grief.

Mourning, *πένθος*, *Luctus*, Grief for the Death of a Friend that was dear to us.

Wailing, *Μάρος*, a Grief accompanied with Tears.

Trouble, *ἔδυνον*, *ærumna*, a laborious piercing Grief.

Sorrow, *Dolor*, a vexatious Grief, perhaps the same which in *Stobæus* is termed *ζών*, a Grief, with conflict of Spirit.

• *Lamentation*, *λόλα*, a Grief with Thoughtfulness, proceeding from, and encreasing by Consideration and Discourse.

Molestia, a permanent Grief.

Affliction, a Grief with corporeal Torment.

Desperation, a Grief without any Hope of Amendment.

Εἰσχυρσις, an urgent Grief attended by Difficulty.

Ἄχος, a Grief taking away the Voice.

Συνγυρσις, an irrational Grief corroding, and hindering us from enjoying the present.

Under *Pleasure*, are,

• *Malevolence*, *ἐπιχειρημασία*, a Pleasure at another's Ill, without any Good to ourselves. This hath no real Subsistence, for no good Man was ever known to rejoice at the Harm of another.

Delectation, *ἡδυσία*, a Pleasure affecting and soothing the Mind by the Ear, and in like manner by the Eye, touch, smell, or taste, which are all of one kind.

Yactation, a boasting Pleasure, with insolent Behaviour.

Τίβησις, *quasi τρέψις*, an Inclination of the Mind to Dissoluteness.

Διάλυσις, the Dissolution of Virtue.

Ἀφαισθεύσις, a Pleasure from Things not expected.

Γαίσησις, a Pleasure caused by Sight, without Deceit.

Under *Fear*, are

Dread, *δῆσις*, a Fear causing *ἄσθ*.

Slack, *ἄσθ*, *Pigrity*, a Fear of future Action, or Succession of Labour.

Shame, *αἰσχύν*, a Fear of Ignominy.

Ἐκπλάξις, a Fear of some unusual Phantasy.

ἄσπετος, a Fear with Loss, or Trepidation of Voice.

Αἰσμία, a Fear of something uncertain, or a Fear of offending or falling.

Δυστάσμος, a Fear of Gods or Demons.

Δύσις, a Fear of some grievous Thing.

Terror, a Fear, which by striking the Mind, causeth Redness, Paleness, Trembling, or Gnawing of the Teeth.

Timor, a Fear of approaching Ill.

Pavor, a Fear thrusting the Mind out of its Place.

Exanimatio, a Fear consequent, and, as it were, Companion to *Pavor*.

Conturbatio, a Fear which disperseth all our Thoughts.

Formido, a permanent Fear.

The Passions subordinate to Desire are generally two, *Anger* and *Love*.

Anger is a Desire of taking Revenge upon those by whom we conceive our selves wrong'd.

The Species thereof are, *Θυμός*, or as *Cicero*, *Submissio*, *exandescencia*, *Anger* beginning.

Χόλος, *Anger* increasing.

• *Μῆνις*, *odium*, *Anger* inveterate.

Κόρος, *Inimicitia*, *Anger* watching the Occasion of Revenge.

Παύσις, *Anger* breaking forth into Action.

Μίσις, a Desire whereby we wish Ill to another, with continual Progression.

Μαλίκη, *Difcordia*, a bitter Anger, with utmost Hatred, conceived in the Heart.

Φιλονομία, a Desire conversant in Difference of Opinions.

Love is an Impulsion of Good-will for apparent Beauty, whereby it is distinguish'd from the Love of the Virtuous, which is a voluntary Succession of Labour for true Beauty. The Species of Love are,

Ἐράσις, *Indigentia*, an (inexpleable) Desire of that which we want, and being separated from it, in vain incline to it.

e Laert. libid. f Cic. libid. g Plot. Cont. Stoic. h Cic. libid. i Laert. 7. 111. k Cic. libid. l Laert. libid. m Laert. 7. 112. n Cic. Laert. whithers supply Stobæus, where (Pleasure being omitted) these are applied to a wrong Head. o Μῆνις & ὀδύς are confounded by Laertius.

Πῆ9, *Desiderium*, a Desire to see that which is not present. They distinguish these two thus: Desire is of those Things which are said, or predicated of any Thing which they call *Categorems*, as to have Riches, to take Honours; Indigence is of the Things themselves; as of Honours, of Money.

Ἰσ9, *Desire of Conversation* of that which is absent.

ἡδονή, *Desire of Pleasure*.

πλοῦτος, *Desire of Riches*.

δοξασία, *Desire of Glory*.

In all these Passions there is Opinion. Opinion is a weak Assent. Hence Passions, (as *Chrysippus* in his Book of *Passions* affirms) are Judgments; for Avarice is an Opinion, or false Judgment that Money is good; Drunkenness and Intemperance are the like. Opinion is likewise sudden from the contractive Motion of an unreasonable Elation of the Mind, unreasonable and preternatural, in as much as it is not obedient to Reason. For every Passion is violent: Wherefore oftentimes, tho' we see in those that are transported by Passion, the Inconvenience thereof; yet notwithstanding, the same Persons that condemn it, are carried away by it, as by a Headstrong Horse, and therefore properly may ulc that Saying:

Against my Judgment Nature forceth me.

Meaning by Judgment, the Knowledge of right Things; for Man is carried beyond Nature by Passion, to transgress natural Reason and Right.

All those who are led by Passion, are diverted from Reason, but in another Manner than those who are deceived. For the Deceived, as for Example, they who think Atoms to be the Principles of all Things, when they come to know that they are not, change their Judgment: But those that are in Passion, altho' that they are taught not to grieve, or fear, or give Way to any Passion in the Soul, yet they do not put them off, but are led on by their Passions, until they come to be subject to their tyrannical Sway.

C H A P. VIII.

Of Sickness and Infirmities.

THE Fountain of all Passions is Intemperance, which is a total Defection from the Mind, and from right Reason, so averse from the Prescription of Reason, that the Appetites of the Soul can by no Means be ruled or contained. As therefore Temperance allayeth Appetites, and causeth them to obey right Reason, and preserveth the considerate Judgments of the Mind; so Intemperance, the Enemy thereto, enflameth, troubleth,

and inciteth the State of the Soul. Thus Grief and Fears, and the rest of the Passions, all arise from this. For, as when the Blood is corrupt, or Flegm, or Choler aboundeth, Sicknesses or Infirmities arise in the Body; so the Disorder of ill Opinions, and their Repugnance to one another, distresseth the Soul of Health, and troubleth it with Diseases.

* B, Passions the Mind becometh indisposed, and as it were sick. *Sickness* of Mind, *morbus*, is an Opinion and Desire of that which seemeth greatly expetible, but is not such, as Love of Women, of Wine, of Money. These *morbus* have likewise their Contraries in the other Extrem, as Hatred of Women, of Wine, of Money.

This Sickness of Mind happening with Imbecility, is called *ἀνισυχία*, *Infirmity*. For, as in the Body there are Infirmities, as Gouts, Convulsions, and the like; so are there Infirmities in the Mind, as Love of Glory, Love of Pleasure. And as in Bodies there is a Propensity to some particular Diseases; so in the Mind there is a Proclivity *προσέγκλισις*, or *προκαταρσις*, to some particular Passions, as *φθονία*, *Propensity to Envy*, *ἀνταγωνισμὸς*, *Propensity to Ungenerousness*, and the like.

† In this Place, much Pains hath been taken by the Stoicks, chiefly by *Chrysippus*, to compare the Sicknesses of the Mind with those of the Body.

Passion (for as much as Opinions are inconstant and turbulently tossed up and down) is always in Motion; and when this Ferour and Concitation of the Mind is inveterate, and, as it were, settled in the Veins and Marrow, then ariseth Sickness and Infirmities, and those Aversions which are contrary to those Infirmities and Diseases. These differ only intentionally, but really are the same, arising from Desire and Pleasure; for when Money is desired, and Reason not immediately applied, as a *Socratick* Medicine to cure that Desire, the Evil spreadeth through the Veins, and cleaveth to the Bowels, and becometh Sickness and Infirmity, which when they grow inveterate, cannot be plucked away. The Name of this Sickness is Avarice. In like Manner arise other Sicknesses, as Desire of Glory, Desire of Women, *φιλολυσία*, and the rest of Sicknesses and Infirmities. Their Contraries arise from Fear, as Hatred of Women, *μισσηγυία*, Hatred of Mankind, Inhospitality, all which are Infirmities of the Mind, arising from Fear of those Things which they fly and shun.

Infirmity of Mind is defined, *A vehement Opinion, inherent, and wobly implanted in us, of a Thing not to be desired, as if it were exceedingly to be desired*. That which ariseth from Aversion, is defined, *A vehement Opinion, inherent, and throughly implanted in us, of a Thing that ought not to be*

shunned, as if it ought to be shunned. This Opinion is a judging ourselves to know what we have not.

Under *Infirmity* are these Species, *Love of Money, of Honour, of Women, of curious Meats,* and the like. *Love of Money, Avarice,* is a vehement Opinion, inherent, and thoroughly implanted in us, as if it were exceedingly to be desired. In the like Manner are all the rest defined.

Aversions are defined thus, *Inhospitality is a vehement Opinion, inherent, and thoroughly implanted in us, that Guests ought to be shunned.* In like manner is defined Hatred of Womankind, such as was that of *Hippolitus*, and of Mankind as that of *Timon*.

As some are more prone to one Sickness than to another; so are some more inclinable to Fear, others to other Passions; in some is Anxiety, whereby they are anxious; in others Cholera, which differeth from Anger; for it is one Thing to be choleric, another Thing to be angry, as Anxiety differs from Grief; for all are not anxious, who are sometimes grieved, nor are all that are anxious grieved always: As there is a Difference betwixt Ebriety and Ebriosity, and it is one Thing to be a Lover, another to be amorous.

This Propensity of several Persons to several Sicknesses, is called from an Analogy to the Body, *Infirmity*, whereby is understood a Propensity to be sick: But in good Things, because some are more apt to some Goods than to others, it is stiled Facility, in ill Things Proclivity, implying a Lapsion; in Neuters it hath the former Name.

As there is Sickness, *Infirmity*, and Defect in the Body, so in the Mind. Sickness is the Corruption of the whole Body. *Infirmity* is Sickness, with some Weakness. Defect is, when the Parts of the Body disagree with one another, whence ariseth Pravity, Distortion, Deformity of the Limbs; so that those two, Sickness and *Infirmity*, arise from the Confusion and Trouble of the Health of the whole Body; Defect is seen in perfect Health. But, in the Mind, Sickness is not distinguished from *Infirmity*, but by Cogitation only.

Vitiosity is a Habit or Affection, inconstant in itself, and oft differing in the whole Course of Life; so that in one, by the Corruption of Opinions, is bred Sickness and *Infirmity*; in the other, Inconstancy and Repugnance. For every Vice hath not disagreeing Parts, as of them who are not far from Wisdom, that Affection is different from self, as being unwise, but not distorted nor depraved.

Sickness and *Infirmities* are Parts of Vitiosity; but, whether Passions are Parts thereof also, it is a Question. For Vices are permanent Affections,

Passions are moving Affections, so that they cannot be Parts of permanent Affections.

And as in all Things the Soul resembleth the Body, so in good likewise. In the Body, the chiefest are Beauty, Strength, Health, Soundness, Agility; so likewise in the Mind. And as the good Temper of the Body is, when those Things whereof we consist, agree well among themselves; so the Health of the Soul is, when the Judgments and Opinions thereof agree. This is the Virtue of the Soul, which some affirm to be Temperance; others, a Soul obedient to the Precepts of Temperance, and obsequious thereunto, not having any Speciousness of her own. But, whether one or other, it is only in a wise Man; yet there is one Kind of Health of the Soul, which is common also to the Unwise, when by the Care of Physicians, the Distemper of the Mind is removed.

And as there is in the Body an apt Figure of the Limbs, together with a Sweetness of Colour, which is called Beauty; so in the Soul, Equality, and Constancy of Opinions, and Judgments following Virtue, with a certain Firmness and Stability, or including the very Power of Virtue, is called Beauty.

Likewise correspondent to the Powers, Nerves, and Efficacy of the Body, in the same Terms are named the Powers of the Soul. Agility of Body is called Quickness; the same Commendation is ascribed to Wit, in respect that the Soul over-runneeth many Things in a short Time. Only there is this Difference betwixt Souls and Bodies; strong Souls cannot be assaulted by Diseases, strong Bodies may. But the Offensions of Bodies may happen without any Fault; those of the Soul cannot, all whose Sicknesses and Passions proceed from Contempt of Reason, and therefore are in Men only; for, tho' Beasts do some Things like this, yet they fall not into Passions.

Betwixt acute and obtuse Persons, there is this Difference, the Ingenious, as *Corinthian* Brads, rusteth, slowly falling into Sickness, and more quickly get out of it: The Dull do not so; neither doth the Soul of an Ingenious Person fall into every Sickness and Passion; for, there are not many Things extremely savage and cruel, and some also have a Shew of Humanity, as Compassion, Grief, Fear.

But the *Infirmities* and Sicknesses of the Mind are less easily rooted out, than those great Vices which are contrary to the Virtues; for the Sicknesses remaining, the Vices may be taken away, because the Sicknesses are no sooner healed, than the Vices are removed.

CHAP. IX.
Of Virtue and Vice.

Virtue is a convenient Affection of the Soul throughout all Life.

Of Virtues there are three Kinds : The first general, taken for any Perfection of a Thing, as of a Statue : The second are *Sciences*, or *Contemplative*, which, according to *Hecaton*, consist in Speculation, as *Prudence* and *Justice*. The third *not Sciences*, or *not contemplative*, which are considered as consequent to the speculative ; as, *Health*, *Strength*, *Hope*, *Joy*, and the like. Health is consequent to Temperance, a theoretick Virtue, as Strength to the Building of an Arch. They are called *not-contemplative*, because they require no Assent, but are by after Accession, and common even to the Wicked, as Health and Strength.

Vice is the contrary to Virtue, for the rational Creature is perverted sometimes by the Persuasion of exterior Things, sometimes by the Counsel of those with whom he converseth, contrary to Nature, who gives us Inclinations unperverted.

Of Vices therefore there are two Kinds ; the first, *Ignorance* of those Things whereof Virtues are the Knowledge ; as *Imprudence*, *Intemperance*, *Injustice* ; the second *not-ignorance* ; as *Puillanimity*, *Imbecility*.

Panaetius asserteth two Virtues, *Theoretick* and *Practick* : Others three, *Rational*, *Natural* and *Moral* ; *Possidonius* four ; *Cleanthes*, *Chrysippus*, and *Antipater* more ; *Apollodorus* one only, *Prudence*.

Of Virtues, some are *primary*, others *subordinate*. The primary are four, *Prudence*, *Temperance*, *Fortitude*, *Justice* ; the first conversant in Offices, the second in Appetite, the third in Tolerance, the fourth in Distribution.

Prudence is the Science of Things that are to be done, and not to be done, and neuter ; or the Knowledge of good, bad, and neuter in civil Life.

The Virtues subordinate to Prudence are five.

Ευκωλία, the Science of Things that are to be done, how they may be done beneficially.

Ευλογισία, The Science of comprehending Things to be effected.

Αρχιτροία, The Science of finding out our Office.

Νευσία, The Science of attaining the Scope in every Thing.

Ευμυχαία, The Science of finding out the Issues of Things.

* *Temperance*, is the Science of Things, expetible, avoidable, and neuter. Under Temperance are these Species.

Ευταξία, the Science of Time and Order for the well-doing of Things.

Κοσμιότης, The Science of honest and dishonest Motions.

Αιδιμούσιον, The Science of avoiding just Blame. *Fortitudo*, is the Science of Things grievous, not grievous and neuter ; the Species under it these :

Εγκρατεία, A Science tenacious of right Reason.

Κελεύση, A Science persisting in right Judgment. *Θαυματοπτεία*, A Science whereby we trust.

Μαγιστο-Ιουχία, The Science of overcoming those Things which happen to the Good and Bad.

Ευ-Ιουχία, A Science of the Soul, which renders her invincible.

Φιλοστοία, The Science of going through to the Attainment of that which we propose to ourselves.

Justice is the Science of distributing to every one according to his Desert ; under Justice are four subordinate Virtues.

Ευπίστεια, The Science of worshipping the Gods. *Χρηστότης*, The Science of well-doing.

Εκκοινωνσία, The Science of Equality in Community.

Ευσυναλλεξία, The Science of contracting honestly with others.

In like manner of Vices, some are primary, others subordinate to the Primary. The primary Vices are, *Imprudence*, *Intemperance*, *Puillanimity*, *Injustice*.

* *Imprudence* is the Ignorance of Things good, ill, and neuter ; and the Ignorance of Things to be done, not to be done, and neuter.

Intemperance is the Ignorance of Things expetible, avoidable, and neuter.

Puillanimity is the Ignorance of Things grievous, not grievous and neuter.

Injustice is the Ignorance of distributing to every one according to his Deserts.

The subordinate Vices to these are correspondent to the secondary Virtues, as, *Ιαργία*, *Εγδυσία κακοβουλία*, which are defined answerably to their opposite Virtues.

These Virtues are perfect, and consist in Contemplation ; but there are other Virtues which are not Arts, but Faculties, consisting in Exercise, as, Health of the Soul, Integrity and Strength thereof, and pulchritude. For, as the Health of the Body is a good Temperature of hot, cold, dry, and moist ; so the Health of the Soul is a good Temperature of the Doctrines in the Soul. And as the Strength of the Body consisteth in a Tension of the Nerves, so the Strength of the Soul in a proper Extension thereof to Judgment and Action : And as the Beauty of the Body is a Symmetry of all the Parts to one another, and to the Whole, so the Beauty of the

u Liert. 7. 8. &c.

w Stob. 2. &c.

x Stob. by whom correct Laertius, who applies this Definition to Temperance.

y Stob.

* Ἀρχιτροία δὲ ὁρμάς ἀναβῆναι, ὁ κακῶς, ὁ ἀνέχων. ὁ ἄγριος δὲ ἐκδύσει, ὁ ἀνέχων ; so supply the Text.

Soul is the Symmetry of the Reason and Parts thereof, to the Whole, and to one another.

All those Virtues which are Sciences and Arts, have common Theorems, and the same End, wherefore they are (as *Zeno* saith) inseparable, connexed to one another, as *Chrysippus*, *Apollodorus* and *Hecaton* affirm. He who hath one hath all, (saith *Chrysippus*) and he who doth according to one, doth according to all. He who hath Virtue, is not only contemplative, but also practick of those things which are to be done. Things which are to be done, are either expetible, tolerable, distributable, or retainable; so that whosoever doth one Thing wisely, doth another justly, another constantly, another temperately; and so is both wise, magnanimous, just and temperate.

Notwithstanding these Virtues differ from one another by their Heads: For, the Heads of Prudence are, to contemplate and do well; that which is to be done in the first Place, and in the Second, to contemplate what Things are to be avoided, as obstructive to that which is to be done. The proper Head of Temperance is to compose our own Appetites in the first Place, and to consider them; in the second, those under the subordinate Virtues, as being obstructive and divertive of Appetites. The Heads of Fortitude are, in the first Place, to consider all that we are to undergo; in the second, other subordinate Virtues. The Heads of Justice are, in the first Place, to consider what every one deserves; in the second, the rest: for all Virtues consider the Things that belong to all, and the Subordinate to one another. Whence *Panætius* saith, *It is in Virtue as in many Archers, who shoot at one Mark, distinguished by divers Colours; every one aims at the Mark, but one proposes to himself the white Line, another the Black, and so of the rest; for all these place their ultimate End in hitting the Mark, but every one proposes to himself a several manner of hitting: so all Virtues have Beatitude, which is placed conformably to Nature for their End, but several Persons pursue it several Ways.*

As Virtues are inseparable, so are they the same substantially with the supreme Part of the Soul, in which respect all Virtue is said to be a Body, for the Intellect and Soul are a Body; for the Soul is a warm Spirit innate in us: therefore our Soul is a living Creature, for it hath Life and Sense, especially the supreme Part thereof, called the *Intellect*. Wherefore all Virtue is a living Creature, because it is essentially the Intellect; and therefore *ἡ ἀρετή ζῶον*, for that Expression is consequent to this Assertion.

Between Virtue and Vice there is no Medium (contrary to the *Peripateticks*, who assert a mean Progression betwixt Virtue and Vice) for all Men

have a natural Appetite to Good; and as a Stick is either straight or crooked, so Man must be either just or unjust; but cannot be either more or less just or unjust.

That Virtue may be learned, is asserted by *Chrysippus*, in his First Book of the *End*, and by *Cleanthes* and *Possidonius* in his *Exhortations*, and *Hecaton*, because Men of bad are made good.

That it may be lost, is likewise affirmed by *Chrysippus*, deny'd by *Cleanthes*. The first saith, *it may be lost by Drunkenness or Madness*; the other, *that it cannot be lost, by reason of the firm Comprehensions of the Soul*.

Virtue is in itself Virtue, and not for Hope or Fear of any external Thing. It is expetible in itself; for which Reason, when we do any thing amiss, we are ashamed, as knowing that only to be good, which is honest.

In Virtue consisteth Felicity, for the End of Virtue is to live convenient to Nature. Every Virtue is able to make a Man live convenient to Nature; for Man hath natural Inclinations for the finding out of Offices for the Composure of Appetites, for Tolerance and Distribution. Virtue therefore is self-sufficient to Beatitude, as *Zeno*, *Chrysippus*, and *Hecaton* assert. For if, saith he, *Magnanimity*, as conceiving all Things to be below itself, is self-sufficient, and that be a Part of Virtue, Virtue itself, which despieth all Things that obstruct her, must also be self-sufficient to Beatitude. But *Panætius* and *Possidonius* deny that Virtue is self-sufficient, affirming, *that it requires the Assistance of Health, Strength, and Necessaries*; yet they hold, that Virtue is always used, as *Cleanthes* affirms, for it cannot be lost, and is always practis'd by a perfect Mind, which is good.

Justice is not by Nature, but by Prescription, as Law and right Reason. Thus *Chrysippus* in his Book of Honesty.

Virtue hath many Attributes, it is call'd,

1. *ἁγαθή*, a Good, because it leadeth us to right Life.
2. *Ἀποδιδόν*, because it is approv'd without any Controversy, as being most excellent.
3. *ἀσκήσιον*, because 'tis worthy of much Study.
4. *Ἐπαινετόν*, because it may justly be praised.
5. *Καλόν*, because it inviteth those that desire it.
6. *Συμμετρικόν*, because it conduceth to Goodness of Life.
7. *χρησιμεύον*, because it is useful.
8. *ἱκετόν*, because it is rightly expetible.
9. *ἀνεγκλιτόν*, because being present it profiteth; being absent, it doth not.
10. *ὑπερβαλόν*, because it hath an Use that exceeds the Labour.

a Plat. repub. Stoick.

b Ibid.

c Laert. 7. 97.

d Laert. 7. 89.

e Laert. 7. 85.

f Laert. 7. 107.

g Stob.

11. *ἑξῆς*, because it is alone sufficient to him that hath it.
 12. *ἀντὶ τοῦ*, because it takes away all Want.
 13. *κοινὴν*, because it is common in Use, and extendeth to all the Uses of Life.

C H A P. X.

Of the End.

TH E ^b End is that, for whose Sake all Offices are done, but itself is not done for the Sake of any; or that to which all Things done conveniently in Life are referred, itself is referred to nothing.

The End is taken three Ways; First, for the final Good, which consisteth in rational Conversation. Secondly, for the Scope, which is convenient Life, in relation thereto. Lastly, for the Ultimate of Expetibles, unto which all the rest are referred.

Scope and End differ; for Scope is the proposed Body, which they who pursue Beatitude aim at. Felicity is proposed as the Scope, but the End is the Attainment of that Felicity. If a Man throw a Spear, or an Arrow at any Thing, he must do all Things that he may take his Aim aright, and yet so, as to do all Things whereby he may hit; so when we say, it is the ultimate End of Man to obtain the Principles of Nature, we imply, in like manner, he must do all Things necessary to taking Aim, and all Things likewise to the hitting of the Mark; but this is the last, the chief Good in Life, that is to be selected, not desired.

Reason being given to rational Creatures, for the most perfect Direction, to live according to Reason, is in them to live according to Nature, that being the Artificer of Appetite. Hence Zeno first (in his Discourse of Human Nature) affirms, that the End is to live conformably, that is, to live according to one's own Reason concordantly; as on the contrary, savage Beasts that are always at Difference, live miserably.

The Followers of Zeno, conceiving his Expression not full enough, enlarged it. First, *Cleanthes*, his Successor, added to Nature, making it up thus, *The End is to live conformably to Nature, which is to live according to Virtue*; for Nature leads us to Virtue. Thus *Cleanthes* in his Book of Pleasure, and *Possidonius*, and *Hecaton* in his Book of Ends.

Chrysippus, to make the Expression of *Cleanthes* more clear, expounds it thus, *To live according to expert Knowledge of Things which happen naturally*; for our Natures are Parts of the Universe, our End therefore is to live conformably to Nature, which *Chrysippus*, in his First Book of Ends, expounds, both our own proper human Nature, and likewise the common Nature of the Universe. But *Cleanthes* allows only common Nature to be followed, and not the Particular. To live according to this

Knowledge, is all one as to live according to Virtue, not doing any thing forbidden by our Common Law. Right Reason, which is current amongst all, being the very same that is in God, the Governor of all. The Virtue thereof, and the Beatitude of a happy Man, is, when all Things are ordered according to the Correspondence of a Man's Genius, with the Will of him who governs the Universe.

Diogenes defineth the End, *a good Use of Reason, in the Election and Refusal of natural Things, chusing those that are according to Nature, and refusing those that are repugnant to Nature*. So likewise *Antipater*.

Archidemus defineth it, *To live, performing completely all Offices, chusing of those Things which are according to Nature, the greatest and most principal, and not to be able to transgress them*.

Panætius, to live according to the Appetites given us by Nature.

Possidonius, to live contemplating the Truth and Order of the Universe.

¹ Thus by living according to Nature, the *Stoicks* understand three Things: First, to live according to the Knowledge of those Things which happen by Nature. This is Zeno's End, to live conveniently to Nature. Secondly, to live, preserving all, or the greater Part of mean Offices. This Exposition differeth from the former; for that is a Rectitude, proper only to a wise Man; this is the Office of a progressive, not perfect Person, which may likewise be to the Foolish. The Third is, to live in Enjoyment of all, or the greater Part of those Things which are according to Nature. This is not constituted in our Action, for it consisteth of that kind of Life which enjoyeth Virtue, and of those Things which are according to Nature, and are not in our Power.

² The chief Good, therefore, is to live suitably to the Knowledge of those Things which arrive by Nature, elective of those which are according to Nature, and rejective of those which are contrary to Nature. ¹ This is to live conveniently and conformably to Nature, when the Soul entering into the Path of Virtue, walketh by the Steps and Guidance of right Reason, and followeth God. That which is in other Arts is artificial, is here epimatic and consequent.

This End is Beatitude. *Beatitudo* by Zeno, is defined a good Course of Life, which Definition is used likewise by *Cleanthes* and *Chrysippus*, and all their Followers, who affirm Beatitude to be nothing but a happy Life.

Fair, and Good, and Virtue, and that which participates of Virtue, are equivalent Terms, whence it follows, that Beatitude is all one with living according to Virtue. = And as Good and Virtue ad-

mit no Degrees of Increase or Diminution, neither doth the ultimate End of all Good and Virtue increase or diminish: For, as they who are drowned are no more able to breathe, tho' they are nearer to the Top of the Water, than they who are in the Bottom; nor a little Whelp, the Time of whose Sight approacheth, see any more than one that is newly littered; so he, who hath made some little Progress in Virtue, is no less in Misery, than he who hath made none.

C H A P. XI.

Of Indifferents.

OF Things, as we have said, some are good, some ill, some indifferent. ^a To deny this Difference of Things, would be to confound all Life, as *Aristo* doth; neither could there be any Function or Act of Wisdom, since that, if amongst those Things which appertain to Life there were no Difference, no Election were requisite.

Good and Ill, as we said, are those Things which are honest or dishonest. Of these hitherto, Betwixt both these, there are some Things which confer nothing to happy or unhappy Life, called Indifferents. ^o To Profit is a Motion or State proceeding from Virtue; to Hurt is a Motion or State proceeding from Vice; but Indifferents neither Profit nor Hurt; such are Life, Health, Pleasure, Beauty, Strength, Riches, Honour, Nobility, and their Contraries; Death, Sickness, Grief, Deformity, Imbecility, Poverty, Dishonour, Meanness, and the like. Thus *Hecaton* in his seventh Book of *Ends*, and *Apollodorus* in his *Ethicks*, and *Chrysippus*. These therefore are not Goods, but Indifferents. For, as the Property of Heat is to warm, not to cool; so is it of Good to profit, not to hurt. But Health and Wealth do not hurt more than they profit, therefore Health and Wealth are not Goods. Again, that which we may use ill as well as well, is not good; but Health and Wealth may be used ill as well as well, therefore Health and Wealth are not Goods. Yet *Posidonius* reckons these amongst Goods. But *Hecaton* in his 19th of *Good*, and *Chrysippus* of *Pleasure*, will not allow Pleasure a Good; for Pleasures are dishonest, but nothing dishonest is good.

^p Moreover, Riches, as *Diogenes* conceiveth, have not only this Power that they guide to Pleasure and good Health, but that they comprise them. They do not the same in Virtue nor in other Arts, whereto Money may be a Guide, but it cannot contain them. Thus, if Pleasure or Health were good, Riches likewise should be numbered amongst the good; but if Wisdom be good, it followeth not that Riches likewise be good, nor

that any Thing which is not reckoned amongst the good; that which is good cannot be contained by any Thing which is not amongst the Good. And also for this Reason, because Sciences and Comprehensions of Things, by which Arts are produced, move Appetition; but if Riches are not reckoned among the Good, it followeth that no Art can be contained in Riches, and much less any Virtue, for Virtue requireth far more Study and Exercise than Art, and compriseth the Firmness, Stability, and Constancy of all Life, which Art doth not.

^q Things are said to be indifferent in three Respects: First, if they move neither Appetite nor Aversion, as, if the Stars be of even Number, or to have even or uneven Hairs on our Head, to stretch out the Finger this Way or that Way, to take up a Straw, and the like. Secondly, Things are said to be indifferent which move Appetite and Aversion equally, not one more than the other; as in two Pieces of Silver of equal Value, no Way different, which to him who comes to make Choice of either, are indifferent. There is an Appetition to the Election of one, but not more of this than of that. The third Kind of Indifferents are those which are neither good nor Ill, expetible nor avoidable, conducing neither to Happiness nor Unhappiness. In this Sense all Things are called indifferent, which are betwixt Virtue and Vice, as Health, Wealth, Strength, Glory, and the like; for we may be happy without these, tho' their Use hath some Relation to Happiness, their Abuse to Unhappiness. In this Sense whatsoever we may sometimes use well, other Times ill, is indifferent, which Kind appertaineth chiefly to Ethick.

^r Again, of Indifferents some are *Natural*, and move Appetite, as Health, Strength, Soundness of Sense, and the like; some *Præternatural*, which move Aversion, as Sickness, Infirmitie, and the like; some *Neuter*, which move neither Appetite nor Aversion, as the Constitution of the Soul and Body, one capable of receiving Phantasies, the other Wounds.

Of natural and præternatural Indifferents, some are *primary*, others by *Participation*. *Primary* natural Indifferents are Motions or Affections convenient with Reason, as Health and Strength. *Participant* are those by which that Motion or Affection is communicated, as a healthful Body, sound Sense. *Præternatural* Indifferents are the contrary to these.

C H A P. XII.

Of Estimation.

Estimation, *αἴμα*, is a certain Concurrence with convenient Life, ^a which concerns all good. Estimation ^b is twofold; on ^c, a mediate Power or

^a Cic. de fin. 3. 15. ^o Laert. 7. 104. ^p Cic. de fin. 3. ^q Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. hyp. 3. 22. whence supply Lactius and Seneca. ^r Stob. Eccl. Phys. 4. 40. ^s Laert. 7. 105. ^t Stob. *ibid.*

Use concurring with Life according to Nature; such we call Health or Wealth, as far as they conduce to Life, according to Nature. The other is the Valuation of the Estimator, imposed by him who is skilful in such Things.

Again, *Estimation* is taken three Ways: First, for absolute *Donation*: Secondly, for *Return of Appreciation*: Thirdly, as *Antipater* calls it, *Election*, by which, when some Things are proposed, we rather choose these than those; as Health before Sickness, Life before Death, and Riches before Poverty. In like Manner, *Disestimation* is taken three Ways, the Terms only changed to the contrary. *Donation*, according to *Diogenes*, is a Judgment that a Thing is according to Nature, or consertheth Use thereto. *Appreciation* is in Man, not in Things. *Election* only in the good, not the Indifferent.

Hence followeth another Distinction of Indifferents, whereof some are *preferred*, some *rejected*, some *neither preferred nor rejected*. *Preferred* are those, which tho' they are Indifferents, have nevertheless a sufficient Reason why they are to be had in Estimation, as Health, Soundness of Sense, Exemption from Grief, Glory, and the like. *Rejected* are those, which are not worthy any Estimation, as Poverty, Sickness, and the like. *Neuter* are those which are neither preferred nor rejected, as to extend or contract the Finger.

These Terms preferred, *προηγμενον*, and rejected, *αποπροηγμενον*, were invented by *Zeno*, upon this Ground; * as when we speak of the Court, no Man saith, the King himself is preferred to Dignity, but those who are in some Honour, next and second to him in Rank; so when we speak of Life, we call not those Things which are in the first Place, the preferred or promoted, but those which are in the second; and so likewise in the rejected. Now so much as Good hath the first Place, it follows, that what is preferred, is neither Good nor Ill. No Good is reckoned amongst the Preferred, because that hath the greatest Estimation; but the Preferred having the second Estimation, approacheth somewhat to the Nature of Good. It is called *Preferred*, not that it conduceth to Beatitude, but in respect of the Rejected. We define it thus: *An Indifferent with mean Estimation*; for it could not be, that nothing should be left in mean Things, that is according to, or contrary to Nature, neither being left, that nothing should be placed in them, which is sufficiently estimable, this being granted, that there is not something preferred. Rightly therefore this Distinction is made, and may more fully be explained by this Simily. As if we should suppose our ultimate End to be so to cast the Die that it may chance right, the Die that shall be so cast as to fall right, must have something preposed and pre-

ferred towards its End; and on the other Side the contrary; yet the Proposition of the Die nothing conduceth to that End; so those which are preferred, relate indeed to the End, but nothing pertain to the Power and Nature thereof.

Of the *Preferred*, some are in the *Soul*, as Ingenuity, Art, Progression, and the like; some in the *Body*, as Life, Health, Strength, Ability, Soundness, Beauty; some *external*, as Riches, Honour, Nobility, and the like.

In like Manner, of the *Rejected*, some are in the *Soul*, as Habitude, Ignorance; some in the *Body*, as Death, Sickness, Infirmitie, Maim, Deformity. Some *external*, as Poverty, Dishonour and Meanings.

Likewise of the *Neuter*, some are in the *Soul*, as Imagination, Assent; some in the *Body*, as Whiteness, Blackness; some *external*, which having no Estimation or Use, are of little Value.

Those which are preferred in the *Soul*, conduce more to living according to Nature, and are of more Worth than those of the *Body*, or the *External*, as to have a good Disposition of Mind is better than to have a good Disposition of Body.

Again, of the *Preferred*, some are preferred for themselves, as Ingenuity, Countenance, State, Notion, and the like; some for others, because they effect something, as Riches and Nobility; some both for themselves and others, as Health, Strength, Soundness, Ability; for themselves, as being according to Nature; for others, as affording no small Benefit.

* As concerning *Reputation*, *ἰνδοξία*, *Chrysippus* and *Diogenes* affirm, that being separated from Utility, we should not so much as stretch out our Finger for it. But those who followed them, not able to withstand *Carnades*, affirmed Reputation to be preferred for itself, and that it was proper for an ingenious Man, freely educated, to desire to be well spoken of by his Parents, Kindred, and good Men, and that for the Thing itself, not for the Use thereof; adding, that as we provide for Children, tho' to be born after our Death; so we must provide for future Reputation after Death, even for its own Sake, separated from all Use.

In like manner of the *Rejected*, some are rejected for themselves, some for others, some both for themselves and others, which appears by the Rule of Contraries.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Actions and Offices.

OF those *Actions* which proceed from Appetite, some are *Offices*, some *præter Offices*, some *Neuter*.

* *Office* is that which is preferred, and hath a

good Reason for the doing thereof, as being convenient to Life; or, as others, Office is whatsoever Reason requireth to be done, as to honour our Brethren, Parents, Country, to relieve our Friends. Zeno first gave it this Name, τὸ καθῆκον, *Office*, ἀπὸ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν. It is an Action conformable to the Dictates of Nature, and extends even to Plants, and irrational living Creatures, for Offices may even be observed in those.

Præter Office is an Action which Reason acquireth that we do not, as, to neglect our Parents, to contemn our Brethren, to disagree with our Friends, to despise our Country, and the like.

Neither are those Actions which Reason neither requireth nor forbiddeth, as the taking up of a Straw.

* Of *Offices*, some are *perfect*, called καλοπαιήματα, *Reſtitutes*, Actions done according to Virtue; as, to do wisely, to do juſtly; others *Not-reſtitutes*, Actions which have not a perfect Office, but a mediate; as to marry, to go an Embaſſy, to diſcouſe, and the like.

Of *Reſtitutes*, some are in *Things requiſite*, others not: Of the firſt Kind are to be wife, temperate, and the like: Of the ſecond thoſe which are not requiſite to the being ſuch. In like manner are *Præter-offices*.

Again, of *Offices*, some are *ordinary*, as, to have a Care of ourſelves, of our Limbs, and the like: Some *extraordinary*, as, to maintain ourſelves, throw away our Goods. Accordingly it is of *Præter-offices*.

Again, of *Offices*, some are *continual*, as, to live virtuously; ſome *intermiſſive*, as, to queſtion, answer, walk, and the like. Accordingly it is of *Præter-offices*.

* Office is a mean Thing, placed neither amongſt the good, nor their Contraries; for, there is ſomething in this approveable, ſo as a right Reason may be given for it, as done approveably. That which is ſo done is *Office*. And forasmuch as in thoſe Things which are neither Virtues nor Vices, there is ſomething which may be of Uſe, it is not to be taken away. Again, it is manifeſt, that a wiſe Man doth ſomething in theſe mean Things, he therefore, when he doth it, judgeth that it is his Office ſo to do; but a wiſe Man is never deceived in Judgment, therefore there is an Office in mean Things. Again, we ſee there is ſomething which we call a Thing rightly done, or Reſtitute, but that is a perfect Office; therefore there is an inchoate Office; as, if it be a Reſtitute juſtly to reſtore a *Depoſitum*, to reſtore a *Depoſitum* muſt be a ſimple Office. The Addition of *juſtly* makes it Reſtitute, the ſimple Reſtitution without the additional Term, is an Office.

* And ſince it is not to be doubted, but that in mean Things, ſome are to be performed, others rejected, whatſoever is done in that Manner, is comprehended in common Office; whence it is manifeſt, that all Men by Nature loving themſelves, as well the Fooliſh as the Wiſe, will take thoſe Things which are according to Nature, and reject the contrary. This is therefore one common Office of the Wiſe and Unwiſe, converſant in mean Things.

All Offices proceeding from theſe, it is juſtly ſaid, that to thoſe are referred all our Thoughts, even the forſaking of Life, or continuing in it. In whom moſt Things are according to Nature, the Office of that Perſon is to remain in Life; in whom there are, or are foreſeen to be more Things contrary to Nature, his Offices is to forſake Life, altho' he be happy, and of a Fool to continue in Life, altho' he be miſerable; for that Good, and that Ill, as we have often ſaid, are Things that follow afterwards. The firſt Principles of natural Appetite fall under the Judgment and Election of a wiſe Man, and is, as it were, the Matter ſubjected to Wiſdom. Thus the Reason of continuing Life, or forſaking it, is to be meaſured by all thoſe Things we mentioned. For, neither are they who enjoy Virtue, obliged to continue in Life, nor they who live without Virtue to die; and it is often the Office of a wiſe Man to part with his Life, even when he is moſt happy, if it may be done opportunitly, which is to live conveniently to Nature. This they hold, That to live happily, depends on Opportunity; for Wiſdom commandeth, that a wiſe Man, if it be required, ſhould part with his Life. Wherefore, Vice having not Power to bring a Cauſe of voluntary Death, it is manifeſt that the Office even of Fools, who are likewiſe wretched, is to continue in Life, if they are in the greater Part of thoſe Things, which we hold to be according to Nature. And forasmuch as going out of Life, and continuing in it, be alike miſerable, neither doth Continuance make his Life more to be avoided; we ſay not therefore without Cauſe, that they who enjoy moſt Naturals ſhould continue in Life.

Hitherto it appertains to know, that the Love of Parents towards their Children is the Effect of Nature, from which Beginning we may tract all Mankind, as proceeding from thence. Firſt, by the Figure and Parts of the Body, which declare, that Nature carefully provided for Procreation. Neither can theſe two agree, that Nature orders Procreation, and takes no Care that thoſe which are procreated ſhould be loved; for even in Beaſts the Power of Nature may be ſeen, whoſe Care, when we behold in bringing up of their young, methinks

we hear the very Voice of Nature herself. Wherefore as it is manifest that we abhor Pain by Nature, so it is likewise apparent, that we are driven by Nature to love those we have begotten.

Hence ariseth a common natural Commendation of Men amongst Men, that it behoveth a Man not to seem alienate from Man, for this very Reason, because he is Man. For, as among the Parts of the Body, some are made only for themselves, as the Eyes and Ears; others assist towards the Use of other Parts, as the Thighs and Hands; so, tho' some huge Beasts are born only for themselves; yet, that Shell-Fish, which is called *Patula prima*, and the *Pinnoteret*, so named from keeping its Shell, which shutteth itself up so close, as if it taught others to look to themselves; as also Ants, Bees, Storks, do something for the Sake of others. Much nearer is the Conjunction of Mankind; so that we are inclined by Nature to Conventions, Councils, Cities.

Whatsoever is produced upon the Earth, is created for the Use of Man; but Men are generated for Men that they may profit one another. In this we ought to follow Nature our Leader, and to bring forth common Benefit to the publick by mutual Offices, by Giving, by Receiving, by Arts, by Endeavours, and by Faculties, to unite the Society of Man with Man.

The World is governed by the Power of God; it is, as it were, a common City of Men and Gods, and each of us is a Part of the World; whence it followeth by Nature, that we should prefer the common Benefit before our own. For as Laws prefer the Safety of the general before that of any particular; so a good and wise Man, conformable to Law, not ignorant of Civil Office, taketh more Care for the Benefit of the general, than of any particular, or of his own. Nor is he who betrays his Country more to be condemned, than he who deferts the common Benefit or Safety. Whence it followeth, that he is to be commended who undergoeth Death for the Commonwealth, and teacheth us, that our Country is dearer to us than ourselves. And because that Speech is esteemed inhumane and wicked, of those who affirm, They care not when they are dead, if all the Earth were set on Fire; it is certainly true, that we are likewise to provide for those who shall hereafter be, even for their own Sake. From this Affection of the Soul, whence proceed Wills and Commendations of dying Persons, as also, so far as no Man will live solitary in a Desert, even with the greatest Abundance or Plenty; it is easily understood that we are born for Conjunction, Congregation, or natural Community; we are impelled by Nature to benefit others the most that we can. All these are Offices, chief-

ly by teaching and communicating the Reasons of Prudence, so that it is not easy to find one, who will not communicate to some other what he knoweth himself. Thus we are not only inclined to learn, but also to teach. And as it is given to Bulls by Nature, to fight even with Lions, for their Heifers, with great Force and Impetuosity; so they who abound in Wealth, and are able to do it (as is related of *Hercules* and *Bacchus*) are incited by Nature to preserve Mankind. Likewise, when *Jupiter* is styled *Optimus* and *Maximus*, *Salutarius*, *Hospitalis*, *Stator*, we hereby express that the Safety of Mankind is under his Tutition. But we cannot expect, if we ourselves are vile, abject, and neglected amongst ourselves, that we should be dear to the immortal Gods, and loved of them. As therefore we make Use of our Limbs, before that we have learned for what Cause of Utility we have them, so are we conjoined and confociated amongst ourselves by Nature to civil Community, which, if it were otherwise, neither would there be any Room for Justice or Goodness.

Yet tho' there are mutual Chains betwixt Man and Man, Man hath no common Right with Beasts, [*by Reason of our Dissimilitude, as both Chrysippus and Possidonius affirm*] for all other Things, such *Chrysippus*, were made for Men and the Gods, but they for Community and Society one with another; so that Men may make Use of Beasts for their Benefit, without doing any Wrong.

Moreover, since the Nature of Man is such, that there is a certain civil Right betwixt him and all Mankind, he who preserveth that Right is just; who transgresseth it, unjust. But as in a Theatre, tho' it be common, that Room which a Man possesseth is justly said to be his Place; so this civil Right in a City and the World, doth not repugn to the Propriety of particular Persons.

In order to the Conservation of all Society, Conjunction, and Dearthness betwixt Man and Man, Emoluments and Detriments, *ἀγαθὰ καὶ βλάβαινα*, which benefit or hurt, must be common amongst them, and not only common but equal. Convenients and Inconvenients, *ὀφελήματα*, and *ἀνενόηματα* must be common, but not equal. Those which benefit or hurt, are either good or ill, and therefore must necessarily be equal; Convenient and Inconvenient are ranked amongst the Preferred and Rejected, and therefore cannot be equal. Emoluments and Detriments are common, but Rectitudes and Sins not common.

Herein Friendship is requisite, as being one of those Things which benefit. Some affirm, that a good Man ought to be as much concerned for his Friend as for himself; others, that every Man ought to be most concerned for himself. Yet these

latter confels, that it is contrary to Justice, whereunto we are born, to take away any Thing from another, and assume it to ourselves.

Neither can Friendship be contracted, nor Justice performed for private Respects and Advantages, for then these Advantages might overthrow and pervert them. But neither could Justice or Friendship be at all, unless they were expetible in themselves. Justice is by Nature; it is contrary to a wife Man, not only to do an Injury, but even to hurt. Neither can it be right to injure those who are our Friends, or have deserved well of us; Equity cannot be separated from Utility; whatsoever is equal and just, is likewise honest; and reciprocally, whatsoever is honest, is equal and just.

Panaetius, who discoursed most accurately of Offices, propoeth three Kinds wherein Men use to deliberate or consult of Offices. First, when they doubt whether that of which the Question is, be honest or dishonest. Secondly, whether it be Profitable or Unprofitable. Thirdly, if that which hath the Shew of Honesty be repugnant to that which seems profitable.

* Next the Gods, we are to reverence our Parents and Brabren. ^b As concerning the Burial of Parents, *Chrysippus* saith, it ought to be done in the most simple manner; for the Body, as the Nails, Teeth, or Hair thereof, nothing pertaineth to us, and therefore ought not to be used with any Curiosity or Respect. Flesh, if it be useful, ought to be converted into Aliment (tho' it were a part of our own Body, as the Foot) as is proper to it; if useless, put under Ground, or thrown into some remote Place, without more Respect than we have of our Nails or Hair when cut off.

¹ Concerning the Office of the Buyer and the Seller, *Diogenes the Babylonian*, and *Antipater* his Disciple differ. *Antipater* holds, that all must be laid open, that the Buyer be not ignorant of any thing that the Seller knoweth. *Diogenes*, that the Seller, as far as is appointed by Civil Law, ought only to tell the Faults, and conceal the rest, for as much as he in selling desireth to sell to his best Advantage.

Hecaton, in his sixth Book of Offices, is full of these Questions, as, *Whether a good Man in a Dearth may give over House-keeping*. He disputes it on both sides, but concludes, that the Office is directed rather by Profit than Humanity.

He questioneth, *Whether if at Sea a Ship be to be distributed by the Casting out of something, we should rather cast over Board a Horse of great Price, or a Slave worth little*. In this Case, private Interest leads one Way, Humanity another.

If a Fool in a Shipwreck catch hold of a Plank, may a wife Man wrest it from him, if he can? He

saith, he may not, for it is injurious. What may the Master of the Ship? May not he take his own? No; no more than he may throw a Passenger out of the Ship, because it is his own, into the Sea; for until they come to the Place to which they are bound, the Ship is not the Master's, but the Passengers.

What if two Shipwreck'd Persons light upon one Plank, and both pluck at it, should one give it over to the other? Yes; but to him, who, it is more expedient, should live, either for his own Sake, or the Commonwealth. But, what if these be alike in both? There will be no Contention, but either as it were by Lot, or Mication with the Fingers (*giuoco della mora*) one will give place to the other.

What if a Father rob Temples, undermine the Publick Treasury, should the Son reveal it to the Magistrates? It were a great Wickedness. On the contrary, he ought to defend his Father, if he be call'd in question. But, is not our Country before all Offices? Yes; but it is for the Good of our Country to have Citizens pious to their Parents.

What if a Father should aim at Possession of the Tyranny, or endeavour to betray his Country, shall the Son keep his Counsel? He shall beseech him not to do it. If that prevail not, he shall accuse him, yea, threaten; and lastly, if the Matter shall tend to the Destruction of the Country, he shall prefer the Safety of the Country before that of his Father.

If a wife Man receive counterfeit Money for good, if afterwards he know it to be counterfeit Money, may he pay it where he owes any thing, for good? *Diogenes* saith, he may; *Antipater*, that he may not.

If a Man sell Wine that will not last, and know it to be such, ought he to declare it or no? *Diogenes* thinks he is not obliged, *Antipater* conceives a good Man must. These are, as it were, Cases of Controversy amongst the Stoicks.

C H A P. XIV.

Of Præter-Offices.

AS^k every perfect Office in a rational Creature is a Requitute, and always compleat in all Numbers; so every Præter-Office in a rational Creature is a Sin. A Sin is that which is done contrary to right Reason, or in which something of Office is omitted by a rational Creature. ¹ A good Deed is the Command of the Law; Sin the Prohibition of the Law. Hence it is, that the Law forbiddeth Fools and Madmen many Things, but prescribeth them nothing, because they are not capable of doing any thing well.

^m All Sins are Impiety, as being a Refitting of the Will of the Gods. The Gods love Virtue and

^f Cit. Off. lib. 1. and again, lib. 3.
^g Laert. ^h Sect. Empir. Pyrr. hypot. 3. 25.
ⁱ Plat. de repugn. Stob.

^g Laert.

^h Sect. Empir. Pyrr. hypot. 3. 25.

ⁱ Cit. de Off. lib. 3.

^k Stob.

its Works; they hate Vice and its Works. Every Sin therefore displeaseth them, and consequently is Impiety.

^a All Sins are equal (so *Chrysippus* in the First of his *Moral Questions*, and *Perseus*, and *Zeno*) tho' not alike, for they flow from one Fountain, as it were, of Vice, and the Judgment is the same in all, but by the external Object by which the Judgment is made, they are render'd unlike: That they are equal, is evident from this: If there be not one Truth more Truth than another, nor one Falshood more Falshood than another, neither is one Deceit more Deceit than another, nor one Sin more Sin than another. He who is distant from *Canobus* a hundred Furlongs, and he who is distant but one Furlong, are both alike not at *Canobus*; so he who sins more, and he who less, are both alike not in the right Way.

Yet, tho' Sins are equal, there are some Differences in them, so far as some proceed from an obdurate incurable Affection, others from an Affection not obdurate nor incurable. And tho' every Lye is equally a Lie, yet all Men do not lye equally; but every Sin is equally Sin; for every Sin consisteth in Lying. Thus *Chrysippus*, *Perseus*, and *Zeno*. But *Heraclides* of *Tarsis*, friend to *Antipater*, and *Athenodorus*, hold, that Sins are unequal.

C H A P. XV.

Of wise or virtuous Persons Paradoxes.

THERE are (according to *Zeno*) two kinds of Men, the Wise or Virtuous, and the Vicious. The Wise make use of Virtue thro' the whole Course of their Life, the Vicious of Vice.

^a Of the Wise there are two sorts, one in Perfection, consummate; the other in Progression, precedent. Of the First are these following Paradoxes to be understood? ^b not that the *Stoicks* positively affirm there ever was such a one in Nature, (for *Zeno*, *Cleanthes*, and *Chrysippus*, were great and venerable Persons, yet did not attain the Height of human Nature) but that such a one might possibly be.

^c *A wise Man is void of Passion*; for he cannot fall. There is another kind of Person void of Passion likewise, a wicked Man that is obdurate and inflexible.

^d *A wise Man is void of Pride*; Honour and Dishonour are alike to him. There is another kind of Person void of Pride, a wicked Man, equally inclinable to Dishonour as to Honour.

^e *A wise Man is austere*; for he neither speaketh for Complaisance, nor admitteth any thing spoken in that kind. There is another sort of austere Persons, which resemble four Wine, not fit for Drinking, but for Medicines only.

^f *A wise Man is sincere*; for he taketh Care that he be not thought better than he is, by reason of some specious Show, and withal to express whatever Good he hath, without any rhetorical Gloss.

^g *A wise Man is not pragmatical*; for he declines the doing of any Thing that is beyond his Office.

^h *A wise Man is never drunk*, altho' he drink Wine; for he never sinneth, but doth all Things according to Virtue.

ⁱ *A wise Man is never mad*; yet sometimes strange Phantasies may occur to him thro' Melancholy or Delirium, not according to the Reason of Eligibles, but præternatural.

^j *A wise Man is never grieved*; for Grief, according to *Apollodorus*, is an irrational Contraction of the Soul.

^k *A wise Man is divine*; for he hath God with himself; but a wicked Man is an Atheist. An Atheist is taken two Ways; for him who is an Enemy to the Gods, and for him who believeth there are no Gods; which all wicked Men do not.

^l A wicked Man is impious, because he doth all Things according to Vice, as the Good according to Virtue; and he who hath one Vice, hath all. He is an Enemy to the Gods, for Enmity is the Discord of Life, as Amity is the Concord. The Wicked differs from the Gods in his Course of Life, and therefore is an Enemy to them, for they account all their Enemies who are contrary to them. The Wicked are contrary to the Good. God is good, therefore the Wicked are Enemies to God.

^m *A wise Man is religious*; for he is skillful in all Divine Rites. Religion is the Science of Divine Worship. He sacrificeth to the Gods, and is pure, detesting all Sin, holy and just in Divine Things.

ⁿ *A wise Man only is a Priest*, skillful in Sacrifices, Business of the Temple, Expiations, and other Things proper to the Gods.

^o *A wise Man is a Prophet*, endued with the Science of those Signs which are communicated by Gods or Demons which belong to human Life. In him therefore are all Kinds of Vaticination, as well by Dreams, Birds, and other Things.

^p *A wise Man reverenceth and loveth his Parents and Brethren, next the Gods*. He hath likewise an innate Love of his Children, which the Vicious hath not.

^q *A wise Man ought to apply himself to some Office in the Commonwealth* (according to *Chrysippus*) unless otherwise diverted; for he will encourage Virtue and suppress Vice, especially in those Commonwealths which are far from Perfection. He ought to make Laws, instruct Men, prescribe Rules. To which is opposite, Study of Popularity, specious Deceit, Prescription of Things unprofitable, which are not competent to a wise Man.

^a Plut. de repugn. Stoic. ^b Senec. Ep. 72. Acad. Quæst. ^c Laert. lib. 2. c. 1. ^d Plut. de repugn. Stoic. citing *Chrysippus*.

^e Cic. 4. Laert. 7. 217.

^f Quintill. lib. 12.

^g Laert. lib. 2.

* *A wife Man ought to marry* (as *Zeno* in his *Commonwealths*) that he may have Children.

A wife Man doth not opine or think, but believe or know, for he never assents to any Falsity. Ignorance is an infirm Assent; he thinks all firmly. There are two Kinds of Opinion, one an Assent to Things not comprehended, the other a weak Belief; neither of these are in a wife Man, for he never assents without Comprehension, and then always firmly; for nothing is hidden from him, otherwise he might have a false Opinion. Therefore he is never diffident. Faith is proper to a wife Man, for it is a firm Existimation. A Science is a firm Habit, therefore a wicked Man doth neither know nor believe.

A wife Man must imitate the Cynicks; for Cynicism is the nearest Way for Virtue, as *Apollodorus* in his *Ethick*. Others say, a wife Man ought to continue in that Sect, if he have been thereof; but if he have not, not to enter into it.

A wife Man may, upon Occasion, eat Man's Flesh. Of this already among the *Offices*.

A wife Man is only free, the Wicked are Slaves; for Liberty is the Power of doing according to our own Judgment. There is another kind of Servitude which consisteth in Subjection, a Third in being possessed and subjected, to which is opposed vicious Domination.

A wife Man is only a King; for Monarchy is a Principality subordinate to none, which only consists in the Wife, as *Chrysippus* in his *Treatise*. That *Zeno* used Words properly. For (saith he) a Prince must know both good and bad, which none of the Wicked knoweth. Dominion and the kinds thereof, Monarchy, Magistracy, Generalship, Admiralty, and the like, are only proper to a wife Man; therefore the Wife only command, tho' not actually, yet potentially.

A wife Man is only proper to be a Magistrate, Judge, and Orator; but not any of the Wicked.

A wife Man is void of Sin; for he cannot fall into Error.

A wife Man is innocent, and uninjurious; for he cannot hurt either himself or others, nor receive, nor do any Injury; for Injury is a hurtful Injustice, which is not competent to a wife Man, altho' he may be unjustly assaulted; for he having within himself all Good and Virtue, is not capable of Vice or Harm.

A wife Man is not merciful, nor pardons any, remitting nothing of the Punishments inflicted by Law, as knowing them to be proportioned to, not exceeding the Offence; and that whosoever sinneth sinneth out of his own Wickedness. A wife Man therefore is not benign; for he who is benign, mitigates the Rigour of Justice, and conceives the Punishments inflicted by Law to be greater than

they ought; but a wife Man knoweth the Law to be good, or a right Reason, commanding what is to be done, and what not.

A wife Man nothing wonders at those Things which seem paradoxal, as *Charon's Cave*, the Ebbing and Flowing of the Sea, and hot Springs, and Ebullitions of Fire.

A wife Man will not live in a Desert; for he is communicative by Nature, and practick, and will undertake Exercise to strengthen his Body.

A wife Man will pray, requesting good Things of the Gods, as *Pollidonius* affirms, in his First of *Offices*, and *Hecaton* in his Thirtieth of *Paradoxes*.

A wife Man only is a Friend: Friendship is only amongst the Wise, for in them only is an Unanimity as to Things that concern Life and Community, so as our Friends may make Use of them as freely as we ourselves. Unanimity is the Science of common Good. A Friend is expetible in himself. Plenty of Friends is a Good; but amongst the Wicked there is no Friendship; for Friendship being real and not feigned, it is impossible it should consist without Faith and Constancy: But in the Wicked there is Infidelity, and Inconstancy, and Hostility, and therefore not Friendship, but some external Connexions, whereby Necessity or Opinion ties them together.

A wife Man doth all Things well; as we say, *all Pipes play the Iliacian Tune well*. He doth all Things wisely, temperately, prudently, modestly, and according to the other Virtues, throughout the whole Course of his Life. A wicked Man doth all amiss, sinning in the whole Course of his Life, inconstant by Nature, often grieved by his own ill Actions, wretched and troubled, so far as he is vexed at the Thing done, so much is he angry at himself for being the Author of it.

* *A wife Man loveth* (virtuously) *those whose Beauty express their inward Virtue*. Thus *Zeno*, *Chrysippus*, and *Apollodorus* affirm: For Love is an Impulsion of Benevolence, raised from Beauty, which Love is not of Conjunction, but of Friendship. For this Reason, *Zeno*, tho' he were in Love with *Thrasymides*, a young Woman that was in his Power, yet suppress'd his Affection because the was averse from him. This *Chrysippus* calls the Love of Friendship; it is no way discommendable, for Beauty is the Flower of Virtue.

A wife Man upon Occasion will die voluntarily for his Country and Friends; or, in case he be seized by some excessive Pain, Loss of his Senses, or incurable Diseases.

A wife Man is μύστης, for he compasseth that which is propoed; ἀνέστη for he is every way augmented; ὑψιπαιδης for he hath attained the just Height of Wisdom; ἀνίκητος for he is invincible, and insuperable. The Wicked are the contrary.

A wife Man profiteth the Wife, and is mutually profited by all the Wife, tho' not Friends or Acquaintance; for betwixt them there is a Concord and Community of Goods; and he who benefiteth another, benefiteth likewise himself. A wicked Man neither conferreth nor receiveth Benefits; for one is to move towards Virtue, the other is to be moved towards Virtue.

A wife Man is a good Oeconomist, skilful to acquire Wealth. Oeconomist is a Habit active, and contemplative in the Business of a Family; Oeconomy is the ordering of Expences, Works and Possessions; the Science of Acquisition is a Reason whereby Wealth is attained, which some account in Indifferents, others in Good. But no wicked Man is a good Oeconomist, since only a wife Man knoweth from whence, how, and how far Gain may be acquired.

*A wife Man only is perfect, for he wanteth no Virtue; a wicked Man is imperfect, for he hath no Virtue. Therefore the Wife are always happy, the Wicked miserable; which Happiness, according to *Chrysippus*, differs nothing from that of God, nor is less expetible. The Wicked partake of no Good, because Virtue, and that which partakes thereof, is good, and those Things which are convenient and requisite, are proper only to the Wife, as the Contraries to the Wicked.*

A wife Man is only rich; for Good is true Riches, and ill true Poverty; a wicked Man is poor, not having the Means to become rich.

A wife Man is only obedient; the Wicked can neither obey nor command.

A wife Man only is honourable; for Honour is the Reward of Virtue; the Wicked wanting this, are justly dishonourable.

*A wife Man is only ingenuous and noble, according to some of the Stoicks; but others deny it, referring these not to Nature, but Institution only, according to the Proverb, *Custom is a second Nature*. So that Ingenuity is an Habit of Nature or Institution, apt to Virtue; Nobility is a Habit of Decent or Institution, apt to Virtue.*

A wife Man is pleasing, persuasive, opportune and sincere; for he is expert in every Thing, affable in Conversation, and helpful to the Publick. The Wicked are the contrary.

A wife Man is the best Physician; for he hath considered his Constitution, and those Things which are requisite for his Health.

A wife Man may lawfully part with his Life, the Wicked cannot, because in their Life they never acquire Virtue, nor eschew Vice. But Life and Death are limited by Offices, and their Contraries.

A wife Man will accept of Empire, and cohabit with Princes; but not unless he perceive it may be done without Danger, and to much Advantage.

A wife Man never lieth; for he who speaketh a Falshood is not properly said to lie, unless it be with Intent to deceive. A Lie may be used many Ways without Assent, as in War against Enemies, or in the like Necessity.

A wife Man neither deceiveth nor is deceived; for he never sinneth, he useth not his Sight, Hearing, or any other Sense ill. He is not suspicious, nor repenteth, for both these are proper to fallacious Assent. He can no Way be changed, or err, or opinionate.

A wife Man only (tho' not all wife Men) is happy in Children, in old Age, and in Death.

A wife Man doth nothing contrary to his Appetite; for all such Things are done with a Privation, and nothing adverse unforeseen happeneth to him. But in the primitive Time, there was some wife Man that did not desire or will any Thing, because that those Things which were then present, were not sufficient to be required by him.

A wife Man is meek; for Meekness is a Habit whereby Things are done meekly, not breaking forth into Anger.

A wife Man is peaceful and modest; Modesty is the Science of decent Motion; Tranquillity the Order of natural Motions. The contrary to these are seen in the Wicked.

A wife Man is free from all Calumny; he calumniates none, and is not calumniated by any; for Calumny is a lying Imputation of feigned Friends, to which the Wife are not liable, for they are true Friends; the Wicked are, for they are feigned.

*A wife Man delayeth nothing; for Delay is an Omission of Office through Slothfulness, of which *Hesiod*,*

*Nothing deser a Year, a Month, a Day,
He fights against himself that doth delay.*

A wife Man can only incite and be incited to Virtue, a Fool cannot; for he neglecteth Precepts, and goeth no further than the Words, not proceeding to Action. A wicked Man is not desirous to hear or learn, as not being capable, by Reason of his Imprudence, of what is rightly said; whence it followeth, that he can neither be incited nor incite to Virtue. He that is capable to be incited, or to incite, must be prepared by Philosophy, which is not competent to a wicked Man; for he who diligently heareth Philosophers, is not prepared to Philosophy, but he who expresseth their Doctrine in their Life and Actions. This no wicked Man can do, for he is prepossessed by Vice. If he should be incited, Vice would pull him back; but none that is vicious is incited to Virtue, as none sick to Health.

Every wicked Man is an Exile, wanting Law and Country, for both these are good. That a City or Country is good, *Cleanthes* proveth thus. If there be a Habitation, where those who fly for Succour, find Justice, it is good; but a City is such a Habitation, therefore a City is good. A City is taken three Ways; for a Habitation, for a Convention of Men, and for both. In the two latter Significations it is called Good.

Every wicked Man is rustick; for Rusticity is Ignorance of Laws and civil Manners. A wicked Man refuseth to live according to Law, and is hurtful as a savage Beast.

A wicked Man is tyrannical, cruel, violent, and injurious, whensoever he gets an Occasion.

A wicked Man is ungrateful, not obliging nor requiring; for he doth nothing by Friendship.

A wicked Man is not perseverant; for Perseverance is the Science of obtaining our Purpose, not being deterred by Labour.

A wicked Man is not capable of the Right of Donation. Donation is the good bestowing of Estimation, but nothing that is good is competent to the Wicked.

Every wicked Man is delighted with his Wickedness, which we may perceive not so much by his Discourse as Actions, which shews that he is carried on to Wickedness.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE STOICKS.

The THIRD PART.

CHAPTER I.

Physick and the Parts thereof.

Phyſick is divided into theſe Places; of *Bodies, of Principles, of Elements, of Gods, of Place, of Vacuum*: Thus eſpecially; but generally into three Places; *of the World, of Elements, Atitick of Cauſes.*

That concerning the *World*, is divided into two Parts; whereof one Contemplation is common alſo to the Mathematicks, concerning fixed Stars and Planets; as whether the Sun be of the ſame Magnitude as he appears to be, and whether the Moon be ſo likewiſe; of their Periods, and the like: The other, Contemplation, proper only to Phyſick, to enquire into the Eſſence of theſe; whether the Sun and Stars conſiſt of Matter and Form; whether generate or ingenerate, whether animate or inanimate, whether corruptible or incorruptible, whether governed by Providence, or the like.

The Place concerning *Cauſes*, is likewiſe twofold; whereof one, Contemplation, is common alſo to the Medicinal Diſquiſitions, whereby they enquire concerning the principal Part of the Soul, and thoſe Things which are produced in the Soul and Seed, and the like. The other is likewiſe uſurped by the Mathematicks, as, in what Manner we ſee, what is the Cauſe of the viſual Phantaſy? How are made Clouds, Thunder, Rainbows, Halos, Comets, and the like?

CHAPTER II.

Of Bodies.

Natural Philoſophy brancheth into two Parts, of Corporeals and Incorporeals.

A Body is that which doth or ſuffereth; it is the Senſe with Eſſence or Subſtance, and finite: Whatſoever is, is a Body, for whatſoever is, either doth or ſuffereth.

Principles are Bodies void of Form.

Elements are Bodies endued with Form.

Cauſes are corporeal, becauſe they are Spirits.

Qualities are corporeal, for they are Spirits, and aſerial Intentions, which affect the Parts of all Things, generated with Form and Figure.

Virtues, Vices, Arts, Memory, Phantaſies, Affections, Appetitions, Aſſents, are Bodies exiſting in the ſupreme Part of the Soul.

The Soul is a Body, becauſe it maketh uſe to be living Creatures.

Night and Day are Bodies.

Voice is a Body, for it maketh that which is heard; in a Word, whatſoever is, is a Body and a Subject, for the Stoicks take away intellectual Subſtances, affirming all Things that are, to be comprehended by Senſe only Differences are not ſubſiſtent.

A ſolid Body (according to *Apollodorus*) is diſviſible three Ways, into Length, Breadth and Depth.

A Superficies is the Term of a Body, or that which hath only Length and Breadth, but no Depth; thus *Poſſidonius*.

A Line is the Term of a Superficies, or a Length without Breadth, that which hath Length only.

A Point is the Term of a Line, or the leaſt Mark.

^a Laert. 7. 113.

^b Senec. Epist. 89.

^c Laert. ibid.

^d Plot. cont. Stoic.

^e Laert. ibid.

^f Plot. plac. phil. 1. 113.

^g Plot. cont. Stoic.

^h Plot. cont. Stoic.

ⁱ Tertul. de anima. cap. 6.

^j Sen. Ep. 113.

^k Plot. de plac. 1. 4.

^l Laert. ibid.

^m Orig. philoſ.

ⁿ Laert. 7. 113.

* A Body is divisible into infinite, yet it consisteth not of infinite Bodies.

C H A P. III.

Of Principles.

THE Place concerning Bodies, is divided into two Degrees, into those which produce, and those which are produced; the first Principles, the second Elements.

* Principles and Elements differ: Principles are ingenerate, incorruptible: Elements shall perish by Conflagration. Moreover, Principles are Bodies, and void of Form; Elements have Form.

* There are two Principles of all Things, the Agent, and the Patient: The Patient is a Substance void of Quality, called Matter; the Agent is the Reason which is in the Matter, God.

* Matter is sluggish, a Thing ready for all Things, but will cease if none move it. The Cause, that is, the Reason formeth Matter, and moldeth it which Way he pleaseth, out of which he produceth various Works. There must therefore be something out of which a Thing is made, and also by which it is made. This is the Cause, that Matter. * The Cause or active Reason is God.

* In the Agent there is Power, in the Patient a certain Matter [or Capacity] and in both, both; for Matter itself could not cohere, if it were not kept together by Power, nor that Power without some Matter; for there is nothing, which is not compelled to be somewhere.

* Both these, God and the World, the Artist and his Work, they comprehend within this Term Nature, as if Nature were God mixed through the World. * Sometimes they call that Nature which containeth the World, sometimes that which generateth and produceth Things upon the Earth.

The Agent is, as we said, called the Cause. A Cause, according to Zeno, is that by which there is an Effect, which is not a Cause; or, as Chrysippus, the Reason of the Effect; or, as Possidonius, the first Author of a Thing. A Cause is a Body, a Not-Cause a Categoricalum. It is impossible that the Cause being assigned, the Effect should not be present, which is to be understood thus: The Soul is the Cause through which we live, Prudence the Cause by which we are wise. It is impossible that he who hath a Soul should not live, or he who hath Prudence should not be wise.

C H A P. IV.

Of Matter.

THE Substance of all [* qualitative] Beings, is first Matter, according to Zeno and Chrysippus, in his first of Physics.

* Matter is that of which every Thing is made; it hath two Names, *ύλη*, Substance, and *ύλη*, Matter. Substance is of all Things in general, Matters of Particulars.

* Universal Matter is (according to Zeno) wholly eternal, not admitting, as Chrysippus saith, Increase or Decrease.

* Particular Matter admitteth Augmentation and Diminution^f, (for it remaineth not always the same, but is separated and mixed, so that, according to Chrysippus, its Parts perish by Separation, and exist by mutual Mixture. But those who call Fire, Air, Water and Earth, Matter, assert not a Thing void of Form, but of a Body.

* Matter is a Body, [* and finite.] Possidonius saith, That the Substance and Matter of the Universe is void of Quality and Form, in as much as it hath not a certain Figure and Quality in itself; but it is always seen in some Figure and Quality. But the substantial Nature of the Universe differs from Matter intentionally only.

* Matter is passible; for if it were immutable, Things could not be generated of it. Hence it followeth, that it is divisible into infinite; yet itself, as Chrysippus saith, is not infinite; for nothing that is divisible is infinite, but Matter is continuous.

* Through this Matter, Zeno affirmeth, that the Reason of the World, which some call Fate, is diffused as Seed.

C H A P. V.

Of the World.

OF this Matter was made the World. The World hath several Appellations, *κόσμος*, the World; *τὸ πᾶν*, the All; *τὸ ὅλον*, the Whole; *κοσμοῦς*, World, is taken three Ways: First, for God himself, who is properly qualified with all Essence. Incorruptible and ingenerate, who framed the Universe after a certain Period of Time, who resolved all Nature into himself, and again generated it out of himself. Secondly, for the starry Ornament: And thirdly, that which consists of both.

o Stob. Phys. 17. p Senec. Ep. 89. q Laert. 7. 134. r Laert. 7. 3. x Laert. 7. 148. y Stob. Phys. 1. 16. s Stob. Phys. 13. e Laert. ibid. f Stob. Phys. 14. g ibid. 137. m ibid.

r ibid. s Sen. Ep. 65. t ibid. u Cic. Acad. quest. 16. v Laert. 7. 150. a Stob. Phys. 14. b Laert. ibid. c ibid. d Laert. ibid. e ibid. f Stob. Phys. 14. g Laert. 7.

* *The All, τὸ πᾶν*, is one Way taken, as *Apollodorus* saith, for the World, and another Way for the System of the World; and the Vacuity beyond it. The World is finite, the Vacuity infinite.

* Thus likewise they distinguish betwixt τὸ πᾶν, and τὸ ὅλον: τὸ πᾶν, includeth also an infinite Vacuity, in which the World is: τὸ ὅλον signifies the World without that Vacuity, which neither is increased nor diminished; but its Parts are sometimes extended, sometimes contracted. It began from the Earth as its Centre, for the Centre is the Beginning of a Circle.

* The World is that which is properly qualified with the Essence of all Things; or, as * *Chrysippus* and * *Possidonius* define it, a System of Heaven and Earth, and of the Natures therein contained; or a System of God and Men, and of all Things that were made for them.

* The World was made by God; for if (saith *Chrysippus*) there be any Thing which produceth such Things as Man, tho' endued with Reason, cannot produce, that (doubleless) is greater and stronger, and wiser than Man. But a Man cannot make the Celestial Things; therefore that which made them, transcendeth Man, in Art, Counsel, Prudence and Power, and what can that be but God?

* The World was made for those animate Essences which have the Use of Reason, these are the Gods and Men, than whom nothing is better.

All Things of which it consisteth, and which it produceth within itself, are accommodated to the Use of Man.

The World was made in this Manner; * God in the Beginning being alone by himself, converted all Substance (which according to *Zeno*, was Fire) first into Air, then into Water. And as in the Plant the Seed is contained; so God, who is the prolifick Reason of the World, left such a Seed in the Humidity, as might afford easy and apt Matter for the Generation of those Things that were to be produced.

* *Zeno* addeth, that one Part tending downward, was condensed into Earth, another Part remained pure Water, and partly, being exhal'd, Air, of a Particle of which Air flashed out Fire.

* *Cleanthes* describeth it in this Manner. The Universe being set on Fire, the middle Part thereof first settled downwards, then the next Parts by little and little were quenched. Thus the Universe being wet, the extreme Fire, (the middle Part opposing it) sprang upward, and began the Constitution of the World, and the Revolution of this Constitution shall never end. For as the Parts of every Thing are at certain Times produced of

Seed; so the Parts of the Universe (amongst which are living Creatures and Plants) are produced in their Seasons; and as some Reasons of the Parts are mixed together in the Seed, which being composed, are again dissolved; so of one are all Things made; and again, of one is all compounded by an equal and perpetual Revolution.

* The World is one, of the same corporeal Substance, and of a spherical Figure, for this is of all Figures most apt for Motion. Thus *Zeno*, *Chrysippus*, *Possidonius*, and others.

* The World is seated in an infinite incorporeal Vacuity, which is beyond it, circumscribed about it, into which the World shall be dissolved by Conflagration. The World is finite, the Vacuity infinite; yet * *Possidonius* saith, it is no more than will suffice for the Revolution of the World, when it shall perish. * By this Argument they confute the Motion of Atoms downward, introduced by *Epicurus*; for in that which is infinite, there are no local Differences of high or low.

The World is not heavy, because the whole Fabric thereof consisteth of heavy and light Elements, and being placed in the Midst, whither such Bodies tend, it keepeth its Place.

* In the World there is no Vacuity, but it is completely one, for that necessitates a Conspiration and Harmony betwixt Celestials and Terrestrials.

The World is self-sufficient, because it alone hath all in itself, whereof it standeth in no Need. Of itself it is nourished and augmented, whereas the Parts are transmutated and converted into one another.

The World is a perfect Body; the Parts of the World are not perfect, because they are respective to the whole, and not of themselves. The Universe is by Nature apt to move itself in all Parts, to contain, preserve, and not break, dissolve and burn itself, the Universe sending and moving the same Point, and the Parts thereof having the same Motion from the Nature of the Body. Like it is that this first Motion is naturally proper to all Bodies, namely, to incline towards the Midst of the World, considering the World moveth so in regard of itself; and the Parts likewise, in that they are Parts of the whole.

* The World is a living Creature, rational, animate and intellectual, (so *Chrysippus*, *Apollodorus*, and *Possidonius*) and hath an animate sensible Essence. For a living Creature is more excellent than that which is not a living Creature; but nothing is more excellent than the World, therefore the World is a living Creature. That it is animate is manifest from our Soul, which is a Piece thereof taken out of it. (But *Boethius* denies that

n Laert. 7. 137. o Stob. Phys. cap. 24. p Laert. ibid.
t Cic. de nat. 2. u Laert. de ira dei, cap. 13. v Laert. 7. 141. q Stob. 25. r Laert. ibid. s Laert. de ira dei cap. 20. y Ibid. z Sto.
exp. 7. 140. a Ibid. b Plut. plac. phil. 2. 9. c Ibid. d Plut. contra Stoic. e Laert. ibid. f Plut. contra Stoic.
g Ibid. h Laert. 7. 142.

the World is a living Creature.) ' The Mind or Providence passeth through every Part thereof, as the Soul doth in us, but in some Parts more, in others less; through some permeating, as a Habit, as in the Bones and Nerves; through some as a Mind, as through the principal (Hegemonick) Part. In like manner the whole World is an animate rational Creature, the Hegemonical Part thereof is the *Æther*, as *Antipater the Tyrian*, in his eighth Book of the World. But *Chrysippus* in his first of Providence, and *Possidonius* of the Gods, affirm, that Heaven is the Hegemonick of the World; *Cleanthes*, the Sun. But *Chrysippus* in the same Book (differing from what he said before) affirmeth it to be the purest Part of the *Æther*, which they call the first God, sensibly, because it passeth through all in the Air, and through all living Creatures and Plants, but through the Earth as a Habit.

* The World, according to the greater Part of Stoicks, is corruptible, for it is generated in the same Manner, as Things comprehensible by Sense. Again, if the Parts thereof be corruptible, the Whole is also corruptible; but the Parts of the World are corruptible, for they are daily changed into one another, therefore the Whole itself is corruptible. And again, if any thing admit any change into the Worse, it is corruptible; but the World doth, for it admitteth Exiccation and Inundation; therefore, &c.

' The World shall perish by Fire, caused by the Power of Fire, which is in all Things, which after a long time, consuming all the Moisture, shall resolve all Things into itself. The Moon, Stars and Sun, saith * *Cleanthes*, shall perish, but God shall assimilate all Things to himself, and resolve all into himself. * This Opinion of the general Conflagration of the World, was held by the first and most ancient of this Sect, *Zeno*, *Cleanthes* and *Chrysippus*.

* This First is the Seed of the World; after the Conflagration it diffuseth itself even into the Vacuity that was beyond the World. Afterwards, by Order of the same Reason which made the World, it shall withdraw and contract itself towards the Generation of a new World, yet not be quite extinguished, but so as that some Portion thereof remain, so far as it is the Cause of Motion.

But * *Boethius*, *Possidonius*, and * *Panetius* deny this Conflagration of the World, conceiving rather that the World is eternal, to whom likewise *Diongenes* the *Babylonian* assents.

CHAP. VI. Of Elements.

GOD ' having converted, as we said, all Matter into Moisture, and prepared it for the Generation of future Things, in the next Place produced the four Elements, Fire, Water, Air, and Earth. Of these discourseth *Zeno* in his Book of the Universe, and *Chrysippus* in his First of Physicks, and *Archedemus* of Elements.

* Element is that of which generated Things are first made, and into which they are resolved. The four Elements are Matter or Substance endued with Quality. Fire is hot, Water moist, Air cold, Earth dry; yet not so, but in Air there is part of the same Quality; for in the highest it is Fire, which is called *Æther*, in which is generated the first Sphere of Planets; next Air, then Water, the Basis of all, Earth being placed in the Midst of all.

' Of the Four Elements, two are light, Fire and Air; the other two, Earth and Water, heavy, which properly tend to the Center; but the Center itself is no way heavy.

CHAP. VII. Of Fire.

THE * first Element is that of Fire, which as all Bodies tend to the Middle, inclineth, as much as the Lightness of its Nature permits, to the Centre of the World, by a circular Motion round about it.

* There are (according to *Zeno*) two kinds of Fire; one artificial, requisite to the Use of Life, which converteth Nutriment into itself; the other, inartificial (so * *Cicero* renders ἀνεργαστος) by which all Things grow, and are preserved; ' for whatsoever is nourished and groweth, compriseth within itself the Power of Heat. This Fire is diffused thro' all the Parts of the World, and they are all sustained by it: That it is in the Earth, appeareth by Seeds and Roots, which spring up and grow by the Temperament of this Heat. That it is in Water appeareth, so far as much as Water is susceptible of greater Cold, as by Freezing. It is consequently in Air also; that being a Vapour extracted from Water, and supply'd by Motion of the Heat which is in the Water. But primarily, and originally, it is in the Element of Fire, a Nature absolutely hot, which dispenseth salutary vital Heat to all other Things. * This is Nature, saith *Zeno*,

i Laert. 7. 138. k Laert. 7. 141. l Phil. Jud. de Immortal. mundi. m Laert. 7. 137. n Numen. apud. Euseb. o Plot. u Stoic. p Phil. ibid. q Cic. de Nat. Deor. 2. 46. Stoic. c. 24. r Laert. 7. 136. s Laert. ibid. t Laert. ibid. w Stoic. ibid. x De Nat. Deor. 2. y Cic. de Nat. Deor. 2. z Stoic. Phys. p. 47.

and the Soul. Of Fire consist the Sun, Moon, and Stars.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Stars.

^a IN the *Æther* are generated the Stars of the noblest and purest Part thereof, without Admixture of any other Nature, wholly hot and pellucid, animate Creatures indued with Sense and Intellect.

^b *Pfissidius* denoteth a Star a Divine Body, consisting of ætherical Fire, splendid and fiery, never resting, but always moving circularly.

^c That the Stars are wholly fiery, *Cleanthes* proveth by the Testimony of two Senses, Touch and Sight; for the Lustre of the Sun is brighter than of any Fire, seeing that it shines so far and wide to so vast a World; and such is its Touch, that it not only warmeth, but oftentimes burneth, neither of which it would do if it were not fiery.

Now (saith he) the Sun being fiery, is either like that Fire which is requisite to the Use of Life, or unto that which is contained in the Bodies of living Creatures; but this our Fire, which the Use of Life requireth, is a Consumer of all Things, disurbeth and dispatceth all Things. On the contrary, the other is corporeal, vital, and salutary, it conserveth all Things, it nourisheth, encreaseth, sustaineth, and affecteth with Sense; therefore, saith he, there's no Question to which of these Fires the Sun is like, for he causeth all Things to flourish and sprout up, according to their several kinds; wherefore the Fire of the Sun being like those Fires which are in the Bodies of living Creatures, the Sun must be a living Creature also, and so must be likewise the rest of the Stars of the celestial Fire, which is called *Æther* or *Heaven*.

^d For seeing that of living Creatures, one kind is generated in the Earth, other kinds in the Water, others in the Air, it were absurd to think, that in that Part which is most apt for Generation of living Creatures, no living Creature is generated. The Stars possess the *Æther*, which being most rare, and in perpetual Agitation and Vigour, it is necessary the living Creature that is generated in it, be endued with most acute Sense, quickest Mobility. The Stars therefore have Sense and Intelligence; whence it followeth, that they are to be reputed Gods. For we say, that they who live in the purest Air, are much more acute and understanding, than those who live in a thick Climate. The Diet likewise is thought to conduce not a little to the sharpening of the Understanding. Whence it is probable, the Stars are endued with most excellent Understanding, inasmuch as they dwell in the ætherial Part of the World, and are nourished with Exhalations from the Sea and Earth, extenuated by a long Distance.

The Sense and Intellect of the Stars is chiefly manifest from their Order and Constancy, for nothing can be moved by Proportion and Number without Providence, in which nothing is temerarious, nothing various, nothing casual. But the Order of Stars, and Constancy throughout all Eternity, cometh neither from Nature, for that is void of Reason, nor from Fortune, which affecteth Variety, and disalloweth Constancy.

Again, all Things are moved either naturally, or violently, or voluntarily. Those which move naturally, are carried either by their Weight downward, or by their Lightness upwards, neither of which is proper to the Stars, for their Motion is circular. Neither can it be said, that they are moved violently against their own Nature; for what Power can be greater? It remaineth, therefore, that their Motion be voluntary.

^e No Fire can subsist without some Aliment, the Stars therefore are nourished by the Vapours of the Earth.

^f Of Stars (according to *Chrysippus*) there are two Sorts, both which are by Nature divine, animate, and providential, the Fixed and the Erratick. The Multitude of the Fixed is incomprehensible; the Erratick are lower than the Fixed; the Fixed are all ranked in one Superficies, as is manifest to the Sight, the Erratick in several. The Sphere of fixed Stars includeth that of the Erratick. The highest of the Erratick, and next to the fixed Stars is the Sphere of *Saturn*, next, that of *Jupiter*, after which, that of *Mars*, then that of *Mercury*, then that of *Venus*, then that of the *Sun*, and lastly, that of the *Moon*, which being nearest the Air, seemeth therefore aerial, and hath greatest Influence upon terrestrial Bodies.

^g *Saturn*, *gavon*, finisheth his Course in almost thirty Years; *Jupiter*, *caidon*, in twelve; *Mars*, *evades*, in twenty-four Months wanting six Days; *Mercury*, *siahor*, in a Year; *Venus*, *quopiegs*, (lowest of the five Planets) in a Year.

^h The Sun and the Moon are properly called *æres*, Stars; but *æres* and *æres* differ; for every *æres* is *æres*, but not the contrary.

ⁱ The Rising of a Star, *Chrysippus* denoteth, its Advancement above the Earth; and the Setting thereof, its Occultation under the Earth. The same Stars at the same time rise to some, and set to others. The Apparition of a Star, *inward*, is its rising together with the Sun; and the Setting thereof, is its setting with the Sun: for Setting is taken two Ways, in Opposition to Rising, and in Opposition to Apparition. As the Apparition of the Dog-star is its rising together with the Sun, and its setting is its Occultation under the Earth together with the Sun, the same is said of the *Pleiades*.

^a Cic. Nat. Deor. 2.
^g Stob. Phys. 25.

^b Stob. Phys. 54. &c.
^h Cic. de Nat. Deor. 2.

^c Cic. Nat. Deor. 2.
ⁱ Stob. Phys. 55.

^d Cic. Nat. Deor. 2.
^k Stob. *ibid*.

^e Cic. *ibid*.

^f Laert. 7. 145.

C H A P. IX.

Of the Sun.

NExt ¹ *Venus* (the lowest Planet) is the *Sun*, the Chief of all that consist of this æthereal Fire. The *Sun* is defined by *Cleanthes* and *Chrysippus*, an intellectual Taper, gathered and kindled from the Vapours of the *Sea*. ² *Possidonius* defineth the *Sun* a most pure Fire, greater than the *Earth*, of a spherical Figure (as ³ *Cleanthes* also affirms) answerable to that of the *World*.

⁴ That the *Sun* is fiery, is manifest in that it hath all the Operations of a Fire; and so far as much as he is Fire, it followeth that he must be nourished. ⁵ The *Sun* is nourished by Exhalations from the Great Ocean.

⁶ According to the Expansion of this subjected Aliment, saith *Cleanthes*, in his Motion from Tropic to Tropic, removeth in a spiral Line, from the Equinoctial towards the North, and towards the South. ⁷ *Zeno* saith, he hath two Motions, one with the *World* from East to West, the other contrary, thro' the Signs.

⁸ That the *Sun* is greater than the *Earth*, appeareth in that it enlighteneth, not only all the *Earth*, but *Heaven* also. Again, the Shadow of the *Earth* being conical, argues the *Sun* to be greater than the *Earth*. Again, it is visible every where by reason of its Magnitude.

⁹ The *Sun* is eclipsed by Interposition of the *Moon* betwixt us and that Part of the *Sun* which is toward us, (as *Zeno*, in his Book of the Universe.) For meeting the *Sun*, and coming under him, the seemeth to darken his Light, and afterwards to disclose it again, as will appear in a Basin of Water.

C H A P. X.

Of the Moon.

IN the lowest Part of the *Æther* is the *Moon*. The *Moon* (according to *Zeno*) is an intellectual, wise, igneous Star, consisting of artificial Fire. *Cleanthes* saith, she is of a fiery Substance, and of a dirty Figure. ¹ *Lipsius* for *πυλωδῆς*, dirty, substitutes *πυλωδῆς*, as if of the same Figure, as a Hat or Cap. But perhaps there needs no Alteration, for they ² affirm'd, as she is nearer to the *Earth* than the *Sun*, so is she of a more terrene Nature. *Possidonius*, ³ and most of the *Stoicks* affirm, she is mix'd of Fire and Air, ⁴ by reason of which Diversity of Substance she is not subject to Corruption. ⁵ To this Mixture of Air in her Composition, they impute likewise those Spots which are seen in her Face. ⁶ She is greater than the *Earth*, as well

as the *Sun* is, and spherical as the *Sun*, yet appeareth in various Figures, the Full Moon, First Quarter, New Moon, Last Quarter.

⁷ *Chrysippus* saith, she is a Fire collected after the *Sun*, from the Exhalation of fresh Waters, for which Cause she is likewise nourished by them, as ⁸ *Possidonius* also assereth.

⁹ Her Motion is spiral. ¹⁰ *Zeno* saith, she hath two Motions, as the one with the *World* from East to West, the other contrary thro' the Signs. ¹¹ The Period of her Course is called a Month; ¹² *μῆς*, is likewise that Part of the *Moon* which appeareth to us, for one half of her is always turned towards us.

¹³ The *Moon* is eclipsed when she falleth into the Shadow of the *Earth*. For altho' every Month she is opposite to the *Sun*, yet she is then only eclipsed when she is fullest, by reason of the Obliquity of her Course, whereby her Latitude is varied towards the North and South. When therefore she happens to be near the Ecliptick, and opposite to the *Sun*, she is eclipsed; which happens (as *Possidonius* saith) in *Libra* and *Scorpio*, and in *Aries* and *Taurus*. Thus *Lærtius*; but *Possidonius* seems to have been ignorant of, or not to have considered the Motion of the Nodes of the *Moon* (commonly called *Caput & Cauda Draconis*) whereby the Restitution or Period of Eclipses is made in nineteen Years, (*κατὰ τὸ ἀνορθώμενον*) which was the Ground of *Metou's Period*, and of the Cycle of the *Moon*, in the *Julian Calendar*.

C H A P. XI.

Of Air.

NExt ¹ the Sphere of the *Moon* (saith *Chrysippus*) is the Element of *Air*, interposed between the *Sea* and *Heaven*, (² a spherical in Figure) ³ consecrated by the Name of ⁴ *Juno*, Sister and Wife of *Jupiter*, who is the *Æther*; betwixt these there is a near Conjunction.

⁵ The *Air* is divided into three Regions, the Highest, the Middle, and the Lowest. The highest Region is the hottest, and driest, and rarest, by reason of the Vicinity of the eternal Fires. The lowest and nearest to the *Earth* is thick and caliginous; because it receiveth terrene Exhalations. The middle Region is more temperate than the higher and lower, as to Siccity and Rarity, but colder than both. This, wherein the Clouds and Winds are generated, is, according to *Possidonius*, forty Furlongs above the *Earth*. Next to it is the pure and liquid Air of untroubled Light. From the turbulent Part of the *Moon* is twenty hundred thousand Furlongs.

¹ Cic. Nat. Deor. 2. m. Stob. p. 56. 57. n. Laert. 7. 144. o. Stob. p. 57. p. Laert. ibid. q. Cic. ibid. r. Stob. p. 56-
Laert. ibid. o. Stob. ibid. s. Stob. p. 57. u. Laert. 7. 145. w. Laert. ibid. s. Stob. Phys. 2. 59. y. Phys. Stoic. 2. 13-
Laert. 7. 145. z. Philo. p. 4. s. Stob. p. 59. a. 30. b. Pl. Acad. Phil. c. Stob. p. 60. d. Pl. Phil. 2. 26. e. Stob. p. 59-
f. Laert. ibid. g. Laert. p. 57. i. Stob. p. 59. k. Laert. 7. 145. l. Stob. p. 49. m. Cic. de Nat. Deor. 2. n. Laert.
7. 147. o. Cic. ibid. p. Senec. Nat. Quest. 2. 16.

^a To the Air is attributed the primitive Cold.

^b As concerning Things in the Air, *Winter* is the Rigour of the Air, next above the Earth, occasioned by the Remoteness of the Sun, and is the coldest of the Seasons of the Year. *Spring* is the Season succeeding *Winter*, preceding *Summer*, and is a good Temperature of the Air, occasioned by Approach of the Sun. *Summer* is that Season of the Year, when the Air above the Earth is warmed, by the Sun's Access towards the North. *Autumn* that Season of the Year which followeth *Summer* and precedeth *Winter*, is made by the Return of the Sun from us.

^c *Winter* cometh, when the Air is predominant in Thickness, and is forced upward; *Summer*, when the Fire is predominant, and driven downward.

^d Wind is a Fluxion of the Air, having several Names, from the Variety of Places; as for Example; that which bloweth from the Darkeness of the Night, and Sun-setting, is called *Zephyrus*; from the East and Sun-rising, *Apeliotes*; from the North, *Boreas*; from the South, *Lybs*. "It is occasioned by the Sun's Extenuation of the Vapours.

^e The *Rain-bow* is a Reflection of the Sun's Beams from a humid Cloud; or, as *Possidonius*, an Apparition of Part of the Sun or Moon in a Cloud, dewy, concave, and continuous to the Phantasy, as in a Looking-glass, the Representation of a Circle.

^f *Comets* are Fires subsisting of thick Air, carried up to the æthereal Place.

^g *Stellas* is an Accension of sudden Fire, swiftly carried through the Air, appearing length-ways.

^h *Rain* is a Conversion of Clouds into Water, when either from the Earth, or from the Sea, by the Power of the Sun, the Humour is drawn upwards ineffectually.

ⁱ *Frost* is congealed Rain.

^j *Hail* is a concrete Cloud, dispersed by the Wind.

^k *Snow* is Humidity from a concrete Cloud, according to *Possidonius*.

^l *Lightning* is an Accension of Clouds, which are driven by the Winds upon one another, and broken, according to *Zeno*.

^m *Thunder* is a Noise occasioned by the Collision of Clouds.

ⁿ *Thunderbolt* is a strong Inflammation rushing upon the Earth with great Violence, when the Clouds, by Impulsion of the Winds are broken against one another. Some define it a Conversion of fiery inflamed Air, violently rushing down.

^o *Typbo* is a violent Thunder, thrust down with

a great Force of Wind, or a smoking Wind, which rusheth down upon the breaking of the Cloud.

Prester, is a Cloud inclosed with Fire by Wind in the Concavity of the Earth: There are many Kinds, *Earthquakes*, *Chasma's*, and the like.

CHAP. XII.

Of Water and Earth.

THAT Part of the World (saith ^b *Chrysippus*) which is the most solid Support of Nature, as Bones are in a living Creature, is called the Earth: About this the Water is evenly diffused. The Earth hath some uneven Parts arising out of the Water, called Islands, or, if of large Extent, Continents, from the Ignorance of Man, who knows not, that even those are Islands, in respect of the great Ocean.

The Earth is in the Midst, being in the Nature of a Centre ¹ one and finite, ² spherical in Figure. The Water is likewise spherical, having the same Centre with the Earth.

The Earth hath five *Zones*, one Northern, beyond the Arctic Circle, uninhabitable through Extemity of Cold; another temperate; a third not habitable by Reason of exreme Heat, whence it is called Torrid; a fourth Temperate; a fifth Southern, not habitable by Reason of Cold. ¹ But *Possidonius* conceiveth the Climate under the Equinoctial to be temperate; for, saith he, under the Tropicks where the Sun dwells longest, the Places are habitable, and why not then under the Æquator? Again, the Night being equal to the Day, affordeth Leisure enough for Refrigeration, which is assisted likewise by Showers and Winds.

² The Generation of the World began from the Earth, as from the Centre; for the Centre is the Beginning of a Sphere.

³ Plants have not any Soul at all, but spring up of themselves, as it were by Chance.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Mixture and Temperament.

Chrysippus asserteth a ^o Spirit moving itself to itself, and from itself, or a Spirit moving itself backwards and forwards. He calleth it Spirit, as being moved Air, answering in some Proportion to the Æther, so that it both meets in one; and this Motion is only according to those who think, that all Nature receiveth Mutation, Solution, Composition, and the like.

¹ *Composition*, *Mixture*, *Temperament* and *Confusion* are different. Composition is a Contract of

^a Laert. 7. 157. ^b Laert. ibid. ^c Ibid. ^d Plut. plac. Phil. 3. 7. ^e Laert. ibid. ^f Ibid. ^g Ibid. ^h Ibid. ⁱ Ibid. ^j Ibid. ^k Ibid. ^l Ibid. ^m Ibid. ⁿ Ibid. ^o Ibid. ^p Ibid. ^q Ibid. ^r Ibid. ^s Ibid. ^t Ibid. ^u Ibid. ^v Ibid. ^w Ibid. ^x Ibid. ^y Ibid. ^z Ibid. ^{aa} Ibid. ^{ab} Ibid. ^{ac} Ibid. ^{ad} Ibid. ^{ae} Ibid. ^{af} Ibid. ^{ag} Ibid. ^{ah} Ibid. ^{ai} Ibid. ^{aj} Ibid. ^{ak} Ibid. ^{al} Ibid. ^{am} Ibid. ^{an} Ibid. ^{ao} Ibid. ^{ap} Ibid. ^{aq} Ibid. ^{ar} Ibid. ^{as} Ibid. ^{at} Ibid. ^{au} Ibid. ^{av} Ibid. ^{aw} Ibid. ^{ax} Ibid. ^{ay} Ibid. ^{az} Ibid. ^{ba} Ibid. ^{bb} Ibid. ^{bc} Ibid. ^{bd} Ibid. ^{be} Ibid. ^{bf} Ibid. ^{bg} Ibid. ^{bh} Ibid. ^{bi} Ibid. ^{bj} Ibid. ^{bk} Ibid. ^{bl} Ibid. ^{bm} Ibid. ^{bn} Ibid. ^{bo} Ibid. ^{bp} Ibid. ^{bq} Ibid. ^{br} Ibid. ^{bs} Ibid. ^{bt} Ibid. ^{bu} Ibid. ^{bv} Ibid. ^{bw} Ibid. ^{bx} Ibid. ^{by} Ibid. ^{bz} Ibid. ^{ca} Ibid. ^{cb} Ibid. ^{cc} Ibid. ^{cd} Ibid. ^{ce} Ibid. ^{cf} Ibid. ^{cg} Ibid. ^{ch} Ibid. ^{ci} Ibid. ^{cj} Ibid. ^{ck} Ibid. ^{cl} Ibid. ^{cm} Ibid. ^{cn} 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Bodies, whose Superficies are contiguous to one another, as in Heaps of Grain or Sand. Mixture if of two or more Bodies, whose Qualities are diffused through the whole, as we see in Fire, and red hot Iron, and in our own Souls; for everywhere there is a Diffusion through intire Bodies, so as one Body doth pass through another. Temperament is of two or more humid Bodies, whose Qualities are diffused through the whole. Mixture is also common to dry Bodies, as to Fire and Iron, to the Soul and the Body, Temperament only to the Humid. For Qualities appear from the Temperament of several humid Things, as of Wine, Honey, Water, Vinegar, and the like; that in such Temperament, the Qualities of the Things tempered remain, is evident from this, that oftentimes they are by some Art separated from one another. For if we put a Sponge dipped in Oil into Wine mix'd with Water, the Water separating itself from the Wine, will gather to the Sponge. Lastly, Confusion is the Transmutation of two or more Qualities into another of a different Nature, as in Composition of Unguents and Medicines.

C H A P. XIV.

Of Generation and Corruption.

Possidonius ² asserteth four Species of Generation and Corruption, of Things that are, into Things that are; (for that of Things that are not, and of Things that are not to be rejected, conceiving there is none such.) Of Transmutations into Things that are, one is by Division, another by Alteration, a third by Confusion, a fourth of the whole by Resolution. Of these, Alteration concerneth the Substance, the other three are of the Qualities which inhere in the Substance. According to these are Generations made. But the Substance itself is neither augmented nor diminished by Apposition or Detraction, but is only altered, as happeneth to Numbers and Measures. But in Things properly qualified, as *Dion* and *Theon*, there is Augmentation and Diminution, whereof the Quality of each remaineth from the Generation until the Corruption thereof, in Plants and living Creatures which are capable of Corruption. In Things properly qualified, he asserted two susceptible Parts; one according to the Substance, another according to the Quality. This, as we have often said, admitteth Augmentation and Diminution. Neither is the Thing properly qualified, and the Substance out of which it is, all one, nor divers, but only, not all one, because the Substance is a Part, and occupateth the same Place; but Things that are divers have distinct Places, and are not considered in Part. That as to the Thing properly

qualified, and as to the Substance, it is not the same, *Mnesarchus* affirmeth to be evident, because it is necessary, that to the same happen the same Things. For if, for Example, a Man having formed a Horse, should break it, and make a Dog, we would presently, beholding it, say, this was not before, but it is now: So are the Qualified and the Substance divers. Neither is it likely that we should all be the same as to Substance; for it often happens that the Substance is pre-existent to the Generation, as the Substance of *Socrates* was, before *Socrates* was; and after the Corruption and Death of *Socrates*, the Substance remaineth, tho' *Socrates* himself be not.

C H A P. XV.

Of Motion.

MOtion ³ (according to *Chrysippus*) is a Mutation of Parts, either in whole or in Part, or an Excession out of Place, either in Whole or in Part, or a Change according to Place or Figure. *Jaculation* is a vehement Motion from on high. *Rest* is partly a Privation of Motion in a Body, partly the same Habit of a Body before and after. There are two first Motions, *right* and *oblique*; from the Mixture of these ariseth great Variety of Motions.

⁴ *Zeno* affirms the Parts of all Things consisting by themselves, are moved towards the Middle of the Whole, and likewise of the World itself; wherefore it is rightly said, that all Parts of the World tend to the Middle thereof, and principally the heavy, and that there is the same Cause of the *Rest* of the World, in the infinite Vacuity, and of the *Rest* of the Earth, in the World, in the Midst of which it is constituted as a Point. All Bodies have not Gravity, as Air and Fire; yet these in some Manner tend to the Midst of the World.

C H A P. XVI.

Of living Creatures.

OF animate Creatures there are two Kinds, (for Plants, as we said, have no Souls) some are appetitive and concupiscent, others rational. The Soul, according to *Zeno*, *Antipater*, and *Possidonius*, is a hot Spirit, for hereby we breathe and move. *Cleanthes* saith, we live so long as that Heat holdeth.

Every Soul hath Sense, and is a Spirit innate in us, wherefore it is a Body, and shall continue after Death; yet it is by Nature corruptible, notwithstanding that it is a Part of the Soul of the Universe which is incorruptible: Yet some hold, that the less firm Souls, such are those of the Unlearned,

² Stob. Phys. 20.³ Ibid. 21.⁴ Ibid. 22.⁵ Ibid.⁶ Plat. plac. Phil. 4. 3.

That there are Gods, *Chrysippus* proveth thus : If there is something in Nature, which the Mind, Reason, Power, and Faculties of Man could not make, that which did make it is better than Man ; but celestial Things, and all those whose Order is sempiternal, could not be made by Man ; there is therefore something which made them, which is better than Man, and what is that but God ? For if there are no Gods, what can there be in Nature better than Man ? For in him only is Reason, than which nothing is more excellent. But for a Man to think that there is nothing in the World better than himself, is a foolish Arrogance ; therefore there is something better, and consequently there is a God.

¹ *Zeno* more concisely thus : That which is rational, is better than that which is irrational ; but nothing is better than the World, therefore the World is rational. In like manner may be proved, that the World is wise, that it is happy, that it is eternal ; for all these are better than the Want of these. But there is nothing better than the World ; whence it followeth, that the World is God.

Again, he argues thus : No Part of an insensible Thing hath Sense ; but the Parts of the World have Sense, therefore the World hath Sense.

He proceedeth to urge this more strictly. *Nothing, faith he, that is void of Mind and Reason, can, of itself, generate that which is animate and rational ; but the World generates animate and rational Creatures, therefore the World is animate and rational.*

Likewise, according to his Custom, he concludeth his Argument with a Similitude : *If out of an Olive Tree should come harmonious Pipes, that made Musick, you would not doubt but that the Science of Musick were in the Olive Tree. What if a Plain Tree should bear Musical Instruments ? you would think there were Musick in those Plain Trees. Why then should we not judge the World to be animate and wise, that produceth out of itself animate and wise Creatures ?*

There is nothing besides the World which wanteth nothing, and which is perfect and compleat in all its Numbers and Parts. *For as the Cover, faith Chrysippus, was made for the Shield's Sake, and the Scabbard for the Sword's, so besides the World, all other Things were made for the Sake of something else.* Fruits of the Earth were made for living Creatures, living irrational Creatures for the Use of Man, Horses for Carriage, Oxen for Tillage, Dogs for Hunting and Defence ; but Man himself was made to contemplate and imitate the World. Not that he is at all perfect, but only a Part of that which is perfect. But the World itself, for as much as it comprehendeth all Things, neither is there any thing which is not in it, is every way perfect. What therefore can be wanting to that

which is best ? But there is nothing better than the Mind and Reason, therefore these cannot be wanting to the World.

Chrysippus addeth this Comparifon ; *As all Things are best in the most perfect and mature Creatures, as in a Horse better than in a Colt, in a Dog better than in a Whelp, in a Man better than in a Child ; so that which is best in all the World, must be in that which is perfect and absolute ; but, than the World, nothing is more perfect, nothing better than Virtue, therefore the World hath proper Virtue. The Nature of Man is not perfect ; yet in Man there is Virtue, how much more then in the World ? The World therefore hath Virtue, therefore it is wise, and consequently God*

^a Thus the Notion and Apprehension Men have of God, is, first, by conceiving the Beauty of those Things which are objected to their Eyes ; for no beautiful Thing hath been made by Chance and Adventure, but compos'd and fram'd by some ingenious and operative Art. Now, that the Heaven is beautiful, appeareth by the Form, Colour, and Bigness thereof, by the Variety also of Stars dispos'd therein. Moreover, the World is round in manner of a Ball, which Figure, of all others, is principal and most perfect, for it alone resembleth all the Parts ; for being round itself, it hath the Parts also round.

As to the second Part of the Question, ^a God is an immortal Being, rational, perfect, or intellectual in Beatitude, void of all Evil, provident over the World, and Things in the World, not of human Form, Maker of all, and, as it were, Father of all.

^o They define God a Spirit full of Intelligence, of a fiery Nature, having no proper Form, but transforming himself into whatsoever he pleaseth, and resembling all Things.

We understand by God, faith *Chrysippus*, a living Nature or Substance, happy, incorruptible, doing good to Mankind. All Men acknowledge the Gods immortal. They who deprive the Gods of Beneficence, have an imperfect Notion of them, as they likewise, who think they are subject to Generation and Corruption.

^r Yet there are some Gods, faith *Chrysippus*, generative and mortal, as well as there are others ingenerate. [The ^v World, Stars, and Earth, are God's, but the supreme God is the æthereal Mind, *Jupiter*.] The Sun, Moon, and other such like Gods were begotten ; but *Jupiter* is eternal. Other Gods use a certain Nourishment, whereby they are maintained equally ; but *Jupiter* and the World after another sort than the generated, which shall be consumed by Fire. *Jupiter* groweth continually, until such time as all Things be consumed in him,

¹ Cic. *ibid.* ¹ Cic. *ibid.* ^m Plot. *ph. Ph.* 1. 5. ⁿ Leont. 7. 147. ^o Plot. *ph. Ph.* 1. 6. ^p Pl. *contrad. Stoic.* ^q Stob.

Death being the Separation of the Soul and Body ; for seeing that the Soul of the World never departeth at all, but augmenteth continually, until it have consumed all the Matter within itself, we cannot say that the World dieth.

The Substance of God, *Zeno* affirms to be the whole World and Heaven ; so also *Chrysippus* in his 11th of the Gods, and *Possidonius* in his first of the Gods. But *Antipater*, in his seventh of the World, affirms his Substance to be aerial. *Boethius* in his Book of Nature saith, the Substance of God is the Sphere of fixed Stars. Sometimes they call him a Nature containing the World, sometimes a Nature producing all upon Earth.

As concerning the third Part of the Question, they affirm, that God is an operative artificial Fire, methodically ordering and effecting the Generation of the World, comprehending in himself all prolific Reason, by which every Thing is produced according to Fate. God is a Spirit diffused through the whole World, having several Denominations, according to the several Parts of the Matter thro' which he spreadeth, and the ' several Effects of his Power shewn therein. They call him *Δία*, as *Διὸν πάνα*, by whom all Things are : *Ζῆνα*, as the Author τῆ Ζῆν of Life. *Μινέρβα*, as diffused thro' the Æther ; *ΐανο*, as thro' the Air ; *Βουλκαν*, as through the ' artificial Fire ; *Νεπτῦνη*, as through the Water ; *Κερες*, as through the Earth. In like manner the rest of his Names were imposed with respect to some Property. " This Place was first discoursed upon by *Zeno*, after whom *Cleanthes* and *Chrysippus* dilated more largely upon it.

" By this Providence, the World, and all Parts of the World, were in the Beginning constituted, and are in all Time ordered. This Disputation they divided into three Parts : The first, from the same Reason that teacheth us there are Gods, inferreth, that the World is ordered by them, seeing that there is nothing higher or more excellent than this Administration. The second, from that Reason which teacheth us, that all Things are subjected to an understanding Nature, and exquisitely ordered by it, inferreth, that it is generated of animate Principles. The third Place is derived from Admiration of celestial and terrestrial Things. Upon these *Cicero* discourseth at large, according to the Opinion of the Stoicks.

As to the fourth Part of the Question in general concerning the Gods, that they have a particular providential Care of Mankind, it is manifest, in that whatsoever is in this World was made for the Use of Man, and is conducive thereunto ; and if for the whole Species, they must consequently have the same Care of Particulars, which they express by many Portents, and all those Signs whereupon the

Art of Divination depends, there was never any great Person without some divine Inspiration. But we must not argue from hence, that if the Corn or Vineyard of any Man be hurt by a Tempest, or Fortune deprive him of any of the Conveniencies of Life, that he to whom this hath happened, may be judged to be hated or neglected of God. The Gods take Care of great Things, the little they neglect ; but to great Persons all Things have always a happy Issue.

Chrysippus in his fourth Book of Providence, saith, there is nothing more ignorant, nothing more sordid than those Persons, who think, Good might have been without Ill. For Good and Ill being Contraries, it is necessary that both consist together mutually, sustaining one another, as it were by Opposition. For how could we understand Justice, unless there were Injuries ? What is Justice, but a Privation of Injustice ? How can Fortitude be understood, but by Opposition to Fear ? How Constancy, but from Intemperance ? How Prudence, if there were not Imprudence ? Why doth not these Fools desire that Truth might be without Falshood ? Such are Good and Ill, Happiness and Misery, Grief and Pleasure ; one is tied to the other, as Plato says, by their contrary Ends.

Here followeth the Question, Whether that Providence which framed the World and Mankind, did make likewise those corporeal Infirmities and Sickneses which Men suffer. *Chrysippus* affirmeth, it was not the Intent of Nature to make Men obnoxious to Sicknes : For this agreeth not with the Author of Nature, and Parent of all good Things ; but he having generated many great Things, most apt and useful, other Things also, incommodious to those which he made, were aggregated together with them, coherent to them, made, not by Nature, but certain necessary Consequence κατὰ αναγκαίαν ὁμολογίαν. As, saith he, when Nature framed the Bodies of Men, more subtle Reason, and the Benefit of the World, would have required that the Head should have been made of the smallest and thin Bones ; but this Utility would have been followed by another extrinsecal Inconvenience of greater Consequence, that the Head would be too weakly defended, and broken with the least Blow. Sickneses therefore and Diseases are engendered whilst Health is engendered. In like manner, saith he, whilst Virtue is begotten in Man, by the Counsel of Nature, Vices likewise are begotten by contrary Affinity.

C H A P. XVIII.

Of Nature.

NEXT *Jupiter*, *Possidonius* placeth Nature. By Nature they sometimes understand that which

q Laert. 7. 143.
cio, αναγκαίαν ὁμολογίαν.

r Plot. plac. Phil. 1. 6.
w Cic. de nat. Deor. 2. 24.

s Laert. Ibid.

t Perhaps it should be εὐνοίας, tho' *Æschylus* assigns this to *Vulcan*.
x Agel. lib. 6. cap. 1. y Ibid. s Plot. plac. 1. 28. Laert.

containeth the World, sometimes that which produceth Things upon Earth; both which, as we said, is to be understood of God. For that Nature which containeth and preserveth the World, hath perfect Sense and Reason, which Power is the Soul of the World, the Mind and divine Wisdom. Thus ^a under the Term of Nature, they comprehend both God and the World, affirming that the one cannot without the other, as if Nature were God permeating through the World, God the Mind of the World, the World the Body of God. This ^b *Chrysippus* calleth *Common-Nature* in Distinction from particular Nature.

^c Nature is defined by *Zeno* an artificial Fire, proceeding in the Way of Generation, which is the fiery Spirit, the Artist of Forms; by others, a Habit receiving Motion from itself, according to prolific Reason, and effecting and containing those Things which subsist by it, in certain definite Times, producing all Things, from which itself is distinct by Nature, propoling to itself these two Ends, Utility and Pleasure, as is manifest from the Production of Man.

C H A P. XIX.

Of Fate.

THE ^d third from *Jupiter* according to *Possidonius* is *Fate*, for *Jupiter* is first, next Nature, then *Fate*.

^e They call *Fate* a Concatenation of Causes, that is, an Order and Connexion which cannot be transgressed.

Fate is a Cause depending on Laws, and ordering by Laws, or a Reason by which the World is ordered.

^f *Fate* is, according to *Zeno*, the motive Power of Matter, disposing of so and so, not much differing from Nature and Providence.

^g *Panaetius* affirmeth *Fate* to be God.

^h *Chrysippus* defineth *Fate* a spiritual Power, governing the World orderly; or, ⁱ a sempiternal and indeclinable Series and Chain of Things, itself rolling and implicating itself by eternal Orders of Consequence, of which it is adapted and connected; or, as *Chrysippus* again, in his Book of *Definitions* hath it, ^k the Reason of the World, or Law of all Things in the World, governed by Providence; or the Reason why Things past have been, the present are, the future shall be. For Reason, he useth Truth, Cause, Nature, Necessity, and other Terms, as attributed to the same Thing in different Respects. *Fate*, from the several Distributions thereof, is called *Clotus*, *Lachesis* and *Atropos*. *Lachesis*, as it dispenfeth to every one, as it were by

Lot; *Atropos*, as it is an immutable Dispensation, from all Eternity; *Clotus*, in Allusion to the Resemblance it hath with spinning and twisting of Threads.

^l Necessity is a Cause invincible, most violent, and enforcing all Things. ^m Fortune is a Cause unknown and hidden to human Reason. For some Things come by Necessity, others by Fate, some by deliberate Counsel, others by Fortune, some by Casualty.

ⁿ But *Fate* being a Connexion of Causes interlaced and linked orderly, compriseth also that Cause proceedeth from us.

^o That all Things are done by Fate, is asserted by *Zeno* in his Book of *Fate*, and *Possidonius* in his second Book of *Fate*, and *Boethius* in his 11th of *Fate*. Which ^p *Chrysippus* proves thus: If there is any Motion without a Cause, then every Axiom is not either true or false; for that which hath not efficient Causes, will be neither true nor false; but every Axiom is either true or false, therefore there is no Motion without a Cause. And if so, then all Things that are done, are done by precedent Causes, and if so, all Things are done by Fate. That all Axioms are either true or false, *Cicero* saith, he labour'd much to prove, whereby he takes away *Possibles*, *Indeterminates*, and other Distinctions of the *Academicks*, of which see *Alcinous*, Chap. 26.

^q In answer to the *sluggish Reason*, if it be your Fate to die of this Sickness, you shall die whether you have a Physician or no; and if it be your Fate to recover, you shall recover whether you have a Physician or not. *Chrysippus* saith, that in Things some are *simple*, some *conjunct*. Simple is thus, *Socrates* shall die on such a Day; for whether he do any Thing or not, it is appointed he should die on such a Day. But if it be destin'd thus, *Laius* shall have a Son *Oedipus*, it cannot be said, whether he accompany with a Woman or not, for it is a *conjunct* Thing, and *confatal*, as he terms it, because it is destin'd that *Laius* shall lie with his Wife, and that he shall get *Oedipus* of her. As if we should say, *Milo* shall wrestle at the Olympick Games, and another should infer, then he shall wrestle whether he have an Adversary or no, he were mistaken; for that he shall wrestle is a *conjunct* Thing, because there is no wrestling without an Adversary. Thus are refuted all Sophisms of this Kind, (you shall recover whether you have a Physician or not) for it is no less determined by Fate that you shall have a Physician, than that you shall recover. They are *confatal*.

Thus there being two Opinions of the old Philosophers; one, that all Things are so done by Fate,

^a Laëtant. lib. 7. cap. 3.

^f Laëtant. 7. 149.

^g Stob. lib. 1.

^h Ibid. 1. 27.

^b Plut. de cont. Stoic.

ⁱ Ibid.

^j Agel. 6. 2.

^k Cic. de Fato.

^c Laëtant. lib. 1.

^d Stob. 1. 9. Plut.

^e Ibid.

^f Ibid.

^l Ibid.

^m Ibid.

ⁿ Ibid.

^o Ibid.

^p Plut. plac. Phil. 1. 28.

^q Ibid.

^r Ibid.

^s Ibid.

that Fate inferreth a Power of Necessity, as *Democritus*, *Heraclitus*, *Empedocles*, and *Aristotle* held; the other, That the Motions of our Souls were voluntary, without any Fate: *Chrysippus*, as an honourable Arbitrator, took the middle Way betwixt these, but inclining most to those who conceive the Motions of our Souls free from Necessity. The Ancients, who held all Things to be done by Fate, said, it was by a Violence and Necessity; those who were of the contrary Opinion, denied that Fate had any Thing to do with our Assent, and that there was no Necessity imposed upon Assents. They argued thus: If all Things are done by Fate, all Things are done by an antecedent Cause; and if Appetite, then likewise those Things which follow Appetite, therefore Assents also. But, if the Cause of Appetite is not in us, neither is the Appetite itself in our Power; and if so, neither those Things which are effected by Appetite are in our Power, and consequently neither Assents nor Actions are in our Power; whence it followeth, that neither Praise can be just, nor Dispraise, nor Honour, nor Punishment; but this is false, therefore all Things are not done by Fate.

But *Chrysippus* not allowing this Necessity, yet maintaining, that nothing happened without precedent Causes, distinguisheth thus: *Of Causes*, saith he, *some are perfect and principal, others assistant and immediate*. When we say, *All Things are done by Fate*, from antecedent Causes, we understand not the perfect and principal Causes, but the Assistant and Immediate. He therefore answers the former Objection thus; *If all Things are done by Fate, it followeth, that all Things be done by antecedent Causes, but not by the Principal and Perfect, but by the Assistant and Immediate, which tho' they be not in our Power, it followeth not, that the Appetite likewise is in our Power*. This Argument, therefore, concludes well against those who join Necessity with Fate, but nothing against those who assert antecedent Causes not perfect nor principal. What Assent is, and how it cometh to be in our Power, we have already shewn in the *Logic*.

Hence it followeth, that notwithstanding all Things are necessarily co-acted and connected by Fate, with a certain principal Reason; yet (saith *Chrysippus*) our Minds are so obnoxious to Fate, as their Property and Quality is. For, if at the first by Nature they were formed soundly and profitably, all that Power which cometh upon them extrinsically from Fate, they transmit easily and inoffensively; but if they are harsh, ignorant and rude, not supported by any Helps of good Art, altho' they are pressed by little or no Conflict of fatal Incommodity, yet by their own Unluckiness, and voluntary Impulsion, they rush into continual Sins and Errors, which Thing maketh, that this

natural and necessary Consequence of Things, which is called Fate, be by this Reason. For it is, as it were, fatal, and consequent in its kind, that wicked Minds should not be without Sins and Errors, an Instance whereof he bringeth not unapposite. *As*, saith he, *a rolling Stone, if you turn it down a steep Place, you first give it the Cause and Beginning of its Precipitation, but afterwards it rolleth headlong of itself; not that you make it do so any longer, but because its Figure, and the Volubility of its Form is such*. In like manner, Order, and Reason, and Necessity, moveth the Beginnings of Causes; but the Impetuousness of our Thoughts and Minds, and our own Actions, are guided by every Man's private Will and Mind. Thence, continueth he, the *Pythagoreans* say,

Men of their own Accord their Ills procure.

As conceiving that all Ills proceed from themselves, and according to their own Appetites, when they sin and offend, and according to their own Mind and Design.

For this Reason he denieth, That we ought to suffer and hear such wicked, or idle, or noxious, or impudent Persons, who being taken in some Fault or Wickedness, have recourse to the Necessity of Fate, as to a Sanctuary, affirming, that they have done wickedly, is not to be attributed to their Timidity, but to Fate.

CHAP. XX.

Of Not Bodies, or Incorporeals; and first of Dicibles.

Hitherto of Bodies; we come next to the second Place of Physick, concerning Not-Bodies, or Incorporeals. Incorporeal is that which may be, but is not contained in Bodies. * Of those there are four Kinds, *Dicibles*, *Vacuum*, *Place* and *Time*.

Dicile is that which consisteth according to rational Phantasy, a Mean betwixt Notion and Thing. Of this already in the *Logic*.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Vacuum and Place.

THE second Incorporeal is *Vacuum*, which is the Solitude or Vacuity of a Body. In the World there is no Vacuum, neither in the Whole nor in any Part: Beyond it, there is an infinite Vacuity, into which the World shall be resolved. Of this already in the Chapter concerning the World.

Next is *Place*. *Place* is that which is fully occupied by the Body; or, as *Chrysippus* defines it, that which is or may be occupied by one or more

Things. Thus it differs from Vacuity, which hath no Body, and from Space, which is occupat-ed but in part, as a Vessel half full of Wine.

C H A P. XXII.

Of Time.

LAST of the Incorporeals is Time. Time is, according to many of the *Stoicks*, the Motion of itself, not of Heaven, and had no Beginning of Generation. *Chrysippus* saith, That Time is the Measure of Slowness or Swiftnes. *Zeno* defined it the Interval of Motion, and Measure of Slowness and Swiftnes, according to which, all Things were and are.

Possidonius saith, That some are wholly infinite, as all Time; some only in part, as the past and future; for they are joyned together by the present. He defined Time the Interval of Motion, or the Measure of Swiftnes and Slowness, one Part of it being present, the other future, the present connected to the future by something like a Point.

It is called *πρῶτον*, attributed to the least Part of Time that falleth under Sense, subsisting according to the Difference of past and future.

Chrysippus saith, That Time is the Interval of Motion, the Measure of Swiftnes and Slowness, a consequent Interval to the World's Motion, according to which all Things are, and are moved, unless rather there be a two-fold Time, as the Earth, and Sea, and Vacuity, and Universe, have the same Names with their Parts. And as Vacuity is every way infinite, so Time is both ways infinite, for the present and future have no End. He likewise asserts, That no entire Present is Time, for continuous Things being divided into infinite, Time likewise admitteth of the same Division; so that no Time is properly present, but so called, after a less accurate manner. The present only is subsistent, unless it be understood as of *Categorems*; as Walking is attributed to him that walketh, but not to him that sitteth or lieth. Thus much for the *STOICAL PHILOSOPHY*.

C L E A N T H E S.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

Cleanthes^a was of *Assus*, a *Lycian* City fortified, as *Strabo* describes it, both by Nature and Art, Son of *Phanias*. He was first, according to *Antisthenes*, a Wrestler, and coming to *Athens*, having no more than four Drachms, he applied himself first to *Crates*, then to *Zeno*, whom he heard constantly, and persevered in his Philosophy and Opinions.

He was much commended for his Laboriousness, in as much as being poor, he went by Night to the Gardens to draw Water, and in the Day time studied Philosophy. Hence he was called *Opsephilus*. *The Drawer of Water*.

Being cited to the Court to give an Account how he lived, being so healthful and lusty, he produced the Gardner, under whom he drew Water, and a Woman, for whom he ground Meal, to witness how he subsisted. The *Areopagites* wondering heret, allotted him to *Minæ*, which *Zeno* would not suffer him to accept. *Antigenus* gave him 3000 *Minæ*. On a time leading some young Men to a Spectacle, the Wind blew back his Cloak, and discovered that he had no Coat; whereupon the *Athenians* much applauded him, and, as *Demetrius* the *Magnesian* saith, bestowed a Coat upon him.

Antigenus, who was his Auditor, asked him why he drew Water^b, he answered, *Do I only draw Water? Do I not also dig and water the Ground, and all for the Sake of Philosophy?* For *Zeno* brought him up to this, and bad him bring him an *Obolus* gained by his Labour. Upon a time he brought in his Gains before all his Disciples, saying, *Cleanthes, if he would, could maintain another Cleanthes; but they who have wherewithal to maintain themselves, would be supplied by others, yet study Philosophy nothing the more diligently.* Hence *Cleanthes* was called a second *Hercules*. He was very laborious, but dull and slow.

^c He used to write the Dictates of *Zeno* in Shells, and the Shoulder-blades of Oxen, for want of Money to buy Paper. He was his Auditor nineteen Years.

For these Reasons, tho' *Zeno* had many other eminent Disciples, yet he succeeded him in the School.

CHAP. II.

His Apophthegms.

HIS^d Fellow-Disciples derided him, he took it patiently, and being called *Assi*, answered, he only could bear *Zeno's* Burthen.

Another Time being reproached as timorous, *Therefore*, saith he, *I sin little.*

Preferring his own Poverty before the Plenty of the Rich; *Whilst they*, saith he, *play at Ball, I manure a hard barren Soil.*

He often chid himself, being all alone, which *Aristo* over-hearing; whom, saith he, do you chide? he smiling, answered, *A grey-headed old Fellow without Wit.*

To one that said, *Arcefilaus* abrogated the Offices of Life; Peace, saith he, dispraise him not, for tho' he takes away Offices in Discourse, he commends them in his Actions; To whom *Arcefilaus* saying, *I cannot endure Flattery; I do indeed flatter*, replies *Cleanthes*, *when I say you speak one Thing and do another.*

^e To one that asked what he should teach his Son, he answered in the Words of *Electra*,

Peace, Peace, a little Step.

A *Lacedemonian* saying, that Labour was good, he laughed, answering,

My Son, thou of a gen'rous Race art come.

Disputing with a young Man, he asked him whether he did feel; the other answers he did; he replied, *Why then do I not feel that you feel?*

Sophistius the Poet, saying in the publick Theatre when *Cleanthes* was present;

Those whom Cleanthes' Madness leads away;

He sat still, not changing his Countenance; whereupon the Auditors applauding him, turned out *Sophistius*, who afterwards coming to *Cleanthes*, told him he was sorry that he had reproached him;

a Laert. 7. 168.

b Laert. ibid. Plot. de vitand. Atr.

c Laert. 7. 174.

d Ibid. 7. 171.

e Orell. apud Euseb.

Cleanthes answered, It were unfit I should behold unconcerned Bacchus and Hercules derided by the Poets, and be angry at a little Word against myself.

He compared the Peripateticks to Lutes, that make good Musick, but hear it not themselves.

Holding, according to *Zeno*, that the Mind may be discerned in the Countenance, some merry young Men brought an effeminate Youth to him rustically clothed, desiring his Opinion of that Man's Disposition. He bad him depart, which the other going to do, sneezed; *Cleanthes* presently cried out, *I have found out the Man, he is effeminate.*

To one that was all alone talking to himself, *You discourse*, saith he, *with a Man that is not ill.*

To one that reproached him with his Age, *I would be gone*, saith he, *but when I consider that I am in Health, fit to write and study, I rather chuse to stay.*

Cleanthes bad those who came to hear him, to fancy Pleasure painted in a Tablet, richly habited and adorned, sitting on a Throne, the Virtues standing about her, as her Handmaids, doing nothing else but wait on her Commands, whispering in her Ear (if it can be fancied of a Picture) to bid her take Care of doing any Thing imprudently, that may offend the Minds of Men, or any Thing that may occasion Grief.

He said, Whosoever sweareth, at the same time sweareth truly, or forswearth himself: If he intend to do that which he sweareth, tho' he do it not, he sweareth truly; if he intended it not, he is forsworn.

One observing him silent, said to him, why do you hold your Peace? It is pleasant to talk to Friends; *It is indeed*, answered *Cleanthes*, *but the more pleasant it is, the more we ought to allow them the Freedom of it.*

He said, That unlearned Men differed from Beasts in their Figure.

Being demanded, why amongst the Ancients, when there were fewest Philosophers, there were more eminent than at this Time; he answered, *Because then they minded the Thing itself, now only in Words.*

To one that asked him, how a Man might be rich, he answered, *By being poor in Desire.*

CHAP. III.

His Writings.

HE left behind him (saith *Laertius*) these excellent Books.

Of Time.

Of Zeno's Philosophy.

Explications of Heraclitus 3.

Of Sense 4.

Of Art.

To Democritus.

To Aristarchus.

To Erillus.

Of Appetite 2.

Archæology.

Of God.

Of Giants.

Of Hymeneals.

Of a Poet.

Of Office 3.

Of right Consultation.

Of Gratitude.

Protreptick.

Of Virtues.

Of Ingenuity.

Of Gorgippus.

Of Envy.

Of Love.

Of Liberty.

The Art of Love.

Of Honour.

Of Glory.

The Politick.

Of Counsel.

Of Laws.

Of Judging.

Of the Reason of Living.

Of Speech 3.

Of the End.

Of honest Things.

Of Actions.

Of Science.

Of a Kingdom.

Of Friendship.

Of a Symposium.

That the Virtue of Man and Woman is the same.

That a wise Man may use Sophisms.

Of Chrias.

Dissertations 2.

Of Pleasure.

Of Properties.

Of Inexplicables.

Of Dialectick.

Of Tropes.

Of Categorems.

Besides these are mentioned,

Of Atoms.

Of Brags.

Of Sumptions.

Fabulous Traditions.

Of The Art of Rhetorick.

^f Cic. de finib. lib. 2.

^g Stob. Ser. 28.

^h Ser. 33.

ⁱ Ser. 30.

^k Ser. 22. ^l Ser. 112.

^m Laert. vit. Zeno

^p Athen. deign. 13.

^o Cic. de fin. l. 4.

C H A P. IV.

His Death.

HE lived according to *Laertius* eighty Years, according to *Lucian*, 99. The Occasion of his Death this; being troubled with a Soreness of his Gums (*Stobaeus* saith, an Ulcer under his Tongue) he was enjoined by the Physicians to fast two Days; which he did, and was well; then they told him

p Stob. Serm. 7. q Laert. 7. 176. r In Epictet. cap. ult.

he might eat again, but he would not, saying, he was now gone a great Way on his Journey; *Would you have me, saith he, having past over the greatest Part of my Life, return back again, and begin it anew?* Having fasted two Days more, he died.

Simplicius saith, he saw an exquisite Statue of *Cleanthes* in *Afius*, an Example of the Magnificence of the Roman Senate, dedicated to his Honour.

C H R Y S I P P U S.

C H A P. I.

His Life.

Chrysippus was of *Soli*, a City of *Cilicia*, afterwards called *Pompeopolis*, his Father was of *Tarsis*, named *Apollonius*, or, as *Suidas*, *Apollonides*, who came and lived at *Soli*, which perhaps gave *Laertius*, and from him *Suidas*, occasion to doubt whether *Chrysippus* himself were not of *Tarsis*.

He first exercised in the *Hippodrome*. *Hecaton* saith, that having waisted his Patrimony in the King's Service, he applied himself to Philosophy. Coming to *Athens*, he heard, as some affirm, *Zeno*, or rather (as *Diocles* and others) *Cleanthes*, from whom, whilst he was yet alive, he dissented. He was an eminent Philosopher, ingenious and acute in every Thing; so that in most Opinions he differed from *Zeno* and *Cleanthes*, to whom he would only say, *Tell me the Doctrines, and let me alone for Proofs*. If at any Time he crossed *Cleanthes* in Dispute, he was afterwards sorry for it, often saying,

*Of Happiness in all I am possess'd,
But in Cleanthes; there alone unblest'd.*

He was so famous for *Dialectick*, that it was a common Speech, *If the Gods themselves would use Dialectick, they would make Use only of the Chrysippean*. But he was more plentiful in Matter, than free in Expression.

He was infinitely studious and industrious, as appeareth from the Multitude of his Books. An old Woman that waited on him said, that he wrote every Day 500 Paragraphs.

When any question'd him in private, he answered meekly and freely; but as soon as any Company came, he grew eager and litigious, saying,

*Brother, there hangs a Cloud before your Eyes;
Cast quite away this Madnest, and be wise.*

When he drunk at Feasts, he lay very still, only shook his Legs; whereupon his Woman said, *Chrysippus's Legs only are drunk*.

He had so good an Opinion of himself, that to one who asked him to whom he should commend his Son, he answered, *To me; for if I knew any better, I would hear Philosophy of him myself*: Whence it was said of him,

*He is inspir'd by Jove,
The rest like Shadows move.*

As also that,

*Had not Chrysippus been,
No Stoa we had seen.*

Arcefilaus and *Lacydes* (as *Sotion* saith) coming into the Academy, he studied Philosophy with them, whence he disputed against Custom and for Custom, and of Magnitude and Multitude, using the Arguments of the Academicks.

He was a great Despisser of Honour, for of all his Writings, he dedicates none to any King. He was content with little, for he lived without any other Attendants than one old Woman; and when

Ptolemy wrote to *Cleanthes*, desiring he would come to him, or send some one of his Disciples, *Spharus* went, but *Chrysippus* refused.

Having sent for *Aristocreon* and *Philocrates*, his Sister's Sons, he first taught in the *Lyceum* in the open Air, as *Demetrius* writes.

C H A P. II.

His Apophthegms.

TO one that blamed him for not hearing *Aristo*, as many did; If I should follow many, faith he, I should not study Philosophy.

To a Dialectick assaulting *Cleanthes* with Sophisms: Leave, faith he, diverting an aged Person from serious Things; propound those to us that are young.

He said, Meditation is the Fountain of Discourse.

He said, Drunkenness is a lesser Madness.

He said, a wife Man grieveth, but is not troubled, for his Mind yields not to it.

To one that said to him, Your Friend revileth you behind your Back: Blame him not, faith he, for he might do it before my Face.

To a wicked Man that cast many Aspersions upon him: You have done well, faith he, not to omit any Thing that is in yourself.

Being told that some spoke ill of him; It is no Matter, faith he, I will live so that they shall not be believed.

He said, there is a Difference between swearing true, and swearing truly; and betwixt swearing false, and forswearing. That which is sworn, at the Time that it is sworn, must necessarily be either true or false, seeing that the Form of swearing is an Axiom: But he that sweareth, at the same Time that he sweareth, is not necessarily perjured, or sweareth true, because the Time is not yet arrived that must determine his Oath. For as a Man is said to have covenanted truly or falsely, not when the Covenant is made, but when the Time whereby it is limited is come: So a Man is said to swear truly or falsely, when the Time comes wherein he promised to make good his Oath.

Being demanded why he did not undertake the Government of the Commonwealth; Because, faith he, if I govern ill, I shall displease the Gods; if well, the People.

He said, he who hath arrived at Perfection, dischargeth all Offices, omitting none, yet his Life is not happy, for Beatitude is a Post-accession thereto, when as the mean Actions acquire a Constancy, Habit, and peculiar Confirmation.

C H A P. III.

His Writings.

BECAUSE, faith *Laetius* ¹, his Writings were very celebrated, we shall give an Account of them, digested according to their Subjects. They were these.

Of the Logical Place, These.

Logick.

Philosophical Commentaries.

Dialectick Definitions, to *Metrodorus*, 6.

Of Dialectick Names, to *Zeno* 1.

Dialectick Art, to *Aristagoras* 1.

Of connex Probables, to *Dioscorides* 4.

The first Order of the Logical Place of Things.

Of Axioms 1.

Of not-simple Axioms 1.

Of Connex, to *Athenades* 2.

Of Negatives, to *Aristagoras* 3.

Of Cataforecticks, to *Athenodorus* 1.

Of Things spoken by Privation, to *Thearus* 1.

Of best Axioms, to *Dion* 3.

Of Indefinites 4.

Of Things spoken according to Time 2.

Of perfect Axioms 2.

The second Order.

Of true Disjunct, to *Gorgippides* 1.

Of true Connex, to *Gorgippides* 1.

Division, to *Gorgippides* 1.

Of Consequents 1.

Of that which is for three, to *Gorgippides* 1.

Of Possibles, to *Clitus* 4.

Of Significations, against *Philo* 1.

What are false 1.

The third Order.

Of Precepts 2.

Of Interrogations 2.

Of Percontation 4.

Epitome of Interrogation and Percontation 1.

Epitome of Answers 1.

Of Question 2.

Answer 4.

The fourth Order.

Of Categorems, to *Metrodorus* 10.

Of Right and Supine, to *Philarchus* 1.

¹ *Laet.* 7. 18a.

² *Stob.* Ser. 3.

³ *Ibid.* 17.

⁴ *Ibid.* 7.

⁵ *Ibid.* 55.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.* 28.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 101.

¹¹ *Laet.* 7. 18g.

Of Conjunctions, to Apollonides 1.
To Pafylus, of Categorems 4.

The Fifth Order.

Of the Five Cases 1.
Of Expressions defined according to the Subject 1.
Of Assimilation, to Stefagoras 2.
Of Appellatives 2.

Of the Logical Place concerning Words, and their Reasons. The First Order.

Of singular and plural Expressions 6.
Of Words, to Soligenes and Alexander 5.
Of the anomaly of Words, to Dion 4.
Of Sorites pertaining to Voice 3.
Of Solæcisms, to Dionysius 1.
Of unusual Speech 1.
Words, to Dionysius 1.

The Second Order.

Of the Elements of Speech 5.
Of the Syntax of Things said 4.
Of the Syntax, and Elements of Speech, to Philip 3.
Of the Elements of Speech, to Nicias 1.
Of Relative Speech.

The Third Order.

Of Not-Dividents 2.
Of Amphibolies to Apollas 4.
Of Tropical Amphibolies 1.
Of Connex Tropical Amphibolies 2.
Upon Panthædus, of Amphibolies 2.
Introduction to Amphiboly 5.
Epitome of Amphibolies to Epicrates 1.
Connex to the Introduction of Amphibolies 2.

Of Logical Place concerning Reasons and Moods.

The First Order.

The Art of Reasons and Moods, to Dioscorides 5.
Of Reasons 3.
Of the Composition of Moods, to Stefagoras 2.
Comparison of Tropical Axioms 1.
Of reciprocal Reasons and Connex 1.
To Agatho, or of sequent Problems 1.
Of Inferences, to Aristagoras 1.
Of placing the same Reason in divers Moods 1.
Against those who oppose that the same Reason may be placed in Sylogistick and not Sylogistick Moods 2.
Against those who oppose the Reduction of Syllogisms 3.
Against Philo's Book of Moods, to Timostratus 1.
Logical Conjunctions, to Timocrates, and Philomathes.
Upon Reason and Moods 1.

The Second Order.

Of conclusive Reasons, to Zeno 1.
Of first indemonstrable Syllogisms, to Zeno 1.
Of Reduction of Syllogisms 1.
Of Redundant Syllogisms, to Pafylus 2.
Theorems of Solæcisms 1.
Sylogistick Introductions, to Zeno 1.
Introductions to Moods, to Zeno 3.
Of Syllogisms false in Figure 5.
Sylogistick Reasons by Reduction in Indemonstrables 1.
Tropical Questions to Zeno and Philomathes (suspected to be spurious) 1.

The Third Order.

Of Coincident Reasons, to Athenades 1. spurious.
Coincident Reasons as to the Medium 3. spurious.
Of Aminius's Disjunctions 1.

The Fourth Order.

Of Hypotheses, to Meleager 3.
Hypothetick Reasons in Law, to Meleager 1.
Hypothetick Reasons for Introduction 2.
Hypothetick Reasons of Theorems 2.
Solution of Hedyllus's Hypotheticks 2.
Solution of Alexander's Hypotheticks 3. spurious.
Of Expositions, to Leodamas 1.

The Fifth Order.

Of Introduction to the Lying Reason, to Aristocreon 1.
Lying Reasons to the Introduction 1.
Of the Lying Reason, to Aristocreon 6.

The Sixth Order.

Against those who think true and false are one, 1.
Against those who dissolve the Lying Reason by Distinction 2.
Demonstration, that Infinites are not to be divided 1.
Upon that which hath been said against the Divisions of Infinites, to Pafylus 3.
Solutions according to the Ancients, to Dioscorides 1.
Of the Solution of the Lying Reason, to Aristocreon 3.
Solution of Hedyllus's Hypotheticks, to Aristocreon and Apollas.

The Seventh Order.

Against those who say the Lying Reason hath false Sumptions 1.
Of the Negative, to Aristocreon 2.

Negative Reasons, to Gymnasia 1.
Of the diminutive Reason, to Stesagoras 2.
Of opinionative and quiescent Reasons, to Onetor 2.
Of the veiled Reason, to Aristobulus 2.
Of the occult Reason, to Athenades 1.

The Eighth Order.

Of the Nullity, to Menecrates 8.
Of Reasons consisting of Indefinite and Definite, to Palyllus 2.
Of the Nullity, to Epicrates 1.

The Ninth Order.

Of Sophisms, to Heraclides and Pollis 2.
Of insoluble Dialectick Reasons, to Diofcorides 5.
Against Arcefilaus's Method, to Sphaerus 1.

The Tenth Order.

Against Custom, to Metrodorus 6.

Of the Logical place besides these four Differences, there are dispersed, not containing in the Body of logical Questions, 39.

Of the Ethick place, for Direction of Moral Notions. The First Order.

Description of Speech, to Theoporus 1.
Moral Theſes 1.
Probable Sumptions for Doctrines, to Philomathes 3.
Definitions of civil Persons, to Metrodorus 2.
Definitions of wicked Persons, to Metrodorus 2.
Definitions of mean Persons, to Metrodorus 2.
General Definitions, to Metrodorus 7.
Definitions of other Arts, to Metrodorus 2.

The Second Order.

Of Things like, to Aristocles 3.
Of Definitions, to Metrodorus 7.

The Third Order.

Of Things not rightly objected against Definitions, to Laodamas 7.
Probables for Definitions, to Diofcorides.
Of Species and Genus, to Gorgippides 2.
Of Divisions 1.
Of Contraries, to Dionysius 2.
Probables for Divisions, Genus's and Species.
Of Contraries 1.

The Fourth Order.

Of Etymologicks, to Diocles 6.
Etymologicks, to Diocles 4.

The Fifth Order.

Of Proverbs, to Zenotodus 2.
Of Poems, to Philomathes 1.
How Poems must be heard 2.
Against Critics, to Diodorus 1.

Of the Moral Place of common Speeches, according to Arts and Virtue. The First Order.

Against Rescriptions, to Timonax 1.
How we think and speak Singulars 1.
Of Nations, to Laodamas 2.
Of Suspicion, to Pythonax 2.
Demonstration that a wise Man doth not opinate 1.
Of Comprehension, and Science, and Ignorance 4.
Of Speech 2.
Of the Use of Speech, to Leptines.

The Second Order.

That the Ancients approved Dialectick with Demonstration, to Zeno 2.
Of Dialectick, to Aristocreon 4.
Upon the Objections against Dialectick 3.
Of Rhetorick, to Diofcorides 4.

The Third Order.

Of Habitude, to Cleon 3.
Of Art and Sloth, to Aristocreon 4.
Of the Differences in Virtues, to Diodorus.
What Virtues are 1.
Of Virtues, to Pollis.

Of the Moral Place concerning Good and Ill. The First Order.

Of Honesty and Pleasure, to Aristocreon 10.
Demonstration, that Pleasure is not the chief End 4.
Demonstration, that Pleasure is not Good 4.
*Of those which are said *****.*

Thus concludes the Seventh Book of *Laertius*; and who seeth not that the last of these Titles is defective, and moreover that the rest of the Orders, concerning this Place of Good and Ill, (whereof this is but the first) are wanting. Doubtless the End of this Book is imperfect, and wanteth, if not the Lives of any Stoical Philosophers, who succeeded *Chrysippus* (whereof he mentions *Zeno*, and others elsewhere) yet at least a considerable Part of his Catalogue, containing the rest of his *Ethick* Writings, and all his *Phylick*, many of which are elsewhere cited even by *Laertius* himself, which, as the learned *Cassaubon* had observed, he would not have ascribed to *Laertius*'s Neglect that *Chrysippus*'s Book of *Laws* is not mentioned. Of his *Ethick* Writings, besides those here named, were these,

- ^k *Of Laws.*
- ^l *Introduction to the Consideration of Things, good or ill.*
- ^m *Of Honesty.*
- ⁿ *Of Consent.*
- ^o *Of Things expetible in themselves.*
- ^p *Of Things not expetible in themselves.*
- ^q *Of Politick.*
- ^r *Of Ends.*
- ^s *Of Passions.*
- ^t *Of Ethick Questions.*
- ^u *Of Lives, whereof Plutarch cites the 4th Book.*
- ^v *That Zero used Names properly.*
- ^w *Of Justice, the first Book cited by Laertius.*
- ^x *Of Life and Transaſtion.*
- ^y *Of Offices.*
- ^z *Demonſtration of Juſtice.*
- ^a *Precepticks.*
- ^b *Of the End.*
- ^c *Of a Common-wealth.*
- ^d *Of the Office of a Judge.*
- ^e *Of Good.*
- ^f *Of Habits.*

To Phyſick belong theſe,

- ^h *Phyſicks.*
- ⁱ *Of the Soul, the 12th Book cited by Laertius.*
- ^j *Of Providence, the firſt Book cited.*
- ^k *Of the Gods.*
- ^l *Of Fate.*
- ^m *Of Divination.*
- ⁿ *Of the Philoſophy of the Ancients.*
- ^o *In Calumniation of the Senſes.*
- ^p *Of Jupiter.*
- ^q *Of Nature.*
- ^r *Phyſical Theſes.*
- ^s *Of Subſtance.*
- ^t *Of Motion.*
- ^u *Phyſical Queſtions, the Third Book cited.*
- ^v *Of Vacuity.*
- ^w *Epistles.*

* The Number of all his Writings, according to Laertius, was 705. He wrote ſo much, that he had often occaſion to treat upon the ſame Subject, and ſetting down whatſoever came into his Mind, he often corrected and enlarged it by the Teſtimonies of others; whence having in one Book inſerted all Euripides's *Medea*, one having the Book in his Hand, answer'd another, that asked him what Book it was, it is *Chryſippus's Medea*. And Apollodorus the *Athenian*, in his Collection of *Doctrines*, aſſerting, that *Epicurus* had written many Books

upon his own Strength, without uſing the Teſtimonies of others, and that he therein far exceeded *Chryſippus*, adds theſe Words, *For if a Man ſhould take out of Chryſippus's Writings, all that belongs to other Men, he would leave the Paper blank.*

Seneca gives this Cenſure of him: * He is moſt ſubtle and acute, penetrating into the Depth of Truth. He ſpeaks to the Thing that is to be done, and uſeth no more Words than are neceſſary to the Underſtanding thereof; but adds, that his Acuteness being too fine, is many times blunted, and retorted upon itſelf; even when he ſeems to have done ſomething, he only pricks, not pierceth.

Some there are who inveigh againſt him, as one that wrote many obſcene Things, not fit to be ſpoken, as in his *Commentary of the ancient Phyſiologiſts*; what he writes concerning *Jupiter* and *Juno* is obſcenely ſeigned, delivering that in ſix hundred Paragraphs, which the moſt impudent Perſon would not have committed to Writing; for, ſay they, he hath related the Story moſt unhandſomely; and tho' he praiſ'd it as natural, yet it becometh *Curtians* rather than Gods.

Moreover, what he ſaith of thoſe that write of *Tables*, is falſe, not to be found in *Polem*, nor *Hippiſtates*, nor *Antigon*, but forged by himſelf.

In his Book of *Common-wealth*, he allows Marriage with the Mother and a Daughter, and repeats the ſame in the Beginning of his Book, *Concerning Things expetible in themſelves*.

In his third Book of *Justice*, extending to a thouſand Paragraphs, he adviſed to feed upon the very Dead.

In his ſecond Book of *Life and Tranſaction*, he affirmeth, a wife Man ought to take Care to provide himſelf Food; but to what End muſt he provide himſelf Food? For Livelihood? Life is an *Indifferent*. For Pleaſure? Pleaſure alſo is *indifferent*. For Virtue? That is *Self-ſufficient for Beatitude*. Such kinds of Acquisition of Wealth are very ridiculous. If they proceed from a King, there is a Neceſſity of complying with him; if from a Friend, that Friendſhip is venial; if from Wiſdom, that Wiſdom is mercenary. For theſe Things, ſaith *Laertius*, ſome have inveighed againſt him.

CHAP. IV.

His Death.

HE died; according to *Apollodorus*, in the 143d Olympiad, (to ſupply *Laertius*, in whom the centenary Number is wanting by *Suidas*.) having lived 73 Years.

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|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|--|--|--------------------------|
| ^z Acl. 14. 4. | ¹ Athen. Deipn. 4. & 12. | ^m Deip. 4. & 8. | ⁿ Deipn. 6. | ^o Athen. Deipn. 7. | ^p Ach. Deipn. 4. | ^q Laert. vit. |
| ^{zen} Pl. rep. Stoic. | ^r Laert. Zen. pl. Rep. | ^s Laert. vit. Zen. | ^t Laert. ibid. | ^u Plut. rep. Laert. ibid. | ^w Laert. | ^x Plut. rep. |
| ^{Laert.} ibid. | ^y Laert. ibid. | ^z Plut. repug. | ^b Plut. repug. | ^c Plut. repug. & de com. not. | ^d Plut. repug. | ^e Plut. |
| ^{repug.} f Plut. repug. | ^g Plut. repug. | ^h Laert. ibid. | ⁱ Laert. ibid. | ^k Laert. ibid. | ^l Plut. repug. Laert. ibid. | ^m Plut. rep. |
| ^{Laert.} ibid. | ⁿ Laert. ibid. | ^o Laert. ibid. | ^p Plut. rep. | ^q Plut. rep. & com. not. | ^r Plut. repug. | ^s Plut. rep. |
| ^u Plut. rep. | ^w Plut. com. not. | ^z Plut. com. not. & Laert. | ^y Laert. ibid. | ^z Laert. 7. 121. | ^a De Beas. 2. 3. | ^b Sen. |
| ^{De Beas.} 1. 4. | ^c Laert. 7. 122. | ^d Laert. 7. 124. | | | | |

The Manner of his Death is differently related; *Hermippus* affirms, That being in the *Odeum*, (a Kind of publick Theatre at *Athens*) his Disciples called him away to Sacrifice, and thereupon taking a Draught of Wine, he was immediately seized by a *Vertigo*, of which at the End of five Days he died. Others report, he died of excessive Laughter. Seeing an *Ape* eat Figs, he bid his Woman offer it some Wine, and thereat fell into such Extremity of Laughter, that it killed him.

As to his Person, he was very little, saith *Laertius*, as appeareth by his Statue in the *Ceramic*, which is almost hid by the Horse that stands next it, whence *Carneades* called him *ἵπποκτατος*, hid by a

Horse. The Posture of this Statue, *Cicero* saith, was sitting, and stretching forth his Hand. *Pausanias* saith, it was set up in the *Gymnasium*, called *Prolemaean* from the Founder, not far from the *Forum*.

Laertius reckons four more of this Name.

The first, a Physician, to whom *Erasistratus* acknowledgeth himself beholding for many Things.

The second, his Son, Physician to *Ptolemy*, who, upon the Calumnies of some that maligned him, was publicly punished and beaten with Rods.

The third, Disciple to *Erasistratus*.

The fourth, a Writer of *Georgicks*.

e Cic. de fin. 1. f Pausan. Attic. c. 17. g Laert. 7. 15.

Z E N O.

Zeno was of *Tarvis*, or according to others, of *Sidon*, his Father named *Diocorides*. He was Disciple to *Chrysippus*, and his Successor in the

School. He wrote few Books, but left behind him many Disciples.

a Suidas. b Laert. vit. Zen.

D I O G E N E S.

Diogenes was born at *Seleucia*, he was surnamed the *Babylonian*, from the Vicinity of that Place. He was Disciple of *Chrysippus*, and is stiled by *Cicero* an eminent and serious Stoick. *Seneca* relates, That discoursing earnestly concerning Anger, a foolish young Man standing by, spat in his Face, which he took meekly and discreetly,

saying, *I am not angry, but am in doubt whether I ought to be so or not*. He was one of the three that was sent from *Athens* on Embassy to *Rome*; of which already in the Life of *Carneades*, who learned *Dialectick* of him. *Cicero* saith, he lived to a great Age. Amongst other Things, he wrote a Treatise of *Divination*.

e Laert. vit. Diag. d Cic. Tusc. quest. 3. 12. e De ira 3. 38.

A N T I P A T E R.

Antipater was of *Sidon*, Disciple to *Diogenes* the *Babylonian*, *Cicero* calls him a most acute Person; *Seneca*, one of the great Authors of the Stoical Sect. He declined to dispute with *Carneades*, but filled his Books with Confutations of him, whence he was called *σαλαπίστις*, The clamorous

Penman. He disputed much against those who asserted nothing. Besides other Things, he writ two Books of *Divination*. *Cicero*, at the latter End of his second Book of *Offices*, saith, he then was lately dead at *Athens*.

f Laert. 7. 28. g De Offic. 3. 12. h Plot. de Curral. i Cic. Ac. quest. 4. 6. k Cic. de Divin. l. 1. 3.

P A N Æ T I U S.

Panæti was of *Rhodes*, his Ancestors eminent for martial Affairs and Exercises. He was Disciple to *Antipater*, intimate Friend to *P. Scipio Africanus*, whom he accompanied in his Journey to *Alexandria*. *Cicero* calls him, *Almost Prince of the Stoicks, a Person extremely ingenious and grave, worthy the Familiarity of Scipio and Lælius*.

He was a great Admirer of *Plato*, whom every where he calleth, *Divine, most wise, most holy, the Homer of Philosophers*. But his Opinion of the Immortality of the Soul, he approved not, arguing thus; Whatsoever is generated, dieth; but Souls are generated, as is manifest from the Likeness of those that are begotten, to their Parents,

not only in Body but in Disposition. His other Argument was, There is nothing that is grieved or pained, but is subject to be sick; whatsoever is subject to Sickness, is likewise subject to Death; Souls are subject to Grief, therefore they are subject to Death.

He alone rejected Astrological Predictions, and receded from the Stoicks, as to *Divination*; yet would not positively affirm there was no such Art, but only that he doubted it.

He wrote three Books of *Offices*, much commended by *Cicero*.

Lipsius conjectures he died old, because *Cicero* affirmeth, out of *Possidonius*, that he lived thirty Years after he had written his Books of *Offices*.

† Strabo. l. 4.
de divin. l. 1. & 2.

m Cic. de Divin. l. 2.

n Plut. Apoph.

o Acad. quest. 4. 31.

p Cic. Tusc. quest. lib. 1. 32.

q Cic.

P O S S I D O N I U S.

Possidonius was born at *Apamea* in *Syria*. He lived at *Rhodes*, and there managed civil Affairs, and taught Philosophy. *Pompey*, in his Return from *Syria*, went to *Rhodes* purposely to hear him, and coming to his Door, forbade the Liſtor to knock, as was the Custom; but he (saith *Pliny*) to whom the East and West had submitted, himself submitted his *Fasces* at this Gate. But understanding that he was very sick of a great Pain in his Joints, he resolved only to give him a Visit. At his first coming and Salutation, he told him with much Respect, that he was extremely sorry he could not hear him. *Possidonius* answered, *You may, for no corporeal Pain shall make me frustrate the Coming of so great a Person*. And thereupon he discoursed seriously and copiously upon this Sub-

ject, as he lay in his Bed, *That nothing is good, but what is honest*. And as often as his Pain took him, he would say, *Pain, it is to no Purpose; thou art troublesome, I will never acknowledge thou art ill*.

He made a *Spear*, wherein were all the Conversations of the Sun, Moon and Planets, exactly as they moved in the Heavens every Day and Night.

Of his Writings are cited by *Cicero* five Books of *Divination*; as also five Books of the Nature of the Gods.

Thus far we have a continued Succession of the Stoick Philosophers, the last School, according to *Laertius*'s Disposition, of those that were descended from *Thales*.

† Strab. lib. 7.

‡ Cic. Tusc. qu. l. 2. 25.

§ Plin. Ep. l. 2. 7.

|| Cic. de nat. Deor. lib. 2.

¶ De divin. l. 1.

FRANCIS Lord Verulam,

Advancement of Learning, LIB. III. SECT. V.

AS for the Placits of Ancient Philosophers, as were those of Pythagoras, Philolaus, Xenophon, Anaxagoras, Parmenides, Leucippus, Democritus, and others, (which Men use disdainfully to run over) it will not be amiss to cast our Eyes with more Reverence upon them. For altho' Aristotle (after the Manner of the Race of the Ottomans) thought he could not safely reign, unless he made away all his Brethren; yet to those who seriously propound to themselves the Inquisition and Illustration of Truth, and not Dominion or Magistrality, it cannot but seem a Matter of great Profit, to see at once before them, the several Opinions of several Authors touching the Nature of Things. Neither is this, for any great Hope conceived, that a more exact Truth can any way be expected from these or from the like Theories: For, as the same *Phænomena*, the same *Calculations*, are satisfied upon the Astronomical Principles, both of *Ptolomy* and *Copernicus*; so the popular Experience we embrace, and the ordinary View and Face of Things, may apply itself to many several Theories; whereas a right Investigation of Truth requires another manner of Severity and Speculation. For as Aristotle saith elegantly, *That Children at first, indeed, call all Men Fathers, and Women Mothers; but afterwards they distinguish them both*: So certainly Experience in Childhood will call every *Philosophy*, *Mother*; but when it comes to Ripeness, it will discern the true Mother. In the mean time it is good to read over divers Philosophies, as divers Glosses upon Nature; whereof, it may be, one in one Place, another in another, is more corrected: Therefore, I could wish a Collection made, but with Diligence and Judgment, *De Antiquis Philosophiis*, out of the Lives of Ancient Philosophers; out of the Parcels of *Plutarch*, of their *Placits*;

cits ; out of the Citations of Plato ; out of the Confutations of Aristotle ; out of a sparfed Mention found in other Books, as well of Christians as of Heathens (as out of Lactantius, Philo, Philostratus, and the rest :) For I do not yet see extant a Work of this Nature. But here I must give Warning, that this be done distinctly, so as the Philosophies, every one severdly, be composd and continued, and not collected by Titles and Handfuls, as hath been done by Plutarch. For every Philosophy, while it is entire in the whole Piece, supports itself ; and the Opinions maintained therein, give Light, Strength, and Credence mutually one to the other ; whereas, if they be simple and broken, it will sound more strange and dissonant. In truth, when I read in Tacitus the Actions of Nero, or of Claudius, invested with Circumstances of Times, Persons, and Inducements, I find them not so strange, but that they may be true : But when I read the same Actions in Suetonius Tranquillus, represented by Titles and common Places, and not in Order of Time, they seem monstrous, and altogether incredible. So is Philosophy when it is propounded entire, and when it is sliced and articulated into Fragments.

MONTAIGNE, ESSAYS, Chap. XII.

How much do I desire, that, in my Life-time, either some other, or Justus Lipsius, the most knowing Person that is left us, of a most polished and judicious Wit, truly allied to my Turnebus, had both the Will and the Health, and Leisure enough to collect in one Register, according to their Divisions and their Classes, sincerely and curiously, as much as we can see thereof, the Opinions of the Ancient Philosophy, upon the Subject of our Being, and of our Manners, its Controversies, the Credit and Succession of its Sects, the Application of the Life of the Authors and Followers, to their Precepts in memorable and exemplary Accidents ! What an excellent and profitable Work would this be ?

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE NINTH PART,
Containing the *ITALICK* Sect.

PYTHAGORAS.

CHAP. I.

The Country, Parents, and Time of PYTHAGORAS.

THE *Italick* Sect was distinct from the *Ionick* in respect of the Author, Place, Discipline, and Doctrine; denominated from that Part of *Italy*, which from the frequency of Greek Colonies was called *Magna Græcia*. Yet was not the Author, *Pythagoras*, an Italian; for, tho' some think, his Father was of *Metapontum*; some, a *Tyrrhene*, of *Etruria* in *Italy*, yet *Diogenes* and others report him a *Tyrrhene*, of the Race of those who inhabited *Lenos*, *Imbrus*, and *Scyrus*; and that coming upon Traffick to *Samos*, he settled there, and was made free. With these concurs *Aristæmus*, (to whom *Clemens Alexandrinus* joineth *Aristarchus* and *Theopompus*) who in the Life of *Pythagoras* saith, that he was born in one of those Islands which the *Athenians* won, and expelled thence the *Tyrrhenians*. Whence *Suidas* saith, that *Pythagoras* was a *Samian*, but by Birth a *Tyrrhenian*, brought over young by his Father from *Tyrrhenia* to *Samos*. And indeed his Country seems inscrutable to *Lycus*; to *Josephus* no less difficult to find out, than that of *Homer*.

Nor is it strange, that the Country of his Father should be question'd, since it is not agreed concerning

his Name and Quality: *Justin* calls him *Demareatus*, (and *Johannes Sarisburiensis*, from *Justin*, *Maratus*)^a others, *Mamercus*: But the greater Part of Writers agree, that he was called *Mnesarchus*; his Profession, according to *Hermippus* and others, a Graver of Rings; according to others, a Merchant.

Some there are who affirm, he was a *Phliasian*; *Pausanias* reports, that he was Son of *Euphron*, Grandson of *Hippasus*, who upon the taking of *Phlius* by the *Dorians*, fled to *Samos*. Others, that he was Son of *Hippasus*; *Hippasus* was Son of *Euthyphron* of *Cleonymus*, who was banished out of *Phlius*; and that *Mamercus* (or rather *Mnesarchus*) lived in *Samos*, whence *Pythagoras* was said to be a *Samian*. *Cleantes* relates he was a *Syrian*, of the City of *Tyrrus* in *Syria*, (or rather in *Phœnicia*) whence making a Voyage to *Samos* for Traffick, at such Time as the *Samians* were much oppressed with Famine, he furnished them with Corn; in requital whereof, they made him free of their Country. *Hippobotus* saith, that *Pythagoras* was a *Samian*.

Indeed, the most general and approv'd Opinion is, that *Mnesarchus* was a *Samian*, descended from *Amæus*, who first brought a Colony into *Samos*; and

^a Porphy. de vit. Pythag. lib. 1. c. 1. ^b Contra Apollon. Alex. Strom.

^c Phil. Sympec. Lib. 10. in Pyth.

^d Porph. lib. 1. c. 1. ^e Laert. lib. 1.

^f Porph. lib. 1. c. 1. ^g Laert. lib. 1.

^h Strom. l. 1. c. 1.

ⁱ Porph. lib. 1. c. 1.

^k Porph. lib. 1. c. 1. ^l Clem.

that *Pythagoras*, his Son, was born at *Sidon* in *Phœnicia*; but by Education, as well as Extraction, a *Samian* also. This is ratified by the Authority of *Jamblichus*, who begins his Life with this fabulous Narration.

It is reported, that *Anceus*, who liv'd at *Same* in *Cephalœnia*, was descended from *Jupiter*, [others say from *Neptune* and *Astypalea*] an Opinion occasioned by his Virtues, or some particular Greatness of Soul. In Prudence and Magnanimity he excelled all other *Cephalœnians*. This *Anceus* was commanded by the *Pythian Oracle*, to gather together a Colony out of *Cephalœnia*, *Arcadia*, and *Theffaly*, augmenting it from *Athens*, *Epidaurus*, and *Chalcis*; and that having got them together under his Command, he should people an Island, named from the Richness of the Soil *Melamphyllos*, (black-leaf) and call the City which they built *Samos*, from *Same* in *Cephalœnia*. The Oracle was thus:

Instead of *Same*, *Samos* thou (an Isle)
Shalt plant *Anceus*, which Men *Phyllas* stile.

That this Colony was drawn from those several Places, appears not only from their religious Rites and Sacrifices, (which are derived from the Countries out of which those People came) but also from the Affinities and mutual Conventions made by the *Samians*. *Mnesarchus* and *Pythais*, the Parents of *Pythagoras*, are said to be descended from the Family of the same *Anceus*, that planted this Colony there. [Of *Pythais*, it is confirmed by *Apollonius*.] Which Nobleness of their Extraction, being much celebrated amongst their Country-men, a *Samian Poet* declar'd him to be the Son of *Apollo*, in these Words.

Pythais of all *Samians* the most fair,
Joy'd lov'd *Pythagoras* to *Phœbus* bare.

Which Report was raised thus. The *Mnesarchus* the *Samian* being upon Occasion of Traffick at *Delphis* with his Wife, who was at that Time newly with Child, and not known to be so, he enquired of the Oracle concerning his Voyage to *Syria*. The Prophetess told him, that his Journey should be according to his Mind, very advantageous. That his Wife was already with Child, and should bring forth a Son that should exceed all Men that ever were, in Beauty and Wisdom, and through the whole Course of his Life conduce much to the Benefits of Mankind. *Mnesarchus* considering, that the Oracle would not have spoken of his Son, seeing that he demand'd nothing concerning him, if there were not something extraordinary to be expected from him, immediately thereupon changed the Name of his Wife, which before was *Parnœnis*, to *Pythais*, from

the Prophetess; and as soon as he was delivered at *Sidon* in *Phœnicia*, they call'd the Child *Pythagoras*. For *Epimenides*, *Eudoxus*, *Xenocrates*, [and others mentioned by *Apollonius*] are to be rejected, who affirm *Apollo* at that time lay with *Pythais*, and got her with Child, (he not being so before) and thereupon foretold it by the Prophetess; this is not to be admitted. But that the Soul of *Pythagoras*, being of the Regimine of *Apollo*, whether as a Follower, or some other Way more near to him) was sent to Men none can doubt, since it may be evinc'd by these Circumstances of his Birth, and the universal Wisdom of his Mind. Thus much (saith *Jamblichus*) concerning his Generation. Whence we see the Greeks did so much admire his Wit, that they thought it could be nothing less than Divine, and thereupon fabled *Apollo* to be his Father.

Pythagoras was the youngest of three Sons, the eldest *Cleanthes*, call'd *Eumysus*; *Laertius*, and *Suidas* *Eunomus*; the second, *Tyrrhenus*. He had likewise an Uncle, *Zoilus*, mentioned by *Laertius*.

The Reasons for establishing the Times concerning *Pythagoras's* Life will hereafter be set forth, upon Occasion of his going into *Italy*. In the mean time I shall desire it may be admitted, that he was born about the third Year of the fifty-third Olympiad: That being eighteen Years old, he heard *Thales* and others. Then he went to *Phœnicia*, thence into *Egypt*, where he staid twenty-two Years; afterwards at *Babylon* twelve Years, then returned to *Samos*, being fifty-six Years old; and from thence went into *Italy*. The Particulars whereof shall in their several Places be more fully discours'd.

CHAP. II.

His first Education and Masters.

Mnesarchus (saith *Jamblichus*) returning from *Syria* to *Samos* with much Wealth, and Abundance of Merchandise, built a Temple, which he dedicated to *Apollo* the *Pythian*, and brought up his Son in several excellent Disciplines, committing him sometimes to *Creophylus*, sometimes to *Pherecydes* of *Syrus*, and to almost all the *Presidents* of the Temple; as being bless'd with the fairest and most divine Son that ever *Samos* bore.

Some there are who affirm, that he was first a Wrestler; and that when *Pherecydes* first discours'd among the Greeks, concerning the Immortality of the Soul, *Pythagoras* the *Samian*, moved at the Novelty of the Discourse, became of a Wrestler, a Philosopher. But these Relations seem to have been occasion'd by confounding *Pythagoras* the Philosopher with a Wrestler of that Name, his Contemporary, of whom hereafter.

Cleanthes

* *Jamb.* v. c. *Pyth.* c. 2. * So used both here and afterwards, as appeareth by the Oracle, *deu* *Edm.* * *Strab.* l. 10. * *Pyth.* p. 127. * Cited also by *Porphyrius*. * *Porph.* p. 129. * Adding 2 *vicinia* *ante* in an other *Pyth.* interpretation. * *Pyth.* p. 128. * *Val.* *Pyth.* p. c. 2. * *Laert.* 7. 2. * *St. Aug.* Ep. 9. ad *Valent.*

Pherecydes and ^a Suidas relate, that he first heard Pherecydes the Syrian, at Samos; and in the second Place Hermodamas, τῷ Κρησφύλῳ, the Creophylian, at the same Samos, then very old. ^b Hermodamas was his Name, but he was surnamed Creophylus. Wherefore perhaps instead of τῷ Κρησφύλῳ, should be ^c read, τῷ Κρησφύλῳ; or else he was termed a Creophylian, as well as surnamed Creophylus; ^d for that reported to be descended from Creophylus a ^e Samian, who, in Times past, entertained Homer as his Guest, and was, or some say, his Master and his Rival in Poetry. But ^f Apuleius, who saith, Hermodamas, or Leodamas, as he calls him, was Disciple to that Creophylus, an Error no less in Chronology, than when he saith, Pythagoras was Disciple to Plato, unless the whole Text be corrupted.

^g Pythagoras his Father dying, he grew up in Prudence and Temperance, being, whilst he was yet very young, generally much respected and honoured, even by the most aged. His Presence and Discourse attracted all Persons; to every one on whom he looked, he appeared worthy Admiration, insomuch that many averred, he was the Son of a Deity. He being thus confirm'd by the great Opinions that were had of him, by the Education of his Infancy, and by his natural Excellency, made himself daily more worthy of these Advantages, adorning himself with Devotions, with Sciences, with excellent Conversation, with Constancy of Mind, with grave Deportment, and with a sweet inimitable Serenity; never transported with Anger, Laughter, Emulation, Contention, or any other Disorder; living like some good Genius, come to converse in Samos. Hereupon, tho' young, a great Report was spread of him, to Thales at Miletus, to Bias at Priene, two of the Sages, and to all the Cities thereabout; many in all those Parts commending the young Man, made him famous, calling him by a Proverb, [The Samian Corner] or, [The fair-hair'd Samian.]

About this Time began the Tyranny of Polycrates, when Pythagoras about eighteen Years old, foreseeing the Event, and how obstructive it would prove to his Designs, and to the Pursuit of Learning, which he intended above all Things, [^h being young, and desirous of Knowledge, left his Country to go to travel] stole away privately by Night, taking with him Hermodamas, (surnamed Creophylus, and descended, as was reported, from that Creophylus who was Host to Homer) and made a Voyage to Pherecydes, [at Lesbos, to whom, Laertius saith, he was recommended by his Uncle Zeilus] and to Anaximander, the natural Philosopher, and to Thales at Miletus. With each of these he conversed severally in such Manner, that

they all lov'd him, admired his Parts, and communicated their Learning to him. [ⁱ Under Anaximander the Milesian, he is said to have studied the Knowledge of natural Things.] Thales entertained him kindly, and, wondering at his Excellency above other Youths, which much surpass'd the Report he had received, assist'd him as far as he was able in Sciences; whilst, accusing his own Age and Infirmary, he advis'd him to make a Voyage to Egypt, there to get Acquaintance with the Priests of Memphis and ^j Diospolis, since of them he had learned those Things for which he was by many esteem'd wise, tho' he were not of such Forwardness, neither by Nature or Education, as he saw Pythagoras to be. Whence he prefaced, that, if he convers'd with those Priests, he should become the most Divine and Wiser of Men.

This Pherecydes fell sick at Delos: that he outlived not the fifty-seventh Olympiad, is manifest from a ^k Letter which he writ the Day before his Death to Thales, who died the first Year of the Olympiad following. And tho' the greater Part of Authors write, that at the same Time, when the Cylonians in Cræte, conspir'd against the Pythagoreans, which was not long before Pythagoras died, Pythagoras was gone from Italy to Delos, to visit and bury Pherecydes, yet Diacæarchus and other more accurate Authors (saith ^l Porphyrius) aver, that Pythagoras was present when that Conspiracy broke forth; and that Pherecydes died before Pythagoras departed from Samos. The former Relation hath impos'd, among others, ^m upon the learned Salmassius, who, to reconcile this with other Circumstances concerning Pherecydes, is constrain'd to imagine another Person of the same Name. It was therefore before Pythagoras left Samos, that ⁿ Pherecydes, being desperately seized by a Phebricist, he went to visit him, and attended him in his Sickness until he died, and then performed the Rites of Funeral, as to his Master. For Laertius and Porphyrius add, that after the Death and Burial of Pherecydes, he returned to Samos, out of a Desire to enjoy the Society of Hermodamas.

^o Phavorinus, in the seventh Book of his various History, and ^p Porphyrius, relate, that after he had liv'd a while with Hermodamas, he first taught Wrestlers, and of them Eurimenes, to diet with Flesh, (whereas other Wrestlers used to eat dry'd Figs, Cheese-curd, and Whey) whereby he became Victor at the Olympick Games. But Laertius and ^q Jamblichus observe, that this is falsely ascribed to Pythagoras the Samian, (for he allowed not the eating of Flesh) but was indeed the Invention of Pythagoras, Son of Eratocles, of whom hereafter.

E e e z

C H A P.

^a Porph. p. 2.^b In Pythag.^c Jamb. c. 2.^d As once in Ritterhusius's Edition, or perhaps τῷ Κρησφύλῳ.^e Jamb.^f Stea-^g Florid. l. 2.^h Jam. continuez.ⁱ Laert. 8. 2.^j Apul. Florid. l. 2.^k Thebes.^l Laert. vit. Thaletis.^m Vg. 38.ⁿ Plin. exercit.^o Porph. p. 10.^p Jam. c. 30. p. 162.^q Laert. 8. 2.^r Laert. 8. 47.^s Cap. 5.

readily performed, to their so great Admiration, that they gave him Power to sacrifice to the Gods, and to acquaint himself with all their Studies, which was never known to have been granted to any Foreigner besides. Clemens Alexandrinus relates particularly that he was Disciple to Sonchedes, an Egyptian Arch-priest.

^a Diogenes saith, that whilst he lived with these Priests, he was instructed in the Learning and Language (as Antiphon also affirms) of the Egyptians, and in their three Kinds of Writing, Epistolick, Hieroglyphic, and Symbolic; whereof one imitates the common way of speaking; the rest allegorical, by Enigms: ^b They who are taught by the Egyptians, learn first the Method of all the Egyptian Letters, which is called Epistolographic; the second, Hieratick, used by those who write of sacred Things; the last and most perfect Hieroglyphic, whereof one is Curiolock, the other, Symbolick. Of the Symbolick, one is properly spoken by Imitation, another is written as it were Tropically; another on the contrary doth allegorize by Enigms. For instance, in the Kyriologick way, to express the Sun, they make a Circle; the Moon, a Crescent. Tropically, they do properly traduce, and transfer, and express by exchanging some Things, and variously transfiguring others. Thus when they deliver the Praises of Kings, in Theological Fables, they write by Anaglyphicks. Of the third kind, by Enigms, let this be an Example; All other Stars, by reason of their oblique Course, they likened to the Bodies of Serpents, but the Sun to that of a Beetle, because having formed a Ball of Cow-dung, and lying upon its back, it rolls it about (from Claw to Claw.) They say moreover, that this Creature liveth six Months under Ground, and the other half of the Year upon the Earth; and that it immits Seed into the Globe (of the Earth) and so generates, there being no Female of that Species. Hitherto Clemens.

Thus being acquainted with the Learning of that Nation, and enquiring into the Commentaries of the Priests of former Times, he knew the Observations of innumerable Ages, as Valerius Maximus saith. And living admiring and belov'd of all the Priests and Prophets with whom he conversed, he informed himself by their means accurately, concerning every thing; not omitting any Person, eminent at that Time for Learning, or any kind of religious Rites; nor leaving any Place unseen, by going into which he conceived that he might find something extraordinary. [For he went into the Adyta of the Egyptians, and, as Clemens saith, permitted himself to that End to be circumcised] and learned Things not to be communicated concerning the Gods, mystick Philosophy.] He travelled to

all the Priests, and was instructed by every one, in that wherein they were particularly learned. In Egypt he lived twenty-two Years, in their Private Sacred Places, studying Astronomy and Geometry, and was initiated (not curiously or casually) into all the religious Mysteries of the Gods.

Laertius saith, He made three Cups of Silver, and presented them to each [Society] of the Egyptian Priests; which, as we said, were three, of Heliopolis, Memphis, and Thebes.

CHAP. V.

How he went to Babylon.

Amasius dying in the third Year of the sixty-third Olympiad, (which was the 223d of Nabonassar) his Son Psamminitus succeeded him, who is by Ctesias named Amisæus, and seems to be the same whom Pliny calls Senniserus, (tho' others interpret it of Amasis) in whose Reign, saith he, Pythagoras was in Egypt. At this Time Cambyses invaded and conquered Egypt, by whom Pythagoras was taken Prisoner, and sent to Babylon. There he lived [with the most excellent among the Chaldeans, and] with the Magi, the Persian Magi, (for so Cicero, Apuleius, and Eusebius term them) in respect that Babylon was then under that Monarchy; which is the meaning also of Valerius Maximus, and Lactantius, who affirm, that he went from Egypt to the Persians, (not to Persia, as some conceive) and resigned himself to the most exact Prudence of the Magi to be formed.

The Magi received him kindly, and instructed him in the most profound and sublime Mysteries of the Worship of the Gods. By their means also he arrived at the Height of Arithmetick, Musick, and other Mathematical Sciences. From them, saith Valerius Maximus, he, with a docile Mind, received the Motions of the Stars, their Power, Property, and Effects, their States and Periods; the various Effects of both in the Nativities of Men, as likewise the Remedies of Diseases, which are purchased at vast Rates by Sea and Land.

Of the Chaldeans, with whom he lived in Babylon, Diogenes particularly instances Zabratas, by whom he was cleansed from the Pollutions of his Life past, and instructed from what Things virtuous Persons ought to be free; and learnt the Discourse concerning Nature, (Physick) and what are the Principles of the Universe. This Zabratas was probably the same with that Zoroaster, one of the Persian Magi, whom Apuleius saith, he chiefly had for Teacher, terming him, Omnis divini arcana antistitem: And the same

^a Strom. 1. ^b Porph. p. 8. ^c Strom. 1. pag. 302. ^d Val. Max. 8. 7. ^e Jam. Cap. 4. continue.
^f Laert. 8. ^g Herod. 1. 3. cap. 14. ^h Lib. 36. cap. 9.
ⁱ Ueber Annal. 4167. ^j Jam. cap. 4. ^k Clem. Stro. 1. ^l De Finib. 5. ^m Florid. 2. ⁿ Prop. 10. ^o Lib. 8. cap. 9.
^p Lib. 4. c. 2. ^q Vossius de Philosoph. sectio cap. 6. sect. 4. ^r Jam. continueth. ^s Lib. 3. ^t Apul. Florid. lib. 2.
^u Porph. p. 2. ^v Florid. 2.

fame with *Nazaratus* the *Affrian*, whom ¹ *Alexander*, in his Book of *Pythagorick Symbols*, affirms to have been Master to *Pythagoras*; the same whom ² *Suidas* calls *Zares*; *Cyril*, *Zaran*; *Plutarch*, *Zaratras*: Whence ³ some conceive, that they all mean *Zoroastres* the *Magus*, who was also called *Zarades*, as evidently appears from *Theodoret* and *Agathias*. Indeed he could not hear *Zoroastres* himself, as being some Ages later; yet it appears from the Relation of *Apuleius*, that many conceived *Pythagoras* to have been a Follower of *Zoroastres*. Perhaps him whose Doctrine *Pythagoras* embraced, (for ⁴ *Clemens* saith, he explained *Zoroastres* the *Persian Magus*) Posterity believed to have been his Master. This *Nazaratus* the *Affrian* was by some supposed to be the Prophet *Ezekiel*; which Opinion *Clemens* opposes; nevertheless (as Mr. *Selden* observes) the most accurate Chronology teacheth, that *Ezekiel* and *Pythagoras* flourished together, betwixt the 50th and 52d Olympiad; and therefore the Account of Time hinders not, but that this *Nazaratus* might be *Ezekiel*.

⁵ *Diogenes* (in his Treatise of incredible things, beyond *Fable*) adds, that he went also to the *Hebrews*, which ⁶ *Lactantius* expressly denies. ⁷ *Eusebius* saith, He is reported to have heard the *Persian Magi*, and the *Diviners* of the *Egyptians*, at what time some of the *Jews* were gone to *Babylon*, others to *Egypt*. That he conversed with the *Jews* at *Babylon*, (saith the ⁸ Bishop of *Armagh*) may be argued, for that he transferred many of their Doctrines into his Philosophy, as *Hermippus* declares in his first Book of things concerning *Pythagoras*, cited by ⁹ *Josephus*; and in his first Book of Lawgivers, cited by ¹⁰ *Origen*, which likewise is confirmed by ¹¹ *Aristobolus* the *Jew*, a Peripatetical Philosopher, in his first Book to *Philometor*; who moreover was induced by the same reason to believe, that the Books of *Moses* were translated into *Greek* before the *Persian Empire*; whereas it is much more probable, that *Pythagoras* receiv'd that Part of his Learning from the Conversation which he had with the *Hebrews*.

¹² *Alexander* adds, that he heard the *Galatæ* and the *Brachmanes*. From *Chaldea* (saith *Apuleius*) he went to the *Brachmanes*: These are wise Persons, a Nation of *India*, for which reason he went to their *Gymnosophists*. The *Brachmanes* conferred many things to his Philosophy; what are the Documents of Minds, what the Exercises of Bodies, how many are the Parts of the Soul, how many the Vicissitudes of Life; what Torments or Rewards, according to their Merits, are allotted to Men after Death.

¹³ *Diogenes* adds, that he went also to *Arabia*, and lived with the King there; but it is not easy to find the Name of the Court of the King of that wandering Nation.

As concerning his Learning, it is generally said, that ¹⁴ he learned many, and those the most excellent Parts of his Philosophy, of the *Barbarians*. ¹⁵ *Diogenes* affirms, he gained the greatest Part of his Wisdom from those Nations. ¹⁶ The Sciences which are called *Mathematical*, he learnt of the *Egyptians*, and the *Chaldeans*, and the *Phoenicians*: for the *Egyptians* were of old *Students* of *Geometry*; the *Phoenicians*, of *Numbers* and *Proportions*; the *Chaldeans*, of *astronomical Theorems*, *divine Rites*, and *Worship of the Gods*; and other *Institutions* concerning the Course of Life, he learned and received of the *Magi*. These are more generally known, as being committed to writing; but the rest of his Institutions are less known.

¹⁷ *Hermippus* saith, He embraced the Opinions of the *Thracians*; which ¹⁸ some interpret of *Pittacus*, whose Father *Hyrrbadus* was of that Country: But with more reason may it be understood of *Orpheus*, from whom *Jamblichus* acknowledgeth that he derived much of the theological Part of his Science.

CHAP. VI.

How he returned to Samos.

¹⁹ HAVING lived at *Babylon* twelve Years, he returned to *Samos* [for that he was redeemed by one *Gyllus* Prince of *Cræta*, *Apuleius* cites but for a less credible Relation] about the fifty-sixth Year of his Age; where being known by some of the most ancient Persons, he was looked upon with greater Admiration than before; for he seemed to them more wise, more beautiful, and more divinely majestic. His Country summoned him to some publick Employment, that he might benefit the Generality, and communicate his Knowledge: Which he not refusing, endeavoured to instruct them in the symbolical way of learning, altogether resembling that of the *Egyptians*, in which he himself had been instituted. But the *Samians* not assenting this way, did not apply themselves to him.

Pythagoras, tho' he saw that no Man came to him, or sincerely affected his Learning, endeavoured nevertheless all possible ways to continue amongst them, not desisting or undervaluing *Samos*, because it was his Country. And whilst he was very desirous that his Countrymen should taste, though against their Will, the Sweetness of his Mathematicks, he observed in a *Gymnasium*, a young Man that play'd at Tennis dextrously and nimbly, but otherwise poor and indigent: And imagining that this Youth would be wholly guided by him, if without Labour he should supply him with Necessaries; when they had done washing, he called him to him, and told him, That he would continually furnish him with all things sufficient for his Maintenance, if he would learn briefly, and without Labour, and constantly

¹ Porph. p. 185. ² In voce Pythagoras. ³ Selden de Diæ Syris. Syntag. 2. ⁴ Strom. 1. ⁵ Porph. p. 2. ⁶ Lib. 4. c. 5. ⁷ Præpar. l. 13. ⁸ Annal. p. 151. ⁹ Contra Apollon. l. 1. ¹⁰ Strom. 1. ¹¹ Strom. 1. ¹² Strom. 1. ¹³ Strom. 1. ¹⁴ Strom. 1. ¹⁵ Strom. 1. ¹⁶ Strom. 1. ¹⁷ Strom. 1. ¹⁸ Strom. 1. ¹⁹ Strom. 1.

ly (that he might not be over-burthen'd) *some Mathematicks*, which he himself, when he was young, had learn'd of the Barbarians; which had now left him, by reason of old Age and Forgetfulness. The Youth promising, and being allured by the Hopes of Maintenance, he endeavour'd to initiate him in Arithmetick and Geometry, drawing the Demonstration of such in a Table; and teaching him, he gave the young Man for every Scheme (or Diagram) three Oboli, as a Reward and Compensation. And this he continued to do a long time, out of a Love of Glory, and industriously bringing him into the Theory by an exact Method. But when the young Man, having made a good Progress, was sensible of the Excellency both of the Pleasure and the Consequences in Mathematicks, the wise Man perceiving it, and that he would not now quit his Learning, what Inconvenience sooner he might suffer, pretended that he had no more Trioboli to give him. "Tis no matter," saith the Youth; I am able to learn and receive your Arithmeticks without it." He replied, "But I have not sufficient to find Food for myself, wherefore I must now give over, to acquire Necessaries for every Day, and daily Food; nor is it fit now to be taken up with Tables and fruitless Studies." Whereupon the young Man, left to be hindered from continuing his Learning, replied, "I will supply you, and in some manner requite you; for I will give you for every Scheme three Oboli." And from thenceforward became so much in love with Mathematicks, that he alone of all the Samians was commended with Pythagoras, being likewise of the same Name, Son of Eratoclea. His Aleiptick Commentaries are extant, and his Directions to the Wrestlers of that Time, to eat Flesh instead of dried Figs; which by some are falsely ascribed to Pythagoras the Son of Mneiarachus, [as is formerly intimated] but by Piny, to one of that Name who professed Exercises of the Body, which agreeth with the Relation of Jamblichus.

CHAPTER VII.

How he went to Delus, Delphi, Crete, and Sparta.

NOT long after, according to the Relation of Jamblichus, Pythagoras went to Delus, where he was much admir'd by the Inhabitants, for that he pray'd only at the Altar of Apollo Genitor, called 'Unbloody, [which stands behind the horn Altar] because at it were offered only Wheat, and Barley, and Cakes; but no Victim, as *Arigale* saith in his Treatise concerning the Delian Commonwealth, and applied himself to none but the attendants thereof.

From Delus, Jamblichus saith, he went to all Places of Oracle. At Delphi he wrote an Elegy upon the Tomb of Apollo, whereby he declared that Apollo

was Son of Silenus; but slain by Pytho, and buried in the Place called 'Triops, which was so named, for that the three Daughters of Triops mourned there for Apollo. At Delphi also (*Arigale* saith) he learned many moral Documents of Themistoclea.

He went also to Crete and Sparta, to acquaint himself with the Laws of Minos and Lycurgus, which at that time were much renowned, as *Justin* and Jamblichus affirm.

Neither was Crete less famous for religious Ceremonies, being esteemed the Place where Jupiter was born, and brought up by the Corybantes or Dactyli, Priests of Cybele, in a Cave of the Mountain Ida, which they so named after that Phrygia, whence they came. They had also a Tradition, that Jupiter was buried there, and shew'd his Tomb. Here Pythagoras address'd himself to the Priests of Metagut, one of the Idaean Dactyli, who purify'd him with the Ceraunian Stone, [so called, in that it is conceived to be a Piece of Jupiter's Thunderbolt, and therefore perhaps used by his Priests.] In the Morning he lay stretch'd forth upon his Face by the Sea-side; at Night by a River, crown'd with a Wreath, made of the Wooll of a black Lamb.

He also apply'd himself to the Cretan Epimenides, that eminent Southsayer, as *Apuleius* calls him. He went [down] with him into the Idaean Cave, wrapt in black Wooll, and stay'd there three times nine Days, according to the Custom; and to Jupiter, and saw the Throe which is made yearly there for him, and writ an Epigram upon his Tomb, beginning thus:

Here Zan descended lies, whom Jove they call.

Thus was he initiated into all religious Rites, as well Grecian as Barbarian.

CHAPTER VIII.

How he went to Olympia and Phlius.

AFTER he had made enquiry into the Laws and Customs of Crete and Lacedaemon, he went down to the Olympick Games; and having given a Proof of his multiplicitious Knowledge, to the Admiration of all Greece, being demanded what his Appellation was, he answer'd, that he was not Sophos, Wife; (for excellent Men had already possess'd that Name) but Philosophos, a Lover of Wisdom.

But some relate this as done at Sicily, in discourse with Leon, Tyrant of that Place; others at Phlius, distant from Sicily a hundred Furlongs. Of the latter are *Heracleides*, in his Book of the breathless Woman; and *Saxicrates* in his Successions.

The

¹ Lib. 23. c. 7.

² Cap. 5. & 7.

³ Clem. Strom. 7.

⁴ Laert. S. 13.

⁵ Cap. 5. p. 40.

⁶ Porph. p. 10, 11.

⁷ Lib. 20.

⁸ Porph. p. 11.

⁹ Lib. 6. p. 11.

¹⁰ Laert. S. 3.

¹¹ Lib. 3. 2.

¹² Val. Max. 5. 7.

¹³ Laert. in Proem.

¹⁴ Lib. 20.

¹⁵ Lib. 20.

¹⁶ Laert. vit. Pyth.

The Testimony of *Heracles* is thus delivered by *Cicero*. He went (as is reported) to *Phlius*, and discoursed upon some things learnedly and copiously with *Leo* Prince of the *Phlians*. *Leo* admiring his Wit and Eloquence, demanded in what Art he did most confide? He answered, "That he knew no Art, but was a Philosopher. *Leo* wondering at the Novelty of the Name, asked, Who were Philosophers, and what Difference there is between them and others? *Pythagoras* answered, "That human Life seem'd to resemble that publick Convention, which is celebrated with the Pomp and Games of all *Greece*. For, as there, some by bodily Exercises aim at the Glory and Nobility of a Crown; others are led away by Gain in Buying or Selling: But there is a certain Kind of Persons, and that those of the better Quality, who seek neither Applause nor Gain, but come to behold, and curiously observe what is done, and how. So we coming out of another Life and Nature into this Life, as out of some City into the full Throng of a publick Meeting, some serve Glory, others Riches: Only some few there are, who despising all things else, studiously enquire into the Nature of things. These he called Enquirers after Wisdom, that is, Philosophers."

Thus, whereas Learning before was called *Sophia*, Wisdom; and the Professors thereof, *Sophoi*, Wise Men, (as *Thales* and the rest, of whom we treated in the first Book) * *Pythagoras*, by a more modest Appellation, named it *Philosophy*, Love of Wisdom; and its Professors, *Philosophers*; conceiving the Attribute of Wise not to belong to Men, but to God only; that which is properly termed Wisdom, being far above human Capacity. "For though the Frame of the whole Heaven, and the Stars which are carried about in it, if we consider their Order, is fair; yet is it such but by Participation of the primary Intelligible, who is a Nature of Numbers and Proportions, diffusing itself through the Universe; according to which, all these things are ordered together, and adorn'd decently. Wisdom therefore is a true Knowledge, conversant about those fair things which are first, and divine, and incommixt, and always the same; by Participation whereof, we may call other things Fair. But Philosophy is an Imitation of that Science, which likewise is an excellent Knowledge, and did assist towards the Reformation of Mankind."

C H A P. IX.

How he lived at Samos.

HAVING been a diligent Auditor and Disciple of all these, he returned home, and earnestly addicted himself to Enquiry after such things as he

had omitted; and first, [as soon as he returned to *Ionia*] (saith *Antiphon*, cited by *Porphyrius*, repeated and enlarged by *Jamblichus*) he built [in his Country] within the City, a School, which even yet is called the Semicircle of *Pythagoras*, in which the *Samians*, when they would consult about publick Affairs, assemble; chusing to enquire after things Honest, Just, and Advantageous in that Place, which he, who took care of them all, had erected. Without the City he made a Cave, proper for his Study of Philosophy, in which he lived for the most part Day and Night, [and discoursed with his Friends] and made enquiry into the most useful Part of Mathematics, taking the same Course as *Minos* Son of *Jupiter*. And so far did he surpass all whom he taught, that they for the smallest Theorems were reputed great Persons,

Pythagoras now perfected the Science of the celestial Bodies, and over-run it, with all Demonstrations arithmetical and geometrical. Nor this only, but he became much more admir'd for the things he performed afterwards; for Philosophy had now received a great Increase, and all *Greece* began to admire him; and the best and most studious Persons, for his sake, resorted to *Samos*, desiring to participate of his Institutions.

C H A P. X.

His Voyage to Italy.

BUT *Pythagoras* being engaged by his Countrymen in all Embassies, and constrained to be interested in their publick Negotiations, and perceiving that if he should comply with the Laws of his Country, and continue there, it would be hard for him to study Philosophy; for which reason, all former Philosophers ended their Lives in foreign Countries: Weighing all these Considerations, and to avoid civil Employments; or, as others say, declining the Negligence of Learning, which at that time possess'd the *Samians*, departed into *Italy*, preferring that Place before his Country, which contained most Persons fervently desirous of Learning.

But before we speak of his Actions in *Italy*, it will be requisite, as well to settle the Time of his coming, as the State of that Country as it was at that Time. It was a received Opinion amongst the more ancient, but less learned *Romans*, that *Pythagoras* was contemporary with King *Numa*. The Occasion of that Tradition might perhaps arise from those Books, which were found in the Sepulchre of *Numa* 805 Years after his Death, as *Antius Valerius*, cited by *Livy*, and *Cassius Hemina*, by *Pliny*, relate; and supposed to contain Pythagorical Philosophy. But that Opinion is long since refuted, by the more learn-

* Tuscul. quest. 5.

* Deacid. 40. lib. viii.

* Laert. Proem.

* Jamb. in vit. Pyth.

* Lib. 13. c. 13. sect. 27.

* Jamb. c. 5. p. 20.

* Page 6.

* Jamb. c. 5. p. 6.

ed *Romans and Grecians, Cicero, Titus Livius, Dio-nyfius Halicarnaffenfis, Plutarch, and others.*

They who have looked more ftrictly into the Time of *Pythagoras*, feem to follow two different Accounts. *Jamblichus* faith, that he lived in *Egypt* 22 Years; that he was carried from thence by *Cambyses*; that he lived in *Babylon* 12 Years; that from thence he returned to *Samos*, being 56 Years old; that from *Samos* he went into *Italy* in the 62d Olympiad, *Erixidas*, a *Chalcidean*, being Victor at the Olympick Games: From whence it follows, that he went into *Egypt* about the third Year of the 53d Olympiad, and that he was born the second Year of the 48th Olympiad; and that it was the 52d Olympiad, when he, in the 18th Year of his Age, heard *Thales*, *Pherecydes*, and *Anaximander*. This Account feems to be followed by *Laertius*, *Porphyrius*, *Themiftius*, *Suidas*, (from *Laertius*) and others, who affirm, he went from *Samos* into *Italy*, at what Time *Polycrates* was Tyrant of *Samos*, conceiving it unfit for a Philofopher to live under fuch a Government: For by *Diodorus*, *Pythagoras* is acknowledged in the 61ft Olympiad, *Thericles* being Archon; by *Cle-ment Alexandrinus*, about the 62d Olympiad, under *Polycrates*; and in the fecond Year of the 64th Olympiad, *Polycrates* was betrayed and put to death by *Oroetes*. This Account *Antiochus* alfo feems to follow, who reckons from the Time of *Pythagoras* to the Death of *Epicurus* 312 Years. *Epicurus* died in the fecond Year of the 127th Olympiad; the 312th Year upwards, is the firft of the 49th Olympiad. Neither is *Livy* much different from this Computation, who makes him to come into *Italy*, *Servio Tul-lio* regnante, who died about a Year or two before. And this Account might be the Occafion of making him live to 90 Years, as *Laertius* faith many do; and to 104 Years, as the namelefs Author of his Life in *Photius*, the Year of his Death being, according to *Eusebius*, the fourth of the 70th Olympiad.

But this Account may, with good Reason, be queftion'd; for if it be granted, (as by *Jamblichus* himfelf, and other good Authorities it is affirmed) that *Pythagoras* was in *Egypt* when *Cambyses* fubdu'd it, and that he was carried away Captive by him into *Babylon*, the Time of his going into *Italy* muft of neceffity be much later; for *Cambyses* invaded *Egypt* in the fifth Year of his Reign, which is the third Year of the 63d Olympiad, and the 223d Year of *Nabonaffar*, of which there is no queftion in Chronology. For that the feventh Year of *Cambyses* is known to be the 225th Year of *Nabonaffar*; becaufe *Ptolemy* in his *Almageft* relates an astronomical Obfervation of a Lunar Eclipse at *Babylon*, on the 17th Day of the Month *Pharvohi*, according to the *Egyptians*, which is with us the 16th of *July*, one Hour before Midnight. From whence now it follows, that

if he lived 22 Years in *Egypt*, that then he went thither in the third Year of the 58th Olympiad; and that if he had ftaid in *Babylon* twelve Years, he went into *Italy* about the End of the 66th Olympiad; and that if he were then 56 Years old, he was not born before the firft Year of the 53d Olympiad. And according to this Account, they who make him to live but 70 or 80 Years, do not much differ in the Time of his Death from them, who, according to the other Account, make him live fo much longer; for they who give him moft Years, do not make him to die later, but to be born fooner.

This Account they feem to follow, who affirm, * he went from *Samos* to *Italy*, for that he could not brook *Sylofon* the Brother of *Polycrates*, on whom (being a private Perfon, after his Brother's Death) *Darius Hyftafpis* afterward beftow'd the Tyranny of *Samos*, in requital of a Garment which *Sylofon* had given him, before he came to the Empire. And thus perhaps is *Strabo* to be underftood, who faith, *Pythagoras*, as they reported, in the Time of *Polycrates*, feeing the Tyranny begun, forfook the City, and went from thence to *Egypt* and *Babylon*, out of Love to Learning; and returning Home, and feeing that the Tyranny continued ftill, he went into *Italy*, where he ended his Days. By this Continuation of the Tyranny, feems to be meant the Reign of *Sylofon*, who ruled fo cruelly, that many Perfons forfook the City, infomuch that it became a Proverb,

*A Regem vafte
By Sylofon laid wafte.*

With both thefe Accounts agree what *Cicero* and *Agellius* affirm, concerning his coming into *Italy*, that it was in the Reign of *Tarquinius Superbus*; but to neither can that of *Pliny* be accommodated, who faith, that *Pythagoras* obferved the Nature of the Star *Venus* about the 42d Olympiad, which was of the City of *Rome* the 142d Year. There muft therefore be either an Error in both the Numbers; or, which I rather believe, in *Pliny* himfelf, occafion'd, perhaps, by miftaking *Tarquinius Prifcus* (under whom they both fall) for *Tarquinius Superbus*, under whom *Pythagoras* flourifhed.

If therefore he came into *Italy* in the Reign of *Tarquinius Superbus*, the Opinion of *Cicero* is to be received, that he was there when *Lucius Brutus* freed his Country; and upon the Expulfion of *Tarquinius Superbus*, he and *Lucius Collatinus* were made the firft Confuls, at which Time the Dominion of the *Romans* extended not any way above fix Miles from their City; and the fouthern Parts of *Italy* were chiefly inhabited by the *Grecians*, who at feveral Times had there planted divers Colonies, whereof we fhall only mention thofe which were more particularly concerned in the Actions of *Pythagoras*.

* Excerpt. Valer. p. 241.

† Lib. 14. ‡ Strabo, ibid.

* Strom.

† Tuk. Quest. 1. 16.

* Clem. Strom. 1.

† Lib. 17. cap. ult.

* Lib. 5. c. 4.

† Lib. 2. c. 3.

* Died. in Excerpt. Valer. p. 241.

† Tuk. Quest. 1. 8. 1.

The most ancient of these is *Metapontum*, seated in the Bay of *Tarentum*, betwixt *Heraclea* and *Tarentum*, built by *Nestor* and the *Pylians*, a People of *Peloponnesus*. Long after were founded,

Catana, a City on the East-side of *Sicily*, betwixt *Messina* and *Syracuse*, built by a Colony of *Chalcidians* in the 11th Olympiad.

Tarentum in *Italy*, in the 18th Olympiad, built by the *Parthenians*, who were Children of the *Lacedæmonian* Women, born in the Absence of their Husbands at the *Messian* Wars, and therefore called *Parthenians* in reproach; which not brooking, they conspired against the *Lacedæmonian* People; but being betrayed and banished, came hither.

Crotona, a City in the Bay of *Tarentum*, built in the 19th Olympiad by a Colony of *Achaëans*, under the Conduct of *Miscellus*; by whom named *Crotona*, at the Command of *Hercules*, in memory of *Croto*, his Host, whom having unwittingly slain, he buried there. This City, for being built by the Command of *Hercules*, engraven his Figure in their Coins.

Sybaris, a City distant from *Crotona* 200 Furlongs, according to *Strabo's* Account; but, as others conceive, more than twice so much; built at the same time by a Colony of *Trojanians*, under the Conduct of *Iseliceus*, betwixt the two Rivers *Crathis* and *Sybaris*.

Locri in *Italy*, built the 24th Olympiad by the *Locrians*, a People of *Achaia*.

Agigentum, an *Ionian* Colony, built by the *Gelaans* 108 Years after their own Foundation.

Gela was built in the 45th Year after *Syracusa*: *Syracusa* in the 11th Olympiad: *Agigentum* therefore in the 49th.

To these add, of less certain Time, *Rhegium* in *Calabria*, built by the *Chalcedæans*. *Nimera* and *Tauromenium* in *Sicily*, Colonies of the *Zanclean*s. Indeed so generally was the *Pythagorical* Doctrine received in these Parts, that *Jamblichus* affirms, *All Italy was filled with Philosophical Persons; and whereas before it was obscure, afterwards, by reason of Pythagoras, it was named Μεγάλη Ἑλλάς, Magna Græcia.*

CHAP. XI.

His Arrival at Crotona, and upon what Occasion he first became eminent there.

HE came at first to *Crotona*, the State of which City in particular was this: At the Beginning, the *Crotonians* joining with the *Sybarites* and the *Metapontines*, determined to expel the rest of the *Grecians* out of *Italy*. They first took the City of *Syris*;

and taking it ill that at their besieging *Syris* the *Locrians* assisted the adverse Party, raised a War against them; related thus by *Justin*: "The *Locrians* being terrify'd, recur to the *Spartians* for Refuge, and beg their Aid. They, oppress'd with a long War, had them seek Help of *Cassir* and *Pellus*. Neither did the Ambassadors slight the Advice of the Associate City; but going into the next Temple, they sacrific'd, and implor'd the Help of the Gods: Having offered Victims, and obtained, as they thought, what they requested, no less joyful, than as if they were to carry the Gods themselves along with them, they made Couches for them in the Ship, and by a fortunate Voyage bring Comfort, instead of Relief, to their Countrymen. This known, the *Crotonians* also send Ambassadors to the Oracle at *Delphi*, praying for Victory, and a happy Success of the War. Answer is made, that Enemies must be overcome in Vows first, before in Arms. They vow'd to *Apollo* the Tents of the Spoil. The *Locrians* understanding the Vow of their Enemies, and the Answer of the God, vow'd the Ninth, and kept it secret, lest they might be out-done in vowing. Being drawn forth into the Field, the *Crotonian* Army consisting of 120000 Soldiers; the *Locrians* beholding how small a Number they were, (for they had but 15000) gave over all Hope of Victory, and unanimously resolved to die; and so great Courage did every Man take from Desperation, that they conceived they should be Conquerors, if they did not die unwillingly. But whilst they fought to die honourably, they overcame more fortunately; neither was there any other Cause of that Victory, than that they despaired of it. Whilst they were in Sight, an Eagle never left the *Locrian* Army, but flew about it all the while, until they had gain'd the Victory. In the Wings of the Army also, two young Men, armed after a fashion different from all the rest, of extraordinary Bigness, on white Horses, in crimson Mantles, were seen to fight; and, after the Fight, were seen no more. This Wonder was increased by the incredible Swiftmess of Fame; for the very same Day that this Fight happen'd in *Italy*, the Victory was reported at *Corinth*, *Athens*, and *Lacedæmon*. Alter this, the *Crotonians* used no military Exercise, nor minded Arms; for they hated what they had taken up unsuccessfully, and would have chang'd their Life into Luxury, had it not been for *Pythagoras* the Philosopher." Hitherto *Justin*.

"As soon as he arriv'd in *Italy*, and came to *Crotona*, *Dicaearchus* saith, that upon the coming of a Person, who was a great Traveller, and excellent,

* Solin. c. 2. * Euseb. Chron. * Euseb. ibid. * Strab. ibid. * Euseb. ibid. * Strab. l. 6. * Solin. c. 2. * Euseb. Chron. * Strab. l. 6. * Thucyd. ibid. * Euseb. Chron. * Cap. 19.
* Justin. l. 20. a. * Lib. 20. * Porph. vit. Pyth. ag. p. 187.

"cellent, and through a peculiar Advantage of Nature, prosperously guided by Fortune, (for he was of a free Preference, tall, graceful in his Speech and Gesture, and in all things else) the Citizens of Crotona were so taken with him, that having won the Affections of the old Men, who were the Magistrates of the City, and made an excellent and large Discourse to the young Men; he did the second Time, by command from the Magistrates, make an Exhortation to the young Men, and afterwards to the Boys, who came flocking out of the School to hear him; and lastly, to the Women, assembled to that Purpose. The Occasion and Manner mentioned by *Plutarch* and *Porphyrius*, related thus by *Jamblichus*.

"At this Time, walking from *Sybaris* to *Crotona*, upon the Sea side, he lighted upon some Fishermen; and whilst their Net was yet at the Bottom laden, he told them exactly the Number of the Fishes that they should draw up. And the Men undertaking to do whatsoever he should command them, if it fell out accordingly; he required them to turn back again the Fishes alive, after they had exactly numbered them; and which is more wonderful, not one of all the Number, at that Time, of the Fishes, whilst they were out of the Water, died; he being present, and giving the Fishermen the Price of the Fish, he departed to *Crotona*. But they divulged what was done, and, learning his Name of the Boys, declared it to every one; which they hearing, desired to see the Stranger, which was opportune to him; for he was of such an Aspect, that whosoever saw him could not but admire him, and conceive him to be the Person that he really was."

CHAP. XII.

His Oration to the young Men.

"SOME few Days after, he went into the publick School, and the young Men flocking to him, it is said, that he made Discourses to them, wherein he exhorted them to respect their Elders, declaring, "That in the World, and in Life, and in Cities, and in Nature, that which is precedent in Time is more honourable than that which is subsequent; as, the East than the West, the Morning than the Evening, the Beginning than the End, Generation than Corruption; moreover, Natives than Strangers. In like manner, in Colonies, the Leader and Planter of Cities, and generally the Gods than Demons, Demons than Semi-gods, Heroes than Men: And of these (Men) the Causes of Generation, than the younger. This he said by way of Induction, to make

"them have a greater Esteem of their Parents, to whom, he said, they had as much Obligation, as a dead Man might owe to him that should raise him again to Life. Moreover, that it was just to love above all, and never to afflict the first, and those who have done us greatest Benefits: But Parents only, by the Benefit of Generation, are the first, and Predecessors are the Causes of all Things that succeed rightly to their Successors; shewing, that they are nothing less beneficial to us than the Gods, against whom it is not possible to offend in so doing; and the Gods themselves cannot but in Justice pardon those, who reverence their Parents equal to them; for it is from them that we learn to worship the Deity; whence *Homer* gives the King of the Gods the same Title, calling him, *Father of Gods and Mortals*. And many other fabulous Writers have delivered, that the chiefest of the Gods were ambitious to make up the divided Love of Children, by a new Conjunction of Parents; and for this End, making a new Supposition of Father and Mother, *Jupiter* brought forth *Minerva*; *Juno*, *Vulcan*; of a contrary Sex to their own, that they might participate of that Love which was more remote.

"Now all Persons granting the Judgment of the Gods to be strongest, he demonstrated this particularly to the People of *Croton*, because that *Hercules* was of Affinity with them, therefore they ought willingly to obey the Injunctions of their Parents, since they understood, that this God, in Obedience to another elder than himself, underwent his Labours, and presented to his Father, as the Epinicion of his Actions, the Olympick Games.

"He declared likewise, that in their Conversation to one another they should so behave themselves, that they might hereafter never become Enemies to their Friends, but might soon become Friends to their Enemies; as to their Friends they should never become Enemies, but to their Enemies quickly become their Friends. And that they should study in their Behaviour towards their Elders, their Reverence towards their Parents, and in their Love to one another, their Community towards their Brethren.

"Furthermore he discoursed concerning Temperance, saying, that young Men should make Trial of their Nature at that Time, in which they have their Desires vigorous. Then he advised them, that it was worth their Observation, that this only Virtue was convenient both for Children, and Maids, and Women, and old Men, but especially for young Men. Further, this Virtue only declares, that they understand the Goods of the Body and the Soul, seeing it preserves Health, and

F f f 2

"A Desire

* Vit. Pyth.

† Cap. 8.

‡ Jamb. continuent.

§ This also is in *Laetius*.

¶ The Beginning of this Oration is in *Laetius* also, l. 8, Num. 22, 23.

" a Desire of the best Studies. This is manifest
 " from the contrary; for the *Barbarians* and the
 " *Grecians* contending about *Troy*, both Parties, for
 " the Intemperance of one Man, fell into extraordi-
 " nary Calamities; those in the War; these in their
 " Voyage home. And God appointed ten Years,
 " and a thousand Years, only for the Punishment of
 " this Injustice, foretelling by Oracle, the taking of
 " *Troy*, and the sending of the Virgins by the *Lacri-
 " ans*, to the Temple of *Minerva* the *Ilian*.

" He likewise exhorted the young Men to love
 " Learning, telling them, how absurd it were to
 " judge Learning to be the most advantageous of all
 " Things, and to wish for it above all Things, yet
 " to bestow no Time or Pains in that Exercise: es-
 " pecially, seeing the Care of our Bodies is like evil
 " Friends, which soon forsake us; but that of Insti-
 " tution, like the good, which stay with a Man till
 " Death; and procuring to some immortal Glory after
 " Death.

" He framed many other Things, partly out of
 " History, partly out of Doctrines, shewing, that
 " Learning was a common Nobility of those, who
 " were first in every Kind; for their Inventions
 " were the Institutions of the rest. Thus is this na-
 " turally advantageous; that of other commendable
 " Things, some it is not possible to communicate to
 " another, as Strength, Beauty, Health, Courage;
 " some, whoever imparts them to another, can-
 " not have them himself, as Riches, Government,
 " and the like: But for this, you may receive it of
 " another, and yet the Giver have nothing the less
 " of it. Moreover some, a Man cannot gain if he
 " would, he may receive Institution if he will:
 " Then he may apply himself to the Affairs of his
 " Country, not upon self-confidence, but Institution;
 " as; for by Education, Men differ from Beasts,
 " *Greeks* from *Barbarians*, Freemen from Slaves,
 " Philosophers from the Vulgar. Who have in ge-
 " neral this Advantage, that as of those who run
 " swifter than others, there had been seven out of
 " this their own City, at one Celebration of the
 " Olympick Games; but of such as did excel in
 " Wisdom, there had been found, but seven in the
 " whole World; and in the following Times in
 " which he lived, there was but one who did excel
 " all others in Philosophy: For he called himself by
 " that Name, (*Philosopher*) instead of *Sophus*, a
 " wise Man.

C H A P. XIII.

His Oration to the Senators.

" **T**HUS he discoursed to the young Men in the
 " School; but they relating to their Fathers
 " what he had said, the Thousand-men summoned

Pythagoras to the Court, and commending him for
 the Advice he had given to their Sons, they com-
 manded him, that if he had any thing which might
 benefit the People of *Cratona*, he should declare it to
 the Magistrates of the Commonwealth.

The *Cratonians* (saith *Valerius Maximus*) did
 earnestly intreat him, that he would permit their Se-
 nate, which consisted of a thousand Persons, to use
 his Advice.

" Hereupon he first advised them to build a Tem-
 " ple to the Muses, that they might preserve their
 " present Concord; for these Goddesses have all
 " the same Appellation, and have a reciprocal
 " Communication and Delight, chiefly in Ho-
 " nours common to them all; and the *Chorus* of
 " the Muses is always one and the same. More-
 " over, Concord, Harmony, Rythm, all those
 " Things which procure Unanimity, are compre-
 " hended.

" He likewise shewed them, that their Power did
 " not only extend to the excellent, but to the Con-
 " cord and Harmony of Beings.

" Further he said, they ought to conceive, they
 " received their Country as a *depositum* from their
 " People: Wherefore they ought so to manage it,
 " as being hereafter to resign up their Trust with a
 " just Account to their own Children. That this
 " will certainly be, if they be equal to all their Ci-
 " tizens, and excel other Men in nothing more than
 " in Justice; knowing, that every Place requireth
 " Justice. He shew'd it out of the Mythology,
 " that *Themis* hath the same Place with *Jupiter*, as
 " *Dice* with *Pluto*, and Law among Cities; so that
 " he who did any thing unjustly in Things under
 " his Charge, seemed to abuse the whole World,
 " [both above, below, and on Earth.]

" That it is convenient in Courts of Judicature,
 " that none attest the Gods by Oath, but use to
 " speak such Things, as that he may be believed
 " without Oath.

" Moreover, that every one should so govern his
 " Family, as that they should refer themselves to
 " their own House, as to a Court of Judicature,
 " and that they should be naturally affectionate to
 " such as are descended of them, as having only of
 " all Creatures received the Sense of this Affection;
 " and that they should converse with the Woman
 " that is Partner of their Life: For, as some Men
 " making Contracts with others, write them in
 " Tables and Pillars; those with Wives, are in the
 " Children. And that they should endeavour to be
 " belov'd of those which come from them, not by
 " Nature, of which they are not the Cause, but by
 " Election; for that Kindness is voluntary.

" That they should likewise take Care, that they
 " know no Women but their Wives, and that the
 " Wives.

¹ Jamb. c. 9.

² Lib. 2. c. 13.

³ Mirus q. inquit, Synes. in Dione, & Cassiod. l. 3. var.

⁴ Ar. 1. Spoh. c. 1.

⁵ Cicero. quid cogitationes quasdam, &c.

⁶ To the same Effect Learning.

" Wives do not adulterate the Race, through the
" Carelessness and Wickedness of their Husbands.

" Further, they must consider, they take the
" Wife from the Altar with Librations, as a Vota-
" res, in the Sight of the Gods, and so to go in un-
" to her, and that she become, in Order and Tem-
" perance, a Pattern to those that live in the House
" with her, and to the Women of the City.

" And that they should see carefully that none
" transgress, lest, not fearing the Punishments of
" Law, such as do unjustly lie hid; but having a
" Respect to Honesty in their Carriage, they may
" be incited to Justice.

" Further, he commanded, that in all their Acti-
" ons they should avoid Idleness; for there is no
" other good, than the Opportunity in every Acti-
" on.

" He asserted, that it is the greatest of Injustice,
" to separate Children and Parents from each other.
" That he is to be thought the greatest Person,
" who can of himself foresee what is advantageous:
" the next to whom is he, who by those Things
" which happen to other Men, observes what is
" good for himself. The worst is he, who stays to
" learn what is best, by the Experience of suffering
" Ill.

" He said, that they who are desirous of Glory,
" shall not do amiss, if they imitate those who are
" crowned for running; for they do no Harm to
" their Adversaries, but desire that they themselves
" may obtain the Victory. And it becometh Mag-
" istrates not to be rigid to those who contradict
" them, but to benefit those who obey them.

" He likewise exhorted every one that aimed at
" true Glory, to be indeed such, as he desired to ap-
" pear to others; for it is not so sacred a Thing to
" be advised by another, as to be praised for what is
" done; for one is only requisite to Men, the other
" much more used by the Gods.

" In conclusion he said, that their City chanced
" to be built by *Hercules*. When he drove [*Gerion's*]
" Oxen through *Italy*, being injured by *Lacinius*,
" *Croto* coming to help him; not knowing him by
" reason of the Night, and thinking him to be one
" of his Enemies, he slew him; and then promi-
" sing at his Grave, that he would build a City
" which should bear his Name, if ever he came to
" be a God; in Gratitude for his Kindness, he said,
" it behoved them to govern their Commonwealth
" justly.

" They hearing this, built a Temple to the Mu-
" ses, and put away the Concubines which they
" used to keep; and intreated him to discourse sever-
" ally in the Temple of *Pythian Apollo* to the Boys,
" and in the Temple of *Juno* to the Women."

C H A P. XIV.

His Oration to the Boys.

" **H**E being persuaded by them, discoursed to the
" Boys in this Manner; " That they should
" neither begin Contumelies, nor return them to
" the Reproachers,

" And concerning *paideia*, (Institution) which
" is of the same Name as the Time of their Youth,
" he commanded them diligently to pursue it; ad-
" ding, that to a well disposed Youth, it is easy to
" preserve Honesty throughout all his Life; but to
" him that is not well disposed, it is hard at that
" Time to continue it, but more difficult from an ill
" beginning to run to the End.

" Moreover he declared, that they are most be-
" loved of the Gods, and for that Reason in Times of
" Dearth, they are sent forth to pray to the Gods
" for Rain, as if the Deity would soonest hear them.
" And they only being always sanctified, had leave
" to live in the Temple.

" For the same Reason, the Gods that are most
" Kind to Men, *Apollo* and *Cupid*, are by all Pain-
" ters represented, as having that Age (of Boys.)
" It is likewise acknowledged, that the crowned
" Games were instituted for the sake of Boys; the
" *Pythian*, upon the Conquest of *Pytho* by a Boy;
" that in *Nemea*, for a Boy likewise; and that in
" *Isthmus*, upon the Death of *Archemorus* and *Me-
" licertus*.

" Besides all this, at the building of the City *Cro-
" to*, *Apollo* told the Leader of the Colony, that he
" would give him a Progeny, if he conducted his
" Colony to *Italy*; whence they ought to reflect,
" that *Apollo* hath a particular Providence for that
" Generation; and over Youth, even all the Gods.
" Wherefore they ought to study to be worthy of
" their Love, and employ themselves in hearing,
" that they may be able to speak. Moreover, if
" they would live to be old themselves, they should
" obey their Elders, and not contradict them; for
" by that Means they will become esteemed worthy,
" not to be injured by those that are younger than
" themselves."

C H A P. XV.

His Oration to the Women.

" **I**T is said, * that he discoursed to the Women con-
" cerning Sacrifices; first, that " As when another
" Man were to pray for them, they would have him
" to be honest and good, because the Gods hearken
" to such Men; in like Manner ought they above
" all.

* Mentioned by *Cicero*, and others.* *Jambl.* c. 11.* *Jambl.* c. 11.

"all things so to behave themselves, as that they may indeed love the Gods attentive to their Prayers.

"Next, that they must present the Gods with such Things, as they themselves make with their own Hands; and without the Help of Servants, offer them at the Altar; as Cakes, Wax and Incense: but that they present not the Deity with Slaughter and Death; nor that they offer so much at one Time, as if they were never to come thither again.

"As concerning their Conversation towards their Husbands, he commanded them to confider, that Fathers did yield to their Daughters, that their Husbands should be more beloved by them than their Parents. Wherefore it is fit, that either they contradict their Husbands in nothing, or then think they have the Victory, when they are overruled by them.

"Moreover he spared that celebrated Apophthegm concerning Coition, that for her who riseth from her own Husband, it is lawful to go to the Temples the same Day; but for her who riseth from him that is not her Husband, never.

"He exhorted them likewise, throughout their whole Life to speak well of others, and to take care that others speak well of them, and that they destroy not that good Report which is given; nor confute those Mythographers, who (seeing the Justice of Women, in respect that they lend their Garments without Witness, when any hath need of them, and that they made no Bargains and Engagements) feigned three Women who made use of one Eye amongst them, because of their readiness to communicate. Which if apply'd to Men, as if when one had received any thing, he should restore presently, or communicate to his Neighbour, every one would say, there is no such Thing, it being contrary to their Nature.

"Further, he who is said to be the wisest of all Persons, who disposed the Language of Men, and invented all Names, whether he were a God, or a Dæmon, or some divine Man, upon consideration, because the female Sex is most addicted to Piety, made every Degree of Age synonymous with some God, and called the unmarried Woman, *Ceres*; her who is given to Man, *Nympha*; her who hath Children, *Mother*; her who hath Childrens Children, in the Dorick Dialect, *Maja*; to which respect of their Devotion, it agrees, that the Oracles at *Dodona* and *Delphi*, are delivered by Women.

"Having thus commended their Devotion, he converted his Discourse to speak of Debency of Habit, that none should presume to wear any

"sumptuous Cloaths, but offer them all at *Juno's*; Temple (which amounted to) many Millions of Garments.

"He is reported also to have said thus, that throughout the Country of the *Crotoniates*, the Virtue of a Man towards his Wife was much celebrated. *Ulysses* refusing Immortality at *Cerberus*'s Hands, rather than to forsake *Penelope*. Let it be the Part of the Wives to express their virtuous Loyalty towards their Husbands, that this Praise may be reciprocal.

CHAP. XVI.

His Institution of a Sect in Private and Publick.

BY this Discourse, *Pythagoras* gained no small Honour and Esteem in *Crotone*, and by means of that City, throughout all *Italy*.

At the first Oration which he made in *Crotone*, he attracted many Followers, inasmuch that it is said, he gained six hundred Persons, who were by him not only won to the Philosophy which he professed, but following his Rules, became, as we call it, *Cenobii*; and these were they who studied Philosophy. [* They did put their Estates into one common Stock, and kept Silence five Years, only hearing his Discourses, but not seeing him, until they were fully proved, and then they became of his Family, and were admitted to him.] There were the same six hundred Persons, who, *Laertius* saith, came to his nocturnal Academies, (perhaps meaning the Lectures through a Screen during their Probation, for he adds) if any of them were thought worthy to see him, they wrote of it to their Friends, as having obtain'd a great Matter. This Society *Laertius* calls, his System, (which *Cassiodorus* interprets, College) *Agellius*, his Family.

Besides these, there were many Auditors, called *Acousmaticks*, whereof he gained [as *Nicomachus* relates] two thousand by one Oration, which he made at his first coming into *Italy*, who [that they might not live from home] erected a large *Amacœion*, [which *Clement Alexandrinus* interprets to be the same as *Ecclesia*, Church with us] whereto were admitted Boys and Women; and built Cities, and inhabited all that Part of *Italy* which is called *Magna Græcia*, and received Laws and Statutes from him as divine Precepts; without which they did not any thing; they lived together unanimously, praised by all, and applauded as happy by such as lived round about them.

Thus *Pythagoras* distinguished those whom he admitted, according to their several Merits; for it was not fit that all should partake alike, being not of a like

¹ So supply the Text from *Laertius*, who cites something to the same purpose out of *Timæus*. *Kopi* is a Name of *Proserpine*; *Nympha*, *Bride*, relates to the *Nymphs*; *Mêryu*, to *Cybele* Mother of the Gods; - *Maia*, to *Maja*, Mother of *Mercury*. ² *Jambli. c. 23.* ³ *Porphy.* p. 12. ⁴ *Jambli. c. 6.* ⁵ *Laert. §. 15.* ⁶ *Jambli. c. 6.* ⁷ *Porphy. p. 13.* ⁸ *Strom. 1.*

like Nature; nor fit that some should receive all the Learning, others none, for that would have been contrary to his Community of all, and to his Equality. He therefore, of the Discourses which he made, communicated to every one that Part which was proper for him; and distributed his Learning so, as that it might benefit every one according to his Capacity; and observing the Rules of Justice, in giving to every one that share of the Discourse which they deserved; calling, upon this Account, some *Pythagoreans* (those of the System) some *Pythagorites*, (those of the Homage) as we call some *Atticks*, some *Atticists*. Dividing them thus aptly into two Names, he appointed one Part to be *young*, Genuine, the other he ordered to be Imitators of them. As to the *Pythagoreans* he decreed, that all their Estates should be in common, and that they should lead their whole Lives together in Community; but the others be ordered to keep their Estates to themselves, yet to meet together. Thus was this Succession of both Parties constituted by *Pythagoras*, the Discipline which was observed by the more genuine, the *Pythagoreans*, we shall remit, together with his Doctrine, to the End of his Life.

C H A P. XVII.

His Authority in Civil Affairs.

• **W**Hatsoever Cities in his Travels through *Italy* and *Sicily*, he found subjected to one another, (whereof some had been so of a long time, others of late) he infused into them a Resentment of Liberty by his Disciples, of whom he had some out of every City, he restored them to Liberty. Thus he freed *Crotone*, *Sybaris*, *Catana*, *Rhegium*, *Himera*, *Agigentum*, *Tauromenium*, and some others, to whom he sent Laws by *Charondas* the *Catanæan*, and *Zaleucus* the *Locrian*, by means whereof they lasted a long time well governed, and were deservedly envied by their Neighbours. He wholly took away Diffention, not only from among his Disciples, and their Successors for many Ages after, but also from all the Cities of *Italy* and *Sicily*, both intestine and external Diffention. For he did frequently pronounce to all manner of Persons every where, whether many or few, an Apothegm, which resembles a monitory Oracle of God, which was a kind of Epitome or Recapitulation of all that he taught. The Apothegm was thus, *That we ought to avoid with our utmost Endeavour, and to amputate with Fire and Sword, and all other Means, from the Body, Sickness; from the Soul, Ignorance; from the Belly, Luxury; from a City, Sedition; from a Family, Discord; from all Things, Excess.* By which he did in-

dulgently put every one in Mind of his best Doctrines.

Yet is he reported to have been the Occasion of the War between the *Sybarites* and the *Crotonians*, which ended in the total Subversion of the *Sybarites*; the Manner is thus related by *Diadorus Siculus* and *Jamblicus*.

• When the *Gracians* built *Sybaris* in *Italy*, it soon came to pass, that through the Goodness of the Soil, [tho' *Atheneus* deny it to be Fertile] "the City became in a short Time very rich; for being seated betwixt two Rivers, *Crathis* and *Sybaris*, (from which it took its Name) and the Citizens possessing a large Country, they soon gathered together great Riches; and admitting many to be free of their Country, they arrived to such Height, that they seemed far to excel all the rest of the Inhabitants of *Italy*. [But so luxurious that they became infamous even to a Proverb; and no less addicted to all other Vices, insomuch that they, out of Insolence, put to death thirty Ambassadors of the *Crotonians*, and threw their Bodies from the Walls to be devoured by Beasts.] "The City was so populous, that it contained no less than 300000 Persons. At that time *Telys* was chief Magistrate, who, accusing the greatest Men, procured of the *Sybarites* to banish 500 of the richest Citizens, and to confiscate their Goods. These banished Men went to *Crotone*, and there (after the manner of Suppliants) fled to the Altars erected in the Forum; hereupon *Telys* sent Ambassadors to the *Crotonians*, to declare, that they should either deliver up the banished Men, or expect War." [These *Sybarite* Ambassadors had been instrumental in the Murder of some Friends of *Pythagoras*, perhaps some of the thirty *Crotonians* whom they slew.] "Amongst them, one there was, who had killed some of them with his own Hands; another was Son to one of the same Murderers, who was dead. Moreover, he was of those Kinds of Persons, who, being oppress'd with Want, stir up Sedition, that they may take occasion thereby to fall on the Goods of others. These *Sybarites* came to *Pythagoras*, and blamed him; and one of them (which was he that had a Hand himself in the Death of his Friends) demanding a Reason of his Reproof, he said, That he did not give Laws. Whereupon they accused him, as if he had made himself *Apello*, and especially for that before, upon a Question being asked, Why these Things were so? he asked him that propounded the Question, Whether, when *Apello* delivered his Oracles, he would require him to render a Reason? The other deriding, as he thought, those Discourses, in which *Pythagoras* declared the Return

" of

• *Porphy.* p. 24. and from him *Jamb.* cap. 7.

• *Diod.* l. 12.

• *Deip.* l. 12.

• *Athen. Deip.* l. 12.

• *Jamb.* c. 30.

"of the Soul, and telling him, That when he went into the other World, he would give him a Letter to carry to his Father, and desired him to bring an Answer to it when he came back; I shall not, replied *Pythagoras*, go to the Place of the wicked, where Murderers are punished. The Ambassadors having thus reviled him, and he going to the Sea-side, and washing himself, many following him, one of those who advised the *Crotonians*, said, When he had sufficiently spoken against all the other Things that they did, at last he accused them especially, for offering to oppose and abuse *Pythagoras*, of whom when heretofore, as Fables report, Beasts could speak, no one of them durst ever speak an ill Word^f.

"*Diodorus* saith, that a Council being called, and it being put to the question, Whether they should deliver up the *Italians* to the *Sybarites*, or undergo a War with an Enemy more powerful than themselves? The Senate and People made some doubt, and the People first inclined to the Delivery of the Suppliants, rather than endure the War. But afterwards, *Pythagoras*, the Philosopher, advising them to protect the Suppliants, they changed their Opinion, and determined to fight in their Defence. The *Sybarites* came into the Field with an Army of three hundred thousand; the *Crotonians* had but one hundred thousand. They were led by *Milo* the Wrestler, who, at the first Onset, himself put to flight that Wing of the Army which was opposite to him, for he was of invincible Strength. This Man having Courage answerable to his Strength, had been six Times Victor at the Olympic Games, and when he began this Fight, was crowned with Olympic Wreaths, wearing, like *Hercules*, a Lion's Skin and a Club, and obtaining the Victory for his Countrymen was much admired by them. [The *Crotonians* likewise made use of a Stratagem, whereby they got the Day: The *Sybarites* were so much addicted to Luxury, that they taught their Horses to dance at Feasts. This the *Crotonians* knowing, (as *Aristotle* relates) in the midst of the Fight, they commanded some Pipers, whom, to that Purpose, they had brought along with them, to play dancing Tunes; the Horses, as soon as they heard the Music, not only fell dancing, but carried their Riders violently over to their Enemies.] "Thus the *Sybarites* being put to Flight, the *Crotonians* spared none that they took, but put all to the Sword, whereby the greater Part of the Army was slain, and the City, after a dishonourable Surrender, laid waste." This, according to *Diodorus*, happened sixty three Years before the second of the

eighty third Olympiad, which falls upon the first Year of the sixty eighth Olympiad.

"*Agriemum* was by his means freed from the Tyranny of *Phalaris*, in this manner: "When *Pythagoras* was detained by *Phalaris*, a most cruel Tyrant, [^g with whom he stayed six Months] and *Abaris* the *Hyperborean*, a wise Person, came to converse with him, and asked him Questions, particularly concerning sacred Rites, Images, Divine Worship, Providence of the Gods, as well of those in Heaven, as conversant about the Earth, and such like Demands; *Pythagoras*, as being highly inspired, answered him with much Truth and Persuasion, inasmuch that he drew the Standers-by to his Opinion: Whereupon *Phalaris* feeling the People taken with him, was angry with *Abaris* for praising *Pythagoras*. He grew fierce against *Pythagoras* himself, and at last came to that Height, as to speak all Blasphemies against the Gods, as were possible for such a kind of Person. But *Abaris* acknowledged himself thankful to *Pythagoras* for these Things. He learned next of him, that all Things depend upon Heaven, and are disposed of from thence; which he collected, as from many other Things, so especially from the Efficacy of Sacrifices. Far therefore was he from thinking, that *Pythagoras*, who taught him these Things, was a Deceiver, but he rather admir'd him as a Person supernaturally inspir'd. *Phalaris*, in answer hereunto, deny'd plainly and openly all Things that were done in sacred Rites. Whereupon *Abaris* transferred his Discourse from these Things to such as appear manifestly to all Men, and by the Divine Operations which are in all Extremities; as in extraordinary Wars, and incurable Diseases, Destruction of Fruit, Transmigration of Pestilence from Country to Country. By these difficult irremediable Causes, he endeavour'd to prove, that there is a Divine Providence which over-rueth all human Hope and Power. But *Phalaris* impudently oppos'd it. Hereupon *Pythagoras* knowing that that Day would be fatal to *Phalaris*, spoke very freely; and looking upon *Abaris*, said, That there is a Passage from Heaven to the Aerial and Terrestrial Parts; and did likewise discourse scientifically, concerning the Dependence of all Things upon Heaven, and did irresistably demonstrate the free Power of the Soul, and proceeded to shew the perfect Operation of the Reason, and of the Mind. Then he spoke boldly concerning Tyranny, and all Excess of Fortune, all Injustice, all Covetousness, strongly maintaining that they are all nothing worth. After this, he made a Divine Exhortation concerning the best Life,

^f Lib. 12. Olymp. 83. 2. ^g So were the *Greeks* that inhabited *Italy* called, not the Natives. The same Difference betwixt *Sybarites* and *Italians*. ^h Athen. Deip. l. 12. ⁱ Jamb. c. 52. ^k Tzetzes Chiliad. 6. 31.

"Life, and made a resolute Opposition against the
 "worst, and did most plainly deliver the Doctrine
 "concerning the Power and Passions of the Soul;
 "and which was more than all these, he demon-
 "strated, that the Gods are not the Causes of Ills;
 "and that Diseases and Passions are Seeds of the Im-
 "temperance of the Body; and reprehended *Mytho-*
 "*graphers* and *Poets* for such Things as they had
 "falsely deliver'd; and sharply reprov'd *Phalaris*, and
 "shew'd what the Power of Heaven is, and how
 "great by its Operations. As concerning Infliction
 "of Punishment by Law, he gave many Instances
 "thereof, and clearly shew'd the Difference betwixt
 "Man and other living Creatures. He likewise
 "scientifically discours'd concerning intrinsecal and
 "enunciative Reason, and concerning the Mind,
 "and the Knowledge proceeding from it, with many
 "other moral Documents dependent thereon. He
 "treated of what Things are useful in Life, making
 "an Exhortation to the Pursuit of the useful, and
 "deteriorating from the hurtful; and that which is
 "most of all, he made a Distinction between
 "the Things done according to Fate, and according
 "to the Mind, and of those which are done accord-
 "ing to Necessity, and according to Decree. More-
 "over, he discours'd concerning *Dæmons*, and the
 "Immortality of the Soul, much and wisely; where-
 "of we shall have occasion to speak elsewhere, and
 "shew, that these Things do coalesce most to Forti-
 "tude, seeing that he himself in the midst of all
 "Dangers, did with a constant Mind discourse Phi-
 "losophy, and arm himself against Fortune; as also
 "for that he slighted and contemned the Person that
 "attempted to hurt him, and despised the Fear of
 "Death, and all human Contingencies, nor was he
 "at that Instant any thing concerned for them. In-
 "deed (continues *Jamblichus*) it is manifest, that he
 "was nothing troubled with the Fear of Death, but
 "had a far more noble Design, the freeing of *Sicily*
 "from the Oppression of Tyranny. That it was
 "he who did it, is manifest from the Oracle of *A-*
 "*pollo*, which declared, That *Phalaris*, when his
 "Subjects grew better and more unanimous, should
 "lose his Authority; which they did at the coming
 "of *Pythagoras*, through his Exhortations and In-
 "structions. But a clearer Evidence hereof is from
 "the Time: For that very Day that *Phalaris* went
 "about to bring *Pythagoras* and *Alcibiades* into Danger
 "of Death, he was himself slain. The manner
 "thus related by *Strabo*: It chanced that a Hawk
 "pursued a great Flight of Pigeons; which *Phalaris*
 "seeing, said to those that stood by him, Behold,
 "Friends, how much an ignoble Fear can do, for
 "if but one of all these Pigeons would turn again, it
 "would presently give a Stop to the Pursuer. This

"Speech an old Man that was present no sooner
 "heard, when taking up a Stone he threw it at *Pha-*
 "*laris*; and the rest following his Example, did
 "the like. Some say they stoned him to Death;
 "others, that they put him into Chains, and wrapt
 "him in a Sheet of Lead, wherein he died miser-
 "ably."

To the *Locrians*, besides *Charmidas* and *Zeuxenus*
 already mentioned, he sent *Timarus* also, to make
 Laws for them.

To the *Rhiginenses* he sent upon the same Em-
 ployment *Theatetus*, *Helicaon*, *Aristocrates*, and
Phytius.

Thus, as *Porphyrius* saith, *Pythagoras* and his
 Friends were a long time so much admired in *Italy*,
 that many Cities committed themselves to be govern-
 ed by them.

CHAP. XVIII.

Wanders related of him.

IF we may credit (saith *Porphyrius*, and from
 him *Jamblichus*) what is related of him by an-
 cient and creditable Authors, his Commands had an
 Influence even upon irrational Creatures; for he laid
 hold of the *Daunian* Bear, which did much hurt to
 the People thereabout, and having stroaked her awhile,
 and given her Maza and Fruits, and sworn her,
 that she never more touch any living Creature,
 he let her go. She straightway hid herself in
 the Hills and Woods, and from thenceforward never
 assaulted any living Creature.

Seeing an Ox at *Tarentum* in a Pasture, wherein
 grew several Things, cropping green Beans, he
 came to the Neat-herd and counselled him to speak to
 the Ox, that he should abstain from the Beans; but
 the Neat-herd mocking him, and saying, He could
 not speak the Language of Oxen, he himself went
 to him, and whispering in the Ear of the Ox, he
 not only refrained immediately from Beans at that
 time, but from thenceforward would never touch
 any, and lived many Years after about *Juno's* Tem-
 ple at *Tarentum*, till he was very old; and was call-
 ed the sacred Ox, eating such Meats as every one
 gave him.

An Eagle flying over his Head at the Olympick
 Games, as he was by chance discoursing to his
 Friends concerning *Auguries* and *Omens*, and divine
 Signs, and that there are some Messages from the
 Gods to such Men as have true Piety towards them;
 he is said [by certain Words to have stop't here and]
 to have caus'd her to come down; and after he had
 stroaked her awhile, he let her go again. This per-
 haps was that white Eagle, which *Jamblichus* re-
 ports

G g g

¹ Chil. 6. 30.
² Jambli. c. 13.

³ Jambli. p. 190. and 154.
⁴ Porphyr. ibid. Jambli. c. 13.

⁵ Jambli. p. 190.
⁶ Plot. in Numa.

⁷ Pag. 190.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Chap. 13.

¹⁰ Porphyr. ibid.

ports he stroaked at *Croto*, and she endured it quietly. For the *Crotonians* instituted Games, which they called *Olympick*, in Emulation of the *Grecians*.

A River (which * *Porphyrius* calls *Caucasus*, *Apollonius* Πόταμος κατὰ Σαύρον; *Laertius* and *Jamblichus*, *Nessus*; *Eliau*, *Cofa*; St. *Cyril*, *Caufus*) as he passed over it, with many of his Friends, spoke to him, and said with a plain clear Voice, χαῖρε Πόταγιός ἐγώ, Hail *Pythagoras*.

* In one and the same Day, almost all affirm, that he was present at *Metapontum* in *Italy*, and at *Tauromenium* in *Sicily*, with the Friends which he had in both Places, and discoursed to them in a publick Convention, when as the Places are distant many *Stadia* by Sea and Land, and many Days Journey asunder. *Apollonius* relates this, as done at *Croto* and *Metapontum*.

* At the publick Solemnity of the *Olympick* Games, he stood up and shewed his golden Thigh; as he did in private to *Abaris*, to confirm him in the Opinion, that he was *Hyperborean Apollo*, whose Priest *Abaris* was.

† A Ship coming into the Harbour, and his Friends wishing they had the Goods that were in it: Then (saith *Pythagoras*) you will have a dead Body: And when the Ship came at them, they found in it the Body of a dead Man.

* To one who much desired to hear him, he said, That he would not discourse until some Sign appeared. Not long after, one coming to bring News of the Death of a white Bear in *Daunia*, he prevented him, and related it first.

* They affirm he foretold many Things, and that they came to pass; inasmuch that † *Aristippus* the *Cyrenæan*, in his Book of Physiologicke, saith, He was named *Pythagoras*, from speaking Things as true as *Pythian Apollo*. He foretold an Earthquake by the Water which he tasted out of a Well; and foretold, That a Ship, which was then under sail with a pleasant Gale, should be cast away.

At *Sybaris* he took in his Hand a Serpent of deadly biting, and let it go again. And at *Tyrrhenia* he took a little Serpent, and biting it, kill'd it with his Teeth.

* A thousand other more wonderful and divine Things are related constantly, and with full Agreement of him; so that, to speak freely, more was never attributed to any, nor was any more eminent. For his Predictions of Earthquakes most certain are remembered, and his immediate chasing away of the Pestilence, and his Suppression of violent Winds and Hail, and his calming of Storms, as well in Rivers as upon the Sea, for the Ease and safe Passage of his

Friends; from whom *Empedocles*, and *Epimenides*, and *Abaris* learning it, often performed the like, which their Poems plainly attest. Besides, *Empedocles* was surnamed *Alexanemos*, the Chaser away of Winds; *Epimenides*, *Calbates*, the Lustrator; *Abaris*, *Ætrobates*, the Walker in the Air; for, riding upon an Arrow of *Hyperborean Apollo*, which was given him, he was carried in the Air over Rivers and Seas, and inaccessible Places, which some believed to have been done by *Pythagoras*, when he discoursed with his Friends at *Metapontum* and *Tauromenium* upon the same Day.

† To these add his Trick with a Looking-glass, as the Scholiast of *Aristophanes* calls it, who describes it thus: The Moon being in the Full, he wrote whatsoever he pleased in Blood upon a Looking-glass, and telling it first to the other Party, stood behind him, holding the Letters towards the Moon; whereby he who stood betwixt him and the Moon, looking steadfastly upon her, read all the Letters which were written in the Looking-glass in the Moon, as if they were written in her.

But these Things, some, even of the Antients, have imputed to Goetick Magick, as *Timon*, who terms him, Γοῖσος, a Magician; others, to Imposture, as appears by this Relation of *Heracles*, and the Scholiast of *Apollonius*: * When he came into *Italy*, he made a Vault under Ground, and charged his Mother [† to give out that he was dead, and] to set down in a Table-book all things that happened, expressing the Times punctually: Then he went down [and shut himself up in the Vault] and his Mother did as he ordered her, until such time as he came up again. After a while *Pythagoras* came up, lean and withered; and coming into the Congregation, declared, that he was returned from the *Inferi*, and related to them what was done there [and told them many prodigious Stories concerning the *Palingenesis*, and the Things of the *Inferi*; telling the living News of their dead Friends, with whom he said he met in the *Inferi*.] † *Hieronymus* relates, That he saw there the Soul of *Hesiod* bound with Brails to a Pillar, shrieking; and that of *Homer* hung up on a Tree, encompassed by Serpents, for the Fables which he had raised concerning the Gods: Those likewise tormented who used not the Company of their own Wives. For this he was much honoured by the *Crotonians*. They being much moved at what he said, wept and lamented, and hereupon conceived such an Esteem of *Pythagoras*, as being a Divine Person, that they sent their Wives to him to be instructed in his Doctrine, which Women were called *Pythagoreans*. Thus *Hermippus*. The Scholiast adds, (Hereby he raised an Opinion concerning himself, That, before the

* Pag. 192. † Porph. ibid. Jamb. c. 28. † Plot. in Numæ. Laert. Porph. p. 18. † Porph. p. 193. † Jamb. c. 28.
 † Anon. de vita Pyth. apud Phot. † Laert. l. 2. † Porph. p. 18, 19. † In Nubæ, p. 759. † Heracles apud Laertium.
 † Schol. Apol. † Laert. l. 2.

the Trojan War, he was *Antibalides*, the Son of *Mercury*; then *Euphorbus*, then *Hermotimus*, then *Pyrrhus*, a *Delian*; lastly, *Pythagoras*.] And, as *Laertius* faith, in his Writings he reported of himself, That he had come from the *Inferi* to Men, 207 Years since. Of this more in his Doctrine, *Part 2. Chap. 5. Sect. 10.*

C H A P. XIX.

His Death.

THE Time of *Pythagoras* his Death hath been formerly touched: It was, according to *Eusebius*, in the fourth Year of the 70th *Olympiad*, after he had lived, as *Justin* faith, at *Cratona* 20 Years. The Occasion is differently related. * *Laertius* thus.

Pythagoras died in this manner: As he fate in Council together with his Friends, in the House of *Milo*, it happened that the House was set on fire by one who did it out of Envy, because he was not admitted. Some affirm, the *Crotonians* did it out of fear of being reduced to a Tyranny. *Pythagoras* running away, was overtaken; coming to a Place full of Beans, he made a Stop, saying, It is better to be taken, than to tread; and better to be killed, than to speak. So the Pursuers slew him. In the same manner died most of his Disciples, about forty in Number; some few only escaped, of whom were *Architas* the *Tarentine*, and *Lyfis*, of whom we spake before. *Dicaearchus* faith, that *Pythagoras* fled to the Temple of the Muses at *Metapontum*, and died for want of Food, having lived there forty Days without eating. *Heraclides*, in his Epitome of the Lives of *Satyrus*, relates, That having buried *Phercydes*, he returned to *Italy*, where finding the Faction of *Cyclo* prevalent, he departed to *Metapontum*, and there starved himself, not willing to live any longer. *Hermippus* faith, that the *Agriegines* and *Syracusan* warring against one another, *Pythagoras*, with his Friends, went to the *Agriegines*, and was Head of them: But they being vanquished, and he flying to a Field of Beans, was there slain; the rest (being thirty-five) were burn'd at *Tarentum*, for intermeddling with the Governors and Rule of the Commonwealth.

Jamblichus, from *Aristoxenus* and others, gives a more particular Account: There were (faith he) some, who opposed these Men, and rose up against them. That this Conspiracy happened in the Absence of *Pythagoras*, is acknowledged by all; but they disagree concerning his Journey: Some say, he was gone to *Phercydes* the *Syrian*; others, to *Metapontum*. The Causes of this Conspiracy are diversely related also; one is said to have proceeded from the

Men who were called *Cylonians*, thus: *Cylo*, a *Crotonian*, who, in Race, and Honour, and Wealth, excelled all the rest of the Citizens, but otherwise of a harsh, violent, turbulent and tyrannical Humour, was exceedingly desirous to participate of the *Pythagorick* Institution; and coming to *Pythagoras*, who was now very old, he was repulsed for the Reasons aforesaid. Hereupon there arose a great Contest, *Cylo* and his Friends opposing *Pythagoras* and his Friends: and so eager and violent was the Malice of *Cylo* and his Party, that it extended even to the last of the *Pythagoreans*. *Pythagoras* therefore for this reason departed to *Metapontum*, where it is said that he died. The *Cylonians* (so called) continue to exercise their Hatred and Enmity, towards the *Pythagoreans*: For a while, the Integrity of the *Pythagoreans*, and the Kindness of the Cities (which was so great as to be governed by them) was prevalent; but at last they so plotted against the Men, as that surprising them, assembled in the House of *Milo* at *Cratona*, consulting about military Affairs, they burned them all except two, *Archippus* and *Lyfis*, who being youthful and strong, escaped out of doors. This falling out, and the Cities not taking any notice of the Misfortune, the *Pythagoreans* gave over their Business. This happened from two Causes, as well by reason of the Unconcernment of the Cities, (for they had no regard of the Murder to punish the Authors thereof) as by reason of the Death of the most excellent Persons, two only of them were saved, both *Tarentines*; of whom, *Archippus* retired to *Tarentum*; but *Lyfis*, out of Hatred of the Neglect they had received from the Cities, departed into *Greece*, and lived at *Achaia* in *Peloponnesus*: Thence, upon a particular Design, he removed to *Thebes*, where *Epimandras* heard him, and called him Father. There he died. The rest of the *Pythagoreans*, all but *Architas* the *Tarentine*, forsook *Italy*; and assembling at *Rhegium*, they lived there together: But in progress of time the Management of publick Affairs decayed. The most eminent of these were *Phanto*, and *Echecrates*, and *Polymastus*, and *Dicales* (both *Peliasians*) and *Xenophilus*, a *Chalcidian* of *Chalcis* in *Thrace*: These preserved the Customs and Doctrines from the Beginning; but, with the Sect itself, at last they were wholly extinguished. This is related by *Aristoxenus*.

Nicomachus agreeth in all things with this Relation, except in that he faith, This Insurrection happened at what time *Pythagoras* was gone to *Delos* to visit *Phercydes*, who was sick of a *Phthiriasis*; then were they stoned and burned by the *Italians*, and cast forth without Burial. Hitherto *Jamblichus*.

With these also agreeth the Relation of *Neambes*, thus deliver'd by * *Porphyrius*.

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*Pytha-** So read, not *Pythius*.† render'd, *amicorum impie*.

‡ Lib. 20. c. 4.

= Vita *Pyth.* p. 205.

§ Laert. 8. 39.

|| *Aristoxenus*, Spin *Porphyrius*, p. 39. *παύειν τὸν ἀσθενέστατον*.

Pythagoras and his Friends having been a long time so much admir'd in *Italy*, that many Cities committed themselves to them, at last they became envied, and a Conspiracy was made against them in this manner: *Cyle*, a *Cratonian* (who, in Extract, Nobility, and Wealth, exceeded all the rest of the Citizens; but otherwise was of a violent, rigid, and tyrannical Disposition, and one that made use of the multitude of his Friends to compass his unjust Ends) as he esteem'd himself worthy of all excellent things, so most particularly to partake of the *Pythagorick* Philosophy; he came to *Pythagoras*, and much extolled himself, and desired his Conversation. But *Pythagoras* presently observing the Nature and Manners of the Person, and perceiving by the Signs which he observ'd in the Bodies of such as came to him, what kind of Disposition he was of, bad him depart, and go about his business. Hereat *Cyle* was not a little troubled, taking it for a great Affront, being of himself a Person of a rough violent Spirit. Therefore calling his Friends together, he began to accuse *Pythagoras*, and to conspire against him and his Disciples. Whereupon, as some relate, the Friends of *Pythagoras* being gathered together in the House of *Milo* the Wrestler, *Pythagoras* himself being absent (for he was gone to *Delos*, to visit *Pherecydes* the *Syrian*, formerly his Master, who was desperately fallen sick of a *Phthiriasis*, and to attend on him) they set the House on fire, and burned and stoned them all, except two who escaped the Fire, *Archippus* and *Lyfis*, as *Neambes* relates; of whom, *Lyfis* went into *Greece* to *Epimondas*, whose Master he had formerly been.

But *Dicaearchus*, and other more accurate Authors affirm, that *Pythagoras* himself was there present when this Conspiracy was perpetrated; for *Pherecydes* died before he left *Samos*. Of his Friends, forty being gathered together, were beset in a House; most of them going dispersedly to the City, were slain. *Pythagoras*, his Friends being taken, first escap'd to the *Caulonian* Haven, thence went to the *Locrians*. The *Locrians* sent some old Men to the Borders of their Country, who gave him this Answer: We have heard, *Pythagoras*, that thou art a Person wise, and of great Worth; but we have nothing in our Laws that is reprehensible, and therefore we will endeavour to preserve them. Go to some other Place, taking of us whatsoever you have need of. Hereupon leaving the City of the *Locrians*, he failed to *Tarentum*; where receiving the same Entertainment he had at *Croto*, he went to *Metapontum*: for great Seditions were raised against him in every Part, which are remember'd by the Inhabitants at this Day, who recount the Seditions against the *Pythagoreans*, as they call them; for all that Faction which sided with *Pythagoras* were called *Pythagoreans*.

In the *Metapontine* Faction, *Pythagoras* is said to have died, flying to the Temple of the *Muses*, and staying there forty Days, through want of Necessaries.

Others relate, that when the House wherein his Friends used to meet, was fired, his Friends threw themselves into the Fire to make a way for their Master, spreading their Bodies like a Bridge upon the fire; and that *Pythagoras*, escaping out of the Burning, destitute of all his Friends, for Grief ended his Days.

With these Men, oppress'd with this Calamity, failed their Knowledge also, which till then they had preserved secret and concealed, except some things difficult to be understood, which the Auditors that lived without (*the Screen*) repeated by heart. *Lyfis* and *Archippus* escaping, and as many as were at that time in other Parts, preserved some little Sparks of Philosophy, obscure and difficult to be found out; for being now left alone, and much grieved at the Perpetration of that Wickedness, fearing lest the Name of Philosophy should be quite extinguish'd amongst Men, and that for this reason the Gods would be angry with them, they made some summary Commentaries; and having reduc'd the Writings of the Ancients, and those which they remember'd, into one Body, every one left them in the Place where they died, charging their Sons, Daughters, and Wives, that they should not communicate them to any out of their own Family. Thus privately continuing it successively to their Successors, they observ'd it a long time. And for this reason, saith *Nicomachus*, we conjecture, that they did purposely avoid Friendship with Strangers; and for many Ages they preserv'd a faithful constant Friendship amongst themselves.

Moderatus saith, that this (*Pythagorick* Philosophy) came at last to be extinguish'd, first, because it was enigmatical; next, because their Writings were in the *Doric* Dialect, which is obscure; by which means the Doctrines deliver'd in it were not understood, being spurious and misapprehended, because (moreover) they who publish'd them were not *Pythagoreans*. Besides, *Plato*, *Aristotle*, *Speusippus*, *Aristoxenus*, and *Ammonius*, as the *Pythagoreans* affirm, vented the best of them, as their own, changing only some few things in them; but the more vulgar and trivial, and whatsoever was afterwards invented by cavious and calumnious Persons, to cast a Contempt upon the *Pythagorean* School, they collected and delivered as proper to that Sect.

But forasmuch as *Apollonius* gives a different Account of these things, and adds many things which have not yet been spoken, let us give his Narration also concerning the Infection against the *Pythagoreans*. He (therefore) saith, That the *Pythagoreans* were envied from their very Childhood; for the Peo-

Part IX.

ple, as long as *Pythagoras* discoursed with all that came to him, loved him exceedingly; but when he apply'd himself only to his Disciples, they undervalued him. That he should admit Strangers, they well enough suffered; but that the Natives of the Country should attribute so much to him, they took very ill, and suspected their Meetings to be Conventicles against them. Besides, the young Men being of the best Rank and Estate, it came to pass, that after a while they were not only the chief Persons in their own Families, but governed even the whole City, they becoming many, as to a Society, (for they were above three hundred Persons) but being a small Part as to the City, which was not order'd according to their Manners and Institutions. Notwithstanding, as long as they possided the Place they were in only, and *Pythagoras* lived there, the City followed the original Government thereof, tho' much perplexed, and watching an Opportunity for Change. But after they had reduced *Sybaris*, and that he departed, and they distributed the conquer'd Country into Colonies, as they pleas'd; at length the concealed Hatred broke forth, and the Multitude began to quarrel with them. The Leaders of this Diffention were those who were nearest ally'd to the *Pythagoreans*. Many things that had pass'd grieved them, according as they were particularly affected; but one of the greatest was, that he only should be thought capable of Discipline. For the *Pythagoreans* used never to name *Pythagoras*; but whilst he lived, they called him *Divine*; after Death, the Men: As *Homer* introduceth *Examenus* mentioning *Ulysses*;

*I to pronounce his Name, though absent, fear;
So great is my Respect, and so far dear.*

In like manner, not to rise out of Bed after the Sun's up, nor to wear a Ring whereon the Image of God is engrav'd; but to observe the Sun, that they may adore his Rising; and not to wear a Ring, lest they might chance to have it on at a Funeral, or carry it into any unclean Place. Likewise, not to do any thing without Pæmeditation, nor any thing whereof they could not give a good Account; but that in the Morning they should consider what they were to do, and at Night they should make a Recollection thereof, as well to ponder the things themselves, as to exercise the Memory. Likewise, if any one of that Community had appointed to meet another in any Place, he should stay there Day and Night until the other came. The *Pythagoreans* likewise accusom'd themselves to be mindful of what is said, and to speak nothing rashly. But above all things, as an inviolable Precept, he kept even until Death, he advis'd them not to reproach, but always to use good Words, as at Sacrifices. These things much displeas'd all in general, as I said, so much as they admitted Men to be educated in this

Singularity amongst them. But, in that they reach'd forth the Hands to *Pythagoreans* only, and not to any of their own Family, except their Parents: likewise, in that they had their Estates in common, wholly alienated from their own Domesticks: hereat their Allies were much displeas'd; and they beginning the Diffention, the rest readily joined themselves, and engaged in it. And at the same time *Hippasus*, *Disdorus* and *Theages* saying, That it was fit every one should partake of the publick Government and Convention; and that the Magistrates being chosen by Lot, ought to give an Account: But on the other side, the *Pythagoreans*, *Alcimachus*, and *Dimachus*, and *Meta*, and *Democedes* opposing it, and forbidding that the Government of the Country should be abrogated: these taking the Part of the Commons, got the better. But afterwards, many of the common People understanding that there was a Division in the publick Convention, *Cylo* and *Nixe*, Orators, framed an Accusation against them; the first was one of the best Quality, the other of the vulgar Sort. To this effect, a long Discourse being made by *Cylo*, the other continued it, pretending that he had found out the greatest Secrets of the *Pythagoreans*. But indeed having forged and writ such things, as thereby he might chiefly traduce them; and having deliver'd the Book to a Notary, had him read it. The Title was, *The sacred Discourse*: the Sum whereof this: *That Friends ought to be reverenced as the Gods themselves, but all other Men tyranniz'd over like Beasts. That the same Sentence of Pythagoras himself reduced to Verse, was thus rehearsed by his Disciples:*

Friends equal with the Gods he did respect,
All others (as of no account) neglect.

And that he chiefly praised Homer for saying, Men should adore, the Shepherd of the People; for that he tacitly imply'd, that the rest of Mankind were but Beasts. That he affected Oligarchy, and was an Enemy to unmarried Persons, as those who had been Chief in Election of Magistrates by Lot. That he affected Tyranny, in as much as he saith, It is better to be a Bull, though but one Day, than an Ox all our Life-time. That he praised the Laws and Customs of other People, and commanded, That whatsoever was decreed by them should be used. In fine, he declared, That their Philosophy was a Conspiracy against the People; and advis'd them, that they should not hearken to the Voice of their Consultations, but rather think of forbidding them to meet in Council at all, if they alledged, that they had a settled Assembly, consisting of a thousand Voices. Wherefore it was not fit that they should, as far as in them lay, give ear to prohibited Persons, and permit them to speak; but to esteem their right Hand which they held from him hostile, when they should offer to put in a Stone for voting, conceiving

conceiving it an unworthy thing, that three hundred thousand Men, who all lived about the River Tetrakis, should be oppressed by Seditions, and overcome by the thousandth Part of them in that City. This Calumny so much exasperated the Hearers, that some few Days after, as they were sacrificing in the Temple of *Pythian Apollo*, they ran in tumultuously to do Violence to them. But the *Pythagoreans* being informed beforehand thereof, fled to the publick Hall. *Democedes*, with the young Men, went to *Platea*; but they dissolving the Laws, used Decrees, whereby accusing *Democedes* of stirring up the young Men to Tyranny, they proclaimed, That whosoever did kill him should have in Recompence three Talents: And there being a Fight, wherein he, by the means of *Theages*, was overcome, they gave him three Talents out of the publick Treasury. But there arising many Misfortunes in the City and Country, the banished Persons being called to Judgment, and the Examination thereof being committed to three Cities, *Tarentum*, *Metapontum*, and *Caulon*, they that were put in Commission, thought good (as appears by the *Crotonian Records*) to banish them. So they banished the whole Generation, saying, That the Children ought not to be separated from their Parents, and seiz'd their Estates. But after many Years, *Dimachus* and his Friends being slain in another Fight, and *Litago* also, who was Head of this Faction, they took Compassion on them, and resolv'd to call home those who were left: Wherefore sending for their Ambassadors from *Achaia*, they made an Agreement with the banish'd Men by them, and hung up the Copies of their Oaths in the Temple of *Delphi*. The *Pythagoreans* who returned, were about Threecore, besides those who were very aged, of whom some addicted themselves to Medicine, and cured the sick, and so became Masters of that which is called Method. Those who were restored, grew into great Favour with the People, at that time in which it was proverbially said, in Opposition to those who violate the Laws, *These are not under the Government of Nino*.

C H A P. XX.

His Person and Virtues.

HIS Person *Jamblichus* describes to have been in his Youth extraordinary beautiful, called, The fair-hair'd *Samian*; * and at 56 Years of Age, of a more comely and divine Presence. † *Laertius* saith, *He is reported to have been of a most awful Aspect, inasmuch as his Disciples thought him Hyperborean Apollo*: Adding, That ‡ *Timon* takes no-

tice of the Awfulness of his Presence in his *Silli*, tho' he alledg'd it in Disparagement of him.

Pythagoras skill'd in the *Geetick Laws*,
Who courts by grave Discourse human Applause.

So great an Impression it made upon those with whom he convers'd, that a young Man being sharply reprehended by him, immediately went and hang'd himself. Whereupon *Pythagoras* ever after forbore to reprove any Person.

§ *Lycon*, in the Life of *Pythagoras*, saith, That he used a spare Diet: *Athenaeus*, That he drank very little, and lived so moderately, that he was often content only with Honey. ¶ By his moderate Diet he preserv'd his Body in the same constant State, not sometimes sick, sometimes well, sometimes fat, sometimes lean. It appear'd by his Countenance, that the same Constancy was in his Soul also. He was not subject to Joy (as *Cicero* likewise observes) or Grief, no Man ever saw him rejoice or mourn. * Neither did any ever see him *alvum exonerantem*, *caerentem*, or drunk. He refrain'd wholly from Derision, and Assentation, and Scoffs, and detraacting Speeches. He never punished any in Anger, neither Servant, nor free Person.

† He wore a white and clean Stole, (or Gown) and used white woollen Blankets, for as yet *Linum* was not known in those Parts, and ‡ a gold Crown and Breeches.

§ *Diogenes* discoursing of his daily Conversation, saith, He had Morning Exercitations at his own House, composing his own Soul to the Lyre, and singing some old Pæans of *Thales*. He likewise sung some Verses of *Homer* and *Hesiod*, whereby he rendred his Mind more sedate. Moreover, he used some Dances, which he conceived to conduce to Agility and bodily Health. His Walks he used not with many, promiscuously, but with two or three, in the Temples or Groves, making choice of such Places as were most pleasant, and remote from Noise.

¶ Having purchased the Estate of *Alcaeus*, who, after his Embassy to *Lacedaemon*, died; he was no less admired for his Economy than Philosophy.

Besides this *Pythagoras* the Philosopher, there were many others of the same Name; the most ancient was a *Lacanian*, Contemporary with King *Numa*.

Laertius reckons four, all about the same Time, or at least not long distant from one another; for, (besides the Philosopher) there was one a *Crotonian*, a tyrannical Person; another a *Philasian*, *equusqueis* *donatus*, (Exercitator, as * *Pliny* renders it) one that profess'd

* Cap. 2. p. 31. † Cap. 5. p. 37.
19. ‡ Laert. see also *Jamb.* c. 21.
Numa. † Lib. 7. c. 23.

* Laert. §. 12. † Ibid.
‡ *Eliaen.* var. *Hist.* 12, 22.

* *Athen. Deipn.* 10.
‡ *Porph.* p. 194.

† *Porph.* p. 195.
‡ *Jamb.* c. 30. p. 170.

* Laert. §.
‡ *Plot.* in

professed to teach corporeal Exercises, and to diet and order the Body for them. This seems to be the same *Pythagoras*, ° Son of *Erastocles*, who write *Alcibiades Commentaries*, and advised the Wrestlers, instead of Figs, to eat Flesh; both which are ascribed by some to *Pythagoras* the Philosopher. The third, a *Locustian*, to whom are ascribed the Doctrines of Philosophy, which it was lawful to divulge, and the proverbial *ἀντὶς ἕσσαι*; both which were proper to *Pythagoras* the Philosopher. Some reckon another *Pythagoras* of *Rhegium*, a Statuary, who invented Rhythm and Symmetry; and another of *Samos*, a Statuary also, (perhaps the same whom ° *Pliny* placeth in the 67th *Olympiad*) and another an Orator of no Reputation; another a Physician, who writ of *σκόλλαν*, the Sea-Onion, (ascribed by ° *Pliny* to the Philosopher) and concerning *Homer*; and another, the History of the *Doreans*, as *Diomysius* relates. Hitherto *Laertius*.

To these add ° *Pythagoras* the *Ephesian*, who lived before *Cyrus*; another of the same Name, ° *Præfect* under *Ptolemy*; a third, a ° *Painter*.

CHAP. XXI.

His Wife, Children, Servants.

HE took to Wife *Theano*. Some affirm, she was a ° *Crotonian*; but ° *Porphyrus*, a *Cretan*, Daughter of *Pythionax*, or ° *Pythionax*. After the Death of *Pythagoras*, she took upon her the Tuition of their Children, and the ° Government of the School, ° marrying *Aristæus*, who succeeded him in that Dignity. *Laertius* saith, *There were some Writings extant under her Name*; whereof *Suidas* instanteth, *Philosophical Commentaries, Apophthegms, and a Poem in Hexameter Verse*. Of her Apophthegms are remembered these: ° Being demanded how soon, after Coition, a Woman is pure, she answered, *If with her own Husband, at the same instant; if with a strange Person, never*. She advised every Woman, when she goeth to-bed to her Husband, to put off her Modesty with her Cloaths, and when she riseth, to put it on again with them. Being asked (upon occasion perhaps of some ambiguous Word) *παις*; which of the two she meant? She answered, *That for which I am called a Woman*. To one admiring her Beauty, and saying, *How white an Arm!* She answered, *But not common*. *Laertius*, who affirms she was Daughter to *Brontinus*, a *Crotonian*, adds, That according to some, *Theano* was Wife to *Brontinus*, and Disciple to *Pythagoras*. And with this second, it seems, the former was frequently confounded, as particularly in the first of the precedent

Apophthegms, which *Jamblichus* affirms to be (spoken by *Theano*, the Wife of *Brontinus*, tho' attributed by some (of whom is *Laertius*) to *Theano*, the Wife of *Pythagoras*).

° Of his Sons by *Theano* are remembered *Telauges* and *Mnesarchus*: *Mnesarchus* seems to be the same whom ° *Plutarch* calls *Mamercus*; for both these Names are given to the Father of *Pythagoras*, from whom that of his Son, doubtless, was derived. ° By some he seems to be called *Damo*, if there be no Mistake occasion'd by *Pythagoras* his Daughter, of the same Name. These two, *Telauges* and *Mnesarchus*, were, upon their Father's Death, bred up under their Mother *Theano*, and afterwards governed the School, as *Jamblichus* attests of *Mnesarchus*, *Laertius* of *Telauges*; who adds, That he taught *Empedocles*, as some conceive; and *Hippobotus* cites, out of *Empedocles* himself, this:

° Noble *Telauges* from *Theano* sprung,
And great *Pythagoras*———

But of *Telauges* there is no Writing extant. Thus *Laertius*, who yet elsewhere cites an Epistle of *Telauges* to *Philolaus*. And *Jamblichus* affirms, That some ascribed to him the sacred Discourse which went under the Name of *Pythagoras*.

To these two Sons, add, (upon the Authority of ° *Duris* the *Samian*, in his second Book of Hours) *Arimnestus*, Master to *Democritus*, who returning from Banishment, suspended a brazen Tablet in the Temple of *Juno*, the Diameter whereof was high two Cubits, bearing this Inscription:

*Me Arimnestus, who much Learning trac'd,
Pythagoras beloved Son here plac'd.*

His Daughters were *Sara*, *Moya*, *Arignota*, (whose Pythagorical Writings *Porphyrus* mentioneth, as extant in his time) and ° *Damo*: With her *Pythagoras* left his Writings at his Death, charging her not to communicate them to any that were not within the Family. Whereupon she, though she might have had much Money for the Books, would not accept it, preferring Poverty, with Obedience to her Father's Command, before Riches. One of his Daughters *Pythagoras* gave in Marriage to *Meno* of *Crotone*, whom he had educated so well, that when a Virgin, she went foremost in the Company of the Virgins; and when a Wife, foremost among the married Women. The *Crotonians* made of her House a Temple to *Ceres*: The Street they called *Musæum*.

Of

° Jam. c. 5. p. 40.

° Lib. 34. c. 8.

° Lib. 19. c. 5.

° Suid.

° Plin. 37. 2.

° Plin. 34. 8.

° Suid. in *Theano*.

° Pag. 122.

° Suid.

° Theodor. de princip. adv. gent. Ser. 2.

° Jamb. ep. ult.

° Laert. 8. 43.

° Suid. in *Pyth.*

° In *Idem*.

° Suid. in *Pythag.*

° Perhaps *Telauges*, κατὰ ἀρχαί, &c.

° Laert. 8. 43.

° Porph. V. t. *Pyth.*

° Suid. *Jamb.*

° *Pyth.*

course, which *Heracides* ascribes to him; for that was in Verse, this in Prose,] as being collected out of the most mystical places of *Orpheus*, written either by *Pythagoras*, as most hold, or, as some eminent and creditable persons of that School assert, by *Teluges*, out of the Commentaries left by *Pythagoras* with *Damo* his Daughter, Sister of *Telauges*, which after her death, they report to have been given to *Bitale*, Daughter of *Damo*, and to *Telauges* Son of *Pythagoras*, Husband to *Bitale*. What *Jamblichus* cites out of this Work, see hereafter in the Doctrine of *Pythagoras*; it is cited also by * *Hierocles*, *Syrianus*, and others.

An Oration to *Abaris*, mentioned by *Proclus*.

Orpheus, a Poem, as *Ion* the Chian (*in triagmis*) (affirms. *Laert.*

The *Scopiads*, beginning thus, Μῆ ἀνὰ σὺν μὲν ἴρι. (*Laert.*

Hymns, out of which *Proclus* brings these Verses.

— Sacred Number springs

From thy uncorrupted Monad, and proceeds
To the divine Tetradicks, she who breeds
All; and assigns the proper bounds to all,
Whom we the pure immortal Decad call.

Arithmetick, mention'd by * *Isidore*, who affirms, He was the first that writ upon this Subject amongst the Grecians, which was afterward more copiously compiled by *Nicomachus*.

Prognosticks, of which thus † *Tzetzes*.

Pythagoras Samian, *Mnesarchus* Son,
Not only knew what would by fate be done,
But ev'n for those who futures would perceive,
He of *Prognosticks* several Books did leave.

Of the magical Virtues of Herbs, frequently cited by * *Pliny*, who saith, That though some ascribe it to *Clemporus* a Physician, yet pertinacious Fame and Antiquity vindicate it to *Pythagoras*; and this very thing gives authority to the Volumes, that if any other thought his pains worthy the name of that Person, which that *Clemporus* did, who can believe? Seeing that he hath put forth other Things in his own name. To this work seems to belong that Volume, which *Pythagoras* wrote concerning the Sea-Union, cited also by *Pliny*; but by *Laertius* ascribed to another *Pythagoras* a Physician.

The golden Verses of *Pythagoras*, or, as others, of the *Pythagoreans*. But indeed their Author, as *Suidas* saith, is not certainly known, though some ascribe them to him. Of these is * *Proclus*, who styles him, Father of the golden Verses. Even the

Verses themselves seem to confirm it, there being amongst them some, which *Pythagoras* is known to have repeated to his Disciples, by the Testimonies of *Laertius*, *Porphyry*, and others.

Nor suffer sleep at night to close thy eyes,
Till thrice thy acts that day thou hast o're-run;
How slipst? what deeds? what Duty left undone?

Others, (as * *Chrysippus*) attribute them to his Disciples; some particularly to *Lyfist* the *Tarentine*; some to *Philolaus*. St. *Hierom* conceives that the Sentences and Doctrines were of *Pythagoras*, but reduced to verse succinctly by *Archippus* and *Lyfides* his Disciples, who had their Schools in *Greek*, and at *Thebes*, and having the Precepts of their Master by heart, made use of their own Ingenuity instead of Books. Or they might be compiled by *Epicarmus*, of whom *Jamblichus* saith, 'coming to *Syracusa* in the reign of *Hiero*, he forbore to profess Philosophy openly; but did reduce the Opinions of the *Pythagoreans* into Verse, thereby in sportive manner venting the Doctrine of *Pythagoras*.

Epistles; * of which are extant two only, one to *Anaximenes*, the other to *Hiero*.

Pythagoras to *Anaximenes*.

AND thou, O best of Men, if thou didst not excel
Pythagoras in *extra* and honour, wouldst have
left *Miletus*; but now the honour of this Country
detracts thee, and would also detain me, were I like
Anaximenes. But if you who are the most considerable Persons should forsake the Cities, their Glory would be lost, and they become more insatiable by the Medes. Neither is it fit to be always busied in *Astrology*, but better to take care of our Country. Even I myself bestow not all my time in Study, but sometimes in the Wars, wherein the Italians are engaged one against another.

This Epistle seems to have been written in answer to that of *Anaximenes* to *Pythagoras*, already produc'd in the life of *Anaximenes*.

Pythagoras to *Hiero*.

MY Life is secure and quiet, but yours will no way suit with me: A moderate and self-denying Person, needs not a Sicilian Table. *Pythagoras*, where-soever he comes; hath all things sufficient for the day; but to serve a Lord is heavy and intolerable, for one unaccustomed to it. Ἀνρίπνα, self-sufficiency, is a great and safe thing, for it hath none that envies or conspires against it; whence that Life seemeth to come nearest God. A good Habit is not acquired by ven-

* In Aur. Carm.
c. 2.

* De Origin. 3. a.

† Chil. 1. 58.

* Lib. 24. c. 27.

* Is Timæum. 1. 3.

* Agel. 1. 9.

real Pleasures, nor high Feeding; but by Indigence, which leadeth to Virtus; various and intemperate Pleasures enslave the Souls of weak Persons, but especially those which you enjoy, inasmuch as you have given your self over to them; for you are carried in suspense, and cannot be safe, because your Reason opposeth not it self to these Things which are pernicious. Therefore write not to Pythagoras to live with you; for Physicians will not fall sick to bear their Patients company.

These are mentioned as the genuine Writings of Pythagoras; others there were accounted spurious, as,

The Mystick Discourse, which (saith Laertius) they affirm to have been written by Hippasus, in detraction from Pythagoras.

* Many Writings of *Asfo*, a *Crotonian*, were likewise ascribed to Pythagoras; as were also,

* *Aliphtick Commentaries*, written indeed by another of that name, Son of *Eratoctes*.

The Dialect used by Pythagoras and his Disciples, was the Dorick, which some conceive chosen by them as the most excellent, as *Metrodorus*, cited by *Jamblichus*; *Epicharmus* (saith he) and before him *Pythagoras*, took the Dorick, the best of Dialects, as it is also the best musical Harmony; for the Ionick and *Æolick* partake of the Chromatick; but the Dorick Dialect is Enarmonick, consisting of full sounding Letters. The Antiquity of the Dorick Dialect is testified by the Fable: For *Nereus* married *Doris*, Daughter of the Ocean, whom they feign to have had Fifty; of whom, one was the Mother of *Arctyllus*. Some (saith he) affirm, that *Deucalion*, Son of *Prometheus*, and of *Pyrria*, Daughter of *Epimetheus*, begot *Dorus*; he, *Hellen*; he, *Æolus*. But in the *Babylonian* sacred Records, *Hellen* is said to be the Son of *Jupiter*, and that *Hellen* begot *Dorus*, and *Xanthus*, and *Æolus*, by whose direction he went to *Rhodes*. Now it is not easy to speak exactly concerning the Ancients to those of later Times, yet it is acknowledged by both these Stories, that the Dorick is the most ancient of these Dialects. Next which the *Æolick*, so named from *Æolus*. The Third the *Ionick*, derived from *Io*, Son of *Xanthus*. The Fourth the *Attick*, founded by *Cremus*, Daughter of *Erichtheus*, so named three Ages after the rest, according to the *Trojanians*, and the Rape of *Orithuia*, which many Histories declare. *Orpheus* also, the most ancient of Poets, used the Dorick Dialect.

But perhaps the true Reason is, because it was the Dialect of the Country. For the *Pythagoreans* * admonished all Persons to use the Language of their own Country, what *Grecians* soever came into

their Community; for to speak a strange Language, they approved not. The Dorick Dialect was common throughout *Magna Grecia*. *Crotone* and *Syracuse* were Colonies of the *Achaans*, *Syracuse* of the *Corinthians*; both which were originally Dorick, as being of *Paloponnesus*; * *Thucydides* alledgeth this as a motive which induced the *Athenians* to war with the *Sicilians*, lest being *Doreans*, they should at some time or other assist the *Doreans*, by reason of their Affinity; and, being a Colony of the *Paloponnesians*, should join with the *Paloponnesians*. Hence, to the Stranger, in *Theocritus* his *Adoniazuzze*, reproving the *Syracusan* Women thus,

* *Peace foolish babbling Women, leave your prate;
Your wide-mouth'd Dorick here is out of date.*

One of them answers,

G'up, whence are you? what is our Talk to thee?

*Correct your Minds, not us of Sicily.
I would you knew't, we are from Corinth sprung,
As was Bellerophon; our Mother-tongue
Paloponnesian is, nor is it scorn
That they speak Dorick who are Dorick-born.*

For, (saith the Scholiast) the *Syracusians* were originally *Corinthians*: *Paloponnesus* was inhabited by the *Doreans*, together with the *Heraclides*.

CHAP. XXIII.

His Disciples.

Many were the Persons, who from several parts resorted to Pythagoras, to be his Disciples, and lived with him in that Condition. Of these there were (as * *Aristoxenus* relates) *Leucanians*, *Messapians*, (or, as *Laertius*, *Preucians*) and *Romans*.

* *Simichus*, Tyrant of the *Centoropians*, [a People of *Sicily*, the Town it self being called *Centorpe*] having heard him, laid down his Command, and distributed his Riches, part to his Sister, part to his Citizens.

* *Abaris* also of *Scythia*, a *Hyperborean*, came hither, who being unacquainted with the *Greek* Language, and not initiated, and wickd advanced into Years, *Pythagoras* would not introduce him by various Theorems; but instead of the Silence, and the long Attention, and other Trials, he made him presently fit to receive his Doctrines, and taught him in a short time to understand those two Books concerning Nature, and concerning the Gods. For *Abaris* now in Years, came from the *Hyperboreans*, a Priest of

* Laert. 2. 7.
* Porphy. ib.

* Jamb. c. 5.
* Jamb. cap. 19.

† Cap. 34.

* Jamb. ib.

* Lib. 6.

* Mr. Skeyboon

* Porphy. p. 120

of *Apollo* there, and converting the wisest Things concerning Religion, from *Greece* to his own Country, that he might lay up the collected Gold to his God's Use, in his Temple among the *Hyperboreans*; but coming by the Way into *Italy*, and seeing *Pythagoras*, and likening him to the God whose Priest he was, and believing he was no other, not a Man like him, but very *Apollo* himself, both by his Gravity, and by some Marks and Tokens which he knew; he gave *Pythagoras* an Arrow which he brought from the Temple, as necessary for his Journey through so many different Contingencies, and such a long Travel: For riding upon that, and so passing over Places that were otherwise impassable, as Rivers, Lakes, Marshes, Mountains, and the like; and coming to any Place, as they say, he made Purifications, and expelled Pesticences and Sporns from those Cities that desired his Assistance. We are informed, that *Lacedæmon* being purged by him, never had the Pesticence afterwards, whereas it was formerly very subject to that Sickness, by reason of want of free Passage of the Air (the *Taygetan* Mountains, amongst which it is built, penning it up; for those Hills lye above it, as *Gnæsus* to *Crete*) and other such Signs of the Power of *Abaris* are reported. But *Pythagoras* accepting the Arrow, and not looking strangely upon it, or asking the Cause why he gave it him; but, as if he were himself the true God, taking *Abaris* aside, he shewed him his golden Thigh, as an assured Mark that he was not mistaken; and then reckoning every Particular of all those that were in the Temple, that he did not guess amiss; and adding, That he came for the Benefit of Men, and for this Reason was in Man's Shape, that they might not be astonished at one so far above them, and so fly his Doctrine. And he commanded him to stay there, and to join with him in instructing them who came to him: And as for the Gold which he had gathered for his God, he commanded him to give it to those whom he had assembled; inasmuch that he actually confirmed the Sentence, All Things are common among *his Friends*. *Abaris* thus staying with him (as we said) he gave him the Epitome of Physiology and Theology, and instead of the Art of guessing by Sacrifices, he taught him that Kind of Prognostick which is by Numbers, as thinking that more sacred and divine, and more agreeable to the celestial Numbers of the Gods. And other Doctrines he taught *Abaris*, such as were proper for him.

¹ Milo of *Crotone*, the most eminent Wrestler of those Times, was Disciple to *Pythagoras*: He, when in the Hall of the College a Pillar begun to yield, went under it, and by that means saved all the Scholars, and at last got away himself; and it is probable

that this Confidence in his great Strength was the Occasion of his Death. For they report that as he was going through a thick Wood far from any Way, finding a great Tree with Wedges in it, he fet his Hands and Feet to it, trying to reive it asunder; whereupon the Wedges fell out, and he being caught, became a Prey to the wild Beasts. In his House it was, that the *Pythagoreans* were surprized and burned by the *Cylonians*.

² *Calliphon* of *Crotone*, is mentioned by *Hermippus*, as an intimate Friend of *Pythagoras*, who reported, when *Calliphon* was dead, That his Soul was continually present with him, and that the Soul commanded him that he should not pass the Place where his Ash fell; and that he should abstain from impure Water, and avoid ill-speaking.

We only mention these here, as being most particularly interested in the Relation of *Pythagoras* his Life: A more perfect Account of the rest, receive in the following Catalogue.

CHAP. XXIV.

The Succession of his School.

THE Successor of *Pythagoras* is by all acknowledged to have been *ARISTÆUS*, Son of *Damophon*, a *Crotonian*, who lived in the time of *Pythagoras*, seven Generations above *Plato*: Neither did he succeed in the School only, but in breeding the Children of *Pythagoras*, and in the Marriage of *Theano*, for his eminent Understanding of his Opinions; for he is said to have taught the Doctrine of *Pythagoras* forty Years together lacking one, living, in all, near an hundred; he assigned the School to *Aristæus*, as being the oldest.

Next him, *MNESARCHUS*, Son of *Pythagoras*.

He deliver'd it to *BULAGORAS*, in whose time the City of *Crotone* was sacked.

Him succeeded *TIDAS*, a *Crotonian*, returning from Travel which he began before the War, but he died with Grief for the Calamity of his Country; whereas it was a common Thing to others, when they were very old, to free themselves from the Fetters of the Body.

Afterwards they took one of the *Lucanians*, saved by some Strangers, to be President of the School; to whom came *DIODORUS* the *Appendian*, who was taken by reason of the Scarcity of Men in their College.

At *Heraclea*, *CLINIAS* and *PHILOLAUS*.

At *Metapontum*, *THEORIDES* and *EURYTUS*.

H h h z

At

¹ Porphyro perhaps read *χρη*.

² Strab. l. 6. p. 263.

³ Joseph. contra Appion. l. 11.

⁴ Jamblic. c. ult.

At *Tarentum*; *ARCHYTAS*.

Of the external *Acratic*; was *Epicharmus*, but not of the College. Coming to *Syracusa* in the Time of the Tyranny of *Hieron*, he forbore publicly to profess Philosophy; but he reduced the Opinions of those Men, (the *Pythagoreans*) into Verse, sportively divulging the abstruse Doctrines of *Pythagoras*.

Of the *Pythagoreans* it is likely that many were obscure; the Names of such as were eminent are these;

Crotonians.

Hypposilus, *Dymas*, *Ægon*, *Æmon*, *Silius*, *Cleophenes*, *Agelas*, *Episylus*, *Phyciadas*, *Ephanius*, *Timæus*, *Buthius*, *Eratus*, *Itanau*, *Phodippus*, *Bryas*, *Evander*, *Millias*, *Antimædon*, *Ægeas*, *Leopbron*, *Agylas*, *Onatus*, *Hypposthenes*, *Cleopbron*, *Alcmaon*, *Damocles*, *Milon*, *Meton*.

Metapontines.

Brontinus, *Parmiscus*, *Arctadas*, *Leo*, *Damarmenos*, *Æneas*, *Chilas*, *Melissias*, *Aristeas*, *Lappaon*, *Evander*, *Besfidamus*, *Zenocides*, *Euriphemus*, *Aristomenes*, *Agelarchus*, *Alcias*, *Xenophantes*, *Thrafsios*, *Arytus*, *Epipbron*, *Eirifius*, *Megisteas*, *Leocydes*, *Thrafsimides* *Euphemus*, *Proclus*, *Antimedes*, *Lacritus*, *Damotages*, *Pyrrhon*, *Rhexibius*, *Alopecus*, *Astylus*, *Dacydus*, *Aliechus*, *Lacrates*, *Glucinus*.

Agrentine.

Empedocles.

Eleate.

Pamenides.

Tarentines.

Philolaus, *Arytus*, *Archytas*, *Theodorus*, *Aristippus*, *Lycon*, *Estiæus*, *Polemarchus*, *Asteas*, *Canias*, *Cleon*, *Eurymædon*, *Arceas*, *Chinagoras*, *Archippus*, *Zopyrus*, *Euthynus*, *Dicearchus*, *Philimides*, *Phrontidas*, *Lyfis*, *Lyfibi*, *Dinocrates*, *Echecrates*, *Pætion*, *Accusiladas*, *Iccus*, *Pisicrates*, *Cleoratus*, *Leonteus*, *Phorinchus*, *Simicheas*, *Aristochides*, *Clinias*, *Abroteles*, *Piserydus*, *Bryas*, *Evander*, *Archemachus*, *Mimnomachus*, *Achmonidas*, *Sicas*, *Caraphantidas*.

Sybarites.

Metopus, *Hippofus*, *Proxenus*, *Evapor*, *Deanax*, *Meneftius*, *Diocles*, *Empedus*, *Timæus*, *Polemæus*, *Evæus*, *Tyrænus*.

Parians.

Ætius, *Phenecles*, *Desirtheus*, *Alcimachus*, *Dinarchus*, *Meton*, *Timæus*, *Timeftanax*, *Ancærus*, *Examaridas*.

Locrians.

Gyptius, *Xenon*, *Philodamus*, *Euctes*, *Adicus*, *Sthenonidas*, *Sofistratus*, *Euthynus*, *Zaleucus*, *Timares*.

Posidonians.

Athamas, *Simus*, *Proxenus*, *Cranius*, *Mayer*, *Bathylaus*, *Phædo*.

Lucanians.

Ocellus and *Ocyllus* (Brethren), *Orefande*, *Ceram-bus*, *Dardaneus*, *Malias*.

Ægeans.

Hippomedon, *Timosthenes*, *Euelibon*, *Thrafsidamus*, *Crito*, *Polydor*.

Laconians.

Antocharidas, *Cleanor*, *Eurycratus*.

Hyperborean.

Abaris.

Rhégians.

Aristides, *Demosthenes*, *Aristocrates*, *Phytius*, *Hlicaon*, *Mneftibulus*, *Hipparchides*, *Athofion*, *Euthcles*, *Opfimus*.

Selinuntian.

Coles.

Syracufians.

Leptines, *Phintias*, *Damon*.

Samians.

Meliffus, *Lacæ*, *Archippus*, *Glorippus*, *Helix*, *Hippæ*.

Caulonians.

Callibrotus, *Dicon*, *Neflas*, *Drymon*, *Xentas*.

Phlafiæans.

Diocles, *Echecrates*, *Polymaftus*, *Phanton*.

Sicyonians.

Paliades, *Demon*, *Softratus*, *Softhenes*.

Cyrenæans.

Prorus, *Melanippus*, *Aristangelus*, *Theodorus*.

Cyzicenes.

Pythodorus, *Hypposthenes*, *Butherus*, *Xenophilus*.

Cabanæus.

Catanzan.

Charondas.

Corinthian.

Lyfiades.

Tyrrhene.

Chryfippus.

Athenian.

Naufitheus.

Of Pontus.

Neocritus, Lyramnus.

In all, 208.

The Pythagorean Women eminent, are,

Tymicha, Wife of Millius the Crotonian.

Philetas, Daughter of Leophron, a Crotonian, Sister of Bindæcus.

Oecelo and Eccelo, of Luca.

Chilonis, Daughter of Chilo the Lacedæmonian.

Theans, Wife of Brontinus the Metapontine.

Muya, Wife of Milo the Crotonian.

Lafthenia of Arcadia, Daughter of Abroteles the Tarentine.

Echecrates, a Phliasian.

Tyrseus of Sybaris.

Pyrronde of Tarentum, Daughter of Nifiades.

Solacera.

Bio of Argos.

Babylma of Argos.

Cleæbma, Sister of Antecbarides, a Lacedæmonian.

In all, 15. Thus Jamblichus.

Lactius faith, His System (or, as Cassiodorus, College) continued for nineteen Generations; for the last of the Pythagoreans (whom Aristæxenus saw) were Xenophilus the Chalcidian of Thrace, and Phanton a Phliasian; and Echecrates, and Diocles, and Polymnestus, who also were Phliasians. They heard Philolaus and Eurytus, both of Tarentum.

The Discipline and Doctrine of PYTHAGORAS.

CHAP. I.

The great Authority and Esteem of Pythagoras amongst his Disciples.

PYTHAGORAS, to render his Disciples capable of Philosophy, prepar'd them by a Discipline so strict and severe, as might seem incredible to have been undergone by free Persons, were it not founded upon the great Authority and Reputation which he had amongst them.

The Credit of their Opinions they conceived to be this, That he who first communicated them was no ordinary Person, but a God; and one of these Acousmata is, Who Pythagoras was: for they say, he was Hyperborean Apollo. In Confirmation hereof, they instance those Wonders related in his Life, and the like; which being acknowledged to be true, and it being impossible they should all be performed by one Man, they conceive it manifest, that these Relations are to be ascribed, not to a human Person, but to something above Mankind. This they acknowledge; for amongst them there is a Saying, that

*Two sacred Men, and Bird
Is, and another Third*

by which Third they meant Pythagoras. And ^a A-

ristotle, in his Book of Pythagorick Philosophy, relates, that such a Division as this was preserved by the Pythagoreans amongst their ineffable Secrets. Of rational Animals, one Kind is God; another, Man; a third, between both these, Pythagoras.

They esteemed Pythagoras in the next place to the Gods; as some good Genius indulgent to Mankind: Some affirming, that he was Pythian; others, Hyperborean Apollo; some, one of those Genii which dwell in the Moon; others, one of the celestial Deities, appearing at that time in a human Shape, for the Benefit and Direction of mortal Life, that he might communicate the wholesome Illumination of Beatitude and Philosophy to mortal Nature; than which, a greater Good can never come, nor shall ever come, which is given by the Gods through the Means of this Pythagoras. Whence to this Day the Proverb of the Fair-hair'd Samian is used for a most renowned Person.

Porphyrius faith, they reckon'd him amongst the Gods; and therefore whensoever they went to deliver to others any excellent Thing out of the Secrets of his Philosophy, whence many physical Concluf-

ens

^a Jamb. c. 28. p. 140. ^b Pag. 143.

^c Read divine. See Etymolog. magal.

^d Jamb. c. 6. p. 31.

^e Jamb. c. 6.

ons might be deduced, then they swore by the *Tetractys*, and calling *Pythagoras*, as some God, to witnesses, said,

*Who the Tetractys to our Souls express,
Eternal Nature's Fountain I attest.*

* Which Oath they used, as forbearing, through Reverence, to name him; for they were very sparing in using the Name of any God.

So great indeed was the Respect they bare him, that^b it was not lawful for any one to doubt of what he said, nor to question him further concerning it; but they did acquiesce in all things that he deliver'd, as if they were Oracles. And when he went abroad to Cities, it was reported, he went not to teach, but to cure.

Hence it came to pass, that^c when they asserted any thing in dispute, if they were question'd why it was so, they used to answer, *Ipse dixit*, He said it; which *He* was *Pythagoras*. This^d *αὐτοῦ ἔπα* was amongst them the first and greatest of Doctrines, his Judgment being a Reason free from, and above all Examination and Censure.

CHAP. II.

The two Sorts of Auditors: and first of the Exoterick, how he explored them.

THE Auditors of *Pythagoras* (such I mean as belonged to the Family) were of two Sorts, *Exoterick* and *Esoterick*: the *Exotericks* were those who were under Probation, which if they well performed, they were admitted to be *Esotericks*. For of those who came to *Pythagoras*, he admitted not every one, but only those whom he liked: first, upon Choice; and next, by Trial.

¹ The *Pythagoreans* are said to have been *αὐρὴν* from those who sell Learning, and open their Souls like the Gates of an Inn, to every one that comes to them; and if they find not a *Vent* or *Sale* in this manner, then they run into Cities, and ramscak the Gymnasia, and exact a Reward from dishonourable Persons: Whereas *Pythagoras* hid much of his Speeches; so as they who were purely initiated might plainly understand them. But the rest, as *Homer* said of *Tantalus*, grieve; for that being in the midst of Learning, they cannot taste of it. Moreover they said, That they who for Hire teach such as come to them, are meaner than Statuaries and Chariot-makers; for a Statuary, when he^e would make a Mercury, seeks out some Piece of Wood fit to receive that Form; but those, of every Disposition endeavour to make that of Virtue.

^a When (therefore) any Friends came to him, and desired to learn of him, he admitted them not, till he had made Trial and Judgment of them. First, he enquired how they did heretofore converse with their Parents and Friends; next, he observed their unseasonable Laughters, and unnecessary Silence or Discourse. Moreover, what their Inclinations were, [^c whether possess'd with Passion and Intemperance, whether prone to Anger or unchaste Desires, or contentious, or ambitious, and how they behaved themselves in Contention and Friendship.] * As likewise what Friends those were with whom they were intimate, and their Conversation with them, and in whose Society they spent the greatest part of the Day; likewise upon what Occasions they joyed and grieved.

² Moreover he considered their Progenie and their Gait, and the whole Motion of their Body; and, physiognomizing them by the Symptoms, he discovered by manifest Signs the occult Dispositions of their Souls. For³ he first studied that Science concerning Men, thereby discovering of what Disposition every one was: neither did he admit any into his Friendship and Acquaintance, before he had physiognomized the Man what he were. This Word (saith^d *Agellius* upon the same Occasion) signifieth to make Enquiry into the Manners of some, by some kind of Conjecture of the Wit by the Face and Countenance, and by the Air and Habit of the whole Body.

⁴ Upon exact Observation of all these Particulars, he found them to be of good Dispositions, then he examined whether they had good Manners, and were docile; first, whether they could readily and ingeniously follow that which he told them; next, whether they had any Love to those things which they heard. For he considered what Disposition they were of as to being made gentle, this he called *εὐμενία*; for he accounted Roughness an Enemy to his way of teaching, because it is attended by Impatience, Intemperance, Anger, Obstinacy, Confusion, Dishonour, and the like; but Mildness and Gentleness by the Contraries.

Likewise^e in making the first Trial of them, he considered, whether they could *ὑπομένειν*, (for that was the Word he used) and examined, whether if they could learn that which they heard, they were able to be silent, and to keep it to themselves.

CHAP. III.

Purificative Institution by Sufferings.

^a THE chiefest Scope which *Pythagoras* propos'd, was to deliver and free the Mind from the Engagements and Fetters in which it is confin'd from her first Infancy; without which Freedom, none can learn any

⁶ Jam. c. 28. p. 150.

^b *Ælian*. Var. Hist. 4. 27.

^c *Apol.* in *Apolog.* l. 1. cites this Sentence of *Pythagoras*.

^d *Porph.* p. 185.

^e *Lib.* 1. c. 9.

^f *Jamb.* c. 20.

¹ *Cic.* Nat. Deor. l. 1.

² *Greg.* Naz. Orat. 3.

³ *Jamb.* c. 34.

⁴ *Jamb.* c. 17.

⁵ *Ibid.* c. 20.

⁶ *Ibid.* c. 20.

⁷ *Ibid.* c. 20. p. 95.

⁸ *Porph.* p. 204.

any thing sound or true, nor can perceive by what that which is unsound in Sense operates. For the Mind (according to him) seeth all, and heareth all, the rest are deaf and blind.

This he performed by many Exercises which he appointed for Purification of the Mind, and for the Probation of such as came to him, which endured five Years before they were admitted.

“ If upon this Examination (which we declared) he judged any Person capable, he then remitted him three Years to be despised, making a Test of his Constancy and true Love to Learning, and whether he were sufficiently instructed as to despise Glory, to condemn Honour, and the like.

“ He conceived it in general requisite, that they should take much Labour and Pains for the Acquisition of Arts and Sciences; and to that End he appointed for them some Torments of cauterizing and incision to be performed by Fire and Steel, which none that were of an ill Inclination would undergo.

CHAP. IV.

Silence.

“ Moreover, he enjoined those that came to him Silence for five Years, making Trial how firmly they would behave themselves in the most difficult of all Continuities; for such is the Government of the Tongue, as is manifest from those who have divulged Mysteries.

This πένταετία σιωπῆς, a quinquennial Silence, was called ἡσυχία, and sometimes, but less frequently, ἡσυχασμός “ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔχειν τὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν λέξιν, from keeping our Speech within ourselves.

The Reason of this Silence was, “ That the Soul might be converted into herself from external Things, and from the irrational Passions in her, and from the Body even unto her own Life, which is to live for ever. Or, as “ Clemens Alexandrinus expresseth it, That his Disciples, being diverted from sensible things, might seek God with a pure Mind. Hence “ Lucian to the Demand, how Pythagoras could reduce Men to the Remembrance of the things which they had formerly known, (for he held Science to be only Reminiscence) makes him answer, First, by long Quiet and Silence, speaking nothing for five whole Years.

Yet “ Agellus affirms, That he appointed not the same Length of Silence to all, but several to several Persons, according to their particular Capacities. And Apuleius, That for the graver sort of Persons, this Taciturnity was moderated by a shorter Space; but the more talkative were punished, as it were, by Exile from Speech five Years.

“ He who kept silence, heard what was said by

others, but was not allowed either to question, if he understood not, or to write down what he heard. None kept silence less than two Years. Agellus adds, That these within the time of Silence and Hearing were called *Acousfici*. But when they had learned these things, the most difficult of all, to hold their Peace, and to hear, and were now grown learned in Silence, which they called ἡσυχία, then they were allowed to speak, and to question, and to write what they heard, and what they conceived. At this time they were called *Mathematici*, from those Arts which they then began to learn and to meditate. Thus Agellus, how rightly, I question; for *Mathematici* and *Acousmatici* were distinctive Appellations of the Pythagoreans not in Probation, but after Admission, as we shall see hereafter.

Thus “ Apuleius saith, He taught nothing to his Disciple before Silence; and with him, the first Meditation, for one that meant to be a wife Man, was, wholly to restrain the Tongue of Words, those Words which the Poets call Winged, to pluck off the Feathers, and to confine them within the Walls of our Teeth. This, I say, was the first Rudiment of Wisdom, to learn to meditate, and to unlearn to talk.

CHAP. V.

Abstinence, Temperance, and other ways of Purification.

“ Moreover, he commanded them to abstain from all things that had Life, and from certain other Meats also which obstruct the Clearness of the Understanding; “ and for the same End (*viz.* in order to the Inquisition and the Apprehension of the most difficult Theorems) he likewise commanded them to abstain from Wine, to eat little, to sleep little; a careless Contempt of Honour, Riches, and the like; an unfeigned Respect towards Kindred, sincere Equality and Kindness towards such as were of the same Age, and a Propensity to further the Younger without Envy.

“ In fine, he procured to his Disciples a Conversation with the Gods by Visions and Dreams, which never happen to a Soul disturbed with Anger or Pleasure, or any other unbefitting Transportation, or with Impurity and a rigid Ignorance of all these. He cleansed and purified the Soul divinely from all these, and enkindled the divine Part in her, and preserved her, and directed in her that intellectual divine Eye, which is better (as “ Plato saith) than a thousand Eyes of Flesh; for by the Help of this only, Truth is apprehended: After this manner he procured Purification of the Intellect; and such was his Form of Institution as to those things.

Diodorus

“ Jamb. c. 17. p. 72.

“ Ibid. c. 16. p. 68.

“ Ibid. c. 15. p. 72.

“ Hesych. Lex.

“ Simplic. in Epictet. c. 42.

“ Strom. 5.

“ Jamb. ibid.

“ In vit. agell.

“ Lib. 1. c. 4.

“ Agell. ibid.

“ Florid.

“ Jamb. c. 16. p. 74.

“ Jamb. ibid.

“ For evidence reading on some words the following.

¹ *Diodorus* saith, they had an Exercise of Temperance after this manner: There being prepared and set before them all sorts of delicate Food, they looked upon it a good while, and after that their Appetites were fully provoked by the Sight thereof, they commanded it to be taken off, [^m and given to the Servants] they themselves going away without dining: This they did, (saith *Jamblichus*) to punish their Appetite.

CHAP. VI.

Community of Estates.

IN this time all that they had (that is, their whole Estate) was made common [ⁿ put together and made one.] They brought forth, saith ² *Agellius*, whatsoever they had of Stock or Money, and constituted an inseparable Society, as being that ancient Way of Association which truly is termed *Koinotiv*. This was given up to such of the Disciples as were appointed for that purpose, and were called *Politici* & *Oeconomici*, as being Persons fit to govern a Family, and to give Laws.

This was conformable to the Precepts of *Pythagoras*, (as ³ *Timeus* affirms) first, *κατὰ τὰ φίλων ἀγαθὰ*, All common amongst Friends; and, *φιλότητις ὀντων*, Friendship, Equality; ⁴ and, Esteem nothing your own. By this means ⁵ he exterminated all Propriety, and increased Community even to their last Possessions, as being Causes of Dissension and Trouble; for all things were common amongst them, no Man had a Propriety to any thing.

But what *Agellius* terms an *inseparable Society*, is to be understood only conditionally, provided that they misliked not at any time this Community; for whofoever did so, ⁶ took again his own Estate, and more than that which he brought into the Community, and departed.

CHAP. VII.

Admission or Rejection.

THEY who appeared worthy to participate of his Doctrines, judging by their Lives and Moderation, after their five years Silence, were made *Estericks*, and were admitted to hear *Pythagoras* within the Screen, and to see him; but before that Time they heard him discourse, being on the outside of the Screen, and not seeing him, giving a long time experiment of their proper Manners by hearing only. But if they were rejected, they received their Estate double, and a Tomb was made by the Disciples, as if they had been dead; for so all that were about *Pythagoras* spoke of them, and when they met

them, behaved themselves towards them, as if they had been some other Persons, but the Men themselves they said were dead.

CHAP. VIII.

Distinction.

WHATsoever he discoursed to those that came to him, he declared either plainly or symbolically. (for he had a twofold form of Teaching;) and of those who came to him, some were called *Mathematici*, others *Acousticici*. The *Mathematici* were those who learnt the fuller and more exactly elaborate reason of Science. The *Acousticici*, they who heard only the chief heads of Learning, without more exact Explication.

Thus ⁷ as there were two kinds of Philosophy, so were there two Sorts of those who studied Philosophy. The *Acousticici* did confess that the *Mathematici* were *Pythagoreans*; but the *Mathematici* did not acknowledge that the *Acousticici* were *Pythagoreans*; for they had their Learning, not from *Pythagoras*, but from *Hippasus*; who, some say, was of *Crotona*, others of *Metapontium*.

The Philosophy of the *Acousticici* consists of Doctrines without Demonstrations and Reasons, but that, so it must be done, and the like, which they were to observe as so many divine Doctrines, and they did esteem those amongst them the wisest, who had most of these *Acusmata*. Now all these *Acusmata* were divided into three Kinds; some tell, *what something is*, others tell, *what is most such a thing*; the third sort tell, *what is to be done, and what not*. Those that tell *what a thing is*, are of this kind, as what is the Island of the Blessed? The Sun? The Moon? What is the Oracle at *Delphi*? The *Tetractys*? What is the Musick of the *Syrens*?

Those which tell *what is most*, as, *what is most just? To sacrifice. What is the wisest? Number; and in the next place that which gave Names to things. What is the wisest amongst us? Medicine. What the most beautiful? Harmony. What the most powerful? Reason. What the best? Beatitude. What the truest? That Men are wicked.* For which (they say) he commended *Hippodamas*, a Poet of *Salamis*, who said,

*O Gods? whence are you? How so good? So blest?
O Men! whence are you? How with ill possess?*

These and such like are the *Acusmata* of this kind; for every one of these telleth, what is most. The same it is with that which is called the Wisdom of

¹ Excerpt. Valef. p. 245.
² Jamb. c. 30.

³ Jamb. 31.
⁴ Agel. 1. 5.

⁵ Jamb. c. 16.
⁶ Jamb. c. 17.

⁷ Agel. 1. 9.
⁸ Porph. p. 196.

⁹ Jamb. c. 17.
¹⁰ Jamb. c. 18. p. 81.

¹¹ Lact.

of the seven Sages, for they enquired not what is good, but what is most good; not what is difficult, but what is most difficult, which is to know our selves; not what is facile, but what is most facile, which is the custom of Nations. Those *Acousmata* seem to follow this kind of Wisdom, for those Sages were before *Pythagoras*. The *Acousmata* which tell what is to be done, or what is not to be done, are thus, *As that we ought to beget Children, for we must leave behind us such as may serve the Gods in our room; or, that we ought to put off the right Shoe first; or, that we ought not to go in the common Road, and the like.* Such were the *Acousmata*; but those which have most said upon them, are concerning *Sacrifices*, at what times, and after what manner they are to be performed, concerning removal from our place of Habitation, and concerning *Sepulture*, how we must bury the Dead, for some whereof there is a Reason given. As, *that we ought to get Children, that we may leave in our Room another servant of the Gods.* But of others there is no reason: and, in some, that which follows the Precept seems to be allied to the Words, but in others is wholly distant, as, *that we ought not to break Bread; because it conduceth to judgment in Hell.* But the Reasons that are applied to these, are not *Pythagorean*, but given by some other who studied *Pythagorean Learning*, endeavouring to apply some probable Conjecture to them: As of the last mentioned, that Bread is not to be broken; some say, he who gathers together, ought not to dissolve. For anciently all Friends used after a barbarous manner to meet at one Loaf; others, that you must not give so bad an Omen, as when you are going about any thing, to break it off.

But there was one *Hippomedon*, * an *Agrinean*, a *Pythagorean* of the *Acousmatick* Rank, who said, that *Pythagoras* gave reasons and demonstrations of all these Things; but because they were delivered by Tradition through many, and those still growing more idle, that the Reasons were taken away, and the Problems only left. Now the mathematical *Pythagoreans* grant all this to be true; but the occasion of the Difference they say was this: *Pythagoras* went from *Ionia*, and *Samus*, in the time of *Polycrates*'s Reign, to *Italy*, which was then in a flourishing Condition, where the chiefest Persons of the Cities became conversant with him. To the most ancient of these, and such as had least leisure, (because they were taken up with publick Employments, so that it would be very hard for them to learn *Mathematicks* and *Demonstrations*) he discoursed barely, conceiving it did nothing less advantage them, even without the Causes, to know what they had to do; as Patients, not enquiring why such Things are prescribed them, nevertheless obtain Health. But to

the younger, who were able to act and learn, he imparted by *Demonstrations* and *Mathematicks*. The *Mathematici* professed that they came from these; the *Acousmatici*, from the others, chiefly from *Hippofus*, who was one of the *Pythagoreans*. But because he published [their Doctrine] and first wrote of the Sphere of twelve Pentagons, he died in the Sea as an impious Person, not obtaining the same at which he aimed.

CHAP. IX.

How they disposed the Day.

WE shall next speak concerning those Things which he taught them in the Day; for, according to his Directions, thus did they who were taught by him. These Men performing their morning Walks by themselves, and in such Places where they might be exceeding quiet and retired, where were Temples, and Groves, and other delightful Places; for they thought it was not fit they should speak with any one, till they had first composed their Souls, and fitted their Intellect, and that such Quiet was requisite for the Composure of their Intellect; for, as soon as they arose, to intrude among the People, they thought a tumultuous Thing. Therefore all the *Pythagoreans* ever made choice of the most sacred Places.

After their morning Walk, they came to one another chiefly in the Temples, or in some such Places. They made use of these times for Doctrines, and Disciplines, and rectifications of their Manners.

After they had studied a while, they went to their morning Exercises; the greater part used to anoint themselves, and run Races; the fewer, to wrestle in Orchards and in Groves; some, by throwing Sledges, or by grappling Hands, to make trial of their Strength; chusing such Exercises as they judged most convenient for them.

At Dinner they used Bread and Honey. Wine after Meals they drunk not. The time after Dinner they employ'd in political Affairs, as well foreign as domestick, according to the injunction of their Laws; for they endeavoured to manage every thing in the Afternoons. As soon as the Evening came, they betook themselves again, not singly, as in their morning Walks, but two or three walked together, repeating the Doctrines they had learnt, and exercising themselves in virtuous Employments. After their Walks, they used Baths and Washing; having washed, they met together to eat; but they did not eat together more than ten Persons. As soon as they who were to come together were met, they used Libations, and Sacrifices of Meal and Frankincense. Then they went to Supper, that they might end it

* For *ἀγρινεύς* *agrineus*, perhaps read *ἀγρινεύς*.

* Jamb. c. 20. p. 97. and c. 22.

before the Sun were set. They used Wine, and Mazza, and Bread, and Broth, and Herbs, both raw and boiled: They likewise fet before them the Flesh of such Beasts as used to be sacrificed. They seldom eat Broths of Fish, because some of them are, in some respects, very hurtful; likewise (seldom) the Flesh of such Creatures as use not to hurt Mankind. After Supper, they offered Libations, then had Lectures: Their Custom was, that the Youngest amongst them should read, and the Eldest should, as President, order what, and how he should read. When they were to depart, he, who filled the Wine poured forth to them in Libation; and during the Libation, the eldest of them declared these Things, That none should hurt or kill a domestick Plant or Fruit; besides, that they should speak well, and think reverently of the Gods, Dæmons, and Heroes; likewise to think well of Parents and Benefactors; to assist Law, and oppose Rebellion. This said, every one departed to his House.

They wore a white and clean Garment; they had also Coverlets white and clean of * Linnen, for they used not any of Skins, because they approved not the exercise of Hunting.

These were the Traditions that were delivered to that Society of Men, partly concerning Diet, [of which hereafter more particularly] partly concerning the course of Life.

CH A P. X.

How they examined their Actions Morning and Evening.

THESE and all other Actions of the day, they contriv'd in the Morning before they rose, and examined at Night before they slept; thus, by a twofold Act, exercising the Memory. * *They conceived that it was requisite to retain and preserve in Memory all which they learnt; and that Lessons and Doctrines should be so far acquired, as until they are able to remember what they have learnt; for that is it which they ought to know, and bear in mind. For this reason they cherished Memory much, and exercised it, and took great care of it; and in Learning they gave not over, until they had gotten their Lesson perfectly by heart. A Pythagorean rose not out of Bed, before he had called to mind the Actions of the Day past, which recollection he performed in this manner: He endeavour'd to call to mind what he first, as soon as he rose, either had heard, or given in charge to his Servants; and what in the second place, and what in the third, and so on in the same Order. And then for his going forth, whom he met first, whom next; and what Discourses*

*he had with the first, what with the second, what with the third, and so of the rest; for he endeavour'd to repeat in memory all that hapned throughout the whole Day, in order as it hapned: And if at their up-rising they had more leisure, then after the same manner they endeavour'd to recollect all that hapned to them for three Days before. Thus they chiefly exercised the Memory; for they conceived, that * nothing conduceth more to Science, Experience, and Prudence, than to remember many Things.*

This was conformable to the Institution of Pythagoras; for, * *He advis'd to have Regard chiefly to two times, that when we went to sleep, and that when we rose from sleep; at each of these we ought to consider, what Actions are past, and what to come. Of the past, we ought to require an Account of our selves; of the future, we ought to have a providential Care. Wherefore he advis'd every one to repeat to himself these Verses [so soon as he came home, or] before he slept.*

Nor suffer Sleep at night to close thine eyes,
Till thrice thy Acts that day thou hast o'er-run.
How slept? what deeds? what duty left undone?

And before they arose, these:

As soon as e'er thou wak'st, in order lay
The Actions to be done that following day.

To this effect Ausonius hath a *Pythagorical Acrostis*, as he terms it. †

*A good wise Person, such as hardly one
Of many thousands to Apollo known,
He his own Judge strictly himself surveys,
Nor minds the Nobles or the Commons Ways:
But, like the World itself, is smooth and round,
In all his polish'd Frame no blemish found.
He thinks how long Cancer the day extends,
And Capricorn the night: himself perpend
In a just balance, that no flaw there be,
Nothing exuberant, but that all agree;
Within that all be solid, nothing by
A hollow Sound betray Vacuity.
Nor suffer Sleep to seize his Eyes, before
All Acts of that long Day he hath run o'er;
What Things were mist, what done in time, what
Why here Respect, or Reason there forgot. (not;
Why kept the worse Opinion? When reliev'd
A Beggar; why with broken Passion griev'd;
What wis'd which had been better not desir'd;
Why Profit before Honesty requir'd?
If any by some Speech or Look offended,
Why Nature more than Discipline attended?*

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* For ἡμῶν ἑαυτῶν, perhaps read ἡμῶν ἑαυτῶν. Yet Laertius expressly saith, that Linnen was not as yet used in those Parts.

† Jamh. restore Diol. in Excerpt. Valer. p. 245. reading αὐτῶν γὰρ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἡ ἐξέτασις, ὅτι δὲ τῶν παρὰ τοὺς αἰσθητὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάλαι μεμνημένων.

* Porph. p. 198.

† Auson. Idyll. 16.

* Jamh.

The Doctrine of PYTHAGORAS.

CHAP. I.

Sciences preparative to Philosophy.

THE Mind being purify'd [by Discipline^a ought to be applied to Things that are beneficial; these he procured by some contrived Ways, bringing it by Degrees to the Contemplation of eternal incorporeal Things, which are ever in the same State; beginning orderly from the most minute, left by the Suddenness of the Change it should be diverted, and withdraw itself through its so great and long Privacy of Nutriment.

To this end, he first used the mathematical Sciences, and those Speculations which are intermediate betwixt Corporeals and Incorporeals, (for they have a threefold Dimension, like Bodies, but they are impassable like Incorporeals) as Degrees of Preparation to the Contemplation of the Things that are; diverting, by an artificial Reason, the Eyes of the Mind from corporeal Things (which never are permanent in the same Manner and Estate) never so little to a Desire of Aliment; by means whereof, introducing the Contemplation of Things that are, he rendered Men truly happy. This use he made of the mathematical Sciences.

Hence it was, that^b *Justin Martyr* applying himself to a *Pythagorean*, eminently learned, desirous to be his Disciple, he demanded, Whether he were vers'd in Musick, Astronomy, and Geometry: Or do you think, faith he, you may be able to understand any thing that pertains to Beatitude, without having first learned these, which abstract the Soul from Sensibles, preparing and adapting her for her Intelligibles? Can you without these contemplate what is honest and what is good? Thus, after a long Commendation of these Sciences, he dismiss'd him, for that he had confess'd himself ignorant of them.

CHAP. II.

Mathematicks, its Name, Parts,

These Sciences were first termed *Μαθηματικά* by *Pythagoras*^c, upon Consideration that all *Μαθηματικά*, (Discipline) is Reminiscence, which comes not extrinsically to Souls as the Phantasies which are formed by sensible Objects in the Phantasy; nor are they an advantageous additional Knowledge, like that which is placed in Opinion; but it is excited from

Phænomena's, and perfected intrinsically by the Cogitation converted into itself.

^d The whole Science of Mathematicks, the *Pythagoreans* divided into four Parts, attributing one to *Multitude*, another to *Magnitude*; and subdividing each of these into two. For Multitude either subsists by itself, or is consider'd with respect to another; Magnitude either stands still, or is moved. *Arithmetick* contemplates Multitude in its self: *Musick* with respect to another: *Geometry*, unmovable Magnitude; *Sphærick*, moveable.

These Sciences consider not Multitude and Magnitude simply, but in each of these that which is determinate: For Sciences consider this abstracted from infinite, that they may not (in vain) attempt in each of these that which is infinite. When therefore the wise Persons say thus, we conceive it is not to be understood of that Multitude which is in the sensible Things themselves, nor of that Magnitude which we perceive in Bodies; for the Contemplation of these, I think, pertains to Physick, not to Mathematick. But because the Maker of all Things took Union, and Division, and Identity, and Alterity, and Station, and Motion to compleat the Soul, and framed it of these Kinds, as *Timæus* teacheth, we must conceive that the Intellect, consisting according to the Diversity thereof, and the Division of Proportions and Multitude, and knowing itself to be both one and many, proposeth Numbers to itself, and produceth them and the arithmetical Knowledge of them. According to the Union of Multitude and Communication with itself, and Colligation, it acquireth to itself Musick: For which Reason Arithmetick excels Musick in Antiquity, the Soul itself being first divided by the Maker, then collected by Proportions. And again establishing the Operation within itself, according to its Station, it produceth Geometry out of itself, and one Figure, and the Principles of all Figures, but according to its Motion, Sphærick; for she is moved by Circles, but consists always in the same manner according to the Causes of those Circles, the Straight and the Circular: And for this Reason likewise Geometry is precedent to Sphærick, as Station is to Motion.

But sofar as the Soul produced these Sciences, not looking on the Excitation of Ideas, which is of infinite Power, but upon the Boundure of that which

is

^a Porph. vit. Pyth. p. 201.^b Dial. cum Tryph.^c Procl. in Eucl. 2. p. 13.^d Procl. in Eucl. 2. 22.^e Τὸ καὶ ἰσχυρὸνἀπορροιαίν. *Barocius* renders it otherwise.^f Read ὅτι οἱ τῶν καὶ ἰσχυρὸν ἀπορροιαίν γινώσκον λαβὴν κινή.

is limited: in their several Kinds, therefore they say that they take infinite from Multitude and Magnitude, and are conversant only about finite: For the Mind hath placed in herself all Principles both of Multitude and Magnitude; because being wholly of like Parts within herself, and being one and indivisible, and again divisible, and producing the World of Ideas, it doth participate essential Finiteness and Infiniteness from the Things which it doth understand: But it understands according to that which is finite in them, and not according to the Infiniteness of its Life. This is the Opinion of the *Pythagoreans*, and their Division of the four Sciences. Hitherto *Proclus*.

S E C T. I.

Arithmetick.

OF these four Methods, Which is that which ought necessarily to be learned the first, (*viz.* that which is by Nature pre-existent to the rest and chiefest, being as it were Principle, and Root, and Mother of the rest)? *Arithmetick*: Not only for that it is pre-existent before the rest in the Intellect of the efficient God, as an ornative and exemplary Reason, according to which the Maker of the Universe caused all Things to be made out of Matter to its proper End, as after a *πρὸτυπον* and archetypal Pattern: But also because being naturally first generated, it together takes away the rest with itself, but is not taken away with them. Thus Animal is first in Nature before Man: For taking away Animal, we take away Man, but not in taking away Man do we take away Animal. [Of this *Nicomachus* discourseth more largely.]

As concerning *Arithmetick*, *Timæus* affirms, that * *Pythagoras* additèd himself chiefly to it: † *Stobæus*, that he esteemèd it above all others, and brought it to Light, reducing it from the Use of Trading. ‡ Hence *Isidore*, and others, style him the *Inventor of Arithmetick*; affirming † he was the first who writ upon this Subject amongst the Græcians, which was afterwards more copiously composèd by *Nicomachus*. He studied this Science exceedingly, and so much did he prefer it above all the rest, that he conceivèd, The ultimate good of Man to consist in the most exact Science of Numbers.

C H A P. I.

Number, its Kinds; the first Kind, Intellectual in the Divine Mind.

Number is of two Kinds, the Intellectual, (or Immaterial) and the Sciential. The intelle-

tual is that † eternal Substance of Number, which *Pythagoras*, in his Discourse concerning the Gods, asserted to be the Principle most providential of all Heaven and Earth, and the Nature that is betwixt them. Moreover, it is the Root of divine Beings, and of Gods, and of Demons. This is that which he termèd † the Principle, Fountain, and Root of all Things; and defined it to be that which before all Things exists in the Divine Mind; from which, and out of which all Things are digested into Order, and remain numbred by † an indissoluble Series.

For all Things which are ordered in the World by Nature, according to an artificial Course in part and in whole, appear to be distinguish'd and adorn'd by Providence and the All-creating Mind, according to Number; the Exemplar being established by applying (as the Reason of the Principle before the Impression of Things) the Number pre-existent in the Intellect of God, Maker of the World. This only is intellectual, and wholly immaterial, really a Substance, according to which, as being the most exact artificial Reason, all Things are perfected, Time, Heaven, Motion, the Stars, and their various Revolutions.

C H A P. II.

The other Kind of Number, Sciential; its Principles.

Sciential Number is that which *Pythagoras* defines † the Extension and Production into All of the seminal Reasons which are in the † Monad, or a Heap of Monads, or a Progression of Multitude, beginning from Monad, and a Regression ending in Monad.

† The *Pythagoreans* affirmèd the expositive Terms, whereby even and odd Numbers are understood to be the Principles of [Sciential] Numbers, as of three insensible Things, the † Triad; of four Insensibles, the Tetrad; and so of other Numbers.

They make a Difference betwixt the Monad and One, conceiving the Monad to be that which exists in Intellectuals; One, in Numbers [or as † *Moderatus* expresth it, Monad amongst Numbers, One amongst Things numbred, one Body being divisible into infinite: Thus Numbers and Things numbred differ, as Incorporeals and Bodies] in like manner Two is amongst Numbers. The Duad is indeterminate; Monad is taken according to Equality and Measure, Duad according to Excess and Defect: Mean and Measure cannot admit more and less, but Excess and Defect (seeing that they proceed to infinite) admit it; therefore they call the Duad indeterminate, † holding Number to be infinite; not that Number which is separate and incorporeal, but that which is † not separate from sensible Things.

C H A P.

‡ Read Κατὰ γένος. † *Nicom.* Ἀριθμητικὴ εἰσαγωγή, (to supply the Title, as at p. 30, 35, 44, 62, 76.) c. 4. † Read πρὸ-τύπον. † *Stob.* ἡ πρώτη καὶ ἡ ἀρχή. † *Laert.* 8. 12. † *Physic.* 2. † *Chron.* † *Orig.* 3. 2. † *Stob. Phys.* 2. † *Nicom.* *Arith.* 1. Jambl. vit. *Pyth.* c. 28. † *Theon.* *Smyrn.* c. 2. † *Nicom.* *Arithm.* c. 5. † *Moderat.* ap. *Stob.* † *Theon.* *Mathem.* c. 4. † *Anon.* *Phot.* vit. *Pytha.* apud *Stob.* † *Stob.* *Phys.* 2. † *Themist.* in *Phys.* 3. † *Arist.* *Phys.* 3. 4.

C H A P. III.

The two Kinds of Scientific Number, Odd and Even.

O^F [Scientific] Numbers *Pythagoras* asserted two Orders, one bounded, Odd; the other infinite, Even. ¹ *Even Number*, (according to the *Pythagorick* Definition) is that which at once admits Division into the greatest and the least; into the greatest Magnitudes, (for halves are the greatest Parts) the least in Multitude (for two is the least Number) according to the natural Opposition of these two Kinds. *Odd* is that which cannot suffer this, but is cut into two unequals.

² Herein the *Pythagoreans* differ from the *Platonists*, in that they hold not all Number to be infinite, but only the Even; for Even Number is the Cause of Section into equal Parts, which is infinite, and by its proper Nature generates Infinity in those Things in which it exists. But it is limited by the Odd; for that being applied to the Even, hinders its Dissection into two equal Parts.

³ Odd Number is said to have been found by *Pythagoras*, and to be of Masculine Virtue, and proper to the Cœlestial Guds (⁴ to whom they sacrificed always of that Number), and to be ⁵ full and perfect. Even, is indigent and imperfect, and Female, and ⁶ proper to the subterraneous Deities, to whom they sacrificed Even Things.

⁷ Moreover, whatever is generated of Odd Number is Male, whatsoever of Even is Female; for Even Number is subject to Section and Passion, Odd is void of both, and is efficacious; wherefore they call one the Male, the other the Female. ⁸ A Number which ariseth out of the Power and Multiplication of Even and Odd, is called ἀρρηθὲς αὐτὸς, *Hermaphrodite*.

This Opinion *Pythagoras* seems to have derived from *Zaratus*, his Master, ⁹ who call'd *Duad* the Mother of Number, *Monad* the Father; and therefore they said, that those Numbers which resemble *Monad* (viz. the Odd) are the best.

¹⁰ Odd Numbers they call *Gnomons*, because being added to Squares, they keep the same Figures; so *Gnomons* do in Geometry.

C H A P. IV.

Symbolical Numbers.

THE ¹ *Pythagoreans* (saith *Moderatus* of *Gades*, who learnedly comprised their Opinions in eleven Books) using the Mathematical Sciences as

Degrees of Preparations to the Contemplations of the Things that are, were studiously addicted to the Business of Numbers, for this Reason. Seeing they could not clearly explain the first Forms and Principles in Discourse (those being the most difficult to understand and express) had recourse to Numbers for the better Explication of their Doctrine, imitating Geometricians, and such as teach to read. For as these going about to explain Letters and their Powers, recur to Marks, saying, That these are, as it were, the first Elements of Learning; nevertheless afterwards they tell us, That they are not the Elements, but that the true Elements are known by them. And as the Geometricians, not being able to express incorporeal Forms in Words, have Recourse to the Description of Figures, saying, This Δ is a Triangle; not meaning that this which falleth under the Sight is a Triangle, but that which hath the same Figure, and which is by the Help thereof, and representeth the Knowledge of a Triangle to the Mind. The same did the *Pythagoreans* in the first Reasons and Forms; for seeing they could not in Words express incorporeal Forms, and first Principles, they had Recourse to Demonstration by Numbers. And thus they called the Reason of Unity, and Identity, and Equality, and the Cause of amicable Conspiration, and of Sympathy, and of the Conservation of the Universe, which continueth according to the same, and in the same manner, ONE. For the one which is in Particulars, is such united to the Parts, and conspiring by Participation of the first Cause. But the twofold Reason of Diversity and Inequality, and of every thing that is divisible and in Mutation, and exists sometimes one way, sometimes another, they call'd *DUAD*, for the Nature of the *Duad*, in particular Things, is such. These Reasons are not only according to the *Pythagoreans*, and not (acknowledg'd by) others, but we see that other Philosophers also have left certain unitive Powers, which comprise all Things in the Universe; and amongst them there are certain Reasons of Equality, Dissimilitude and Diversity. Now these Reasons, that the way of teaching might be more perspicuous, he called by the Names of *Monad* and *Duad*; but it is all one amongst them if it be called biform, or equaliform, or diversiform.

The same Reason is in other Numbers, for every one is ranked according to some Powers. In the Nature of Things exists something which hath Beginning, Middle and End. To such a Form and Nature they attributed the Number Three, saying, That whatsoever hath a middle is triform; so they called every perfect thing. And if any thing be perfect, they affirm it maketh use of this Principle, and is adorned according to it; which, since they could

¹ Eustrat. in Ethic. 1. Serv. in Eclog. 8. ² Nicom. Introd. Arithmet. c. 6. ³ Themist. in Physic. 3. ⁴ Macrobi. Saturn. 1. 13. ⁵ Serv. in Ænec. 3. ⁶ Plutarch de Hom. Poet. ⁷ Serv. ad Æn. 3. ⁸ Anon. in Ptolem. Tert. lib. 1. 1. ⁹ Anon. Theolog. ¹⁰ Plot. de anima progr. ¹¹ Simplic. in Physic. 1. 3. ¹² Porph. p. 102a.

not name otherwise, they made use of the Term *Triad* to express it; and when they endeavour to bring us to the Knowledge thereof, they lead us to it by the Form of this *Triad*. The same in other Numbers.

These therefore are the Reasons, according to which the foresaid Numbers were placed; but these that follow are comprehended under one Form and Power, which they call *Decad*, q. *Decad*, [from Comprehension.] Wherefore they say, that Ten is a perfect Number, even the most perfect of all Numbers, comprehending in it all Difference of Numbers, all Reasons, Species and Proportions. For if the Nature of the Universe be defined according to the Reasons and Proportions of Numbers; and that which is produced, and increased, and perfected, proceed according to the Reasons of Numbers; and the *Decad* comprehends every Reason of Number, and every Proportion, and all Species: Why should not Nature itself be termed by the Name of Ten, the most perfect Number? Hitherto *Moderatus*.

Thus from the symbolical Use of Numbers proceeded a multiplicitous Variety of Names, attributed to them by *Pythagoras* and his Followers. Of which we shall speak more particularly, beginning with the *Monad*.

CHAP. V.

The Monad.

THE *Monad* is a Quantity, which in the Decrease of Multitude, being deprived of all Number, receiveth Mansion and Station; for below Quantity, *Monad* cannot retreat. The *Monad* therefore seems to be so called, either from standing, or from remaining (*μῆναι*) always in the same Condition, or from its Separation (*μονογενῆς*) from Multitude.

To the *Monad* are attributed these Names.

Mind, (*Nicomachus* in *Photius*, and *Anon. Theologumena Arithmetices*) because the Mind is stable, and every way alike, and hath the Preheminence. (*Alex. Aphrod. in Metaph.*)

Hermaphrodite, (*Nicom.*) it is both Male and Female, Odd and Even, (*Macrob. in Senn. Scip. l. 6.*) it partakes of both Natures; being added to the even, it makes odd; to the odd, even. (*Aristot. in Pythagorica*, cited by *Theon. Smyrn. Mathem. cap. 5.*)

God, because it is the Beginning and End of all, itself having neither Beginning nor End. (*Macrob.*)

Good, for such is the Nature of one. (*Porphy. vit. Pyth.*)

Matter, Receptacle of all, (*Nicom.*) because it produceth *Duad*, which is properly Matter. (*Anon. Theol.*)

Chaos, Confusion, Contemperation, Obscurity, Chasm, Tartarus, Styx, Flavour, Impermition,

Subterraneous Barathrum, Lethæ, Rigid Virgin, Atlas, Axis, Sumus, Pyralios, Morphe. (*Nicom. Anon.*)

Tower of Jupiter, (*Nicom.*) *Custody of Jupiter, Throne of Jupiter*, (*Simplic.*) from the great Power which the Center hath in the Universe, being able to restrain the general circular Motion, as if the Custody of the Maker of all Things were constituted therein. (*Procl. in Timæum. com. 4.*)

Seminal Reason, (*Nicom.*) because this one only is one to the Retractors, and is alone, and the rest are procreated of it, and it is the only Seminary of all Numbers. (*Mart. Capel. 7.*)

Apollo Prophet. (*Nicom.*)

Prometheus, as being Author of Life. (*Anon. Theol.*)

Geniture, because without it no Number hath Being. (*Anon. Theol.*)

Substance, (*Theolog.*) because Substance is primary. (*Alex. Aphr. Met. l. 1.*)

Cause of Truth, Simple Exemplar, Constitution of Symphony, (*Anon. Theolog.*)

In greater and Lesser, *Equal*; in Intention and Remission, *Middle*; in Multitude, *Mean*; (*Theolog.*) in Time, *New*, the present; (*Anon. Theolog.*) because it consists in one Part of Time which is always present. (*Macrob. in Somn. l. 6.*)

Ship, Chariot, Friend, Life, Beatitude. (*Anon. Theolog.*)

Form, (or *Species*) because it circumscribes, comprehends, and terminates, (*Anon.*) and because it produceth the rest of the Effects. (*Mart. Capel.*)

Jupiter, (*Anon. Procl. in Tim.*) because he is Father and Head of the Gods, (*Mart. Cup.*) whence the Pythagorick Verse:

Hear noble Number, Sire of Gods and Men.

Love, Concord, Piety, Friendship, because it is so connected, that it cannot be divided into Parts. (*Mart. Cap.*)

Proteus, as containing all Forms, (*Anon.*)

Mnemosyne, (*Anonym.*)

Vesta, or *Fire*, (*Plut. in Numa.*) For the Nature of *Monad*, like *Vesta*, is seated in the midst of the World, and keeps that Seat, inclining to no Side.

Polyonymous. (*Hesych.*)

CHAP. VI.

The Duad.

THE Names of the *Duad* are these, *Genius, Evil*, (*Plut. Plac. Phil. l. 3.*)

Darkness, Sinister, Unequal, Unstable, Moveable, (*Porphy. vit. Pythag.*)

Boldness,

Boldness, (Nicom.) *Fortitude*, (Anon.) *Contention*, (Plut. de *Isid.* & *Osirid.*) because it proceeds to Action, and first separates itself from the *Monad*. (Anon.)

Matter, (Nicom.) because indefinite; indeterminate *Duad*, proceeds from *Monad* as *Matter*. The Cause of Tumour and Division. (*Simplic. Phys.* 1.)

Cause of Dissimilars. (Nicom.)

Partition betwixt Multitude and Monad. (Nicom.)

Equal, because, in Composition and Permission, this only maketh Equality. (Nicom.) Two and two are equal to twice two.

Unequal, *Defect*, *Superfluity*, (Nicom.) according to the Motion of *Matter*. (Anon.)

Only Inform, *Indefinite*, *Indeterminate*, (Nicom.) because from a Triangle and Triad, Polygons are actually procreated to infinite; in *Monad* they exist all potentially together: But of two right Lines or Angles is made no Figure. (Anon.)

Only Principle of Purity, yet not even, nor evenly even, nor unevenly even, nor evenly uneven. (Nicom.)

Erato, (Nicom.) because through Love applying itself to *Monad*, as the Species, it procreates the rest of the Effects. (Anon.)

Harmony, (Nicom.)

Tolerance, (Nicom.) because it first underwent Separation. (Anon.)

Root, but not in act. (Nicom.)

Fect of Fountain-abounding Idea. (Nicom.)

Top, *Phanes*. (Nicom.)

Justice, because of its two equal Parts. (Anon. *Mart. Cap.*)

Jis, *Nature*, *Rhea*, *Jove's Mother*, *Fountain of Distribution*, *Phrygia*, *Lydia*, *Dindymene*, *Ceres*, *E-leusinia*. (Nicom.)

Diana, (Nicom.) because the Moon takes many Settings from all the fixed Stars, and because she is forked, and called Half-moon. (Anon.)

Love, *Dianna*, *Aeria*, *Astoria*, *Disamus*, *Station*, *Venus*, *Dione*, *Michia*, *Cythieria*, *Ignorance*, *Falsity*, *Permission*, *Alterity*, *Contention*, *Diffidence*, *Fat*, *Death*, (Nicom.) *Impulse*. (Anon.)

Opinion, because it is true and false. (Anon. *Alex. Aphrod. Met.* 1. *Philop. ibid.*)

Motion, *Generation*, *Mutation*, *Division*. (Anon.) (*Mauricius* reads *ἡ ἀναγωγή*, *Djudication*.) *Longitude*, (Anon.) or rather, *first Longitude*, (*Simplic.*) *Augmentation*, *Composition*, *Communion*. (Anon.)

Misfortune, *Sustentation*, because it first suffered Separation. (Anon. *Martian.*) *Discord*. (Plut. de *Isid.* & *Osirid.*)

Imposition, (*Hefych.*)

Marriage, *June*; *June*, being both Wife and Sister to *Jupiter*. (*Mart. Capel. Eulog.* in *Sonn. Scip.*)

Soul, from Motion hither and thither. (*Philop. Metaph.* 1.)

Science, for all Demonstration, and all Credit of Science, and all Syllogism collects from some Things granted, the Thing in Question, and easily demonstrateth another; the Comprehension of which Things is Science. (Plut. de *Plac.* 1. 3.)

Maia. (Nicom. apud Phot.)

C H A P. VII.

The Triad.

THE *Triad* is the first Number, actually odd, and the first perfect Number, and Middle, and Proportion. It causeth the Power of the *Monad* to proceed to Act and Extension; it is the first and proper Coacervation of Unities: ° For which Reason *Pythagoras* said, *Apollo* gave Oracles from a Tripod; and he advised to offer Libation three Times.

The Names of the Triad are these:

First, *Latitude*, not simply *Latitude*. (*Simp. de Anim.* 1.)

Saturnia, *Latona*, *Cornucopia*, *Ophion*, *Thetis*, *Harmonia*, *Hecate*, *Erana*, *Charitia*, *Polymymia*, *Pluto*, *Arctus*, *Helice*. Not descending to the Ocean, *Damatrane*, *Disgoria*, *Metis*, *Tridume*, *Triton*, *President of the Sea*, *Tritogenia*, *Achelaus*, *Nastis*, *Agiopaza*, (perhaps ἀγίωμα, as before, *Thetis*) *Curetis*, *Crataeis*, *Symbenia*, *Mariadga*, *Gorgonia*, *Phorcis*, *Trifamus*, *Lydius*. (Nicom.)

Marriage, *Friendship*, *Peace*, *Concord*, (Nicom.) because it collects and unites, not Similars, but Contraries. (Anon.)

Justice, (Nicom.)

Prudence, *Wisdom*; because Men order the present, foresee the future, and learn Experience by the past. (Anon.)

Piety, (Anon.) *Temperance*, (Anatol.) All Virtues depend upon this Number, and proceed from it. It is the *Mind*; it is *Cause of Wisdom and Understanding*. It is *Knowledge*, which is most proper to number.

It is the *Power and Composition of all Music*, and much more of *Geometry*: It hath all *Power in Astronomy*, and the Nature and Knowledge of Celestials, containing and impelling it to the Production of Sub-stance.

° The Cube of this Number *Pythagoras* affirmed to have the Power of the lunar Circle, inasmuch as the Moon goeth round her Orb in 27 Days, which the Number Ternio, in Greek Τερας, the Triad gives in its Cube.

C H A P.

CHAP. VIII.

The Tetrads.

THE Tetrads was much honoured by the *Pythagoreans*; and esteemed the most perfect Number, the primary and primogenious, which they called the Root of all Things, and the Fountain of Nature.

The Tetrads are all intellectual, and have an emergent Order, and (for that Reason) the empyreal Prefecture; they go round about the World, as the *Empyrum* passeth through all.

Even God himself *Pythagoras* expressed by the Tetrads.

How God is a Tetrads, you may clearly find in the sacred Discourse ascribed to *Pythagoras*, wherein God is the Number of Numbers. For if all Beings subsist by his eternal Counsel, it is manifest, that Number in every Species of Beings depends upon their Causes; the first Number is there, from thence derived hither: The determinate Stop of Number is the Decad, for he who would reckon further, must return to 1, 2, 3, and number a second Decad; in like manner a third, to make up 30, and so on, till having numbred the tenth Decad, he comes to 100. Again, he reckons from 100, in the same manner, and so may proceed to infinite, by Revolution of the Decad. Now the Tetrads is the Power of the Decad; for, before we arrive at the Perfection of the Decad we find an united Perfection in the Tetrads, the Decad being made up by Addition of 1, 2, 3, 4.

Moreover, the Tetrads is an arithmetical mean betwixt 1 and 7, equally exceeding, and exceeded in Number. It wants 3 of 7, and exceeds 1 by 3. Monad, as being the Mother of Numbers, contains all their Powers within itself. The Hebdomad, as being Motherless, and a Virgin, possesseth the second Place in Dignity, for it is not made up of any Number within the Decad, as 4 is of twice two, 6 of twice 3, 8 of twice 4, 9 of thrice 3, 10 of twice 5. Neither doth it make up any Number within the Decad, as 2 makes 4, 3 makes 6, 5 makes 10. But the Tetrads lying betwixt the unbegotten Monad, and the Motherless Hebdomad, comprehends all Powers, both of the productive and produced Numbers; for this of all Numbers under 10, is made of a certain Number, and makes a certain Number; the Duad doubled makes a Tetrads, the Tetrads doubled makes 8.

Besides, the first solid Figure is found in a Tetrads; for a Point is correspondent to Monad, a Line to Duad, [because drawn from one Point to another] a Superficies to Triad, [because it is the most simple of

all rectiline Figures) but a Solid properly agrees with the Tetrads: For the first Pyramid is in a Tetrads, the Base is triangular; so that at the bottom is 3, at the top 1.

Furthermore, the judicative Power in things are four, Mind, Science, Opinion, and Sense; for all Beings are adjudicated either by Mind, or Science, or Opinion, or Sense: [for which reason *Pythagoras* affirmed, the Soul of Man to consist of a Tetrads.]

Finally, the Tetrads connects all Beings, of Elements, Numbers, Seasons of the Year, Coeuvous Society; neither can we name any thing which depends not on the Tetrads, as its Root and Principle: for it is as we said, the Maker and Cause of all things; Intelligible God, Author of celestial and sensible Good. The Knowledge of these things was deliver'd to the *Pythagoreans* by *Pythagoras* himself. Hitherto *Hierocles*.

For this reason the word *Tetrads* was used by *Pythagoras*, and his Disciples, as a great Oath; who likewise, out of respect to their Master, forbearing his Name, did swear by the Person that communicated the *Tetrads* to them,

*Eternal Nature's Fountain I attest,
Who the Tetrads to our Soul express't.*

But *Plutarch* interprets this *Tetrads*, (which he saith was also called *μικρὸς κόσμος*, World) to be 36, which consists of the first four odd Numbers, thus:

$$\begin{array}{ccccccc} 1 & 3 & 5 & 7 & 9 & 11 & 13 \\ 2 & 4 & 6 & 8 & 10 & 12 & 14 \end{array} \left. \begin{array}{c} 3 \\ 11 \\ 7 \\ 15 \end{array} \right\} 36$$

The Names of the Tetrads are these:

Another Goddess, Multidity, Pentad, Fountain of natural Effects. (Nicom.)

Key-keeper of Nature, because the universal Constitution cannot be without it; to these Sciences it conferreth Constitution and Settlement, and reconcilith them; yea, it is Nature itself and Truth. (Nicom.)

Nature of Aëolus, (Nicom.) from its various Property. (Anon.)

Hercules, Impetuosity, most Strong, Masculine, Infectimate, Mercury, Vulcan, Bacchus, Soritas, Maidades, Erinnius, Socus, Dioscurus, Bassarius, Twinmother's of feminine Form, of virils Performance, Bacchation. (Nicom.)

Harmony. (Nicom.) because it hath a *symplicitia*. (Anon.)

Urania the Muse. (Nicom.) *World.* (Plut.)

Body, as a Point is 1, a Line 2, a Superficies 3.

* Photopath. in Hesiod. dies.
in sue. carn.

* Lucian pro laps. in Galatru. adm.
Phil. plac. phil. l. 1. c. 3.

* In procr. an. sec. Timon.

* Irrenus, l. 1. c. 1.

* Simple. ad Phys. 4.

* Hierocl.

Soul, because it consists of Mind, Science, Opinion and Sense. (*Plut. Plac. Phil.* 1. 3.)

First Profundity, as it is a Body. (*Simplic. de Anim.* 1.)

Justice. The Property of Justice is Compensation and Equality. This Number is the first evenly even; and whatsoever is the first in any kind, is most that thing. This, they said, was the Tetrad, because being quadrate, it is divided into Equals, and is itself equal. (*Alex. Aphrod. Metaph.* 5.)

C H A P. IX.

The Pentad.

THE Pentad is the first Complexion of both kinds of Number, even and odd, two and three. Its Names these:

Assensu, Reconciliation. (Nicom.) because the fifth Element, *Ether*, is free from the Disturbances of the other four. (*Anon.*)

Alteration, Light, because it changed that which was separated threefold, into the Identity of its Sphere, moving circularly, and ingenerating Light. (*Anon.*)

Justice, (Nicom.) because it divides 10 into two equal Parts. (*Johan. Pert. in Hef.*)

The left and top of Liveliness. (Nicom.)

Numera, (Nicom.) because it distributes conveniently Celestial, Divine, and Natural Elements. (*Anon.*)

Bubastia, (Nicom.) because worshipp'd at *Bubastus* in Egypt. (*Anon.*)

Venus, Gamelia, Androgynia, Cytherea, Zonia. (Nicom.) *Marriage*, (Anon.) because it connects a masculine and feminine Number. (*Anon. Plut. de 'Ei delph.*) consisting of 2, the first even, and 3 the first odd. (*Alex. Aphrod. in Metaph. Protoph. in Hesiod.*)

Κυκλωξ, President of Circles. (Nicom.)

Semi-goddi, (Nicom.) not only as being the half of 10, (which is divine) but for that it is placed in the middle. (*Anon.*)

Tower of Jupiter.

Didymos, or *Twin*, (Nicom.) because it divides 10 into two. (*Anon.*)

Firm Axis. (Nicom.)

Immortal, Pallas, implying the fifth Essence. (*Anon.*)

Καρδιαις, *Cordial*, (Nicom.) from Similitude with the Heart. (*Anon.*)

Providence, because it makes Unequals equal. (*Anon.*)

Τετράς, *Sound*, the fifth being the first Diasteme. (*Plut. de An. procr. i Tim.*)

Nature, because multiply'd by itself, it returns into itself. For as Nature receiving Wheat in Seed, and introducing many Forms by altering and changing

it, at last returns it Wheat, at the End of the whole Mutation restoring the Beginning; so, whilst other Numbers multiply'd in themselves are increased, and end in other Numbers, only 5 and 6 multiply'd by themselves, represent, and retain themselves. (*Plut. de 'Ei delph.*)

This Number represents all superior and inferior Beings; for it is either the supreme God, or the Mind born of God, wherein are contained the Species of all things, or the Soul of the World, which is the Fountain of all Souls, or Celestials, down to us; or it is Terrestrial Nature, and so the Pentad is repeat with all things. (*Macrob. in Somn. Scip.* 1. 6.)

C H A P. X.

The Hexad.

THE Pythagoreans held the Number Six to be perfect, respecting (as *Clem. Alexandrinus* conceives) the Creation of the World according to the Prophet. The Names of the Hexad are these:

Form of Form, Articulation of the Universe, Mother of the Soul, Harmony; (Nicom.) because it hath the Power to ingenerate a vital Habit; Whence it is called *Hexad*, ἡ ἐν ἑξ ἑστί; and *Harmony*, because all Souls are harmonick. (*Anon.*)

Οὐρανίστην, *Perfection of Parts*, (Nicom.) or (as *Anon.*) *Οὐρανίαν*. The Pythagoreans called it thus, imitating *Orpheus*, either as being the only Number under ten, which is whole and equal in its Parts; or because the whole Universe is divided into Parts by it. (*Anon.*)

Venus, (Nicom.) because it procreates Harmony: 6 to 12 is a Diapason Concord; 6 to 9 Hemioles, 6 to 8 Epitritus; that is, a Diatessaron Concord: Whence it is named *Venus*, who was the Mother of Harmony. (*Mart. cap. 7.*)

Ζῆνους, (Nicom.) *Γαμήλια*, (Nic.) *Τετράς*, *Marriage*, (*Clem. Strom.* 5.) because of the Mixture of the first even and first odd. (*Plut. de An. procr. Sec. Tim.*) For as Marriage procreates by a Male and Female; so this Number is generated of 3, which is odd and called Male; and of 2, which is even and called Female: for twice 3 makes 6. (*Clem. Alexand. Strom.* 6.) It produceth Children like the Parents. (*Theon. Smyr. Mathem.* 45.)

Ζῆνους Οὐρανίαν, (Nicom.) or *Οὐρανίαν*, *Cconciliation*, because it conciliates the Male and Female. (*Anon.*)

Τετράς, *Health*; (Nicom. Anon.) a triple Triangle, which being alternately composed within itself, constituteth a Figure of five Lines: they used it as a Symbol to those of their own Sect, and called it *ἵσλη*, *Health*. (*Lucian. prolaps. in sal. admiff.*)

Anon.

Ἀσπίς, Aspis, (Nicom.) *qu. adspicere*, unwarried; because the principal Triangles of the soundness Elements have Share in it, being each of them six, if measur'd by three Perpendiculars. (Anon.)

Ἑκατόμβη, Hecatombe, being compounded of, and as it were *ἑκατόμβη*, the Triad, which is called Hecate. (Anon. Theol.)

Τριάδις, from the Nature of that Goddess, or because the Hexad first assumes the three Motions of Intervals, being divided into two Parts, each of which is on each side. (Anon.)

Διάρθρωσις, the Distribution of all Time, of things above the Earth and under the Earth, which is done by the Hexad in the Zodiac; or because Time is of the Nature of the Triad, consisting of three Parts, and the Hexad consists of two Triads. (Anon.)

Περφεία, Triforme. (Nicom.)

Ἀμπίτρις, (Nicom.) because it hath a Triad on each side. (Anon.)

Νεῖκιστος, Justice, (Nicom.) as being nearest to 5, which is named Justice. (Anon.)

Θαλία, the Muse; (Nicom.) because of the Harmony of the rest. (Anon.)

Πανάρια, Panacea, (Nicom.) in respect to Health mentioned already; or *ἡ Πανάρια*, Omni-sufficiency, endowed with Parts sufficient for Totality. (Anon.)

Μεσότης, Middle-right, being in the middle betwixt 3 and 10, equidistant from both. (Clem. Alexandr. Strom. 6.)

Ῥεῦμα, the World, because the World, as the Hexad, is often seen to consist of Contraries by Harmony. (Anon.)

CHAP. XI.

The Heptad.

THE Heptad was so called, *qu. οὐραία ὁλοκαυτί*. *ἑξήκω*, worthy of Veneration; for *Pythagoras* held this Number to be most proper to Religion. He also held, that it is perfect; thence it was, (as the Pythagoreans conceived) that Creatures born in the seventh Month live.

The names of the Heptad, are these.

Fortune, Occasion; (Nicom.) because it occurs casually and opportunely to every Thing. (Anon.) Whatsoever is best amongst sensible Things, by which the Seasons of the Year and their Periods, are orderly compleat, participates of the Hebdomad, (Philo de die sept.) the Moon having 7 days, measures all Time. (Johan. Philop. in Metaphys. 7.)

Ἀῖμα, Motherless, Virgin, (Hieroc. in aur. car. Nicom.) *Minerva*, as being a Virgin, unmarried, not born of a Mother (odd Number); nor of a Father, (even Number;) but out of the crown or top

of the Father of all, Monad. (Anon. Chalcid. in Tim. Theon. Smyrn. c. 45.)

Mars, Nicom. Anon. *Ἀσπίς*, (Nicom.)

Agelia, (Nicom.) an epithet of *Minerva* (Hesych.)

Ἀτρωνή, Atrone, (Nicom.)

Θυλακίτις, Cystody, (Nicom.) because the Stars which guard the Universe are seven. (Anon.)

Ῥεῦμα, Tritegma, Γλαυκῶς, Ἀλακρίδης,

Παντοχία, Ἐργον, Πολυαῖτον, Ὀυραία; *Stock of Amalthea, Egis, Osiris, Dream, Voice, Sound, Clio the Muse, Judgment, Adrastia*. (Anon.) *Τελίωσις, leading to the End*; (Anon.) because by it all are led to the End. (Philo. de Mund. opif.)

CHAP. XII.

The Ogdoad.

THE Ogdoad, they said was the first Cube, and the only Number evenly even under Ten (Anon.)

The Names of it.

Panarmonia, (Nicom.) because of its excellent Convenience. (Anon.)

Cedmaa, Mother, Rheia, ἑρμῶς, Cibeles, Dindymus, Πλούτης, Love, Friendship, Council, Prudence, Orcia, Themis, Lou, ἑρμῶς, Euterpe the Muse, Ἀσπίς, Ἐξοχία, Ἐξοχία, (Anon.) Neptune. (Philo. de Isid. & Osirid.)

Justice, because it is first resolved into Numbers, especially equal. (*Macrob. in Soma. Scip. 1. 5.*)

CHAP. XIII.

The Ennead.

THE Ennead is the first square of an odd Number. Its Names, these:

Ocean, Horizon; because Number hath nothing beyond it, but it revolves all within it. (Anon.)

Prometheus, because it suffers no Number to outgo it, and justly, being a perfect Ternary. (Anon.)

Concord, (Nicom. Anon.) Perseus. (Anon.)

Helius, (Nicom. Anon.) because it doth not permit the content of Number to be dispersed beyond it, but collects it. (Anon.)

Ἀντιστή, Antisth, because of the revolution to Monad. (Anon.)

Ὀπισθός, Opisth, because it is the first odd Triangle, (Anon.)

Vulcan, because to it, as Conflature and Relation, there is no return. (Anon.)

Juno, because the sphere of the Air hath the ninth Place. (Anon.)

K k k 2

Styl

¹ Nicom. apud Phot. Anon. Macrob. in Soma. Scip.
² Jul. Paul. recept. sent. lib. 4. tit. 9.

³ Apud Metam. lib. 11.

⁴ Alex. Aphrod. Probl. 2. Quest. 47.

Sister and Wife to Jupiter, from Conjunction with Unity. (Anon.)

Ἐκείνη, because there is no Shooting beyond it. (Anon.)

Pæon, Nyssæis, Agyia, Ennalios, Agelia, Tritægenia, Suada, Curetis, Proserpina, Hyperion, Terpsichore the Muse. (Nicom. Anon.)

ἑνιάμηνη Τάλην, because nine Months compleat the Infant.

CHAP. XIV.

The Decad.

TEN, according to the Pythagoreans, is the greatest Number, as well for that it is the Tetractys, as that it comprehends all Arithmetical and harmonical Proportions. *Pythagoras* said, that Ten is the nature of Number: Because all Nations Greeks, and Barbarians, reckon to it; and when they arrive at it, return to the Monad.

Names of the Decad.

World; because according to the Decad, all Things are ordered in general and particular. (Anon.) The Decad comprehends all Numbers, the World all Forms; (Philop. Metaph. 1.) for the same Reason termed also Sphere: (Anon.)

Heaven, (Nicom.) because it is the most perfect Term of Number, as Heaven the receptacle of all Things. (Anon.) The Decad being a perfect Number, the Pythagoreans desired to apply to it those things which are contained in Heaven, where finding but 9, (the Orbs, the seven Planets, and the Heaven of fixed Stars, with the Earth) they added an Antichthon, (another Earth opposite to this) and made Ten; by this means they accommodated them to the Decad. (Pachymer. in Metaphys. 3.)

Fate, (Nicom.) because there is no Property neither in Numbers nor Beings, according to the composition of Number, which is not feminally contained in the Decad. (Anon.)

Age. (Nicom.)

Power, (Nicom.) from the command it hath over all other Numbers. (Anon.)

Faith. (Nicom.)

Atlas; for as *Atlas* is fabled to sustain Heaven with his Shoulders, so the Decad all the Spheres, as the Diameter of them all. (Anon.)

Unwearied, God, Phanes, Sun, Urania, Memory, Mnemosyne. (Anon.)

First square, because made of the first four Numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4. (Chalcid. in Tim.)

Κανὼν, as the Magazine and Confinement of all Proportions; (Anon.) or, *Κανὼν*, because all Numbers branch out of it. (Cedren.)

Πανταλιν, because it perfects all Number, comprehends within itself all the Nature of even and odd, moved and unmoved, good and ill. (Anon.)

CHAP. XV.

Divination by Numbers.

UPON the near Affinity which *Pythagoras* (following *Orpheus*) conceived to be betwixt the Gods and Numbers, he collected a kind of Arithmonancy; not practised by himself only, but communicated to his Disciples, as is manifest from *Jamblicus*, who cites this Fragment of the sacred *Discoverie*, a Book ascribed to him: *Concerning the Gods of Pythagoras, Son of Mnesearchus, I learned this when I was initiated at Libeth in Thrace, Aglaophemus administering the Rites to me; Orpheus son of Caliope, instructed by his Mother, in the Pangaean Mountain, said, that Number is an eternal substance, the most provident Principle of the Universe, Heaven, and Earth; and middle Nature; likewise the root of divine Beings, and of Gods and Demons.*

Hence (saith *Jamblicus*) it is manifest that *Pythagoras* received of Numbers the determinate Essence of the Gods, from the traditions of *Orpheus*. By these Numbers he framed a wonderful Divination and Service of the Gods, of nearest affinity to Numbers, as may be evinced from hence (for it is requisite to give an Instance for Confirmation of what we say), whereas *Abasius* performed those kind of Sacrifices to which he was accustomed, and practised diligently Divination, after all the ways of the Barbarians, by Victims, principally of Cocks, (whose Entrails they conceived to be most exact for Inspection) *Pythagoras* willing not to take him off from his study of Truth, yet to direct him by a safer way, without Blood and Slaughter, (nevertheless observing the Cock sacred to the Sun) taught him to find out all Truth by the Science of Arithmetick. Thus *Jamblicus*. And elsewhere he saith, that *Pythagoras*, instead of the art of divining by Sacrifices, taught him that kind of Prediction which is by Numbers, as conceiving that to be more sacred and divine, and more agreeable to the celestial numbers of the Gods.

This Hint some have taken to impose upon the World, under the name of *Pythagoras*, and oromantick kind of Arithmetick, assigning particular Numbers to the letters of the Alphabet, to the Planets, to the days of the Week, and to the signs of the Zodiac, thereby resolving Questions concerning Nobility, Victory, Life, or Death, Journeys, Prosperity or Adversity, as is set down by (*) *Flud*, who adds, *Apollonius* hath delivered another way of Divination, according to the *Pythagorick Doctrine*; affirming, that future Things may be prognosticated by virtue of a Wheel

* Aethenag. apolog. pro. Christ.

* Plot. plac. 2. 3.

* Vit. Pyth. c. 28.

* Vit. Pyth. c. 18.

* Microcosm.

Wheel invented by Pythagoras, whereby is treated of Life and Death, of Eupitrius, of litigious Business, of Victories, of the Sex of Children unborn, and infinite others of the like Kind. But concerning the exposition of the Wheel, and the true position of Number, therein, the ancient Authors have written very inconsistently, as the truth of its Composition cannot be comprehended otherwise than by conjecture. What ancient Authors he means, I know not; the citation of Apollonius, I doubt to be no less supposititious, than the Wheel itself, which (*) Tritheimus and others acknowledge to be an invention of later Times.

S E C T. II.

Musick.

(*) THE Pythagoreans define Musick an apt composition of Contraries, and an Union of many, and content of Differents. For it not only coordinates Rhythms and Modulation, but all manner of Systems. Its End is to unite, and aptly conjoin. God is the reconciler of Things discordant, and this is his chiefest Work according to Musick and Medicine, to reconcile Enmities. In Musick, say they, consists the agreement of all Things, and aristocracy of the Universe: For, what is Harmony in the World, in a City is good Government, in a Family Temperance.

Of many Sects (saith Ptolemaeus) that were conversant about Harmony, the most eminent were two, the Pythagorick and Aristoxenian; [* Pythagorick adjudicated it by Reason, Aristoxenus by Sense.] The Pythagoreans not crediting the Relation of hearing in all those Things, wherein it is requisite, adapted Reasons to the differences of Sounds, contrary to those which are perceived by the Senses; so that by this critery (Reason) they gave occasion of Calumny to such as were of a different Opinion.

Hence the Pythagoreans named that which we now call Harmonick, Canonick; not from the Canon or Instrument, as some imagine, but from Rectitude, since Reason finds out that which is right, by using harmonical Canons or Rules. Even of all sorts of Instruments, framed by harmonical Rules, (Pipes, Flutes, and the like) they call the Exercise, Canonick; which although it be not Canonick, yet is so termed, because it is made according to the Reasons and Theorems of Canonick. The Instrument therefore seems to be rather denominated from its canonick Affection. A canonick in general is a Harmonick, who is conversant by Ratiocination, about that which consists of Harmony. Musicians and Harmonicks differ; Musicians are those Har-

monicks who begin from Sense, but Canonicks are Pythagoreans, who are also called Harmonicks; both Sorts are termed by a general Name, Musicians.

C H A P. I.

Voice, its Kinds.

OF human Voice, they who are of the Pythagorean School, said, that there are (as of one Genus) two Species. One they properly named Continuous, the other Diastematick, (intermissive) framing Appellations from the Accidents pertaining to each. The Diastematick they conceived to be that which is sung, and rests upon every Note, and manifests the Mutation which is in all its Parts, which is inconfused, and divided, and disjoined, by the Magnitudes which are in the several Sounds, as coarsened, but not commixt; the parts of the Voice being apply'd mutually to one another, which may easily be separated and distinguished, and are not destroy'd together. Such is the musical kind of Voice, which to the knowing, manifests all Sounds, of what Magnitude every one participates: for if a Man use it not after this manner, he is not said to sing, but to speak.

The other kind they conceived to be Continuous, by which we discourse one to another, and read, and are not constrained to use any manifest distinct tensions of Sounds, but connect the Discourse, till we have finished that which we intended to speak. For if any Man in disputing, or apologizing, or reading, make distinct Magnitudes, in the several Sounds, taking off, and transferring the Voice from one to another, he is not said to read, but to sing.

Human Voice having in this manner two Parts, they conceived that there are two Places which each in passing possesseth. The place of continuous Voice, which is by Nature infinite in Magnitude, receiveth its proper Term from that wherewith the Speaker began, until he ends; that is, the place from the beginning of his Speech to his conclusive Silence, so that the Variety thereof is in our power. But the place of Diastematick Voice is not in our power, but natural; and this likewise is bounded by different Effects. The beginning is that which is first heard, the end that which is last pronounced; for from thence we begin to perceive the magnitude of Sounds, and their mutual Commutations, from whence first our Hearing seems to operate; whereas it is possible there may be some more obscure Sounds perfected in Nature, which we cannot perceive or hear. As for instance, in things weigh'd there are some Bodies which seem to have no weight, as Straws, Bran, and the like; but when as by apposition of such Bodies, some beginning of Ponderosity appears,

* Antig. Mal. l. 3.

* Theon. Smyrn. Math. c. 1.

* Porphyre, in Hæm. Probemad.

* Plat. de Mus. Porph. in Ptol.

Harmon. Sec.

* Ptolem. Harmonic. c. 2.

* Ptolemaeus loc. citato apud Porphyre.

* Nicom. Harmon. l. 1. c. 2.

appears, then we say, they first come within the compass of Statick. So, when a low Sound increaseth by degrees, that which first of all may be perceived by the Ear, we make the beginning of the Place which musical Voice requireth.

CHAP. II.

First Musick in the Planets.

THE names of Sounds in all probability, were derived from the seven Stars, which move circularly in the Heavens, and compass the Earth. *The circumagitation of these Bodies must of necessity cause a Sound; for Air being struck from the intervention of the Blow, sends forth a Noise; Nature herself constraining that the violent collision of two Bodies should end in Sound.*

Now, (say the *Pythagoreans*) all Bodies which are carried round with Noise, one yielding and gently receding to the other, must necessarily cause Sounds different from each other, in the magnitude and swiftness of Voice, and in Place; which (according to the reason of their proper Sounds, or their Swiftness, or the orbs of Repressions, in which the impetuous Transportation of each is performed) are either more fluctuating, or on the contrary more reluctant. But these three differences of Magnitude, Celerity, and local Distance, are manifestly existent in the Planets, which are constantly with Sound circumagitated thro' the æthereal Diffusion; whence every one is called *ἀέρις*, as void of *εἰς*, Station; and *ἀσὶ* *στῆναι*, always in course, whence God and Æther are called *Θεὸς* and *Ἄσθρῃς*.

Moreover, the Sound which is made by striking the Air, induceth into the Ear something sweet and musical, or harsh and discordant: for, if a certain observation of numbers moderate the Blow, it effects a Harmony consonant to itself; but if it be temerarious, not governed by Measures, there proceeds a troubled unpleasant Noise which offends the Ear. Now in Heaven nothing is produced casually, nothing temerarious, but all things there proceed according to divine Rules, and settled Proportions; whence irrefragably is infer'd, that the Sounds which proceed from the conversion of the celestial Spheres, are musical. For Sound necessarily proceeds from Motion, and the Proportion which is in all divine Things causeth the harmony of this Sound. This Pythagoras first of all the Greeks conceived in his Mind; and understood that the Spheres sounded something concordant, because of the necessity of Proportion, which never forsakes celestial Beings.

* From the motion of Saturn, which is the highest and furthest from us, the gravest sound in the

diapason Concord, is called *Hypate*; because *ὑμεῖς* signifies *highest*: but from the Lunar, which is the lowest and nearest the Earth, *nete*; for *νεῦν* signifies *lowest*. From those which are next these, viz. from the motion of Jupiter who is under Saturn, *parhypate*; and of Venus, who is above the Moon, *paramete*. Again, from the middle, which is the Sun's Motion, the fourth from each Part, *mesē*, which is distant by a Diatessaron, in the Heptachord from both Extreame, according to the ancient way; as the Sun is the fourth from each extreme of the seven Planets, being in the midst. Again, from those which are nearest the Sun on each side, from Mars who is placed betwixt Jupiter and the Sun, *Hypermesē*, which is likewise termed *Lichanon*, and from Mercury who is placed betwixt Venus and the Sun, *Paramesē*.

† Pythagoras by musical Proportion calleth that a Tone, by how much the Moon is distant from the Earth: from the Moon to Mercury the half of that Space, and from Mercury to Venus almost as much: from Venus to the Sun sesquialter: from the Sun to Mars a Tone, that is, as far as the Moon is from the Earth: from Mars to Jupiter half, and from Jupiter to Saturn half, and thence to the Zodiacal sesquialter: thus there are made seven Tones, which they call a diapason Harmony, that is, an universal Consent: In which Saturn moves in the *Doric* Mood, Jupiter in the *Phrygian*, and in the rest the like.

‡ Those Sounds which the seven Planets, and the Sphere of fixed Stars, and that which is above us, termed by them *Antichthon*, make, Pythagoras affirmed to be the nine Muses: but the Composition, and Symphony, and as it were connexion of them all, whereof as being eternal and unbegotten, each is a Part and Portion, he named *Ademusianon*.

CHAP. III.

The Octachord.

NOW Pythagoras first of all, left the middle Sound by conjunction, being itself compared to the two Extreame, should render only a diatessaron Consent, both to the Neate and to the Hypate: but that we might have greater Variety, the two Extreame making the fullest Consent each to other, that is to say, the concord of Diapason, which consists in a double Proportion. Which inasmuch as it could not be done by two Tetrachorde, he added an eighth Sound, inserting it betwixt the Mesē and Paramesē, siting it from the Mesē a whole Tone, and from the Paramesē a Semitone; so, that which

was

† Nicom. Harm. c. 3.

* Macrobi. in Somn. Scip. a. p. 82.

† Nicom. ibid.

‡ Macrobi. ibid.

• Nicom. ibid.

† Phil. l. 2. c. 22.

† Porphy. p. 21.

* Nicom. c. 5.

• The Heptachord was made up of two Tetrachorde, which being

conjoined, the middle Note was the end of one, and the beginning of the other.

was formerly the Paramese in the Tetrachord, is still the third from the Neate, both in Name and Place; but that which was now inserted is the fourth from the Neate, and hath a Consent unto it of Diatesseron, which before the Mese had unto the Hypate; but the Tone between them, that is, the Mese, and the inserted, called the Paramese, instead of the former, to which soever Tetrachord it be added, whether to that which is at the Hypate, being of the lower, or to that of the Neate, being of the higher, will render Diapente Concord; which is either way a System, consisting both of the Tetrachord itself, and the additional Tone, as the Diapente proportion (*viz.* sesquialtera) is found to be a System of sesquialtera, and sesquioctava, the Tone therefore is sesquioctava. * Thus the Interval of four Chords, and of five, and of both conjoined together, called Diapason, and the Tone inserted between the two Tetrachords, being after this manner apprehended by Pythagoras, were determined to have this Proportion in Numbers.

CHAP. IV.

The Arithmetical Proportions of Harmony.

* Pythagoras is said to have first found out the Proportion and Concord of Sounds one to another, the Diatesseron in sesquialtera, the Diapente in sesquialtera, the Diapason in duple. The Occasion and Manner is related by * Confortinus, * Boethius, * Macrobius, and others; but more exactly by * Nicomachus, thus:

Being in an intense Thought, whether he might invent any instrumental Help for the Ear, solid and infallible; such as the Sight hath by a Compass and a Rule, and by a Dioptré; or the Touch by a Balance, or by the Invention of Measures: As he past by a Smith's Shop, by a happy Chance he heard the Iron Hammers striking upon the Anvil, and rendering Sounds most consonant one to another in all Combinations except one. He observed in them these three Concorde, the Diapason, the Diapente, and the Diatesseron; but that which was between the Diatesseron and the Diapente, he found to be a Discord in itself, though otherwise useful for the making up of the greater of them, (the Diapente). Apprehending this came to him from God, as a most happy thing, he hasted into the Shop, and by various Trials, finding the Difference of the Sounds to be according to the Weight of the Hammers, and not according to the Force of those who struck, nor according to the Fashion of the Hammers, nor ac-

cording to the turning of the Iron which was in beating out: Having taken exactly the Weight of the Hammers, he went straightway Home, and to one Beam fastned to the Walls, cross from one Corner of the Room to the other, (left any Difference might arise from thence, or might be suspected to arise from the Properties of several Beams) tying four Strings of the same Substance, Length, Swift-ness, and * Twist, upon each of them he hung a several Weight, fastning it at the lower End, and making the Length of the Strings altogether equal. Then striking the Strings by two at a time interchangeably, he found out the aforesaid Concorde, each in its own Combination; for that which was stretched by the greatest Weight, in respect of that which was stretched by the least Weight, he found to found a Diapason. The greatest Weight was of 12 Pound, the least of 6. Thence he determined, that the Diapason did consist in double Proportion, which the Weights themselves did shew. Next he found, that the greatest to the least but one, which was of eight Pound, founded a Diapente; whence he inferred this to consist in the Proportion, called, Sesquialtera, in which Proportion the Weights were one to another, But unto that which was less than itself in Weight, yet greater than the rest, being of nine Pound, he found it to found a Diatesseron; and discovered, that, proportionably to the Weights, this Concord was Sesquialtera; which String of nine Pound is naturally Sesquialtera to the least; for nine to six is so, (*viz.* Sesquialtera) as the least but one, which is eight, was to that which had the Weight six, in Proportion Sesquialtera; and twelve to eight is Sesquialtera; and that which is in the middle between Diapente and Diatesseron, whereby Diapente exceeds Diatesseron, is confirmed to be in Sesquioctava Proportion, in which nine is to eight. The System of both was called Diapente, that is, both of the Diapente and Diatesseron joined together, as duple Proportion is compounded of Sesquialtera and Sesquialtera; such as are two, eight, six. Or on the contrary, of Diatesseron and Diapente, as duple Proportion is compounded of Sesquialtera and Sesquialtera, as twelve, nine, six, being taken in that Order.

Applying both his Hand and Ear to the Weights which he had hung on, and by them confirming the Proportion of the Relations, he did ingeniously transfer the common Result of the Strings upon the cross Beam, to the Bridge of an Instrument, which he called *Xeydron*; and as for stretching them proportionably to the Weights, he did transfer that to an

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* Meibomius seems to mistake the Meaning of *καταλαβόντων ἔργον*, and therefore puts a Point after *καταλαβόντων*. * Theon. Smyrn. * De die natali, c. 10. * Mos. 1. c. 10, 11. * In Soma. Scip. 2. * Harm. enchirid. c. 6. repeated by * Jamblach de vit. Pyth. c. 26, &c. * *ἡρκε ἐκαστος ἀνάλυσας*, Meibomius otherwise. * *ἡρκεσιν*, which Meibomius, contrary to all MSS. would change unnecessarily into *ἡρκεσιν*, and renders *αὐτὴν ἡρκεσιν*.

answerable screwing of the Pegs. Making use of this Foundation, as an infallible Rule, he extended the Experiment to many Kinds of Instruments, Cymbals, Pipes, Flutes, Monochords, Trignons, and the like; and he found, that this Conclusion made by Numbers was consonant without Variation in all. That Sound which proceeded from the Number six, he named *Hypate*; that which from the Number eight, *Mese*, being Sefquitertia to the other; that from nine, *Paramese*, being a Tone sharper than the *Mese*, viz. Sefquioctava; that from twelve, *Nete*. And supplying the middle Spaces according to the Diatonick Kind, with proportionable Sounds, he so ordered the Octochord with convenient Numbers Duple, Sefquialtera, Sefquitertia, and (the Difference of these two last) Sefquioctava.

Thus he found the Progress by a natural Necessity, from the lowest to the highest, according to the Diatonick Kind; from which again he did declare the Chromatick and Enarmonick Kinds.

CHAP. V.

The Division of the Diapason, according to the Diatonick Kind.

THIS Diatonick Kind seems naturally to have these Degrees and Progresses, Hemitone, Tone and Tone, (half Note, whole Note, and whole Note.) This is the System Diatesseron, consisting of two Tones, and that which is called a Hemitone; and then another Tone being inserted, Diapente is made, being a System of three Tones and a Hemitone. Then in order, after this there being another Hemitone, Tone and Tone, they make another Diatesseron, that is to say, another Sefquitertia. So that in the antienter Heptachord, all fourths from the lowest, found a Diatesseron one to another, the Hemitone taking the first, second, and third Place, according to the Progression in the Tetrachord. But in the *Pythagorical* Octochord, which is by a Conjunction a System of the Tetrachord, and the Pentachord, and that either jointly of two Tetrachords, or disjointly of two Tetrachords, separated from one another by a Tone, the Procession will begin from the lowest, so that every fifth Sound will make Diapente, the Hemitone passing into four Places, the first, the second, the third, and the fourth.

CHAP. VI.

The Canon of the Monochord.

*P*YTHAGORAS, as *Timæus* saith, found out the Canon of one Chord, that is, the Rule of the Monochord. *Aristides* relates, that a little before he

died, he exhorted his Friends to play on the Monochord, thereby implying, that the Height which is in Music, is to be received rather by the Intellect through Numbers, than by the Sense through the Ears.

Duris (cited by *Porphyrus*) mentions a brazen Tablet, set up in the Temple of *Juno*, by *Arminius* Son to *Pythagoras*, on which were graven, besides other Arts, a musical Canon; which was afterwards taken away by *Simon* a Musician, who arrogated the Canon to himself, and published it as his own.

The Division of the Canon, saith *Theon*, is made by the *Tetractys* in the Decad, which consists of a *Menad*, a *Duad*, a *Triad*, a *Tetrad*, 1, 2, 3, 4. For it comprehends a *Sefquitertia*, a *Sefquialtera*, a *Duple*, a *Triple*, and a *Quadruple* Proportion. The Section of the *Pythagorical* Canon, according to the Intention of *Pythagoras* himself, not as *Eratosthenes* misunderstood it, or *Thrallius* [whose Operation *Theon* sets down] but as *Timæus* the *Locrean* (whom *Plato* also followeth) to 27. *Nicomachus* mentions, as intending to deliver it in his larger Treatise of Music. See also *Euclid*, *Aristides*, *Quintilianus*, and others.

CHAP. VII.

Institution by Music.

*C*ONCEIVING, that the first Institution of Men was to be made by Sense, so that a Man might see those fair Figures and Forms, and might hear the most excellent Music, he first began by teaching Music by Songs and Rhythms; by which the Cures of Manners and Passions were made, and by which the Harmonies of the Faculties of their Souls were reduced to their primitive Dispositions; and Cures of Distempers, both of Body and Mind were invented by him. And that which was above all these, worthy to be taken notice of, that he made for his Disciples, those which were called *Isapiron* and *Enapai*, [of Music] both by Weight and by Sound, and composed them harmonically, in a strange way making the Commixtures of those Tones which are called Diatonick, Chromatick, and Enarmonick, by which he changed all the Passions of the Mind, which were newly raised in them without Reason, and which did procure Griefs, and Angers, and Pities, and unseemly Loves, and Fears, and all Kind of Desires, and Vexations, and Appetites, and Softnesses, and Idlenesses, and Impetuosities; correcting and directing every one of these towards Virtue, by convenient Harmonies, as by certain effectual Medicines. And at Night when his Disciples went to sleep, he delivered them from all the Noises and Troubles of the Day, and purify'd the Perturbations of their Minds.

* Luert. 11.

† De Musica, l. 3.

‡ Vit. Pyth.

§ Mathematic.

¶ Manual Music. l. x. p. 24.

‡ Sect. Cxi.

† Mus. l. 3. p. 216.

‡ Jambl. vit. Pyth. c. 10.

Minds, and rendered their *Sleeps* quiet, with good Dreams and Predictions. And when they rose again from their Beds, he freed them from the Drowsiness of the Night, from Faintness and Sluggishness, by certain proper Songs, either set to the Lute, or some high Voice. As for himself, he never played on Instrument, or any thing, but he had it within him; and by an unconceivable Kind of Divinity, he applied his Ears and Mind unto the Harmony of the World, which he alone did understand; and understanding the universal Harmony and Consent of the Spheres, and those Stars that move in them, which makes a more full and excellent Musick than Morals by reason of their Motion, which of unequal differing Swiftneses and Bignesess overtaking one another, all which are ordered and disposed in a most musical Proportion one towards another, beautified with various Perfections, wherewith being irrigated, as having likewise orderly the Discourse of his Mind, as we may say exercising, he framed some Representations of these, to exhibit them as much as was possible, imitating (that Musick) chiefly by Instruments, or the Voice alone. For he conceived that to himself only of all upon the Earth, were intelligible and audible, the universal Sounds, from the natural Fountain and Root, and thought himself worthy to be taught and to learn, and to be assimilated by Desire and Imitation to the Celestials, one that was organized [in the Parts of the Body] by the Deity which begot him. But it was sufficient for other Men, that they, always looking upon him, and such Things as they received from him, be benefited by Images and Examples, as not being able to lay hold on the first clear Archetypes of all Things: As to them who cannot look upon the Sun by reason of its Splendor, we shew the Eclipse either in a Pond of Water, or by some boarded pitched Thing, or by some dark-coloured Glass, fearing the Weakness of their Eyes, and framing another way of Perception, instead of looking on it, to those who love such Things, though something inferior. This Empedocles seemeth to imply concerning his extraordinary and divine Constitution above others, when he said:

*'Might these was one in Things sublimest skill'd,
His Mind with all the Wealth of Learning fill'd.
His sought whatever Sayes did invent;
And whilst his Thoughts were on this Work intent,
All Things that are, be easily survey'd,
And Search through ten or twenty Ages made.*

Intimating by *sublimest Things*; and, *He survey'd all Things that are*; and, *The Wealth of the Mind*, and the like, the exquisite and accurate Constitution of

Pythagoras beyond others, both for Body and Mind, in seeing, hearing, and understanding.

C H A P. VIII.

Medicine by Musick.

*P*ythagoras conceived, that Musick conduced much to Health, if used appetitely; for he was accustomed to make use of this Purification, not perfunctorily. This he called *Medicine by Musick*, which kind of Melody he exercised about the Spring-time. He seated him who play'd on the Lute in the midst, and those who could sing sat round about him; and so he playing, they made a Consort of some excellent pleasant Verses, wherewith they seem'd exhilarated, and decently compos'd.

They likewise at another time made use of Musick as of a Medicine; and there were certain pleasant Verses framed, conducing much against the Affections and Diseases of the Mind, and against the Dejections and Corrodings of the same. Moreover, he compos'd others against Anger and Malice, and all such Disorders of the Mind. There was also another kind of Musick and Song invented, against unlawful Desires. He likewise us'd Dancing. He us'd no musical Instrument but the Lute. Wind-Instruments he conceived to have an ignoble Sound, and to be only fit for the common People, but nothing generous.

He likewise made use of the Words of Homer and Hesiod, for the Rectification of the Mind. It is reported, that Pythagoras, by a Spontick Verse out of the Works [perhaps of Hesiod, whose Poem bears that Title, ὕμνος] by a Player on the Flute, assuaged the Madness of a young Man of Tauromenium, who being drunk, and having employ'd all the Night lasciviously with his Mistress, was going about to fire the Door of his Rival's House; for he was exasperated and inflamed by the Phrygian Mood. But Pythagoras, who was at that time busied in observing the Stars, immediately appeas'd and reclaimed him, by persuading the Piper to change his Air into the Spontick Mood. Whereupon the young Man being suddenly compos'd, went quietly home, who but a little before would by no means bear the least Exhortation from Pythagoras, but threatened and reviled him. In like manner Empedocles, when a young Man drew his Sword upon Anchitus his Host, (for that he had in publick Judgment condemn'd his Father to Death) and was about to have killed him, straightway changing his Tune, sung out of Homer,

Nepenthe calming Anger, easing Grief;

and by that means freed Anchitus his Host from Death,

^a Jamb. c. 25.

^b Reading ἀνὶ τῶν ἡγῶν. This Example of Pythagoras seems to relate to Hesiod; the other of Empedocles to Ho-

and the young Man from the Crime of Murder; who from thenceforward became one of his Disciples, eminent amongst them.

Moreover, the whole School of Pythagoras made that which is called *ἄσπετον*, and *εὐακουσθὲν*, and *ἰσχυρὸν*, by certain Verses suitable thereto, and proper against the contrary Affections, profitably diverting the Constitutions and Dispositions of the Mind. For when they went to bed, and resigned themselves to rest, they purified their Minds from the Troubles and busy Noises of the Day, by some Songs and proper Verses, whereby they render'd their Sleeps pleasant and quiet, and little troubled with Dreams, and those Dreams which they had were good. In the Morning, when they arose from the common Relief of Sleep, they expelled Drowsiness and Sleepiness of the Head with other Songs.

Sometimes also, without pronouncing Verses, they expelled some Affections and Diseases, and reduced the Sick to Health, *ἰατρικῶς*, by charming them. And from hence it is probable that the word Epode came to be used. After this manner, Pythagoras instituted a most profitable Correction of Manners and Life by Music. Hitherto *Jamblicus*. All which is ratified by other Testimonies: That they had Verses against the Affections of the Mind, Grief, Anger, Lust, is related also by *Seneca*, who saith, that Pythagoras composed the Troubles of his Soul by the Lute. And *Cicero*, That the Pythagoreans used to deliver Verses, and some Precepts, and to reduce the Mind from Intensity of Thoughts to Tranquility, by Songs and Instruments. To which effect, *Ælian* relates of Clinius the Pythagorean, that if at any time he perceived himself inclining to Anger, he, before it took full Possession of him, play'd upon the Lute; and to those who asked him, Why he did so, answer'd, Because I am calmed.

That he danced, *Porphyrus* confirms, saying, He danced some Dances, which he conceived to confer Agility and Health to the Body.

That he disallowed Flutes and Wind-Instruments, appears from *Aristides Quintilianus*, who saith, He advised his Disciples to refrain from permitting their Ears to be defiled with the Sound of the Flute; but, on the contrary, to purify the irrational Impulsions of the Soul by solemn Songs to the Lute.

That he made use of Homer and Hesiod for Rectification of the Mind, is thus related by *Porphyrus*: He had Morning-Exercises at his own House, composing his Soul to the Lute, and singing some old Poems of *Thales*. He likewise sang some Verses of Homer and Hesiod, whereby the Mind seemed to be render'd more sedate.

The Story of the young Man is confirmed by *Ammonius*, by *Cicero*, related thus: *Whenas some*

young Man being drunk, and irritated by the Musick of Flutes, would have broken open the Door of a modest Matron's House, he had the Woman-piper play a Spemdiack Tune; which as soon as she did, their raging Petulancy was allayed by the Slowness of the Mood, and Solemnity of the Tune. *St. Basil* relates another Story to the same purpose, That Pythagoras meeting with some that came from a Feast drunk, bid the Piper (the Musician at that Feast) to change his Tune, and to play a Dorick Air; whereupon they were so brought to themselves, that they threw away their Garlands, and went home ashamed.

That, Evening and Morning, they used Musick to compose their Minds, is affirmed by many others. *Quintilian*: It was the Custom of the Pythagoreans, as soon as they waked, to excite their Souls with the Lute, that they might be the readier for Action; and before they went to sleep, to soften their Minds by it. *Plutarch*: The Musick of the Lute the Pythagoreans used before they went to sleep, thereby charming and composing the passionate and irrational Part of the Soul. *Censorinus*: Pythagoras, that his Mind might be continually season'd with Divinity, used (as they say) to sing before he went to sleep, and as soon as he awaked.

As for the several Moods which, in musical Compositions, were observed by the Ancients for moving particular Passions, there is a remarkable Fragment of *Damon* the Musician, cited by *Aristides*.

S E C T. III.

Geometry.

PYthagoras (saith *Jamblicus*) is reported to have been much addicted to Geometry; for, amongst the Egyptians (of whom he learned it) there are many geometrical Problems; the most learned of them having been continually, for many Ages of Gods and Men, necessitated to measure their whole Country, by reason of the Overflowing and Disruise of Nilus; whence it is called Geometry. *Some* there are who ascribe all Theorems concerning Lines, jointly to the Egyptians and the Chaldeans; and all these, they say, Pythagoras took, and augmenting the Science, explained them accurately to his Disciples. *Proclus* affirms, That he first advanced the geometrical Part of Learning into a Liberal Science, considering the Principles were sublimer (than *Thales*, *Americus*, and *Hippias*, his Predecessors in this Study) and performatting the Theorems immaterially and intellectually. *Tamias* saith, That he first perfected Geometry; the Elements whereof, (as *Anticlistides* affirms) were invented by *Mocris*. *Aristæus*, That he first introduced Measures and Weights amongst the Grecians.

C H A P.

^a See cap. 10. ^b De ira, 3. 9. ^c Tusc. quest. 4. preem.
^d Page 135. ^e But the Philosophers, but the Crown.
^f *Boetius*, l. 1. c. 1. ^g *Homil.* 24. ^h Lib. 9. cap. 4.
ⁱ l. 2. p. 95. ^j Cap. 29. p. 258. ^k Ibid. ^l In *Euclid.* l. 1.

^m Lib. 14. c. 25. ⁿ Pag. 195. ^o Lib. 2. de Mo.
^p See the Life of *Thales*. ^q In quinquæ voc. ^r Cited by
^s De deis & Officiis. ^t Cap. 22. ^u *Mauro*
^v *Leart.* 2. 22. ^w *Leart.* 2. 22.

CHAP. I.

Of a Point, Line, Superficies, and Solid.

Pythagoras asserted a Point to be correspondent in proportion to a Unite; a Line, to 2; a Superficies, to 3; a Solid, to 4.¹ The *Pythagoreans* define a Point, a *Monad* having Position.

A Line being the second, and constituted by the first Motion, from indivisible Nature, they called *Diad*.

A Superficies they compar'd to the Number 3; for that is the first of all Causes which are found in Figures: for a Circle, which is the Principle of all round Figures, occultly compriseth a Triad in Center, Space, and Circumference. But a Triangle, which is the first of all rectiline Figures, is manifestly included in a Ternary, and receiveth its Form according to that Number. Hence the *Pythagoreans* affirm, that the Triangle is simply the Principle of Generation, and of the Formation of things generable; whereupon *Timæus* saith, that all Proportions, as well natural, as of the Constitution of Elements, are triangular, because they are distant by a threefold Interval, and are collective of things every way divisible, and variously permutable, and are replenished with material Infinity, and represent the natural Conjunctions of Bodies dissolved, as Triangles which are comprehended by three right Lines; but they have Angles which collect the multitude of Lines, and give an adventitious Angle and Conjunction to them. With reason therefore did *Philolaus* dedicate the Angle of a Triangle to four Gods, *Saturnus*, *Pluto*, *Mars*, *Bacchus*, comprehending in these the whole quadripartite Ornament of Elements coming down from Heaven, or from the four Quarters of the Zodiac. For *Saturn* constituteth an Essence wholly humid and frigid; *Mars* wholly fiery; *Pluto* compriseth all terrestrial Life, *Bacchus* predominates over humid and hot Generation; of which Wine is a Sign, being humid and hot. All these differ in their Operations upon second Bodies, but are united to one another; for which reason *Philolaus* collected their Union according to one Angle. But if the Differences of Triangles conduce to Generation, we must justly acknowledge the Triangle to be the Principle and Author of the Constitution of sublunary Things; for the right Angle gives them Essence, and determines the Measure of its Being; and the Proportion of a rectangle Triangle causeth the Essence of generable Elements; the obtuse Angle giveth them all Distance; the Proportion of an obtuse-angled Triangle augmenteth material Forms in Magnitude, and in all kinds of Mutation; the acute Angle maketh their Nature divisible; the Proportion of an

acute-angled Triangle prepares them to receive Divisions into infinite; and simply, the triangular Proportion constituteth the Essence of material Bodies, distant and every way divisible. Thus much for Triangles.

Of quadrangular Figures, the *Pythagoreans* hold that the Square chiefly representeth the divine Essence, for by it they principally signify pure and immaculate Order; for Rectitude imitateth Inflexibility, Equality firm Power; for Motion proceedeth from Inequality, Rest from Equality. The Gods therefore, who are Authors in all things of firm Consistence, and pure incontaminate Order, and inextinguishable Power, are not improperly represented by the Figure of a Square. Moreover, *Philolaus* by another Apprehension calleth the Angle of a Square, the Angle of a *Rhea*, *Ceres*, and *Vesta*; for seeing that the Square constituteth the Earth, and is the nearest Element to it, as *Timæus* teacheth, but the Earth itself receiveth genital Seeds and prolific Power from all these Gods; he not unaptly compareth the Angle of a Square to all these Life-communicating Deities. For some call the Earth and *Ceres* herself *Vesta*; and *Rhea* is said wholly to participate of her, and that in her are all generative Causes. Whence *Philolaus* saith, the Angle of a Square by a certain terrestrial Power comprehends one Union of these divine Kinds.

SECT. II.

Propositions.

OF the many geometrical Theorems invented by *Pythagoras* and his Followers, these are particularly known as such.

Only these three Polygons fill up the whole Space about a Point, the equilateral Triangle, and the Square, and the Hexagon equilateral and equiangular. The equilateral Triangle must be taken six times, for six two thirds make four right Angles; the Hexagon must be taken thrice, for every sex-angular Angle is equal to one right Angle, and one third; the Square four times, for every Angle of a Square is right. Therefore six equilateral Triangles joined as the Angles, complet four right Angles; as do also three Hexagones and four Squares. But of all other Polygons whatsoever, joined together at the Angles, some exceed four right Angles, others fall short. This *Proclus* calls a celebrated Theorem of the *Pythagoreans*.

Every Triangle hath the internal Angles equal to two right Angles. This Theorem *Eudemus* the Peripatetic, ascribes to the *Pythagoreans*; their manner of Demonstration see in *Proclus*.

In rectangle Triangles, the square which is made of the side that subtendeth the right Angle, is equal to

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the

¹ *Procl. in Euclid. l. 1. def. 2.*

² *Ibid. l. 1. def. 2.*

³ *Ibid. l. 1. def. 2.*

⁴ *Ibid. l. 1. def. 5.*

⁵ *Ibid. l. 1.*

⁶ *Ibid. l. 1. def. 34.*

⁷ *Ibid. l. 1. com. 20.*

⁸ *Ibid. l. 4. prop. 32. com. 6.*

⁹ *Euclid. l. 1. prop.*

But they who seem more strictly to follow the Mind of Pythagoras and his Disciples, aver, *They held the celestial Spheres to be ten, whereof nine only are visible to us*, (the fixed Sphere, the seven Planets, and our Earth) *the tenth is Antichthon, an Earth above, or opposite to ours.* This Antichthon they added, to make up the number of the moving Bodies. For considering, that the affections and proportions of Music consist in Numbers, but all other Things appear to be assimilated to Numbers, that Numbers are the first of all Nature, that the elements of Numbers are the elements of all Beings; They asserted, that all Heaven is Harmony and Number, and that the affections and parts of Heaven are correspondent to Number: and collecting these, they adapted them to the composition of the whole, wherein if any thing were wanting, they supplied it, that the whole might be alike compacted. As, because that the Decad seems to be perfect, and to comprehend the whole nature of Numbers, therefore they asserted the celestial Spheres to be ten. Now there being nine only visible to us, hereupon they conceived the tenth to be *Antichthon*, an Earth opposite to ours.

As concerning the Order and System of these, the Pythagoreans¹ held, *That in the middle of the World is Fire*; or (as² *Stobæus*) *in the midst of the four Elements is the fiery Globe of Unity*,³ which they term *Sefta* and *Monad*. They (saith *Simplicius*) who understand this thing more intimately, say, that this Fire is the procreative, nutritive, and excitative Power, which is in the midst of the Earth. But *Simplicius* himself seems not to have apprehended the right meaning of the Pythagoreans, who by this Fire, or fiery Globe of Unity, meant nothing else but the Sun, seated in the midst of the Universe, immovable, about which the other parts of the World are moved. This Opinion Pythagoras seems to have derived from the Egyptians, who hieroglyphically represented the Sun by a Beetle, because, as the Beetle having formed a ball of Cow-dung, and lying upon its Back rolls it about from Claw to Claw; so the other parts of the World are moved and rouled by and about the Sun.

That by this immovable Fire in the midst of the Universe, they understood not (as⁴ *Simplicius* conceiveth) the Earth, is manifest, forasmuch as they further held, that the Earth is not immovable, nor seated in the midst of the Globe, but suspended, as being one of the Stars carried about the Fire which is in the middle, and that thereby it maketh Day and Night.⁵ The Reason why the Earth ought not to have the middle Place, is, because the most excellent Body ought to have the most excellent Place: but Fire is more excellent than Earth, and

the Center more excellent than all Places without it; therefore they conceived, that not the Earth, but the Fire, is placed in the midst.⁶ Moreover, because that which is the most excellent of the Universe, ought principally to be preserved, and the Middle is such, therefore they term the Fire, *Διδο γυμνασιον*, the custody of Jupiter.

* The same they held of the *Antichthon* also, [viz. That like our Earth it is suspended, as being one of the Stars carried about the Fire, and thereby maketh Day and Night.] By this *Antichthon*, *Clemens* saith, they understood Heaven: *Simplicius*, the Moon, as being a kind of æthereal Earth, as well for that it eclipseth the light of the Sun, which is proper to the Earth, as for that it is the bound of Celestials, as the Earth of Sublunaries. But the contrary is manifest, as well from the completing of the number Ten, (in respect whereof this *Antichthon* was imagined) as for that they held, it is not visible to us, by reason, that following the motion of this Earth, it is always opposite to, or beneath us, and the bigness of our Earth hinders us from seeing it: And *Aristotle* affirms there were some who conceived the *Antichthon* to be the cause why there are more Eclipses of the Moon than of the Sun, which may likewise happen by reason of many other Bodies invisible to us.

* *Laertius*, who saith *Philolaus* was the first that conceived the Earth to have a circular Motion, seems to mean no more, than that he first committed this Opinion of Pythagoras to writing, and first made it publick; for *Eusebius* expressly affirms, that he committed to writing the Disquisitions of Pythagoras. His Opinion, as delivered by *Plutarch* and *Stobæus*, is exactly the same; for he placed Fire in the midst, which he called the *Genius* of the Universe, and the Mansion of Jupiter, and the Mother of Gods, and Altar, and Ward, and Measure of Nature: he conceived that the ten celestial Bodies move about it. Heaven of the sphere of fixed Stars, the five Planets, the Sun, the Moon, the Earth, and lastly the *Antichthon*.

From the same Fountain seems *Aristarchus* the Samian to have derived this Hypothesis, though some ascribe the Invention thereof to him; for he supposeth, that the Sun and Planets move not, but that the Earth moveth round about the Sun, which is seated in the middle. * *Plutarch* adds, that *Plato* in his old Age repented for that he had placed the Earth in the midst of the Universe, and not in its proper Place.

† This Opinion was of late revived by *Nicolaus Copernicus*, who considering how inconvenient and troublesome it is to understand, and maintain the Mo-

¹ Plot. de Anim. proc.

² Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 5.

³ Arist. ibid.

⁴ in Aræan. Plot. plac. 3, 13.

⁵ Arist. de celo, c. 13.

⁶ Ad Arist. de celo, c. 9.

⁷ Arist. ibid.

⁸ In Platon. quest. and in Numa.

⁹ Arist. de celo, lib. 2.

¹⁰ Plot. in Numa.

¹¹ Arist. de celo, lib. 2.

¹² Laert. 8. 85.

¹³ Phys. c. 25.

¹⁴ Arist. de celo, lib. 2.

¹⁵ Laert. 8. 85.

¹⁶ Archimedes.

Motions of the Heavens, and immobility of the Earth, explained it with admirable Ingenuity, after the mind of the *Pythagoreans*. According to whose Hypothesis, the Sun (as we said) is settled in the midst of the World, immovable: The Sphere of fixed Stars in the extremity or outside of the World, immovable also; betwixt these are disposed the Planets, and amongst them the Earth as one of them; the Earth moves both about the Sun, and about his proper Axis. Its diurnal Motion by one Revolution, makes a Night and a Day; its annual motion about the Sun, by one Revolution makes a Year; so as by reason of his diurnal motion to the East, the Sun and other Stars seem to move to the West; and by reason of its annual Motion through the Zodiac, the Earth itself is in one Sign, and the Sun seems to be in the Sign opposite to it: Betwixt the Sun and the Earth they place *Mercury* and *Venus*: Betwixt the Earth and the fixed Stars, *Mars*, *Jupiter*, and *Saturn*: The Moon being next the Earth, is continually moved within the great Orb betwixt *Venus* and *Mars*, round about the Earth, as its Centre: Its Revolution about the Earth is completed in a Month; about the Sun (together with the Earth) in a Year.

CHAP. II.

The Motions of the Planets.

AS concerning the Course and Revolution of the Planets, * they affirm the great Year to be the revolution of *Saturn*; for the rest of the Planets dissolve their Periods in a shorter time; but *Saturn* in no less than thirty Years, *Jupiter* in twelve Years, *Mars* in two; the Sun (speaking according to the *Phænomenon*) in one; *Mercury* and *Venus* as the Sun, [or to speak more exactly, *Mercury* in three Months, *Venus* in eight] the Moon, as being next the Earth soonest, in a Month.

According to this Inequality, appears the motion of the Planets to our sight, by reason that the Eye is out of the center of the Orb: But in the whole course of Astronomy (saith *Geminus*) are supposed the motions of the Sun, Moon, and five Planets, equal and circular, contrary to the diurnal Revolution of the World. The *Pythagoreans* first applying themselves to these Disquisitions, supposed circular and equal motions of the Sun, the Moon, and the five Planets; for they admitted not such irregularity in eternal and divine Bodies, that sometimes they should move swifter, sometimes slower, and sometimes stand still, as the stationary Points in the Planets: Neither in any sober, well-tempered Person could we admit such irregularity of Pace. In-

deed, the necessities of Life often cause Men to move faster or slower; but in the incorruptible Nature of the Stars, there cannot be alledged any cause of Swiftness and Slowness. Wherefore the *Pythagoreans* proposed this Question, how the *Phænomena* might be saved by circular and equal Motions.

That *Pythagoras* himself observed these Irregularities, and the Ways to save them, appears from *Jamblichus*, who saith, * he communicated a revelative right Knowledge of all manner of motions of the Spheres and Stars; *ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν πλανητῶν* is the anticipation of any Planet, either in respect to some other Planet, or to the fixed Stars. *ἡ ἀποκλίσις* is the falling later of any Planet, either in respect to some other Planet, or to the fixed Stars. *ἡ ἀνισότης*, Inequality, is, when the same Planet moveth slower and faster, according to its distance from the Sun, in the Pythagorick Hypothesis; (or in the Ptolemaick, from the Earth) slower in its *Aphelium*, faster in its *Perihelium*.

The two ways of saving these *Phænomena*'s, are by *Eccentrics*, or by *Epicycles*; for a *Homocentrick* with an *Epicycle*, (as *Eudoxus* first demonstrated) is equipollent to an *Eccentric*. Eccentricity is, when the Center of their equal Motion is distant from the Center of their apparent Motion. Both these *Jamblichus* ascribes to *Pythagoras*, from whom perhaps they were derived to *Eudoxus*, to whose invention † others ascribe them.

CHAP. III.

The Intervals and Harmony of the Spheres.

Pythagoras (saith * *Censorinus*) asserted, that this whole World is made according to musical Proportion, and that the seven Planets, betwixt Heaven and the Earth, which govern the natures of Mortals, have a harmonious Motion, and Intervals correspondent to musical Diatemes, and render various Sounds, according to their several Heights, so consonant, that they make most sweet Melody; but to us inaudible, by reason of the greatness of the Noise, which the narrow passage of our Ears is not capable to receive. For, as *Erastosthenes* collected, that the largest circumference of the Earth is 25000 *Stadia*; so *Pythagoras* declared how many *Stadia* there are betwixt the Earth and every Star. In this measure of the World, we are to understand the *Italic Stadium*, which consists of 625 Feet; for there are others of a different Length, as the *Olympick* of 600 Feet, the *Pythick* of 500. From the Earth therefore to the Moon, *Pythagoras* conceived to be about 126000 *Stadia*, and that distance [according to musical

* Anon. vit. Pyth. a. d. Plac.

* Cap. 6.

† Loc. cit.

* Laert. Eudox.

* De diat. c. 13.

ficat Proportion] is a Tone; from the Moon to Mercury (who is called *staseus*) half as much, as it were a *Hemitone*; from thence to *Phosphorus*, which is the Star *Venus*, almost as much, that is, another *Hemitone*; from thence to the Sun twice as much, as it were a *Tone* and a half. Thus the Sun is distant from the Earth three *Tones* and a half, which is called *Diapente*; from the Moon two and a half, which is *Diatesseron*; from the Sun to *Mars*, who is called *Flugius*, there is the same Interval as from the Earth to the Moon, which makes a *Tone*; from thence to *Jupiter*, who is called *heudon*, half as much, which makes a *Hemitone*; from thence to the supream Heaven, where the *Sigae* are, a *Hemitone* also; so that the Diastems from the supream Heaven to the Sun is *Diatesseron*, that is, two *Tones* and a half; from the same Heaven to the Top of the Earth six *Tones*, a *Diapason* Concord. Moreover he referred to other Stars many Things, which the masters of Musick treat of, and showed, that all this World is Enarmonick. Thus *Confrinius*. But *Pliny* delivering this Opinion of *Pythagoras*, reckons seven *Tones* from the Earth to the supream Heaven; for whereas *Confrinius* accounts but a *Hemitone* from *Saturn* to the *Zodiack*, *Pliny* makes it *Septuple*.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Planet Venus.

NEXT the Sun (saith *Pliny*) there is a great Star, called *Venus*, alternately errant, in Names emulating both the Sun and Moon. For, prevent-

ing and rising before Morning, he takes the Name of *Lucifer*, as another Sun bringing on day; on the other side, shining at Sun-set, it is called *Vesper*, as proroguing Light, and performing the Office of the Moon; which its Nature *Pythagoras* the *Samian* first found out, about the forty-second *Olympiad*, which was of Rome the 147th Year. In Magnitude it exceeds all the other Stars, and is of so great Splendor, that this Star only casts a Shadow; whence it hath Diversity of Names; some call it *Juno*; others, *Isti*; others, *Mother of the Gods*. By the Nature hereof, all things are generated upon Earth; for, at either rising, it scattereth prolifick Dew, supplying not only the Conceptions of Earth, but likewise stimulating all living Creatures. It performs the Revolution of the *Zodiack* in 348 Days, never receding from the Sun more than 46 Parts, according to *Timaeus*. Thus *Pliny*. That there is a Mistake in the Time, hath been already shewn; but the Thing itself is confirmed by *Loarius*, who affirms, *Pythagoras* first said, that *Vesper* and *Lucifer* are the same Star; yet elsewhere adds, that some ascribe this to *Parmenides*. But that it was a Doctrine of the *Pythagoreans*, appears from this Account given by *Timaeus*; the Star *Juno* many call *Venus* and *Lucifer*. All Persons are not skilful in the Rules of sacred Astronomy, and in the Sciences of rising and setting; for the same Star is sometimes *Heber*, when it followeth the Sun in such manner that it is conspicuous to us when the Sun is set; and sometimes *Eous*, when it goeth before the Sun, and riseth before Sun-rising.

* Lib. 9. cap. 21, 22.

* Lib. 2. cap. 8.

The Doctrine of PYTHAGORAS.

CHAP. I.

Philosophy, its Name, Definition, Parts, Method.

THE *Pythagoreans* being adorned with these Studies of Science; from thence ascended to perfect the Works of the World, and the Principles of Nature.

Pythagoras first gave the Name to Philosophy, defining it, An Appetition, and Love to Wisdom. Wisdom is the Science of Truth in Things that are. Things that are, he called *Immaterial*; and *Eternals*, and sole Agents, which are the *Incorporeals*; the rest are equivocally called such, by Participation with these; viz. Corporeals, Materials, and Corruptibles, which indeed are not. Now Wisdom is the Science of those Things which are, but not of those which

are equivocally; for Corporeals are not docible, nor admit certain Knowledge, being infinite, and not comprehensible by Science, and Things which (as it were) are not, according to the Difference of all Things, neither can be rightly described by any Definition. Of those whose Nature is such as that they cannot be known, it is impossible to frame a Science; wherefore neither is it likely that there can be a Love of a Science which is not. But rather about that which is conversant about those Things which properly are, and continue always the same, and like themselves, and co-exist always with a true Appellation. Upon the Knowledge of these followeth that

which

* Agell. 2. p.

* Jambl. 4. 29. p. 144.

which is of equivocal Things (though not fought after) as the Science of Particulars follows the Science of Universals: For, as *Architas* saith, *They who know Universals well, will plainly see what Particulars are.* Wherefore Things that are, are not of one kind only and simply, but of many various Kinds, Intelligibles and Incorporeals, whose Appellation is *τὰ ὅντα*, Things that are. Corporeal Things, subject to Sense, are those which are by Participation of those that are. Concerning all these, he delivered most proper Sciences, leaving nothing unexcused, and delivered also to Men the common Sciences, as the Demonstrative, the Definitive, the Divisive, as is manifest from the Commentaries of the *Pythagoreans*.

Hereupon he defined Philosophy, * the Knowledge of Things that are, as Things that are, and * the Knowledge of Things divine and human, as also * the Meditation of Death, daily endeavouring to free the Soul from the Prison of the Body, and the Resemblance of God as far as is possible for Man.

For † the Scope of Philosophy is to free the Mind, (the divine Part of the Soul) which is planted in us, and to set it at liberty, without which Liberty none can learn or perceive any thing solid or true by the Help or Benefit of Sense; for the Mind, according to him, seeth all Things, and hears all Things; all Things else are deaf and blind.

In order hereunto it is, that Philosophy being of two Kinds, Practick and Theoretick; the Practick, according to the Method of the *Pythagoreans*, preceeds the Theoretick. The Reason receive thus explained by † *Hierocles*.

Philosophy is the Purification and Perfection of human Life; Purification from material Irrationality and the mortal Body; Perfection, from the Recovery of its own excellent Life, reducing it to the divine Resemblance. Virtue and Truth are chiefly able to effect these, that taking away Excess of Passions, this (rightly had) inducing the divine Form.

First are laid down the Instructions of Practick Virtue; for we must compose the Irrationality which is in us, and then (so prepar'd) apply ourselves to the Knowledge of the more divine Things. For as it is not possible for the Eye, being full of Dirt, and not cleansed, to look upon things very bright; so neither can the Soul, not possessing Virtue, gaze upon the Beauty of Truth. For that which is not pure, is not capable of touching that which is pure. Practick Philosophy produceth Virtue; Theoretick, Truth. As in those golden Verses (of Pythagoras) we find the Practick Philosophy, called human Virtue, but the Theoretick celebrated as divine Virtue, when closing the Instructions of civil Virtue.

Those labour (saith he) study these, and these effect;

To Divins Virtue these thy Steps direct.

First therefore a Man must be made good, then a God: Good the Civil Virtues render a Man, but the Sciences conducing to the Divine Virtue divinity. But to those who ascend, the lesser Things precede the greater; for which Reason in the Pythagorical Precepts, the Rules of Virtue are first delivered, teaching us to ascend from the greatest Use of Life, to the Divine Resemblance.

Three Ways, say they, Man may become better than himself; first, by Conversation with the Gods; for it is necessary, that he who addresseth himself to them, at that time, sequester himself from all Evil, assimilating himself as near as he can to God. Secondly, by Well-doing, for that is proper to God, and therein he imitates God. Thirdly, by Death; for if the Soul in this Life, being a little separated from the Body, becometh better, and beginneth to divine in Dreams by Visions and Extasies of Dislates, it will be much better when it shall be wholly separated from the Body.

Hence he affirmed, that † the most considerable of all Things human, is to inform the Soul concerning Good and Ill: That † Men have perfect Felicity when they have a good Soul; or that † the Knowledge of the Perfection of the Virtues of the Soul is the chief Felicity: That * every Man is appointed by God to know and to contemplate: That † Virtue is a Harmony, and so is all Good, even God himself: That * the End or chief Good is to resemble God; whence he expressly said, Follow God, not visible to the Eye, but intelligible to the Understanding, by the Harmony of the World: That the most excellent Things given by the Gods unto Men, are, to speak Truth, and to benefit others, [Theoretick and Practick Virtue] and that each of these resembled the Works of God; to this latter *Strabo* alludes, commending those who said, † Men imitate the Gods most when they benefit others: The former is confirmed by † *Paraphrasius*, that he advised above all Things to speak Truth, for that only is able to make Men like to the Gods; for God himself, as he learn'd of the *Magi*, who term him *Oromasdes*, in his Body resembles Light, in his Soul Truth. This is that *Σωφροσύνη* (Divinity) which † *Jamblichus* reckons last in his Recapitulation of the Heads of the Pythagorick Philosophy; and is the same with which the golden Verses conclude, thus,

*Then strip of Flesh up to free Æther fear,
A deathless God, Divine, mortal no more.*

S E C T.

* Páfl. compend. de quinque tribus.

† Arch. Phot. † Leert. B. 32.

‡ 9. p. 18. † Leert. loco cit.

* Páfl. loc. cit.

† Leert. ibid. citing Alexander.

‡ Stob. Eth. 2. p. 263.

* D. Hieron. adv. Rufin. l. 3.

† Lib. 5.

† Clem. Strom. 2. citing Hierocles.

† p. 27. see also Stob. Strom. 2.

† Jan bl. prototyp. † Cap. 6.

S E C T. I.

Prædict Philosophy, its Parts; and first of Pædeutick.

PRÆdict Philosophy seems to have been the Invention of *Pythagoras*; for *Aristotle* affirms that he first undertook to discourse concerning Virtue; That *Socrates* is generally esteemed the Author thereof, perhaps is only because, as *Aristotle* adds, coming after him he discoursed better and more fully thereupon.

To this Part of Philosophy alludes this Sentence of *Pythagoras*; That the Discourse of that Philosopher is vain, by which no Passion of a Man is healed; for as there is no Benefit of Medicine, if it expel not Diseases out of Bodies, so neither of Philosophy, if it expel not ill out of the Soul.

Virtues being of two kinds, *private*, which respect ourselves, and *publick*, which have Reference to others; *Pythagoras* seems to have comprehended the first under *Pædeutick*, the second under *Politick*. *Laertius* affirms he writ three Treatises, *Pædeutick*, *Politick*, *Physick*. The Heads of *Pædeutick*, according to the general Recapitulation of *Jamblichus*, seem to have been these, *Institution*, *Silence*, *Abstinence from Flesh*, *Fortitude*, *Temperance*, *Sagacity*.

C H A P. I.

Institution, Silence, Abstinence.

CONCERNING Institution, &c. there are these Sentences and Precepts of *Pythagoras*, preserved by *Stobæus* and others.

¹ We ought to make choice of the best Course of Life; for Customs will make it pleasant. Wealth is a weak Anchor, Glory a weaker: The Body, Magistracies, Honours, all these are infirm and unstable. What are then able Anchors? Wisdom, Magnanimity, Fortitude; these no Tempest shakes. This is the Law of God, that Virtue only is solid; all else are but trifles.

² To take away Bitterness from Wormwood, and Liberty from Speech, are both alike.

³ Endeavour not to conceal thy Faults with Words, but to mend them by Reproof.

⁴ It is not so hard to offend, as not to reprove an offending Person.

⁵ As the Sickness of the Body, if hid or praised, is not healed; so the Soul cherished in its Ways, or concealed, is not reformed.

⁶ Rejoice more in Reprovers than in Flatterers: Fly from Flatterers as Enemies.

⁷ We ought either to be silent, or to speak things that are better than Silence.

⁸ It is better to throw a Stone at random, than an idle Word.

⁹ Comprehend not few things in many Words, but many things in few Words.

¹⁰ We must faithfully restore to him that entrusts us, the *Depositum*, not only of Money, but of Words.

¹¹ Of Opinion, the *Pythagoreans* said thus: It is the Part of a Man void of understanding, to adhere to all Mens Opinions, especially to that which is maintained by the greatest Number: for to conceive and judge aright is proper to few; it only belongs to the knowing, who are not many: this Power therefore extends not to many. On the other side, it is no less Madness to condemn all Conception and Opinion. Such a Person must be unlearned and unrectifiable; for it is necessary, that he who is ignorant learn those things whereof he is ignorant; and that he who learneth, addict and resign himself to his Teacher. In a word, they said, It is necessary that such young Men as would be preserved, should addict themselves to the Conceptions and Opinions of their Elders, and such as lead a good Life.

Now in the whole Course of human Life, there are certain distinct Ages, which are not temerariouly to be connected; for they are expelled by one another, unless a Man be well and rightly order'd from his Birth. It is requisite therefore, that from the Institution of a Child in Goodness, Temperance, and Fortitude, a great Part be transmitted to his Youth, when he arrives at that Age; likewise of his Youth instituted in Goodness, Fortitude and Temperance, a great Part be transmitted to his manly Estate. Herein the Course ordinarily taken, is ridiculous; for most think that Children ought to be well order'd, instructed in Temperance, and to abstain from all things odious and unbecoming; but when they come to be Youths, most leave them to their own Management, to do what they please; whereas at that Age they are subject to both sorts of Vices, of Children, and of Men. To shun Study and Order, and to follow Play and Wantonness, the Vice of Childhood, is likewise most proper to Youth. Again, vehement Desires, Ambition, and the like, the Affections of Manhood, insinuate into Youth; for which reason, this Age requireth Care above all the rest. In fine, a Man should never be so given over, as to do whatsoever he please; but that there should always be some Overseer president over the rest, a legitimate sitting Magistrate, whom every Citizen ought to obey. For a living Creature, as soon as ever it is neglected, falls into Ill and Wickedness.

¹ Stob. ferm. 80.

² Laert. S. 8.

³ Cap. 6.

⁴ Stob. ferm. 1. mention'd also by *Plutarch*, de exilio.

⁵ Stob.

ferm. 13.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Stob. 14.

¹⁰ Stob. 14.

¹¹ Stob. 34.

¹² Stob. 35.

¹³ Porph.

P. 197.

¹⁴ Jamb. c. 6.

They affirm, That they often have enquir'd and examin'd, for what reason we give Children Food at set times, and moderately; the ordinary Answer is, That Order and Moderation are good: their Contraries, Disorder and Immoderateness, ill; as is manifest, in as much as to be a Glutton, or a Drunkard, is esteem'd a great Reproach. For if none of these were useful and beneficial to us when we arrive at Man's Estate, it were needless to accustom ourselves, whilst Children, to such Order. It is the same in other Habits. We see it manifest also in all other Kinds of living Creatures, which are taught by Man from the very Beginning, as Whelps, and the like, those things which they are requir'd to practise when they are come to full Growth. Thus *Jamblichus*. Of Silence, Abstinence, and the whole Course of his Institution, we have formerly treated.

CHAPTER II.

Fortitude.

THE greatest Argument of the *Pythagoreans* for Fortitude, was, for that they fully persuaded themselves, that of all human Chances, nothing ought to happen unexpectedly to any, but that they should expect all things which were not within their own Power. Precepts of *Pythagoras*, tending to this Virtue, are these.

Do those things which you judge to be good, altho' after you have done them, you shall be displeased; for the Vulgar is an ill Judge of all good things: As you despise their Praise, so despise their Dispraise.

He forbids to forsake the Protection and Station of this Life, without the Command of our supreme Lord.

CHAPTER III.

Temperance and Continence.

HE often used this Apophthegm to all his Auditors, whether many or few: *We must avoid with our utmost Endeavour, and amputate with Fire and Sword, and by all other means, from the Body, Sickness; from the Soul, Ignorance; from the Belly, Luxury; from a City, Sedition; from a Family, Discord; from all things, Excess.*

It is better to live lying on the Ground with a settled Confidence, than to have a golden Bed and be troubled.

Temperance is the Strength of the Soul; for it is the Light of the Soul clear from Passion.

To serve Passions is more grievous than to serve Tyrants.

It is impossible he can be free, who serves Passions, and is governed by them.

No Man is free who doth not command himself.

The Labour of Continence precedes all excellent things.

To possess Continence is the best Strength and Wealth.

It is better to die, than to cloud the Soul by Intemperance.

He said, that Drunkenness is a little Madness; or, that it is the Study of Madness; or, as *Leontius*, that it is the Canker of the Flower of the Mind.

The Voice of the Flesh is, No Hunger, no Thrift, no Cold.

He admonish'd all Men to shun Ambition and Vain-glory, because these chiefly excite Envy.

He discommended all Excess, saying, that we ought not to exceed a due Proportion in Labour and Food.

We must consider, there are three Kinds of things which deserve to be pursued and acquired; the first is of those which are honourable and virtuous; the second, conducing to Life; the last, Pleasures: Not the vulgar enchanting Pleasures, for that he allowed not; but the solid and grave, free from blame. For, he said, there are two Kinds of Pleasure, whereof that which indulgeth to the Belly, and to Lasciviousness, by Profuseness of Wealth, he compar'd to the murderous Songs of the *Syrms*; the other, which consists in things honest and just, as also in the Necessaries of Life, is sweet as well as the first, and withal it is not followed by Repentance. Hither perhaps alludes *Clemens*, who saith, *Pythagoras* advised to esteem the Muses (sweeter than *Syrms*); teaching, that we should study Learning not with Delight; whereby he condemn'd the other Delight of the Mind, which is fallacious.

Pythagoras seeing one that made himself fat by exercising and eating; *This Man* (saith he) *will not cease to make a stricter Prison for himself.*

The *Pythagoreans* exhorted such as came into their Society, to shun Pleasure as much as any thing that ought to be avoided; for nothing so deceives us, and draws into Sin, as this Passion. In general, as it seems, they endeavour'd not to do any thing which might tend to Pleasure, this Scope being for the most part undecent and hurtful; but that they should aim at what is good and decent, to do what they ought. In the next place, to discern what is convenient and beneficial, it requireth a more than ordinary Judgment.

As to that which is called Desire, they said thus: Desire is an Impulsion and Appetite of the Soul, either

¹ Jamb. c. 32. p. 189.

² Ibid.

³ Laert. 8. 9.

⁴ Porph. p. 197.

⁵ Stob. ferm. 44.

⁶ Stob. r6.

⁷ Cic. de senect.

⁸ Stob. 17.

⁹ Porph. p. 190.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Stob. 18.

¹² D. Basil. Hom. 2. 1.

¹³ Strom. 1. p. 294.

¹⁴ Stob. ferm. 5.

¹⁵ Stob. 99.

¹⁶ Jamb. c. 32.

¹⁷ Stob. 6.

¹⁸ Porph.

¹⁹ Pothage

²⁰ See Hom. in Pind. xxi. p. 195.

ther of some Repletion, or Derogation of some things belonging to Sense, or the sensitive Affection. This Passion is various, and the most multiplicitous of all that belong to Man. Of human Desires many are acquired and framed by the Persons themselves; wherefore this Passion requireth greatest Care and Observation, and corporeal Exercises more than ordinary. For the Body, when its Aliment is evacuated, to desire Repletion, is natural; and again, being replete, to desire Evacuation, is natural also: But to desire superfluous Aliment, or superfluous and sumptuous Raiment and Lodging, or superfluous and various Household-stuff, and Utensils, and Cups, and Servants, and Herds of Cattle bred for Diet; in a word, of all human Passions, this is most such, that it never is at a Stay, but proceeds to infinite. Wherefore, from our very Childhood, Care must be taken, that we desire such things as are needful, and thus vain and superfluous Desires; being undisturbed, and clear from such Appetites, and condemning those who deserve Contempt, being settler'd in their Desires.

It is of most Concernment to observe the vain, brutish, superfluous Desires of those, who are transported by their Power: there is nothing so absurd, whereto the Souls of such Persons, Children, Men and Women, are not transported. The most various is that of Meats, infinite is the multitude of Fruits, infinite of Roots, used by Mankind. Besides this, all sorts of Flesh, making it their business to find, of terrestrial, volatile, and aquatic Creatures, wherewith to satisfy their Taste, and all Variety of dressing them, with the mixture of all kind of Juices, whereby Mankind is really prophetic and multiform, as to the Motion of the Soul; for every several sort of Meat is Cause of a peculiar Constitution. Now Men behold that these produce great Alteration, as Excess of Wine to such a degree exhilarates; further, causes Frenzy and Disorder: But those things which discover not so much their Force and Efficacy, they are ignorant of, notwithstanding that whatsoever Food we take, is Cause of some peculiar Constitution. Wherefore it is a great Part of Wisdom to know and understand what Kind and Quantity of Meat is requisite for Nourishment. This Science was first communicated by Apollo and Parn, afterwards by the *discipulians*.

Concerning Generation, he said thus: We ought principally to observe, that which is called *procreatio*, precious to for neither too forward Plants nor Animals, before the due Season, when they are in their full Strength. Youths therefore and Virgins ought to be educated in Labour, and Exercises, and Actions conducing to Fortitude, using Food convenient

thereto, and in a laborious, temperant and tolerant Life. Of the things in human Life there are many, in which to be late conversant is best; of this kind is Coition. A Youth ought to be educated, as not to addict himself thereto before twenty Years of Age; and when arrived at those Years, to use it seldom is best, if we esteem a good Habit of Body; for Intemperance and Good rarely meet in the same Person.

They commended the Rites and Laws of the Ancients, in the *Greek Cities*, not to lie with Mothers, or Daughters, or Sisters, nor in a Temple, nor in Publick, for this is evil; and to procure all possible Impediments thereof, is very profitable.

They were of Opinion, that all unnatural ignominious Generations ought to be taken away, and those only preserved which were according to Nature, with Temperance, and Lawful.

They conceived, that such as go about to beget Children, ought to have much Providence of their future Issue. The first and greatest Providence is, to prepare himself for that Action by a temperate, healthful Life; not eating too much at unseasonable Times, not using such Meats as deprave the Habits of the Body; but above all things, not to perform it when drunk: for they thought that by ill, and discordant, and disturbed Temperament, the Seed became adulterate. They also thought him a foolish, inconsiderate Person, who being desirous of Children, and taking a Wife to that End, should not with utmost Study foresee by what means his Issue might be most advantaged. They who love Dogs are very careful of their Breed, as of which they shall breed, and when, and accordingly the Whelps prove; the like do they who love Birds. But tho' it be well known, that they who breed any other kind of living Creature, use their utmost Endeavour to procure a generous Race; yet Men have no Respect to their own Offspring, but beget them inconsiderately, and bring them up negligently. This is the chief and most manifest Cause that so many Men are evil and wicked, the greater Part begetting their Children like Beasts, without any Consideration.

Finally, *Pythagoras discoursing concerning the Benefit of several Pleasures, advised, in the Summer-time to abstain wholly from Coition; in the Winter, to use it but rarely; for it is generally harmful: but the continual Use thereof causeth Debility, and is most pernicious.* Laertius saith, He advised, that in the Winter and Spring it should not be used at all; in Summer and Autumn but sparingly; for at all times it is pernicious and prejudicial to the Health. And being asked, At what time a Man should use it? he answered, When he hath a mind to be weaker.

M m m 2

CHAP.

¹ Reading *avert* according to *Boetius*, *cap. 99.* who cites this Fragment out of *Asiphanus*; perhaps it belonged to his Book, *De vita Pythagorae.*

² *Diodor. excerpt. Valer. p. 247.*

CHAP. IV.

Sagacity and Wisdom.

TO *Wisdom* (the last general Head of *Pædæstic*) belong the Sentences of *Pythagoras*.

^a *The Strength, Wall, and Armour of a wise Man is Wisdom.*

^b *Call to mind, that most Men acknowledge Wisdom to be the greatest Good; but few endeavour to possess this greatest Good.*

^c *The Sacrifices of Fools are the Food of Fire; their Donatives the Subsistence of sacrilegious Persons.*

^d *A Horse is not to be guided without a Bridle, nor Riches without Wisdom.*

^e *He conceived the Imposition of Names on things to be the highest Part of Wisdom.*

SECT. II.

Of Politick, the other Part of Practick Philosophy.

THE Heads of Politick (according to ^a *Jamblichus*) are these: *Common Conversation, Friendship, Worship of the Gods, Piety to the Dead, and Law-making.*

^b They hold *Pythagoras* to be the Inventor of all politick Discipline. He used to say, that amongst Beings nothing is pure, but every thing partakes of some other, as Earth of Fire, Fire of Water and Air. In like manner, Honest partakes of Dishonest, Just of Unjust, and the like. Hence it is, that Reason is carried away to either Side. There are two Motions, one of the Body, the other of the Mind; one Irrational, the other Elective. Commonwealths he compar'd to a rectangled Triangle, wherein one Side consists of three Parts, the Base of five, the other Side of the Mean between them, of four. In the Coincidence of these Lines with one another, and their Squares, we behold delineated the best Form of a Commonwealth, [and of Justice.]

CHAP. I.

Common Conversation.

TO common Conversation belong these Maxims of *Pythagoras*.

^a *A Stranger just, is to be preferr'd not only before a Countryman, but before a Kinsman.*

^b *Esteem it a great Part of good Education, to be able to suffer the want of Education in others.*

^c *Desire that they who converse with you, should rather respect than fear you: for Admiration accompanies Respect; Hatred, Fear.*

^d There being a Justice in the mutual Conversation of Men one towards another; of this also the *Pythagoreans* deliver'd this manner. There is in the common Conversation of Men one opportune, another importune: They differ in Diversity of Age, and in Dignity, and in Nearness of Affinity, and Benefi-

cence, and, if there be any thing like these, in mutual Differences. For there is a kind of Conversation which appeareth, to the Younger towards the Younger, not to be importune; but, towards the Elder, it is importune: for no kind, neither of Anger, nor of Menacing, or Boldness, but all such kind of Opportunity ought diligently to be avoided by the Younger toward the Elder. In like manner is the Reason of Dignity; for coming to a Person endow'd with true Worth and Virtue, it is neither decent nor opportune to speak much, or to commit any of the foremention'd things. Like these also are those which concern such as have oblig'd and deserv'd well of others.

^e There is a various and multiplicitous Use of Opportunity. For of those that are angry and incens'd, some do it opportunely, others importunately: and again, of those who covet, and desire, and have Appetite, it may be opportune for some to pursue those things, not for others. The same Reason there is of other Affections, and Actions, and Dispositions, and Conversations, and Intercessions, and Discourses. But Opportunity is of such a Nature, that it is docible, and undecivable, and capable of All, and generally, and simply, having nothing of all those in it. But the Consequents are of such a kind, that they together, decent, and convenient, and the like, attend the Nature of Opportunity.

They held that there is a Primacy in every thing, and that every-where there is one thing which is best, in Science, and in Experience, and in Generation; likewise in a Family, and in a City, and in an Army, and in all such like Constitutions: But it is difficult to discern and understand the Nature of the Primacy in all the aforesaid things; for in Sciences it is the Part of more than ordinary Intelligence, by clear Intuition, to discern and judge the Parts of the thing, which is the Primacy of them. But there is great Difference, and almost of the whole and general a Hazard, in not rightly taking the Primacy: for, in a word, nothing can afterwards be right, if the true Primacy be not known. The same Manner and Reason is in other kinds of Primacy; for neither can a Family be well governed, where there is not a true Master, and voluntary Government; for it is requisite, that both these be voluntary in the Prefecture, as well he who is chief, as those who are subject to him. As Learning is then right, when there is such Conformity betwixt the Masters and the Scholans, that they will teach, these will learn; for if either be refractory, it cannot be rightly performed. In this manner he conceived it to be fit for Inferiours to obey Superiours, Disciples their Masters.

CHAP. II.

Friendship.

^a *Pythagoras* evidently demonstrated, that there is a Friendship of all unto all; of Gods towards

^a Stob. ferm. 3.
^b Ibid. 9.

^c Ibid. 4.
^d Ibid. 19.

^e Ibid. 90.
^f Ibid. 44.

^g Cic. Tusc. l. 25.
^h Jamb. c. 30.

ⁱ Cap. 6.
^j Ibid. c. 16.

^k Jamb. c. 27.

^l Stob. Men.

PART IX.

Men, by Piety and religious Worship; of Doctrines to one another; of the Soul to the Body; of the rational Part to the Irrational, by Philosophy and its Theory; of Men towards one another; betwixt Countrymen, by right Observation of Laws; betwixt Strangers, by right Physiology; of a Man to his Wife, or Children, or Brethren, and Servants, by unperturbed Communion. In a word, of all towards all; moreover of some irrational Creatures, by Justice and natural Affinity and Communion; of the Body, in itself mortal, a Conciliation and Combination of the contrary Faculties, by Health and wholesome Diet, and Temperance, in Imitation of the good Composure in the Elements. In all these, of one and the same, according to Comprehension of the Name Friendship, *Pythagoras* is acknowledg'd to be the Inventor and Lawgiver: And so admirable a Friendship did he deliver to those who enquired of him, that, unto this Day, saith *Jamblichus*, we say of those who are intimately joined together by Friendship, *they are of the Pythagoreans*.

We must add the Institution of *Pythagoras* herein, and the Exhortations he used to his Disciples. They were adviſed to take away all Contention, and Love of Controversy, out of true Friendship; if possible out of all. But if that be not possible, at least out of that which is our own Country, and generally that towards Elders. Likewise out of that towards Benefactors; for to become Antagonists, or contest with such, when we are fallen into Anger, or some other Passion, is not consistent with the Preservation of the Amity we have with them. They said, that in Friendship there ought to be least Scratches and Cuts; and, if any happen, we should fly and subdue Anger. It were best that both should do so, but chiefly the younger; and that those Exercises which they called *παιδαγωγικα*, ought to be made from the Elder towards the Younger, with much Commendation and Benevolence. That there appear much Care and Tenderneſs in those who give the Correction; for by this means the Correction shall be profitable. That we do not extirpate Credit out of Friendship, neither in jest nor in earnest; for it is not easy to heal the Friendship betwixt Men, if once a Falſhood hath incurred into the Manners of those who call themselves Friends.

That we must not renounce Friendship for Adversity, or any other Impotence which happens in Life. That Renunciation of Friendship only is commendable, which is made by reason of some great Wickedneſs and Misdemeanour. But that we must not take away our Friendship from them, unless they become absolutely wicked; and, before we take it off, we must ingeniously pause, to try, if by Contestation and Fight he may be diverted from this ill Habit, and become rectified. We must fight, not in Words, but Actions; the Fight is lawful and pious. Tho'

Difference of Power be not a just Ground for one Man to fight with another, yet this is a just Ground, even the most just that is possible.

They said, that to a Friendship that will prove true, are requir'd many Definitions and Rules; these must be well discern'd, and not confusedly: Moreover, it ought to be accommodated to the Disposition of others, that no Conversation be made negligently and vainly, but with Respect and right Order: Neither that any Passion be excited vainly, and wickedly, and sensually, as Concupiscence or Anger. The same of the other Passions and Habits.

Much more admirable are those things which they defin'd concerning the Community of the divine Good, and those concerning the Unanimity of the Mind, and those concerning the divine Mind. For they mutually exhorted one another, that they should not tear asunder the God which is in them. Thus their Study of Friendship by Words and Actions had reference to some divine Temperament, and to Union with God, and to Unity with the Mind, and the divine Soul. Thus *Jamblichus*.

^c He conceived the Extremity (or End) of Friendship, to be the making one of two. ^e Man ought to be one. This Sentence (saith *Clement*) is mystick. ^d He first said, *κατὰ φίλων*, and *φίλων ἰσότητι*.

C H A P. III.

Worship of the Gods.

* THE Principles of worshipping the Gods, proposed by *Pythagoras* and his Followers, are these. That all which they determine to be done, aim and tend to the Acknowledgment of the Deity: This is the Principle; and the whole Life of Man consists in this, that he follow God; and this the Ground of Philosophy. For Men do ridiculously, who seek that which is good any where else than from the Gods. They do as if a Man in a Country, govern'd by a King, should apply his Service to some Citizen of inferior Magistracy, and neglect the supreme Governor. In the same manner conceive they that such Men do; for, since there is a God, we must confess that Good is in his Power. Now all, to those whom they love and delight in, give good things; and to the contrary to these, their Contraries. Therefore it is manifest, that such things are to be done in which God delights.

Thus he defin'd particularly of all things. To believe of the Divinity, that it is, and that it is in such manner as to Mankind; that it overlooks them, and neglects them not; the *Pythagoreans*, taught by him, conceived to be profitable. For we have need of such a Government, as we ought not in any thing to contradict; such is that which proceeds from the Divinity; for the Divinity is such, that it merits the Dominion of all. Man they affirmed to be, rightly speaking,

speaking, a Creature reproachful and fickle, as to his Appetites, Affections, and other Passions; he therefore hath need of such Government and Guidance, from which proceeds Moderation and Order. Now they conceived, that every one being conscious of the Fickleness of his own Nature, should never be forgetful of Sanctity, and Service towards the Divinity; but always have (the Divinity) in their Mind, how it overlooks and observes human Life.

In fine, they say, that *Pythagoras* was an Imitator of the *Orphean* Constitutions, worshipping the Gods after the manner of *Orpheus*, placed in brazen Images, not representing the Forms of Men, but of the Gods themselves, who comprehending and foreseeing all things, resemble in Nature and Form the whole. He declared their Purifications and Rites, which are called *πυθαγορικά*, having the most exact Knowledge of them.

Moreover they affirm, he made a Composition of the divine Philosophy and Service; Part whereof he had learned from the *Orpheans*, Part from the *Egyptian* Priests; some from the *Chaldeans* and *Magi*; some from the *Eleusinian* Rites, and those in *Imber*, and *Samo-Thracia*, and *Delos*, and the *Celts*, and *Iberians*.

Amongst the *Latins* also is read the sacred Discourse of *Pythagoras*; not to all, but to such as are admitted to the Doctrine of excellent things, and are not addicted to ought that is dishonest.

It prescribes, that Men offer Libation thrice; and *Apollo* gives Oracles from a Tripod, because Number first consists in a Triad.

That we must sacrifice to *Venus* on the sixth Day, because that is the first common Number of the Number of universal Nature. Now after all ways, the thing divided in like manner, assumes as well the Power of those things which are taken away, as of those which are left.

That to *Hercules* we ought to sacrifice on the eighth Day of the Month, in respect of his being born at the End of seven Months.

It saith also, That we ought to enter into a Temple having a pure Garment, and in which none hath slept the Sleep of Slothfulness; black and russet, testifying Purity in Ratiocinations of Equality and Justice.

It commanded, that if Blood be shed unwillingly in a Temple, that it be either taken up in a Dish, or scatter'd into the Sea; for that is the first Element, and most estimable of all Creatures.

It saith likewise, that a Woman ought not to be brought to-bed in a Temple, for it is religious; that the Divinity of the Soul should be annexed to the Body in a Temple.

It commanded, that upon holy Days we cut not

our Hair, nor pare our Nails; intimating, that the Increase of our Goods ought not to be prefer'd before the Empire of the Gods.

That we must not kill a Flea in the Temple, because to the Deity we ought not to offer any superfluous things, or Vermine; but that the Gods are to be worshipp'd with Cedar, Laurel, Cypress, and Myrtle, &c.

He said, *Piety and Religion are chiefly conversant in our Minds, at such time as we attend the divine Rites.*

That the Gods and Heroes are not to be worshipp'd with equal Honours; but that the Gods must always be worshipp'd with Applause, (or Silence at the Celebration of their Rites) we bring sobriety and pure; Heroes, only from Noise. [He advised, that such as sacrifice should present themselves to the Gods, not in rich, but in white and clean Garments; and that not only the Body be clear from all Blemishes, but that they bring also a pure Mind.] Purity is acquir'd by Expiations, and Bathings, and Sprinklings; and by refraining from Murder, and Adultery, and all Pollution; and by abstaining from the Flesh of things that die of themselves, and from Mollusks, and Melanurus, and Sheep, and various Creatures, and Beans; and all other things which are commanded by those who have the Care of sacred Rites.

He permitted not, that any should pray for himself, because none knoweth what is good for himself.

An Oath is just, and therefore Jupiter is serv'd by Oaths. He commanded his Disciples to be very backward in taking an Oath; but that when they have taken it, they should be very forward and diligent to keep it.

CHAP. IV.

Piety to the Dead.

Piety to the Dead was a Part, not the least, of the *Pythagorick* Doctrine: Whence *Cicero* (speaking of the Immortality of the Soul; *Mores prevalent with me*, saith he, *is the Authority of the Ancients, or our Ancestors, who afforded the Dead so religious Rites; which certainly they had not done, if they had conceived that nothing pertains to them; or if those who were in this Country, and instructed Magna Græcia, which now is abolish'd, but then flourish'd, with their Institutions and Precepts.*

Pythagoras allow'd not the Bodies of the Dead to be burn'd; herein imitating the *Magi*, as not willing that any Mortal should participate of divine Honour. The *Pythagorick* Custom, as described by *Pliny*, was, to put the Dead into earthen Barrels, amongst Leaves of Myrtle, Olive, and black Poplar.

To

Died

¹ Cic. Leg. 2.
excerpt, Valef. ibid.

² Laert. S. 35.
De Amicitia.

³ Diodor. excerpt. Valef. p. 247.
Jamb. c. 28.

⁴ Laert. S. 35.
Lib. 35. 5.

⁵ Ibid. S. 39.

To accompany the Dead at Funerals in white Garments, he conceiv'd to be pious; alluding to the simple and first Nature, according to Number, and the Principle of all things.

The *Crotanians* delighting to bury their Dead sumptuously, one of the *Pythagoreans* told them, he heard *Pythagoras* discoursing of divine Things, thus: The celestial Gods respect the Affections of the Sacrificers, not the Greatness of the Sacrifice. On the contrary, the terrestrial Gods, as to whose Share the lesser things belong, delight in Banquets, and Mourning, and funeral Libations, and costly Sacrifices; whence *Hades* (the Inferi) from its raking Choice of Entertainment, is named *Pluto*; those who pay Honours to him most sparingly, he permitted to continue longest in the upper World; but of those who are excessive in Mourning, he bringeth down ever and anon one, that thereby he may receive the Honours which are paid in Memory of the dead. By this Discourse he wrought a Belief in his Auditors, that they who do all Things moderately upon such adverse Occasions, farther their own Safety; but as for those who bestow excessive Charge, they will all die untimely.

They forbore to make Tombs of Cypress, forasmuch as Jupiter's Scepter was of that Wood; as *Hermippus*, in his second Book of *Pythagoras*, affirms.

CHAP. V.

Reverence of Parents, and Obedience to the Law.

Next to Gods and Demons, we ought to reverence Parents and the Law, and to render ourselves obedient to them, not feignedly, but really. Or, as *Porphyrus*, He commanded to think and to speak reverently of Gods and Demons, to be kind to Parents and Benefactors, and to obey the Law.

They held (saith *Jamblichus*) that we ought to believe, there is no greater Ill than Anarchy; for a Man cannot be safe where there is no Governor. They held also, that we ought to persevere in the Customs and Rites of our own Country, though they be worse than those of other Countries. To revolt easily from settled Laws, and to be studious of Novelty, they conceived to be neither advantageous nor safe.

Seeing that Contumelies, Pride, and Contempt of Law, often transport Men to unjust Actions, he daily exhorted, that the Law should be assisted, and injustice opposed. To which End he alledged this Distinction: The first of Ills, which insinuateth in-

to Houses and Cities, is *Pride*; the second, *Contumely*; the third, *Destruction*. Every one therefore ought to expel and extirpate Pride, accustoming themselves from their Youth to a temperate masculine Life, and to be free from slanderous Repining, contentious Reproaching, and hateful Scurrility.

Wickedness disobeys the Divine Law, and therefore transgresseth.

A wicked Man suffers more Torment in his own Conscience, than he who is punished in Body and sobbed.

CHAP. VI.

Law-making.

Moreover, (saith *Jamblichus*) he constituted another excellent Kind of Justice, the Legislative Part, which commandeth that which ought to be done, and forbiddeth that which ought not to be done; which is better than the Judicative Part; for this resembles that Part of Medicine which cureth the Sick, but the other suffers them not to fall sick, but takes care as for off of the Health of the Soul.

Varro affirms, that *Pythagoras* deliver'd this Discipline (of governing States) to his Auditors last of all, when they were now learned, now wise, now happy; for he saw so many rough Waves shewn, that he would not commit it, but to such a one as was able to shun the Rocks; or, if all fail'd, might stand himself as a Rock amidst those Waves.

They who punish not ill Persons, would have the Good injur'd.

SECT. III.

Theoretick Philosophy, its Parts; and first of the Science concerning Intelligibles.

We come next to the Theoretick Part, to which more particularly belongs that Saying of *Pythagoras*, That by Philosophy he had this Advantage, to admire nothing; for philosophical Discourse takes away Wonder, which ariseth from Doubt and Ignorance, by Knowledge and Examination of the Faculty of every thing.

Theoretick Philosophy seems to have been divided by the *Pythagoreans* into two Parts: They first (saith *Jamblichus*) deliver'd the Science of Intelligibles, and the Gods; next which, they taught all Physik. To the Science of Intelligibles belong these Heads, where-with *Jamblichus* begins his Recapitulation, Of the Gods, of Herots, of Demons.

CHAP.

* Jamb. c. 28.

* Ibid. c. 33.

* Inert. 5. 30.

* Jamb. c. 30.

* Prop. 197.

* loco cit.

* Jamb. c. 30.

† 153.

* Mention'd by *Lucianus*, 8. 23.

* Ibid. c. 33.

* Ibid. c. 33.

* Ibid. c. 33.

* Ibid. c. 33.

* Ibid. c. 33.

ac. c. 2.

* Stob. serm. 44.

* Cap. 6.

* Ibid.

* Ibid.

* Ibid.

* Ibid.

* Ibid.

CHAP. I.

Of the Supreme God.

Pythagoras defined what God is, thus: * *A Mind which commeateth, and is diffused through every Part of the World, and through all Nature; from whom all Animals that are produced receive Life.*

† God is one. He is not (as some conceive) out of the World, but entire within himself, in a complete Circle surveying all Generations. He is the Temperament of all Ages, the Agent of his own Powers and Works, the Principle of all things, one, in Heaven luminary, and Father of all things; Mind and Animation of the whole, the Motion of all Circles.

‡ God (as Pythagoras learned of the Magi, who term him *Oromasdes*) in his Body resembles Light, in his Soul, Truth.

§ He said, that God only is wise.

¶ He conceived that the first (Being) God, is neither sensible, nor passible; but invisible, and intelligible.

CHAP. II.

Of Gods, Dæmons; Heroes.

NEXT to the supreme God, there are three Kinds of Intelligibles, *Gods, Dæmons, Heroes*; that Pythagoras thus distinguished them, is manifest from his † Precept, that *We must in Worship prefer Gods before Dæmons, Heroes before Men*: But in † *Jamblichus*, he seems either to observe a different Method, or to confound the Terms; teaching first of *Gods*, then of *Heroes*, last of *Dæmons*: which Order perhaps is the same with that of the *golden Verses*;

*First, as decreed, th'immortal Gods adore;
Thy Oath keep: next great Heroes, then implore
Terrestrial Dæmons with due Sacrifice.*

By *Terrestrial Dæmons* seems to be understood (not Princes, as *Hierocles*; but) the Dæmons themselves, confin'd to several Offices upon Earth: For,

‡ All the Air is full of Souls, which are esteem'd Dæmons and Heroes: from these are sent to Men Dreams and Presages of Sickness, and of Health; and not only to Men, but to Sheep also, and to other Cattle; and to these pertain Expiations and Averrun- cations, and all Divinations, Cledones, and the like.

CHAP. III.

Of Fate and Fortune.

ALL the Parts of the World above the Moon are govern'd according to Providence, and firm Order, and *anapaïns*; the Decree of God, which they follow; but those beneath the Moon by four Causes, by God, by Fate, by our Election, by Fortune. For Instance: To go aboard into a Ship, or not, is in our Power: Storms and Tempests to arise out of a Calm, is by Fortune; for the Ship being under Water to be preserved, is by the Providence of God. Of Fate, there are many Manners and Differences: It differs from Fortune, as having a Determination, Order, and Consequence; but Fortune is spontaneous and casual; as to proceed from a Boy to a Youth, and orderly to pass through the other Degrees of Age, happens by one manner of Fate. [Here the Text seems deficient.]

¶ Man is of Affinity with the Gods, by reason that he participates of Heat; wherefore God hath a providential Care of us. There is also *anapaïns*, a Fate of all things in general, and in particular the Cause of their Administration.

CHAP. IV.

Divination.

FORasmuch as by Dæmons and Heroes, all Divination is convey'd to Men, we shall here add what Pythagoras held and practis'd therein. † *Jamblichus* saith, that † *he* honoured Divination not the least of the Sciences; † for what things are agreeable to God cannot be known, unless a Man hear God himself, or the Gods, or acquire it by divine Art. For this reason they diligently studied Divination, as being the only Interpretation of the Benevolence of the Gods. It is likewise an Employment most suitable to those who believe: there are Gods: but whoever thinks either (Belief of the Gods, or Divination) a Folly, to him the other is such also.

‡ Pythagoras approved all Kinds of Divination, except that which is performed by the Sacrifice of living Creatures.

¶ He first used Divination by Frankincense. † This was the only Burnt-offering by which he was divined.

¶ He also used Divination by Cledones, and by Birds; which *Cicero* confirms, saying, that † *he* would himself be an Augur; and that † the Pythagoreans observed not only the Voices of the Gods, but of Men also, which they call Omens. Cledones are Observations of occur- rent

* Libant. Inst. l. 5.

† Just. Mart. Serm. Protr.

‡ Porph. vit. Pyth.

¶ Clem. Alex. Strom. 4.

† Plat. in Num.

‡ Laert. 3. 23.

¶ Cap. 6.

¶ Laert. 3. 32.

¶ Anon. apud Phot.

¶ Laert. ibid.

¶ Cap. 29.

¶ Jamb.

‡ Cic. ibid.

¶ Plat. Plac. Phil. lib. 9.

¶ Porph. p. 235.

¶ Laert. 3. 20.

¶ Laert. ibid.

¶ Cic. divin. l. 1.

rent Speeches, collecting from what is accidentally laid upon some other Occasion, the Effect of what is sought: An Instance whereof see in the Epigram of Callimachus upon *Pittacus*.

The Interpretation of Dreams, (Porphyrius * saith) he learned of the Hebrews: He communicated it also to his Disciples; for *Jamblicus* relates, he used Means to procure them quiet Sleeps, with good and prophetic Dreams: Out of this respect some conceive it was, that he forbade stultent and gross Meats, for that they obstruct the Serenity which is requisite thereto. Such Apparitions he held not to be fantastick, but real, ^a (not *ὄρα* but *ὄρα*) as is manifest from one who told him, that he dreamed he had talked with his Father (who was dead), and asked him what it portended; Nothing, (saith he) for you did really talk with him; as my speaking now to you portends nothing, no more did that.

^b He was skillful likewise in Judicial Astrology, if we credit *Apuleius*, who affirms, the Chaldeans shewed him the Science of the Stars, the Number of the Planets, their Stations, Revolutions, and the various Effects of both in the Nativities of Men.

^c *Varro* relates him skillful in Hydromancy, which (saith he) came from Persia, and was practised by Numa, and afterwards by Pythagoras; wherein they used Blood, and Invocation of Demons. Hither perhaps alludes *Eustathius*, who saith, the Pythagoreans affirm, that all Brass doth sound by some divine Spirit, for which Reason a Tripod of that Metal is dedicated to Apollo; and when the Winds are all laid, the Air calm, and all Things else quiet, yet the hollow Brass Caldrans seem to quake: The same may be the Meaning of ^d Pythagoras, when he saith, Sound which is made by Brass, is the Voice of the Demon inclosed in the Brass; reading (perhaps) *ἡ ἀκούσιμος*, for so *Psellus* describes a kind of Hydromancy practised by the Assyrians; They take a Basin full of Water convenient for the Demons to glide into the Bottom; the Basin of Water seems to make a Noise as if it breath'd; the Water in the Basin, in Substance, differs nothing from other Water, but through the Virtue infused therein by Charms is much more excellent, and made more ready to receive a prophetic Spirit. This is a particular Demon, Terrestrial, attracted by Compositions; as soon as he glideth into the Water, he maketh a little Sound inarticulate, which denotes his Presence; afterwards the Water running over, there are certain Whispers heard with some Prediction of the Future: This Kind of Spirit is very wandering, because it is of the Solar Order; and this Kind of Demons purposely speak with a low Voice, that by reason of the indistinct Obscurity of the Voice, their Lies may be less subject to Discovery. Hitherto *Psellus*.

SECT. IV.

Physick.

THE general Heads of Physick are these, Of the World, and of all Things in the World; of Heaven and of Earth, and of the Natures betwixt them*. The Defect of the Fragments concerning these we shall endeavour to supply, by adding the Treatise of *Timæus* the Locrian upon the same Subject.

CHAP. I.

Principles.

THE most learned of the Naturalists (saith *Sexsus* [†] *Empiricus*) attributed so great Power to Numbers, that they thought them to be the Principles and Elements of all Things. These were the Disciples of *Pythagoras*: For, say they, such as treat of Philosophy aright, imitate those who study a Language; they first examine Words, because Language consists of Words; then, because Words consist of Syllables, they first consider Syllables; and because Syllables consist of Letters, they first examine Letters. In like manner, say the *Pythagoreans*, Natural Philosophers, when they make enquiry into the Universe, must first examine into what the Universe is resolved.

Now to affirm that something apparent to Sense is the Principle of all Things, is repugnant to Physick; for whatsoever is apparent to Sense, must be compounded of Things not apparent; whereas a Principle is not that which consists of any thing, but that of which the Thing consists. Therefore Things apparent cannot be said to be Principles of the Universe, but those of which Things apparent consist, themselves not being apparent.

They who maintain Atoms, or Homoiomeria's, or Bulks, or intelligible Bodies, to be the Principles of all Things, were partly in the right, partly not: As conceiving the Principles to be unapparent, they are in the right; as holding them to be corporeal, they err. For as intelligible unapparent Bodies precede the sensible, so most incorporeals precede intelligible Bodies. The Elements of Words, are not Words; nor of Bodies, Bodies: but they must either be Bodies, or Incorporeal, therefore they are wholly Incorporeal. Neither can we say, that Atoms are eternal, and therefore, tho' corporeal, the Principles of all Things; for first, they who assert Homoiomeria's, and Bulks, and Leafs, and Indivisibles, to be Elements, conceive their Substance eternal, so as in that respect, Atoms are no more Elements

* Life of *Pittacus*, c. 2. p. 180.

^a Porph. p. 199.

^b Jamblic. c. 6.

^c Cap. 15.

^d Adv. Math. l. 9.

^e Jamblic. c. 27.

^f Florid. l. 2.

^g August. civ. Dei, l. 8. In *Iliad*. v.

than they. Again, though it were granted, that Atoms were eternal; yet, as they who conceive the World to be unbegotten, and eternal, enquire, by an imaginary way, the Principles whereof it first consists; so we (say the *Pythagoreans*) treating of Physick, consider in an imaginary way, of what Things these eternal Bodies, comprehensible only by Reason, consist. Thus the Universe consists either of Bodies or Incorporeals; we cannot say Bodies, for then we must assign other Bodies whereof they consist; and so proceeding to infinite, we shall remain without a Principle. It rests therefore to affirm, that intelligible Bodies consist of Incorporeals, which *Epicurus* confesseth, saying, By Collection of Figure, and Magnitude, and Resistance, and Gravity, is understood a Body.

Yet it is not necessary, that all Corporeals pre-existent to Bodies, be the Elements and first Principles of Beings. Idea's (according to *Plato*) are Incorporeals, pre-existent to Bodies, and all generated Beings have reference to them; yet they are not the Principles of Being; for every Idea, singly taken, is said to be one; when we comprehend others with it, they are two, or three, or four. Number therefore is transcendent to their Substance, by Participation whereof, one, two, or more, are predicated of them. Again, solid Figures are conceived in the Mind before Bodies, as having an incorporeal Nature; yet they are not the Principles. Superficies precede them in our Imagination, for Solids consist of Superficies. But neither are Superficies the Elements of Beings, for they consist of Lines; Lines precede them; Numbers precede Lines. That which consists of three Lines, is called a Triangle; that which of four, a Quadrangle. Even Line itself, simply taken, is not conceived without Number; but being carried on from one Point to another, is conceived in two. As to Numbers, they all fall under the Monad; for the Duad is one Duad, the Triad one Triad, and the Decad one Summary of Number.

This moved *Pythagoras* to say, That the Principle of all Things is the Monad; by Participation hereof, every Being is termed One; and when we reflect on a Being in its Identity, we consider a Monad; but when it receives Addition by Alterity, it produceth indeterminate Duad, so called, in Distinction from the arithmetical determinate Duads; by Participation whereof all Duads are understood, as Monads by the Monad. Thus there are two Principles of Beings, the first Monad, and the indeterminate Duad.

That these are indeed the Principles of all Things, the *Pythagoreans* teach variously. Of Beings, (say they) some are understood by Difference, others by Contrariety, others by Relation. By Difference, are those which are considered by themselves, subjected by their proper Circumscription; as, a Man, a Horse, a Plant, Earth, Water, Air, Fire; each of these is

considered absolutely without any. By Contrariety, are those which are considered by Contrariety of one to the other, as good and ill, just, unjust; profitable, unprofitable; sacred, profane; pious, impious; moving, fixt; and the like. By Relation, those which are considered by Relation to others; as, right, left; upwards, downwards; double, half. For right is understood by a relative Habit to left, and left by a relative Habit to right; upwards to downwards, and downwards to upwards; and so of the rest. Those which are understood by Contrariety, differ from those that are understood by Relation. In Contraries, the Corruption of the one is the Generation of another; as, of Health, Sickness, Motion, and Rest. The Induction of Sickness is Expulsion of Health, and the Induction of Health is the Expulsion of Sickness; the same in Grief and Joy, Good and Ill, and all Things of contrary Natures. But the Relative exist together and perish together; for right is nothing unless there be left; double is nothing unless we understand the half whereof it is the double: Moreover, in Contraries there is no Mean, as between Health and Sickness, Life and Death, Motion and Rest. But betwixt Relatives there is a Mean; as betwixt greater and lesser, the Mean is equal; betwixt too much and too little, sufficient; betwixt too flat and too sharp, concord.

Above these three Kinds, Absolute, Contrary, Relative, there must necessarily be some supreme Genus; every Genus is before the Species which are under it. For if the Genus be taken away, the Species are taken away also; but the Removal of the Species takes not away the Genus, the Species depending on the Genus, not the Genus on the Species. The transcending Genus of those Things which are understood by themselves, (according to the *Pythagoreans*) is the *One*; as that exists and is considered absolutely, so they. Of Contraries, equal and unequal holds the Place of a Genus, for in them is considered the Nature of all Contrarieties; as of Rest in Equality, it admits not Intension and Remission; of Motion Inequality, it admits Intension and Remission. In like manner, natural Inequality, it is the instable Extremity; preternatural Inequality, it admits Intension and Remission. The same of Health and Sickness, Straightness and Crookedness. The Relative consists of Excess and Defect, as their Genus; great and greater, much and more, high and higher, are understood by Excess; little and less, low and lower, by Defect.

Now forasmuch as Absolutes, Contraries and Relatives, appear to be subordinate to other Genus's, (that is, to One, to Equality, and to Inequality, to Excess and Defect) let us examine, whether those Genus's may be reduc'd to others. Equality is reducible to One, for one is equal in itself; Inequality is either in Excess or Defect; of Unequal, one exceeds, the other is deficient: Excess and Defect are reducible to the indeterminate Duad; or of the first

Excess and Defect is in two, in the excellent and the deficient. Thus the Principles of all Things appear in the Top above all the rest, the first Monad, and the indeterminate Duad.

Of these is generated the Arithmetical Monad and Duad; from the first Monad, one; from the Monad and the indeterminate Duad, two, the Duad being not yet constituted amongst Numbers; neither was here two, before it was taken out of the indeterminate Duad, of which, together with the Monad, was produced the Duad, which is in Numbers. Out of these, in the same manner proceeded the rest of the Numbers, one continually stepping forward, the indeterminate Duad generating two, and extending Numbers to an infinite Multitude.

Hereupon they affirm, that, in Principles, Monad hath the Nature of the efficient Cause, Duad of passive Matter; and after the same manner, as they produced Numbers, which consists of them, they composed the World also, and all Things in it. A Point is correspondent to the Monad; the Monad is indivisible, so is the Point; the Monad is the Principle of Numbers, so is the Point of Lines. A Line is correspondent to the Duad, both are considered by Transiion. A Line is Length without Breadth, extended betwixt two Points. A Superficies corresponds to the Triad; besides Length, whereby it was a Duad, it receives a third Distance, Breadth. Again, setting down three Points, two opposite, the third at the Juncture of the Lines made by the two, we represent a Superficies. The solid Figure and the Body, as a Pyramid, answer the Tetrad; if we lay down, as before, three Points, and set over them another Point, behold the pyramidal Form of a solid Body, which hath three Dimensions, Length, Breadth, Thickness.

Some there are who affirm, that a Body consists of one Point, the Point by Fluxion makes a Line, the Line by Fluxion makes a Superficies, the Superficies moved to Thickness makes a Body, three ways dimensionable. This Sect of the *Pythagoreans* differ from the former; they held, that of two Principles, the Monad and the Duad were made Numbers, of Numbers were made Points, Lines, Superficies, and Solids: These, that all Things come from one Point, for of it is made a Line, of the Line a Superficies, of the Superficies a Body.

Thus are solid Bodies produc'd of Numbers precedent to them. Moreover, of them consist Solids, Fire, Water, Air, Earth, and in a word, the whole World, which is governed according to Harmony, as they affirm again; recurring to Numbers, which comprize the Proportions that constitute perfect Harmony. * Harmony is a System consisting of three Concords, the Diatesseron, the Diapente, the Diapason; the Proportions of these three Con-

cords are found in the first four Numbers, one, two, three, four. The Diatesseron consists in a Sesquialtera Proportion. The Diapason in Sesquialtera, the Diapente in Double; four being Sesquialterius to three, (as consisting of three and one third) hath a Diatesseron Proportion; three being Sesquialter to two (as containing two and its half) a Diapente; four being the double of the Monad of two, a Diapason. The Tetractys affording the Analogy of these Concords, which make perfect Harmony, according to which all Things are governed, they stil'd it;

The Root and Fountain of eternal Nature.

Moreover, whatsoever is comprehended by Man, (say they) either is a Body, or Incorporeal; but neither of these is comprehended without the Notion of Numbers: A Body, having a triple Dimension, denotes the Number three. Besides, of Bodies, some are by Connexion, as Ships, Chains, Buildings; others by Union, compriz'd under one Habit, as Plants, Animals; others by Aggregation, as Armies, Herds. All these have Numbers, as consisting of Plurality. Moreover, of Bodies, some have simple Qualities, others multiplicitous, as an Apple, various Colour to the Sight, Juice to the Taste, Odour to the Smell; these also are of the Nature of Numbers. It is the same of Incorporeals; Time, an Incorporeal, is comprehended by Number, Years, Months, Days, and Hours. The like of a Point, a Line, a Superficies, as we said already.

Likewise to Numbers are correspondent both Naturals and Artificials. We judge every thing by Criteries, which are the Measures of Numbers. If we take away Number, we take away the Cubit, which consists of two half Cubits, six Palms, twenty four Digits; we take away the Bushel, the Balance, and all other Criteries, which consisting of Plurality, are Kinds of Number. In a word, there is nothing in Life without it. All Art is a Collection of Comprehensions. Collection implies Number; it is therefore rightly said,

—To Numbers all Things Reference have.

that is, to judicative Reason, which is of the same Kind with Numbers, whereof all consists. Hitherto *Sextus*.

* The Sum of all (as by *Alexander* in his Successions, extracted out of the *Pythagorick Commentaries*) is this: *The Monad is the Principle of all Things. From the Monad came the indeterminate Duad, as Matter subjected to the Cause, Monad; from the Monad and the indeterminate Duad, Numbers; from*

N n n 2

Numbers,

* *Sext. Emp. advers. Mathem. l. 7.*

† *Laert. 8. 25.*

Numbers, Points; from Points, Lines; from Lines, Superficies; from Superficies, Solids; from these, solid Bodies, whose Elements are four, Fire, Water, Air, Earth, of all which, transmutated, and totally changed, the World consists.

CHAP. II.

Of the World.

THE World, or comprehension of all Things, Pythagoras called *Kósmos*, from its Order and Beauty.

The World was made by God, in Thought, not in Time; He gave it a beginning from Fire, and the fifth Element: for there are five figures of solid Bodies, which are termed mathematical. Earth was made of a Cube, Fire of a Pyramid, Air of an Octædre, Water of an Icosædre, the Sphere of the universe of a Dodecaedre. In these Plato followeth Pythagoras.

The World is corruptible in its own Nature, for it is sensible and corporeal; but it shall never be corrupted, by reason of the Providence and Preservation of God. Fate is the cause of the order of the Universe, and all Particulars; Necessity encompasseth the World.

The World is animate, intelligible, spherical, enclosing the Earth in the midst of it.

The Pythagoreans affirm, That what is without Heaven is infinite; for beyond the World there is a Vacuum, into which, and out of which, the World respirates.

The right side of the World is the East, whence Motion begins; the left is the West.

CHAP. III.

Of the Superior or Æthereal Parts of the World.

Pythagoras first called Heaven *Kósmos*, as being perfect in all kinds of Animals, and adorned with all kinds of Pulchritude.

In the fixed Sphere resides the first Cause; whatsoever is next him, that they affirm to be best, and firmly compounded and ordered; that which is furthest from him, the worst. There is a constant Order observed as low as the Moon, but all things beneath the Moon are moved promiscuously. For,

The Air which is diffused about the Earth, is unmoved and unwholesome, and all Things that are in it are mortal; but the Air which is above is perpetually in motion, and pure, and healthful; and all that are in it are immortal, and consequently divine. This they call, The Free Æther, (immediately above the Moon): Æther, as being void of Matter, and an eternal Body; Free, as not being obnoxious to material Disturbances. Hence it followeth, that

The Sun, Moon, and the rest of the Stars, according to Pythagoras, are Gods.

The Pythagoreans held, that every Star is a World in the infinite Æther, which containeth Earth, Air, and Æther. This Opinion was also held by the Followers of Orpheus, that every Star is a World.

The Sun is spherical, eclipsed by the Moon's coming under him.

The body of the Moon is of a fiery Nature; she receives her Light from the Sun. The eclipse of the Moon is a reverberation or obstruction from the Antichthon.

The Pythagoreans affirm, that the Moon seems earthly, because she is round about inhabited as our Earth; but the Creatures are larger and fairer, exceeding us in bigness fifteen times, neither have they any Excrements; and their Day is so much longer.

Some of the Pythagoreans affirm, that a Comet is one of the Planets, but appears not in Heaven but after a long time, and is near the Sun, as it happens also to Mercury; for, because it recedes but little from the Sun, often when it should appear it is hid, so as it appears not but after a long time. Or, as (Plutarch expresth it,) A Comet is one of those Stars which are not always apparent, but rise after a certain Period. Others hold, that it is the reflection of our sight on the Sun, like Images in Glasses.

The Rain-bow be asserted to be the splendor of the Sun.

SECT. IV.

Of the sublunary Parts of the World.

OF the inferior sublunary Parts of the World, the anonymous Pythagorean placeth first the sphere of Fire, then that of Air, next that of Water; last, that of Earth.

The Bodies of all the Elements are round, except that of Fire, which is conical.

Below the Moon, all Things move disorderly; Evil therefore necessarily exists about the Region of the Earth; that being settled lowest as the basis of the World, the receptacle of the lowest Things.

The Air, which is diffused about the Earth, is unmoved and unwholesome, and all Things in it are mortal.

There is Generation and Corruption; for Things are produced by Alteration, Mutation, and Resolution of the Elements. Motion is a difference, or alterity in matter.

In the World there is equally proportioned Light and Darkness, and Heat and Cold, and Siccity and Humidity; which when they are exuberant, the excess of Heat causeth Summer; of Cold, Winter; when they are equal, then are the best Seasons of the Year; whereof that which is growing up is the

* Plut. plac. 2. 1. Stob. phys. 1.

* Laert. 8. 27.

* Plut. plac. 2. 25.

* Anon. vit.

* Plut. ibid.

* Apud Phot.

* Plut. ibid.

* Plut. plac. 2. 14.

* Plut. pla. 2. 4.

* Laert. ibid.

* Laert. 8. 26.

* Aristot. Meteor. 1. 6.

* Anon. apud Phot.

* Stob. ph. 1. 1.

* Arist. phys. 3. 4.

* Hierocl. in aut. coram. pag. 313.

* Plac. 3. 2.

* Laert. 8. 26.

* Plut. pl. 2. 6.

* Plut. plac. 2. 9.

* Laert. 8. 27.

* Plut. ibid.

* Plut. plac. lib. c. 23.

* Plut. pl. 2. 4.

* Plut. plac. 2.

* Plut. ibid.

* Elian. var. 4. 27.

* Laert. ibid.

the Spring, healthful; that which is decaying is Autumn, unhealthful. Even of the Day, the Morning is growing up, the Evening decaying, and therefore more unwholesome.

CHAP. V.

Of Living and Animate Creatures.

¹ *There penetrates a Beam from the Sun, through the Æther, which is cold and dry; (they call the Air cold Æther, and the Sun and Humidity gross Æther) this Beam penetrates to the Abyss, and thereby all Things vivificate; all Things live in as much as they participate of Heat; (wherefore even Plants are ζῶα, living Creatures) but all Things have not Soul; the Soul is a portion of Æther of Heat and Cold, for it participates of cold Æther; the Soul differeth from Life. She is immortal, because that from which she is taken is immortal. Thus Alexander in his Successions, out of the Commentaries of the Pythagoreans.*

CHAP. VI.

Of the Generation of Animate Creatures.

² *Animate Creatures are generated of one another by Seed, (but of Earth nothing can be generated.) Seed is a distillation from the Brain, [of the foam of the most useful part of the Blood, the superfluity of the Aliment, as Blood and Marrow] which being injected, τῇ μίτρᾳ, purulent Matter, and Moisture, and Blood, issue from the Brain, whereof Flesh, Nerves, and Bones, and Hair, and the whole Body consists: [the Power of Seed is incorporeal as the motive Mind; but the effused Matter corporeal.] From the Vapour comes the Soul and Sense; it is first compacted and coagulated in 40 Days: and being perfected according to harmonical Proportions in 7, 9 or 10 Months (at the farthest) the Infant is brought forth, having all proportions of Life; of which (aptly connected according to the proportions of Harmony) it consists; all Things happening to it at certain times. Thus Alexander, out of the Pythagorick Commentaries. The Proportions themselves are most exactly deliver'd by ³ Censorinus; thus.*

Pythagoras said, that generally there are two kinds of Births, one lesser, of 7 Months; which comes into the World the 207 day after the Conception: the other greater, of 10 Months; which is brought forth in the 274 Day. The first and lesser is chiefly contained in the number 6: For that which is conceived of the Seed, (as he saith) the 6 first Days, is a milky Substance; the next 8 Days, Bloody; which 8 with the 6 make the first concord, Diatessaron: The third degree is of 9 Days; in which time it is made Flesh; these to the first 6 are in sequialtera

Proportion, and make the second concord, Diapente: then follow 12 Days more, in which the Body is fully formed; these to the same 6 consist in duplicate Proportion, and make the Diatessaron concord: These four Numbers, 6, 8, 9, 12, added together make 35 Days. Nor without Reason is the number 6 the foundation of Generation, for the Greeks call it *πέντε*, we *perfect*; because its three Parts, $\frac{2}{3}$ and $\frac{1}{3}$; and $\frac{1}{2}$ (that is, 1, 2, and 3.) perfect it; now as the beginnings of the Seed, and that milky foundation of Conception, is first completed by this Number; so this beginning of the Man now formed, and as it were another foundation of Maturity, which is of 35 Days, being multiplied by 6, makes 220 Days, in which this Maturity is fulfilled.

The other (greater) Birth, is contained in the greater number 7. And as the beginning of the former is in 6 Days, after which the Seed is converted into Blood; so that of this is in 7. And as there the members of the Infant are formed; so here (about) 40. These 40 Days being multiplied by the first 7, make 280 Days, that is, 40 Weeks: but so much as the Birth happens on the first day of the last Week, 6 Days are subtracted, and the 274th observed.

⁴ He held that Mankind had ever been; and never had beginning.

CHAP. VII.

The Soul, its Parts, and first of the irrational Part.

⁵ *THE Power of Number being greatest in Nature, Pythagoras defined the Soul, ¹ A self-moving Number.*

² *Of the Pythagoreans some affirm, that the Soul is in the Motes in the Air; others, that it is that which moves those Motes.*

³ *The Soul is most generally divided into two Parts, rational, and irrational; but more especially into three; for the irrational they divided into irascible and desiderative. ⁴ These are termed ψῆς, Φθῆς, θυμὸς. Νῆς and θυμὸς are in other living Creatures, Φθῆς only in Man. [Υπερ]*

⁵ *The Souls of all animate Creatures are rational, even of those which we term irrational; but they act not according to Reason, because of the ill temperament of the Body, and want of Speech, as in Apes and Dogs, λαλοῦσι μὲν ὅσον ἄνθρωποι, ἢ εἰς ἑαυτοὺς δὲ, They talk but cannot speak.*

The beginning of the Soul, is from the heat of the Brain; that part which is in the Heart is θυμὸς, but σπῆς and ψῆς are in the Brain. The Senses are distillations from these; the rational Part is immortal, the rest mortal. The Soul is nourished by Blood,

and

¹ Laert. 3. 29.

² Laert. 3. 78.

³ De die natal. cap. 11.

⁴ Varro de re rust. lib. 2. cap. 1. Censor. de die nat. cap. 4.

⁵ Nemes. de nat. hom.

⁶ Plut. de Plac. Phil. 4. 2.

⁷ Arist. de anima 1. 2.

⁸ Plut. plac. 4. 4.

⁹ Laert. 3. 31.

¹⁰ Plut. plac. 20.

and the Faculties of the Soul are Spirits. Both the Soul and her Faculties are invisible, for Æther is invisible: The Fetters of the Soul are Veins, Arteries, and Nerves; but when she is strong, and composed within herself, her Fetters are Reasons and Actions.

Every Sense is derived from its proper Element; sight from Æther, hearing from Air, smelling from Fire, taste from Water, touch from Earth.

Sense in general, and particularly Sight, is a Vapour very hot; and for this Reason we are said to see through Air, and through Water, for the Heat pierceth the Cold; for if that which is in the Eyes were a cold Vapour, it would fight with the Air, which is like it, (hot.) In some Places he calleth the Eyes the gates of the Sun; the same he determined concerning Hearing, and the rest of the Senses.

Sight is the judge of Colours. Colour they call the superficies of a Body. The kinds of Colour are Black, White, Red, Pale; or, (as the anonymous Writer delivers the opinion of Pythagoras) ten, Black, White, and the rest between them, Yellow, Tawney, Pale, Red, Blue, Green, Bright, Grey. The differences of Colours are derived from mixtures of the Elements, and in living Creatures from variety of Place, and of Air.

The Image in a mirror is made by reflection of the Sight, which being extended to the Brass, and meeting with a thick smooth Body, is repercussed, and returns into itself; as when the Hand is stretch'd forth, and again brought back to the Shoulder.

Hearing, is the judge of Voice, sharp and flat. Voice is incorporeal; for not Air, but the figure and superficies of Air, by a stroke becomes Voice; but no superficies is a Body. And tho' it followeth the motion of the Body, yet itself hath no Body; as when a Rod is bent, the Superficies suffers nothing, the Matter only is bent.

Smelling judgeth of Odours, good and ill, and the fix between them, putrid, humid, liquid, vapourate.

Taste judgeth of Savours, Sweet, Bitter, and the five between them, for they are in all seven, Sweet, Bitter, Sharp, Acid, Fresh, Salt, Hot.

Touching judgeth many things, Heavy, Light, and those that are between them; Hot, Cold, and those that are between them; Hard, Soft, and those that are between them; Dry, Moist, and those that are between them. The other four Senses are seated in the Head only, and confined to their proper Organs; but Touching is diffused through the Head, and the whole Body, and is common to every Sense; but exhibits its Judgment most manifestly by the Hands.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the rational Part of the Soul, the Mind.

IN Pythagoras his definition of the Soul, *A self-moving Number*, Plutarch saith, he takes Number for Mind; The Mind is, is induced into the Soul, as extrinseco, from without, by divine Participation, *ἡνὶ μῆνι*, a delimited of the universal divine Mind. For there is a Soul intent and commoat through the whole Nature of Things, from which our Souls are pluck'd. She is immortal, because that from which she is taken is immortal; yet not a God, but the work of the eternal God. Thus Pythagoras exceedingly confirmed the opinion of his Master Pherecides, who first taught, that the Souls of Men are sempiternal.

Our Souls (said he) consist of a Tetrad, Mind, Science, Opinion, Sense: From which proceeds all Art and Science, and by which we our selves are rational. The Mind therefore is a Monad, for the Mind considereth according to a Monad. As for Example; there are many Men; these one by one are incomprehensible by Sense, and innumerable; but we understand this one Man, to which none hath Resemblance; and we understand one Horse, for the Particulars are innumerable. Thus every Genus and Species is according to Monad, wherefore to every one in particular they apply this Definition, a rational Creature, or, a neighing Creature. Hence is the Mind a Monad, whereby we understand these Things. The indeterminate Duad is Science: for all Demonstration, and all Belief of Science, and likewise all Syllogism from some Things granted, infers that which is doubted, and easily demonstrateth another Thing, the comprehension whereof is Science, therefore it is as the Duad. Opinion is justly a Triad, being of many. Triad implies a multitude, as, *Thrice happy Greeks*:—[The rest of the Text is wanting.]

The Pythagoreans assert eight Organs of Knowledge, Sense, Phantasie, Art, Opinion, Prudence, Science, Wisdom, Mind. Of these, we have common with divine Natures, Art, Prudence, Science, Mind; with Beasts, Sense and Phantasie; only Opinion is proper to us. Sense, is a deceitful knowledge through the Body; Phantasie, a motion in the Soul; Art, a habit of operating with Reason. We add, with Reason, for a Spider also operates, but without Reason. Prudence, is a habit elective of that which is right in Things to be done; Science, is a habit of those Things which are always the same, and

* Stob. phys. 2. pag. 150.

plac. 4. 14.

* Anon. vi.

* Lucet.

* Anon. Phot.

* Of which the Ancients made their Mirrors, see Callim. Hymn. 5.

* Plac. phil. 4. 2.

* Stob. phys. 1.

* Anon.

* Plut. plac. 1. 15. for *ἡνὶ μῆνι* perhaps *ἡνὶ μῆνι*.

* Plac. Alex. from 5.

* Anon. apud Phot. de vit. Pyth.

* Plut. libid.

* Anon. Phot.

* Cic. de senect.

* Plut. plac. 4. 20.

* Cic. nat. deor. 2.

and in the same manner; *Wisdom*, a knowledge of the first Cause; *Mind*, the Principle and Fountain of all good Things.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Transmigration of the Soul.

*What he delivered to his Auditors (saith * Porphyrius) none can certainly affirm, for there was a great and strict Silence observed amongst them; but the most known are these: First, he said, that the Soul is immortal; then, that it enters into other kinds of living Creatures. [Or, as Laetius expresseth it, He first asserted, that the Soul passing through the circle of Necessity, lives at several times in different living Creatures.] Moreover, that after some Periods, the same Things that are now generated, are generated again, and that nothing is simply New; and that we ought to esteem all animate Creatures to be of the same kind with us. These Doctrines Pythagoras seems to have brought first into Greece. † Didorus Siculus affirms, he learn'd them of the Egyptians: " They were the first who asserted, that the Soul of Man is immortal, and the Body perishing; it always passeth into another Body; and when it bath run through all Things terrestrial, marine, volatile, it again entereth into some generated human Body. Which Circuition is completed in three thousand Years. This Opinion (adds Herodotus) some of the Greeks have usurped as their own; some more ancient, others later, whose Names knowingly I omit.*

Pythagoras, (saith Theodoret) Plato, Plotinus, and the rest of that Sect, acknowledging Souls to be immortal, asserted, That they are præexistent to Bodies; that there is an innumerable company of Souls; that those which transgress, are sent down into Bodies, so as being purify'd by such Discipline, they may return to their own Place. That those which, whilst they are in Bodies, lead a wicked Life, are sent down farther into irrational Creatures, hereby to receive Punishment, and right Expiation; the angry and malicious into Serpents, the ravenous into Wolves, the audacious into Lions, the fraudulent into Foxes, and the like.

* Upon this Ground (as some conceive) it was, that he forbade to eat Flesh: for, * *We ought to esteem all animal Creatures to be of the same kind with us, and to have common Right with us, and to be allied (in a manner) to us.* Whence a Bean is to be avoided (saith Horace stiled, cognata Pythagoræ, because he forbade it to be eaten upon the same Grounds; * *for that Men and Beans arose out of the same Putrefaction.*

This Assertion he defended by many Instances, particularly of himself. * *Heracides relates, that he said, he had been in former times Æthalides, esteemed the Son of Mercury, [a powerful Orator, who wrote two Treatises, the one mournful, the other pleasant; so that, like Democritus and Heraclitus, he bewailed and derided the instability of Life, and was said to die and live from Day to Day] and that Mercury bad him request whatsoever he would, Immortality only excepted. That he desired, that he might preserve the remembrance of all Actions, alive and dead: whereupon he remembered all Things whilst he lived, and after Death retained the same Memory. That afterwards he came to be Euphorbus, and was slain by Menelaus. Now Euphorbus said, that he had been in former times Æthalides, and that he had received this Gift from Mercury, to know the Migration of the Soul, as it pass from one Body to another, and into what Plants and Animals it migrated, and what things his Soul suffered after Death, and what other Souls suffered. Euphorbus dying, his Soul passed into Hermotimus, who desiring to passjs who he was, went to the Branchidæ, and coming into the Temple of Apollo, shewed the Shield which Menelaus had hung up there, [but * Porphyrius and * Jamblicus affirm, it was dedicated (together with other Trojan Spoils) to Argive Juns in her Temple at Mycenæ] for he said, That at his return from Troy, he had dedicated that Shield to Apollo, it being then old, and nothing remaining but the Ivory Stock. As soon as Hermotimus died, he became Pyrrhus, a Fisherman of Delus; and again remembered all Things, how he had been first Æthalides, then Euphorbus, then Hermotimus, and lastly Pyrrhus. When Pyrrhus died, he became Pythagoras, and remembered all that we have said. Others relate, that he said, he had been, first Euphorbus; secondly, Æthalides; thirdly, Hermotimus; fourthly, Pyrrhus; and lastly, Pythagoras. † *Clearchus and Dicæarchus, that he had been first Euphorbus; then Pyrauder; then Callicæa; then a beautiful Courtesan, named Alce. † For this Reason, of all Homer's Verses, he did especially praise these, and set them to the Harp, and often repeated them as his own Epicedium.**

As by some Hand, a tender Olive set
In a lone Place, near a smooth Rivulet;
Fair she shoots up, and fann'd on ev'ry Side
By amorous Winds, displays her blooming Pride;
Until some churlish unexpected Gust
Plows up her Root, and buries her in Dust.
So by Alcides slain, Euphorbus lay,
Stretch'd on the Ground, his Arms the Victor's
(Pry.
Hence

* P. g. 188. † Cited by Euseb. præpar. Evam. 1. 2. 2. 13. † Jamet. c. 24. * Porph. p. 200. * Agell. 4. 11. † Porph. p. 191. c. 14.

* Herodot. 1. 2.

* Laert. 5. 4.

* Anon. vit.

* Stetz. Chil. 2.

* Porph. loc. cit.

* Pag. 192.

* Laert.

* Cap. 14.

Hence in his Person, ' *Ovid*.

" O you, whom Horrors of cold Death affright,
Why fear you *Syx*? Vain Names, and endless
Night,
The Dreams of Poets, and feign'd Miseries
Of forged Hell? Whether last Flames surprize,
Or Age devours your Bodies, they not grieve,
Nor suffer Pains. Our Souls for ever live:
Yet evermore their antient Houses leave
To live in new, which them, as Guests receive.
In *Trojan* Wars, I (I remember well)
Euphorbus was, *Pantheus* Son, and fell
By *Menelaus* Lance: my Shield again
At *Argos* late I saw in *Juno's* Fane.
All alter, nothing finally decays;
Hither and thither still the Spirit strays;
Guest to all Bodies; out of Beasts it flies
To Men, from Men to Beasts, and never dies.
As pliant Wax each new Impression takes,
Fixt to no Form, but still the old forsakes,
Yet is the same: So Souls the same abide,
Though various Species their Reception hide.
Then lest thy greedy Belly should destroy
(I prophesy) depressed Pity,
Forbear t'expulse thy Kindred Ghosts with Food
By Death procur'd, nor nourish Blood with Blood.

Neither did he instance himself only, but ^u put many others also in mind of the Accidents of their former Life, how they had lived, before their Souls were confined the second time to the Body. This he did (adds ^x *Porphyrus*) to those whose Souls were rightly purify'd; such was ^y *Millias* of *Crotona*, whom he caused to call to Memory, that he had been *Midas* Son of *Gordias*. Whereupon *Millias* went to *Epire*, to perform some Funeral Rites, as he appointed.

CHAP. X.

The separate Life of the Soul.

THE ^z Soul hath a twofold Life, Separate, and in the Body; her Faculties are otherwise in *anima*, otherwise in *animali*.

^a The Soul is incorruptible; for when it goes out of the Body, it goes to the Soul of the World, which is of the same Kind.

^b When the goeth out upon the Earth, she walketh in the Air like a Body. *Mercury* is the Keeper of Souls, and for that Reason is called Περαιδης, and Πυλαιος, and Χθονιος, because he brings Souls out

of Bodies in the Earth and the Sea; of which, those that are pure, he leadeth into an high Place; the impure come not to them, nor to one another, but are bound by the Furies in indissoluble Chains.

^c The *Pythagoreans* affirmed, that the Souls of the Dead neither cast a Shadow nor Wink; for that it is the Sun which causeth the Shadow: But he who enters there, is by the Law of the Place deprived of the Sun's Light, which they signify in that Speech.

^d *Pythagoras* held, that Earthquakes proceed from no other Cause but the Meeting of the Dead.

SECT. V.

Medicine.

TO Physick we shall annex, as its immediate Consequent, Medicine. *Apuleius* affirms, that *Pythagoras* learnt the Remedies and Cures of Diseases of the Chaldeans. *Laertius* ^e, that he neglected no Medicine. *Ælian* ^f that he studied it accurately. *Jamblichus*, that the *Pythagoreans* esteem it not the least of the Sciences. Lastly, *Diogenes* ^g relates of *Pythagoras*, that whensoever his Friends fell into any Indisposition of Body, he cured them.

^h Health, *Pythagoras* defined, The Consistence of a Form. Sickness, The Violation of it.

CHAP. I.

Diætick.

OF Medicine, the ^b *Pythagoreans* chiefly applied themselves to the Diætick Part, and were most exact in that; and endeavoured first to understand the Proportion, not only of Labour, but likewise of Food and Rest. Then concerning the dressing of such Meats, they were almost the first who endeavoured to comment and to define.

ⁱ Forasmuch as Diet doth much conduce to good Institution, being wholesome and regular, let us examine what he decreed therein. Of Meats be absolutely disallowed such as are flatulent, and disorder the Body; on the contrary, he approved and commanded those which confirm and unite the Constitution; whence be judged Millet to be a convenient Food.

But he also wholly forbade such Meats as are not used by the Gods, because they separate us from the Correspondence which we have with them.

Likewise he advised to abstain from such Meats as are esteemed sacred, which deserve a Respect; and are nothing convenient for the ordinary Use of Man.

Whatsoever

^a Lib. 15. ^b Englished by my Uncle, Mr. Sandys. ^c Porph. p. 193. ^d Jamb. c. 14. ^e Pag. 301. ^f Jamb. c. 28. p. 134. See also *Ælian*, var. Hist. ^g Stob. Phys. p. 109. ^h Plot. plac. 4. 7. ⁱ Laert. 8. 39. ^j Plin. quæ præc. p. 2. ^k *Ælian*, var. Hist. 4. 26. ^l Laert. 8. 12. ^m Var. Hist. 9. 22. ⁿ Porph. c. 29. ^o Laert. 8. 35. ^p Jamb. c. 29. p. 167.

Whatsoever Meats obstructed Divination, or were prejudicial to the Purity and Sanctity of the Mind, or to Temperance and habitual Virtue, he advised to abstain: As also those which are contrary to Purity, and defile the Imaginations which occur in Sleep, and the other Purities of the Soul, he rejected and avoided.

These Rules concerning Diet he prescribed generally to all Persons, but more particularly to Philosophers, who are most addicted to Contemplation of the sublimest Things. He denied at once all superfluous Meats as were unlawful to be eaten, not permitting them at any time to feed on that which had Life, or to drink Wine, or to sacrifice to the Gods any living Creature, or hurt any of them; but commanded, with all Exactness, to preserve the Justice which belongs even to them. In this manner he lived himself, abstaining from the Flesh of living Creatures, and worshipping unbloody Altars, and both taking care, that others should not put tame Beasts to Death, and himself making the savage tame, and moderating and instituting them both by Words and Actions; but by no means would punish or kill them.

He likewise commanded civil Lawgivers to abstain from the Flesh of living Creatures, because it behoveth them who would make use of the Height of Justice, no way to injure living Creatures, which are of Affinity with us. For how can they persuade other Men to do just Things, who themselves are transported by Avarice to feed on living Creatures, which are of Affinity with us, allied, in a manner, to us, through the Community of Life, consisting of the Temperament and Commission of the same Elements?

But to others, whose Life was not extraordinary pure, and sacred, and philosophical, he prescribed a certain Time for Abstinence. To those he decreed, That they should not eat the Heart: That they should not eat the Brain. And these are prohibited to all Pythagoreans; for they are Leaders, and, as it were, Seats and Houses of Wisdom and Life. But these were consecrated by the Nature of the divine Word.

In like manner he prohibited Mallows, as being the first Messenger and Interpreter of Celestial Affections, and (as I may say) Compassions towards Men.

Likewise he commanded to abstain from the Melanure, [a Fish so called from the Blackness of its Tail] because it is peculiar to the Terrestrial Deities.

He forbade also the Erythrine, for the like Reason.

Also to abstain from Beans, for many Reasons, divine and natural, referring to the Soul.

The Pythagoreans at Dinner used Bread and Honey. Wine they drank not (betwixt Meals.) At Supper, Wine, and Maza, and Bread, and Broth,

and Herbs, both raw and boiled. They likewise set before them the Flesh of sacrificed Beasts. They seldom eat Broths of Fish, because some of them are in some respects very hurtful, likewise (seldom) the Flesh of such Creatures as use not to hurt Mankind.

As concerning the Diet of Pythagoras himself, his Dinner consisted of Honey-Combs, or Honey; his Supper of Bread made of Millet, and [his Opsonium] of boiled or raw Salads, very seldom of the Flesh of sacrificed Victims, and that not promiscuously of every Part, [and seldom of Sea-fish.]

When he designed to go into the private Places of the Gods, and to stay there a while, he used for the most part such Meats as expelled Hunger and Thirst. For the expelling of Hunger, he made a Composition of the Seed of Poppy, and Sesame, and the Skin of the Scammony well wash'd, till it be quite drain'd of the outward Juice, of the Flowers of the Daffidil, and the Leaves of Mallows, of Pulse of Barley and Peas; of all which taking an equal Weight, and chopping them small, he made up into a Mass with Hymettian Honey. Against Thirst, he took of the Seeds of Cucumbers, and the fullest dried Raisins, taking out the Kernels, and the Flower of Coriander, and the Seeds of Mallows, and Purslain, and scraped Cheese, Meal and Cream; these he made up with wild Honey. This Diet, he said, was taught to Hercules, by Ceres, when he was sent into the Lybian Deserts.

CHAP. II.

Therapeutick.

THE Therapeutick Part Pythagoras practised by Cataplasms, Charms, and Musick.

The Pythagoreans (saith Jamblichus) treated chiefly of Cataplasms; but Potions they less esteemed. And of those they used only such as were proper against Ulcerations; but Incision, and Cauterising they absolutely disallow'd.

Magical Herbs, saith Pliny, were first celebrated in our Part of the World by Pythagoras, following the Magi. He first wrote a Treatise of their Virtues, assigning the Invention and Original to Apollo and Æsculapius, Immortal Gods.

By Coriacea, and Callicia, Pythagoras affirms, that Water will be turned into Ice; the mention whereof I find not, saith Pliny, in others; nor in him, any more concerning them.

He likewise speaks of Menias, which he also calls by another Name, Corinthas; the Juice whereof boiled in Water, he saith, immediately cures the biting of Serpents, fomenting the Part therewith. The same Juice being spill'd upon the Grass, they who tread upon

^a The Pythagoreans. ^b Ibid. ^c Ibid. ^d Ibid. ^e Ibid. ^f Ibid. ^g Ibid. ^h Ibid. ⁱ Ibid. ^j Ibid. ^k Ibid. ^l Ibid. ^m Ibid. ⁿ Ibid. ^o Ibid. ^p Ibid. ^q Ibid. ^r Ibid. ^s Ibid. ^t Ibid. ^u Ibid. ^v Ibid. ^w Ibid. ^x Ibid. ^y Ibid. ^z Ibid. ^{aa} Ibid. ^{ab} Ibid. ^{ac} Ibid. ^{ad} Ibid. ^{ae} Ibid. ^{af} Ibid. ^{ag} Ibid. ^{ah} Ibid. ^{ai} Ibid. ^{aj} Ibid. ^{ak} Ibid. ^{al} Ibid. ^{am} Ibid. ^{an} Ibid. ^{ao} Ibid. ^{ap} Ibid. ^{aq} Ibid. ^{ar} Ibid. ^{as} Ibid. ^{at} Ibid. ^{au} Ibid. ^{av} Ibid. ^{aw} Ibid. ^{ax} Ibid. ^{ay} Ibid. ^{az} Ibid. ^{ba} Ibid. ^{bb} Ibid. ^{bc} Ibid. ^{bd} Ibid. ^{be} Ibid. ^{bf} Ibid. ^{bg} Ibid. ^{bh} Ibid. ^{bi} Ibid. ^{bj} Ibid. ^{bk} Ibid. ^{bl} Ibid. ^{bm} Ibid. ^{bn} Ibid. ^{bo} Ibid. ^{bp} Ibid. ^{bq} Ibid. ^{br} Ibid. ^{bs} Ibid. ^{bt} Ibid. ^{bu} Ibid. ^{bv} Ibid. ^{bw} Ibid. ^{bx} Ibid. ^{by} Ibid. ^{bz} Ibid. ^{ca} Ibid. ^{cb} Ibid. ^{cc} Ibid. ^{cd} Ibid. ^{ce} Ibid. ^{cf} Ibid. ^{cg} Ibid. ^{ch} Ibid. ^{ci} Ibid. ^{cj} Ibid. ^{ck} Ibid. 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^a Porph. p. 195.

^b Ibid.

^c Ibid.

^d Ibid.

^e Ibid.

^f Ibid.

^g Ibid.

^h Ibid.

ⁱ Ibid.

^j Ibid.

^k Ibid.

^l Ibid.

^m Ibid.

ⁿ Ibid.

^o Ibid.

^p Ibid.

^q Ibid.

^r Ibid.

^s Ibid.

^t Ibid.

^u Ibid.

^v Ibid.

^w Ibid.

^x Ibid.

^y Ibid.

^z Ibid.

^{aa} Ibid.

^{ab} Ibid.

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^{cq} Ibid.

^{cr} Ibid.

it, or are besprinkled therewith, die irrecoverably: a strange Nature of Poison, except against Poison.

* There is an Herb called Aproxis, by the same Pythagoras, the Root whereof takes Fire at distance, as Naptha, of which, saith Pliny, we have spoken in the Wonders of the Earth. The same Pythagoras relates, That if any Disease should happen to Men when the Aproxis is in its Flower, although they be cured, yet shall they constantly have some grudging thereof as often as it blows; and Wheat, and Hemlock, and Violet, have the same Quality. I am not ignorant, adds Pliny, that this Book is by some ascribed to Cleompurus, the Physician; but pertinaacious Fame, and Antiquity, vindicate it to Pythagoras.

† Pythagoras the Philosopher wrote also one Volume concerning the Sea-Onyon, collecting the medicinal Properties thereof, which Pliny professeth to have taken from him, lib. 20. And ‡ again, he saith, Pythagoras affirms, that a Sea-Onyon, hung over the Threshold of the Gate, hinders all ill Medicaments from entering the House.

Likewise, Coleworts (as § Pliny relates) were much commended by Pythagoras. He adds, ¶ that concerning the white Kind of the Erings, (by the Romans call'd, Centum-capita) there are many Vanities delivered, not only by the Magi, but by the Pythagoreans.

Besides the Pharmaceutick, Pythagoras practised two other Ways of Cure, one by Musick, the other by Charm. Of the first we have already spoken. Of the second thus * Jamblicus: There is also a

way without the singing of Birds, by which they expell'd some Passions and Sicknesses, (as they say) induced by Incantation; whence it seems was derived the Word *Ward*. The Way of Cure by Charm, saith † the Greek Etymologist, was of antient Use; whence Homer :

— And staid the black Blood by a Charm.

And Pindar, speaking of Æsculapius, *ἀμύκων*, with soft Charms.

That Pythagoras made use of Epodes, is also affirmed by ‡ Porphyrius. He alayed, saith he, the Passions of the Soul and Body by Rhythms, and Verses, and Epodes. And Diogenes, cited by the same Porphyrius, if his Friends fell into any Indisposition of Body, he healed them; if they were troubled in Mind, he assuaged their Grief, as we said, partly by Charms and Magick Verses, partly by Musick. For he had some Verses proper to the Cure of the Indispositions of the Body, by singing which, he restored the Sick to their former Health: He had other Verses that procured Forgetfulness of Grief, assuaged Anger, and suppressed inordinate Desires.

Of these Charms we find an Instance preserved by § Pliny, who prescribes, as an Invention of Pythagoras, which seldom fails against Lameness, or Blindness, or the like Accidents, to apply to the Part, if on the Right-side, an uneven Number of Vowels of impossible Words; if on the Left, an even.

* Plin. loc. cit.

† Plin. 19. 5.

‡ Lib. 20. 9.

§ Lib. 20. c. 9.

¶ Lib. 22. c. 9.

‡ Cap. 3.

§ In *transi.*

§ Pag. 93.

¶ Lib. 28. c. 4.

The Doctrine of PYTHAGORAS.

CHAP. I.

Pythagoras his Symbolical Way of Teaching.

PYTHAGORAS † had a twofold Manner of teaching: Whatsoever he communicated to his Auditors, was delivered, either plainly or symbolically. Hitherto of the plain Way. We come now to the other, the symbolical.

‡ He used by short Sentences to vaticinate an infinite multiplicitous Signification to his Disciples, after a symbolical manner: no otherwise than Apollo by short Answers exhibits many imperceptible Sentences; and Nature herself, by small Seeds, most difficult Effects. Of this kind is,

— half is the whole's Beginning.

* Porph. p. 197.

† Jambl. c. 29. p. 162, &c.

An Apophthegm of Pythagoras himself. Neither in that Hemistich only, but in others of the same Kind, the most divine Pythagoras wrapped up Sparks of Truth, for such as could enkindle them, in a short Way of Speech, treasuring up concealed a most copious Production of Theory; as in this,

— to Number all have reference.

And again, *φιλότης, ἰσότης*, Friendship, Equality; and in the Word *Κόσμος*, (World, or Heaven) and in the Word Philosophy, and in *σύνταξις*, and in that celebrated Word Tetrachys. All these, and many more,

more, did Pythagoras invent, for the Benefit and Rectification of such as conversed with him.

Some Things likewise (saith * Porphyrius) he spoke in a mystical Way symbolically, most of which are collected by Aristotle; as when he called the Sea 'a tear of Saturn; the two Beans, the hands of Rhea; the Pleiades, the lutes of the Muses; the Planets, the dogs of Proserpina [the ' Eyes, the gates of the Sun.]

He had also another kind of Symbols, as, *Go not over a Balance; that is, shun Avarice, &c.* Thus Porphyrius. These are variously recited and interpreted by several Authors; we shall begin with Jamblichus, as being herein of greatest Credit.

CHAP. II.

The Symbols of Pythagoras, according to Jamblichus.

THE last way of Exhortation to Virtue, and Dehortation from Vice, is that by Symbols; one way being proper to the Sect, not communicable to other Institutions; another vulgar and common to them; the third is betwixt both, neither absolutely Publick, nor wholly Pythagorical, nor quite different from either; such are those which they term Symbols; of which, as many as deserve Commemoration, in our Opinion, of the adhortatory Form, we shall communicate, and add a suitable Interpretation; conceiving that hereby, the Exhortation to Philosophy may be more prevalent on those that hear them, than if delivered more at large. And so much as we shall insert some exoterick Solutions, common to all Philosophy, it is to be understood, as different from the meaning of the Pythagoreans. But inasmuch as we shall intermix some of the most particular Opinions of the Pythagoreans, consonant to each; this is wholly proper to them, and dissonant from all other Philosophers, but most fit to be alleged. This will insensibly lead us from the exoterick Notions, bringing us to the others, and acquainting us with them. And to the Exhortations framed according to this Sect, as a Bridge or Ladder, by which we ascend from a Depth to a great Height, guiding the Minds of those who addict themselves genuinely thereto. For to this End it was framed, according to imitation of the Things already mentioned. For the most ancient, and such as were contemporary with, and Disciples to Pythagoras, did not compose their Writings intelligible, in a common vulgar Style, familiar to every one, as if they endeavoured to dictate Things readily perceptible by the Hearer; but consonant to the Silence decreed by Pythagoras, concerning divine Mysteries,

which it was not lawful to speak of before those who were not initiated; and therefore clouded both their mutual Discourses and Writings by Symbols; which, if not expounded by those that proposed them, by a regular Interpretation, appear to the Hearers like old Wives Proverbs, trivial and foolish; [a] but being rightly explained, and instead of dark, rendered lucid and conspicuous to the Vulgar, they discover an admirable Sense, no less than the divine Oracle of Pythian Apollo, and give a divine Inspiration to the Philologists that understand them.] That therefore their Benefit may be known, and their adhortative Use manifest, we will give the Solutions of every Symbol, both after the exoterick and the aeroatick Way; not omitting those Things which were preserved in Silence, not communicable to uninitiated Persons. The Symbols are these:

1. When you go to the Temple Worship, neither do nor say any thing concerning Life.
2. If there be a Temple in your way, go not in, no not though you pass by the very Doors.
3. Sacrifice and Worship barefoot.
4. Decline High-ways, and take the Foot-path.
5. Abstain from the Melanure, for it belongs to the terrestrial Gods.
6. Above all Things, govern your Tongue, when you fellow the Gods.
7. When the Winds blow, worship the Noise.
8. Cut not Fire with a Sword.
9. Turn away from thy self every Edge.
10. Help a Man to take up a Burthen, but not to lay it down.
11. Put on the Shoe first on the right Foot, but the left Foot first into the Basin.
12. Discourse not of Pythagorean Things without Light.
13. Pass not over a pair of Scales.
14. Travelling from Home, turn not back; for the Furies go back with you.
15. Urine not, being turned towards the Sun.
16. Wipe not a Seat with a Torch.
17. A Cock keep, but not sacrifice; for it is consecrated to the Moon and the Sun.
18. Sit not upon a Chanix.
19. Breed nothing that hath crooked Talons.
20. Cut not in the way.
21. Receive not a Swallow into your House.
22. Wear not a Ring.
23. Grave not the Image of God on a Ring.
24. Look not in a Glass by Candle-light.
25. Concerning the Gods, disbelieve nothing wonderful, nor concerning divine Doctrines.
26. Be not taken with immoderate laughter.
27. At a Sacrifice, pare not your Nails.

○ ○ ○

28. Lay

* Pag. 199.

571. Laert.

* For *τὴν Σελήνην ἵκανον τῆς ἀσπίδος*; read *ἵκανον* *Κρίνε ἀσπίδος*, for so Clemens Alexandrinus, Strom. l. b. 5. p.

† Porph. loco cit.

‡ Jamb. prorept. cap. ult.

§ Vlt. cap. 23.

28. *Lay not hold on every one readily with your right Hand.*
29. *When you rise out of Bed, disorder the Coverlet, and deface the Print.*
30. *Eat not the Heart.*
31. *Eat not the Brains.*
32. *Spit upon the cuttings of your Hair, and the parings of your Nails.*
33. *Receive not an Erythrine.*
34. *Deface the print of a pot in the Apbes.*
35. *Take not a Woman that bath Gold, to get Children of her.*
36. *First honour the Figure and Steps, a Figure and a Tribunal.*
37. *Abstain from Beans.*
38. *Set Mallows, but eat it not.*
39. *Abstain from living Creatures.*

C H A P. III.

An Explication of the Pythagorick Symbols, by Jamblichus.

ALL these Symbols are in general adhortative to all Virtue; and every one of them in particular conduceth to some particular Virtue, and part of Philosophy, and Learning; as the first are adhortative to Devotion, and divine Knowledge.

S Y M B. I.

FOR this, *When you go to the Temple Worship, neither do nor say any thing concerning Life*, observes the Divinity after such a manner, as it is in itself, pure and incommixt. He joins pure to the pure, and takes care, that no worldly Business insinuate itself into the divine Worship; for they are Things wholly different and opposite to one another. Moreover, this conduceth much to Science; for we ought not to bring to the divine Science any such thing as human Consideration, or care of outward Life. Thus nothing is hereby commanded, but that divine Discourses, and sacred Actions, ought not to be intermixt with the unifiable Manners of Men.

S Y M B. II.

TO that is consonant the next, *If a Temple lie in your way, go not in, nor though you pass by the very Doors*. For if Like is delightful to its Like, it is manifest that the Gods, having the chiefest Essence of all Things, ought to have the principal Worship: But if any Man doth it upon occasion of any other Thing, he makes that the second,

which is the first and chiefest of all; and by that means he subverts the whole Order of Worship, and Science. The most excellent Good ought not to be ranked in the latter Place, as inferior to human Good; neither ought our own Affairs to have the place of the chief End and better Things, either in our Words or Thoughts.

S Y M B. III.

That which follows is an Exhortation to the same; for this, *Sacrifice and Worship barefoot*, signifieth one way, that we ought to serve the Gods, and perform their Knowledge decently and moderately, not exceeding the order in the Earth. Another way, that we ought to perform their Service and Knowledge, being free without Fetters. This the Symbol commands to be observ'd, not in the Body only, but in the Acts of the Soul, that they be not restrained by Passions, nor by the Infirmary of the Body, nor by our external Generation, but all free and ready for Communication with the Gods.

S Y M B. IV.

There is another Symbol of this kind, exhorting to the same Virtue; *Concerning the Gods, disbelieve nothing wonderful, and concerning divine Doctrines*. This Rule is religious, and declareth the superlative Excellence of the Gods; instructing us, and putting us in Mind, that we ought not to estimate the divine Power by our own Judgment. To us who are corporeal, and generated, and corruptible, and transitory, and obnoxious to several Diseases, and to narrowness of Habitation, and to aggravation of Motion towards the Center, and to sleepiness, and to indigence, and to abundance, and to imprudence, and to infirmity, and to impediment of Soul, and the like; some Things will seem difficult, and impossible; yet have we many Excellencies by Nature: but we are quite short of the Gods, neither have we the same Power, or Ability. This Symbol, therefore, chiefly adviseth to knowledge of the Gods, as of those who are able to do all Things; whence it admonisheth to *disbelieve nothing concerning the Gods*. There is added, *nor concerning divine Doctrines*, meaning those which are declared by the Pythagorick Philosophy; because they being settled by Mathematicks, and scientific Speculation, will show by Demonstration, strengthened by Necessity, that there are true Beings existent void of Fallaciousness.

These may also exhort to the Science concerning the Gods, and persuade that such a Science is to be acquired, as by which we shall not^b disbelieve any thing

^b Perhaps ἀπιστεύω.

Part IX.

thing concerning the Gods: The same may advise to divine Doctrines, and to proceed by Mathematicks; for they only clear the Eyes, and are illuminative of all Beings, to him that will behold them; for by participation of Mathematicks, one thing is constituted before all; that we disbelieve not any Thing, either concerning the nature of the Gods, or their Essence, or their Power: nor of those *Pythagorical Doctrines*, which seem monstrous to Persons not initiated into Mathematicks: Thus disbelieve not, is equivalent to, *acquire and possess* those Things, by means whereof you shall not disbelieve; that is, Mathematicks, and scientifick Demonstrations.

S Y M B. V.

THE next Symbol tends (as I conceive) to the same Effect; *Declining High-ways, walk in Path-ways*. For it commandeth to leave the Publick popular course of Life, and to pursue that which is separate, and divine; Likewise that we despise the common Opinions, and much esteem the Private, which are not to be divulged; and to condemn the Pleasure which tends towards Men; but to value exceedingly that Felicity which is joined with the divine Will: And to leave human Customs as vulgar; but to apply our selves to the Worship of the Gods, which far exceeds the ordinary course of Life. Allied to this, is that which followeth.

S Y M B. VI.

Abstain from the Melanure, for it belongs to the Terrestrial Gods. We shall say more upon it in our explication of the adhortative Symbols: It adviseth to make choice of the heavenly Journey, and to adhere to the intellectual Gods, and to withdraw our selves from material Nature, and to direct our Course to that Life which is pure, void of Matter, and to make use of the best way of divine Worship, and that which is most suitable to the chief Deities. These Symbols are adhortative to the Knowledge and Worship of the Gods.

S Y M B. VII.

THE following Symbols exhort to Wisdom; *Above all Things govern your Tongue, following the Gods*; for the first work of Wisdom is to revert our Speech into itself, and to accustom it not to pass forth, that it may be perfect within our selves, and in its Conversion towards our selves. Moreover in following the Gods: For nothing renders the Mind so perfect, as when a Man, being reverted into himself, followeth the Gods.

S Y M B. VIII.

THIS Symbol likewise, *When the Winds blow, worship the Knife*, is an exhortation to divine Wisdom; For it implieth that we ought to love the similitudes of divine Natures and Powers: and when they make a Reason suitable to their Efficacies, it ought exceedingly to be honoured and revered.

S Y M B. IX.

THE next Symbol, *Cut not Fire with a Sword*, exhorts to Wisdom; for it excites in us a convenient Knowledge, that we ought not to give sharp Language to a Man full of Fire and Anger, nor to contest with him; for you may often by Words exasperate and trouble a rude and unlearned Person. Of this *Heraclitus* witnesseth; *To contest with Anger (saith he) is hard, for whatsoever it would have done, it will purchase tho' at the expence of Life*. And he said truly; for many, gratifying their own Anger, have exchanged their Souls, and preferred Death before them: but from Continence of the Tongue, and Peacefulness, this happens, that out of Contention ariseth Friendship, the wrathful Fire being extinguished, and thou thy self wilt appear not to be void of Reason. This Symbol is confirmed by that which followeth.

S Y M B. X.

Turn away from thy self every Edge; for towards whomsoever it shall be turned, it will hurt him. This Symbol commandeth to use Prudence not Anger; for that Edge of the Mind which we call Anger, is void of Reason and Prudence; for Anger boileth like a Pot upon the Fire, never dividing the Mind to that which is past. You must therefore settle your Mind in Tranquility, diverting it from Anger, and often preventing your self; as a Man maketh Brass sound, not without touching it. This Passion therefore must be suppressed by Reason.

S Y M B. XI.

THIS, *Help to lay on a Burthen, but not to take it off*, adviseth to Fortitude; for, whosoever layeth on a Burthen, signifieth Labour and Action; but he who taketh it off, Rest and Remission. The Meaning therefore of the Symbol is this, Be not the Cause, either to thyself or any other, of Remission of Mind and soft Life; for every useful thing is acquired by Labour. This Symbol *Pythagoras* called *Herculean*, as being sealed by his Labours; for whilst he lived amongst Men, he passed frequently through Fire and many Difficulties, shunning Idleness. From Actions and Labour proceeds a right Office, but not from Sloth.

S Y M B.

S Y M B. XII.

THIS, *Pluck off your right Shoe first, but put your left Foot first into the Basin*, exhorts to active Prudence; that good Actions, as right, are to be set round about us; but the ill, as left, to be laid aside and rejected.

S Y M B. XIII.

THIS, *Discourse not of Pythagorean things without Light*, is chiefly Adhortatory, that the Mind acquire Prudence; for that resembles the Light of the Mind, which being indefinite, limits and reduces it, as it were, out of Darkeness into Light; it is therefore chiefly requisite to look upon the Mind, as Guide of all good Actions in Life: but in the *Pythagorick* Doctrines, this is most particularly necessary; for it is not possible to understand what they are without Light.

S Y M B. XIV.

THIS, *Pasi not over a Balance*, commands to do justly; and above all things, to respect Equality and Mediocrity, and to know Justice, the most perfect Virtue, which compleats the rest, and without which, the rest profit nothing: neither must we know it superficially only, but by Theorems, and scientifick Demonstrations. This Knowledge is the Work of no Art and Science, but only of the Philosophy of *Pythagoras*, which preferreth Mathematicks before all things else.

S Y M B. XV.

TO the same purpose is this, *Travelling from home, turn not back, for the Furies go back with you*. This Symbol exhorteth to Philosophy, and free Action about the Mind. It likewise manifestly teacheth thus: When thou studiest Philosophy, separate thyself from all corporeal and sensible things, and truly make a Meditation of Death unto things intelligible, which are always the same, and after the same manner; proceeding (without turning back) by Mathematicks, conducting thereto. For Travel is the Change of Place, Death is the Separation of the Soul from the Body. But we must so study Philosophy, as to make use of the pure Mind sincerely, without the Acts of corporeal Senses, to the Comprehension of the Truth which in things that are, which is acknowledg'd to be Wisdom. But after you have once applied yourself to study Philosophy, turn not back, nor be drawn back to the former corporeal things, in which you were bred up; for you will much repent hereof, being hinder'd from sacred Comprehensions, by the Darkeness which is in corporeal things. Repentance they call *Eriny's*, or *Fu-*

S Y M B. XVI.

THIS, *Urine not, being turned towards the Sun, admonisheth, that we offer not to do any bestial Action, but to study and practise Philosophy*, looking upon Heaven and the Sun; and remember, that in the Study of Philosophy you never bear a low Mind, but by the Contemplation of heavenly things ascend to the Gods, and to Wisdom. And having applied yourself to study Philosophy, and to the Light of Truth that is in it, purifying yourself, and converting yourself wholly to that Design, to Theology, and Physiologick, and Astronomy, and *Ætiologick*, which is above all the rest, do nothing irrational or bestial.

S Y M B. XVII.

THE same Meaning is of the next, *Wipe not a Seat with a Torch*; for not only because a Torch is purificative, as partaking of much Quick-fire, like Sulphur, it adviseth that this ought not to be defiled, its Nature being such, as it dispelleth all things that defile; nor ought we to oppose natural Habitude, by defiling that whose Nature is repugnant to defiling. Much less ought we to join and mix things proper to Wisdom, with those which are proper to Animality. For a *Torch*, in respect of its Brightness, is compared to Philosophy; a *Seat*, in respect of its Lowness, to Animality.

S Y M B. XVIII.

THIS, *Breed a Cock, but not sacrifice it, for it is sacred to the Moon and the Sun*; admonisheth us to nourish and cherish (and not to neglect, so as to suffer them to perish and corrupt) the great Evidences of the Union, and Coagmentation, and Sympathy, and Conspiracy of the World. It therefore adviseth, to address ourselves to Contemplation of the Universe, and to Philosophy; for the Truth of all things being by Nature concealed, and hard to be found out, yet requisite to be sought, and investigated by Man, chiefly through Philosophy, (for to do it by any other Study is impossible) which receiving some little Sparks from Nature, blows them up, and makes them greater and more perspicuous by its Doctrines. Philosophy therefore ought to be studied.

S Y M B. XIX.

THIS, *Sit not upon a Charnix*, may appear to be more *Pythagorick*, from what was already said; for because Aliment is to be measured by Corporeity and Animality, not by the Chœnix, rest not, nor lead thy Life uninitiated into Philosophy; but applying thyself thereto, take greatest care of that in thee which is most divine, the Soul; and in the Soul, chiefly

chiefly the Mind, whose Aliment is not measured by the Chrenix, but by Contemplation and Discipline.

S Y M B. XX.

THIS, *Breed nothing that hath crooked Talons*, adviseth to a thing which is yet more *Pythagorick*; be free and communicative, and endeavour to make others such also, accustoming thyself to give and receive without Grudging or Envy; not to take all things insatiably, and to give nothing. For the natural Condition of those Fowls which have crooked Talons, is, to receive and snatch readily and quickly, but not easily to let go, or impart to others, by reason of the Tenacity of their Talons, being crooked; as the Nature of Shrimps is such, that they quickly lay hold of a thing, but very hardly part with it, unless they be turned upon their Backs. Now we having Hands given us by Nature, proper to communicate, and straight, not crooked Fingers, ought not to imitate those which have crooked Talons, unlike us; but rather mutually to communicate to, and participate from, one another; as being excited thereto by those who first gave Names to things, who named the more honourable Hand *Nisus*, the Right, not only *ἀνὰ τὴν Νίσσον*, from receiving; but likewise, *κατὰ τὴν Νίσσον* to the communicating, from being ready to receive in communicating. We must therefore do justly, and for that reason philosophise; for Justice is a return and remuneration, exchanging and supplying Excess and Defect.

S Y M B. XXI.

THIS, *Cut not in the way*; that Truth is one, Falshood multiplicitous; which is manifest from this, that what every Thing is, speaking plainly, is expressed but one way; but what it is not, is expressed infinite ways. Philosophy seems to be a way; it therefore saith, chuse that Philosophy, and that way to Philosophy, in which thou shalt not cut (or divide) nor establish contrary Doctrines, but those which are constituted and confirmed by scientific Demonstration, by Mathematicks and Contemplation; which is, *Philosophise Pythagorically*. It may be taken also in another Sense, forasmuch as that Philosophy which proceeds by Corporeals and Sensibles, (with which Philosophy the younger Sort are satisfied, who conceive, that God, and Qualities, and the Mind, and Virtues, and in a word, all the principal Causes of things, are Bodies) is easily subverted and confuted, as appears by the great Disagreement amongst them, who go about to say any thing therein. But the Philosophy which is of Incorporeals, and Intelligibles, and Immaterials, and Eternals, which are always the same in themselves, and towards one another, never admitting Corruption or Alteration, is firmly established, and the

Cause of irrefragable Demonstration. Now this Precept adviseth us, when we philosophise, and perfect the Way which is manifest, that we shun the Snares and Entertainments of Corporeals and Divisibles, and intimately apply ourselves to the Substance of Incorporeals, which are never unlike themselves, by reason of the Truth and Stability which they naturally have.

S Y M B. XXII.

THIS, *Receive not a Swallow into your House*, adviseth, that you admit not a slothful Person (who is not a constant Lover of Labour, neither will perforce to be a Disciple) unto your Doctrines, which require continual Labour and Patience, by reason of the Variety and Intricateness of the several Disciplines. He makes use of the Swallow to represent Sloth, and cutting off Times, because this Bird comes to us but in one Season of the Year, and then stays but a short while with us; but is absent from us, and out of Sight, a much longer Space.

S Y M B. XXIII.

THIS, *Wear not a Ring*, is likewise adhortatory after the *Pythagorick* way, thus: Forasmuch as a Ring encompasseth the Finger of the Wearer in nature of a Chain, but hath this Property, that it pincheth not, nor paineth, but is so fit, as if it naturally belonged to that Part; and the Body is such a kind of Chain to the Soul; *Wear not a Ring*, signifies, *Philosophise truly*, and separate your Soul from the Chain which goeth round about it. For Philosophy is the Meditation of Death, and Separation of the Soul from the Body. Seriously and earnestly therefore apply yourself to the *Pythagorick* Philosophy, which separates the Soul, by the Mind, from all Corporeals, and is conversant about Intellectuals and Immaterials by Theoretick Doctrines. But untie and loose your Sins, and all things that pluck you back and hinder philosophising, Diversions of the Flesh, excessive Eating, unseasonable Repletion, which, as it were, fetter the Body, and continually breed infinite Diseases.

S Y M B. XXIV.

THIS, *Grave not the Image of God in a Ring*, adviseth thus, Philosophise, and, above all things, think that the Gods are incorporeal. This Symbol is, beyond all others, the Seminary of the *Pythagorick* Doctrines; of it all things (almost) are fitly adapted, and by it are established to the End. Think not that they use Forms that are corporeal, neither that they are received into material Substance, fetter'd (as it were) to the Body, like other living Beings. The Figures engraven in Rings, in the very Ring express a Chain, and Corporeity, and sensible

fible Form, as it were the Figure of some Animal, perceptible by Sight; from which we must absolutely separate the Gods, as being eternal and intelligible, and always the same in themselves, and towards one another; as is largely discoursed in the Treatise concerning God.

ed) carry them along with you, and renew your Domestick Familiarity with them.

S Y M B. XXVIII.

S Y M B. XXV.

THIS, *Look not in a Glass by Candle-light*, adviseth more *Pythagorically* thus: Philosophise, pursuing not the Phantasies of Sense (which give a kind of Light to Comprehensions, like a Candle, neither natural nor true) but those which procure Science, and are conversant in the Mind, by which a most bright Purity is constituted in the Eye of the Soul, of all Notions and Intelligibles, and the Speculation of them, but not of Corporeals and Sensibles, for they are in continual Fluxion and Mutation, (as hath often been shewn) no way stable or existing like themselves, whereby they might uphold a firm and scientifick Comprehension, as the others do.

S Y M B. XXVI.

THIS, *Be not seized with immoderate Laughter*, sheweth that we should vanquish Passions: Put thyself in mind of right Reason; be neither blown up in good Fortune, nor cast down in bad; admitting no Thought of Change in either. He named *Laughter* above all other Passions, because that is most apparently shewn in the Face itself; perhaps also, because this is proper to Man only of all living Creatures; whence some define Man, A risible living Creature. This Precept shews that we ought to take Humanity only, as it were in our way, like Guests; but to acquire the Imitation of God, as far as we are able; by Philosophising, secretly withdrawing ourselves from the Property of Men, and preferring the Rational before the Risible, in Distinction from other Creatures.

S Y M B. XXVII.

THIS, *At a Sacrifice pare not your Nails*, is adhortative to Friendship: for of Domesticks and Allies, some being nearly related to us, as Brothers, Children, Parents, are like our Limbs and Parts, which cannot be taken away without much Pain and Maim: others who are allied to us at a great Distance, as the Children of Uncles, or of Cousins, or their Children, or such like, resemble those Parts which may be cut off without Pain, as Hair, Nails, and the like. Intending therefore to signify those Allies, whom, by reason of this Distance, we at other Times neglect, he useth the Word *Nails*, saying, Cast not those quite away; but, in Sacrifices, (though at other Times neglect-

THIS, *Lay not bold on every one readily with your Right Hand*, saith, Give not your Right Hand easily, that is, Draw not to you, nor endeavour to draw out improper and uninitiated Persons, by giving them your Right Hand. Moreover, to such as have not been long tried by Disciplines and Doctrines, nor are approved as worthy to participate of Temperance, and of the Quinquennial Silence, and other Trials, the Right Hand ought not to be given.

S Y M B. XXIX.

THIS, *When you rise out of Bed, wrap the Coverlets together, and confound the Print of your Body*; adviseth, that having undertaken to philosophise, you should acquaint yourself with Intellectuals, and Incorporeals: Therefore as soon as you rise from the Sleep of Ignorance, and that Darkness which resembles Night, draw not to yourself any corporeal Thing to the Light of Philosophy which resembles the Day, but blot out of your Remembrance all Prints of that Sleep.

S Y M B. XXX.

THIS, *Eat not the Heart*, signifieth, that we ought not to tear asunder the Unity and Conspiration of the Whole: Moreover it implieth, Be not envious, but obliging and communicative; hereupon it exhorted to philosophise. For of all Arts and Sciences, only Philosophy envieth not the Good of others, nor grieveth thereat, nor rejoiceth in the Ill of a Neighbour; but declareth that all Men are by Nature allied to one another, and Friends, and alike affected, and subjected alike to Fortune, and alike ignorant of the Future; and therefore commands them to commiserate and love one another, as becomes a Creature, sociable and rational.

S Y M B. XXXI.

LIKE that, is this, *Eat not the Brain*, for that is the principal Instrument of Wisdom: it signifieth therefore that we ought not with Reproaches to bite and tear in pieces Things well intended, and Doctrines. Those are well intended, which are exactly considered by the principal Reason of Mind, like to Things comprehended by Science; for these are beheld not by the Organs of the irrational Soul, that is, by the Heart and the Liver, but by the pure rational Part of the Soul; wherefore it is a Folly to oppose them. This Symbol rather adviseth to worship the Fountain of Minds, and next Instrument of Intel-

Intellection, by whose Means we acquire Speculation and Science, and (in a word) all Wisdom; and truly philosophise; and not to confound and deface the Prints that are therein.

S Y M B. XXXII.

THIS, *Spit upon the Cuttings of thy Hair, and Parings of thy Nails, saith thus, Those Things are easily concerned which are born with thee, but are more distant from the Mind; as, on the other side, those are more esteem'd, which are nearer to the Mind. So having addicted thy Mind to Philosophy, above all, reverence those Things which are demonstrated by the Soul and Mind, without the Organs of Sense, by speculative Science; but condemn and spit upon those Things which are without the Light of the Mind, by the sensitive Organs which are born with us; which are not capable of reaching the Eternity of the Mind.*

S Y M B. XXXIII.

THIS, *Receive not an Erythrine, seems to respect the Etymology of the Word; Entertain not an impudent blushing Person; nor, on the other side, one over-bashful, ready to fall back from the Mind, and firm Intellection; whence is understood also, Be not such yourself.*

S Y M B. XXXIV.

THIS, *Deface the Print of a Pot in the Ashes,* signifieth, that he who applies his Mind to Philosophy, must forget the Demonstrations of Confusion and Grossness, (that is, of Corporeals and Sensibles) and wholly make use of Demonstrations of Intelligibles: By *Ashes* are meant the Dust or Sand in Mathematical Tables, wherein the Demonstrations and Figures are drawn.

S Y M B. XXXV.

BUT *Approach not her to get Children who hath Money,* is not meant of a Woman, but of a Sect of Philosophy, which hath in it much Corporeity and Gravity tending downwards; for of all Things in the Earth Gold is the most heavy, and aptest to move towards the Center, which is the Property of Corporeal Weight: To *approach*, means not only *Coition*, but to apply ourselves, and to be *affiant*.

S Y M B. XXXVI.

THIS, *In the first place honour the Figure and the Degrees, the Figure and the Tribolus; advi-*

* In Plat. Phædon.

b Cap. 23.

c In Num.

seth to philosophise, and study Mathematicks, not superficially, and by them, as by Degrees of Ascension, arrive at our proposed End; but despise those Things which others prefer before these; and chiefly reverence the *Italic* Philosophy, which considers Incorporeals in themselves, before the *Ionick*, which first looks upon Bodies.

S Y M B. XXXVII.

THIS, *Abstain from Beans,* adviseth to beware of every Thing that may corrupt our Discourse with the Gods, and Presence.

S Y M B. XXXVIII.

THIS, *Plant Mallows, but eat it not,* signifies that such Things are turned with the Sun. *Plant*, that is, insisting on its Nature and Application to the Sun, and Sympathy, neither abstain from it, nor wholly adhere to it; but transfer your Mind and Intellect, and transplant them as it were to Plants and Herbs of the same Kind; and to Animals which are not of the same Kind, and to Stones and Rivers, and in a word, to all Natures; for thou wilt find that which designed the Unity and Conspiracy of the World, to be fruitful and full of Variety, and admirably copious, as if it sprung from a Mallows-root: Therefore not only eat not, nor deface such Observations, but on the contrary increase them, and multiply them, as it were by Transplantation.

S Y M B. XXXIX.

THIS, *Abstain from living Creatures,* exhorts to Justice, and Respect of Alliance by a like Kind of Life, and the like.

By these is explained the symbolical adhortative Form; containing much that is common with the Customs of the Antients, and Pythagorical. Thus *Jamblicus*.

C H A P. IV,

The same Symbols explained by others.

MOST of these Symbols are mentioned also by others, with different Explications. The first * *Olympiodorus* ascribes to *Philolaus*, delivering it thus, *When you come into a Temple, turn not back. Jamblicus* b, in the Life of *Pythagoras*, cites it in the same Words, adding this Exposition, *That we ought not to perform divine Rites cursorily and negligently.*

Upon the Second, *Adore not the Gods, as it were, in passing by:* c *Plutarch* saith, *We ought to go si-*

Horns with that express Intent. And for this Reason the Cryers used, upon Festival Days, to go before the Priests, and commanded the People to forbear working.

The same Exposition ^a *Jamblichus*, in the Life of *Pythagoras*, gives of the Third, *Sacrifice*, and go to sacred Rites barefoot.

To the Fourth, Concerning the Gods, *disbelieve nothing wonderful, and concerning divine Doctrines*, may be applied to what *Jamblichus* saith in the Life of *Pythagoras*: *Many Precepts were introduc'd into the Practice of divine Rites, forasmuch as they gave firm Credit to these Things, concerning them not to be fantastick Boasts, but to derive their Beginning from some God. All this the Pythagoreans believe to be true, as the fabulous Reports concerning Aristæus the Proconecian, and Abaris the Hyperborean, and the like. And they did not only believe all these, but also endeavour themselves to frame many Things that seem fabulous, derogating from nothing which relates to the Deity. In all such Things he conceived not that the Persons themselves were foolish, but those only who gave no Belief to it. For they are not of Opinion, that the Gods can do some Things, others they cannot, as the Sophists imagine; but, that all Things are possible. And the same in the Beginning of the Verses which they ascribe to Linus, but perhaps were made by Pythagoras:*

Hope all Things; for to none belongs Despair:
All Things to God easy and perfect are.

The Fifth, *Decline High-ways*, is mentioned by many; only *Laertius* delivers it quite otherwise, *Go not out of the High-way*; but, in the Exposition, differs not from the rest, that *we ought not to follow the Opinions of the Vulgar, which are without Judgment, and not indisputable; but those of the few and learned.*

The Sixth, *Abstain from the Melanure*, for it belongs to the terrestrial Gods, ^c *Plutarch* interprets, as forbidding to converse with Persons black in Impiety. *Tryphon*, as forbidding Falshood and Lies, which are black in their Clofe. The *Melanure* is a kind of Fish, so named from the Blackness of its Tail.

The Ninth, *Cut not Fire with a Sword*, is one of those Symbols which are ascribed to *Andocides*, the *Pythagorean*. ^a *Porphyrus*, ^b *Plutarch*, *Laertius*, and ^c *Athenæus*, interpret it, as advising, not to exasperate an angry Person, but to give way to him. *Fire is Anger, the Sword Contention.* *St. Basil* expounds it of those who attempt an *Impossibility*.

The Tenth, *Laertius* reads thus, *Turn away a sharp Sword*; it is generally expounded, *Decline all Things dangerous.*

The Eleventh, *Help to lay on a Burthen, but not to take it off*, is expounded by *Porphyrus*; ^a that *we ought to further others, not in Sluggishness, but in Virtue and Labour.* Or, as ^b *Jamblichus*, that *we ought not to be the Cause of another's being idle.* *Laertius* and *Olympiodorus* cite it thus, *Lay not Burthens down together, but take them up together*; expounding it, that *we must work together in the Course of Life, and co-operate with others in Actions, tending not to Idleness but to Virtue.*

The Twelfth, which is cited by *Suidas* out of *Aristophanes*, in Verse, thus:

Into the Shoe first the right Foot,
The left first in the Bason put.

He expounds it not as a Symbol, but a Proverb, of those who perform Things dextrously.

The Fourteenth, *Pass not over a Balance*, is generally interpreted by ^a *Plutarch*, *Laertius*, ^b *Clement Alexandrinus*, *Porphyrus*, and others, that *we ought to esteem Justice, and not to exceed it.* *Athenæus* and *Porphyrus* expound it, as *dehorting from Avarice, and advising to pursue Equality.*

The Fifteenth *Laertius* delivers thus, *When you go to travel, look not back upon the Bounds.* ^a *Plutarch* thus, *When you come to the Borders, return not back.* They both interpret it, that *when we are dying, and arrived at the Bound or End of our Life, we should bear it with an equal Mind, without Grief, not to desire a Continuance of the Pleasures of this Life.* See also ^b *Porphyrus*.

The Sixteenth *Laertius* reads thus, *Wipe not a Seat with Oil.*

The Seventeenth *Laertius* and *Suidas* deliver thus, *Touch not a white Cock, for it is sacred to the Moon, and a Monitor of the Hours.*

The Nineteenth, *Sit not upon a Chœnix*, *Plutarch* and *Porphyrus* interpret, that *we ought not to live idly, but to provide Necessaries for the Future.* For, a *Chœnix*, according to *Laertius* and *Suidas*, is the same which *Clearchus* calls *Elemeratrophes*, a Proportion of Food daily spent. But *Clement Alexandrinus* interprets it, as advising to consider not the present Day, but what the future will bring forth: To be solicitous, not of Food, but prepar'd for Death.

The Twentieth, *Breed nothing that hath crooked Talons*, is ascribed to *Andocides* the *Pythagorean*.

The Twenty first, *Olympiodorus* delivers thus, *Clear not Wood in the Way; wickerby, saith he, the Pythagoreans advised, not to disgust Life with acceffory Cares, and vain Solitude.*

The Twenty second, *Entertain not a Swallow under your Roof*, ^a *Plutarch* interprets, *Take not unto you*

^a Cap. ibid.

^b Cap. 28.

^c De Educ. lib.

^a Pag. 199.

^b De Educ. lib.

^c Lib. 10.

^d Pag. 199.

^e Vit. Pyth. ibid.

^f De Educ. lib.

^g Strom. 5.

^h De Educ. lib.

ⁱ Pag. ibid.

^j Lib. 10.

^k Synops. quæst. 58.

you an ungrateful and unconstant Friend and Companion; for only this Bird, of all the lesser Kind, is reported to prey upon Fleas. * Clemens Alexandrinus and Porphyrius interpret it, as forbidding to admit into our Society a talkative Person, intemperate of Speech, who cannot contain what is communicated to him.

The Twenty third, * *Plutarch* allgeth thus, *Wear not a strait Ring*; that is, faith he, *Follow a free Course of Life, and settir not yourself.* Or, as St. Hierom, *that we live not anxiously, nor put ourselves into Servitude, or into such a Condition of Life as we cannot free ourselves from, when we should have a Mind to do it.*

The Twenty fourth, *Wear not the Picture of the Gods in Rings*; * *Porphyrius* expoundeth, *Discourse not of the Gods inconsiderately, or in publick.* * *Jamblichus*, in the Life of *Pythagoras*, delivers it thus, *Wear not the Image of God in a Ring, lest it be defiled; for it is the Image of God.* * *Clemens Alexandrinus* affirms the Meaning to be, that we ought not to mind Sensibles; but to pass on to Intelligibles.

In the Twenty eighth, *Lay not hold in every one readily with your Right Hand.* *Plutarch* omits this, *Suidas* adds. It is generally expounded thus, *Be not hasty and precipitate in contracting Friendship with any.*

The Twenty ninth, *When you rise out of Bed, wrap the Coverlet together, and confound the Print of your Body*; *Plutarch* ascribeth it to the *Majesty and Respect due to the Bed.* * *Clemens Alexandrinus* faith it signifies, that we ought not in the Day-time to call to Mind any Pleasures, even of Dreams which we had in the Night. Perhaps also, faith he, it means, that we ought not to confound dark Phantasy with the Light of Truth.

The 30th and 31st, *Eat not the Heart and the Brain*; * *Jamblichus*, in the Life of *Pythagoras*, faith, he enjoined, *serafimuh* as these two are the Seats of Life and Knowledge. *Porphyrius* is the first, and *Plutarch* to the second, give one Interpretation, *Consume not yourself with Grief, nor afflict your Mind with Cares.*

The Thirty second, *Laertius* delivers contrary to *Jamblichus*; *Upon the Parings of your Nails or Cuttings of your Hair, neither urine nor tread.*

The Thirty fourth, *Deface the Print of a Pot in the Ashes*; *Plutarch* and *Clemens Alexandrinus* expound, as advising, that upon Reconciliation of Enmity, we utterly abolish, and leave not the least Print or Remembrance of Anger.

The Thirty sixth concerning the Figure and three Obols, seems to have Reference to the Story related in the sixth Chapter of his Life.

Of the Thirty seventh, *Abstain from Beans*, there are alleg'd many different Reasons. *Aristotle* * faith,

He forbod them, for that they resemble aëtois, or the Gatus of the Inferi; or, for that they breed Worms; [a little sort of Meggots called Midæ] or, for that they resemble the Nature of the Universe; or, for that they are Oligarchick, being used in Suffrages. This last Reason is confirmed by *Plutarch*, who explains this Symbol, *Abstain from Suffrages*, which of old were given by Beans. *Porphyrius* faith, *He interdited Beans, because the first Beginning and Generation being confus'd, and many Things being commixed, and consecret together, and computrified in the Earth by little and little, the Generation and Discretion broke forth together; and living Creatures being produced together with Plants, then out of the same Putrefaction arose both Men and Beans; whereof he alleg'd manifest Arguments. For, if any one should chew a Bean, and having minced it small with his Teeth, lay it abroad in the warm Sun, and so leaving it for a little time, return to it, he shall perceive the Scent of human Blood. Moreover, if any one at the time when Beans shoot forth the Flower, shall take a little of the Flower which then is black, and put it into an earthen Vessel, and cover it close, and bury it in the Ground ninety Days, and at the End thereof take it up, and take off the Cover; instead of the Bean, he shall find either the Head of an Infant, or worms aëtois.* The same Reason * *O-rigen* ascribeth to *Zaratus*; from whom perhaps *Pythagoras*, being his Scholar, received them. Hence it is that *Pliny* faith, *He condemned Beans, because the Souls of the Dead are in them.* And *Porphyrius* elsewhere, *Because they most partake of the Nature of a living Creature*: Some of whom, as *Cicero* says, it was because they disturb the Tranquility of the Mind. Wherefore to abstain from them, faith *Porphyrius*, makes our Dreams serene and untroubled. * *Agellius* faith, he meant, from venereal Delights. And *Plutarch* faith, *He forbod Beans, because they conduce thereto.* On the contrary, * *Clemens Alexandrinus* affirms they were prohibited out of no other Reason, than that *Women* feeding on them, became barren.

For the Thirty ninth, *Abstain from the Fleth of living Creatures*; the most general Reason is, because they are of the same Nature and Temperament with us; and, in a manner, allied unto us. But of this formerly.

CHAP. V.

Other Symbols.

TO the foregoing Symbols collected by *Jamblichus*, may be added these:

Take not up what falls from the Table; meaning, that Men should not accustom themselves to eat intemperately.

* Strom. 5. * De Educ. lib. * Pag. 24. * Cap. 18.
* In Philo. * Lib. 4. * Strom. 5.

* Strom. 5. * Strom. 5. * Cap. 109. * Laert. 2.

temperately. Or, alluding to some religious Rite; for, *Aristophanes* saith, That which falls so, belongs to the Heroes; saying in his *Heroes*,

Taste not what from the Table falls.

Break not Bread; Divide not Friends. Others refer it to the Judgment in the infernal Places. Others, that it implieth Fear in War. (*Laert.*)

Set down Salt, in remembrance of Justice; for Salt preserves all Things, and is brought out of the purest Thing, Water. (*Laert.*)

Pluck not a Crown; that is, Offend not the Laws, for Laws are the Crown of Cities. (*Porphyrius.*)

Offer Libations to the Gods, just to the Ears of the Cup; signifying that we ought to worship and celebrate the Gods with Musick, for that passeth in at the Ears. (*Porph.*) And drink not of that Libation. (*Jamb. c. 18. p. 87.*)

Eat not (which are unlawful) *Generation, Augmentation, Beginning, End, nor that of which the first Basis of all Things consists.* Meaning, we must abstain from the Loins, *σίσυμρον* *σίσυμρον*, Marrow, Feet, and Head of Victims. He called the Loins, Basis, because living Creatures are settled upon them as their Foundation; *σίσυμρον* *σίσυμρον*, Generation, for without the Help of these, no living Creature is engendered. Marrow he called Increase, it being the Cause of Augmentation in living Creatures. The Beginning, the Feet; the Head, the End; which have most Power in Government of the Body. (*Porph.*)

Eat not Fishes. (*Laert.*) Some apply this to Silence, (*Athen. Deipn. l. 7.*)

Others say, he disapproved them, because not used in Sacrifice to the Gods.

Put not Meat in a Chamber-pot; meaning, communicate nothing that is wise to a rude and foolish Person. (*Plut. de Educ. Lib.*)

Sleep not at Noon. For at that time the Sun sheweth its greatest Force, (*Olympiad. in Plat. Phædon.*) We ought not to shut our Eyes against the Light, when it is most manifest.

Quit not your Station without the Command of your General. Our Souls ought to be kept in the Body, neither may we forsake this Life without special leave from him who gave it us, lest we seem to despise the Gift of God. (*Cicer. in Cat. and de Repub.*)

Roast not what is boiled; that is, change not Meekness to Anger, (*Jamb.*)

Heap not up Cyprus; Of this Wood they conceived the Scepter of Jupiter to be made. (*Laert.*)

Sacrifice even Things to the Celestial Deities, odd to the Territorial. Of this, already in his Arithmetick.

When it thunders, touch the Earth, calling to mind our own Mortality: (*Jamb.*) or, When a King is angry, the Offender ought to humble himself.

Eat not sitting in a Chariot. (*Plut.*) Some expound it, that we ought to eat in quiet; or, that we ought not to give ourselves to Luxury in a time of Business.

Go into the Temple on the Right-hand, go out on the Left. Right and Left seem to refer to the Ceremonial Numbers; of which already.

Where Blood hath been shed, cover the Place with Stones; that is, abolish the very Remembrance of any War or Diffention. (*Jamb.*)

Hurt not a mild Plant. (*Laert. Porph.*) Some expound it, Harm not the harmless.

Pray aloud; implying, not that God cannot hear such as pray softly, but that our Prayers should be just, (*Clem. Alex. Strom. 4.*) such as we need not care who hears.

Sail not on the Ground; signifying, that we ought to forbear raising Taxes, and such Revenues as are troublesome and unstable. (*Clem. Strom. 5.*)

Begot Children; For it is our Duty to leave behind us, such as may serve the Gods in our Room. (*Jamb. vit. cap. 18.*)

Neither dip in a Basin, nor wash in a Bath. (*Jamb. ibid.*)

Put not away thy Wife, for she is a Suppliant. (*Jamb. ibid.*)

Counsel nothing but what is best, for Counsel is a sacred thing: (*Jamb. ibid.*)

Plant not a Palm; (*Plut. in Isid. and Osir.*)

Lastly, Hither may be referred the Symbolical Letter Y. They said that the course of human Life is like that Letter, for every one arriving at the first state of Youth, where the Way divides itself into two, stands at a gaze, not knowing which to take; if he meets with a Guide that leads to the better, that is, if he learn Philosophy, Oratory, or some honest Art, which may prove beneficial, but cannot be attained without much Labour, they affirm that he shall lead an honourable and plentiful Life. But if not lighting upon such a Master, he takes the left hand way, which seems at first to be the better, and to lead to Virtue, that is, if he gives himself over to Sloth and Luxury, which seem pleasant at first to him who is ignorant of true Good, he shall ere long lose both his Credit and Estate, and live thence forward ignominiously, and miserably. Thus *Laetantius*, perhaps alluding to the old Verses.

*The Pythagorick Letter two ways spread,
Shows the two Paths in which Man's Life is led.
The right hand Track to sacred Virtue tends,
Though steep and rough at first, in rest it ends.*

The other broad and smooth, but from its Crown,
On Rocks the Traveller is tumbled down.
He who to Virtue by harsh Tails aspires,
Subduing Pains, Worth and Renown acquires:
But who seeks slothful Luxury, and flies
The labour of great Acts, dishonour'd dies.

The GOLDEN VERSES of Pythagoras.

A Summary of the Pythagorick Doctrine is extant in Verse, Entitled, *The Golden Verses of Pythagoras*: or as others, of the Pythagoreans. For that, saith Hierocles, as Gold is the best and purest of Metals, so these are the best and most divine of Verses. They are these.

First, in their Ranks, the immortal Gods adore,
Thy Oath keep; next, great Heroes; then implore
Terrestrial Demons with due Sacrifice.
Thy Parents Reverence, and near Allies.
Him that is first in Virtue make thy Friend,
And with observance his kind Speech attend:
Nax (to thy Power) for light Faults cast him by:
Thy Pow'r is Neighbour to Necessity.

These know, and with intentive Care pursue;
But Anger, Sloth, and Luxury subdue.

In sight of others or thy self forbear
What's ill; but of thy self stand most in fear.
Let Justice all thy Words and Actions sway;
Nor from the even course of Reason stray:
For know, that all Men are to die ordain'd,
And Riches are as quickly lost as gain'd.
Crosses that happen by divine Decree,
(If such thy Lot) bear not impatiently.
In seek to remedy with all thy Care,
And think the Just have not the greatest Share.
'Mongst Men, Discourses good and bad are spread:
Despise not those, nor be by these misled.
If any some notorious Falshood say,
Thou the Report with equal Judgment weigh.
Let not Men's smoother Promises invite,
Nor rougher Threats from just Resolves thee fright.
If ought thou shouldst attempt, first ponder it;
Fool only inconsiderate Acts commit;
Nor do what afterwards thou may'st repent;
First learn to know the Thing on which thou art bent.

Thus thou a Life shalt lead with Joy replete.

Nor must thou care of outward Health forget.
Such Temperance use in Exercise and Diet,
As may preserve thee in a settled Quiet.
Meats unprohibited, not curious, chuse;
Decline what any other may accuse.

The rash Expence of Vanity detest,
And Sordidness: A Mean in all is best.
Hurt not thy self: Before thou act, advise;
Nor suffer Sleep at Night to close thine Eyes,
Till thrice thy Acts that Day thou hast o'er-run,
How slipt, what Dreads, what Duty left undone?
Thus thy Account summ'd up from first to last,
Grieve for the Ill, joy for what Good hath pass'd.

These study, practise these, and these affect;
To sacred Virtue these thy Steps direct.

Eternal Nature's Fountain I attest,
Whose Tetractys on our Souls impress.
Before thy Mind thou to this Study bend,
Invoke the Gods to grant it a good End.

These, if thy Labour vanquish, thou shalt then
Know the connexure both of Gods and Men;
How every Thing proceeds, or by what staid,
And know (as far as fit to be survey'd)

Nature alike throughout; that thou may'st learn
Not to hope hopeless Things, but all discern;

And know those Wratches whose perverser Wills
Draw down upon their Heads spontaneous Ills:

Unto the Good that's nigh them, deaf and blind:
Some few the Cure of these Misfortunes find.

This only is the Fate that harms, and rolls
Through Miseries successive, human Souls.

Within is a continual hidden Fight,
Which we to shun must study, not excite.

Great Jove! how little Trouble should we know,
If thou to all Men wouldst their Genius show?

But fear not thou; Men come of heav'nly Race,
Taught by diviner Nature what t' embrace:

Which if pursu'd, thou all I nam'd shalt gain,
And keep thy Soul clear from thy Body's Stain.

In time of Pray'r, and Cleansing, Meats deny'd
Abstain from; thy Mind's Reins let Reason guide:

Then stripp'd of Flesh up to free Æther soar,
A deathless God, Divine, mortal no more.

TIMÆUS the Locrian.

Of the Soul of the World, and of Nature.

TIMÆUS, the Locrian, said these things: There are two Principles of all things: the *Mind*, of things effected according to Reason; *Necessity*, of those which are by Violence according to the Powers of Bodies. Of these, one is of the nature of Good, and is called *God*, and is Principle of the best things; the Consequent and Concausal are reduced to *Necessity*. For all things are the Off-spring of these, *Idea*, *Matter*, *Sensibles*. The first is ungenerated, immovable, permanent, of the nature of *Identity*, intellectual, the Exemplar of things that are made, and immutable. This is *Idea*. *Matter*, is the Print, Mother, Nurse, and Productrix of the third Essence; for, receiving Likeness into itself, and being, as it were, characterized by them, it perfects all Productions. This *Matter* he asserted to be eternal, but not immovable in Form of itself, and without Figure; but receiving all Forms. In Bodies it is divisible, and of the nature of Alterity: They call *Matter*, *Place* and *Religion*. These two Principles are contrary. Form hath the nature of Male and Father; *Matter*, of Female and Mother; the third is their Off-spring. These being three, are known three ways; *Idea*, by Intellect, according to Science; *Matter*, by specious Ratiocination, not being understood by direct Comprehension, but by Analogy; their Off-spring, by Sense and Opinion. Before Heaven was made, we must conceive, that there was *Idea*, and *Matter*, and *God*, the Maker of the better, [*viz.* *Idea*.] Now so far as the elder is better than the younger, and the orderly than the disorderly; *God*, being good, and seeing *Matter* receive *Idea*, and become totally changed, yet disorderly; saw also it was needful to bring it into Order, and from indefinite Transformations to fix it determinately, that Bodies might have proportionate Distinctions, and not receive promiscuous Variations.

Of all this *Matter* he framed the World, * (making it the Bound of the nature of Being, since it comprehends all other things) one only-begotten, perfect, animate, and rational, (for these are better than inanimate and irrational) and a spherical Body, that being more perfect than other Figures. Designing therefore to make the best Production, he made this *God*, generate, not corruptible by any other Cause, but by the same *God* only which composed it, if it should please him at any time to dissolve it. But he who is good, will not be carried on to the Destruction of the fairest Production.

Wherefore it is permanent, and being such, incorruptible, unperishable, and blessed. It is the best of Productions, being made by the best Cause, who looked not upon Patterns made by Hands, but upon the *Idea*, the intellectual Essence; after which, this being exactly made, is the fairest of all, and not to be demolish'd. It is perfect, as to sensible things; for the Exemplar comprehended in itself all intelligible Creatures, left nothing out, it being the perfect Bound of Intelligibles, as the World is of Sensibles; which being solid, tactile, and visible, is divided into Earth, Fire, and (betwixt these) Air, and Water. It consists of perfect Bodies, which exist entirely in it, so as no Part remains beyond it, that the Body of the Universe might be self-sufficient, and not liable to dissolution by any external Accidents; for there are no other things besides these, and what are contained in them, they being, after the most excellent Analogy, connected in equal Power, neither predominating over the other in any Part, nor being predominated, that whereby some might increase, others decrease; but it resteth in an indissoluble harmonious Concord, according to the best Proportion. For there being three Bounds, and the Intervals distant from each other in the same Proportion, the middle is that to the first which the third is to it, and so reciprocal, according to disposition of Place and Order. But to number these without the help of another thing equal to them, is absolutely impossible. It is well ordered both for Figure and Motion: As to the first being round, it is every way like itself, and able to contain all other Figures. As to its circular Motion, it keepeth a perpetual Tenser: for a Sphere only, whether in Rest or in Motion, is so adapted to the same Place, as that it never ceaseth nor removes; all its Parts being equidistant from the Center. Now its outward Superficies being exactly smooth, it needs not the weak Organs, which are bestow'd on other living Creatures, for their Accommodation.

The Soul of the World *God* enkindled in the midst, but diffused beyond it, covering the Universe with it, and tempering it with a Temperament of indivisible Form, and divisible Substance, so as these two make one Temperament; with which he mingled two Powers, Principles of the two Motions of Identity and Alterity; which (Soul) being not easily miscible, was not without difficulty contemplated.

All

* Principles.

* The World.

* The Soul of the World.

All these Proportions are mixed according to harmonical Numbers; which Proportions he cunningly divided, that it might be known of what, and by what, the Soul consisteth. This Soul God did not ordain (as we affirm) after corporeal Substance, (for that which is most honourable, is first both in Power and Time) but made it before the Body, removing one, the first of four Monads, into eight Decads, and three Centuries. Of this, the duple and triple is easily collected, the first being settled. All these, with their Complements, and Sequioctaves, will amount to thirty-six. The whole Sum will be one hundred and fourteen thousand six hundred and ninety-five. The Divisions are one hundred and fourteen thousand six hundred and ninety-five. After this manner he divided the Soul of the Universe.*

* The Mind only seeth the Eternal God, the Ruler and Father of all Things. That which is generated we behold with our Eyes, this World, and its Parts; the *Ætherial* are two-fold, some of the nature of Identity: others, of Alterity. Of these, some extrinsically carry about all that is within them, from East to West, by an universal Motion. The rest, being of the Motion of Alterity, intrinsically turn about from the West to the East, moved by themselves. They are carried round by Accident, with the Motion of Identity, having the greatest Force in the World. The Motion of Alterity, divided according to harmonical Proportions, is disposed to seven Circles; the *Moon* being nearest the Earth, performeth her Course in a Month: next her, the *Sun* perfects his course in a year. There are two of equal Course with the *Sun*, *Mercury*, and the *Star Jumo*, which many call *Venus*, and *Lucifer*. All Persons not being skilful in the Rules of sacred Astronomy, and the Observations of Rising and Setting: The same Star is sometimes *Hesper*, when it so followeth the *Sun*, that it is conspicuous to us when the *Sun* is set: sometimes *Eos*, when it goeth before the *Sun*, and riseth before him. *Lucifer* therefore many times is the *Star Venus*, when the runs along with the *Sun*: and likewise are many of the fixed Stars and Planets; for any Star of visible Magnitude, ushering the *Sun* above the Horizon, foretells Day. The other three, *Mars*, *Jupiter*, and *Saturn*, have peculiar Velocities, and unequal Years: but they complete their Course in certain and comprehensible Regularities, and Appearances, and Occultations, and Eclipses, and Risings, and Settings. They have, besides their *Phases*, Rising and Setting in regard of the *Sun*: who maketh Day in performing his Course from East to West: Night, by Motion from West to East: whilst he is carried about with Motion of Identity, a Year, by his own proper Motion. By these two Motions, the *Sun*

performs a double Course, one, as being carried about with the general Motion of Heaven, the other by an oblique Motion: One distinguisheth the Times of the Day and the Seasons: The other, by which he is carried about after the rapid Motion of the fixed Stars, at every Revolution maketh Night Day. These are parts of Time called Periods, ordained by God together with the World: for before the World there were no Stars, and consequently neither Year nor Seasons, by which this generable World is commensurated. This Time is the Image of that which is ingenerate, called Eternity: for as this Universe was formed after the eternal Exemplar of the Ideal World, so was this Time ordained together with the World after its Pattern, Eternity.

The Earth being established in the midst, the Seat of the Gods is the Bound of Night and Day, of Rising and Setting, according to the Section of Horizons, as they are circumscribed by the Sight, and by Section of the Earth. It is the most ancient of all Bodies in the Universe; for Water was not produced without Earth, nor Air without Humidity: and Fire cannot subsist without Humidity and Matter, which it kindles. So that the Earth is settled upon its own Weight, as the Root and Basis of all things. The Principle therefore of generated things, as to the Subject, is Matter; as to Form, Idea. The Productions of these are Bodies; Earth, Water, Air, and Fire, whose Generation is thus: Every Body consists of Superficies's; a Superficies of Triangles; of which this is a rectangled equi-crural Semi-quadrangle; the other unequilateral, having the greater Angle in Power, triple to the lesser. The least Angle in it is one third of a right Angle: double to this is the middle Angle, consisting of two thirds; the greatest is a right Angle, sesquialter to the middle, triple to the least. Now this Triangle is a Sesqui-quadrangle to an equilateral Triangle, the Perpendicular from the top to the bottom being divided into two equal Parts: there are therefore in each two rectangled Triangles; but in one, the two Sides which include the right Angle are equal; in the other, all the three Sides are unequal. This Figure is called *Scholin*. This Semi-quadrangle is the Principle of which the Earth was constituted; for the Quadrangle is compounded of these four Semi-quadrangles. Of the Quadrangle is generated the Cube, the firmest and most settled of all Bodies, having six Sides, eight Angles. For this reason Earth is the most heavy Body, and unapt for Motion, and not transmutable into any other, as being incommunicable with any kind of Triangle; for the Earth only hath a stable Principle, which is the Semi-quadrangle, the Element of the other Bodies, Fire, Air, and Water: for the Semi-quadrangle being six times compounded, there ariseth an equilateral Triangle; of

* The Parts of the World.

of which a Pyramid, with four Bases, and four equal Angles, is compounded; the Form of Fire most apt to Motion, and of rarest Parts. Next these, Octaedron, with eight Bases and six Angles, the Element of Air. The third, Icosiedron, of twenty Bases and twelve Angles, the Element of Water, being fullest of Parts, and heaviest. These being compounded of the same Element, are transmuted into one another. The Dodecaedron, he made the Image of the Universe, as nearest to a Globe. Fire, by reason of the Rarity of its Parts, penetrates all things; Air, all things but Fire; Water, Earth. All things therefore are full, and admit no Vacuity. They are carried about by the Circumvolution of the Universe, and by reason of their Solidity grate one another, rendering an unintermitted Alteration to Generation and Corruption. These God used in framing the World, tactile by reason of Earth; visible by reason of Fire, the two Extremes. By Air and Water, he connected it in a most firm Band, Proportion, capable to contain both itself, and the things that are comprised in it. If then that which is connected be a Superficies, one Medium is sufficient; if a Solid, it requires two. To the two Mediums he adapted the two Extremes, Fire to Air, Air to Water, Water to Earth; and again, Fire to Air, Air to Water, and Water to Earth; and again, as Earth to Water, Water to Air, and Air to Earth; and reciprocally, as Earth to Air, Water to Fire. And so far as all these are equal in Power, their Proportions are equal likewise. Thus is the World one, and by a happy Connexure proportionable. Each of these four Bodies have divers Species; the Fire, Flame, Light, Splendor, by reason of the Inequality of the Triangles of each of these. The Air is partly clear and dry, partly humid and cloudy. The Water, fluid and concrete, as Snow, Frost, Hail, and Ice. Of humid, one sort is fluid, as Honey, Oil; another compact, as Pitch, Wax. Of the compact are two kinds, one fusile, as Gold, Silver, Brass, Tin, Lead; the other frangible, as Sulphur, Bitumen, Nitre, Salt, Allom, and Stones of that kind.

After he had made the World, he * proceeded to the Production of mortal Creatures, that it might be perfect and compleatly wrought according to its Pattern. Having contempered and distributed the Soul of Man by the same Proportions and Powers, he deliver'd it over to that Nature which had the Power of changing. She succeeding him in the producing mortal transitory Creatures, infused their Souls, some from the Moon, some from the Sun, some from the other Stars which wander in the Region of Alterity, excepting one Soul in the Power of Identity, which he mingled in the rational Part, an Image of Wisdom to those who make use of good Fate. For of the human Soul, one Part is rational and intel-

lectual, the other irrational and foolish; of the irrational, the better is of the nature of Identity; the worse, of that of Alterity. Each of these is resident about the Head, that all the other Parts of the Soul and Body may be subservient to it, according to the Analogy of the Body of the Universe. Of the irrational Part, one is irascible, placed about the Heart; the other desiderative, about the Liver.

As for the Body, the Principle and Root of Marrow is in the Brain, wherein is the Hegemonick of the Soul. From the Brain issues a Defluxion along the Spondyles of the Back, from whence it is distributed into Seed and generative Substance. The Bones are the Case of the Marrow; the Flesh is the Tegument of the Bones; the Joints he connected by Nerves for Motion. Of the inward Parts, some were made for Nourishment, others for Conversation. Of the Motions, those which come from without, and flow into the apprehensive Part, are sensible; those which fall not under Comprehension are insensible, whether by reason that the affected Bodies are more earthy, or that the Motions are weaker. Whatsoever Motions change Nature, are painful; whatsoever comply with her, are named Pleasures.

Of the Senses, God enlighten'd our Sight for Contemplation of Celestials, and Apprehension of Science. Hearing, he framed perceptive of Discourse and of Musick. Of this, if any be destitute from his Birth, he will also be incapable of speaking. Whence we say, this Sense is nearest ally'd to Reason. All that are termed Affections of Bodies, are denominated with reference to the Touch, and their Inclinations to a Place; for the Touch dijudicates vital Faculties; warm, cold; dry, moist; smooth, rough; yielding, resisting; soft, hard; but heavy and light, the Touch prejudicates. Reason defines by Inclination to move to the middle, and from the middle; below, and the middle, they affirm to be the same thing; for the Center of a Globe is below; whatsoever is betwixt that and the Circumference, is above. Heat seems to consist of rare Parts, and disgregates Bodies; Cold, of more dense Parts, and bindeth the Pores. The Taste resembles the Touch in Concretion and Discretion, and in Penetration of the Pores, and in its Objects, which are either harsh or smooth. Those which have an absterfiv Faculty, stupifying the Tongue, are bitter; those which are moderately absterfiv, salt; those which inflame and pierce further into the Flesh, acid. Contrary to these, are smooth and sweet. The Kinds of Odor are not distinct; for they insinuate through narrow Pores, which are too solid to be contracted and dilated by Putrefaction, and Concoction of Earth and earthly things. They are sweet or stinking. Voice is a Percussion in the Air, passing to the Soul thro' the Ears, whose Pores extend to the Liver. In the Ears is a Spirit, whose Motion is Hearing. Of

Voice

Voice and Hearing some are swift, the sharp; some slow, the flat; the mean are incommensurable. Again, one is much and diffused, the loud; another small and contracted, the low: one is ordered according to Proportions, the *harmonious*; another disorderly and unproportionate, the *inharmonious*. The fourth Kind of Sensibles is most various and multi-form, termed Visibles, comprising all Colours, and innumerable coloured things. The primary Colours are four, White, Black, Bright, Purple; the rest are made by Commixtion of these. White disperseth the Sight, Black contracts it; as Hot diffusethe Touch, Cold contracts it; Bitter contracteth the Taste, and Sweet dissipates it.

The Bodies of Creatures that breathe Air, are nourished by Aliment, distributed by the Veins thro' the whole Frame diffusively, as by Channels, and irrigated by the Spirit, which diffuseth it to the utmost Bounds. Respiration is made (there being no Vacuity in Nature) by Influxion, and Attraction of the Air in the room of that which issueth forth at invisible Vents, out of which also Sweat evaporates. Now something of it being wasted by the natural Heat, it is necessary something be introduced to supply that which was consumed; otherwise there would be a Vacuity, which is impossible: for a living Creature could not be restor'd by perpetual Fluxion, and entire, if the Body were disjoin'd by Vacuity. The like Composition of Organs is likewise in inanimate things, with an analogical Respiration; a Cupping-glass and Amber are Resemblances of Respiration, for the Spirits evaporate through the Body, and enter again at the Mouth and Nostrils by Respiration: then again, like *Euripus*, it is brought round into the Body, which by these Effluxions is extended. The Cupping-glass, the Air being consumed by Fire, attracts Moisture; the Amber, by Emission of Spirits, attracts the Body that is like to it. All Aliment is taken into the Body from the Root of the Heart, and the Fountain of the Ventricle; if the Accession be more than the Defluxion, it is termed Growth; if the contrary, Decay. The *Acma* consists in the Confinement betwixt these two, and is conceived to be the Equality of Accession and Defluxion. When the Ligaments of the Constitution are dissolved, so as there is no Passage for the Breath, or Distribution of Aliment, the Animal dies. There are many things which are pernicious to Life, and cause Death; whereof one is termed, Sickness. The Origins of Sickness are the Disproportions of the primary Faculties: If the simple Faculties, Heat, Cold, Humidity, Siccidity abound, or are deficient, then follow Mutations and Alterations of the Blood by Corruption, and Depravations of the consumptive Flesh: If according to the Changes into sharp, or salt, or acid (Humours) the Turnings of the Blood,

or Consumptions of the Flesh be caused; from hence are generated Choler and Flegm. Unwholesome Chyles, and Putrefaction of Humours, are considerable except they be deep; but those whose Causes lie in the Bones, are not easily cur'd; those which arise out of the Marrow are painful. The Extremities of Diseases are Wind, Choler, Flegm, increasing and flowing into Places not proper to them, or into the vital Parts; for then obtaining a better Place, they expel their Neighbours, and settle there, and afflicting the Bodies, they resolve them into themselves.

These are the Diseases of the Body. Out of these arise many Sicknesses of the Soul, several of several Faculties; of the Sensitive, Stupidity; of the Reminiscent, Forgetfulness; of the Desiderative, Loathing, and excessive Appetite; of the Pathetick, wild Passions, and furious Frenzies; of the Rational, Indocility and Indiscretion. The Forces of Vice are Pleasures and Griefs, Desires and Fears, raised out of the Body, mingled with the Soul, and express'd by various Names, Loves, Desires, dissolute Affections, impetuous Angers, deep Malices, various Longings, inordinate Delights. In a word, to behave ourselves amiss as to Passions, or to subdue them, is the Bound betwixt Virtue and Vice; for to be excessive in them, or too hard for them, put us in a good or bad Condition. To these Inclinations the Temper of the Body may contribute much; if vehemence, fervent, or any way extraordinary, it transports us to Melancholy and extravagant Lusts. For the Parts being overflowed by these Defluxions, make the Constitution of the Body rather hydropical than sound; whence arise Sadness, Forgetfulness, Folly, and Confarnation. The Customs also whereunto a Man hath conformed himself in the City, or Family, where he was born and bred, conduce much; as also the daily Course of Life, whether softning or corroborating the Soul: for living abroad, Diet, Exercise, and the Manners of those with whom we converse, greatly avail to Virtue or Vice; and these Occasions are derived rather from our Parents and Elements, than from ourselves; for they are not ineffectual, we ourselves so easily receding from those * Actions which are good.

To the Well-being of an Animal, it is requisite that the Body have the Virtues competent to it, Health, perfect Sense, Strength, and Beauty. The Principles of Beauty are a Symmetry of the Parts amongst themselves, and with the Soul; for Nature made the Body as an Instrument, obedient, and accommodate to all the Businesses of Life. In like manner, the Soul must be order'd to Virtues answerable to those; to Temperance, as the Body to Health; to Wisdom, as the Body to perfect Sense; to Fortitude, as the Body to Strength; to Justice, as the

* *ἡδοναὶ* perhaps is for *παραινέσεις*. Doric.

Body to Beauty. The Principles of these are from Nature, their Means and Ends from Industry; those of the Body are attained by Exercise and Medicine; those of the Soul by Institution and Philosophy. For these Faculties nourish and strengthen both the Soul and Body, by Labour, Exercise, and Purity of Diet; these by Medicaments; those instituting the Soul by Chastisements and Reprehensions; for they strengthen it by Exhortation, by exciting the Inclination, and enjoining those things which are expedient for Action. The Aleiptick Art, and, its nearest Ally, Medicine, are design'd for the Cure of Bodies, reducing the Faculties to the best Harmony; they purify the Blood, and make the Spirits flow freely; so as if any thing unwholesome settle, the Vigors of the Blood and Spirits being thus confirm'd, overmaster it. Musick, and its Director, Philosophy, ordained by the Gods, and by the Laws, for Reformation of the Soul, inure, compel and persuade the irrational Part to obey the rational, and in the irrational mollify Anger, and quiet Desire; so as they neither move nor rest without Reason, the Mind summoning them either to Action or Fruition. The Bound of Temperance is Obedience and Fortitude. Now Science and venerable Philosophy, purifying the Mind from false Opinions, bring her to Knowledge, and reducing her from great Ignorance, raise her to Contemplation of divine things; wherein if a Man be conversant with Contentedness as to human things, and

endeavour in a moderate way of living, he is happy. For he to whom God hath allotted this Estate, is undoubtedly guided to a most happy Life. But if a Man be stiff and refractory, he shall be pursued by Punishment according to the Laws, and those Discourses which declare things Cœlestial and Infernal. For irremissible Punishments are prepar'd for the unhappy Dead, and many other things; for which I commend the *Ionick* Poet, who makes Men religious by ancient fabulous Traditions. For as we cure Bodies with things unwholesome, when the wholesome agree not with them; so we restrain Souls with fabulous Relations, when they will not be led by the true. Let them then, since there is a Necessity for it, talk of these strange Punishments, as if Souls did transmigrate; those of the Effeminate into the Bodies of Women given up to Ignominy; of Murderers, into those of Beasts, for Punishment; of the Lascivious, into the Forms of Swine; of the Light and Temerarious, into Birds; of the Slothful and Idle, Unlearned and Ignorant, into several Kinds of Fishes. All these in the second Period, *Nemesis* decrees, together with the vindictive and terrestrial Demons, the Overseers of human Affairs, to whom God, the Disposer of all things, hath committed the Administration of the World, replenish'd with Gods, Men, and all other living Creatures: all which are formed after the best Image, of the ungenerate and eternal Idea.

An Explication of the *Pythagorick* Doctrine.

By ^b JOHN REUCHIN.

CHAP. I.

Of Pythagoras his Way of Teaching by Silence and Symbols.

THE indocible and abstruse Tradition of *Mysteries and Symbols* is not to be investigated by Acuteness of human Wit, (which rather affects us with a doubtful Fear, than an adherent Firmness) it requires ample Strength of thinking and believing; and above all things, Faith and Taciturnity. Whence *Pythagoras taught nothing* (as *Apuleius* saith) *to his Disciples before Silence*; it being the first Rudiment of contemplative Wisdom to learn to meditate, and to unlearn to talk. As if the *Pythagorick* Sublimity were of greater Worth, than to be comprehended by the Talk of Boys. This Kind of

Learning (as other things) *Pythagoras* brought into Greece from the *Hebrews*, that the Disciple being to ask some sublime Question, should hold his Peace; and being question'd, should only answer, *αὐτὸς ἔφη. He said.* Thus the Cabalists answer, *אֲנִי הָאֵלֹהִים אֲמַרְתִּי. The Wise said;* and Christians, *אֲמַרְתִּי, Believe.*

Moreover, all the *Pythagorick* Philosophy (especially that which concerns divine things) is mystical, expressed by *Ænigms* and *Symbols*. The Reasons these: First, The Ancients used to deliver Wisdom by Allegories: all their Philosophers and Poets are full of Riddles, avoiding, by Obscurity, Contempt of

^b E Cabalæ libro 1.
Philos. cap. 7.

* Page 664.
* Florid. 2.

Out of which *Paulus Scholasticus* collects his first Canon, *de Mysticiis Pythagoricis.* Myb.
* Page 685.

of the Vulgar; for the most apt Interpreter of things, not perceivable by human Infirmitv, is Fable: *That bests Philosophers, which is declared under the pious Veil of Fictions, hidden in honest Things, and attired in honest Words; for, what is easily found, is but too negligently pursued.* Secondly, It sometimes happens, that we cannot express abstruse Things without Circumlocution, unless by some short Ænigm. Thirdly, as Generals use Watch-words to distinguish their own Soldiers from others; so it is not improper to communicate to Friends some peculiar Symbols, as distinctive Marks of a Society. These, among the *Pythagoreans*, were a chain of indissoluble Love. *Pythagoras* was studious of Friendship; and if he heard of any that used his Symbols, he presently admitted him into his Society. Hereupon all became desirous of them, as well thereby to be acceptable to their Master, as to be known *Pythagoreans*. Lastly, As memorial Notes; for, intreating of all Things divine and human, the vastness of the Subject requires short Symbols, as conducing much to Memory.

CHAP. II.

The Triple World.

THE *Pythagoreans* reduce all *Beings*, subsistent or substant, immediately to *Ideas* which truly are; and those to the *Idea of Ideas*. Hereupon they asserted *three Worlds*, whereof the third is infinite; or rather not finite; and that all Things consist of Three. The *Pythagoreans* (saith Aristotle) affirm that the whole, and all Things are terminated by Three: Some are Bodies and Magnitudes, others keep and inhabit Bodies and Magnitudes, others are the Rulers and Origines of the Inhabitant. This we understand of three Worlds, the *Inferior*, the *Superior*, and the *Supreme*. The *Inferior* containeth Bodies and Magnitudes, and there appropriate Intelligence, Movers of the Spheres, Overseers, and Guardians of Things generable and corruptible, who are said to take care of Bodies, each according to the particular Task assign'd him; by the Ancients named sometimes *Angels*, sometimes *Gods*, and (in respect of the anxious Solitude of Things whereto they are confin'd) *Dæmons*.

Next over it, immediately shineth the *Superior World*; this containeth the superior Powers, incorporeal Essences, divine Exemplars, the Seals of the inferior World, after whose Likeness, the Faces of all inferior Things are formed. These *Pythagoras* calls *Immortal Gods*, as being the Principles of things produc'd out of the divine Mind, essential *Æther*, Causes of those Forms which dwell in Bodies, and

inform the compounded Substances of the lower World. There are also other Gods, incorporeal Beings, individual, differing (not by material, but) by formal Number; Spirits void of Matter, simple, unmixt, seated beyond the sensible Heaven, confin'd neither to Time nor Place, neither suffering Age nor Transmutation, much less any Alteration; In a word, not being affected with any Passion, they lead a self-sufficient excellent Life, and inhabit Eternity, which is *αιωνις*, always being, because it always was, is, and shall be intemporally in the divine Mind; yet by the Energy of God, it was created and placed beyond the Convex of the visible Heavens, as being the lucid Mansion of the blessed Spirits, [whom the *Pythagoreans* believe Gods] placed in the highest Region of Æther, Ævternal, invested in the immortal Ævum.

The third World, *Supreme*, containing all other Worlds, is that of the Deity, consisting of one divine Essence, existent before Ævum; for it is the Age of Ages, the præ-existent Entity and Unity of Existence, Substance, Essence, Nature.

These three Worlds are called *Receptacles*, in different Respects; the first, of *Quantity*; the second, of *Intelligences*; the third, of *Principles*. The first, *circumscriptively*; the second, *definitively*; the third is not received, but receiveth, because it is everywhere, and is called a *Receptacle repletively*.

Through the superior World is communicated from the *Tetractys* to the inferior, Life, and the being (not accidental, but substantial) of every Species; to some, clearly; to others, obscurely. This the *Pythagoreans* collect from those Words of their Master:

— ^b the *Tetractys* to our Souls did send
The Fountain of Eternal Nature —

The *Tetractys* is the Divine Mind communicating, the *Fountain* is the exemplar *Idea* communicated, and eternal Nature is the essential *Idea* of things received. *Idea*, considered as to God, (say they) is his Knowledge; as to the sensible World, *Exemplar*; as to itself, *Essence*.

Now as in the sensible World, the superior Sphere hath an Influence on all the Spheres beneath it; so in the intelligible World, not only every superior Chorus of Angels, hath an Influence upon all the inferior; but the whole superior World hath an Influence upon the whole inferior, whereby all things are reduced according to their Capacities, as far as possible, momentary to eternal, inferior to superior. But to the third World, nothing that is merely a Creature can be reduced, incapable of its own Nature of that Sublimity which is proper only to God.

^a Pag. 664. Sallic. can. 4.

^b Aur. arm.

^c Carm.

CHAP. III.

The Supreme World.

THE supreme World, being (as we said) that of the Deity, is one divine, continual, constant Essence of Sempiternity, poised (as it were) with immovable Weight; not unfixedly termed, *ἀνέκωκυτον ἰδέα, the All-governing Throne*. It is not confined to Genus, Place, Time or Reason, but is the free, unlimited President over all these; infinitely supreme in Place, Power, Possession, Excellence, above all Essence, Nature, *Ævum*, Age.

This Divine Mind, the Receptacle of Principles, *Pythagoras* symbolically terms *Number*, saying, *Number is the Principle of all things*. (For none can believe so meanly of so wise a Person, as that he should conceive the ordinary Numbers by which we cast account, to be the Principle of all things; which are far from being antecedent to things, for they are consequential Accidents.) So * *Plutarch*, by *Number Pythagoras understands the Mind*; a Symbol not improper; in Incorporeals nothing more divine than the *Mind*, in Abstractions nothing more simple than *Number*.

The divine Essence therefore, existent before *Ævum* and Age, (for it is the Age of Ages) the pre-existent Entity and Unity of Existence, Substance, Essence, Nature, was by *Pythagoras* called *by one*, by *Parmenides* *by being*, both upon a like Ground; because it is the super-essential Unite and Being, from which, and by which, and through which, and in which, and to which, all things are, and are ordered, and persist, and are contained, and are filled, and are converted.

Of this first *One*, and first *Ens*, Aristotle thus; *Plato* and the *Pythagoreans* (saith he) hold no other concerning *Ens* or *One*, but that this is their Nature, their Essence is the same, to be *One* and a *Being*. *Xenophanes* declared this *One* to be God, herein agreeing with *Pythagoras*,¹ who asserted *Infinite*, and *One*, and *Number*, to be the first Principles of things; by *Infinite* signifying the *Power*; for nothing can be imagined before *Power*, which in God is infinite, or rather it is infinite God: in him *esse* and *posse* are not distinct, who containeth the Essences, Virtues and Operations of all Produci- bles. With *Pythagoras* agreeth² *Anaxagoras*, saying, *for all things were together*; *Democritus*, *for all things were in Power*. This also is the commission of Things mentioned by *Empedocles*, and *Anaximander*; not confusedly in *Chaos*, *Erebus*, or *Night*, but distinctly and orderly, in *full Light*, in the most perfect Splendor of the divine Light, intuitive Knowledge, that is the *Idea*, (from *ἰδέω γινώσκω*) whose

Power is Being, including all, whether Mental, Rational, Intelligible, Sensible, Vital, Substantial, Adhæzible or Adhæfive; and is not only all Things that are, but those that are not: This is no other than the divine Essence, within which (before all things) *one* produced *two*. *Two* is the first Number, *one* is the Principle of Number, *one* is God; and the Production of *two* being within the divine Essence, (for Number is constituted of itself, and next *one* is naturally only the Number *two*) this *two* must necessarily be God also, for within God is nothing but God. Thus these three, (*One* and *Two*) being the Principle and first, and not exceeding the Essence of God, are indeed one God: for his Essence is not divided by the Production of *two* out of *one*. In like manner, it often happens in Corporeals, that *one* being moved to *two*, proceeds to *three*, the Substance of things continuing; as, in a Tree, of Boughs and Branches; in Man, the Body, Arms, and Fingers. Of *one* therefore in the Divinity producing, and *two* produced, ariseth a *Trinity*, to which if there be added an Essence formally distinct from them, there will be a formal *Quaternity*, which is the infinite one and two, the Substance, Perfection, and End of all Number. *One, two, three, four*, by a collective Progression make *ten*; beyond *ten* there is not any thing. This *Pythagoras* meant, when he asserted all things *Tetractys*; he understood God by it; for he swore by it, and seems to have transferr'd the Hebrew Tetragrammaton, into a Greek Symbol.

³ Thus the most apt Symbol, of the Principles of things, is *one* and *two*; for when we make Enquiry into the Causes and Origin of all things, what sooner occurs than one and two? That which we first behold with our Eyes, is the same, and not another; that which we first conceive in our Mind is *Identity* and *Alterity*, *one* and *two*. (*Alcmaeon*, contemporary with *Pythagoras*) affirmed *two* to be many, which he said were *contraries*, (perhaps the same with *Empedocles* *Esses*) yet unconfind and indefinite, as White and Black, Sweet and Bitter, Good and Evil, Great and Small. These multitudinous Diversities the *Pythagoreans* designed by the Number *ten*, as finite and infinite, even and odd, one and many, right and left, male and female, steadfast and moved, straight and crooked, light and darkness, good and ill, square and oblong. These Pairs are two, and therefore contrary; they are reduced all into *ten*, that being the most perfect Number, as containing more kinds of Numeration than the rest; even, odd; square, cube; long, plain; the first uncompounded, and first compounded, than which nothing is more absolute, since in *ten* Proportions, four cubick Numbers are consummated, of which (according to the *Pythagoreans*) all Things consist. By this all Nations reckon, (not exceeding it.)

* P. g. 666.

* Plac. phil.

* Sollich. Canon. 2.

* Laert. on Anax.

* P. g. 686. d.

*) as by the natural Account of ten Fingers; Heaven itself consists of ten Spheres. *Architas* includeth all that is, in the Number *Ten*; in Imitation of whom *Aristotle* nameth ten Kinds of Ens, *Categories*, reducible to two, *Substance* and *Accident*, both springing from one Essence; for *ten* so loves *two*, that from *one* it proceeds to *two*, and by *two* it reverts into *one*. The first *Ternary* is of *one* and *two*, not compounded, but consistent; *one* having no Position, makes no Composition; an *Unite* whilst an *Unite* hath no Position; nor a *Point* whilst a *Point*. There being nothing before *One*, we rightly say, *one* is first; *two* is not compounded of Numbers, but a Co-ordination of Unites only. It is therefore the first Number, being the first Multitude; not commensurable by any Number, but by *Unite* the common Measure of all Number; for *one*, *two*, is nothing but *two*; so that the Multitude which is called *Triad*, *Arithmeticians* term the first Number uncompounded, the *Dual* being not an uncompounded Number, but rather not-compounded.

* Now the *Triad*, through its Propensity to multiply, and communicate its Goodness to all Creatures, proceeds from Power to Operation, beholding with a perpetual Intuition that Fecundity of Multitude which is in it, productive (as it were) of Number from Number, and that Essentiality which is one in it, the Fountain of all Production, the Beginning of all Progression, the Permanence of all immutable Substance; it reverts itself into itself, multiplying itself (as it were) by *Unite* and *Duity*, saying, *Once twice two are four*. * This is the *Tetrads*, the Idea of all created things; for all Progression is perfected in four. Hence ariseth the *Decad*, the ten most general Kinds of all things; *one*, *two*, *three*, *four*, going out of Omnipotency to Energy, (out of Power to act) produce *ten*, the half whereof is *five*; now in the midst put *five*, on the right Hand the next superior Number *six*, on the left Hand the next inferior *four*: these added, make *ten*. Again, the next superior *seven*, and the next inferior *three*, make *ten*. Again, the next superior *eight*, and the next inferior *two*, make *ten*. Lastly, *one* and *nine* make *ten*. This *ten* being carried up to *twenty*, comes again to *one*; and so on, in all the cardinal Numbers, to a hundred: For, as twice one make two, thrice one three, four times one four, and so forward; so twice ten makes twenty, thrice ten thirty, four times ten forty, and so on; the like in a hundred, a thousand, and forward. And because the *Decad* ariseth out of, and ends in a *Monad*, the *Greeks* express *ten* by *τ*, the *Hebrews* by a *Point*, which Marks (as well amongst the Barbarians as in *Latin*) denote *one*. * Hitherto alludes the *Pythagorick* Symbol, *One, Two*, by *Zaratas* (the Master of *Pythagoras*) used as the Names of Propagation; *one*, the Father; *two*, the

Mother; *one* and *two* (in the divine Essence) producing *four*, the *Tetrads*, the Idea of all things, which are conformed in the Number *ten*. This *Pythagoras* files

Eternal Nature's Fountain

No other than the Knowledge of things in the divine Mind intellectually operating. From this Fountain of eternal Nature floweth down the *Pythagorick* Number, *One* and *Two*, which from Eternity, in the Fountain of the immense Ocean, was, shall be, or rather always is, plentifully streaming. This *one* was by the Ancients termed *Zeus*, *Jupiter*; *two*, *Hec*, *Juno*, Wife and Sister to *Jupiter*; of whom * *Homer*:

*Golden-thron'd Juno, with Eyes full of Love,
Beheld her Spouse and Brother, sacred Jove,
Sitting on th' Top of fount-abounding Ide.*

In *Ida* (ἀνδ' ἄν' ἰδὲν, from *Prescience*) *Jupiter* and *Juno* sat as *one* and *two*, in the streaming Idea of the *Tetrads*, whence flow the Principles of all things, *Form* and *Matter*.

CHAP. IV.

The Intelligible World.

THE *Intelligible World* proceeds out of the Divine Mind, after this manner: The *Tetrads* reflecting upon its own Essence, (the first *Unite* Productrix of all things) and on its own Beginning, (the first Product) faith thus: *Once one, twice two*, immediately ariseth a *Tetrad*, having on its Top the highest *Unite*, and becomes a *Pyramis*, whose Base is a plain *Tetrad*, answerable to a *Superficies*, upon which the radiant Light of the Divine Unity produceth the Form of incorporeal Fire, by reason of the Descent of *Juno* (Matter) to inferior things. Hence ariseth essential Light, not burning, but illuminating. This is the Creation of the middle World, (which the *Hebrews* call the *Supreme*, the World of the Deity, admitting no Comparison.) It is termed *Olympus*, ὁλοκαύσους, wholly lucid, and replete with separate Forms, where is the Seat of the immortal Gods,

—Deum domus alta,

whose Top is Unity, Wall, Trinity, Superficies, Quaternity.

Number emanating from the Divinity by degrees, declineth to the Figure of Creatures; instead of the *Tetrads* a *Tetragone*, in each of its Angles a *Point*, for so many Unites the *Unite* at the Top, which

now

* Scalich. can. 9.

* Ibid. can. 10.

* Ibid. can. 11.

* Illud. 14.

* Page 689. d.

now begins to have Position, elevated as much as is possible. Thus the former Sides elevated will be four Triangles, built upon their quadrangular Latitude, and carried on to one high Point. This is the Pyramis itself, * the Species of Fire, of which a Pyramis, having four Bases and equal Angles, is compounded, the most immovable and penetrant Form, without Matter, essential separate Light, next to God, sempiternal Life. The Work of the Mind is Life, the Work of God is Immortality, eternal Life. God himself is not this created Light, but the Author of all Light; whereof in the divine Trinity he containeth a most absolute Pyramid, which implieth the Vigor of Fire. Whence the Chaldeans and Hebrews affirm, that God is Fire. But the Pyramid which this divine Tetractys produceth, is the fiery Light of the immaterial World, of separate Intelligences, beyond the visible Heaven, termed *aider*, Age, Eternity, *Ether*. Having overcome these things (saith * Pythagoras) thou shalt know wisdom, the Cohabitation of the immortal Gods, and mortal Men. In which Words are imply'd three Properties of this middle World, (which he terms the *free Ether*; free, as being separated from the Power of Matter; *Ether*, as receiving Ardor from God, and heating all Inferiors by an insensible Motion) Condition, *Cborus*, Order.

Condition, It is replenished with Forms simple, immaterial, separate, both universal and individual, containing all ideated Ideas of Genus's and Species, the Exemplars imitated in lesser Copies, their Original being in the divine Mind. Thus the World of the Deity is the absolute Exemplar in the intelligible World; the abstract Example; and, in the sensible World, not Example, but Contraction of Exemplars, as Seal, Figure, and sealed Wax.

Chorus, the infinite Joy of the blessed Spirits, their immutable Delight, styl'd by Homer *ἄριστος γάλας, inextinguishable Laughter*. For what greater Pleasure, than to behold the serene Aspect of God; and next him, the Ideas and Forms of all Things, more purely and transparently, than secondarily in created Beings? and to communicate these Visions to Inferiors, the Office of the Gods, called *ἄνθ' ἑαυτῶν, from Speculation and Vision*; Angels, from communicating their Visions to others; not that we imagine them equal to the supreme God, who is ineffable. No Dæmons, how good soever, are admitted into this *Chorus*; so Plotinus, (the most exact Follower of the Pythagorick Mysteries, as Porphyrius and Longinus attest.) * The kind of Gods we conceive to be void of Passion; but to Dæmons we adjoin Passions, saying, they are sempiternal in the next Degree after the Gods. It is better to call none in the intelligible World, *Dæmon*; rather, if a *Dæmon* be plac'd there, to esteem him a God.

Order, thus explained by Pythagoras: * If thou live according to right Reason, grieving for what is ill done, and rejoicing in what is well done, and prayst the Gods to perfect thy Work:

Then stript of Flesh, up to free *Ether* soar,
A deathless God, divine, mortal no more.

This is the Order in the Acquisition of Man's Beatitude. The incorporeal Heaven of the middle World, the invisible *Olympus* of the blessed, admits nothing impure; therefore Vices are to be shunn'd, and Virtues to be embrac'd. The Preservation of Men is by the Mercies of God; therefore the Divinity is to be worshipp'd, and the superior Powers to be invocated, that they would perfect our Work. Lastly, nothing material, corporeal, mixt, is received there. Therefore we must die, and holly put off the Body, where we can be admitted to the Society of the Gods.

CHAP. V.

The Sensible World.

* WE now come down to the sensible World.

Its Exemplar is, the World of the Deity, its Example the intelligible World of Ideas, the *αὐτὴν ἑαυτῶν*, Subsistence of Exemplars in itself. As One is the Beginning of the intelligible World, so Two is of the corporeal; which were not corporeal, if it did not consist of these four, Point, Line, Surface, Solidity, after the Patern of the Cube, made by one, two, three, four. One, fixed by Position, creates a Point; a Line, being protracted from one Point to another, is made of the Number two; a Surface ariseth from three Lines; a Solid from four Positions, before, behind, upwards, downwards. Two multiplied in itself produceth four; retorted into itself (by saying twice two twice) makes the first Cube. Next five (the Tetragonical Pyramid Principle of the intelligible World) is the Cube of eight with six Sides, Architect of the sensible World. Amongst Principles, the *Heptad* hath no place, being a Virgin, producing nothing, and therefore named *Pallas*. This first Cube is a fertile Number, the Ground of Multitude and Variety, constituted of two and of four. Zoroaster termed two the *Mother*; we the Cube that proceedeth from it, *Matter*, the Bottom and Foundation of all natural Beings, the Seat of substantial Forms. Timæus, of the Tetragon is generated the Cube, the most settled Body, steadfast every way, having six Sides, eight Angles. The Form immers'd in this solid Receptacle is not received loosely, but fixtly; and singly it becomes individual and incommunicable, confin'd

* Timæus de anima mundi.

* De anima mundi.

* Aur. carm.

* De amore Deor.

* Aur. carm.

* Page 694. f.

find to Time and Place, losing its Liberty in the Servitude of Matter. Thus the two Principles of temporal things, the *Pyramis* and *Cube*, *Form* and *Matter*, flow from one Fountain, the *Tetragon*, whose Idea is the *Tetraphys*, the divine Exemplar.

Now there is requisite some third thing to unite these two, *Matter* and *Form*; for they flow not into one another spontaneously, or casually; the Matter of one thing doth not contingently receive the Form of another. When the Soul departs out of Man, the Body becomes not Brass or Iron, neither is Wool made of a Stone. There must then be a third thing to unite them, (not *Privation*; Privation and Power act nothing substantively; nor *Motion*; an Accident cannot be the Principle of a Substance; but) *God*, as *Socrates* and *Plato* acknowledge, saying, *There are three Principles of things, God, Idea, and Matter*; symbolized before by *Pythagoras* in these three secret Marks, *Infinite*, *One* and *Two*; by *Infinite*, designating *God*; by *Unity*, *Form*; by *Alterity*, *Matter*. Infinite in the supreme World; *One*, or Identity, in the *Intellectual*; *Two*, or Alterity, in the *sensible*; for Matter is the Mother of Alteration.

The Tetragonal Bases of these Figures joined together make a *Dodecaedre*, the Symbol of the Universe. *Alcinous*, the *Dodecaedre* God used in making the Universe, this World. If upon an octangle Cube we erect a *Pyramis* by four equi-crural Triangles, it makes a *Dodecaedre*, wherein the Cube is, as it were, Mother, and the *Pyramis* Father. Thus *Timeus*, *Form* both the Nature of Male and Father; *Matter*, of Female and Mother; the Compositions are their Offspring.

Of these are produced all things in this World, by their seminal Faculties; which things appear in a wonderful variety, by reason of the various commensuration of Forms to their Matter, and the admixture of innumerable Accidents, by excess and defect, discord and amity, motion and rest, impetuosity, and tranquility, rarity and density. Hence arises the Spheres, the Stars, the four Elements, out of which evaporate hot, moist, cold, dry, and all the objects of sense, the transmutation of Forms, and variety of Colours in several things.

The Gods are natural, the Gods of Gods supernatural; those inhabit the Inferior World, these the Superior. The Gods of Gods are most simple and pure, as being no where; they are supercelestial, as being every where; they are with us, where Strangers, there natives; Never in our World, but when sent; *Angels*, Messengers from Heavens, appearing in what Form they please, kind and beneficial to us. The inferior Spirits never ascend to the super-celestial, but are sent sometimes on errands to us, whence termed *Angels*, as the others. God himself inhabits

the lowest, the highest, and the middlemost, intimately; so that there is no Being without God. Moreover the Gods of this World are more excellent than the Souls of Men; though those assist, these inform Bodies. Betwixt them, are placed *Demons* and *Heroes*; *Demons* next the Gods, *Heroes* next Souls; mentioned by *Pythagoras* in his *Golden Verses*, who assigns to each a peculiar Worship.

CHAP. VI.

The State of the Soul after Death.

Rational Man is more noble than other Creatures, as more divine; not content solely with one Operation, (as all other things drawn along by Nature, which always acts after the same manner) but endued with various Gifts, which he useth according to his Free-will; in respect of which Liberty,

— (*) *Men are of heavenly race,
Taught by divine Nature what to embrace.*

By *Diviner Nature* is meant the Intellectual Soul; as to Intellectual, Man approaches nigh to God; as to inferior Senses, he recedeth from God: Reason teaching us what to embrace; when it converts itself to the Mind, renders us blessed; when perverted by the Senses, wretched. For Men often straying from the Rule of Right Reason, precipitate themselves into Misery, *ἐκ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ἐκπίπτειν*, in *Pythagoras's* word, incurring ill voluntarily.

Thus is man placed between Virtue and Vice, like the Stalk betwixt the two Branches in the *Pythagorical Y*; or young *Hercules*, described by *Prodicus*. As therefore none can be called Happy before their Death, (as *Solon* said to *Croesus*) so none is to be esteemed unhappy whilst he is in this Life: *We must expect the Last Day of a Man*. If when he hath put off his Body, he remaineth burdened with Vices, then begins he to be truly miserable. This Misery after Death, *Pythagoras* divides into two kinds. The unhappy are either near Beatitude, which though at the present they enjoy not, yet are they not oppressed with extreme Misery, being hereafter to be delivered from their Punishment: Or, wholly distant from Beatitude, in endless infinite Pains. Thus there are two Mansions in the Inferi, *Elizium*, possit by those that see to ascend into Blessedness; and *Tartarus*, by those who endure infinite Torments, *ἐκ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ἐκπίπτειν*, (as *Plato*, imitating *Pythagoras*, saith) whence they never come out. But when a Man, who hath lived justly, dieth, his Soul ascends to the pure Aether, and lives in the happy *Ævum* with the Blessed, as a God with the Gods.

Man

* Scilicet, can. 1.
soph. memor. lib.

* Dr. Plat.

* De Animis mundi.

* Pag. 675.

* Aue. carm.

* Xc.

Man is the Image of the World; he, in many things, metaphorically, receives the name of the World. The *Mind* of Man (as the supreme Mind) is termed God, by participation; the *rational Soul*, if directed by the Mind, it inclines the Will to Virtue, is termed the good *Dæmon* or *Genius*; if by Phantasies and ill Affections, it draweth the Will to Vices, the *evil Dæmon*. Whence *Pythagoras* desires of God, to keep us from ill, and to show every one the *Dæmon* he ought to use. Leaving the Body, the Soul, if defiled with the Vices, becomes an evil *Dæmon*: Its Life, *ἡδυστορία*, *Infelicity*; but if having forsaken Vice, it retain a solicitous affection to the good Exercises and Virtues which it practised in this Life, it shall become a good *Dæmon*, and in the Amenity of that World live happily; reflecting with joy upon the good Actions it hath done, and retaining the same willingness to the right doing of them. This Life is *ἡδυστορία*, *Felicity*, of which *Virgil*:

————— the same Care
Which heretofore, breathing this vital Air,
Of Chariots, Arms, and sleek-skin'd Steeds they had,
Pursues them now in Earth's cold Bosom laid.

These Souls the Ancients termed *Lemures*; of these, that which lives in, and takes care of any particular House, is *Lar-familiaris*; that which for its Demerits in this Life, wanders up and down in the Air, a Terror, vain to good Men, but to the bad hurtful, is *Larva*; those which are not certainly known to be *Larvæ* or *Lares*, are called *Dii manes*; *Dii* out of Reverence, who having performed the course of their Lives prudently and justly, died holily.

C H A P. VII.

Of the Pythagorical Transmigration.

It is commonly averred *Pythagoras* was of opinion, that the Souls of Men after death informed the Bodies of Beasts. We cannot imagine this of so knowing a Person. This Suspicion of this Transmigration, seems rather to have been raised by such, as were partly ignorant, partly envious, of the *Pythagorick* Mysteries; as *Timon*, *Xenophanes*, *Cratinus*, *Aristophanes*, *Hermippus*, and others, who have ascribed many things to *Pythagoras* which he never said nor wrote, and have perverted what he did say. He holds, that the substantive Unity of one Number, is not the Unity of another Number. That the Monads in the Duad are inconnexive to those in the Triad. That the participate Essence of every thing is One, which will not occupy the

Essence of another thing. No Animal (then) can transmigrate into the Life of a different Animal; but must continue under the Law of its own Nature in its proper Office; *ἡ δὲ φύσις ἑκάστη ἐν ἑαυτῇ μένει, Species not being coincident with Species.* One Seal may make many Impressions upon several pieces of Wax; but one piece of Wax cannot bear the Form of many Seals. The Seal of human Form (the Image of God) is not permitted to set an Impression upon inferior Nature; implied by *Pythagoras* in this Symbol, *We must wear the Image of God in a Scolding.* The Image of God (Man's Soul) cannot seal or form the other Natures that are near it. So *Hermes Trismegistus*, Of Man, one part is simple, which we call the Form of divine Similitude. And again, There are two Images of God, the World and Man.

This is the meaning of *Pythagoras* concerning the Transmigration of Souls after Death, and their Descension into Life. Others thought the Soul educated out of the Power of Matter; *Pythagoras* asserted it infused by God into the Body, and therefore before it, not in Time, but in Purity and Dignity. This Infusion he termed, *The Descent of the Soul*; not understood of its Situation, or its Motion from the intellectual World through the several Spheres of the Elementary, as *Proclus* and others; but of the natural Series or Form; the rational Soul being the ultimate Perfection of human Body.

That *Pythagoras* said, he was in times past *Euphorbus*, the meaning is this: The Ancients called the Inclinations and Wills of Men their *Minds*; whence such as are of one Study, Intention, Inclination, Motion, and Sense, are termed *Unanimous*. Thus the ancient Philosophers call the motive and sensitive Faculty, *The Soul*. An *Animate* differs from an *Inanimate* (saith *Aristotle*) chiefly in two things, *Motion and Sense*. Whosoever therefore are alike affected, and moved by the same Object, are said to have the same Soul. The *Metempsychists* then is nothing else, but equal Care, Motion, and Study of some dead Person, appearing in some living Person. Thus *Pythagoras* might arrogate the Soul of *Euphorbus*, *Callicles*, *Hermotimus*, *Pyrrhus*, *Pyander*, *Calidona*, *Alice*, as having an Inclination to the several Excellencies that were in those Persons.

Again, in saying he was *Euphorbus*, *Pythagoras* zenigmatically taught (not the Transmigration of Souls, but) the Transmutation of Bodies out of first Matter; which is not only susceptible, but covetous of all Forms; continually desiring, never fatiated with any; as, if a Comedy (to use the comparison of *Aristotle*) should say, I was first a Tragedy, because both Tragedy and Comedy are form'd of the same Letters

* Pag. 697.

* Aur. carm.

* Æscid. 6.

* Pag. 626.

* Scalich. can. 6.

* Ibid. can. 5.

* Ibid. can. 5.

* Page 632.

* De Genes.

Letters and Elements. * Thus Apollonius, demanding of the Indian Bramans, what their Opinion was concerning the Soul, *Jarchus* answered, "According as Pythagoras delivered to you, we to the Egyptians." Apollonius replies, "Will you then affirm you were one of the Trojan Captains, as Pythagoras said he was Euphorbus?" *Thespasian* warily askt, "Whom he thought the most worthy of them?" *Achilles* (saith Apollonius) if we believe "Homer." Then *Jarchus*, "Look on him as my Progenitor, or *παιστρον ὄντα*, progeniting Body; for such Pythagoras esteemed Euphorbus."

Or if he meant historically, *παρυφυσία*, that is, the Soul separate from the Body, may by the Power of God, be brought again, the same into

* Philost. vit. Apollon.

the same Body: The Body in which *Pythagoras* was so often revived, though called by several Names, was one and the same, not in Quantity, but Substance; as the Sea is one and homogeneous in itself, yet is here called *Egean*, there *Ionian*; elsewhere, *Myrtæan* and *Cælian*; so one Man often renate, is named *Ethalides*, *Euphorbus*, *Hermatimus*, *Pyrrhus*, and lastly *Pythagoras*. These Generations he ascribes not to the Power of Nature, but to *Mercury*, God only; none can revive but by the Divine Power of God, whom he acknowledgeth, *ψυχῶν ἡ δυνάμις*, Animation of all Things. He infuseth Soul into all Men, and being infused, taketh it away; and being taken away, restores it, when, and as often as he pleaseth.

EMPEDOCLES.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents.

IN the Catalogue of the Pythagoreans, we find *Empedocles* not the least eminent amongst them. He was of *Agrigentum*, the most considerable City, next *Syracuse*, of *Sicily*; built by a Colony of *Gelonians*, 108 Years after their own Foundation. *Gela* was built 45 Years after *Syracuse*; *Syracuse* in the 11th Olympiad; *Gela* therefore in the 22d, *Agrigentum* in the 48th. It had its Name from the River, and grew in a short while to so vast an Increase, that in the time of *Empedocles* it contained 800000 Inhabitants. Eminent it was for many things, but for none so much as the Birth of * *Empedocles*: Whence *Lucretius*:

'An Agrigentine Citizen 'mongst these
Is chief and principal, *Empedocles*:
Born on the Shore of Sicily's triquile Bounds,
Which the Ionian in wide Bays surrounds.
Leaving its Cliffs with azure Waves, whose Force
And rapid Current Italy divorce
By a small Strait. Here's vast *Charibdis* Seat,
And here the murm'ring *Ætna's* Flames do threat
To re-inforce once more their dreadful Ire,
And vomit yet again devouring Fire;
Belching it forth out of his footy Faws,
Which he at Heaven in lightning Flashes throws.
Altho this Isle for sundry things may seem
Famous, and many Nations it esteem,
Renown'd for Wealth and many gallant Men;
Yet never had it eught more glorious, than

* Thucid. l. 6.

* Laert. 8. 63.

* Lucret. l. 1, 2. 717.

* By Mr. Evelyn.

*This Personage; nought more miraculous,
More holy, or which was more precious.
His Verse divine, and his Inventions rare;
The Fruits of that rich Breast do so declare
An universal Knowledge, that some doubt
Whether or no he sprung from human root.*

Of his Parentage, *Laertius* gives this Account. *Empedocles*, as *Hippobotus* saith, was an *Agrigentine*, Son of *Meto*, Son of *Empedocles*; which *Timæus* confirms in his Sixteenth Book of *Histories*, saying, that there was one *Empedocles* an eminent Person, Grandfather to the Poet. *Hermippus* saith the same. Likewise *Heraclides*, in his Treatise concerning Islands, affirms that his Grandfather was of a noble Family, and kept Chariot Horses. And *Eratosthenes*, in his *Olympionics*, saith, that the Father of *Meto* was Victor in the 71st Olympiad, upon the Testimony of *Aristotle*. But *Apollodorus* the Grammarian saith, it was that *Empedocles* who was Son of *Meto*. *Glaucus* writes, that he came to the *Thurians*, at such time as they had newly built their City; and not long after adds, They who relate that he was banished his Country, and came to *Syracuse*, and fought with the *Syracusians* against the *Athenians*, seem to me to be quite mistaken. For either *Empedocles* at that time was dead, or very old; the latter is not likely, for *Aristotle* saith, that he and *Heraclitus* dy'd in the Sixtieth Year of their Age. But he who won the Race in the Seventy-first Olympiad,

ad, was of the same Name, as *Apollodorus*: hath set down the Time. *Satyrus* in his *Lives*, saith, that *Empedocles* was Son of *Exænetus*, and that he himself had a Son named *Exænetus*; and that in the same Olympiad *Empedocles* won the Horse-race, and the Son was Victor at Wrestling, or, as *Heraclides*, won the Foot-race. But I find in the Commentaries of *Favorinus*, that in the Olympiac Games, *Empedocles* sacrific'd an Ox made of Honey and Flower, and that he had a Brother named *Callicratides*. But *Telauges*, Son of *Pythagoras*, in his Epistle to *Philolaus* saith, that *Empedocles* was Son of *Archinamus*: That he was of *Agrigentum* in *Sicily*, he himself professeth in his *Lustrations*, beginning thus:

Friends, who in spacious Agrigentum dwell, &c.

Thus much (saith *Laertius*) of his Descent.

CHAPTER II.

His Masters.

**TIMÆUS*, in the Ninth Book of his History affirms, he heard *Pythagoras*; adding, that he was taken stealing a Dissertation of his, (as *Plato* also was) and thereupon expelled out of their Society; and that he mentions *Pythagoras* in his Verses, saying,

*'Amongst these was one in things sublimest skill'd;
His Mind with all the Wealth of Learning fill'd.*

But some there are who say, he meant this of *Parmenides*. *Neanthes* relates, that until *Philolaus* and *Empedocles*, the *Pythagoreans* communicated their Discourses; but, after that *Empedocles* divulged them in his Poems, they made an Order not to communicate any thing to an Epick Poet. They say likewise, that *Plato* was prohibited in the like manner.

But which of the *Pythagoreans* *Empedocles* heard, he tells not; the Epistle which goes abroad under the Name of *Telauges*, affirming *Empedocles* was Disciple to *Hippasus* and *Brontinus*, deserves no Credit.

Theophrastus saith, he was an Emulator and Imitator of *Parmenides* in his Poetry; for he among other things writ a Discourse concerning Nature.

Hermippus saith, he was not an Emulator of *Parmenides*, but of *Xenophanes*, with whom he lived, and imitated his Poetry, and afterwards applied himself to the *Pythagoreans*. But *Alcidamas*, in his Physick, relates, that *Zeno* and *Empedocles* heard *Parmenides* at the same time; at last both left him. *Zeno*

went and studied Philosophy by himself; *Empedocles* went and heard *Anaxagoras* and *Pythagoras*; and imitated the one in his Gravity of Life and Deportment; the other in his Physiology.

Empedocles, saith *Philistratus*, repeated by *Suidas*, is reported to have followed the *Pythagorean* Philosophy; which is confirmed by many Verses of his, as this:

Farewel, Friends; mortal I shall be no more.

And this,

A Boy I was, then did a Maid become.

Besides, the Ox which he made of Meal, and sacrific'd in *Olympia*, shews, that he approved the way of *Pythagoras*.

CHAPTER III.

How he lived amongst the Agrigentines; his Power and Authority.

**NEANthes* relates, that *Meto* dying, there began a Tyranny: But *Empedocles* perswaded the *Agrigentines* to give over Sedition, and to endeavour a Civil Parity; and that he himself being very rich, bestowed Dowries upon many Virgins that had none, and thereupon clothed himself in Purple, and wore a golden Girdle, as *Phavorinus* affirms, and a Delphick Crown, and had Servants attending on him; his Look severe and constant. After this manner he went. And the Citizens that met him paid such Respect to him, as if those had been the Marks of Regal Authority.

Nevertheless, he was, as *Aristotle* affirms, very free, and averse from taking any Government upon him; for he refused a Kingdom which was offered him, (as *Xanthus* saith in his Book concerning him) preferring a moderate Condition. *Timæus* relates the same, adding the Reason of his being Democratically affected; for being invited by one of the Governors, and the Company falling to drink, he commanded, that Supper should be brought in. He who had invited him, said, That he staid for the chief Magistrate. As soon as he came, he was made Symposiarch, Master of the Feast; for so it was ordered by him who invited them. He began to discover a tyrannical Kind of Humour, commanding, either that he should drink, or that it should be poured on his Head. *Empedocles* for the present held his Peace. But the next Day citing them to the Court, he condemned them both to Death, the *Inviter*, and the Symposiarch. Of so great Authority was he in the Commonwealth.

Again,

Again, when *Acrs* the Physician petition'd for a Place, to build a Monument for his Father, *Empedocles* stood up and oppos'd it, and discours'd very largely of Parity; and withal asked, what Epitaph should be inscribed on the Tomb? This:

Ἀκρῆς ἰατρὸς ἄκρῳ ἀκρογανῶν πατρὸς ἄκρῳ
ἐπὶ τῇ κρημνίδι ἄκρως παλαιοῖς ἀκροτάτης.

playing upon his Name *Acrs*. Others recite the second Verse thus:

Ἀκροτάτης κορυφῆς τύμβος ἄκρ' ἐστὶ χη.

This, some ascribe to *Simonides*.

Afterwards *Empedocles* dissolved the Council of a thousand Senators, and constituted it Triennial; so that it consisted, not only of the rich, but of the ordinary sort.

But *Timæus*, in his first and second Books, (for he often mentions him) saith, that he seems to be of an Opinion contrary to the Democracy; sometimes proud and self-conceited in his Poetry; as when he saith,

A deathless God am I, mortal no more.

CHAP. IV.

Wonders related of him.

HE was so excellent, not only in natural Philosophy, but in Medicine also, that by his Skill in both these, he performed many admirable Things.

Timæus relates, that the *Etesian* Winds blowing very strongly, inasmuch that they destroy'd the Fruits; he gave order, that many Asses should be flead, and Bottles made of their Skins, and placed on the Tops of the Hills to receive the Blasts; by which means the Winds gave over: and upon him was conferred the Attribute of *Colybanæmos*, or *Alexanemos*, The Chaser away of the Winds.

Not unlike to this is that which *Plutarch* reports of him, that by stopping up a Cleft in a Mountain, one of which there came an unwholesome southern Blait to the Plains, it is conceived that he drove away the Plague out of that Country.

The same Cure he wrought among the *Selinuncians*, by a different Means; for they being, as *Diodorus* the *Ephesian* saith, infected by a Plague, caused by the Noisomeness of the River, whereof the Men died, neither could the Women be, without much Difficulty, delivered; *Empedocles* contriv'd, and at his own Charge convey'd two other Rivers that ran near

into this Channel; by which Mixtion, the Water became sweet, and the Plague ceased.

Another time, a young Man drawing a Sword upon *Anchytus*'s Host, (for that he had in publick Judgment condemn'd his Father to Death) and being about to have killed him, *Empedocles* prevent'd it, and immediately changing his Tune, and singing out of *Homer*,

Nepenthe calming Anger, easing Grief.

freed *Anchytus*'s Host from Death, and the young Man from the Crime of Murder; who, from thenceforward, became one of his Disciples, eminent among them.

Hermippus saith, that he cured *Panthea*, a Woman of *Agrigentum*, given over by all the Physicians.

But the most memorable Cure was that which he performed upon a Woman that had lain seven Days dead, as *Pliny* terms it; but as *Galen*, more exactly out of *Heracleides*, describes it, *breathless*, and without Pulse; differing in nothing from a dead Body, saving that she had a little Warmth about the middle Parts of her Body. The Book of *Heracleides* was intitled, The breathless Woman. And it was a Controversy amongst the Physicians that were present, whether she were dead or alive. *Heracleides* adds, that *Empedocles* acquainted *Pausanias* with the whole Business, and that the breathless Woman could preserve herself thirty Days, without breathing or eating. Whence he terms *Empedocles* both a Physician and a Prophet; confirmed even by his own Verses:

Friends, who in spacious *Agrigentum* dwell,
Bask'd in noble high Designs, farewell.
A deathless God I am, mortal no more;
Henceforth by all, with Garlands cover'd o'er:
Which, 'soon as I come to any Town,
Both Men and Women pay to me Renown.
Thousands of Men enquire the Way to Wealth,
Some would divine, others restore to Health.

Some there were who ascribe these to *Gostick Mægick*. *Satyrus* in his *Lives* relates, that *Gorgias* the *Leontine*, who had been Disciple to *Empedocles*, used to say, that he himself had been present with him when he præsid'd *Gostick*; and that *Empedocles* makes a Profession thereof in his Poems, when he saith:

Mad comes to strengthen Age, and cure Disease,
Thou shalt be taught, for I am skill'd in these.
The Wrath of restless Winds thou shalt assuage,
Which blast the Corn in their pernicious Rage.

R r r z

And

¹ Laert. 8. 60.

² Lib. de Curios.

³ Jabl. vit. Pyth. c. 25.

⁴ Laert. 7. 69.

⁵ Laert. Solid. 8. 6a.

*And when thou call'st, they shall come back again.
Rain thou shalt change to Drought, and Drought to
Rain;
By whose kind Moisture Trees may sprout and thrive,
And make the dead quit Pluto, and revive.*

In fine, he was so much admired for these Things, that when he went to the Olympick Games, the Eyes of all Men were fixed on him; neither was their Discourse of any thing so much as of *Empedocles*.

CHAP. V.

His Death.

HIS Death (saith *Laertius*) is variously reported. *Heraclides* having related the Story of the breathless Woman, how much *Empedocles* was admired for raising a dead Woman to Life, adds, that he appointed a Sacrifice in the Field of *Pisfanax*, and invited thither many of his Friends, amongst whom was *Pausanias*. After the Feast was done, the Company withdrew themselves to Rest, but he stirr'd not out of the Place where he lay at Supper. The next Morning when they arose, he alone was missing, which giving them occasion to enquire after him of the Servants, they said they knew not what was become of him; only one of them said, that about Midnight he heard a great Voice calling *Empedocles*; whereupon rising up, he saw a heavenly Light, and a Splendor of Torches, but nothing else. They were all amazed at this Accident, and *Pausanias* going down, sent forth others to enquire more strictly, but was at last persuaded not to trouble himself any further, saying, that the thing that had fallen out deserved Prayer, and that Sacrifice should be made to him as to a God. *Hermippus* saith, that he made the Sacrifice upon the Cure he wrought on *Panthea*, and that the Persons invited were eighty.

Hippobotus affirms, that he rose up from his Place and went to *Ætna*, where he leaped into the Fire, that he might leave behind him an Opinion that he was a God; and that afterwards it was discovered by one of his Sandals, which the Fire cast up again, for his Sandals were of Brafs. But this Report *Pausanias* contradicts.

Diodes the *Ephesian*, having told how he cured the *Selinuncians* of the Plague, adds, that the *Selinuncians* upon a time feasting by this River, *Empedocles* appeared to them, and they rising up, worshipped him, and prayed to him as a God; which Opinion he desiring to continue, cast himself into the Fire.

This Relation *Timæus* contradicts, affirming, that he departed into *Peloponnesus*, and never returned; whereby it came to pass, that the manner of his Death is not known. He likewise in his fourth

Book expressly confutes *Heraclides*; for he proveth that *Pisfanax* was a *Syracusan*, and had not any Estate or Field at *Argentum*; that *Pausanias*, upon that Report, erected in Memory of his Friend, either a little Image or Chapel, as to a God, for he was rich. And how, saith he, could he cast himself into the Flames of *Ætna*, of which being so far distant, he never makes any mention? Indeed he died in *Peloponnesus*, and it is no wonder that his Tomb is not known, for it hath happen'd so to many others besides. Thus *Timæus*; adding, that *Heraclides* tells extraordinary Things; as among the rest, the Story of a Man that fell out of the Moon.

Hippobotus affirms, that a Statue of *Empedocles* cover'd, which stood first at *Argentum*, was afterwards plac'd before the Senate-house at *Rome* uncovered, being brought thither by the *Romans*, of which saith *Laertius*, there are yet some Pictures.

Neambes relates, that going in his Chariot to a great Solemnity at *Messena*, he fell and broke his Thigh, of which he died, being seventy seven Years old. His Sepulchre is at *Megara*; but in the Account of his Years *Aristotle* differs, who saith he died at sixty. Yet others affirm, he lived to an hundred and nine Years of Age. He flourished in the 84th Olympiad.

But *Demetrius* the *Træzanian* relates, in *Homer's* Words, that,

*About his Neck he knit a Rope, and fell
From a high Cliff; his Soul went down to Hell.*

In the forementioned Epistle of *Telauges*, it is said, that being exceeding old, he fell into the Sea, and so died. Thus much for his Death.

CHAP. VI.

His Writings.

Aristotle in his Sophist affirms, that *Empedocles* first found out Rhetorick, *Zeno* Dialectick; and in his Book concerning the Poets, that *Empedocles's* Style was *Homericall*, and that he was weighty in his Expressions, using Metaphors much, and other poetical Figures; and that having written, among other Poems, the Passage of *Xerxes* over the *Hellspont*, and a Hymn to *Apollo*, they were both burnt by a Sister, or, as *Hieronimus*, a Daughter of his; the Hymn upon mistake; the *Persian* Poem wittingly, for that it was imperfect. He adds, that he wrote Tragedies also, and Politics; but *Heraclides*, Son of *Serapion*, ascribes the Tragedies to another. *Hieronimus* saith, he lighted upon forty three of them; *Neambes*,

^a Laert. 2. 67.

^b Laert. 2. 72.

^c Laert. 2. 57.

Numbers, that he wrote Tragedies when he was young, and that he had a Sight of them.

Moreover he wrote Books concerning *Nature* and *Lustrations*, which extended to 5000 Verses, and a *Medicinal Discourse*, containing 600 Verses.

His *Lustrations*, *Clemens* the Rhapsodist collected, and sung at the Olympick Games, as *Pbæwrinus* saith in his Commentaries.

C H A P. VII.

His Opinions.

HE held that there are ^a four Elements, Fire, Air, Water, Earth; and two principal Powers, Amity and Discord; one unitive, the other disjunctive; for thus he writes:

*To the four Roots of all, Attention give;
The Æther Jove; Juno, by whom we live;
Next these is Pluto; Neftis last, whose Eyes
Afford the mortal Fountain fresh Supplies.*

He calls the Heat and Æther, *Jupiter*; the Air, *vital Juno*; the Earth, *Pluto*; the Water, *Neftis*, and the Mortal Fountain. *Laertius* cites it thus:

*White Jove, and vital Juno, Pluto then,
And Neftis giving Tears to the Eyes of Men.*

The Fire, saith he, he calls *Jupiter*; the Earth, *Juno*; the Air, *Pluto*; the Water, *Neftis*. These are in an incessant Mutation, whereby there is such an eternal Production of Things; whence he adds,

*Sometimes by Friendship all are knit in one;
Sometimes by Discord sever'd and undone.*

¹ Before the four Elements, there are certain less Fragments, = as it were Elements of Elements, of similar Parts, and round.

² The World is one; the World is not the Universe, but a little Part of the Universe; the rest is sluggish Matter.

³ Nature is nothing but the Mixture and Separation of the Elements; for so he saith in the first of his Physics:

*We otherwise; there's no such Thing as all
As that which Mortals Death or Nature call.
To Mixtion and Discretion all we owe,
On which the Names of Nature Men bestow.*

⁴ The World is circumscribed by the Circulation of the Sun, and that is the Bound of it.

⁵ The Right-side of the World is that which is towards the Summer Tropic, the Left that which is towards the Winter Tropic.

⁶ He as all those who held the World to be made of little Bodies, introduced Concretions and Discretions, but deny'd Generation and Corruption; saying, That Compounds are not made by *Quality* and Alteration, but by *Quantity* and Coagmentation.

⁷ Heaven is solid, being made of Air condens'd by Fire, like Crystal; it containeth a fiery and aerial Nature in both Hemispheres.

The Stars are fiery, consisting of that Fire which the Æther containing in itself struck forth in its first Secretion.

⁸ The fixed Stars are fasten'd to the Crystal of the Heavens, the Planets are loose.

⁹ The Sun is a great Heap of Fire, bigger than the Moon.

¹⁰ There are two Suns, one an archetypal Fire in the other Hemisphere of the World, filling this Hemisphere, which is continually opposite to its Splendor. As for that which we see, it is the Light in that other Hemisphere, replenish'd with Air, mixed with Heat; and the same is occasioned by Refraction from the Earth, that is more round, entering into the Sun, which is of a Crystalline Nature, and yet is trained and carried away together with the Motion of that Fire. But to speak more plainly and distinctly, this is as much as to say, The Sun is nothing else but the Reflection of that Light of the Fire which is about the Earth.

¹¹ He ascribed the Reasons of the Solstices, or Tropicks of the Sun, to the Sphere that containeth him, and hindreth him from passing further; as also to the two Tropicks.

¹² The Moon is in Form like a Dish.

¹³ The Moon is twice as far from the Sun, as she is from the Earth.

¹⁴ Winter cometh when the Air is predominant in Thickness, and is forced upward; Summer, when the Fire is in like manner predominant, and is driven downward.

¹⁵ The Sea is the Sweat of the Earth, burnt by the Sun, which squeezeth the Sweat out of it.

¹⁶ The Soul puts on the several Forms of all living Creatures and Plants; whence he said of himself:

*A Boy I was, then did a Maid become:
A Plant, Bird, Fish, and in the vast Sea swim.*

The

^a Plot. plac. phil. 1. 3.

¹ Plot. 1. 10.

² Plot. 1. 27. Laert. 8. 77.

³ Plot. 2. 31.

⁴ Plot. 1. 13.

⁵ Plot. 2. 11.

⁶ Plot. 3. 8.

⁷ Stob. Ecl. Phys. 1. 17.

⁸ Plot. 2. 13.

⁹ Plot. 3. 8.

¹⁰ Plot. 3. 16.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Plot. 3. 16.

¹³ Plot. pl. 1. 5.

¹⁴ Laert. 8. 77.

¹⁵ Laert. ibid.

¹⁶ Plot. 1. 30.

¹⁷ Plot. 2. 20.

¹⁸ Plot. 2. 23.

¹⁹ Plot. 1. 1.

²⁰ Plot. 2. 23.

^c The particular Senses are affected according to the Proportion of their Pores and Passages, namely, as the proper Object of each Sense is well disposed and fitted.

^f Resemblances in Mirrours come by the means of certain Defluxions gathered together, upon the Superficies of the Mirrour, and accomplished by the Fire that ariseth from the said Mirrour; and withal, transmuteth the Air that is before it, into which those Fluxions are carried.

^e Plut. 4. 9.

^f Plut. 4. 14.

^g Plut. 4. 13.

^h Plut. 4. 16.

ⁱ Plut. 4. 5.

^a *Plutarch* saith, he mingled the visual Images and Beams together, calling that which is made thereof, The Rays of a compound Image.

^b Hearing is perform'd by means of a Wind within the hollow of the Ear, turned in manner of a Screw, fitted and framed of Purpose within the Ear, hanging up, and beaten upon in manner of a Bell.

^c The Hegemonick is the Consistence of the Blood.

EPICHARMUS.

EPICARMUS ^a also heard *Pythagoras*. He was of *Cos*, Son of *Hilotales*. At three Months old, he was carried from *Sicily* to *Megara*, and from thence to *Syracuse*, as he himself saith in his *Commentaries*. On his Image was this Inscription:

*As Stars exceeded by the radiant Sun,
Streams by the Ocean, into which they run;*

^a *Laert.* 8. 78.

*So all by Epicharmus are surpass'd,
On whose Head Syracuse this Garland plac'd.*

He wrote *Commentaries*, in which he discoursed Physiologically, and Sentientiously, and Medicinally; and added little Notes to his *Commentaries*, by which they are known to be his. He died ninety Years old.

ARCHYTAS.

ARCHYTAS ^a was of *Tarentum*, Son of *Mnesagoras*, or (as *Aristoxenus*) of *Hestæus*. He also heard *Pythagoras*. This was he, by whose means *Plato*, when *Dionysius* had a mind to put him to Death, was delivered. He was generally admired for all Sorts of Virtue. He was seven times General of his own Countrymen, whereas all others were but once, the Law prohibiting that they should be oftner. There is extant an Epistle of his to *Plato*, to this Effect.

Archytas to Plato, Health.

IT is well that you are recover'd of your Sickneſs, for besides what you wrote, Damiscus hath inform'd us so. We took care of the Commentaries, and went to the Lucanians, where we discours'd with the Sons of Ocellus. Part, concerning Laws, and a Kingdom, and Piety, and the Generation of all Things we have; and part we have sent; the rest are not to be found at present: as soon as we find them, you shall have them.

^a *Laert.* 8. 79.

^b *Lib.* 1. *Od.* 28.

Plato returned this Answer:

Plato to Archytas, Evergetes.

THE Commentaries which you sent, we received with much Joy, and exceedingly admire the Author, who seems to us to be a Person worthy his Ancestors, who were Myræans, some of those Trojans who went with Laomedon, good Men, as the Story speaks them. As for my Commentaries, concerning which you wrote, they are not polish'd, but as they are I have sent them; as for the Custody of them, we are both agreed, so that I shall need to enquire nothing of you. Farewel.

Aristoxenus saith, he was never worsted in the Field; but once, thro' the Envy of others, resign'd his Charge, and then all his Soldiers were taken; It appears by *Horace* ^b that he perished by Shipwreck; who brings in a Mariner expostulating with him upon it, thus:

Don

*Thou the Surveyor of the Sea and Land,
And the innum'rous Sand,
A little Share of these small dusty Grains;
Archytas now contains,
Hard by the Marine Shore. It ought avoid'd,
Since die thou must, 't have seal'd
Th' aerial Orb, or that thy soaring Soul
O'erun the wheeling Pole.*

ARCHYTAS Answers.

*And so dy'd Pelop's Father, at whose Feasts
The Gods themselves were Guests;
And Tithon, who Aurora entertain'd;
Minos, whom Jove design'd
Admission to his Counsels; and again
Dark Tartara detain,
Panthous Son, who, by his Target known,
And from the Shrine ta'ne down,
Stuffed, that in Trojan Wars he breath'd,
And to black Death bequeath'd
Nothing but Skin and Nerves, whom thou wilt yield
In Truth and Nature skill'd.
But all Men to one endless Night are led,
And once to Death's Path must tread.
Some are stern Mars's Trophies; Seas become
The greedy Sailor's Tomb.
The Fates of young and old together croud,
No Head is disallow'd
By mercilefs Proserpina; and me
Into th' Illyrian Sea
The Wind, which doth Orion's Star pursue,
Unwily Auster threw.
But grudge not thou, kind Mariner, to spread
On my unburied Head
And Bones, some few of these loose Sands; so may
Fierce Eurus turn away
Whatever threatens the Hesperian Floods,
On the Apulian Woods,
Securing thee from Harm; a swelling Tide
Of Wealth on every Side
Flow on thee, by great Jove and Neptune sent.
Tarentum's President,
If thou neglect, thou may'st in future Age
Thy guiltless Sons engage
In this Offence; perhaps Fate may return
What's due unto thy Scorn.
Vengeance may on my poor Petition wait,
And thee nought expiate.
The Ship is small, as thou sail'st on, thou may'st
Dust thrice upon me cast.*

He invented Cranes and Screws, and made a Pigeon of Wood that flew; but when she once rested, could not rise. Of the Duplication of a Cube, I have spoken formerly in the Life of Plato.

Being angry with a Countryman, he said, What would I have done to thee if I had not been angry?

He was very modest, and abstained from obscene Expressions; and if there were a Necessity of any, he wrote it upon the Wall.

He said, That if a Man should go to Heaven, and behold the Nature of the World, and Beauty of the Stars, he would find, that the Admiration of them, otherwise the most pleasing thing in the World, would be very unpleasant to him, if he had not one to communicate it unto.

He said, That it is as hard to find a Man without Deceit, as a Fish without Bones.

He said, That the Judge and Sanctuary is one; for he who hath received Wrong, flies to both.

He said, That every Commonwealth consists of three Things, the Ruler, the Ruled, and the Laws; whereof the best ought to command; the worst, to be commanded.

Cicero, in the Person of Cato, gives an Account of an Oration of Archytas to this Effect: That there is no Pestilence more capital given by Nature to Men, than corporeal Pleasure, by which they are incited to run headstrong, and unbridled on, to enjoy the Lust of that greedy Pleasure. Hence proceed Betrayings of our Country; hence, Subversions of Commonwealths; hence private Treaties with Enemies. In fine, there is no Wickedness, no Mischief to the undertaking whereof, this lusting after Pleasure will not impel us: Rapes, Adulteries, and all such Lewdness, are provoked by no other Allurements than those of Pleasure. And whereas Nature, or some God, hath not bestowed on Man any thing more excellent than a Mind, there is nothing so contrary to this divine Gift, as Pleasure; for, as long as Pleasure rules, there is no Place for Temperance; nor can Virtue subsist under the Jurisdiction of Pleasure: Which, to understand the better, he advised to fancy to ourselves some Man, provoked by corporeal Pleasure the greatest imaginable; and he conceived, that no Man will doubt, but that as long as he took Joy therein, he could fix his Reason, his Mind, his Thoughts, upon nothing else. Wherefore there is nothing so detestable, nothing so pestilential, as Pleasure; for if it be great and long, it extinguisheth all the Light of the Mind.

There were four of this Name; the first, this Philosopher; the second, of Mitilene, a Musician; the third, wrote concerning Agriculture; the fourth, an Epigrammatick Poet. Some add the fifth, an Architect.

A L C M Æ O N.

* Laert. S. 83.

* Cic. de Amic.

* Æl. var. Hist. 14. 19.

* De Senect.

* Laert. S. 82.

ALCMÆON.

ALCMÆON was of *Crotone*; he also heard *Pythagoras*. He was chiefly addicted to Medicine, but studied *Phisiology* also, saying, there are many Causes of human things. *Phavorinus* thinks him the first that wrote a *Physical Dissertation*. He asserted, that the Moon hath an eternal Nature. He was Son of *Perithus*, as appeareth by the beginning of his Book; *Alcmæon* a *Crotonian*, Son of *Perithus*, saith thus to *Brontinus*, and *Leon*, and *Bathyllus*, *Of invisible and immortal things, the Gods have a certain Knowledge, Men, Conjecture, &c.* He asserted the Soul to be immortal, and that it moveth perpetually like the Sun.

° He asserted, that the Planets hold an opposite Course to the Fixed Stars, from West to East.

° We hear by the Hollow of the Ear; that resoundeth when the Wind entereth into it, because all empty things make a Sound.

° By Moisture and Warmth in the Tongue, together with the Softness thereof, all Objects of Taste are distinguished.

° Reason, the principal part of the Soul, is within the Brain, and that by it we Smell, drawing in Scents and Smells by respirations.

* Lact. 8. 84.

° Plut. pl. Phil. 2. 16.

° Plut. 4. 16.

° Ibid. 4. 18.

° Ibid. pl. 4. 17.

° Ibid. 5. 16.

° Ibid. 5. 17.

° Ibid. 5. 24.

° Ibid. 5. 30.

HIP P A S U S.

HIP P A S U S was a *Metapontine*, (or, as some affirm, a *Sybarite*) a *Pythagorean* also. *Jamblichus* saith he was drown'd in the Sea; a just Reward for his Impiety, for that he had publish'd the Doctrine of *Pythagoras*.

° He asserted that Fire is the Principle of all things, of which all things are made, and into which all things resolve. All things are made by Extinction of this Fire: first, the grosser Part of it being contracted, becometh Earth; then the Earth being loosen'd by the Nature of the Fire, becomes Water; the Water exhaled, becomes Air. Again, the World and all Bodies

Why Mules are Barren, see *Plut. plac. phil. lib. 5. cap. 14.*

° The Infant in the Womb feeds by the whole Body; for it sucketh and draweth to it, like a Sponge, of all the Food, that which is good for Nourishment.

° The Head is first made, as being the Seat of Reason.

° Sleep is made by the return of Blood into the confluent Veins: Waking, is the diffusion of the said Blood; Death, the utter departure thereof.

° The equal Distribution of the Faculties of the Body, Moisture, Heat, Driness, Cold, Bitter, Sweet, and the rest, is that which maintaineth Health; the Predominance of any of them causeth Sickness; for the Predominance of one is the Corruption of all the other, and is the Cause of Indisposition; the Efficient, in respect of excessive Heat or Cold; the Material in respect of Abundance, or defect of Humours; as in some there is want of Blood or Brain; whereas Health is a proportionable Contemperation of all these Qualities.

* Lact. 8. 84.

° Dr vit. Pythag.

° Lact. Ibid.

PHILOLAUS.

PHILOLAUS was of *Cratona*, a *Pythagorean*: of him it was that *Plato* wrote to *Dion*, to purchase some *Pythagorean* Books; he was put to death upon suspicion that he aimed at the Tyranny.

He asserted, that all things are made by Necessity and Harmony; and was the first that said the Earth moveth circularly: which some ascribe to *Hicetus* of *Syracuse*.

He wrote one Book, which *Hermippus* (citing some other Author) affirms, that *Plato* when he went to *Sicily* to *Dionysius*, purchased of the Kinsmen of *Philolaus*, paying for it forty *Alexandrian* Minæ, and out of it took his *Timæus*. Others say that *Dionysius* gave it him, having taken it from a young Man, Disciple to *Philolaus*, whom he freed out of Prison.

Demetrius saith, that *Philolaus* first publish'd a *Pythagorick* Discourse concerning Nature, beginning thus: *Nature, and the whole World, and all things in it, are aptly connected of Infinites and Finites.*

Plutarch relates, that after the *Pythagorean* Affiliations were expelled the Cities, those who kept still together, being assembled in a House at *Metapontum*,

* Laert. 8. 84.

• So read here, and afterward.

• Plut. 2. 20.

• Ibid. 3. 23.

the *Cylonians* set the House on fire, and burnt them all except *Philolaus* and *Lysis*, who being young Men, strong and active, escaped through the Fire. *Philolaus* fled to the *Lucanians*, where some other Friends came to him, who gathering themselves together, over-master'd the *Cylonians*. But of this formerly, in the Life of *Pythagoras*.

He affirmed, that there is a twofold Corruption: one while by Fire falling from Heaven; another, by Water out of the Moon, poured forth by the Circumgyration of the Air; the Exhalations whereof become the Food of the World.

• The Substance of the Sun's, as it were, of Glass, receiving the Reverberation of all the Fire in the World, and transmitting the Light thereof to us, as it were through a Strainer, as that fiery Light in Heaven resembleth the Sun; then that which proceedeth from it, is in Form of a Mirrour: and thirdly, there is a Splendor, which by way of Reflection from that Mirrour is spread upon us; and this we call the Sun, as it were the Image of an Image.

• The Earth moveth round about the Fire in an oblique Circle, as the Sun and Moon do.

EUDOXUS.

EUDOXUS was of *Gnidus*, Son of *Æschines*: He was an Astrologer, Geometrician, Physician, and Lawgiver: He learnt Geometry of *Aritytas*; Medicine of *Philistio* the *Sicilian*, as *Callimachus* affirms.

Sotion saith, he heard *Plato* also: for being 23 Years old, and in a very mean Condition, he was invited by the Fame of the *Socratick* Philosophers to go to *Athens*, with *Theomides* a Physician that maintained and much affected him. He lived in the *Pyraum*, and went up every Day to *Athens*, where he heard the Sophists, and return'd. Thus he lived two Months, and then went home; where his Friends making a Collection of Money for him, he travelled to *Egypt* with *Chrysippus* a Physician, carrying along with him Letters of Recommendation from *Agisilaus* to *Nectabius*, who recommended him to the Priests. There he lived a Year and four Months, shaving his Eye-brows; and wrote, as some think, his History of eight Years. Thence he went to *Cyzicus*, and to *Prepontis*, teaching Philosophy; and to *Mausolus*,

• Laert. 8. 86.

At last, having gotten together many Disciples, he return'd to *Athens* to vex *Plato*, as some conceive, for having formerly rejected him. Some say, that *Plato* making a Feast, he taught him the way of placing his Guests in the Figure of a Semicircle.

Nicomachus, Son of *Aristotle*, saith, he asserted Pleasure to be the chief Good.

He was much honour'd in his own Country, as appears by the Decree made concerning him. He was very eminent also among the *Greeks*; for he gave Laws to some Cities, and taught them (as *Hermippus* affirms) Astrology and Geometry, and many other excellent things.

He had three Daughters, *Actis*, *Philitis*, and *Dilphis*. *Eratosthenes* affirms, he wrote *Κυρίως διαλέγους*; but others, that the *Egyptians* wrote them in their own Language, and that *Aristoxenus* translated them into *Greek*.

From him *Chrysippus* the *Gnidian*, Son of *Erineus*, received all that he wrote concerning the Gods, and the World, and Meteors.

He left many excellent Writings.

He had a Son, *Aristagoras*, Father to *Chryseus*, the Disciple of *Aetilius*.

He flourished in the 103d Olympiad, died 53 Years old. When he lived in *Egypt* with *Ichonuphus*, a *Heliopolitane*, an Ox licked his Garment; whereupon the Priests foretold that he should be very eminent, but not long-liv'd. Thus *Laertius*.

If therefore he lived about the 103d Olympiad, and in the 23d Year of his Age heard *Plato*, *Eusebius* seems to be mistaken, who affirms, he flourished in the Beginning of the 97th Olympiad, which was seven Years after the Death of *Socrates*; at what time *Eudoxus* could not have attained any Eminence, if he were Disciple to *Plato*, as *Cicero* also affirms he

was; *Strabo*, that he went with *Plato* into *Egypt*; *Suidas*, that he was Contemporary with him.

Of his Writings are mentioned *Odiaetes*; see *Comforinus de Die Natali*, cap. 18.

His *μυστήρια*, cited by *Athenaeus* and others; perhaps the same *Strabo* calls *Τὰ μυστήρια τῶν Εὐδοξίου*; it consisted of many Books, the seventh cited by *Stephanus* and *Porphyrius*.

Phænomena; mentioned by the anonymous Writer of the Life of *Aratus*.

There were others of this Name; * one of *Rhodes*, a Historian; another of *Sicily*, a Comic Poet; another of *Gnidus*, a Physician; † another of *Cynicus*. Hitherto of the *Pythagorean* Philosophers.

* *Laert.* l. 90.

† *Plin.* 26. 7.

THE
HISTORY
OF
PHILOSOPHY.

THE TENTH PART,
Containing the *HERACLITIAN* Sect.

HERACLITUS.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, Masters.

AS the *Ionick* Sect, which was so named from the Place of its Institution, communicated that Denomination in general to all the Sects that were descended from it, though founded in other Places; so the *Pythagorean* Sect, being from the Country where it was planted termed *Italic*, all the Sects that sprung out of it, though some of them had their Beginning far from *Italy*, were included under the general Notion of *Italic*. Of these there were four; the *Heracitian*, the *Eleatic*, the *Septick* (or *Phrygian*) and the *Epicurean*.

The Author of the first was *Heracitus*, an *Ephesian*; his Father, by *Laertius*, called *Plyfo*; by *Clement*, *Bauso*; by *Suidas*, *Blisso*, or *Blento*, or (saith he) as others, *Heracem*. He had also an Uncle, *Heracleodorus*, whom he mentions in his *Epistles*.

¹ *Aristonymus* saith, That whilst he was yet young, he was the wisest of all Men, because he knew that

he knew nothing: *Laertius*, that he was admirable from his Childhood; for, whilst he was young, he used to say, that he knew nothing; and when he was grown up, that he knew all things.

Laertius adds, That he heard no Man, but profess'd that he himself made Enquiry, and sought out all things of himself. But the learned *Casaubon* justly doubts, that *Laertius* mistakes the Meaning of those Words; and that they rather refer to a strict Enquiry, which he used to make into himself, according to the *Delphian* Motto, *Know thyself*; to which effect, ² *Plutarch* commends as a memorable Saying of his, *I have been seeking out myself*. And *Laertius* himself acknowledgeth, upon the Testimony of *Sotion*, that some affirm'd he heard *Xenophanes*; to whom *Suidas* adds, *Hippesius* the *Pythagorean*.

³ He flourished about the 69th Olympiad, ⁴ in the Time of *Darius Hystaspis*.

§§§

CHAP.

¹ Cic. *Tull.* *Quaest.* 5. 36. *Laert.* 9. 1.

² *Ad Amphid.* 2.

³ *Stob.* *Serm.* 21.

⁴ *Adv.* *Colot.*

⁵ *Laert.* 9.

⁶ *Suid.*

C H A P. II.

How he lived at Ephesus.

Laertius saith, He was of a high Spirit, contemning others, as appears by a Book of his (perhaps the fifth Book of Politicks, out of which Clemens seems to cite the same Sentence) wherein he saith, "Much Learning instructs not the Mind; for then it would have instructed Hesiod and Pythagoras, as also Xenophanes and Hecataeus: for there is but one wise thing, which is to know when to govern all by all. He also said, That Homer deserved to be thrown out of the Schools and beaten, as also Archilochus."

As a further Argument of the Greatness of his Spirit, Antisthenes relates, That he gave the Kingdom to his Brother; Laertius, That being desired to take upon him the supreme Power, he slighted it, because the City was prepossessed with an ill Way of Government; and retiring to the Temple of Diana, play'd at Dice there with the Boys, saying to the Ephesians that stood about him, "Worst of Men, what do you wonder at! Is it not better to do thus, than to govern you?"

Much offended was he with the Ephesians, for that they had banished his Friend Hermodorus, in whose behalf he reproved them sharply, writing thus: The Ephesians deserve to die all Children, and to leave their City to Children, for that they cast out Hermodorus, the most excellent amongst them, saying, Let not one of us be more excellent than the rest; and if there be any such, let him go to another Place, and live amongst other People.

Darius King of Persia wrote to the Ephesians to repeal the Banishment of Hermodorus, and to restore him to his Patrimony. He wrote also to Heraclitus, inviting him to come and live with him; the Letter was to this effect:

* I King Darius salute Heraclitus the Ephesian, a wise Person.

YOU have put forth a Book concerning Nature, hard to be understood and interpreted; but by so much as I understand of it, it seems to promise the Theory of the whole World, and of the things that depend hereon, which consists in divine Motion; and by many Questions and Doctrines, as well to those who are skilful in the Greek Learning, as to others vers'd in Meteorology, and other Learning, to doubt what is the true Meaning of what you have written. King Darius therefore, Son of Hytaspes, desires to participate of your Learning, and of the Greek Institution. Come as soon as you can to my Presence, and Royal Pa-

lace; for the Greeks, for the most part, are not obsequious to wise Men, but despise the good things which they deliver. With me you shall have the first place, and daily Honour and Titles; your way of living shall be as noble as your Instructions.

But Heraclitus refused his Offer, returning him this Answer:

Heraclitus to Darius the King, Son of Hytaspes, Health.

ALL Men living refrain from Truth and Justice, and pursue Unsatiableness and Vain-glory, by reason of their Folly; but I, having forgot all Evil, and shunning the Society of inbred Envy and Pride, will never come to the Kingdom of Persia, being contented with a little, according to my own Mind.

^b Demetrius affirms, he slighted the Athenians also, who had a great Respect for him.

He continually bewailed the wicked Lives of Men, and as often as he came abroad amongst them fell a weeping, considering that all things which are done are Misery.

C H A P. III.

His Retirement.

AT the last, saith Laertius, growing into a great Hatred of Mankind, he retir'd to the Mountains, and lived there, feeding upon Grass and Herbs; the Dislike which he had of the Ephesians being much exasperated by a Disrespect they shewed to him; whence Demetrius affirms, that the Ephesians slighting him, he betook himself to a private Life: The Occasion is related by himself in two Epistles to Hermodorus; the first is this,

Heraclitus to Hermodorus.

BE not angry any longer in your own Cause, Hermodorus; Euthycles, Son of that Nychophem who committed Sacrilege, hath indicted me of Impiety (overcoming me by his Ignorance, who am excellent in Wisdom) for that upon the Altar by which I stood, I wrote my Name, making of myself, of a Man, a God. Thus I shall be condemned of Impiety by the Impious. What think you? I shall seem impious to them for dissenting from them in Opinion concerning the Gods. If blind Men were to judge of Sight, they would say that Blindness were Sight: but, O ye ignorant Men, teach us first what God is, that when you declare us to be impious, you may be believed. Where is God shut up in Temples? O pious Men, who place God in the Dark!

* Laert. 9. 1.

* Strom. 1. where perhaps read παλαμῶν πινεῖν καὶ ἀποδιδόναι.

* Laert. ibid.

* Epist. Cræc.

* Epist. Cræc. & Laert. ibid.

* Laert. 8. 13.

* Laert. 8. 15.

dark! It is a reproach to a Man to tell him, he is a Stone; but of God you profess, as a Truth and in his Commendations, he is born of a Rock. You ignorant People! you know not, that God is not made with Hands, neither hath he any Basis from the Beginning, nor hath one Circumference; but the whole World, adorned with living Creatures, Plants and Stars, is his Mansion. But if you yourselves are unlearned, let not my Learning be confuted Impiety. Learn Wisdom, and understand it; but you will not, neither will I force you. You grow Old with Ignorance, and rejoice in your own Wickedness. *Hercules* was not, as *Homer* bely'd him to be, a Murderer of Strangers. What was it that deified him? his own Integrity and Fortitude, by which he perform'd so many Labours. Am not I then, O ye Men, good also? I was mistaken when I asked you, for though you should say the contrary, yet I am good, and have performed many difficult Labours. I have overcome Pleasures; I have overcome Riches; I have overcome Ambition; I have master'd Cowardice; I have master'd Flattery: Fear hath nothing to object against me; Drunkenness hath nothing to object against me: Sorrow is afraid of me; Anger is afraid of me; I have won the Garland in fighting against these Adversaries, a Task which was imposed on me by my self, not by *Euristus*. Will you not give over to slander Wisdom, and to press your own Sins and Crimes upon your selves? If you could return to Life 500 Years hence, you would find *Heraclitus* still alive, but not the least Print of your Name. I shall equalize, by reason of my Learning, the Lives of Cities and Nations; I shall never be silenc'd. If the City of the *Ephesians* were razed to the Ground, and all their Altars destroy'd, yet will the Souls of Men be the Places to preserve my Memory. I will also marry *Hebe*, not the *Hebe* of *Hercules*; he will always be with her himself; mine is another. Virtue hath brought forth many, and bestow'd one upon *Homer*, another upon *Hesiod*, and to every good Man one, which is the Renown of his Learning. Am not I wiser than *Eutbycles*, who alone know God? But thou being Bold and Impious thy self, think'st him God, who is not God. If the Altar of God be not erected, there is not God; but if the Altar of One that is not God be erected, then he is God, as if Stones were Witnesses of the Gods. His Works should bear witness of him, as those of the Sun, Night and Day, bear witness; the four Seasons of the Year are his Witnesses; the whole fruitful Earth is his Witness; the Moon is his Work, a heavenly Testimony.

The other Epistle is this.

To *Hermodorus*.

I Understand that the *Ephesians* are about to make a Law against me, most illegally; for it is not a Law which is made for a single Person, but Judg-

ment: the *Ephesians* know not that a Judge is different from a Lawgiver; and this is so much the better, for that it is uncertain who shall transgress it: but the Judge seeth before his Eyes the Person that is to suffer. They know, *Hermodorus*, that I assisted you in the framing of Laws, and therefore will banish me, but not before they have confuted themselves. They decree, that he who laughs not, and hates Mankind, shall depart the City before the Sun rise; this is the Law they would make. There is no Man, *Hermodorus*, but laughs, except *Heraclitus*; and so they banish me. O ye Men; Will ye not learn why I never laugh? It is not that I hate Men, but their Wickedness. Write your Law thus, Whosoever hateth Wickedness, let him depart the City, and I will be the first that shall go, willing to forsake, not my Country, but the Malice of my Countrymen. Write your Decree over again. But if you grant there is Wickedness and Vice amongst the *Ephesians*, and that I hate you for it, why should not I make a juster Law, that they, who through their Wickedness are the occasion that *Heraclitus* never laughs, should depart this Life? Or rather let them be fined great Sums, for the loss of Wealth will more afflict you; this is death to you. You have done me wrong in taking away that which God gave me, and banishing me unjustly. Shall I therefore love you? First, for that you have taken all Joy away from me, and not ceasing there, oppress me with Laws and Exile; for whilst I live in the City, I am banished from you? With whom do I commit Adulteries? With what Company do I commit Murder? With whom am I drunk? With whom do I join in Wickedness? I corrupt none; I injure none; I am alone in the City. You have made it a Desert by your Wickedness. Hath *Heraclitus* made your *Forum* honest? No; but *Heraclitus* would have made you and the whole City good, but you would not. I would do it, and am a Law to others; I am the only Person that ought not to be punished by the City. Do you wonder that I never laugh? I wonder at you, that you can rejoice, and do wrong; for those that do unjustly ought to have a frowne Look. If you would give me an Opportunity of Laughter, live in Peace, and contest not unjustly: You carry Swords in your Tongues, plunder Wealth, ravish Women, poison Friends, commit Sacrilege, betray the Trust the People repose in you, take away Mens Lives by Torture; every Man is full of several Wickedness. Shall I laugh when I see Men do these things? Their Garments, Beards and Heads order'd with unnecessary Care; a Mother deserted by a wicked Son, or young Men consuming their Patrimony, or a Citizen whose Wife is taken from him, or a Virgin ravish'd, or a Concubine entertained as a Wife, or one impudent young Man courted by the whole City, or deadly Poisons by Unguents, or some at

Faſts filling their Bellies more with Poiſon than with Dainties, or the People treating of publick Affairs in the Theatre? Virtue, more rigid than Vice, would ſtrike me blind, if I ſhould laugh at your Ways. By Muſick, Pipes, and Stripes, you are excited to things contrary to all Harmony. Iron, a Metal more proper for Ploughs and Tillage, is fitted for Slaughter and Death. You injure the Gods, warlike *Minerva*, and *Mars*, ſurnamed *Emalius*: Men, raiſing Armies againſt Men, covet to kill one another, puniſh them who forſake the Field, for not being murderous; and honour, as valiant, ſuch as are drunk with Blood: But Lions arm not themſelves againſt one another; Horſes betake not themſelves to Swords; the Eagle buckles not a Breſt-plate againſt an Eagle. No other Creatures uſe Inſtruments of War, their Limbs are their Weapons. Horns are the Arms of thoſe, Beaks of theſe, Wings of others; Swiftneſs to ſome; Bigneſs, Smallneſs, Swimming to others; to many their Breath; no irrational Creature uſeth a Sword, but keeps itſelf within the Laws to which it is deſign'd by Nature; but Man doth not ſo, more blameable, becauſe more underſtanding. You muſt wiſh for an end of your Wars, if you would take me off from the Severity. Nor worſe than theſe internal Diſſentions, is your Depopulations of Cities, tormenting aged Perſons, raviſhing Wives, taking away Children from their Mothers and Nurſes, deſiling Beds, vitiating Virgins, abuſing Boys, caſting free Perſons into Bonds, demolishing the Temples of the Gods, digging up the Monuments of the Heroes, triumphing in Wickedneſs, and offering gratulatory Sacrifices to the Gods for theſe unjuſt Actions. About theſe, without laughing, you conteſt in Peace by Argument, and in War with Steel. You force away Juſtice by your Swords. *Hermodorus* is baniſhed for writing Laws: *Heraclitus* is baniſhed for Impiety; the Cities are deſerted of Juſtice, the Deſarts of Injuſtice. The People have built Walls, as Teſtimonies of the Wickedneſs of the Inhabitants, ſhutting up your own Lives. You are all fenced with Houſes; there are other Walls of Wickedneſs; Enemies within you, your own Country men; Enemies without you, Strangers; All Enemies, no Friends. Can I laugh, ſeeing ſo many Enemies? You think the Wealth of other Men is your own; you think the Wives of other Men are your own. You lay the Yoke of Servitude upon free Perſons; you devour the Living; you violate the Laws; you ratify Wickedneſs by a Law; you do violence to all ſuch as conſent not to your Juſtice. Your Laws themſelves convince you of Injuſtice; for if they were not, you would go wholly unpuniſhed; whereas now you are a little reſtrained, and, by Fear of Punishment, withheld from the utmoſt Injuſtice.

There is a third Epiſtle of his to the ſame Per-

ſon, expreſſing no leſs Diſaffection to the *Ephesians*.

Heraclitus to Hermodorus.

GIVE me notice, *Hermodorus*, when you intend to go to *Italy*; may the Gods and Demons of that Place receive you kindly. I dreamt, that I beheld all the Diadems of the whole World make their Addreſs to your Laws, and, ſhutting their Mouths after the *Persian* manner, adore them, they being ſeated above all the reſt. The *Ephesians* will adore thee when thou art dead, when thy laws ſhall bear a general Sway; then Neceſſity will force them to uſe them; for God hath taken away the Power from them, and they have acknowledg'd themſelves worthy of Servitude. This I learnt from the more Ancient. All *Aſia* is reduced by the King [of *Persia*] and the *Ephesians* are ſpoiled. They are not accuſtomed to true Liberty and Dominion, and now it is very likely will be obedient, if they are commanded to lament and accuſe the Gods for not giving them Riches. It is the part of blind Men, not of a good Man, to value the Goods of Fortune. The Sybil frequently hinted this, that from *Greece* there ſhould come a wiſe Man into *Italy*. The Sybil knew thee ſo many Ages ſince, *Hermodorus*; even then thou wert in being; but the *Ephesians* will not yet ſee him whom Truth acknowledged by the Mouth of a Woman divinely inſpir'd. A Teſtimony is given of your Wiſdom; but the *Ephesians* diſallow the Teſtimony of a God: they ſhall ſmart for their Inſolence, and even now do ſmart for it, having an ill Opinion of us alſo. God puniſheth not by taking away Riches, he rather allows them to the Wicked, as an Aggravation of their Crimes, that, abounding in Wealth, their Offences may be more notorious to all Men; for Poverty is a Vail. I wiſh Fortune may not forſake you, that all Men may ſee your Wickedneſs. But farewell they; as for you, acquaint me with the Time of your Departure, for I would by all means meet you, and diſcourſe with you a little, amongſt other things, concerning Laws. I had committed to writing, but that I thought it fit rather to be conceal'd: nothing is more conceal'd than when one Man ſpeaks to another alone, and eſpecially when *Heraclitus* to *Hermodorus*. The ordinary Sort of Men diſfer not from broken Pitchers, which can hold nothing, but let it run out by dabbling. The *Albanians*, being *Autochtones*, knew the Nature of Men, that being made of Earth, they have crafty Minds, and therefore inſtituted them in a Secrecy and Silence of Myſteries, that they might hold their peace through Fear, not out of Judgment, and that it might be no longer hard for them to praſtice Silence.

C H A P. IV.

His Sickness and Death.

THE Diet which he used in the Mountains being nothing but Grains and Herbs, brought him into a Dropsy, whereupon he was constrained to return to the City. The Account of his Sickness receive from himself, in two Epistles to *Amphidamas*. The first is this.

Heraclitus to Amphidamas.

I Am fallen sick, *Amphidamas*, of a Dropsy. Whatsoever is in us, if it get the Dominion, it becomes a Disease. Excess of Heat is a Fever; Excess of Cold, a Palsy; Excess of Wind, Cholick. My Disease comes from Excess of Moisture. The Soul is something divine, that keeps all these in due Proportion. The first thing is Health: Nature herself is Health; we cannot foresee what is contrary to Nature, but after that it happens. I know the Nature of the World; I know that of Man; I know Diseases, I know Health; I will cure myself, I will imitate God, who makes equal the Inequalities of the World, committing it to the Sun. *Heraclitus* shall not die of this Disease; the Disease of *Heraclitus* shall die by good direction. In the Universe moist things are dried up, hot things are made cold. My Wisdom knoweth the Ways of Nature; it knows the Cure of Sickness: but if my Body be over-press'd, it must descend to the destin'd Place; nevertheless my Soul shall not descend, but being a thing immortal, shall fly up on high to Heaven. The æthereal Mansions shall receive me, and I will accuse the *Ephefians*. I shall converse, not with Men, but with Gods; I shall not build Altars to others, but others to me. *Euthycles* shall not charge me with Impiety; but I him of Malice. They wonder, that *Heraclitus* look'd always sad; they wonder not that Men are always wicked. Withhold from your Wickedness, and perhaps I shall smile. My Sickness is the more gentle to me, for that I am not amongst Men, but alone; and perhaps for that my Soul presageth she shall shortly be freed out of this Prison, and looking through her shatter'd Body, calls to mind her own Country, from whence she came to encompass this transitory mortal Body, which to others seems built up of Flegm, Choler, purulent Matter, Blood, Nerves, Bones, and Flesh; for unless Passions did contrive Pains, we would never go out of it.

The second Epistle was to this effect.

To the Same.

THE Physicians, *Amphidamas*, met together, and were very diligent about the Cure of my

Sickness, but knew neither Art nor Nature; they would have it to be this, and to be that, but knew neither. They did nothing but soften my Belly with seeking it, as if it had been a Leather Bottle; yet some of them would have undertaken the Cure, but I would not allow it, before I had required an Account of the Disease, which they could not give me; neither were they too hard for me, but I for them. How, said I, can you be Masters of piping, when one that is not a Piper hath over-match'd you? I shall cure myself sooner than you can, if you will but teach me how a Drought may be made of a Shower; but they, not understanding my Question, held their peace, and where much at a loss in their own Science. I have known others cured, not by them, but by Chance. These Men, *Amphidamas*, do wickedly, professing Arts which they have not, and undertaking the Cure of that which they understand not, bringing Death to Men under the Pretext and Name of Art, doing wrong both to Art and Nature. It is abominable to profess Ignorance, but more abominable to profess an Art, of which we are ignorant. What Delight take they in lying, but that by Deceit they grow rich? It were better for them to beg, for then they would be pities; but now they are hated for doing wrong, and lying. Other Arts are more fortunate; these are easily confuted, the better more hardly. These were the Men that took Compassion of me in the City; not a Physician amongst them, but all Cozeners and Impostors, who sell Cheats of Art for Money. They kill'd *Heraclodorus*, my Uncle, and took Money for it, and were not able to tell me the Cause of my Distemper, and how a Drought might be made out of an Excess of Moisture. They are ignorant that God cures the great Bodies in the World, reducing their Inequality to an even Temper; that he makes whole those that are broken, stops such as are falling, gathers the dispersed together into one Body, polisheth the deformed; those which are taken, he puts into Custody; those which fly, he pursues; illuminates the Dark with his Light, terminates the Infinite with certain Bounds, gives Form to those which have none, gives Sight to things void of Sense, permeates through all Substance, Striking, Composing, Dissolving, Condensing, Diffusing; he dissolves the dry into moist, he condenses the loose Air, and continually moveth the things above, setteth those beneath. This is the Cure of the sickly World: This I will imitate in myself; to all the rest, I bid farewell.

Thus having demanded of the Physicians enigmatically, whether they could of a Shower make a Drought; not understanding him, he shut himself up in an Ox-stall, hoping that the Hydropical Humours would be extracted by the Warmth

of

* Lact.

† Epist. Græc.

‡ Lact. 3. 3.

of the Dung; but that doing him no good, he died, having lived 60 years.

Hermippus relates, that he demanded of the Physicians, whether they could squeeze the Water out of the inward Parts of his Body; which they acknowledging they could not do, he laid himself in the Sun, and commanded his Servant to plaister him all over with Cow-dung, in which Posture he died the next Day, and was buried in the Forum. *Neanthes* of *Cyzicum* saith, that they could not get off the Cow-dung, and not being known in that Condemnation by the Dogs, they tore him to pieces.

But *Aristo* saith, he was cur'd of this Dropsy, and dyed afterwards of some other Disease, which *Hippobotus* confirms.

Laertius reckons five of this Name. This Philosopher the first.

The second, a Lyrick Poet, who writ an Encomium of the twelve Gods.

The third, an Elegiack Poet, of *Halicarnassus*; upon whom *Callimachus* hath an Epigram.

The fourth, of *Leibos*, who writ the Macedonianick.

The fifth, a Jester. To whom add, mentioned by *Athenaus*, another of *Mitylene*, a Juggler: and lastly, one of *Tarentum*, a Lutenist, who play'd at the Marriage of *Alexander*.

It is reported of *Heraclitus* the Philosopher, that he persuaded *Melancomas* a Tyrant to lay down his Crown.

CHAP. V.

His Apothegms.

OF his Apothegms, and moral Sentences, are remembered these: He said, that we ought to take more care to extinguish Contumely, than the hottest Fire: And that a People ought to fight for their Laws, as well as for their Walls.

Deriding the Sacrifices, whereby they thought that the Gods were pacify'd; These, saith he, cleanse themselves by polluting themselves with Blood, as if a Man should go into the Dirt to wash himself.

He saith, that he wholly contemned his Body, and esteemed it more vile than Dross; yet would take care for the Cure of it, as long as God should command him to use it as an Instrument.

Of all the Discourses that ever I heard, none came so far as to prove, that Wisdom is something separate from all other things: A solitary Man is either a God or a Beast.

Even the Eyes and Ears of Fools that have rude Minds, are tainted with ill.

It concerneth every Man to know himself, and to govern himself prudently.

Being desired by the Citizens, to make some Discourse concerning Concord, he went up into the Chair, and taking a Cup full of Water, sprinkled some Meal and Penny-royal into it, and having drunk it off, went away; giving them to understand, That Cities might be preserved in Peace and Concord, if the Inhabitants would be content with a little, and not affect costly Superfluities.

It is hard to conceal Rudeness at any time, but especially in Wine.

A drunken Man reels, and is led by a Child; his Soul is wet, and knows not whither she goeth; a dry Soul is the wisest and best.

He said, That the Wit of a Man is his Genius.

Being asked by one, why he held his Peace? he answer'd, That you may speak.

He said, That the King to whom the *Delphian* Oracle belongs, neither Speaks, nor Conceals, but gives Signs.

It is all one to be Living and Dead, Waking and Sleeping, Young and Old; for each of these alternately changeth into the other.

He seemed to blame Generation, saying, That those who are born will Live and Die, or rather Rest, and leave behind them Children to die also.

Unless a Man hopeth that which is not to be hoped for, he shall not find that which is inscrutable, and hath no Passage whereby he may come at it. This, *Clemens* calls a kind of Paraphrase upon that of the Prophet, (Isa. 6.) *Unless you believe, you shall not understand.*

Reproving some incredulous Persons, he said, They can neither Hear nor Speak.

How can that Light, which never sets, be hidden or obscured, (meaning God?)

Justice shall seize upon the Framers and Witnesses of false Things.

CHAP. VI.

His Writings.

THE Treatise (saith *Laertius*) which goeth abroad under his Name, is a continued Discourse of Nature. It is divided into three Books; One, concerning the *Universe*; the Second, *Politick*; the Third, *Theologic*. This Book he deposited in the Temple of *Diana*, and, as some affirm, he affected to write obscurely, (whence called *εὐρόμοις*, dark) that he might be read only by the more learned, and not

¹ Laert. 2. 17.

² Ser. 4. ³ Ibid. 5.

⁴ Plot. de Pyth. Crac.

⁵ Clem. Alex. Strom. 1.

⁶ Plot. de Garrul.

⁷ Consol. ad Apollon.

⁸ Laert. 9. 2.

⁹ Stob. Ser. 17.

¹⁰ Clem. Strom. 5.

¹¹ El. Cret. in Nazians. Orat. 23.

¹² Ser. 5.

¹³ Ibid. 102.

¹⁴ Suid.

¹⁵ Ibid. 6.

¹⁶ Ibid. 2.

¹⁷ Stob. Ser. 3.

¹⁸ Laert. 9. 12.

¹⁹ Ibid. 5.

not become contemptible, by being read by the Vulgar; which *Timon* implies, saying,

*'Amongst these the great Confounder did arise,
Dark Heraclitus, he that dash'd despite
The Multitude*

And perhaps it conduceth not a little to the Obscurity of his Writings, that, through Excess of Melancholy, as *Theophrastus* saith, he began many Things, and left them unfinished, and many times wrote contrary Things.

Aristo relates, that *Euripides* brought this Book of *Heraclitus* to *Socrates* to be read; and asking his Opinion of it, "The Things, said *Socrates*, which I understand in it, are excellent, and so, I suppose, are those which I understand not; but they require a *Delian Diver*, (one that is able to explain Oracles.)" But *Salmus* the Grammarian, citing one *Crates*, saith, That a certain Person, named *Crates*, brought this Book first among the *Graecians*, and said, It required a *Delian Diver*, for only such a one could escape drowning in it. Some entitle it, *The Muses*; others, *Concerning Nature*; *Diodorus*, *An exact Rule to steer Life by*; others, *The Judgment of Manners, the Ornament of one Institution above all*.

Yet *Laertius* gives this Judgment of that Treatise, that sometimes he writes so clearly and plainly, that any Man may understand it, and discern the Height of his Mind; adding, that his Style was very short and found.

There were many that explain'd and commented upon his Book: of whom were *Antisthenes*, and *Heraclides* of *Pontus*, and *Cleantes* of *Pontus*, and *Sphaerus* the Stoick; as also *Pausanias*, who was surnamed the *Heraclitic*, and *Nicomachus*, and *Dionysius*; and, of Grammarians, *Diodorus*, who denies the Book concerning *Nature* to be his; but admits that of *Politick*, alledging, that what he said of *Nature*, is only brought in by way of Example.

Hieronymus saith, that *Scythinus*, an *Iambick* Poet, wrote against him in Verse.

CHAP. VII.

His Doctrine.

Laertius saith, That his Writings gained so great a Reputation, that the Followers of his Sect were, from him, called *Heraclitians*. His Assertions were these:

SECT. I.

That Fire is the Principle of all Things.

HE held, that Fire is the Principle of all Things; for of Fire all Things are made, and into Fire all Things shall resolve: Or, as *Laertius*, That Fire is the Element, and the Vicissitude of Fire generates all Things by Rarefaction and Condensation, (but he delivers nothing plainly.) That all Things are made by Contrariety, and the whole flows like a River. That the Universe is bounded, and that there is one World, which was made of Fire; and shall again be fet on Fire by certain Periods for ever, and that this is done by Fate. That, of the Contraries, that which conduceth to Generation is named War and Contention; That which to Conflagration, Concord and Peace. That Mutation is a way up and down, and that the World is made by it; for the Fire being condensed, groweth humid, and settles into Water; the Water condensed turns into Earth, this is the way down. Again, the Earth is diffused, of which is made Water; of the Water, almost all Things else, meaning the Exhalation out of the Sea, this is the way up. That there are made Exhalations from the Earth and from the Sea, some whereof are bright and pure, others dark: the Fire is augmented by the bright, the Water by the rest; but what that is which includes all, he declares not. Hitherto *Laertius*.

Plutarch delivers it thus: That all Things are made by Extinction of this Fire; first the grosser Part of it being contracted, becometh Earth; then the Earth being loosned by the Nature of the Fire, becomes Water; the Water exhaled, becomes Air. Again, the World and all Bodies shall be dissolved in a Conflagration: Fire therefore is the Principle, for all Things were made of it; and the End, because all Things are resolved into it.

This is further explain'd by *Clemens Alexandrinus*, out of the Words of *Heraclitus*. That he held, (saith *Clemens*) the Universe to be eternal, is manifest; for that he saith, *the Universe was not made by any, either God or Man, but was, is, and shall be an ever-living Fire, kindling Measures, and quenching Measures*.

That he held this World was generated, and shall perish, is manifest also from his saying, *The Conversions of Fire, first Sea, then the half of Sea, Earth, the Half-greter, meaning, that by the Power of that Fire, the Word and God, who governeth all Things, turneth by Air into Measures, the Seed as it were of*

¹ Ibid. 6.

² Laert. 9. 6.

³ Plot. plac. 1. 5.

⁴ Loc. cit.

⁵ Strom. 5.

the Disposer of the World, which he calleth Sea. Of this again is generated Heaven and Earth, and all Things that are in them.

Lastly, how it returns to its first Condition, and becomes Fire again, he shews thus: *The Sea is dissolved, and measured according to the same Proportion as it was first, before it was Earth, the like happens to the other Elements.* Thus Clemens.

Moreover he held, * that the Soul of the World is an Exhalation of the humid Parts thereof, and that † the Essence of Fate is a Reason (or Proportion) permeating through the Universe; which Fate is an aethereal Body, the Seed of the Generation of all Things; for all Things are done by Fate.

This Opinion (that Fire is the Principle of all Things) was asserted also by Hippasus the Pythagorean; whom Plutarch, in the Account which he gives of it, joins with Heraclitus, and it is probable that Heraclitus, being his Disciple, received it from him.

† Plutarch adds, that he introduced *ἄγμωνα τινὸν ἀίθερα*, certain Sharings, the least of Things, and not divisible.

SECT. II.

Of the Stars, Sun, Moon, Day, Night, &c.

IN the World * there are certain *Schapba*, Things in the Fashion of Boats, the hollow Sides whereof are turned towards us, in which certain shining Exhalations are crowded, which cause Flames. These Flames are the Stars, nourished by Exhalations, arising out of the Earth. Of these, the Flame of the Sun is the brightest and hottest, by reason that the other Stars are more distant from the Earth, and therefore shine and heat less.

† The Sun is just as big as it seems to be, † his Figure like that of a Boat, the hollow Part turned downwards. † He is in a transparent and unmixt Place, † (that is, in the purer Air) and keeps a proportionable Distance from us, by which means he heateth and shineth more than the Moon. † He happens to be eclipsed by reason of his Boat-like Figure, when the Hollow thereof is turned upwards, and the convex Part downwards towards us.

‡ The Moon is a Kind of Earth encompassed with a Mist, † in Form like a Boat; she is nearest

the Earth, and moved in a Place that is not pure, the grosser Air. * She is eclipsed, when the hollow Part is turned upwards; and the Variety of Appearances, which she hath in a Month, are caused by the turning of her hollow Part upwards by degrees.

† Day, Night, Months, Hours, Years, Showers, Winds, and the like, are caused by different Exhalations: for a splendid Exhalation, flaming in the Circle of the Sun, makes it Day; the contrary, being predominant, makes it Night; the Heat of the Splendid increasing, maketh Summer; the Moisture of the Dark abounding, maketh Winter. Suitably to these he explained the Causes of other Things; but of the Earth he said nothing, nor of the *Schapba*.

SECT. III.

Of the Ebbing and Flowing of the Sea.

THE Ebbing and Flowing of the Sea is caused by the Sun, which stirreth, raiseth and carrieth about with him the most part of the Winds, which coming to blow upon the Ocean, cause the *Atlantick* Sea to swell, and so make the Flux or High-Water; but when the same are allay'd, the Sea falleth low, and so causeth a Reflux and Ebb.

SECT. IV.

Of Living Creatures.

OF the Nature * of the Soul, he said, It is so profound, as that it cannot by any means be found out: He only asserted, † That it is, as all other Things are, an Exhalation; that which is without, and that which is within, being all of one Nature: it is incorporeal and always in Fluxion. That it is moved, is evident from its being moved: † Of Souls, the dry is the wisest and best.

‡ Man beginneth to be perfect about his second seventh Year, at what time the generative Vigour beginneth to move: for then Trees begin to be perfect, when they begin to bring forth; for as long as they bear no Fruit, they are immature, and imperfect. Moreover, at that time a Man comes to the Knowledge of Good and Ill, and is capable of being instructed therein.

* Plut. plac. 4. 3. † Plut. plac. 1. 28.

* Laert. ibid.

* Stob. S. 15.

* Plut. plac. 2. 24.

* Laert. ibid.

* Plut. plac. 2. 25.

* Laert. ibid.

* Plut. plac. 2. 27.

* Plut. plac. 2. 23.

* Laert.

* Plut. plac. 3. 27.

* Laert. ibid.

* Plut. plac. 4. 3.

* Arist. de an. 1. 3.

* Stob. se. 17.

* Plut. plac. 5. 23.

THE
H I S T O R Y
O F
P H I L O S O P H Y.

THE ELEVENTH PART,
Containing the *ELEATICK* Sect.

XENOPHANES.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

THE Eleatick Sect was denominat'd from *Ela* a City of *Magna Græcia*, founded in the Time of *Cyrus* by a Colony of *Phœceans*; of whom being besieged by *Harpagus*, some made their escape by Night, and came into this Part of *Italy*, where they built a City which they nam'd *Elea*, *Helea*, or *Hyela*, either from *Eles* the River of that Place, or, * as some conceive, in Allusion to the Marthes round about it,

Of this City were *Parmenides*, *Zeno*, and *Leucippus*; who being eminent Persons of one Sect, from them the Sect itself was term'd *Eleatick*.

But its first Inſtitutor was *Xenophanes*. The *Eleatick* Sect, faith * *Clemens*, was begun by *Xenophanes* the Colophonian, who (as *Timæus* affirms) lived in the Time of *Hieron* King of *Sicily*, and of *Epicharmus* the Poet: But *Apollodorus*, that he was born in the fourth Olympiad, and his Life extended to the Time of *Darius* and *Cyrus*. *Parmenides* was Disciple to *Xenophanes*; *Zeno* to him; then *Leucippus*;

then *Democritus*: The Auditors of *Democritus* were *Protagoras* the Abderite, *Metrodorus* the Chian, and *Diogenes* the Smyrnan, whose Disciple was *Anaxarchus*.

* *Xenophanes* was (as was said) a Colophonian, Son of *Dexius*, or (as *Apollodorus*) of *Orthomenes*, praised by *Timon*; who faith of him,

*Xenophanes, not wholly free from Pride,
The Fictions of old Homer did deride.*

Being banish'd his Country, he lived at *Zande* and *Carana* in *Sicily*. Some affirm, he had no Master; others, that he heard Botho the Athenian; others *Archelaus*, [which is least probable, for] he was (as *Sotion* relates) contemporary with *Anaximander*. He wrote in Verse *Elegies* and *Iambicks* against *Hesiod* and *Homer*, reprehending what they deliver'd concerning the Gods. He also wrote the building of *Colophon*, and the beginning of the Colony into *Elea* in *Italy*, which consisted of two thousand Verses. But * *Strabo*, who affirms he writ the

T t t 2

Silli.

* *Strabo*, l. 6.

† *Strom.* 2.

‡ *Laert.* 9. 28.

§ *Lib.* 24.

Silli in Verse, seems to have ascribed to him what was indeed written by Timon the Sceptick; his Mistake perhaps arising from hence, that the second and third Books of that Poem were written by way of Dialogue, wherein Timon questions Xenophanes about every thing, who gives answers to all.

Xenophanes sung his own Works. It is farther said that he asserted Doctrines contrary to Thales and Pythagoras, and somewhat against Epimenides. He flourish'd in the 60th Olympiad. Demetrius Phalereus, and Panætius the Stoick relate, that like Anaxagoras he buried his Sons with his own Hands. He lived to a great Age; for he saith of himself,

Sixty seven years in Greece I now have told;
And when I came was twenty five years old.

Lucian therefore reckons amiss, affirming he liv'd ninety one years; for this Account of sixty seven and twenty five amounts to ninety two. Censorinus saith, he lived above a hundred years.

Empedocles saying to him, that he could not find a wise Man; That may very well be, saith he, for you are not capable to know a wise Man.

He was redeemed by Parmeniscus and Orestades, Pythagoreans, as Phavorinus relates.

There was another Xenophanes of Lesbos, an Iambick Poet.

CHAPTER II.

His Opinions.

Xenophanes, as Socion affirms, held all things to be incomprehensible, and reproved the Arrogance of those Persons, who not capable of knowing any thing, durst say, they knew; nevertheless he did maintain many dogmatical Assertions; affirming,

* Not all at first the Gods to Men reveal'd,
But by long Search they find out things conceal'd.

When it is, that Timon the Sceptick calls him *Σωφρογ*, not wholly free from Pride, or dogmatical Self-conceit.

He held, that God is one, and incorporeal, eternal, in Substance and Figure round; no way resembling Man; that he is all Sight, and all Hearing, but breathes not; that he is all Things, the Mind and Wisdom, no generate, but eternal, impossible, immutable, and rational,

— Greatest of Gods and Men, one God we find,
Like Mortals not in Body, not in Mind.

Moreover, he reproved and confuted the fabulous Narrations of Homer and Hesiod concerning the Gods; and the Descriptions which the Grecians made of them, as that they are of human Form, and subject to human Affections; every one fancying them after their own Likeness; the Ethiopians black and flat-nos'd, the Thracians ruddy and grey-eyed; and so for their Minds or Dispositions, the Barbarians believed them fierce and cruel, the Grecians more mild, yet obnoxious to Pains.

Men think the Gods like them begotten were,
And that like them their Form, Shape, Garments are.

* That this (God, or) One, is all things; the Universe consists of this eternal One. * Whatsoever is, is eternal; for it is impossible that something should be made of nothing. The World is eternal, without Beginning or End, [as being ingenerate, for] he first asserted, that whatsoever is generated, is corruptible.

* That there are infinite Worlds, and those immutable.

* That there are four Elements.

* That the Stars are made of certain Clouds set on Fire, which are extinguish'd every Day, and kindled again at Night: for the rising and setting of the Stars is nothing else, but their enkindling and extinguishing. * As for those Lights which appear about Ships, (commonly termed *Castor* and *Pollux*) these are little Clouds set on Fire, and shining by reason of some Motion; and that all Comets, Falling-stars and the like, are Clouds kindled by Motion.

* That the Sun consists of a Collection of little Fires made by a humid Exhalation, or that it is a fiery Cloud. * That the Eclipse of the Sun is caused by Extinction, and that there riseth a new Sun in the East. He further avers, that the Sun hath been eclipsed for a whole Month together.

* That the Moon is a close compacted Cloud; Cicero saith, he held that she is habitable, containing many Cities and Mountains.

* That the Sun is requisite for the Generation of the World and living Creatures, but the Moon of no Use thereunto.

* That there are many Suns and many Moons, according to the several Climates and Zones of the Earth; and that when the Sun grows sometimes to some Part of the Earth unknown to us, he seemeth to be eclipsed, that the Sun grows forward to infinite, but to us seemeth to move circularly by Reason of the great Distance.

That

* Laert. in Timone. * De die nat. c. 15. * Laert. g. 19.
* Laert. g. 19. * Clem. Alex. Strom. 6. * Laert. g. 18.
* Xenoph. * Laert. g. 19. * Ibid. * Ibid.
* Stob. phys. 1. p. 55. * Plut. Plac. 2. 24.
* Stob. phys. 1.

* Ibid. g. 20. * Cic. Acad. quest. 1. 4. * Stob. ser. 27.
* Clem. Alex. Strom. 7. * Cic. Acad. quest. 4. * Aristot.
* Plut. plac. Stob. Phys. 52. * Plut. plac. 2. 18. * Plut.
* Plut. plac. 2. 25. * Acad. quest. 4. * Stob. phys. 55.

' That the Clouds are a Vapour drawn up by the Sun to the Heavens.
 * That the Earth was first founded and rooted as it were in an infinite Depth.
 † That the Soul is a Spirit, and that there are ma-

ny things beneath the Mind.

¹ Cicero saith, that he was the only Philosopher that believed there were Gods, and yet denied Divination; but ² Plutarch joins Epicurus with him in this Assertion.

¹ Laert. 9. 19.

² Plat. Plac. 3. 11.

³ Laert. ibid.

⁴ De Divinat. 1.

⁵ Plac. Phil. 5. 1.

P A R M E N I D E S.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

Parmenides¹ was of Ela, Son of Pyretes; he heard Xenophanes: Theophrastus, in his Epitome, saith, that he heard Anaximander. But though he heard Xenophanes, yet he did not follow him. He conversed also with Aminias, and with Diocletus the Pythagorean, (as Socion saith) a Person indigent, but good and honest, whom he chiefly follow'd; and when he died, built a Temple to him as to an Hero. Parmenides being of a noble Family, and rich, he was reduced to a Privacy of Life by Aminias, not by Xenophanes.

He flourished in the 69th Olympiad.

² Athenæus therefore; not without reason, blames Plato for supposing him contemporary with Socrates. He is also said to have given Laws to his Countrymen, as Spuffippus saith in his Book of Philosophers.

He wrote Philosophy in Verse, as did also Hesiod, Xenophanes, and Empedocles.

But Callimachus saith, that he wrote not any Poem.

There was another Parmenides, an Orator, who wrote concerning that Art.

CHAP. II.

His Opinions.

He asserted that Philosophy is twofold, one according to Truth, the other according to Opinion; wherefore he somewhere saith,

— All things I would that thou enquire,
 As well the Heart that doth sweet Truth pursue,
 As Mens Opinions, whose Belief's untrue.

That Reason is the Criterie, and that the Senses are not certain; whence he saith,

Trust not thy self into the various way,
 Nor thy rash Eye, or Ear, or Tongue obey;
 But poise with Reason every Argument.

That ³ the Principle of all things is one, and that it is immoveable; that one is all, that *Ens* is infinite; whatsoever is besides *Ens*, is *non Ens*, and consequently nothing; but *Ens* is one, therefore, whatsoever is besides one, is nothing; therefore all is one.

⁴ That hot and cold are the Principles or Elements of things; these he called Fire and Earth; one hath the Office of Maker, the other of Matter.

That no things are generated and corrupted, but only seem so to us.

⁵ That the Moon is of equal Brightness with the Sun, yet borroweth her Light from him.

⁶ That the Galaxie is a Mixture of dense and rare.

⁷ He first asserted, that the Earth is round, and seated in the midst; and ⁸ first set out and limited the habitable Parts of the Earth, betwixt the cold Zones and the Tropicks.

⁹ That the Earth is every way equidistant, and evenly poised; so that there is no Reason she should incline more to one Side than to another; yet is she shaken, but not removed.

¹⁰ That Men were generated of ¹¹ Slime, and consist of hot and cold, whereof all things are compounded.

That (contrary to Empedocles) Men ¹² were first produced in the northern Parts of the World, those being most dense; the first Woman in the southern, those being most rare. That ¹³ Males now are generated on the right Side of the Mother; Females, on the left. ¹⁴ That the Hegemonick is seated in the Breast.

Phavorinus

¹ Laert. 9. 21.

² Deignon. 11.

³ Laert. 9. 22.

⁴ Arist. Phys. 1. 2. 3.

⁵ Laert. 9. 22.

⁶ Plat. plac. 2. 26.

⁷ Ibid. 5. 11.

⁸ Laert. 9. 23.

⁹ Plat. plac. 3. 11.

¹⁰ Ibid. 3. 15.

¹¹ Laert. 9. 22.

¹² So read.

¹³ Plat. plac. 5. 7.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid. 4. 5.

Phavorinus ascribes to his Invention the Observation, that Vesper and Lucifer are the same Star; others attribute this to *Pythagoras*.

Phavorinus also saith, "he used the Argument called *Achilles*, by others ascribed to *Zeno*.

C H A P. III.

Of *Ideas*.

BUT the Assertion for which he became most eminent, was that of *Ideas*, delivered by *Plato* in a Dialogue, which he entitl'd *Parmenides*, or of *Ideas*; the Sum whereof is this:

All is One, and Many; One the *Archetype*, *Idea*; Many the Singulars.

There are *Ideas*, that is, certain common Natures, which include all Singulars, and are the Causes of them, from which they have both their Essence and Name. These are *αἰετὸν Species*, the many exist, as they participate of one, in these *Species*.

The *Species* so include all Singulars, as that they may combine them, and difference them; for there is a twofold Power of specifick Differences, compositive and discretive.

The visible things shew the Power of this one; all Singulars are reduced to a One, that is, to their respective Communities; and so particular things can neither subsist nor be apprehended, but in this Community of *Species*; therefore the *Species* is one thing, the *Individua* contained in the *Species*, another.

These *Ideas* subsist two ways; in our Minds, as Notions; in Nature, as Causes. In our Minds they exist, as they are variously comprehended by us, according to divers manifold Respects. In Nature they exist, as they are ideal Forms, and have the Power both of Existence and Denomination. All Beings are reduced to this Unity of *Idea*. Thus are they insensible visible things, and the Kinds of them are Similitude, Dissimilitude, Unity, Multitude, Rest, Motion, &c. Things visible are, or are denominated like, inasmuch as they participate of Similitude, which is the *Idea* of things like; great or little, inasmuch as they participate of the *Idea* of Greatness or Littleness, &c. The like of Man himself, for many individual Men are such by Participation of the *Idea* of Man, (as if we should say Homoneity) which hath a permanent Subsistence, whereas particular Men are in perpetual Fluxion and Mutation.

The same Power of the One in *Ideas*, is also in things comprehended by Discourse: they likewise have a Form subsistent by and of itself; so that to know the Nature of Intelligibles, they must be recalled to the Unite of *Idea*. For instance; if we would understand the Nature of good Things, we must proceed in such manner as that we may arrive at the

Idea of Good, which is the very Form of Good, whence all things that participate thereof, are, and are called good. So that there are two distinct things, the Form of things, which subsist of itself, and the Things themselves, sensible or intelligible.

Idea is twofold, *ἀντὶ τοῦ ἁλλοῦ* ἢ *τὸ ἀπαθὲρ*, the fair, which is also the good, and all the things which we understand as being *Ideas*; the first is God, the second the *Species* of things in the Order of Nature.

As concerning the second *Ideas*, there is a One, that is the Foundation of all Singulars; out of which, as from a Thread, the whole Web (as it were) of *Individuums* is woven.

One and the same *Species* in many *Individuums*, which exist separately, is wholly together One, and not separate from itself, but whole in itself.

The Many (that is, Singulars) so participate of their *Ideas*, in such manner as that the *Ideas* are not divisible, but preserve their own Essence in themselves, over and above all the Singulars; that is, they have their Essence in themselves, and not in reference to us.

Ideas are Notions of the Mind, and subsist in our Mind; yet so, as that primarily, and of themselves, they exist in Nature. So as these Notions subsist no otherwise in our Minds, than as they resemble those eternal Forms of Nature, that is, not as real Beings, but as Similitudes and Images of Beings. So that from these *Ideas*, which subsist of themselves, as a Communication is derived to the Notions that are in our Mind; for otherwise, if the *Ideas* themselves, or the whole *Species*, were in our Minds, Notions would not be Notions, and *Eni, non Eni*, inasmuch as the things themselves are variously perceived by several Men.

Besides, there would follow a great Confusion and Disorder in the things themselves, if there were continually produced new Forms of things at Man's Pleasure; which must needs be, if the Mind of Man could form them, and that whatsoever a Man imagined in his Mind, became immediately a *Species*.

Again, by this means the most excellent Science of all things that is in God, would be denied to be in him, whose Mind is the Original of all things; so as it were a great Absurdity to attribute to Man, a Mind procreative of *Species*, and to deny it to God, who governs all things.

Therefore *Species* have not their Dependence on the Mind of Man; on the contrary, they are unknown to human Nature, or Mankind. The *Genus*, and Essence of every thing is of itself, not existing in the Singulars, but the Support and Foundation of the Singulars.

Moreover, if there were not certain *Species* of things, there would be a great Confusion in all Sciences, they being of *Universals*; for no Man comprehends

prehends in his Mind all Individuals; it were infinite and full of Disorder to take that Course; so that all Philosophy and-Differtation would lose the Truth and certain Knowledge of things: whereas, on the contrary, in all Science, the true Course of Learning is to reduce Particulars to their proper Species, whence may appear their Nature and Qualities.

Of the Primary Archetypal *Idea*, the essential Properties; and they are these.

First, it is not Many (that is, it is not intermingled with generated Beings, of which it is the Original;) for it is void of Parts and Figure, being infinite.

Secondly, it is void of all Motions and Mutation, remaining always immovable and the same.

Thirdly, it is void of all Age and Time, being eternal, neither elder nor younger, nor any way partaking of Time, subject to no Circumstances of Time, all things being always present to it.

Fourthly, it partakes not of that Essence by which Singulars are said to be, but communicates the Power and Faculty of Being to all Singulars, itself being beyond all Essence. Essence is distributed amongst the many of Beings, and is not wanting in any Being whatsoever, neither least nor greatest.

Fifthly, the first *Idea* is so diffused into all things whereto it gives the Power and Faculty of Being, as that it circumscribes and limits the Multiplicity, and almost Infinity of Singulars, within the Bounds of the one: so that the one, which of itself is infinite and void of Parts, is as it were terminated in Singulars.

Of the secondary *Ideas* (which are natural Causes, the Works of the primary *Idea*) the Properties are these.

First, they, as well as the primary *Idea*, are one; for all Singulars comprised within them are determinately reduced to their respective Classes; but in this they differ from the primary *Idea*, that the one in secondary *Ideas* is truly finite, having Beginning, Middle, and End.

Secondly, they consist entire in the Singulars, not

as deriving their Essence from them; for they exist in the divine Mind, yet they are conspicuous in Singulars; as if you would know what is Homogeneity, or the Species of Man, you must look upon the Singulars of Men, in which the Species itself is visible. The secondary *Ideas* in sensible things are *εἰκαστικαὶ*, figurate.

Thirdly, the secondary *Ideas* are the same and another; the same, in themselves; another, in the Singulars; and consequently both rest and move: whereas the primary *Idea* is void of all Mutation, amidst the Vicissitudes of transient Things.

In the Order of Nature, the one in the Species is of itself, and derives not its Essence from Singulars, but is self-subsistent, as being a Species; by whose Power all the many (*i. e.* Singulars) subsist.

Fourthly, the others (*i. e.* Singulars) proceed from the one; but the one, which is seen in the others, hath its Essence from a third; that is, Individuals exist by these secondary *Ideas*, yet so as that the secondary *Ideas* have from the primary *Idea* their Essence, and the Power by which they give to Singulars a Subsistence.

Fifthly, the secondary *Ideas* act from contrary Principles, yet so as that those Contraries are connected in one type of Similitude, whence a third thing reflects. To the Production of natural things three things concur, two *ἄλλες*, and the third that ties them together; *ἄλλες* are Beings mutually touching one another (that is, the natural things themselves.) The third is the Analogy betwixt the other two, the Similitude of their Proportions. There can be no *ἄλλες* without two things at the least; nor can they produce any thing without the third, Combination. The *ἄλλες* must be dissimilar, that one and equal may be introduced.

Sixthly, the secondary *Ideas* are not without Time, but what they do, they do in Time; whereas (as we said) to the primary *Idea* all things are present. Natural things exist and perish according to Time, but their Species or *Ideas* are constant and permanent.

MELISSUS.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

Melissus was a Samian, Son of Libogetus; he heard Parmenides, and converted also with Heraclitus, at what time the Ephesians had such a misapprehension of him, as the Ade-

rites had of Democritus. He was a Person conversant in Civil Affairs, and much honoured by his Countrymen, who made him their Admiral, and particularly admired him for his Virtue. He flourished,

riſh'd, according to *Apollodorus*, about the 84th Olympiad.

His Opinions.

HE asserted (as *Parmenides*) that ¹ the Principle of things is *One*, which is Immovable; that this *One* is All; that *Ens* is Infinite; arguing thus, that which is made, hath a Principle, therefore that which is not made hath no Principle: But the Universe, or that which is, is not made; therefore it hath no Principle, and therefore no End; therefore it is Infinite; therefore *One*, for there cannot be more Infinites; therefore Immovable, for it occu-

pates all things, and hath not any thing whereby it may be moved.

² That the Universe is infinite and Immutable, and immovable, and one like itself, and full. ³ He proved that it is Immovable thus; because, if it were moved, there must necessarily be a *Vacuum*, but there is not a *Vacuum* amongst Beings.

⁴ That there is not Motion, but that it only seems to be; and ⁵ that things are not generated and corrupted, but only seem so to us.

⁶ As for the Gods, he said, that we ought not to assert any thing concerning them, so far as we have not any knowledge of them.

* *Arist. Phys.* 1. 1, 2, 3.

* *Laert.* 9. 24.

* *Arist. Phys.* 4. 3.

* *Laert.* *ibid.*

* *Arist. de Cal.* 3. 1.

* *Laert.* *ibid.*

Z E N O.

C H A P. I.

His Life.

ZE N O was of *Elea*; *Apollodorus* saith, he was Son of *Pyretes*; * but *Pyretes* indeed was Father to *Parmenides*. *Zeno* was by Nature Son of *Teleutagoras*; by Adoption, Son of *Parmenides*, whom he heard, and was much beloved of him. *Plato* saith, he was tall, and calls him the *Eleatic Palamedes*. He was a Person excellent, as well for Philosophy as Politicks; his Writings being full of much Learning.

* *Valerius Maximus* saith, he forsook his own Country, where he could not enjoy Security and Freedom, and went to *Agigentum*, which at that time was oppressed with miserable Servitude, out of a Confidence, that by his own Wit and Courage he might deliver the People there from the savage Tyranny of the Tyrant *Phalaris*; and perceiving, that he was carried on more by a customary way of Rule, than sound Counsel, he excited in the young Men of the City a Desire to free their Country: which being discovered to the Tyrant, he called the People together into the *Forum*, and began to torture him several ways, demanding of him, who were privy to the Conspiracy besides himself? *Zeno* would not disclose them, but names one that was most in favour with the Tyrant, and reproving the *Agigentines* for their Cowardice and Timidity, raised such a sudden Courage in them, that they immediately fell upon the Tyrant, and stoned him to death. Thus not a suppliant Prayer, nor pitiful Crying out, but the valiant Exhortation of an old Man, stretch'd

upon the Rack, chang'd the Minds and Fortune of the whole City.

* But others relate this after a different manner. ¹ *Satyrus* in his Epitome of *Heracleides* saith, that conspiring against *Nearchus*, or, as others, *Diomedon*, a Tyrant, he was taken, and being question'd concerning the Conspirators, and the Arms he had convey'd into *Lipara*, he named all such as were Friends to the Tyrant, as privy to the Plot, that thereby he might leave him destitute of Assistants; and further, telling him that he had something to speak in his Ear, he bit him by the Ear, and would not let go his hold, till they ran him through; suffering in the same manner as *Aristogiton*, who slew *Hipparchus* the Tyrant of *Athena*. *Demetrius* affirms, he bit off his Nose; *Antisthenes* relates, that having named all the Tyrant's Friends, and being demanded by him, Whether there were any more? answered, Yes; Thou, that art the Destruction of the City. And then turning to the Standers-by, said, I wonder at your Cowardice, that you can endure to be Slaves to a Tyrant, only through fear of suffering what I now suffer; which said, he bit off his Tongue, and spit it in the Tyrant's Face: whereupon the Citizens unanimously fell upon the Tyrant and stoned him. These relate the Story after this manner; but *Hermippus* saith, he was bray'd to death in a Stone Mortar.

Besides his other Virtues, he had a magnanimous Contempt of great Persons, as well as *Heracleides*; and

* *Laert.* 9.

* The Text seems to require to be thus supplied.

* *Lib.* 3. c. 3.

* *Laert.* 9. 26.

and therefore preferred his own Country *Ela*, first named *Hyela*, a Colony of the *Phocæans*, a little Town, only for that it brought forth honest Men, before the Pride and-Glory of the *Athenians*; never travelling thither, but living for the most part at home.

It is reported of him, that being reviled, he appeared much troubled at it, answering one that reproved him for it, If I should be pleased with Reproaches, I could not delight in Praises.

He flourished in the 79th. *Olympiad*.

CHAP. II.

His Invention of a Dialectick.

ARISTOTLE (cited by *Laertius*, * *Sextus Empiricus*) affirms, that *Zeno Eleates* was the Inventor of *Dialectick*, as *Parmenides* of *Rhetorick*; which *Galen* likewise confirms, saying, *Zeno* is remembered as Author of the *Eristick Philosophy*. But the Names of *Eristick* or *Dialectick* seem to have been later; for, as * *Laertius* describes the Succession of it, *Euclid* (who was of *Megara*) learning the *Parmenidean Philosophy*, his Disciples were called *Megaricks*, afterwards *Eristicks*, lastly *Dialecticks*; which Name *Dionysius* the *Carthaginian* first gave them, for that they made *Dissertations* by way of *Question and Answer*. That by the *Parmenidean Philosophy*, he means no other than *Dialectick*, may be evinced from *Sextus Empiricus*, who alledgeth, that *Parmenides* seemeth not to have been ignorant of *Dialecticks*, for that, as *Aristotle* conceives, *Zeno*, his Disciple, invented it. Hence perhaps may *Cicero* be explain'd, who, for this reason seems to include the *Eleatic Philosophers* under the Title of *Megaricks*, who had, saith he, a noble Discipline; of which, as I find it written, the Prince (or Author) was *Xenophanes* lately mentioned. Then did *Parmenides* and *Zeno* follow him; so they were named *Eleatic Philosophers* from thence. Afterwards *Euclid*, Disciple of *Socrates*, a *Megarian*, from whom the same were called *Megaricks*; who held, that only to be good, which is one and the same, and like, and always. These also borrowed much from *Plato*, being called, from *Menedemus*, *Eretricks*, for that he was an *Eretrian*. Thus *Cicero*.

CHAP. III.

His Opinions.

HE held, ¹ that it is impossible, that if there be any thing, it can be Generated, or Made; asserting this of God: For it is necessary, that what-

soever is generated, is generated, either of things like, or of things unlike; but neither of these is possible: For a thing like may as well generate its like, as be generated of it; forasmuch as amongst things equal and alike, all things are in a like respect to one another. But neither can an unlike be generated of a like; for whether a stronger he made of a weaker, or a greater of a lesser, or a worse of a better; or on the contrary, the better be made of the worse, of a *non Ens* will be made something, which can no way be. For this reason, he asserted God to be Eternal: And if God be that which is the most excellent of all things, it is requisite, saith he, that he be *One*; for if there were two or more, he could by no means be the most excellent of all; forasmuch as every God of them, being like him, would be such as he. Now God, and the Power of God, is such, as that it governs, but is not governed; it governs all things, so that if there were any thing better then he, he could not be God. If therefore there were many, and of these some were better, others worse, they could not be Gods, for God cannot be inferior, or subjected, or governed. Neither if they were equal, could God be more excellent than all things else; for what is equal must neither be better nor worse than that to which it is equal; therefore if there be a God, and he be such, this God must be only *One*; otherwise, he could not do all things that he would; because, if there were more, the *One* could not be of absolute Power. Now God being *One*, he further affirms, that he is every way like himself, as to seeing, and hearing, and all other Senses; for otherwise, the Parts of God would not be most excellent, but exceeded by one another; which is impossible. Now being every way alike, he must be round; for he must not be partly of one fashion, partly of another. Thus being eternal, and one, and round, he is neither finite nor infinite; infinite he is not, for that hath neither Middle, nor Beginning, nor End, nor any other Part; but an *Ens* cannot be such as is a *non Ens*. If there were many, they would bound one another; but *One* is neither like to a *non Ens*, nor to many; for *One* hath nothing whereby it may be bounded. Moreover, God being such an *One*, is neither moved nor immovable, for that which is immovable is *non Ens*. Neither can any thing pass into it, nor it into another. Again, the things which are moved are more than one; for a thing must be moved into another; now if that which is not, is not moved, forasmuch as that which is not, is no where; and those things which are moved, must be more than one; hence he affirmeth, that those which are moved are two, or more than one; and that *non Ens* rests, for it is immovable, but *One* neither rests nor moveth, forasmuch as it is neither *non Ens*, nor many. Thus he asserted, that

* Adv. Math.

† Hist. Phil.

‡ In Euclid. 2. 136.

§ Acad. 4. 42.

¶ Aristot. de Zenon.

God is Eternal, and One, and Like, and Round; neither Infinite, nor Finite; neither Quiescent, nor Moveable.

^a Moreover he asserted, that there are many Worlds; that there is no *Vacuum*; that the Nature of all things consists of Hot and Moist, and Cold and Dry, mutually interchanged; that Man was made of Earth, and his Soul tempered of those four, neither of them being predominant.

¹ Against Place he argued thus; If every *Ens* be in a Place, there must be a Place of that Place, and so to infinite.

Against Motion, he alledged four Arguments: The first, that Nothing is moved; for whatsoever makes a Progression, must come to the Middle, be-

fore it comes to the End. The second is that which is termed *Achilles*, that a slow thing will never be overtaken by a swift; for the thing which followeth must necessarily come to the Place from which that which went before departed, therefore that which went before makes a continual Progression as well as the other. The third, if every thing rests when it is in its just Place; and, in every moment, every thing is in its just Place, an Arrow flying is immovable. The fourth, that if things were moved; as for Example, if equal Bulks were moved, one from the Beginning of the Race, another from the Middle, alike swiftly, it would come to pass, that the Half of Time would be equal to the Whole.

^a Laert. 9. 29.

¹ Arist. Phys. 6. 9.

LEUCIPPUS.

^a *Leucippus* was of *Elea*, or, as some say, an *Abderite*, or, as others, a *Melian*: He heard *Zeno*.

His Assertions are thus delivered by *Laertius*; that all things are infinite, and transmuted into one another; that the Universe is *Vacuum* and Full, (that is, little Bodies, or Atoms.) That the Worlds are made by the falling of those Bodies into the *Vacuum*, and entangling with one another, from which Motion, by Coagmentation of them, the Stars were made. That the Sun is moved in a greater Circle about the Moon. That the Earth is moved about the Centre, and is in Figure like a Drum. He first asserted Atoms to be the Principles of all Things. This is the Sum of his Doctrine; the Particulars these.

He held, that the Universe, as we said, is infinite; one Part of it is full, the other vacuum; these are the Elements of which infinite Worlds are made, and resolve into them. The Worlds were generated after this Manner: out of the Infinite there were carried, by a kind of Abstraction (from the rest) into a great *Vacuum*, many Bodies of all Sorts of Figures, which being crowded up together, caused a Circumgyration; by which means hitting against one another, and rolling about all manner of Ways, those which were alike, separated themselves from the rest, and joined with their equal like; but being of equal Weight, and not able by reason of their Multitude, to move round; those of them which were rare, leaped forth to the exterior *Vacuum*; the rest stayed together, and entangled themselves by run-

ning one within another, and made a first Compound round. This was like a Kind of Membrane or Skin containing all Kinds of Bodies; which Bodies moving round about the Middle, the Membrane that enclosed them became more thin, there flowing together continually more Bodies unto those in the Middle, and engaging themselves in their Motion. By this Means was the Earth made, those which went to the Middle being settled together. Moreover, the outer Circumference or Membrane, as it were, was continually increased by the Accession of new Bodies from without, and, as it turned about, got hold of all that came at it. Some of these, entangling with one another, first made a humid, and, as it were, a dirty Kind of Mass; but being dried in their Motion together with the whole, and afterwards kindled, the Stars were made of them. The utmost is the Orb of the Sun, that of the Moon is next the Earth, the rest are betwixt these; the Stars are kindled or set on fire by the Swiftness of their Motion, the Sun by the Stars, the Moon borrows a little Fire from the Sun. The Sun and Moon happen to be eclipsed, by reason that the Earth inclines towards the South; the Northern Parts are continually oppress'd with Snow and Frost; the Sun is seldom eclipsed, the Moon continually, because their Orbs are not equal. In the same manner as the World was made, it increased, will diminish, and perish, by a certain kind of Necessity. Hitherto *Laertius*. What is more to be said of his Opinions, we shall insert amongst those of *Democritus*, who borrowed most of them.

D E M O -

^a Laert. 9. 30.

DEMOCRITUS.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, Brethren, Time.

Democritus^a is by some supposed to have been a Milesian; but the more general Opinion is, that^b he was of Abdera, a Town of Thracæ, noted for the Simplicity of the Inhabitants, which grew even to a Proverb. He was of a noble Family^c; being descended from the Brother of Heracles. His Father is by^d some called *Hegeſistratus*; by others *Athenocritus*; by others^e *Damaspippus*. Democritus was the youngest of three Sons; the other two, *Herodotus*^f and *Damafus*; or (as^g *Suidas*) *Damastes*.

^h Democritus was born (according to *Apollodorus* in his *Chronology*) in the 80th Olympiad; which is confirmed by what heⁱ saith of himself in his little *Diaſcormus*, that he was young when *Anaxagoras* was old, being forty Years younger than he. *Anaxagoras* was born in the first Year of the 70th Olympiad; the 40th Year after it, exclusively, falleth upon the first of the 80th Olympiad, *Thraſyllus* therefore is not to be followed, who affirms, he was born in the third Year of the 77th Olympiad, being a Year older than *Socrates*.

^j *Pliny* and ^k *Agellius* affirm he flourished chiefly in the time of the Peloponnesian War. *Pliny* saith, after the Building of Rome 300 Years; *Agellius*, 323 Years; by which it appears that he was Contemporary, as *Agellius* adds, with *Socrates*, and perhaps (as *Laertius*) with *Achælus* the Disciple of *Socrates*, and with *Oenipodes*, for he mentions him, as likewise the Opinion of *Zeno* and *Parmenides* concerning One, as Persons most eminent in his Time, and *Protagoras* the Abderite, whom all acknowledge (saith he) to have been in the Time of *Socrates*. That he is said to have written his little *Diaſcormus* 730 Years after the taking of *Troy*, agrees with this Account. For, according to *Eratoſthenes*, from the taking of *Troy* to the first Olympiad are 407 Years, to which add 323 Years (to make up 730) and it falls upon the 84th Olympiad.

CHAP. II.

His first Education and Masters.

Democritus, (saith^l *Valerius Maximus*) may well be reckon'd amongst the rich, for his Father was

able to entertain the Army of *Xerxes*. *Laertius* adds, from the Testimony of *Herodotus*, that the King in requital, left with him some Magi and Chaldeans; referring perhaps to^m that Text of *Herodotus*, where he relates, that *Xerxes*, in his Return to Asia, came to Abdera, and was entertained by the Abderites, and bestowed on them a golden Scimitar, and the Tiara embroidered with Gold; and, as the People there affirm, this was the first Place where he untied his Zone, since he fled from Athens (which I believe not) so great was his Fear. Abdera is nearer to the Hellespont than the Bay of *Strymon*, so that he took Shipping from hence. Thus *Herodotus*. From these Magi and Chaldeans, Democritus first received Learning, of whom, whilst yet a Boy, he learnt Theology and Astronomy.

ⁿ He next applied himself to *Leucippus*^o. Some affirm, he was Disciple also to *Anaxagoras*; but *Phavorinus*, in his various History, relates, that Democritus said of *Anaxagoras*, that those Opinions which he delivered concerning the Sun and Moon, were not his, but more ancient, and that he stole them. He likewise undervalued his Assertions concerning the Fabrick of the Universe, and the Mind; How then (saith *Phavorinus*) was he, as some hold, his Disciple?

No less doubted is the Report of his going to Athens, where^p *Valerius Maximus* saith, he dwelt many Years, making use of every Moment of Time, towards the Perception and Exercise of Learning. He lived unknown in that City, as he himself attests in one of his Books. *Laertius* adds, he kept himself undiscover'd, out of a Contempt of Glory; and knew *Socrates*, but was not known to him; whereupon he said of himself, "I went to Athens and no Man knew me." If the Rivals (saith *Thraſyllus*) be a genuine Dialogue of *Plato*, this is the Anonymous Person there, who, besides the two who were busied concerning *Oenipodes* and *Anaxagoras*, discoursed concerning Philosophy with *Socrates*, to whom he said that a Philosopher resembles a *Pentathlus*, (a Person skilful in five Exercises) and indeed he was (continues^q *Thraſyllus*) a *Pentathlus* in Philosophy, for he was skilful in Physick, Ethick, Mathematick, the liberal Sciences, and all Arts. But *Demetrius Phalereus*, in his Apology for *Socrates*, saith, he never went to Athens; and this (saith *Laertius*) is far greater, that he could despise so eminent a

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City,

^a Laert. g. 34.^b Laert. *Ælian* 4.^c Lib. 30. Cap. 1.^d Lib. 30. Cap. 1.^e Lib. 30. Cap. 1.^f Lib. 30. Cap. 1.^g Lib. 30. Cap. 1.^h Lib. 30. Cap. 1.ⁱ Lib. 30. Cap. 1.^j Lib. 30. Cap. 1.^k Lib. 30. Cap. 1.^l Lib. 30. Cap. 1.^m Laert. ib. id.ⁿ Laert. ibid. Plin. 18. 35.^o Lib. 17. Cap. 21.^p Lib. 17. Cap. 21.^q Lib. 17. Cap. 21.^r Lib. 17. Cap. 21.^s Lib. 17. Cap. 21.^t Lib. 17. Cap. 21.^u Lib. 17. Cap. 21.^v Lib. 17. Cap. 21.^w Lib. 17. Cap. 21.^x Lib. 17. Cap. 21.^y Cic. ad Attic. 4. 16.^z In Democ.^{aa} Lib. 8.^{ab} Lib. 8.^{ac} Lib. 8.^{ad} Lib. 8.^{ae} Lib. 8.^{af} Lib. 8.^{ag} Lib. 8.^{ah} Lib. 8.^{ai} Lib. 8.^{aj} Abderit. Ep. ad Hippocr.^{ak} Laert. ibid.^{al} Laert. ibid.^{am} Laert. g. 34.^{an} Laert. ibid.^{ao} Laert. ibid.^{ap} Laert. ibid.^{aq} Laert. ibid.^{ar} Laert. ibid.^{as} Laert. ibid.^{at} Laert. ibid.^{au} Laert. ib. id. *Suidas*.^{av} Laert. ibid.^{aw} Laert. ibid.^{ax} Laert. ibid.^{ay} Laert. ibid.^{az} Laert. ibid.^{ba} Laert. ibid.^{bb} Laert. ibid.^{bc} Laert. ibid.^{bd} Laert. ibid.^{be} Laert. ibid.

word they honoured him as a God; Clemens faith, they called him *encheiridion*, *Wisdom*; *Helianus*, *Philosophy*; as *Protagoras* was termed *Logos*, Discourse. "So much indeed was he requir'd for his extraordinary Wisdom, that they conferred the supreme Government of Abdera upon him.

CHAP. V.

His Retirement.

BUT being naturally more inclined to Contemplation, than delighted with publick Honours and Employments, he withdrew himself from them, and "endeavour'd, as *Aristophanes* relates, to make "several Trials of Phantasies (meaning the Impressions of Things appearing to the Phantasy, not the Phantasy itself) "often living alone, and in Solitude." "*Lucian* adds, that shutting himself "up in a Tomb without the Gates of the City, he "continued there writing and composing Night and Day: And that some young Men intending to deride and fright him, attired themselves like Ghosts, "in black Garments, with Vizards like Deaths-heads, and came about him dancing and skipping; "whereat he was nothing moved, nor would so much as look on them, but continued to write. "Leave fooling, saith he; so firmly did he believe, "that Souls are nothing after they are out of the "Bodies."

Such Places he made choice of, as were most conducive to Contemplation, by reason of their Solitude and Darkness. And "*Agellius* reports, "out of "the Monuments of the Greek History, now not "extant, That for the same Reason he put out his "own Eyes, because he conceived the Cogitations "and Meditations of his Mind in contemplating the "Reasons of Nature, would be more vigorous and "exact, if free from the Allurements of Sight, and "Impediments of the Eyes; which Act, together "with the manner whereby he easily procured Blindness, by a most subtle Ingeniousness, *Laberius* "described; feigning another Cause of his voluntary "Blindness, converting it to his own Purpose.

*Democritus, the Abderite, will shill'd
In natural Philosophy, a Shield
Plac'd to Hyperion's rising opposite
And with the Sun's Beams thus put out his Sight;
That bad and impious Men he might not see
Triumphant in their full Prosperity.*

The former Reason given by *Agellius* (that he might study Philosophy the better) is alledged also by *Cicero*, *Plutarch*, and others. "For though, saith

"*Cicero*, having lost his Eyes he could not discern "black and white, yet could he good and ill, just and "unjust, honest and dishonest, profitable and unprofitable, great and little; he might live happy without "out the Variety of Colours, but he could not without the Knowledge of Things. Thus he conceived, that the Acuteness of the Mind was obstructed "by the Sight of the Eyes." "*Tertullian* alledgeth another Reason, because he could not look on Women without inordinate Desires. But *Cicero* elsewhere speaks doubtfully concerning the Truth of the Thing itself; and not without Reason, since the contrary appears manifest by this following Narration.

CHAP. VI.

His Communication with Hippocrates.

Democritus thus neglecting all outward Things, living Day and Night privately in Caves and solitary Places, the Abderites imagined that he was Melancholy even to Madness; which Suspicion was confirmed by his continual Laughing upon all Occasions whatsoever. Hereupon they sent *Amalegoras*, one of the chief Persons of their City to *Hippocrates*, that most eminent Physician, who lived at *Cos*, with this Epistle.

*The Senate and People of Abdera to Hippocrates,
Health.*

Our City, *Hippocrates*, is in very great Danger, together with that Person, who, we hoped, would ever have been a great Ornament to it. But now, O the Gods! it is much to be feared, that we shall only be capable of envying others, since he, through extraordinary Learning and Study, by which he gained it, is fallen sick; so as it is much to be feared, that if *Democritus* become mad, our City *Abdera* will become desolate; for, wholly forgetting himself, watching Day and Night, laughing at all things little and great, and esteeming them as nothing, he after this manner leadeth his whole Life. One marries a Wife; another trades; another pleads; another performs the Office of Magistrate; goeth on Embassy, is chosen Officer by the People, is put down, falls sick, is wounded, dies; he laughs at all these, beholding some to look discontented, others pleas'd. Moreover, he enquireth what is done in the infernal Places, and writes of them, and affirms the Air to be full of Images, and that he understands the Language of Birds, and often rising in the Night singeth to himself, and saith, That he sometimes travels to the Infinity of Things, and that there are innumerable *Democritus's* like him; thus, together with

* *Suid.*
Filib. 5.

* *Laert.* 8. 38.
* *Epist.* *Græc.*

* *Plutarch.*

* *Lib.* 16. 7.

* *Tul.* *Quæst.*

* *Apolog.* adv. gent.

* *De*

with his Mind, he destroyeth his Body. These are the Things which we fear, *Hippocrates*; These are those which trouble us. Come therefore quickly, and preserve us by your Advice; and despise us not, for we are not inconsiderable; and if you restore him, you shall not fail either of Money or Fame: And tho' you prefer Learning before Wealth, yet accept of the latter, which shall be offer'd to you in great abundance.

To restore *Democritus* to health, if our City were all of Gold we would give it: We think our Laws, *Hippocrates*, are sick: Come then, best of Men, and cure a most excellent Person. Thou wilt not come as a Physician, but as a Founder of all *Ionia*, to encompass us with a sacred Wall. Thou wilt cure not a Man, but a City, a languishing Senate, and prevent its Dissolution; thus becoming our Law-giver, Judge, Magistrate, and Preserver. To this purpose we expect thee, *Hippocrates*; all these (if you come) you will be to us. It is not a single obscure City, but all *Greece*, which beseecheth thee to preserve the Body of Wisdom. Imagine that Learning herself comes on this Embassy to thee, begging, that thou wilt free her from this Danger. Wisdom certainly is nearly allied to every one, but especially to us who dwell so near her. Know for certain, that the next Age will own itself much obliged to thee, if thou desert not *Democritus*, for the Truth which he is capable of communicating to all. Thou art allied to *Æsculapius* by thy Family, and by thy Art; he is descended from the Brother of *Hercules*, from whom came *Aderus*, whose Name, as you have heard, our City bears; wherefore even to him will the Cure of *Democritus* be acceptable. Since therefore, *Hippocrates*, you see a whole People, and a most excellent Person falling into Madness, hasten we beseech you to us. It is strange, that the Exuberance of Good should become a Disease; *Democritus*, by how much he excelled others in Acuteness of Wisdom, is now in so much the more danger of falling mad, whilst the ordinary unlearned People of *Abdera* enjoy their Wits as formerly; and even they, who before were esteemed foolish, are now most capable to discern the Indisposition of the wisest Person. Come therefore, and bring along with you *Æsculapius*, and *Epione*, the Daughter of *Hercules*, and her Children, who went in the Expedition against *Troy*; bring with you the Receipts and Remedies against Sickness; the Earth plentifully affords Fruits, Roots, Herbs, and Flowers to cure Madness, and never more happily than now, for the Recovery of *Democritus*. Farewel.

Hippocrates returned this Answer.

Hippocrates to the Senate of *Abdera*, Health.

Your Countryman, *Amelagoras*, arrived at *Cos* the same Day on which with us was celebrated the Susception of the Rod, which, as you know, is an annual Convention, and great Solemnity amongst us, held at a Cypress Tree, which are born by those who are particularly consecrated to the God.

But finding both by the Words and Countenance of *Amelagoras*, that your Business required much haste, I read your Letter, and much wondred to find your City no less troubled for one Man, than if the whole City were but one Man. Happy indeed are the People who know, that wise Men are their Defence; not Walls or Bulwarks, but the sound Judgments of wise Persons. I conceive, that Arts are the Dispensations of the Gods; Men the Works of Nature: And be not angry, ye Men of *Abdera*, if I conceive, that it is not you, but Nature herself which calls me to preserve her Work, which is in danger of failing.

Wherefore, obeying that which is the Invitation of Nature and of the Gods, rather than yours, I shall make haste to cure the Sickness of *Democritus*, if it be a Sickness, and not, as I hope, an Error in you. And it would be yet a greater Testimony of your Good-will, if you were troubled only upon Suspicion. Neither Nature nor the Gods have promised me any thing for my coming, and therefore (Men of *Abdera*) do not you force any thing upon me, but suffer the Works of a free Art to be free. They who take Rewards compel Sciences to Servitude, and make them Slaves, bereaving them of their former Freedom. Besides, it is impossible that such may dissemble, in a great Disease, and deny in a little; and when they have promised, not come; and come, when they are not sent for. Miserable indeed is human Life, for that the unsatiate Desire of Wealth continually invades it, as a Winter Wind. I wish that all Physicians would rather join together to cure it of this Disease, which is worse than Madness, notwithstanding it is thought happy, but indeed a pettilential Sickness. All Distempers of the Mind, are, as I conceive, High-madness, for they stir up in the Reason strange Opinions and Fantasies, which Reason must be purify'd and cur'd by Virtue. As for me, if at all I made it my design to be rich, I would not, ye Men of *Abdera*, come to you for ten Talents, but would rather have gone to the great King of *Persia*, where there are vast Cities full of all kind of Wealth, there I would have practis'd by Physick. But I refused to cure a Nation which are Enemies to *Greece*, and, to the best of my Power, have my self opposed the Barbarians. I thought it a Dishonour to accept of the Wealth of a King, Foe to our Country,

Country, by which means I might become a Destroyer of *Grace*. To get Wealth by all means, is not to be Rich; the Rites of Virtue are sacred and just. Do you not think it an equal Offence to cure our Enemies, as to take Money for the Cure of our Friends? But this is not my Custom; I raise not Gain out of Sickness; nor did wish, when I heard that *Democritus* was mad, that it might prove so indeed; if he be well, he is a Friend; if he happen to be cured of his Sickness, more a Friend. I understand that *Democritus* is a Person of firm and settled Parts, the Ornament of your City.

In order to this Voyage, he sent to his Friend *Dionysius*, that he would take care of his Family in his Absence; to *Damagetus*, that he would provide a Ship for him; to *Cratesus*, that he would furnish him with Simples. The day before he arrived at *Abera*, he dreamt that *Æsculapius* appear'd to him, and told him, that he would have no need of his Assistance, but only the direction of a Woman, whom he brought along with him; and having presented her to him, departed. The Woman promised, that she would meet on the Morrow at *Democritus's* House; he asked her Name, she told him she was called *Truth*; and, pointing to another Woman that followed her, added, that her Name was *Opinion*, and that she lived with the *Aberites*. This was the Dream of *Hippocrates*. How he was received the next day at *Abera*, he gives this account to his Friend *Damagetus*.

To *Damagetus*, Health.

It was, as I conjectur'd, *Damagetus*: *Democritus* is not mad, but is extraordinary wife, and hath taught us Wisdom, and by us all Men. I have sent back, with many Thanks, the *Æsculapian* Ship, on the Prow whereof, to the Picture of the *Sun*, may be added *Health*; for we made a quick Voyage, and arrived the same Day that I had sent word I would be there at *Abera*. I found all the People flocking together at the Gate, in expectation, as it should seem, of our coming; not only the Men, but the Women, the Old, the Young; and by *Jove*, the very Children; so much were they troubled at the Madness of *Democritus*, who, at that time, was seriously employ'd in Philosophy. As soon as they saw me, they seem'd a little to be comforted, and to have some Hope. *Philopæmen* offer'd to conduct me to my Lodging, as all of them likewise desir'd; but I told them, "Men of *Abera*, I will do nothing 'till I have seen *Democritus*;" which, as soon as they heard, they applauded and rejoic'd, and brought me immediately along the *Forum*; some following, others running before, crying out, Great King *Jupiter*, help, heal. I advis'd them to be of Comfort, for that it being the Season of the *Etesian* Winds,

I was confident that there was not any Sickness that would continue long; and in saying thus, on I went. The House was not far, nor indeed the City; we went to it, it being next the Walls, whither they brought me quietly. Behind the Tower there was a high Hill, very full of tall Poplars, from whence we beheld the Habitation of *Democritus*. *Democritus* himself sat under a thick, but low, plain Tree, in a thick Gown, all alone, squalid, upon a Seat of Stone, wan and lean, with a long Beard; at his right Hand ran a little Brook down the Hill, upon the Hill there was a Temple consecrated, as it should seem, to the Muses, encompassed round about with Vines, which grew there naturally. He sat very composedly, having a Book upon his Knees, and round about him lay other Books, and the Bodies of many living Creatures dissected. Sometimes he wrote hastily, sometimes paused, seeming to resolve things within himself. Soon after he rose up and walked, and looked intently into the dissected Creatures; then laid down again, and return'd to his Seat. The *Aberites* standing about me, and hardly refraining from Tears, said, "You see, *Hippocrates*, the Life of *Democritus*, how mad he is, and knoweth not either what he would have, or what he doth." One of them, that would have given me a farther Description of his Madness, on the sudden fell a sobbing, and howled like a Woman at the Death of her Son, and then began to lament like a Traveller robb'd of his Goods: which *Democritus* hearing, sometimes smiled, sometimes laugh'd, not writing any longer, but often shaking his Head. "Men of *Abera* (said I) stay you here, whilst I go nigher to him, that by hearing him speak, and observing his Constitution, I may judge the Truth of his Distemper;" and in so saying, I went gently down: the Place was very steep, so that I could hardly keep myself from falling. At such time as I came nigh him, it happen'd that he was writing something as in a Rapture, earnestly; whereupon I made a stand, waiting when he would give over. It was not long ere he did so; and seeing me coming towards him, said, "Hail, Stranger." I answer'd, "Hail also, *Democritus*, the wife of Men." He, as I imagine, a little troubled that he had not saluted me by Name, reply'd, "What may I call you? for my Ignorance of your Name is the Reason that I styled you, Stranger." My Name (said I) is *Hippocrates*, a Physician." "You are (reply'd he) the Glory of the *Æsculapians*, the Fame of whose Worth and Knowledge in Physick is arriv'd as far as to me. What Business hath brought you hither? but first sit down." This Seat, you see, is pleasant, green, and soft, better than high Thrones, which are subject to the Envy of Fortune. As soon as I was set, is it a publick or private Business, *saith he*, which

"brought

"brought you hither? Tell me freely, and we shall
 "to our utmost Power assist you. I answer'd, It is
 "for your sake that I come hither, to be acquainted
 "with you, a wise Person, the Occasion being af-
 "forded me by an Embassy from your Country. He
 "reply'd, Then let my House entertain you."

Having thus made Trial of him several ways, and
 not finding any thing of Madness in him, "You
 "know (said I) *Philopœmen*, one of this Town.
 "Exceeding well, answer'd he; you mean the Son
 "of *Damon*? He lives near the *Hermæan* Foun-
 "tain. The same, reply'd I; he hath been my old
 "Acquaintance, and received me for his Guest.
 "But you, *Democritus*, I intreat to afford me a
 "better Entertainment, and first tell me, What it
 "is that you are writing? He, after a little Pause,
 "answer'd, Concerning Madness. Good *Jupiter*,
 "said I, you write seasonably against the City!
 "What City, *Hippocrates*, answer'd he? I reply'd,
 "that I only spoke at random. But what is this
 "that you write of Madness? What else, said he,
 "but what it is, and how it comes to be ingender'd
 "in Man, and how it may be cured. These Creatures
 "which you behold, I have dissected for that end;
 "not as *bating* the Works of the Gods, but to make
 "Enquiry into the Nature and Seat of Cholera; for
 "you know, that where this abounds too much, it
 "most commonly causeth Madness in Men. It is
 "in every Nature, but in some less, in others more:
 "Its Excess causeth Diseases, as being a Matter
 "partly good, partly bad. By *Jove*, said I, *De-*
 "*mocritus*, you speak truly and wisely; and I judge
 "you happy, who can enjoy such Quiet, as I can-
 "not partake of. And why cannot you? saith he.
 "I answer'd, Because either Travel, or Children,
 "or Estate, or Sicknesses, or Deaths, or Servants,
 "or Marriages, or the like, interrupt my Leisure."
 "Hereupon he fell into his usual Passion, and laugh-
 "ed a while exceedingly, giving over Discourse.
 "Why, said I, *Democritus*, do you laugh? Whe-
 "ther is it, that I have spoken well or ill? Here-
 "at he laughed more than before; which the *Aderites*,
 "who stood aloof off, seeing, some beat their own
 "Heads, others their Foreheads, others tore their
 "Hair; for, as they afterwards said, they observed
 "him to laugh at that time more than ever he had
 "done. " *Democritus*, thou best of wise Men, *con-*
 "*tinued* I, I desire to know the Reason of this Pas-
 "sion, wherein that which I said seems ridiculous?
 "That if it proves such, I may reform it; but if
 "otherwise, that you may desist from this unse-
 "asonable Laughter. By *Hercules*, said he, if you
 "can convince me, *Hippocrates*, you will perform
 "a Cure greater than any you have yet done.
 "And why, said I, should you not be convinced?
 "Know you not, that you do absurdly in laughing
 "at the Death of a Man, or at Sickness, or Mad-
 "ness, or Murther, or any thing that is worse

"than these; and on the other side, at Marriages,
 "at Assemblies, at the Birth of Infants, at solemn
 "Rites, at Magistracies, at Honours, and generally
 "at every thing that hath the Name of Good? At
 "those things which deserve to be pitied, you
 "laugh; and at those things for which we should
 "rejoice, you laugh also; inasmuch that you seem
 "not to put any Difference betwixt Good and Bad.
 "Then he, You say well, *Hippocrates*; but you are
 "not acquainted with the Reason of my Laughing;
 "which, as soon as you know, I am confident you
 "will prefer it before the Cause for which you came
 "hither, and carry it along with you as a Medicine
 "to your Country, thereby improving both your-
 "self and others: and in requital of it, perhaps will
 "think yourself obliged to teach me Physick, when
 "you shall understand what Pains all Men take for
 "things that deserve not Pains, but are of no Value,
 "and consume their Lives unprofitably in Pursuit
 "of things that deserve only to be laugh'd at. What!
 "said I, Is all the World sick, and knows it not?
 "If so, they can send no whither for Help; for
 "what is beyond it? He reply'd, There are infinite
 "Worlds, O *Hippocrates*! Have not so mean an
 "Esteem of the Riches of Nature. Teach me this,
 "said I, *Democritus*, at some other time: for I am
 "afraid, that if you begin to talk of this Infinity,
 "you will fall again into your Fit of Laughter;
 "but now, tell me the Reason, why you laugh at
 "the Accidents of Life.

Then, looking stedfastly upon me, "You think,
 "saith he, there are two things which occasion my
 "Laughter, Good and Ill; whereas indeed I laugh
 "but at one thing, Man, full of Folly, destitute of
 "right Actions, playing the Child in all his Designs,
 "undergoing great Toils for no Benefit, travelling
 "to the Ends of the Earth, and sounding bottomless
 "Depths, to get Silver and Gold, never ceasing to
 "hoard them up, and with their Store increasing his
 "own Troubles, lest, if he should want them, he
 "might be thought not happy. He digs into the
 "Bowels of the Earth by the Hands of Slaves,
 "whereof some are buried by the Earth falling upon
 "them; others dwell there, as if it were their native
 "Soil, searching for Gold and Silver, sifting
 "one Sand from another, cutting and tearing their
 "Mother-Earth, which they both admire and tread
 "on. How ridiculous is this, that they should love
 "that Part of the Earth that lies hid, and condemn
 "that which lieth open unto them? Some buy
 "Dogs, others Horses; some delight in having
 "large Possessions, which they may call their own,
 "and would command many others, when they
 "are not able to command themselves. They
 "marry Wives, and in a short time put them a-
 "way; they love, and then hate; they take delight
 "in their Children, and when they are grown up,
 "disinherit them; they war, and despise Quiet;
 "they

"they conspire against Kings; they murder Men; they dig the Earth to find Silver; with the Silver, which they have found, they buy Land; what the Land which they have bought yields, of Corn or Fruits, they sell, and receive Silver again. To what Changes and Mischances are they subject? When they have not Riches, they desire them; when they have, they hide or scatter them: I laugh at their ill-designed Actions, I laugh at their Misfortunes. They violate the Laws of Truth by Contention and Enmity with one another: Brethren, Parents, and Countrymen fight and kill one another for those Possessions, of which, after Death, none of them can be Masters. They pursue an unjust Course of Life; they despise the Poverty of their Friends and Country; mean and inanimate things they account for Riches; they will part with a whole Estate to purchase Statues, because the Statues seem to speak; but those who speak, indeed they hate. They affect things hard to be got; they who dwell in the Continent, covet the things of the Sea; they who dwell in the Islands, the things of the Continent, perverting all things to their own depraved Desires. In War they praise Valour, whilst they are daily subdued by Luxury, Avarice, and all Passions, and in the Course of his Life every Man is a *Thersites*. Why did you, *Hippocrates*, reprove my Laughter? No Man laughs at his own Madness, but at the Madness of another. They who think themselves to be sober, laugh at those who seem to them to be drunk; some laugh at Lovers, whilst they themselves are sick of a worse Distemper; some, at those who travel by Sea; others, at those who follow Husbandry: for they agree not with one another, neither in Arts nor Actions. All this, said I, *Democritus*, is true; neither is there any Argument that may better prove the unhappy Estate of Man: but these Actions are prescribed by Necessity, by reason of the Government of Families, the Building of Ships, and other civil Offices, wherein a Man must necessarily be employ'd; for Nature did not produce him to the end he might rest idle. Again, Height of Ambition causeth many Men to go astray, who aim at all things, as if there were nothing amiss in them, not being able to foresee the Darkness that attends them. For, *Democritus*, what Man is there, that when he marries, thinks of Divorce or Death? Who is there, that whilst he bringeth up his Children, thinketh of losing them? The like in Husbandry, Navigation, Dominion, and all other Offices of Life. No Man foresees that it may go amiss with him, but every one flatters himself with Hopes of good Success, and does not look upon the worst. Why therefore is this ridiculous?"

Democritus replied, "You are yet far from un-

derstanding me, *Hippocrates*, neither perceive, through want of Knowledge, the Bounds of Indisturbance and Perturbation. For if they did order these things prudently, they might be easily discharged of them, and evade my Laughter; and whereas now they are blind as to the Offices of Life, and, with Minds void of Reason, are carried on by inordinate Appetites; it were enough to make them wise, if they would but consider the Mutability of all things, how they wheel about continually, and are suddenly changed; whereas they looking upon these, as if they were firm and settled, fall into many Inconveniences and Troubles, and coveting things harmful, they tumble headlong into many Miseries. But if a Man would rightly consider and weigh in his Mind all things that he attempts, understanding himself and his own Abilities, he would not let his Desires run to infinite, but follow Nature, out of whose Store all are plentifully nourished and supplied. As a fat Body is in greatest Danger of Sickness, so an high Estate is in greatest Danger of falling; great Minds are known in Extremities. Some there are, who, taking no warning at that which happeneth to others, perish by their own ill Actions, minding things manifest no more than as if they were not manifest; whereas yet they have a large Precedent by which to guide their Life, of things done and not done, by which we ought to foresee the future. This is the Occasion of my Laughter, foolish Men punished by their own Wickedness, Covetousness, Lust, Enmity, Treachery, Conspiracy, Envy. It is a hard thing to give a Name to many of these Ills, they being innumerable, and practised so closely. Their Behaviour, as to Virtue, is yet worse; they affect Lies, they follow Pleasure, disobeying the Laws; my Laughter condemns their Inconsiderateness, who neither see nor hear; whereas the Sense of Man only, of all others, is able to foresee Futures. They hate all things, and then again apply themselves to them; they condemn Navigation, and then they put to Sea; condemn Husbandry, and then fall a Ploughing; they put away their Wives, and then marry others; they bury their Children, and beget more, and bring them up; they wish to live long, and when old Age comes, are grieved at it; never remaining constant in any Estate whatsoever. Kings and Princes commend a private Life; private Persons, a publick; he that ruleth a State, praiseth the Tradesman's Life, as free from Danger; the Tradesman his, as full of Honour and Power. For they regard not the direct, sincere and smooth Way of Virtue, in which none of them will endure to walk; but they take crooked and rough Paths, some falling down, others rearing themselves out of Breath to overtake others. Some are

“guided by Incontinence to the Beds of their Neighbours; others are sick of a Consumption through insatiate Avarice; some by Ambition carried up into the Air, and by their own Wickedness thrown down headlong. They pluck down, and then they build; they do good, and oblige others, and then, repenting of it, break the Laws of Friendship, and do wrong, and fall at Enmity, and fight with their nearest Relations; of all which, Avarice is the Cause. Wherein do they differ from Children that play, whose Minds, being void of Judgment, are pleased with every thing they light on? in their Desires they differ not much from brute Beasts, only the Beasts are contented with that which is enough. What Lyon is there, that hides Gold under Ground? what Bull fights for more than he needs? what Leopard is insatiately greedy? the Wolf, when he hath devoured as much as serves for his necessary Nourishment, gives over. But whole Nights and Days, put together, are not enough for Men to feast and riot. All brute Beasts have their yearly set Times of Coition, and then leave; but Man is continually transported with Lust. How can I, *Hippocrates*, but laugh at him that laments the Loss of his Goods? and especially, if without regard to Dangers, he travels over Precipices, and on the Sea; how can I forbear to laugh exceedingly? Shall I not laugh at him, who drowns a Ship by lading it with rich Merchandize, and then blames the Sea for drowning it? If I seem wrongfully to laugh at these, there is at least in them something that deserves to be lamented. These stand not in need of the Physick or Medicines of your Predecessor *Æsculapius*, who, preserving Men, was himself requited with Thunder. Do you not see, that I also am partly guilty of Madness, who, to enquire into the Causes of Madness, dissect these several living Creatures, whereas indeed I ought to search for it in Man himself? Do you not see, that the whole World is full of Inhumanity, stuffed as it were with infinite Hatred against Man himself? All Man is from his very Birth a Disease: when first born he is useless, and sues for Relief from others; when he grows up, foolish, wanting Instruction; at full Growth, wicked; in his decaying Age, miserable, toying throughout all his Time imprudently; such is he from the Womb. Some being of furious angry Dispositions, are continually engaged in Broils, others in Adulteries and Rapes, others in Drunkenness; others in coveting the Goods of their Neighbours; others in consuming their own; so that if the Walls of all Houses were transparent, we should behold some eating, others vomiting, others wrongfully beaten, others mixing Poisons, others conspiring, others casting Accusants, others rejoicing, others weeping, others

“plotting against their Friends, others raving mad with Ambition. Some Actions there are more remote within the Soul, some young, some old, some denying, poor, rich, starved, luxurious, sordid, imprison’d, murder’d, buried, despising what they enjoy, and aiming at what they have not; impudent, niggardly, insatiate, vain-glorious; some setting their Minds on Horses, others on Men, others on Dogs, others on Stone or Wood; some affect Embassy, others the Command of Armies, others sacred Rites; some wear Crowns, others Armour; some fight at Sea, others at Land, others till the Ground, some plead in the Forum, others act on the Theatre, every one is severally employ’d; some affect Pleasure and Intemperateness, others Rest and Idleness, how then can I but laugh at their Lives? and it is to be feared, that your Art of Physick will nothing please them, for Intemperance makes them froward, and they esteem Wisdom Madness; and I doubt much that many Things in your Art are openly reproached, either through Envy or Ingratitude; for the Sick, as soon as they are cured, ascribe the Cause either to the Gods, or to Chance; and many are of such a Disposition, as to hate those that have obliged them, and can hardly refrain from being angry if they need their Help; many also, being themselves ignorant, prefer Ignorance before Science; Fools give their Suffrages, neither will the Sick commend, nor they who are of the same Art give their Approbation, through Envy. And it cannot be, but that you must have suffered Wrong in this Kind, for I know very well, that you have been often treated unworthily, and reproached by Malice and Envy.”

There is no Knowledge nor Attestation of Truth in saying this; he smiled and seemed to put on a divine Look, casting off that which he had before. “Then I, Excellent *Democritus*, I shall carry back with me to *Gæa* the great Gifts of your Hospitality, full of your wise Instructions. I shall return to proclaim your Praises, for that you have made Enquiry into human Nature, and understood it; I shall go away cured in Mind, it being requisite that I take Care for the Cure of the Bodies of others. To-morrow, and afterwards, we shall meet here again.”

Which said, I arose, and he readily accompanied me. A Man came to him, from whence I know not, to whom he delivered his Books. When I came to the *Abderites*, who all this while stayed for me; “Men of *Abdera*, said I, I return you many Thanks for the Message you sent me, for I have seen *Democritus*, the wisest of Men, who only is able to reduce Men to sound Understanding. This (*Damagetus*) is all, which I had to relate unto

“unto you with Joy, concerning *Democritus*.
“Farewel.”

This Account *Hippocrates* gives of *Democritus*; neither did their Acquaintance and Friendship end here, but continued after the Departure of *Hippocrates* to *Gos*, as appears by the Correspondence of two Letters betwixt them. The first, from *Democritus* to *Hippocrates*, in these Words.

You came to us, *Hippocrates*, as to give *Hellebore* to a mad Man, at the Instigation of foolish People, who think Study Madnes; I was at that Time busied in writing concerning the Fabrick of the World, and the Poles and the Stars of Heaven; as soon as you understood the Nature of these Things, how excellently they are framed, and how far from Madnes, you commended my Employment, and condemned them as stupid and mad. All those things which pass to us through the Air by Images, and are seen in the World, and succeed one another, my Mind, making a Scrutiny into these, hath clearly found out the Nature of them, and brought it to Light; witness the Books that I have written. You ought not therefore, *Hippocrates*, to converse with such Men, whose Minds are wavering and unconstant; for if, as those Men desired, you had given me *Hellebore*, as being mad, you had, of wife, made me mad indeed, the Guilt whereof would have lain upon your Art: for *Hellebore*, administred to found Persons, clouds their Understandings; but to the Mad it doth good. I believe, that if you had found me not writing, but lying down or walking; revolving things in my Mind, sometimes laughing, and not minding such Friends as came to me, but wholly taken up with Contemplation of something, you would have inferred from what you beheld, that I was Mad. A Physician therefore must not judge of the Affections or Passions by the Sight only, but by the Actions themselves, and observe, whether they are in their Beginning, or in the Middle, or in the End, and to consider the difference of Time and Age, before he undertake to cure the Body; for by all these, the Disease will be discovered.

To which *Hippocrates* return'd this Answer.

In the Art of Physick, that which happens successfully, Men for the most part commend not, but commonly ascribe to the Gods; but if any thing happen amiss in it, so as that the Patient dieth, they let the Gods alone, and accuse the Physician. And indeed, I perceive that I gain more Blame than Credit by my Art; for tho' now very old, I have not yet arrived at the height of Medicine, neither, did *Esculapius* himself who invented it, as appears in

that he many times dissent from those who have written hereupon. Your Letter to us condemns the administration of *Hellebore*; I was sent for indeed, *Democritus*, to cure a Mad-man, neither at that time could I guess in what condition you were: But as soon as I had conversed with you, I knew you to be far from Madnes, and worthy of all Respect. I acknowledged you to be the most excellent Interpreter of Nature, and the World; and judged those that sent for me, mad, and to stand in need of Physick. But since this Accident hath begot an Acquaintance betwixt us, you will not do amiss in writing oftner, and in communicating your Works to me. I have sent you a Treatise concerning the use of *Hellebore*. Farewel.

Hence it is, that some held *Hippocrates* to have been the Disciple of *Democritus*, as *Cornelius Celsus* affirms. Indeed, that *Hippocrates* learnt much Philosophy of him, as well by his Discourse, as Communication of his Writings, is manifest from the precedent *Epistles*.

CHAP. VII.

His Death.

HE^a lived to a great Age; *Laertius* saith, above 100 Years; *Phlegon* and *Lucian* more expressly, 104. ^b *Censorinus*, 108. ^c *Hipparchus*, 109. *Laertius* saith, he died of Age; *Phlegon*, for want of Food; the Manner related thus by *Hermippus*. Being very old, and drawing nigh his End, his Sister was extremely troubled, that he should die within the Time of the Festival of *Ceres*; but he bad her be of good Comfort, and bringing him every Day some hot Bread, which holding to his Nose, he prolonged his Life, till the Days of the Festival were past, which were three: And then without any Pain gave up the Ghost, ^d and was buried at the publick Charge.

CHAP. VIII.

His Writings.

Heraclitus. ^e who disposed the Writings of *Plato* according to Tetralogies, digested also those of *Democritus* into Order thus:

ETHICK.

Pythagoras.

Of the Disposition of a wise Man.

Of the things that are in the Inferi; to which perhaps the *Alderites* alluded in their Epistle to *Hippocrates*.

Tritogenia; that all human things consist of Three.

Of Goodness, or Virtue.

X x x 2

Amal-

^a Cic. de senect.

^b De die nat.

^c Laert. 9. 43.

^d Laert. 39.

^e Laert. 9. 45.

Amalthæa's Horn.

Of Tranquility of Mind.

Commentaries, or of Houses, Oeconomical.

Felicity (ἡδυσία) not extant in the Time of Thrasyllus.

PHYSICK.

The great Diacosmus, consisting of 12 Books. Theophrastus ascribes it to Leucippus: but Anisibenes affirms, Democritus recited it in publick as his own; and as His is it cited by Epicurus, in his Epistle to Herodotus. To this Work it was perhaps that Cicero alludes, saying, What shall I say of Democritus? Whom can we compare with him, who durst begin thus, Hæc loquor de Univerſis? He excepts nothing, whereof he professeth not to treat; for what can be beyond all things?

The little Diacosmus.

Of the Planets; In which Treatise he proved that there are more than Seven.

Of Nature, The first.

Of the Nature of Man, or of Flesh; the second. Dedicated to Hippocrates.

Of the Mind. Of the Senses, These two some put together, and entitled, Of the Soul.

Of Sapours.

Of Colours.

Of Different Figures (ἰσμετα.)

Of the reciprocation of Figures. This and the foregoing Treatise perhaps tended to shew the Nature of Qualities, which, according to him, arise from the various Disposition of Atoms, according to their particular Figures.

Κεραυρίαια, or, Of the Mixtures of the things aforesaid.

Of an Image, or, Of Foresight.

Of Pestilences (Gassendus reads μετὰ λογικῶν, Of Logicks) Canon. 1, 2, 3.

Of Effluents.

EXTRAORDINARY.

Celestial Causes.

Aerial Causes.

Plain superficial Causes; perhaps, what things are made of plain Atoms; for that which immediately followeth, is opposite to it.

Causes of Fire, and things in Fire; these consist of round Atoms.

Causes of Sounds.

Causes of Seeds, and Plants and Fruits.

Causes of Animals, three.

Mixed Causes.

Of Stone.

MATHEMATICK.

Ἡεὶ διαγωγὴς γινώσκου, or, Of the Contact of a Circle and a Sphere.

Of Geometry.

Geometrick.

Numbers.

Of surd Lines, and solid. Two.

Ἐκκρινόμενα.

The great Year, or, Astronomy.

Parapegma; Salmastus makes this all one with the other; reading, The great Year, or Parapegma of Astronomy. Parapegma is a Table describing the rising and setting of the Stars, Equinoxes, Solstices, and the like.

The Contention or Examination of the Hour-glass.

Uranography.

Geography.

Polography.

Actinography.

MUSICK.

Of Rhythms and Harmony.

Of Poetry.

Of the Neatness of Verses.

Of sweet-sounding, and harsh-sounding Letters.

Of Homer; or, of right versifying and speaking.

Of Songs.

Of Words; a Dictionary.

MECHANICK, or concerning ARTS.

Prognostick.

Of Diet, or, Diatetick, or a Medicinal Rule.

Causes of things seasonable and unseasonable.

Of Agriculture, or Geometrick.

Of Painting.

Tactick, and of Arms.

To which some, out of his Commentaries, annex these:

Of the sacred Letters in Babylon; to which perhaps Clemens Alexandrinus alludes: Democritus, faith he, writ Babylonian moral Discourses; for he is said to have inserted into his own Writings the Sense of the Pillar of Aecacus.

Of the things that are at Meroc.

A Voyage on the Ocean.

Of History.

A Discourse of Chaldaea.

A Discourse of Phrygia.

Of the Fever and Cough in Sickness.

Cherica, or Problems. Perhaps the same which Pliny terms Chirocineta, ¹ Vitruvius, Chirotonitru; adding, that in it be made use of a Ring, and drew the Figures of the Experiments in Wax and Red-lead. The rest (saith Thrasyllus) that go under his Name, are partly made out of his Writings, partly acknowledged to be the Writings of other Men. Of which kind

¹ Magnenus planæ causæ: See his interpretation, p. 561

² Strom. 2.

³ 24. 17.

⁴ 3. 9.

kind perhaps is his Book of the *Virtue of Herbs*, mentioned by ² *Pliny*, and that of ¹ *Commentarius upon Apollonius, Capridenes, and Dardanus*; from whence he argues *Democritus* to have been skilful in Magick: ³ *Agellius* much blames him for ascribing to *Democritus* such prodigious Fables.

⁴ *Aristoxenus* affirms, that *Plato* had an Intent to have burned all the Writings of *Democritus*, and for that end had made a Collection of a great many of them; but was diverted by *Amyclas* and *Clinias*, Pythagoreans.

CHAP. IX.

Physics.

HE completed the *Eleatic* Sect, and brought it to Perfection, insisting upon and improving the Principles of those that went before, but most particularly those of *Leucippus*. His Assertions these.

SECT. I.

Of the Principles of Things, Atoms, and Vacuum.

THE Principles of all things are Atoms ¹ (solid, ² full) and Vacuum, ³ whereof one is *Ens*, the other *Non-ens*. ⁴ *Ens* is full and solid; *Non-ens* is vacuum and rare. *Ens* participates no more of Being than doth *Non-ens*, nor of Body more than doth Vacuum. These are the Causes and Matter of Beings.

⁵ Bodies must either consist of Atoms, or of nothing; for if every Body be divisible, let us suppose it actually divided, and then there will remain either Atoms or Nothing; but of nothing, nothing is made, and nothing goes away into nothing.

⁶ Neither of these Principles is made of the other; but the common Body itself is the Principle of all Things, differing only in Magnitude and the Figure of its Parts.

They are both infinite: Atoms ⁷ in Number, Vacuum in Magnitude.

⁸ The Properties of Atoms are two, Figure and Magnitude. ⁹ As to Figure, they are infinite; ¹⁰ angular, not-angular, strait, round; ¹¹ some are smooth, others rugged, some pointed, some crooked, and as it were hooked.

As to their Magnitude, ¹² they are by reason of their

Littlest, invisible; ¹³ by reason of their Solidity, indivisible, ¹⁴ impassible, and unalterable.

To these two Properties ascribed to Atoms by *Democritus*, ¹⁵ *Plutarch* saith, that *Epicurus* added a third, Weight; but ¹⁶ *Aristotle* affirms, that *Democritus* held one Atom to be heavier than another, according as it exceeded that other in Bigness.

Of all other Qualities they are destitute, having neither native Whiteness, nor Blackness, nor Sweetness, nor Bitterness, nor Heat, nor Cold, nor any other Quality.

¹⁷ *Cicero* who calls *Democritus* the Inventor and Author of this Assertion of Atoms, elsewhere ascribes it to *Leucippus*; adding, that ¹⁸ *Democritus* herein followed him, but was far more full in the rest. But neither seems it to have been invented by *Leucippus*; for *Posidonius* the Stoick ascribes it to *Moschus* a Phœnician, whom *Strabo* affirms to have lived before the Trojan War. But perhaps the *Eleatic* Philosophers derived it from *Pythagoras*: Of which Opinion ¹⁹ *Aristotle* seems to be; In some manner, saith he, they make all Things that are, Numbers, and to consist of Numbers: for tho' they say it not expressly, yet this is their Meaning. Whence perhaps it is, that ²⁰ *Automedon* gives them the Pythagorick Denomination, *Monads*.

SECT. II.

Of the Motion of Atoms in a Vacuum, whereby all Things are made.

THESE ¹ Atoms, or first Bodies, are continually moved in the infinite ² Vacuum, in which there is neither high, nor low, nor middle, nor last, nor extreme.

This Motion had not any Beginning, but was from all Eternity.

³ This Motion is but of one kind, oblique. Herein *Epicurus* differs from him, asserting a twofold Motion, direct and declining.

The little Bodies being carried in this Region or Space, are entangled with one another, or hit against one another, or rebound, or separate, or associate with one another; by whose Concussions and Complications all Things are made. Thus ⁴ whatsover is, or is made, is made by natural Weights or Motions.

Thus ⁵ all Things are done by a Necessity; the rapid Motion of the Atoms (which he called Necessity) being

¹ 25. 3. ² 30. 1. ³ 10. 12. ⁴ Laert. 9. 40. ⁵ Arist. Phys. 1. 6. ⁶ Cic. Acad. 4. Arist. Met. 1. 4. ⁷ Arist. loc. cit. ⁸ Arist. Met. 12. ⁹ Aristot. ¹⁰ Arist. Phys. 3. 4. ¹¹ Arist. de gen. & cor. 1. 1. & de celo, 3. 4. ¹² Laert. 9. 44. ¹³ Arist. de gen. & cor. 1. 1. ¹⁴ Laert. ibid. ¹⁵ Arist. Phys. 1. 6. ¹⁶ Cic. Nat. Deor. 1. 24. ¹⁷ Philop. in 1. Phys. ¹⁸ Cic. de finib. 1. 6. ¹⁹ Plut. plac. phil. 1. 15. ²⁰ Laert. *Magenus* interprets this of the vulgar Elements, Fire, Water, Earth, p. 41. 42. adding, as an Assertion of *Democritus*, *Atomus mutabilis esse figuram*, and proves it out of *Aristotle* as strangely, p. 42. ¹ Plac. ² De Gen. 1. 8. ³ De fato. ⁴ Acad. 4. 37. ⁵ De Celis, 3. 4. ⁶ Antilog. 1. 15. ⁷ Arist. de Celis 3. 4. ⁸ Cic. de finib. 1. ⁹ *Magenus* will have *Democritus* to understand by this Vacuum, the Air; and endeavours to prove it by Authorities of *Aristotle*, *Galen*, *Virgil*, which intimate the contrary, p. 37. and 42. ¹⁰ *Stob. Phys.* 1. 23. ¹¹ Cic. Acad. quæst. 4. ¹² Laert. 38. ¹³ Cic. de fato, Plut. plac. 1. 55.

being the Cause of the Production of all Things. * This Necessity is Fate, and Justice, and the Providence which made the World; which is no other than the Resistance, Lation, and Percussion of Matter.

SECT. III.

Of the Generation, Corruption, Alteration, and Qualities of Compounds.

THE Elements (as we said) or Principles of all Things are two, Full, and Vacuum. One is Ens, the other non Ens; the full and solid is Ens, the vacuous and rare, non Ens. Ens participates not more of Being than non Ens, nor a Body more than Vacuum. These are the Causes and Matter of Beings.

And, as they who assert a Subject to be one in Substance, various as to its Affections, make rare and dense to be the Principles of those Affections; in like manner they (Leucippus and Democritus) affirm, that the Differences are the Causes of all the rest. These Differences they hold to be three, Figure, Order, and Position; for they say that Ens differs only *ῥομῶ* and *τάξει* and *πόσει*. *ῥομῶ* is Figure, *τάξει* Order, *πόσει* Position: A and N differ in Figure; A N and N A in Order; Z and N in Position.

Thus they suppose Figures of which they make Alteration and Generation: Generation and Corruption, by Congregation and Segregation (of Atoms); Alteration, by Order and Position.

Now forasmuch as they conceived, that what is apparent to Sense is true, seeing that apparent Things are contrary to one another, and infinite in Number, they conceived that there are infinite Figures (of Atoms;) so that by several Transmutations of the Compound, the same thing seemeth contrary to another, and so another thing; and by Imixture of some small thing to be transmuted, and to appear quite different; and being transmuted, one thing to appear to be quite another thing; for a Comedy and Tragedy are made of the same Letters.

Hence it is, that * Plutarch and others affirm, he did reject Qualities, asserting that Colour is *ῥῶμ*, white *ῥῶμ*, sweet *ῥῶμ*, hot *ῥῶμ*, cold *ῥῶμ*, and all other Qualities; *ῥῶμ* is here commonly expounded (after the usual Acceptation of the Word) lege esse, to be by law. * Magnus interprets it, that by a certain Law and Proportion betwixt the Agent and Patient, the same thing is sweet to one which is bitter to another. The learned Gassendus, metaphorically, that as the Justice, Injustice, Decency, Indecency, Laudability

ty, Culpability, &c. of human Actions, depend on the Constitutions of Laws; so the Whiteness, Blackness, Sweetness, Bitterness, Heat, Cold, &c. of natural Things, depend on the various Positions and Ordinations of Atoms. Whence you see (saith he) how in Laertius is to be understood, * Ἀρχαί τῶν πάντων ἀτόμους εἰ κίνησι, τὰ δ' ἀνά πεί. τα νομοῖται, That Atoms and Vacuum are the Principles of all Things, cetera omnia lege sanciri, Thus Gassendus.

But *ῥῶμ*, which (as Suidas saith) is *πολυτροπὸν λέξις*, a Word of various Significations, seems here to be taken in Opposition to *ἰστί*; in which Sense Laertius explicates it by *νομοῖται*, (from whence it seems derived) and *νομοῖται* by *διεξάγειται*, for so perhaps should the Text be distinguished, *τὰ δ' ἀνά πάντα νομοῖται διεξάγειται*, cetera omnia censeri vel existimari; the latter being only a Gloss and Exposition of the former. So that in the Sense of Democritus, (who affected a particular Use of Words, as appears by *ῥομῶ*, *τάξει*, *πόσει*, *συν*, &c.) *ῥῶμ* is no other than *ἰστί*. Thus he seems to have opposed *ἰστί* and *ῥῶμ*, as the Schools *Ens reale* and *rationis*; as if he should say, there is nothing really existent but Atoms and Vacuum, all things else are only *quoad nos*, viz. in Opinion. This may be further confirmed by a noted Place of Galen *, who dilates upon it in this manner.

The first Element of Things is void of Quality, having not in its own Nature Whiteness, nor Blackness, nor Sweetness, nor Bitterness, nor Heat, nor Cold, nor any other Quality. Colour is (*ῥῶμ*) in Opinion, Bitterness is in Opinion, Sweetness is in Opinion; but Atoms and Vacuum are indeed, saith Democritus, conceiving that all sensible Qualities are made by the Concussion of Atoms, according as they are, as to us, who have the Sense of them; but that nothing is by Nature white, or yellow, or red, or bitter, or sweet. By *ῥῶμ* he means as it were *ῥῶμ*, by Opinion, and as to us; not in the Nature of the Things themselves; for that on the other side he calls *ἰστί*, making the Word from *ἰστί*, which signifies true. The whole meaning of the Sentence is this, Men do opinate or think (*ῥῶμ*) that white is some things, and black, and sweet, and bitter; but truly and indeed (*ἰστί*) One, and (*σύν*) Nothing are all. All Atoms are little Bodies, void of Qualities; Vacuum is a Region or Space in which all these Bodies are carried upwards and downwards everlastingly, or are intangled within one another, or hit against one another, or rebound, or separate from, or associate with one another; where by they make all Compounds, and especially our Bodies,

* Stob. Phys. c. 8.

* Plut. plac. t. 26.

* Arist. Metaph. t. 4.

* Ibid.

* Arist. de gen. & cor. t. 2.

* Ibid.

* Adv. Colot. l. 1.

* Democ. reviv. p. 436.

* Animadv. p. 231.

* Lib. t. de Elem. c. 3.

Part XI.
"Bodies, and their Passions and Senses. Hitherto
"Galen.

Democritus alone, contrary to the rest of the Philosophers, asserted, that the Agent and the Patient must be of the same and like; for he conceived it not to be possible, that Things different and divers can suffer from one another: And if any different Things act upon one another, this happens to them not as being different, but as they have something in them that is the same.

Broad Iron swims on the Water, because the Atoms of Heat, which ascend out of the Water uphold the broad Atoms even of things that are weighty; but the narrow slide down, because these which resist them are but few. But then, objects he, This will be done much more in the Air; whereto he answers, that the *Sun* is not carried one way, meaning by *Sun* the Motion of Bodies ascending.

Things become liquid or concrete, by Conversion or Contaction.

SECT. IV.

Of the World.

There are infinite Worlds in the infinite Space, according to all Circumstances; some of which are not only like to one another, but every way so perfectly and absolutely equal, that there is no Difference betwixt them. These all are generated and corrupted.

The World is inanimate, round, compassed about with a Coat, as it were, interwoven with Stars.

The Atoms being (as we said) rapidly carried thro' the Universe; by this means all Things were made, Fire, Water, Air, Earth.

To the Fire, he and Leucippus ascribed a round Figure; but Air, Water, and the rest, he distinguished only by Greatness and Littleness, because their Nature is the Pan-spermia, or universal Diffemination of the Elements or Atoms.

SECT. V.

Of the Heavens.

The Sun and Moon consist of smooth little Bodies which are carried round. Plutarch affirms, he held, with Anaxagoras, that the Sun is a burning Plate or Stone; Laertius adds, he said of An-

naxagoras, that those Opinions which he delivered concerning the Sun and Moon, were not his, but more ancient, and that he had stoln them.

He conceived the Sun to be very big; for, adds Cicero, he was exceeding skilful in Geometry.

The Moon is a fiery Firmament; containing Plains, Mountains, Vallies.

He placed the Stars in this Order; first, the fixed Stars, then the Planets, then the Sun, Lucifer, and the Moon.

All the Stars move from East to West. Those which are nearest to the Earth are less apt to be carried about by the rapid Circumvolution of Heaven. Whence it comes to pass, that the Sun and the inferior Stars, especially the Moon, move much slower than the rest.

He held, as Anaxagoras, that Comets are the Co-appearance of Planets, which coming near one another seem to be all one.

SECT. VI.

Of Air, Earth, Water.

When in a narrow Vacuum there are many little Bodies, there followeth Wind; and contrary the Air is quiet and calm, when in a great Vacuum there are but a few little Bodies. For as in a Market-place or Street, as long as the People are but few, they walk without any Trouble, but when they run into some narrow Place, they jostle and quarrel with one another; so in this Space which encompasseth us, when many Bodies crowd into one Place, they must necessarily jostle one another, and be thrust forward, and driven back, and entangled, and squeezed; of which is made the Wind, when they which contested yield; and, having been long toiled up and down uncertainly, shrink; but when a few Bodies stir up and down in a large Space, they can neither drive, nor be driven impetuously.

The Earth at first wandered up and down, as well by reason of its smallness as lightness; but in time growing thick and heavy, it settled down immovable. Its Breadth is the Cause of its Settledness, for [it is of the Fashion of a Dish, hollow in the midst, and] it divides not but covers the Air which is beneath it; as appears by broad Bodies, which are not easily stirred by the Winds, but stick fast: Thus doth the Earth, by reason of its breadth, to the Air; and the Air, not having a Place whereto it might go sufficient to receive it, resteth underneath, as Water within

Arifot. Gen. 1. 7. Arifot. de Celo. 4. 6. Arifot. de gen. & cor. 1. 2. Plut. plac. 2. 1. Cic. Acad. Quest. 4. 17. Laert. 9. 44. Ibid. Plut. Stob. Phys. 1. 18. Ibid. 1. 71. Laert. Ibid. What Magnetus means, I know not, when he saith, p. 43. aeris ab eo non fit materia tanquam de Elementis propriis dictis; upon which the whole second Chapter of his first Disputation is founded. Arifot. de Celo. 3. 4. Laert. 9. Plut. 2. 20. Cic. de finib. 1. 6. Plut. plac. 2. 25. Ibid. 2. 15. Plut. plac. 3. 16. Laert. 1. 3. v. 623. Arifot. Meteor. 1. 6. Senec. nat. quest. 5. 2. Eut. plac. 4. 13. Arifot. de Celo. 2. 13. Plut. plac. 3. 12.

within Vessels which cover it. That the Air can uphold a great Weight, they demonstrate many ways.

^a Now by reason that this Air is weaker towards the South, the Earth, as it groweth and increaseth bendeth to that Side; for the Northern Parts are intemperate, the Southern temperate, whence they produce more and fairer Fruits.

^a He imputeth the Cause of Earthquakes to Water; for the Earth being full of Water, and receiving to it much Rain-water, this causeth the Earthquake: For there coming more, because it is not able to receive it, forcing its Caverns, it maketh it shake, and being dried and attracted into empty Places from the more full, in its Passage causeth that Motion.

^a The Sea continually decreaseth, and at last will dry up.

^a The overflowing of *Nilus* is caused by the melting and diffusion of the Snow in the Northern Parts under the Summer Tropic; from the Vapours, Clouds are condensed, which being driven towards the South, and to *Egypt*, by the Etesian Winds, they are dissolved into great and vehement Showers, wherewith are filled as well the Lakes, as the River *Nilus*.

SECT. VII.

Of the Generation of living Creatures.

MEN^a were first generated of Water and Mud; from which Opinion *Epicurus* little differs.

^a The Distinction of Sexes, Male and Female, is made in the Womb, not by reason of heat or cold, but according to that Party of the two, whose Seed proceeding from the Part which distinguisheth Male and Female, is predominant; or of that Party whose Seed first takes up the Place.

^a The Infant in the Womb is nourished at the Mouth, wherefore as soon as it is born, it layeth the Mouth to the Dug.

SECT. VIII.

Of the Soul.

DEMOCRITUS^a held, that the Soul is a kind of Fire and Heat; for there being infinite Figures of Atoms, he saith, the round make Fire, and the Soul, because that Figure is most capable to permeate through the Universe; and to move the rest, the Soul itself being moved also. Thus he and *Leucippus*

held the Soul to be that which giveth Motion to living Creatures. Hence it comes to pass, that Respiration is the Bound of Life, for when that which encompasses the Bodies, compresseth them, and squeezeth out those Figures which give motion to living Creatures, so far as much as they never rest, there is a Relief by the coming in of others of the same Kind through Respiration; for this hinders those which are in the Animals from being squeezed out, they driving forward together that which compresseth and fastneth. All Animals [^a breathe, and they] live as long as they can do thus.

^a The Soul is corruptible, and perisheth with the Body.

^a The Soul hath two Parts; the rational, seated in the Breast; the irrational, diffused through the whole Body; but ^a the Soul and Mind are all one.

^a There are more than five Senses of irrational Animals, God and wise Men.

^a Sensation and Intellection are made by the Insinuation of Images from without, which flow from solid Bodies and certain Figures. ^a So the Image in a Looking-glass is made also.

He conceived, as *Aristotle* saith, that all Sensibles are Tangibles, that all Sensation is caused by a Touch or Stroke upon the Organ; and further affirmed, that 'Whiteness is Smoothness, [the Light being reflected from a smooth Superficies upon the Eye, exhibits a white Colour.] ^a Blackness is Roughness; [the same Light reflected from a rough Superficies, exhibits Blackness,] in like manner ^a He referred Sours to Figures. ^a The round Atoms, and such as are of a Bulk suitable [to the Contexture of the Organ,] make a sweet Sapor; the great, a sour; the multangular and nothing round, a harsh; the acute, conical, crooked, not slender nor round, a sharp; the round, slender, angular, crooked, an acriminous; the angular distorted equicrural, a salt; the round, light, distorted, small, a bitter; the slender, round, small, a fat or luscious.

^a The Mind is the same with the Soul, consisting of smooth little Bodies. ^a The Hegemonick is seated in the whole Head; ^a Cogitation is made by Incurrence of Images; ^a so also are Dreams.

SECT. IX.

Of the Gods.

DEMOCRITUS (saith ^a Cicero,) in my Opinion, wavers, and seems uncertain, concerning the Nature of the Gods; for sometimes he conceives, that there are Images indued with Divinity in the Universe;

^a Plut. plac. 3. 12. ^a Plut. plac. 3. 15. ^a Arist. Meteor. 2. 7: nat. 4. ^a Arist. de gen. animal. 5. 1. ^a Perhaps reading *μυρμυρ*.

reading *αμυρμυρ* *ἢ ἄλλως* *μυρμυρ* *ἢ αμυρμυρ*. See *Arist. de gen. & cor.* 11. ^a Plut. plac. 4. 7. ^a Plut. plac. 4. 4. ^a Arist. de an. 1. 2. ^a Plut. plac. 4. 14. ^a Arist. de dent. & sens. cap. 4. ^a Arist. loc. cit.

^a Plut. plac. 4. 5. ^a Cic. de finib. 1. Plut. plac. 4. 8. ^a Plut. plac. 5. 2. ^a Arist. loc. cit. ^a Theophrast. de sensib. ^a De nat. deor. 1. 43.

^a Plut. plac. 3. 11. ^a Confer. de die ^a Arist. de anima. 1. 2. ^a Plut. plac. 5. 16. ^a Arist. de resp. cap. 2. ^a Plut. plac. 4. 10. ^a Plut. plac. 4. 8. ^a Plut. plac. 4. 14. ^a Theophrast. de sensib. ^a Plut. plac. 4. 14. ^a De nat. deor. 1. 43.

verse ; sometimes he calleth the Principles and Minds in the same Universe, God ; sometimes animate Images, which use either to profit or to harm us ; sometimes certain vast Images, to great ; that they extrinsically embrace the whole World.

Sextus Empiricus delivers his Opinion thus : There are certain Images which come to Men, some of which do good, others hurt ; whence he wisteth, that he might light upon good Images ; these are large and extraordinary vast, not easily perishable, nor absolutely unperishable. They foretel Events to Men by Discourse and Speech, the Ancients having received an Impression of these in their Fantasies, from thence imagined that there is a God ; whereas besides these there is no God, or a Nature that is not subject to Dissolution.

He approved the Presentation of future Things, that is, Divination ; and conceived, that the Ancients did wisely institute, that the Entrails of sacrificed Victims should be looked into ; from the Conspicition and Colour whereof may be perceived signs of Health or Pestilence ; sometimes also what Dearth or Plenty shall follow.

CHAP. X.

Ethick.

HE asserted, the chief End or Good to be *euodia* : not placing it in Pleasure, as some have misunderstood him ; but in a serene, secure State of Mind, not distracted with any Fear, or Superstition, or any other Passion.

Of his moral Sentences these have been preserved by *Stobaeus* and others.

*'Tis easy Wickedness to circumvent :
For whilst on Gain alone it is intent,
It blindly strays, and any way is bent.*

It is easy to praise what we ought not, and to blame ; but both are Signs of a depraved Disposition.

Wisdom not admiring any thing, merits all things, being most honourable.

The Bounds of profitable and unprofitable, are pleasant and unpleasant.

It is the Work of Prudence to prevent an Injury ; of Indolence, when done, not to revenge it.

There ariseth a great Delight from beholding good Actions.

From good things arise ill to Men, if they know not how to manage or bear the Good.

To yield to the Law, the Magistrate, and a wife Person, is decent.

Temperance augments Things that are pleasant, and maketh the Pleasure itself greater.

Sleeps in the Day signifieth either Distemper of the Body, or Grief of the Mind, or Sloth, or Dullness.

Coition is a short Apoplexy ; One Man is struck out of another.

Not he only is valiant who vanquisheth his Enemy, but he also who subdueth Pleasure ; yet some there are, who command Cities, and are Slaves to Women.

It is good not only to do no harm, but not so much as to will it.

Where ill Actions acquire Wealth, the Infamy is the greater.

Hope of ill Gain is the beginning of Loss.

We ought to speak Truth where it is best.

It is better to blame our own Faults, than those of others.

Freedom of Speech is proper to Generosity, but the difference of Occasions render it dangerous.

To praise good Things is good, but to praise the Ill is proper to a counterfeit deceitful Soul.

He is well disposed who grieves not for what he hath not, and rejoiceth for what he hath.

Of pleasant Things, those which we have most seldom, delight most.

If a Man exceeds Moderation, the sweetest Things prove the most bitter.

He is valiant who vanquisheth, not Enemies only, but Pleasures.

They who indulge to the Pleasures of the Belly, consuming the Time in Eating, Drinking, or Wantonness ; in all these there are short Pleasures, which last as long as they are Eating and Drinking, but many Griefs : For they are in a continual Desire of these Things, and when they have obtain'd them, the Pleasure passeth away, and there is nothing in them but a momentary Titillation ; the Pleasure is short, and they soon need the same again.

To resist Anger is difficult, but to vanquish it is proper to an understanding Person.

He who contends with his Superior, ends in Infamy.

Wicked Men, after they have escaped the Danger, keep not the Oaths which they had made in their Extremity.

More are made good by Exercitation, than by Nature.

Adv. Mathem. Cic. de divin. 1. 3. Cic. de divin. Ibid. Laert. 9. 45. Ser. 2. Ibid. Ser. 3.
Ibid. Ibid. Ser. 4. Ibid. Ser. 5. Ibid. Ser. 6. Ibid. Ser. 7. Ser. 9. Ser. 10.
Ser. 12. Ser. 13. Ser. 17. Ibid. Ser. 14. Ser. 17. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ser. 20.
Ser. 22. Ser. 23. Ser. 29.

1 All Labours are sweeter than Rest, when Men obtain that for which they labour; but if a Man be frustrate of his Designs, there is one Remedy, if all Things are alike troublesome and difficult.

2 Neither say nor do ill, though alone; learn to stand more in awe of thyself than of others.

3 It is a defrauding of others, to desire to speak all, and to hear nothing.

4 A Man must either be good, or seem such.

5 They whose Manners are orderly, their Life is orderly.

6 A good Man cares not for the Reproofs of ill Men.

7 The Laws would not have prohibited every Man from living according to his own Will, if one were not injurious to another; for Envy causeth the Beginning of Sedition.

8 To live in foreign Countries teacheth Frugality; Maza, and a grassy Bed are sweet Cures of Hunger and Labour.

9 Every Country is pensive to a wife Man; for the whole World is the Country of a wife Soul.

10 The Law requires, that the Life of Man should do good to others; this may be done if they will suffer, for it declares its own Virtue to the Obedient.

11 Civil War hurts both Parties; the Harm is equal to the Victor, and to the Vanquished.

12 By Concord, besides other great Things, War may be undertaken by Cities; without it, not.

13 It is better for the Unwise to be governed, than to govern.

14 It is Justicē to do those things which ought to be done; Injustice not to do them, but to decline them.

15 As concerning the killing and not killing of Animals, the Business stands thus: Those who do, or would do Injury, he who killeth is blameless; nay, such ought rather to be killed, than not.

16 We ought to kill all that do Injury, and Injustices; and he who kills them, ought to have, throughout the whole World, Esteem and Privilege of his Desire, and Justice, and Courage, and Possession.

17 As it is written concerning Beasts and Serpents, that are in Enmity with us, so also in my Opinion may we do with Men. According to the Laws of our Country, an Enemy may be kill'd in any Part of the World, where no Law forbiddeth it; but Law forbiddeth sometimes, and they have sacred Rites, Covenants, and Oaths.

18 Any Man that either kills with his own Hand, or causeth to be killed by command or vote, a Thief, is to be esteemed innocent.

19 It is a grievous Thing to be ruled by a worse Person.

20 They who suffer Injuries are to be defended to the utmost, and not to be despised; for this is just and good, the other unjust and ill.

21 They who commit any thing deserving Banishment, or Bonds, or any other Punishment, ought not to be acquitted, but condemned; if any Man should acquit them either for Gain or Favour, he doth unjustly.

22 He hath the greatest part of Justice and Virtue, who honours those that are worthy.

23 Stand not more in awe of other Men than of thyself; nor commit more Offences, though no Man were to know it, than if all Men: Imprint this Rule in thy Mind; and do no ill.

24 Men are more mindful of Wrongs than of Benefits, and it is but just it should be so: as he who restores a *Depositum*, deserves no Commendation; but he who detains it, Blame and Punishment. The same Case it is in a Ruler, who is chosen not to do ill, but good.

25 To be naturally fitted for Command, is proper to the most excellent Persons.

26 Boldness is the Beginning of an Action, the End is guided by Fortune.

27 Make use of Servants, as of the Parts of your own Body; appoint to each a several Office.

28 She that is below'd, easily forgiveth the Offence of her Lover.

29 A Woman is sharper-witted for Mischief than a Man.

30 To speak little, becomes a Woman; plain Attire adorns her.

31 To obey a Woman is the greatest Ignominy to a Man.

32 I approve not the having of Children; for I see the Troubles of them are many and great; the Comforts and Pleasures few and small.

33 A rich Man, in my Opinion, shall do well to adopt the Son of some Friend; for, by this means, he may have such a one as he hath a mind to; for he may chuse where he pleaseth, and take such a one as may best agree with him. There is a great Difference betwixt these two; he who adopts a Son, hath the Liberty to make choice out of many that are good, and will please him; he that begets one, runs the hazard whether he will prove such, or no.

34 The begetting of Children seemeth to come from a most ancient Institution, and Instinct of Nature; as is manifest even from brute Beasts, who beget young ones, though without hopes of receiving any Advantage by them: As soon as they are brought forth, they feed and bring them up, and are solicitous for them.

1 Ser. 29. 2 Ser. 31. 3 Ser. 36. 4 Ser. 37. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Ser. 38. 9 Ibid. 10 Ser. 41. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid. 93 Ibid. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid.

them even in the least things; and if they come to any hurt, they grieve at it. Such is the Disposition of all Animals; how much more of Man, who hopes for a Benefit from his Offspring.

¹ The Excellency of Sheep consisteth in being fat; of Men, in being virtuous.

² As of Wounds, the worst is that which gangrenes; so, of the Diseases of the Mind, is insatiable Avarice.

³ A prudent Use of Money conduceth to the Practice of Liberality and Relief of others: He that useth Money foolishly, makes it the Prey of all Men.

⁴ To get Money, is not ill; but to get it unjustly, is the worst of Ills.

⁵ Poverty and Riches are the Names of Want and Sufficiency: He who wants, ought not to be called Rich; nor he who wants not, Poor.

⁶ If you desire many things, many things will seem but a few.

⁷ To desire little, makes Poverty equal with Riches.

⁸ Good things are hardly obtained by those that seek after them; the Ill come without seeking.

⁹ We must consider that the Life of Man is brittle and momentary, involved in many Troubles.

¹⁰ He is happy who is cheerful, though possessing little; he unhappy who is troubled, amidst much Wealth.

¹¹ He that will lead a secure quiet Life, must not engage himself in many things, neither publick nor private; nor attempt any thing above his own Ability and Nature: but have such Regard to himself, that he decline any Exuberance of Fortune that is offer'd him, assuming no more than he is well able to bear; for the Convenience of what we enjoy is more excellent than the Largeness of it.

¹² A publick Calamity is greater than a private, for it affords no Hope of Relief.

¹³ The Hopes of wise Men may come to pass, but those of Fools are impossible.

¹⁴ The Hopes of Fools are beyond Reason.

¹⁵ They who rejoice in the Misfortunes of their Neighbours, know not that Fortune is common to all, and that they have not a Propriety in Joy.

¹⁶ Strength and Beauty are the Goods of the Body: Temperance and Prudence the Crown of old Age.

¹⁷ It is certain, that the old Man was once young;

but whether the young Man shall ever come to be old, is uncertain. A good thing that is compleat, is better than that which is to come, it being uncertain.

¹⁸ Old Age is an universal Imperfection; it hath all things, and yet wants all things.

¹⁹ Some Men, not understanding the Nature of moral Dissolution, and being conscious of their own ill Actions in Life, are, during the whole Course of their Lives, miserably distracted with Fears, fancying and feigning to themselves many things that are false, as if they were to happen after Death.

²⁰ His also was this Saying, *Speech is the Shadow of Action.*

²¹ He held, that from publick Offices, and the Favour of great Persons, accrue many Ornaments which grace and set off this Life.

²² He said, that Nature thrust down Truth, and hid her quize in the bottom.

²³ He said, that none can be a great Poet without Madness.

To his moral Sentences may be added, what is related of him by ¹ Julian the Emperor, That not being able by Discourse to comfort *Darius*, who was extremely afflicted at the Death of his beautiful Wife, he promised him to restore her to Life, if he would supply him with such things as were requisite for Performance thereof. *Darius* bad him not spare any thing, which he thought might help him to bring it to pass. Soon after he came to *Darius*, and told him, that he had furnished himself with all things except only one, which he could not get; but that he, who was King of all *Asia*, might haply procure it with little Difficulty. *Darius* demanding what it was, that no Man could get but the King himself? *Democritus* told him, that if he could write on her Tomb the Names of three Persons that have never grieved, she would return to Life. *Darius* perplexed hereat, there being no Man to whom some Occasion of Grief hath not happen'd; *Democritus*, after his usual manner, laugh'd, saying, Can you then, the most unreasonable of all Men, weep with such Confidence, as if you were the only Person that ever suffer'd Affliction, and yet are not able to find out, through all the Ages of Mankind, one Person that hath not received some particular Cross?

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¹ Ser. 84. ² Ibid. 90. ³ Ibid. 92. ⁴ Ibid. ⁵ Ibid. 95. ⁶ Ibid. ⁷ Ibid. 96. ⁸ Ibid. ⁹ Ibid. 101. ¹⁰ Ibid. ¹¹ Ibid. 102. ¹² Ibid. 109. ¹³ Ibid. ¹⁴ Ibid. 111. ¹⁵ Ibid. 112. ¹⁶ Ibid. ¹⁷ Ibid. 115. ¹⁸ Ibid. 119. ¹⁹ Ibid. ²⁰ Ibid. ²¹ Ibid. ²² Ibid. ²³ Ibid. ²⁴ Ibid. ²⁵ Ibid. ²⁶ Ibid. ²⁷ Ibid. ²⁸ Ibid. ²⁹ Ibid. ³⁰ Ibid. ³¹ Ibid. ³² Ibid. ³³ Ibid. ³⁴ Ibid. ³⁵ Ibid. ³⁶ Ibid. ³⁷ Ibid. ³⁸ Ibid. ³⁹ Ibid. ⁴⁰ Ibid. ⁴¹ Ibid. ⁴² Ibid. ⁴³ Ibid. ⁴⁴ Ibid. ⁴⁵ Ibid. ⁴⁶ Ibid. ⁴⁷ Ibid. ⁴⁸ Ibid. ⁴⁹ Ibid. ⁵⁰ Ibid. ⁵¹ Ibid. ⁵² Ibid. ⁵³ Ibid. ⁵⁴ Ibid. ⁵⁵ Ibid. ⁵⁶ Ibid. ⁵⁷ Ibid. ⁵⁸ Ibid. ⁵⁹ Ibid. ⁶⁰ Ibid. ⁶¹ Ibid. ⁶² Ibid. ⁶³ Ibid. ⁶⁴ Ibid. ⁶⁵ Ibid. ⁶⁶ Ibid. ⁶⁷ Ibid. ⁶⁸ Ibid. ⁶⁹ Ibid. ⁷⁰ Ibid. ⁷¹ Ibid. ⁷² Ibid. ⁷³ Ibid. ⁷⁴ Ibid. ⁷⁵ Ibid. ⁷⁶ Ibid. ⁷⁷ Ibid. ⁷⁸ Ibid. ⁷⁹ Ibid. ⁸⁰ Ibid. ⁸¹ Ibid. ⁸² Ibid. ⁸³ Ibid. ⁸⁴ Ibid. ⁸⁵ Ibid. ⁸⁶ Ibid. ⁸⁷ Ibid. ⁸⁸ Ibid. ⁸⁹ Ibid. ⁹⁰ Ibid. ⁹¹ Ibid. ⁹² Ibid. ⁹³ Ibid. ⁹⁴ Ibid. ⁹⁵ Ibid. ⁹⁶ Ibid. ⁹⁷ Ibid. ⁹⁸ Ibid. ⁹⁹ Ibid. ¹⁰⁰ Ibid. ¹⁰¹ Ibid. ¹⁰² Ibid. ¹⁰³ Ibid. ¹⁰⁴ Ibid. ¹⁰⁵ Ibid. ¹⁰⁶ 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PROTAGORAS.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Father, and the Occasion upon which he studied Philosophy.

Protagoras was an Abderite, Son of Artemon; or, as Apollodorus and Dinon, of Mæandrius; but Eupolis saith, he was a Teian.

He was first a Porter, as Epicurus relates, and by that Occasion came into Favour with Democritus: Being young, saith Agellius, he was constrained, for his Sufferance, to take upon him the Office of a Porter; and, from some Places adjoining, carry'd Burthens of Wood to Abdera, of which City he was. Democritus, who was also of the same City, a Person eminent for his Virtue and Philosophy, going abroad into the Fields, saw him coming nimbly along loaden with one of his usual Burthens; and when he came near him, observing that the Wood was neatly placed, and handsomely bound up, spoke to him to rest himself a little; which he did, and Democritus, in the mean time, took great notice of the Bundle, that it was tied up as it were geometrically. He asked him, who put his Wood in that Order? and he answering, that it was he himself had done it, Democritus desir'd him to untie it, and put it into the same Order again; which he did. Democritus admiring the Ingenuity of a Person wholly void of Learning; Young Man, saith he, seeing you have the Wit to know how to do well, there are better and greater things which you may do with me; and immediately carrying him home, kept and maintained him, and made him that which afterwards he was.

CHAP. II.

His Opinions, and Writings.

HE first said, That every thing hath two Reasons or Arguments, one contrary to the other; which way of arguing he first used.

He began one of his Books thus; *Man is μέτρον ἕκαστον*, the Measure of all things: of Beings as they are; or of Beings, as they are not. By μέτρον he means the Criterium, by ἕκαστον, ἑκάστης, of things; which is as much as to say, Man is the Criterium of all things; of Beings as they are, of not Beings as they are not. Hereupon he asserts the Phenomena to be particular to every one.

He saith, that Matter is fluid, and being in perpetual Fluxion, Appositions are made instead of Subtractions; and the Senses are transmutated and chan-

ged, according to the several Ages and Constitutions of the Body.

He saith also, the Reason (or Powers) of all Phenomena are subjected in Matter; so that Matter in itself is all things which it appears unto all. But Men at different times perceive things different, by reason of their different Habits. He whose Constitution is sound, of the things which are in Matter, perceiveth those which are capable of appearing to such Persons; they who are otherwise disposed, perceive the things which are capable of appearing to Persons of a contrary Constitution. The same reason there is in the Difference of Ages, in sleeping and waking, and in all kinds of Habits. Man therefore is the Criterium of things that are; for all things which appear to Men, are; those which appear not to any Man, are not.

He held, that the Soul is nothing more than the Senses, as Plato in his *Thætetus* affirms; and that all things are true.

Another of his Books he began thus; *Of the Gods I know nothing, neither that they are, nor that they are not; for there are many things which hinder us from this Knowledge, the Blindness and Shortness of human Life.* For the Beginning of this Book he was banish'd by the Athenians, and his Books burnt in the open Market-place, after that they had been diligently exacted of all that had any of them, by the publick Cryer.

He was the first that took a hundred Minæ for a Gratuity. He, and Prodicus the Teian, got Money by reciting Oration in publick.

He first defined the Parts of Time, and explained the Power of Opportunity, and instituted Disputations by way of Contest; and proposed Sophisms to the Disputants, slipping besides the Sense and playing upon the Word, introducing the light, superficial, cristick way; whence Timon saith of him,

Protagoras, well in Contention read.

He first abrogated the Socratick way of Disputation, and first examined the Argument of *Antisthenes*, whereby he endeavours to demonstrate, that it could not be contradicted, as Plato saith in his *Euthydemus*; and first produced Epicheirems against Positions.

He first divided an Oration into four Parts, Request, Interrogation, Answer, Command: Some say

^b Liert 9. 50.

^c Ibid. 10. 52.

say into seven; Narration, Interrogation, Answer, Command, Enuntiation, Request, Appellation; which Parts he called the Foundations of Orations. But, as *Alcidamas*, four; Affirmation, Negation, Interrogation, Appellation.

He first recited his Discourse concerning the Gods (the Beginning whereof we formerly mentioned) at *Athens*, in the House of *Euripides*, or, as some say, of *Megacles*: Others say, in the *Lyceum*, and that *Archagoras*, his Disciple, Son of *Theodorus*, spoke it for him. He was accused by *Pythodorus*, Son of *Polyzelus*, one of the 400 Senators; but *Aristotle* saith, that *Evasthus* accused him.

His Writings which are now extant, saith *Laertius*, are these;

The Eriick Art.
Of Wrestling.
Of Mathematicks.
Of Politics.
Of Ambition.
Of Virtues.
Of Settlement of Government.
Of the things in the Inferi.

■ *Laert.* 9. 55.

Of the things that are done amiss by Men.
Preceptory.
Judgment upon Reward.
Antilogicks 2.

These were his Books. *Plato* wrote a Dialogue, and intitled by his Name.

CHAP. III.

His Death.

■ *Philochorus* relates, that as he was sailing to *Sicily*, the Ship wherein he went was cast away; and this he saith, is confirmed by *Euripides* in his *Ixion*. Others relate, that he died by the way, having attained to ninety Years; *Apollodorus* saith, to 70. and that he had been a Sophist forty Years; and that he flourished about the 74th Olympiad. *Laertius* hath this Epigram upon him:

And thee, Protagoras, flying, they say,
From Athens, Death did seize on by the way.
Thou might'st escape from Pallas and her Town,
But Pluto would not lose what was his own.

ANAXARCHUS.

A *Naxarchus* was an *Aberite*; he heard *Diogenes* of *Smyrna*; or, as others, *Metrodorus* of *Chios*, who said he did not know so much as this, that he knew nothing. *Metrodorus*, as some say, heard *Nessus* a *Chian*; as others, *Democtritus*. *Anaxarchus* lived with *Alexander*, and flourished about the 110th Olympiad, and was a great Enemy to *Nicomere* King of *Cyprus*; inasmuch that *Alexander* at a Feast demanding what he thought of the Entertainment? he answered, All things, great King, are very magnificent; only there is wanting the Head of some Satrapa, reflecting upon *Nicomere*. After the King's Death, *Nicomere* bearing this Injury in mind, laid hold of *Anaxarchus*, (who against his Will was cast upon the Shore of *Cyprus*) and caused him to be put into a Mortar, and pounded with Iron Pestles: Whilst he, despising the Pain, often repeated this celebrated Speech, *Pound the Cause of Anaxarchus, Anaxarchus himself you hurt not*. Hereupon the Tyrant commanding them to cut out his Tongue, he bit it off, and spit it in his Face.

He, from his Apathy and the Tranquillity of his Life, had the Attribute of *Fortunate* bestowed on

him. He likewise had an excellent Faculty in reducing others to Moderation; as he reformed *Alexander*, who would conceit himself a God, by pointing to his Finger when it bled, and saying, This is Blood, and not

— *The Juice that from immortal Gods doth flow.*

Yet *Plutarch* relates, that *Alexander* himself said this to his Friends.

Another time, *Anaxarchus* drinking to him, pointed to the Cup, saying,

A mortal Hand one of the Gods shall wound.

When *Alexander* came near *Babylon*, the *Chaldeans* dissuaded him from entering the City, affirming, that if he did, it would be fatal to him; whereupon he passed by, and went to *Berisia*, a City on the other side of *Euphrates*. But *Anaxarchus*, and other *Greeks*, persuaded him by philosophical Reasons to contemn the Predictions of the Magi as false and uncertain; whose Advice he following, brought back his Army to *Babylon*, where he died.

■ *Laert.* 9. 58.

T H E

THE
HISTORY
OF
PHILOSOPHY.

THE TWELFTH PART,
Containing the *SCEPTICK* Sect.

P Y R R H O.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parentage, Time, Masters.

OUT of *Elia* there sprung another Sect, no less Eminent than the former; its Author was ^a *Pyrro*, an *Elia*n. His Father, as *Diocles* affirms, was named *Plistarchus*, of obscure and mean Quality; for such ^b *Antigonus* relates *Pyrro* himself at first to have been; his Sister *Philista*, a Midwife.

Suidas saith, he was in the Time of *Philip* King of *Macedon*, about the 101st Olympiad: But this seems rather to have reference to the Time of his Birth, than to that wherein he flourished; for *Anaxarchus* (his Master) was contemporary with *Alexander* the Son of *Philip*, and is, by *Laertius*, said to have flourished in the 110th Olympiad; for which reason perhaps it is, that *Suidas* adds, *And thence-forward*.

^c He was first (as *Apollodorus* relates) ^d a Painter; *Aristocles* saith, an ill one: But ^e *Antigonus* affirms, That in the *Gymnasium* at *Elis* was preferred a very good Piece of his doing, representing Torch-bearers.

^f Afterwards (saith *Apollodorus*) he applied himself to Philosophy. *Aristocles* saith, He lighted upon some Writings of *Democritus*. *Alexander* in his Successions, That he heard *Dryfo*, Son of *Stilpo*, whom *Suidas* terms *Bryfo*; adding, He was Disciple to *Glinomachus*, a Dialectick, contemporary with *Stilpo*.

^g Next he addicted himself to *Alexander*, Disciple of *Marodorus* the *Chian*, whose Master was *Metrodorus* the *Abderite*.

^h Afterwards he heard *Anaxarchus*, [the *Abderite*] whom he followed every-where, inasmuch as he conversed with the *Gymnosophists* in *India*, and with the *Magi*.

CHAP. II.

His Institution of a Sect.

HE seemeth (saith ⁱ *Afcanius* the *Abderite*) to have found out a noble way of philosophizing, introducing Incomprehension, and the way

“ of

^a Laert. 9. 62.
^b Laert. ibid.

^c Ibid. 9. 62.
^d Laert. 9. 61.

^e Ibid. 9. 58.

^f Ibid. 9. 61.

^g Ibid. 9. 62.

^h Suid.

" of Suspension. For he asserted nothing, neither
 " honest nor dishonest, just nor unjust; and so of
 " every thing. That there is nothing indeed such,
 " but that Men do all things by Law and Custom;
 " that in every thing, *this* is not rather than *that*.

¹ This was called the *Zetetic* Philosophy, from
 its continual Enquiry after Truth; *Septick*, from
 its continual Inspection, and never finding; *Ephetic*,
 from the Affection which follows upon this In-
 quision, Suspension; *Apoietick*, from doubting of
 all dogmatical Opinions; ² *Pyrrhonian*, from *Pyrrho*.
 But *Theodosius*, in his *Septick* Summary, saith,
 That the *Septick* Philosophy ought not to be called
Pyrrhonian: For if the Motion of another's Intellect
 be incomprehensible to us, we cannot know how
Pyrrho was affected; and, not knowing it, we can-
 not be called *Pyrrhoniens*. Besides, neither was
Pyrrho the first that found out *Septicism*, To assert no
Doctrine. It should rather be called, *Like the Course*
of Pyrrho. Thus *Theodosius*.

On the other side, *Numenius*, (and he only, as
Laertius observes) affirmed, That *Pyrrho* dogmatiz-
 eth. But of this more hereafter.

C H A P. III.

His Manner of Life.

CONformable ¹ hereunto was his Manner of Life;
 he shunned nothing, nor took any heed, but
 went straight on upon every thing; Chariots, if it so
 happened, Precipices, Dogs, and the like; not turning
 out of the way, nor having any regard to Sense, be-
 ing saved, as *Antigonus* saith, by his Friends that
 followed him. But *Enesidemus* affirms, That
 though he discoursed philosophically upon Suspension,
 yet all his Actions were not inconsiderate.

² He used to walk forth solitary, seldom shew-
 ing himself to those of his Family. This he did up-
 on hearing a certain *Indian* reproach *Anaxarchus* for
 teaching, That no Man but himself was good, and
 yet in the mean time he frequented the Courts of
 Princes.

³ He was always in the same State, inasmuch
 that if any Man in the midst of his Discourse went
 away, he nevertheless continu'd his Discourse till he
 had ended it. Though in his Youth he was sickle,
 he took many Journeys, never telling any whither
 he went, and chose such Company as he pleased.

⁴ *Anaxarchus*, falling into a Ditch, he went on,
 not offering to help him; which when some blamed,
Anaxarchus himself commended his Indifference and
 want of Compunction.

⁵ Being found talking to himself, and demanded,
 Why he did so? *I study*, saith he, *how to be good*.

⁶ In Arguments he was slighted by none, foras-
 much as he had an extraordinary way of speaking to
 the Question; with which he took *Nausiphanes*, be-
 ing a very young Man. He said, that his Affection
 ought to be *Pyrrhonian*, his Words his own. *Epi-
 curus*, often admiring the Conversation of *Pyrrho*,
 continually question'd him concerning himself. So-
 much was he honour'd by his Country, as that they
 made him chief Priest, and, for his sake, made a
 Decree of Immunity for all Philosophers. He had
 many that imitated his Unconcernedness; whence
Timon saith of him in his *Pytho*, and *Silli*;

*How learn'd'st thou (aged Pyrrho) to untye
 The slavish Bands of empty Sophistry?
 The Air of Greece thou mind'st not, nor to know
 Whence things are made, and into what they go.*

And again in *Indalmis*;

*Pyrrho, I long to be inform'd by Thee,
 How Thou, a Man, liv'd'st like a Deity?*

Diocles (cited by *Laertius*) affirms the *Athenians*
 made him free of their City, for killing *Cotis* the
Thracian: But this, as the learned *Causaban* hath
 observed, seems to be a Mistake, occasion'd by the
 Nearness of the Names; for it was *Pytho*, Disciple
 to *Plato*, who slew *Cotis*, as is manifest from
Plutarch.

⁷ *Eratosthenes* relates, That he lived piously with
 his Sister, and often carried to Market Birds; or,
 as it happened, Pigs to sell, and managed his Houf-
 hold Affairs with the like Indifference, inasmuch as
 he is reported to have washed a Sow.

⁸ But as once *Philista*, his Sister, was sacrificing,
 (who being disappointed by a Friend, who promised
 to give her things for the Sacrifice, *Pyrrho* himself
 was constrain'd to buy them) he was very angry,
 and fell out with her for it; whereupon one of his
 Friends saying, " That his Actions were not an-
 " swerable to his Discourse, nor such as his Profess-
 " on of Apathy, or Indifference, required; he an-
 " swer'd, *Indifference is not to be shewn towards Wo-*
 " *men*.

⁹ On a time, a Dog flying upon him, he was
 troubled at it, [and got to a Tree] for which they who
 were by, deriding him, and cavilling at it, he said,
 " It is hard to put off Man quite, yet we must first
 " strive as far as possible, with Action against Things,
 " and if not so with Reason.

¹⁰ They say, that upon occasion of some Wound,
 he underwent corrosive Medicines, Incision and
 Cauterising. His Greatness of Courage is attested
 by *Timon*.

Philo

¹ Laert. 9. 70.
² Ibid.

³ Reading *supra*. See *Sext. Empir. hypoc. 1. 3.*
⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Aristot. apud. Euseb. Prep. 14. 13.

⁶ Laert. 9. 62.

⁷ Ibid. 2. 65.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Laert. 9. 66.

¹¹ Arist. and Laert.

¹² Laert. 9. 67.

Philo the Athenian, who was his Disciple, saith, He mentioned *Democritus* with greatest Respect, and next him *Homer* with much Admiration, continually saying,

Just like the Race of Leaves is that of Men; and for that he compared Men to Flies and Birds. He used also to repeat these Verses,

*But die, my Friend, why should'st thou thus lament?
Patroclus dy'd too, who Thee far out-went.*

And all things whatsoever that declar'd the Inconstancy, Vanity, and Childishness of Mankind.

Posidonius relates of him, That, being at Sea in a Storm, his Companions dejected, he, with a quiet Mind, shew'd them a Pig feeding in the Ship, saying, *A wise Man ought to be settled in such Indifference.*

CHAP. IV.

His Death, and Disciples.

HE * died 90 Years old, † leaving nothing behind him in writing.

* Laert. 9. 62.

† Ibid.

* Ibid.

* Of his Disciples, some were very eminent, of which Number were these:

Eurylochus, of whom is related this Extravagance: On a time he was so far transported with Fury, that, snatching up the Spit with the Meat upon it, he pursued the Cook into the Forum: And at *Elis*, being weary of those that disputed with him, he threw off his Cloke, and swam cross the River *Alpheus*. He was a great Enemy to the *Sophists*, as *Timon* saith.

Philo, [an *Athenian*] who frequently talked to himself; whence *Timon* of him:

*Of private, talking with himself alone,
Not minding Glory, or Contention.*

Hecataeus of *Abdera*.

Timon, the *Phliasian*, who writ the *Silli*.

Nausiphanes, a *Teian*, whom, they say, *Epicurus* heard.

These all were called *Pyrrhonians* from their Master; *Aporeticks*, and *Scepticks*, and *Ephesicks*, and *Zetetics*, from their (as it were) Doctrine.

T I M O N.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

A *Pollonides* the * *Nicean*, in his first Book of Commentaries upon the *Scilli*, dedicated to *Tiberius Cæsar*, saith, That the Father of *Timon* was named *Timarchus*, by Country a *Phliasian*; and that *Timon*, whilst in his Youth, taught to dance; but afterward changing his Mind, he took a Journey to *Megara* to see *Stilpo*, and having had Conversation a while with him, returned home and married. Then he went to *Elis* to see *Pyrrho*, taking his Wife along with him, who, during the time of his being there, bare him Sons; the Elder he called *Xanthus*, whom he taught Physick, and left him his Successor in the Course of Life he himself had led.

Sotom in his tenth Book affirms, he was very eminent. Wanting necessary Provisions, he went to the *Hellepont* and *Propontus*, and professing Philosophy at *Chalcedon*, was exceedingly honour'd. From thence having now gotten a good Stock, he went to *Athens*, and lived there to his End, except that once

he made a short Journey to *Thebes*. He was known to *Antigenus* the King, and *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*, as he himself attests in his lambicks.

He was, as *Antigenus* saith, a Lover of Wine, and gave himself much Diversion from philosophical Studies, as appears by his Writings.

He took much delight in Gardens and Solitude, as *Antigenus* reports; whereupon *Hieronymus* the Peripatetic said, That as the Scythians shoot both when they fly, and when they pursue; so of Philosophers, some get Disciples by running after them, others by running from them, as *Timon*.

He was of an acute Apprehension, and quick in deriding; a great Lover of writing, very skilful in composing poetical Fables and Dramas. In his Tragedies he had much of *Homer*, and of *Alexander*. When Servants or Dogs disturb'd him, he gave over, aiming above all things at a quiet Life.

Aratus demanding of him by what means he might procure an uncorrupt Copy of *Homer*? he answer'd,

If you can light upon old Copies, not those that have been lately corrected.

His own Poems were thrown up and down, confusedly, and many times torn; inasmuch as when Zopyrus the Orator read something of his, he made it up out of his own Memory; but when he came to the middle, there was a great Gap, which he was ignorant of.

He was so indifferent, that he observed no time for Dinner.

Seeing Arcefilaus walking amongst Flatterers, he said, What do you here where we Freemen are?

Of those who judge by the Senses and Mind, he continually said, Attogas and Numinius are met.

* He often used to sport after this manner: To one that admired all things, *Why then, saith he, dost thou not admire, that we, being but three, have four Eyes*; for he, and Diocorides his Disciple, had each of them but one Eye, [* whence he used to call himself *Cyclops*] the other to whom he spoke had two. And on a time, being demanded by Arcefilaus, Why he came from *Thebes to Athens*, he said, *That I might laugh to see you fly*. But though in his *Silli* he abused Arcefilaus, yet in his Treatise entituled, *The funeral Banquet of Arcefilaus*, he commends him.

CH A P. II.

His Death and Writings.

HE died almost 90 years of Age, as Antigonus, and Sotion in his 11th Book affirm.

There was another Timon, the Man-hater; of whom, see Lucian and Suidas.

He writ Poems, and Verses, and Tragedies, and Satires, Comical Drama's 30. and Tragicall 60. and *Silli* and *Cinædi*. There were also several Writings of his in *Prose*, amounting to 20000 Paragraphs.

Of his *Silli* there are three Books, in which, as a Sceptick, he reproached and derided all the Dogmatists: The *First* written in his own Person, in a continued way. The *Second* and *Third* by way of Dialogue. He question'd *Xenophanes the Colophonian* about every thing, who answers to all. In the *Second*, he treats of the more ancient; in the *Third*, of the later Philosophers, whence some entitle it the *Epilogue*. The *first* Book contains the same things, only deliver'd in another way, the Poem having but one Person. It begins thus:

Now busy Sophists all, come follow me.

CH A P. III.

Succession of the School.

ALTHOUGH, as Disciples of Timon, are mentioned by Laertius, Xenobius his Son, and Diocorides;

and, by Suidas, Pyrrho a Phlegian, Son of Timarchus; yet * Menodotus affirms, "That Timon had no Successor, but that the Institution was intermitted, until Ptolomy a Cyrenæan renew'd it; whose Auditors (according to Hippobotus and Sotion) were Diocorides a Cyprion, Nioleobus a Rhodian, Euphranor a Seleucian, and Praxylus of Troas; who was of so settled a Constancy, that being accused of Treason, he chose rather to undergo the Punishment unjustly, than to plead to his Countrymen.

"Eubulus an Alexandrian heard Euphranor; him, Ptolomy; him, Sarpedon and Heraclides; Disciple to Heraclides was Anesidemus a Gnesian, [who flourished, as Aristocles saith, at Alexandria] he wrote eight Books of Pyrrhonian Discourses. Him, Zeuxippus of Polis heard; him, Zeuxis, surnamed *Twivros*; him, Antiochus, a Laodicean of Lycus; him, Menodotus of Nicomedia, an Empirical Physician, and Theodas of Laodicea; Disciple to Menodotus was Heradotus of Tarsis, Son of Arius; to Heradotus, Sextus Empiricus, whose Ten Books of Sceptick Philosophy are extant, and other excellent Treatises. [This Sextus may probably be esteemed that Sextus Cheronensis, Nephew of Plutarch, whom Marcus Aurelius the Emperor so honoured, that he admitted him to sit in Judicature with him.] "Disciple to Sextus was Saturninus a Cybænæan, who was also surnamed Empiricus." Hitherto Laertius.

HAVING spoken of the Author of the *Sceptick* "Philosophy, and its Succession, our Method leads us to set forth the Doctrine itself; which being already excellently handled by Sextus Empiricus, I think it would be more for the Reader's Advantage, to have it deliver'd in his Words than in my own. The Treatise, I confess, may seem long; and indeed I had some Thoughts of abridging it: But when I consider'd, how difficult it were so to prune it as to please all Persons, and that itself was intended but as a Summary; and that if it had been my Case to have received it from some other Hand, I should rather have desir'd to have it entire, of what Length soever, than mangled even by a skilful Artist; I hope I shall be excused, if I so deal with the Reader, as I should desire to have been dealt withal myself. Neither can I suppose it will be unpleasant to those, who have been conversant in the more severe and knotty Disquisitions of the Schools; for the Author is learned and acute, even beyond the Subject he handler, and hath many Passages of the Ancients, which are not elsewhere to be had. But if any who have accustomed

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"them-

* Laert. g. 114.

* Laert. g. 112.

* Laert. g. 112.

* Laert. g. 109.

“ themselves only to lighter Studies shall think it tedious, it is no great pains to turn over some

“ Leaves, and see if they can find something else more acceptable.

A Summary of S C E P T I C I S M.

Sexti Empirici, Pyrrhoneæ Hypotyposes.

The FIRST BOOK.

CH A P. I.

The Three Differences of Philosophers in general.

IT is likely that they who seek must either find, or deny that they have or can find, or persevere in the Enquiry. Hence (it may be) some of those who profess Philosophy, declare they have found the Truth; others hold it impossible to be found; others still enquire. They who suppose they have found it, are called *Dogmatists*; such are the *Peripateticks*, the *Epicureans*, the *Stoicks*, and others; they who think it incomprehensible, are *Clitomachus*, *Carmades*, and other *Academicks*; they who still enquire, are the *Scepticks*. So as there seemeth to be three Kinds of Philosophy, *Dogmatick*, *Academick*, *Sceptick*. The two first we leave to others, intending a Summary of the *Sceptick*: professing before-hand, that we are not sure any thing we say is absolutely so as we affirm; but we shall plainly discourse on every thing, as it appeareth to us for the present.

CH A P. II.

The Parts of Scepticism.

OF *Sceptick* Philosophy there are two Parts, *General* and *Special*; the *General* is that, wherein we explain the Character of *Scepticism*; declaring, (1.) the Signification of it; (2.) the Principles; (3.) the Reasons; (4.) the Criteria, (or Instrument of Judication); (5.) the End; (6.) the Common-places of Suspension; (7.) how the *Sceptical* Phrases are to be understood; (8.) the Difference of *Scepticism* from those Philosophies that are most like it.

The *Special* is that, wherein we contradict every Part of that which is called Philosophy. But first of the *General*.

CH A P. III.

The Names of Scepticism.

THE *Sceptick* Institution is called also *Zetetic*, (*Inquisitive*) from the Act of Enquiring; *Ephesick*, (*Suspensive*) from the Affection rais'd by Enquiry after things; *Aporetick*, (*Dubitative*) either (as some say) from doubting of, and seeking after all things, or from being in doubt whether to assent or deny; *Pyrrhonian*, in as much as *Pyrrho* deliver'd it to us more substantially and clearly than those before him.

CH A P. IV.

What Scepticism is.

SCepticism is a Faculty opposing Phenomena's (Appearances) and Intelligibles all manner of ways; whereby we proceed through the Equivalence of contrary Things and Speeches, first to Suspension, then to Indifference.

We call it a Faculty, from the Power thereof; by Phenomena's we understand Sensibles, which we oppose to Intelligibles. These Words, all manner of ways, may be referred to Faculty, taking the word Faculty (or Power) simply. It may likewise be applied to the Opposition betwixt Phenomena's and Intelligibles, since we oppose them several ways; Phenomena's to Phenomena's, or Intelligibles to Intelligibles, or One to the Other. Wherefore, to include all Oppositions, we say, all manner of ways; or, all manner of ways, of Phenomena's and Intelligibles; not enquiring how Phenomena's seem, or how Intelligibles are understood, but taking them simply.

By

By *contrary Speeches*, we mean not only Affirmation and Negation, but simply those which are repugnant. *Equivalence* we call an Equality as to Belief or Unbelief; so as neither of the repugnant Speeches is preferred as more credible than the other. *Suspension* is a Settlement of the Intellect, whereby we neither affirm nor deny any thing. *Indisturbance* is a Composure and Tranquility of Mind: how Indisturbance is induced by Suspension, we shall discourse when we come to speak of the End.

A Pyrrhonian Philosopher is wholly addicted to the Sceptick Institution; for he is such an one as participates of this Faculty.

CHAP. V.

The Principles of Scepticism.

THE final Cause (*End or Aim*) of Scepticism we hold to be, Hope of *Indisturbance*: for Man's Mind being troubled at the Unsettledness in things, and doubting what to assent unto, enquireth what is true and what false, that by Determination thereof it may be quiet. But the chief Ground of Scepticism is, that to every Reason there is an opposite Reason equivalent, which makes us forbear to dogmatize.

CHAP. VI.

Whether the Sceptick dogmatizeth, and hath a Self, and treats of Physick.

WE say, *The Sceptick doth not dogmatize*: not understanding *Dogma* as some do in the general Acceptation, an Assent to any thing (for the Sceptick assenteth to those Affections [or Impressions] which are necessarily induced by Phantasy, as (being hot or cold) he will not say, *I think I am not heated or cool'd*; but we say, he doth not dogmatize in their Sense, who take *Dogma* for an Assent to any of those non-manifest things which are enquired into by Sciences. For a Pyrrhonian Philosopher assents to nothing that is not manifest; neither doth he dogmatize when he pronounceth the Sceptick Phrases concerning things not manifest, as, *Nothing rather, or I assert nothing*, or any of the rest, of which hereafter. For he who dogmatizeth, asserteth the thing, which he is said to dogmatize, to be such; but a Sceptick useth these Expressions not as positive, for he conceiveth that Proposition, *All things are false*, (amongst the rest) declareth itself also to be false; in like manner this, *Nothing is true*; so this, *Nothing rather* (amongst others) implies itself is nothing rather to be credited; so as (together with the rest) it circumscribeth itself. The same we hold concerning the rest of the Sceptick Phrases. Now if he who dogmatizeth, asserteth that which he dogmatizeth to be such; but the Sceptick delivers his Expressions in such manner as they may be circumscribed by themselves, he cannot be said to

dogmatize: Moreover, in these Expressions he speaketh that which appeareth so to him, and declareth how he is affected, without engaging his Opinion (or Judgment) but ascertaining nothing concerning external Objects.

The same Course we observe, being demanded *Whether the Sceptick hath a Self*: If a Man understand *Self* to be an Inclination to many Dogma's or Tenets, which have a mutual Consequence, and likewise *Phænomena's*, and take *Dogma* to be an Assent to something not manifest, we say he hath not a *Self*. But taking *Self* to be an Institution, which, according to the *Phænomenon*, adhereth to some kind of Reason, that Reason shewing how to live rightly (meaning rightly, not only according to Virtue, but more simply, and tending to Suspension of Assent) we say, he hath a *Self*; for we follow some certain Reason according to the *Phænomenon*, which sheweth how to live according to the Rites, Laws, and Institutes of our Country, and our own Affections.

The like we say to those who enquire, *Whether the Sceptick treats of Physick*; as to Assentment grounded on a firm Belief of any physical Dogm, we have nothing to do with Physick: But, as to equal Opposition of all Speeches, even in Physick, we obtain Indisturbance; and thus also we deliver the *Logick* and *Ethick* Parts of that which is called Philosophy.

CHAP. VII.

Whether the Scepticks take away Phænomena's.

THEY who say, *the Scepticks take away Phænomena's*, seem not to understand what we have said; for we subvert not those Patheticks in Phantasy, which force us against our Wills to an Assent, (as we said before.) Such are *Phænomena's*: For, when we enquire whether the Subject be such as it appears, we grant that it appears; but we enquire (not of the *Phænomenon*, but) of that which is said concerning the *Phænomenon*. For instance, Honey seemeth to us to be sweet; this we grant, for we find it such to our Sense; but whether sweet come within the Reach of Reason, we doubt: This is not the *Phænomenon*, but that which is said concerning the *Phænomenon*. Moreover, when we raise Questions concerning the *Phænomenon*, we endeavour not to subvert the *Phænomena's* (these we presuppose) but only to discover the Temerity of the Dogmatists. For if Reason be so fallacious, that it almost takes away *Phænomena's* from our Eyes, how can we but mistrust it in Things not manifest, rather than precipitately follow it?

CHAP. VIII.

The Criterie of Scepticism.

THAT we acquiesce in *Phænomena's*, is manifest from what we say concerning the Criterie of the Sceptick Institution. Criterie is understood two

ways; *One is*, that whereby we believe a Thing to be, or not be, (of this hereafter, when we come to refel the Opinions of others concerning it;) the *other* is of Action, whereby we judge in the Course of Life what Things are to be done, what not; this last is that of which we now speak. We say the Criterie of *Scepticism* is the *Phænomenon*; so call we Phantasy in Power; for when it proceeds to Persuasion and coactive Passion, it is not questionable. As to the Appearance, whether the Subject be such or such, perhaps none doubteth; but whether it be such as it appeareth, is questioned. Thus acquiescing in *Phænomena's*, we live (without engaging Opinions or Judgments) according to the ordinary Course of Life, in regard we cannot be free from acting [as we may from assenting.]

This Course of Life seems to be four-fold; conversant partly in *natural Instruction*, partly in the *Impulsion of Passions*, partly in *giving Laws and Customs*, partly in *teaching Arts*. In *natural Instruction*, by which we are naturally endued with Sense and Intellect; in *Impulsion of Passions*, as Hunger leads us to Meat, Thirst to Drink; in *giving Laws and Customs*, by which we learn that to live virtuously is good, to live viciously, ill; in *teaching Arts*, by which we are not idle in those Arts which we receive. All this we say, without engaging our Opinion (or Judgment.)

CHAPTER IX.

The End of Scepticism.

IT follows that we treat of the End of *Scepticism*. The End is, *That for which all things are acted or contemplated, but itself is not for any other; or the last of things appetible*. We say that the End of the *Sceptick* is ἀμεγέθεια, *Indisturbance*, in whatsoever belongs to Opinion; and μετριοπάθεια, *Moderation*, in whatsoever belongs to Compulsion. For beginning to study Philosophy, that he may discern and comprehend which Phantasies are true, which false, and by that means not to be disquieted, he lights upon an equivalent Contrariety, of which not being able to judge, he suspends; and whilst he is accidentally in this Suspense, there follows it an Indisturbance as to things opinionative: For he who is of Opinion there is something good or bad in its own Nature, is continually disturbed; when those Things which seem to him good are not present, he imagineth himself tormented with Things ill in their own Nature, and pursueth that he conceives to be good; which having obtained, he falleth into more Troubles. For being unreasonably and immoderately transported, and fearing a Change, he useth all Endeavour that he may not lose those Things which he conceives good.

Whereas he who defines nothing concerning things naturally good or bad, neither flyeth nor pursueth any thing eagerly, so that he remains undisturbed.

Thus it happens to the *Sceptick*, as to *Apelles* the Painter, who having drawn a Horse, and trying to paint his Foam, it succeeded so ill, that in despair he threw the Sponge, wherewith he used to blot out Colours, at the Picture, which lighting upon the Place, made an exact Representation of Foam. In like manner, the *Scepticks* hoped to obtain Indisturbance by judging of the Unsettledness in *Phænomena's* and Intelligibles; which not being able to do, they suspended, and whilst they were in suspense, as it were accidentally, Indisturbance overtook them, as a Shadow follows the Body.

Yet we conceive not the *Sceptick* to be absolutely free from Trouble; we grant he is troubled by external Impulsions, he suffers Cold, Thirst, and the like. But in these, the ordinary sort of Men are doubly affected, first, with the Passions themselves; and again, no less, that these Things are naturally ill; whereas the *Sceptick*, taking away the Opinion that they are naturally ill, undergoes them more moderately. Hence we say, that the *Sceptick's* End is, in Opinionatives, Indisturbance; in Impulsives, Moderation; to which some eminent *Scepticks* add *Suspension in Disjunctives*.

CHAPTER X.

The general Ways (or Places) of Scepticism.

INDisturbance following Suspension, it is requisite that we declare how we attain Suspension.

It ariseth, (to speak generally) from the opposition of things; we oppose either *Phænomena's* to *Phænomena's*, or *Intelligibles*, to *Intelligibles*; or the former to the latter. *Phænomena's* to *Phænomena's*, as when we say, the same Tower seemeth afar off, Round, Near, Square; *Intelligibles* to *Intelligibles*, as when to him, who from the order of the Celestial Bodies, argues, there is a Providence, we oppose, that good Men are often Unfortunate; bad Men, Fortunate; and thence infer, there is no Providence. *Intelligibles* to *Phænomena's*, as *Anaxagoras*, to *Snow is White*, opposed that *Water is Snow concrete*; but *Water is Black*, therefore *Snow is Black*.

Again, we sometimes oppose things *Present* to the *Present*, as those we last instanced; sometimes the *Present*, to the *Past*, or the *Future*, as when an Argument is proposed, which we are not able to resolve, we say; "As before the Author of the Sect, "to which you addict yourself, was born, the Reason thereof did not seem sound, and yet the Thing "was the same in Nature; so it is likely, that a "Reason (or Argument) contrary to this which you "have

"have alledged, may be subsistent in Nature, and
 "not yet appear to us; wherefore we ought not to
 "assent to any Argument, how convincing soever
 "it seems."

To shew these Oppositions more exactly, I will
 lay down the Common-Places by which Suspension
 is collected; not asserting any thing of their Num-
 ber or Power; for it is possible, they may be of no
 Force, or more in Number than we reckon.

C H A P. XI.

The ten Common-Places of Suspension.

THE ancient *Scepticks* have deliver'd ten Moods,
 whence Suspension seems to be collected, which
 they call also *Reasons* and *Places*. They are these;
 the first, from the *Variety of living Creatures*; the se-
 cond, from the *Difference of Men*; the third, from
 the *Difference of the Organs of Sense*; the fourth, from
Circumstances; the fifth, from *Positions, and Distances*,
 and *Places*; the sixth, from *Commissions*; the
 seventh, from the *Quantities and Constitutions of*
Subjects; the eighth, from *Relations*; the ninth,
 from *rare Accidents*; the tenth, from *Institutions*,
Customs, Laws, fabulous Persuasions, and dogmati-
cal Opinions.

This is the Order which we lay down. But there
 are three Moods which comprehend the rest; first,
 from the Thing *judging*; secondly, from the Thing
judged; thirdly, from *both*. Under that of the
 Thing judging, are comprehended the first *four*; the
 Thing judging is either an Animal, or a Man, or
 Sense, or in some Circumstance; under the Thing
 judged, the *seventh* and the *tenth*; under that which
 consists of both, the *fifth*, the *sixth*, the *eighth*,
 and the *ninth*. Again, these three are comprehended in
 the Mood of *Relations*; so as the most *general* is,
 that of *Relations*; the *special*, the other three, under
 which are comprehended the ten. Thus much we
 probably hold as to their Number; now as concern-
 ing their Power.

C H A P. XII.

The first Common-place.

THE first Common-place we hold to be that
 whereby, *through the Difference of living Crea-*
tures, Phantasies not the same are derived from them.
 This we collect both from the Difference of their
Generations, and from the Difference of the *Constitu-*
tions of their Bodies. Of their *Generations*, because
 of living Creatures, some have their Being *without*
Coitition; others by *Coitition*. Of those which are pro-
 duced *without Coitition*, some come of Fire, as the

Crickets in Chimnies; some of *corrupted Water*, as
 Gnats; some of *sour Wine*, as Snipes; some of
Earth, whereof some of *Slime*, as Frogs; some of
Dirt, as Worms; some of *Ashes*, as Beetles; some
 of *Plants*, as Caterpillars; some of *Fruits*, as Mag-
 gots; some of *putrified Animals*; as of *Bulls*, Bees;
 and of *Horses*, Walpas.

Of those which are produced by *Coitition*, some are
 begotten by Creatures of the *same Species*, such are
 the greatest part; others by Creatures of *different*
Species, as Mules. Again, of living Creatures, some
 are brought forth *alive*, as Man; others come from
Eggs, as Birds; some from a Lump of *Flesh*, as
 Bears. It is therefore probable, that the Dissimi-
 litudes and Differences of these Generations effect great
 Antipathies, receiving thereby contrary Tempera-
 ment, Discordance, and Repugnance.

Moreover the *Difference of several Parts* of the Bo-
 dy (especially of those which Nature made for Judg-
 ment and Sense) may cause a great Repugnance of
 Phantasies, according to the Diversity of living Crea-
 tures. Those Things which to us seem white, they
 who have the *Yellow Jaundice* affirm to be Yellow,
 and they who have a *Hyphosphagme* in their Eyes,
 Red. As therefore, of living Creatures, some have
 Eyes Blood-red, others Whitish, others of other Co-
 lours, it is likely they perceive Colours after different
 manners. Even to us, if we gaze a while upon
 the Sun, and immediately after look upon a Book,
 the Letters will seem of Gold, and as if they moved
 round.

Forasmuch also, as some living Creatures have
 naturally a certain *Brightness* in their Eyes, and emit
 from them a quick rare Light, so as they can see in
 the Night, we think it probable, that external Ob-
 jects incur not into their Sense, like what they seem
 to ours.

Again, Jugglers, by anointing Candles with a Li-
 quor made of the Rust of Brass, or with the Blood of
 the Fish *Sepia*, cause the Standers-by to seem either
 of the *Colour of Brass*, or *Black*, by that little Inspec-
 tion of Unguent; much more likely 't is it, that the
 Humours, mixed in the Eyes of living Creatures,
 being different, they have different Phantasies, from
 the same Object.

Again, if we pinch the Eye, the Forms and Fi-
 gures of visible Things seem long and narrow; it is
 therefore likely, that all living Creatures which have
 Eye-balls oblique and narrow (as Goats, Cats, and
 the like) have a peculiar Phantasy of Objects, differ-
 ent from those which have round Balls.

Looking-glasses, according to their several Forms,
 sometimes represent the Object *less*, as when they are
 concave; sometimes *oblong and narrow*, as the con-
 vex; some there are that represent the Head of the
 Beholder *downward*, and his Feet *upward*. As
 therefore

† Reading perhaps *τίους*, for so *Leont. neta d'ian τίους*.

‡ M. S. *μεγίστην*.

therefore of the Organs of Sight, some are exuberant, some hollow, some plain, it is likely that the Phantasies are different; and that Dogs, Fishes, Lions, Men, Lobsters, behold not Things as great, or in the same Form, as they are in themselves, but according to the various Impressions which the Sight suffereth from the Object.

It is the same in other Senses; for how can we say, That Creatures covered with Shells, with Flesh, with Pickles, with Feathers, with Scales, are alike affected as to the Touch? Or, that they which have the Hole of their Ear narrow, and they which have it wide; those which have Ears full of Hair, and those which have smooth Ears, receive Sound alike? Seeing that we ourselves, ^a pressing the Ear, hear it different from that which it seems otherwise.

Moreover, the *Smelling* may differ according to the Difference of living Creatures; for, since we ourselves are affected one way, when we have caught cold, and are oppress'd with Flegm; another way, when the Parts of, and near the Head, abound with Blood, (disliking those Scents which to others seem sweet, and thinking ourselves, as it were, hurt by them:) And since of living Creatures, some are naturally flegmatick, others languine; some choleric, others melancholick, it is possible, that from thence, Scents seem different to them.

The like as to the *Taste*; some have a Tongue rough and dry, others very moist, (even we ourselves having our Tongues drier than ordinary in Fevers, think, that such Things as are given us taste earthy, unfavoury, or bitter.) This we suffer thro' the different Prevalence of Savours in us. Since therefore in living Creatures, the Organs of Taste are different, and abound with different Humours; hence they may in Taste receive different Phantasies from the same Objects.

For, as Meat digested turns here into Veins, there into Arteries; here into Bone, there into Sinews, and so of the rest; manifesting a different Power, according to the Difference of the Parts which receive it. And as Water, one and the same specifically, being infused into Trees, here turns into Leaves, there into Boughs; here into Fruit, Figs, Pomegranats, and the rest. And as one and the same Blast of a Musician in a Pipe, here is Flat, there Sharp; and the Touch of the Hand upon the Lute, makes sometimes a high, sometimes a low Sound; so is it likely, that external Objects are differently apprehended, according to the different Constitutions of the living Creatures, to which the Phantasies occur.

This we learn more evidently from the Appetite and Aversion of living Creatures. Unguents seem sweet to Men, but to Beetles and Bees are intolerable: Oil is wholesome to Men, but kill Wasps and

Bees, if sprinkled upon them: Sea-water, to Men, is unpleasant of Taste and unwholesome; to Fishes sweet and potable. Swine delight more to wallow in filthy Mire, than in pure Water.

Moreover, of living Creatures, some eat Herbs, some Boughs, some Sperrn, some Flesh, some Milk; some love putrified Meat, some fresh; some raw, some roasted. Generally, What is pleasant to some, is to others unpleasant, distasteful, and poisonous; as Hemlock fattens Quails, Henbane Swine; Swine delight also to eat Salamanders, as Stags do Serpents, and Swallows Cantharides. Pismires and Snipes are unpleasant and unwholesome for Men to take down; but the Bear, if he fall sick, recovers his Strength by feeding on them. The Viper, if it touch a Bough of a Beach Tree, is taken with a Giddiness; so the Bat, if it touch the Leaf of a Plane-Tree: The Elephant flies from the Ram; the Lion from the Cock; Whales, from the crackling of bruised Beans; the Tiger from the Sound of a Drum. We might instance many more, but not insist too long hereupon; if the same Things are to some pleasant, to others distasteful; but pleasant and distasteful consist in Phantasies; then different Phantasies are arrived to several living Creatures from the same Object. Now if the same Things seem different to several Creatures, what the Object appears to us, we can say, but as to what it is in its *own* Nature, we will suspend; for we are not competent Judges betwixt our own, and other Creatures Phantasies, ourselves being Parties in the Difference, and consequently requiring a Judge, rather than being in a Capacity of judging.

Again, neither without Demonstration can we prefer our own Phantasies before those of irrational Creatures, nor with Demonstration; for to prove that there is no Demonstration, perhaps the Argument or Demonstration will either be apparent to us, or not apparent; if not apparent, we shall not entertain it with Belief; but if apparent, seeing the Question is concerning (*Phænomena's*) Things apparent to living Creatures, and the Demonstration seems apparent to us, who are in the Number of living Creatures, the Demonstration itself will be questioned, (so far as it is apparent) whether it be true. But it is absurd, to endeavour to prove a thing in question, by a thing which is likewise in question, for so the same thing shall be credible and incredible; credible, as used in Demonstration; incredible, as requiring to be demonstrated. We shall not therefore find a Demonstration, whereby to prefer our own Phantasies before those of other living Creatures, called irrational. Now if Phantasies be different, according to the Variety of living Creatures, and it be impossible to judge of them, it is necessary we suspend as to the external Objects.

^a Perhaps *οὐρανιστικῶς*.

CHAP. XIII.

Whether the Creatures, commonly termed Irrational, have Reason.

WE will (over and above) compare the Creatures termed irrational, with Men, as to their Phantasy, that we may, after the more serious Reasons, sport with the self-conceited Opinion of the *Dogmatists*. Most of our Party confer irrational Creatures in general, simply with Men; but because the *Dogmatists* cavil heret, we the better to deride them, will insist only upon one Creature, the *Dog*, than which none seemeth more contemptible. By this means we shall know, that the Creatures of which we now discourse, are nothing inferior to us, as to credit of *Phænomena*'s.

Now that this Creature excelleth us in Sense, is acknowledged by the *Dogmatists*; it is of a much quicker Scent, whereby it pursueth Beasts unseen; it discovers them sooner by the Eye than we, and is likewise more acute of hearing.

Come we therefore to Discourse, which is twofold, *Internal* and *Enunciative*. Let us first examine the *Internal*; This, according to (our greatest Adversaries amongst the *Dogmatists*) the *Stoicks*, seemeth to be conversant in these Things; in Election of Things convenient, and Evitation of their Contraries; in Knowledge of the Arts conducing hereto; in Comprehension of the Virtues belonging to their Nature concerning Passions. Now the *Dog*, in whom we instance, chuseth Things convenient, and sheth the hurtful; he pursueth his Food, and runneth away from the Whip; he hath likewise the Art of acquiring Things proper for him. Neither is he destitute of Virtue; Justice being distributive to every one according to their Merit; the *Dog*, who fawneth upon his Friends and Benefactors, and revengeth himself upon his Enemies, by whom he is injur'd, is not void of Justice. And if he hath this Virtue, all the Virtues being linked together, he hath all the rest, which the wisest allow not the ordinary sort of Men. We see he is valiant in revenging wrong; prudent, by the Testimony of *Homer*, who makes *Ulysses*, not discover'd by any of his Friends, owned by *Argus* the *Dog*; not deceived, either by the Alteration in the Body of the Man, swearing from his own comprehensive Phantasy, (which is manifest) he hath in a degree above Man. But, according to *Chrysippus*, (who oppugns irrational Creatures with most eagerness) he partakes of their so much cried up *Dialectick*; for he saith, When the *Dog* cometh into a Way divided into three, he makes choice of the third by several *Indemonstrables*; for having scented the two Ways by which the

Beast did not pass, he runs strait upon the third, without scenting it; which is as much (saith the old Philosopher) as to discourse thus; *The Beast passed either this Way, or this Way, or this Way; but neither this Way, nor this Way, therefore this Way.*

Moreover, he apprehends and cures his own Sickness: If a Splinter get into his Foot, he presently strives to get it out, by rubbing his Foot against the Ground, and with his Teeth. If he be wounded, (Wounds that are kept clean being easily cur'd, the putrid not easily) he continually licks the Hurt. He likewise strictly observes the Rule of *Hippocrates*; the Cure of the Foot consisting in Rest; he, if hurt in that Part, holds it up, and stirs it as little as he can. If he be troubled with ill Humours, he eats Grass; by which means, vomiting up that which disagreed with him, he is cured. Now if this Creature can chuse what is convenient for him, and fly what is inconvenient; if he hath the Art of acquiring Things proper to him, and can apprehend and cure his own Sickness, and is not void of Virtue, in all which consists the Perfection of intrinsecal Discourse, the *Dog* must be perfect, as to that. For which Reason, as I conceive, some Philosophers chose to be called by Name of that Creature.

As to *Enunciative* Discourse, it is not necessary to examine it; for there are some *Dogmatists* who condemn it, as contrary to Virtue; whence they kept Silence all the Time of their Institution. Besides, though we should suppose a Man to be dumb, yet none will say, he is void of Discourse (irrational;) and on the other side, we see many living Creatures which have the Speech of Man, as Pyes, and the like. To omit which, though we understand not the Voices of Creatures (termed) irrational, it is nevertheless likely they discourse among themselves. We understand not the Language of Foreigners, it seems a continued Sound without Variety. But we hear that the Voice of the *Dog* is different; of one kind, when he assaults; of another, when he howls; of another, when he is beaten; of another, when he fawns. In a word, he who examines it curiously, will find a great Variety of Voice, not only in this Creature, but in others, according to the Diversity of Accidents. So that the Creatures, called Irrational, may justly be said to participate of Enunciative Discourse; and if they come not short of Men in Acuteness of Sense, nor in Intrinsecal Discourse, nor in Enunciative, (tho' that be not necessary) certainly they are no less creditable, as to Phantasy, than we.

It is possible, perhaps, to shew the same Discourse in all other Creatures; as, who will deny Birds to have a Sagacity, and Enunciative Discourse, seeing they know not only Things present, but the future, which they declare to such as are able to compre-

hend

* What *Indemonstrables* are, see afterwards, l. 2. c. 25.

† The Cynick.

‡ Pythag.

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hend it, (amongst many other ways) by a Voice. But this Comparison is added, as I said before, more than necessary, without which, we have sufficiently, I conceive, declared, That our own Phantasies are not to be preferred before the Phantasies of irrational Creatures. Now if irrational Creatures are no less creditable than we, in Disjudication of Phantasies, and Phantasies are different, according to the Variety of the Creatures; what every Object *appeareth* to me, I am able to say; but what it is in itself (for the Reasons alledged) I suspend.

C H A P. XIV.

The second Common-place.

THE second Common-place of Suspension we hold to be, *from the Diversity of Men*; for, though we should grant it were more Reasonable to stand to the Judgment of Men, than of any other living Creature; yet shall we find so much difference amongst ourselves, as may well induce Suspension. Man, they say, consists of two Parts, *Soul and Body*; in both these we differ one from another: in *Body*, by *Form and Constitution*; The Body of a Scythian differs in Form from the Body of an Indian. This difference ariseth, as we said, from the different prevalence of Humours; and from the different prevalence of Humours arise Phantasies, as we said upon the first ground; whence in Election and Evitation of external things, there is great Difference among them. *Indians* delight in some things, we in others; but to delight in several things, argueth a Reception of different Phantasies from the same Objects.

We differ also in *Constitution*; there are some who can digest Beef easier than Anchovies; some, upon drinking of *Lesbian-Wine*, are troubled with Cholera. It is reported of an old *Athenian* Woman, That she drank four Drams of Hemlock without any hurt; and *Demophon*, *Alexander's* Sewer, whilst he was in the Sunshine, or in a Bath, was cold; in the Shade, was hot. *Athenagoras*, the *Argive*, felt no Pain at the biting of Scorpions or Phalangies. The People called *Pisylli* never take hurt by the biting of Serpents, or Asps. * The *Tintiriæ* of *Egypt* take no hurt by Crocodiles. The *Æthiopians*, that live opposite to *Meroe*, along the River *Hydaspes*, eat Scorpions, Snakes, and the like, without danger. *Rufinus* of *Chalcis* when he drunk *Hellebore* never vomited, nor was purged any way by it, but digested it as ordinary Drink. *Chrisfermus*, the *Herophillian*, if at any time he eat Pepper, was taken with the *Passion of the Heart*, even to hazard of his Life. In *Snerius* the Chyrurgion, the Smell of the Fish *Silurus* excited Cholera. *Andron* the *Argive* was so little

subject to Thirst, that when he travelled through the Desarts of *Lybia* he did not need Drink. *Tiberius Cæsar* saw in the dark. *Aristotle* mentions a *Thasian*, who thought the Apparition of a Man went always before him. Now there being so great Diversity in the *Bodies* of Men, (it is sufficient that we instance these few, out of the multitude acknowledged by the *Dogmatists*) it is probable, that Men differ from one another in *Soul* also; for the Body is a kind of Image of the Soul, as the Physiognomy Science sheweth. But the greatest Evidence of the infinite Difference of Men, as to Intellect, is the Discordance amongst them in Election and Evitation; rightly expressed by the Poets; as *Pindar*,

*Some joy in swift-beel'd Courfers; some,
In living wantonly at home;
And others on the Ocean roam.*

And the Poet.

In several Actions, several Men delight.

The Tragedians are full of this; as

*If all Men what is good did see
Alike, they would not disagree.*

And again.

*Alas! that some Men take Delight
In things which grieve another's sight.*

Since therefore Appetition and Aversion consists in Pleasure and Hatred, but Pleasure and Hatred consists in Phantasy; and since the same things are pursued by some, shunned by others; we may infer this Consequence, That they are not alike affected by the same things, otherwise they would all alike desire to shun them. Now if these things affect differently, according to the diversity of Men, there may justly be induced Suspension; since what every Subject appeareth, every one perhaps according to his particular Apprehension may express; but what it is in its own Nature, we cannot assert. For we must either give Credit to all Men, or to some few; if to All, we undertake Impossibilities, and admit Repugnancies; if to some Few, let them tell us, which those Few are. The *Platonists* will say, we must assent to *Plato*, the *Epicureans*, to *Epicurus*; and by their confused Disagreement, reduce us again to Suspension. If any Man alledge, we ought to assent to the greater Number; he argues childishly, since none can overrun all Men, and examine what every one thinks best; and it is possible that in Countries unknown to

* *Antiphras*.
Procop. Hist. Mir. 10.

* The Text is defective; but *Franciscus Mirandula* renders it thus, *Qui Tintiriæ*
De vanit. Gen. Lib. 2. cap. 23.

* *Antiphron Oretanus*.

to us, what things are rare to us, are there frequent; and what happens frequently to us happens there very seldom. As for Instance, in such a Country there are many who receive no harm by the Biting of Phalangies, few who receive harm thereby. And so in all other Constitutions: wherefore it is also necessary to induce Suspension, by reason of the Diversity of Men.

C H A P. XV.

The third Common-place.

As much as *Dogmatists* are so self-conceited as to affirm, That their Judgment in things ought to be preferred before all others; though we know how absurd this Postulation is, (for they are Parties in the Controversy, and having first prejudged themselves, if then they judge *Phænomena's*, even before they begin to judge, they seize on the *Phænomena's* as already judged:) yet that, in our Dispute, fixing the Discourse upon one Man (that wise Man they dream of) we may arrive at Suspension, let us examine the third Common-place.

This we derive from the *Difference of the Senses*. That the Senses differ from one another is manifest. *Pictures* seem to the Eye rising and falling, but not such to the Touch. Many esteem *Honey* pleasant to the Tongue, unpleasant to the Eye; whence it is impossible to say, whether it is simply pleasant, or unpleasant. The like of *Unguent*s, they please the Smell, displease the Taste. *Euphorbium* is hurtful to the Eyes, but not to any other Part of the Body: therefore, whether it be simply hurtful to the Body, we cannot say. *Rain-water* is good for the Eyes, but frets the Arteries and Lungs; as Oil doth also, though it smooths the Skin. The *Sea-Tortoise*, applied to the extreme Parts of the Body, causeth Numbness, but laid to any other part makes no alteration. Thus, what each of these things is in its own Nature, we cannot affirm; but how it appears to others, we may. We might instance more; but, not to insist longer hereon than our Design permits, let us say, Every sensible *Phænomenon* seemeth to incur a several way into our Senses, as an Apple smooth, fragrant, sweet, yellow. It is therefore unmanifest, whether it really hath these Qualities, or whether it hath but one Quality, which seemeth different, according to the Diversity of the Senses; or whether it hath many more Qualities, some of which incur not to our Senses. For, that it hath but one Quality, may be argued from what was said before, concerning the Nutriment of living Creatures, the Growth of Trees by Rain, the unequal Sound of the Breath in Pipes, and other Instruments. It is therefore possible, the Apple may have but one Quality, and yet be looked upon as different, by reason of the Difference of the

Organs of Sense, by which it is apprehended. Again, That it is possible the Apple may have more Qualities than appear to us, we argue thus: Let us suppose a Man, endued from his Birth with Touch, Smell, and Taste; but wanting Sight and Hearing, he will think there is nothing Visible, nothing Audible: So it may be, that we having Five Senses, of all the Qualities of an Apple, perceive only those, whereof ourselves have the apprehensive Faculty; yet in the mean time, it may have other Qualities, incident to other Organs of Sense, which we have not. Therefore neither can we perceive what their sensible Operations are.

But Nature, may some object, hath equally commensurated the Senses according to the Sensibiles. What Nature; there being so confused a Disagreement among the *Dogmatists* concerning her Essence? For if any Man judge what Nature is, if he be one of the Unlearned, he is, according to them, not worthy Credit; if a Philosopher, he is interested in the Difference, being one of the Parties to be judged, not the Judge. Now if it be nothing absurd to say, The Apple hath all the Qualities we seem to apprehend, and more than these; or, on the contrary, that it hath not even those which incur to our Senses, it will be unmanifest to us how the Apple is qualified. The same of other Sensibiles. And if the Senses comprehend not external Objects, neither can the Intellect comprehend them. Thus Suspension may be induced from external Objects.

C H A P. XVI.

The fourth Common-place.

THAT as well over-running in our Discourse every Sense, as receding from Sense, and receding from Sense, we may arrive at Suspension, we come to the fourth Ground.

This is said to be from *Circumstances*. By *mesurise* (Circumstances) we understand Dispositions; we say it consists in being according to Nature (sound;) or contrary to Nature (unsound;) in *Waking* or *Sleeping*, in Difference of *Age*, in *Motion* or *Rest*, in *Hate* or *Love*, in *Want* or *Satiety*, in *Drunkenness* or *Thirst*, in *Predispositions*, in *Courage* or *Fear*, in *Joy* or *Grieving*. According as we are found or unsound, things occur variously to us; Frantick, and Divine-like-inspired Persons think they hear Spirits, we not; and those kind of Persons often say, they smell Perfumes of Storax or Frankincense, when we smell none. Again, the same Water poured upon any Part that is inflamed, seems scalding, to us lukewarm: The same Garment to those that have a Hypo-phagm in their Eyes, seems bloody, to me not: The same Honey to me is sweet, to those that are troubled with the over-flowing of the Gall, bitter.

If any shall alledge, that the Admission of some Humours, in those who are unsound, excites Phantasies not conformable to their Objects; we answer, forasmuch as they who are in Health have commixed Humours, those Humours may cause external Objects (which perhaps appear to those who are unsound, such as they are indeed in themselves) to appear to the healthful, such as they are not in themselves. For, to attribute the Power of changing Objects to the Humours of the one, and not to those of the other, is vain; since as they who are in Health, are according to the Nature of the healthful, but contrary to the Nature of the sick; so they who are sick, are contrary to the Nature of the healthful, and according to the Nature of the sick: So that these also are to be credited, as being according to Nature.

From *Sleep* and *Waking* arise also different Phantasies; we have not the same Phantasies sleeping, which we have waking; nor the same waking, which we have sleeping; therefore their Existence is not simple, but relative. Thus in Sleep we see things, which when we wake, are inexistant; not that they are inexistant in themselves, for they exist in sleep, as well as those things which are said to exist when we are awake.

From *different Ages*; the same Air to old Men seems cold, to the youthful temperate; the same Meat to old Men heavy, to the young light. So the same Voice to some seemeth low, to others loud. In like manner are they, who differing in Age, differently incline to desire, or abhor things. Children delight in Whips and Tops; they who come to Man's Estate, prefer other things; old Men, others. Whence may be inferr'd, That different Phantasies are derived from the same Object, according to the Difference of Ages.

From *Motion* or *Rest*, things appear unlike; that which seems unmoved to us, while we stand still, when we sail we think it moves.

From *Love* or *Hate*; some abhor Swines Flesh, which others eat with much Delight. Many that have deformed Mistresses think them beautiful.

From *Hunger* or *Satiety*; The same Meat to an hungry Man seems pleasant; to a Man that is full, unpleasant.

From *Drunkenness* and *Sobriety*; Things, which when we are sober we esteem undecent; drunk, seem not such to us.

From *Predispositions*; the same Wine to such as have eaten Dates or Figs a little before, seems fowre; to such as have eaten Nuts or Pulse, sweet. The *Peraspas* of a Bath warms those that go in, cools those who go out, if they have stay'd any while in it.

From *Courage* or *Fear*; the same thing to a timorous Man seems dreadful, to a Valiant nothing so.

From *Sorrow* and *Joy*; the same things which trouble the sorrowful, delight the joyful.

Now there being so great Difference and Disproportion of Habits, and Men being constituted sometimes in one Habit, sometimes in another, what every Object *seems* to any, perhaps it is easy to declare; but what it *is*, is not easy, since the Difference is indjudicable. For he that judgeth it, either is conversant in one of the forementioned Habits, or in none: To say he is in none, that is, he neither is well nor sick, neither moveth nor resteth, nor is of any Age, and wholly void of the other Habits, is most absurd: On the other side, if being in any of these Habits, he judgeth Phantasies, he is himself a Party in the Controversy, and consequently cannot be a sincere Judge of external Objects, being infected with the Habits in which he is. For he who is awake, cannot compare the Phantasies of those who are asleep, with the Phantasies of those who are awake; nor he, who is in Health, compare the Phantasies of the sound and the sick: for we sooner assent to such things as are present, and move us, than to things not present.

Moreover, the Difference of such Phantasies is indjudicable another way. He that prefers one Phantasy before another, and one Circumstance (or Habit) before another, either doth it without Judgment and Demonstration, or upon Judgment and Demonstration. Not without, for then he is of no Credit; nor with, for if he judge Phantasies, he must do it by a Criterium; this Criterium must be either the true or false; if false, neither is it to be credited; if he say it is true, he affirms it, with Demonstration or without. If without Demonstration, it will be uncreditable; if with Demonstration, it is absolutely necessary that the Demonstration be true, otherwise neither will that be creditable. He will therefore say, the Demonstration alledged to prove the Judicatory creditable, is true. Whether doth he affirm this, as having judged, or not judged? If not having judged, he is not to be credited; if as having judged, he must acknowledge he hath judged it by a Criterium, of which Criterium we shall require a Demonstration, and then of that Demonstration a Criterium. Thus the Demonstration will continually require a Criterium to confirm it, and the Criterium a Demonstration to shew it is true: Therefore the Demonstration cannot be true, unless a true Criterium precede it; nor can the Criterium be true, unless the Demonstration be first credited. Thus the Criterium and the Demonstration fall into the *Alternate Common-Place*, wherein both will be found not creditable; for either wants Credit, till the other afford its Assistance to confirm it.

If therefore we cannot prefer one Phantasy before another, neither without a Demonstration and Criterium,

tery, nor with them, the Phantasies which different Habits produce, will be indjudicable. Thus Suspension is induc'd from the Nature of external Objects.

C H A P. XVII.

The Fifth Common-place.

THE fifth Common-place is from *Positions, Distances, and Places*: for through any of these, the same things seem different: the same Walk, to him that is entering into it, seems narrow at the further end; to him who is in the middle, equally broad. The same Ship, at a Distance, seems little and fix'd; near, great and in Motion. The same Tower seems afar off, round; near, square. This for *Distance*.

From *Place*; the Light of a Candle in the Sunshine seems dim; in the Dark, bright: The same Oar under Water, seems broken; above Water, straight. An Egg in the Fowl is soft; in the Air, hard. The *Lyncurium* [a Stone concrete of the *Lynx* his Urine] in the *Lynx* is humid, in the Air, hard. Coral is soft in the Water, hard in the Air. A Voice sounds diversly through a Pipe, through a Flute, and in the open Air.

From *Position*; the same Image, laid flat, seems smooth, but inclining, seems to have Extuberances and Cavities; the Neck of a Pigeon, as it is variously turned, seems to have a different Colour.

Since then all *Phænomena*'s are seen in some *Place*, at some *Distance*, and in some *Position*, every one of which (as we said) causeth a great Alteration in Phantasies, we shall be hereby reduced to Suspension. For he who would prefer one of these Phantasies before another, attempts an Impossibility; for if he assert it of them simply, without Demonstration, he shall not be credited; if he would use Demonstration, and acknowledge that Demonstration to be false, he confutes himself: If he say it is true, it will be required he bring a Demonstration to prove it true, and a third to prove the second, because that also must be true, and so to infinite; but to alledge infinite Demonstrations will be impossible. Therefore one Phantasy cannot be preferred before another by Demonstration. And if the aforesaid Phantasies can neither be judged with Demonstration, nor without it, there must be inferred Suspension; since what every thing seems according to this *Position*, this *Distance*, or in this *Place*, we may indeed affirm; but what in itself it is, (for these Reasons) we cannot.

C H A P. XVIII.

The Sixth Common-Place.

THE Sixth Place is from *Commixtions*: Whence we infer, That no Object incurrerth into our Senses simply, but together with some other; what this Mixture is, as well from the external Object,

and from that together with which it is seen, it is perhaps possible to say, what it seems to us; but what the external Object is, purely in itself, we cannot say: For no external thing incurrerth into our Sense purely of itself, but with some other; whence, as I conceive, it seems different to Beholders. Our Complexion seems of one Colour in warm Air, of another in cold; neither can we say what our Colour is naturally, but what it seemeth with these Circumstances. The same Voice seems different in a thin Air, and in a thick. Perfumes are of stronger Scent in a Bath, or in the warm Sun, than in the Cold; a Body surrounded with Water, is light; with Air, heavy.

Moreover, (setting aside external Commission) even our Eyes have in themselves Tunics and Humours. Visible Objects therefore, because we cannot see without these, are not perhaps perceived exactly and purely, for we perceive them with Admission. Hence to those who have the Jaundice, all things seem yellow; to those who have a Hypophagm, red. And forasmuch as the same Voice seemeth different in open and straight Places, from what it seems in narrow and crooked; in calm Air, from what it seems in tempestuous; it is probable, we perceive no Voice purely. For our Ears have narrow oblique Holes, and are said to be troubled and prepossessed by Vapours from the Parts next the Head.

Likewise by our Nostrils, and the Instruments of Taste, when Objects are presented, we perceive their Smell, and Taste, but not purely. Wherefore what external Objects are exactly in themselves, the Senses cannot perceive, by reason of Commissions. Neither can the Intellect, because the Senses, her Guides, err. Perhaps also the Intellect alters that which it receiveth from the Senses; by intermixing something of its own. For in the Parts wherein the Hegemonick, according to the Dogmatists, is placed, we see there are certain Humours, as in the Brain, or the Heart, or what part soever they shall place it in. Thus, by this Common-place, seeing that we can determine nothing concerning the Nature of the external Objects, we suspend.

C H A P. XIX.

The Seventh Common-Place.

THE Seventh Place is, from the *Quantities and Constitutions* of Subjects, generally stiled *Compositions*. That we are enforced upon this ground to Suspension concerning the Nature of things, is manifest; as, the shaving of Goats-horn seems white, but in the Horn itself black; Filings of Silver seem black, but in the whole white; the Pieces of the *Tamarian* Stone polish'd seem white, the whole seems yellow; Sands taken singly seem rugged; all together

in a heap, smooth; *Hellebore* eaten young and downy, suffocates, but at full Growth it doth not; Wine drunk moderately, strengthens; excessively, weakens: Meat commonly shews a different Power, according to the Quantity; Excess thereof, for the most part, oppresseth the Body with Crudities and cholerick Humours. Now as to these we are able to say, What the thin Parts of the Horn seem separated, and what they seem compacted; what the minute Parts of Silver, and what the whole consisting of those Parts; what a little Piece of the *Tænarian* Stone, and what the whole: So likewise in Sands, *Hellebore*, Wine, Meat, we can express what they are relatively; but the Nature of the things themselves we cannot, by reason of the Difference which happens in Composition. Generally, healthful things are hurtful, if we take too much of them; and hurtful things hurt not, if we take but little of them. This is most evident in Medicine; a just Measure in their Composition is beneficial; but sometimes to put in ever so little more or less, is not only not beneficial, but destructive, and often deadly. Thus Quantities and Compositions confound the Existence of external Objects, whereby we are justly reduced to Suspension, not being able to affirm any thing of the external Object.

C H A P. XX.

The Eighth Common-Place.

THE Eighth Place is, *From Relation*; for every thing having Relation to some other, what they are simply in their own Nature, we suspend from affirming. (The term [*Is*] here and elsewhere we use improperly for *Seems*, which is as much as to say, Every thing seems to have relation to some other.) This is said to be two ways; one is to the thing judging, for the External Object appeareth such to the Thing judging; the other is to the Things which are considered together with it, as Right to Left.

That all things are relative, we argued before, as well to the thing judging; for the Appearance of a thing is what it seems to this Animal, to that Man, to such a Sense, to such a Habit: As likewise to the things seen together with it; for every thing appears by such a Commixture, such a Manner, such a Composition, such a Quantity, such a Position.

That all things are relative, may also be argued thus: Whether are different things different from Relatives, or not? If not different, then they are Relatives; if different, since every thing that differs from another is relative, (as implying a relation to that from which it differs) they are relative by Difference.

Again, of things, some, according to the Dogmatists, are Supreme *Genus's*; others, most Special *Species*; others, *Genus's* and *Species*: But all these are relative, therefore there is nothing that is not relative.

Moreover they say, that of things, some are manifest, some unmanifest. The manifest (*Phænomena's*) signify the unmanifest; the unmanifest are signify'd by the *Phænomena's*, for they hold *Phænomena's* to be the Sight of the unmanifest things; but the significant and the significate are Relatives, therefore all things are relative.

Besides, of things, some are like, some unlike; some are equal, others unequal; but these are Relatives, therefore all things are relative.

Even he who saith, *All things are not relative*, confirmeth that they are relative: For by the Arguments wherewith he oppugns us, he sheweth, that this Assertion, *All things are relative*, hath reference only to us, but not to all in general.

Thus all things being relative, what every Object is in its own Nature we cannot say, but only what it appears in Relation: Whence it follows, that, as to the Nature of the things, we suspend.

C H A P. XXI.

The Ninth Common-Place.

THE Ninth Place is *from frequent or rare Contingence*, thus deduced: The Sun is certainly much more wonderful than a Comet; yet because one is seen every Day, the other seldom, the Comet makes us wonder so much, as to think some strange thing is portended thereby, the Sun not so. But if we should imagine the Sun to appear but seldom, and as soon as he had enlightened all things, presently to withdraw, and leave all in Darkness, we should therein find much Cause of wonder. Earthquakes trouble us far more at first, than when we are us'd to them. How doth a Man admire the Sea at first View? Even corporal Beauty strikes us much more at the first Sight, than after we have been accustomed and acquainted with it. Moreover, things that are scarce are esteemed, the common not esteemed. If Water were hard to be got, how much would it be prized above all things which we now value at so high Rates? If Gold were as common as Stones, who would hoard it up? Since therefore the same things are sometimes esteemed wonderful or precious, sometimes not such, according to their Scarcity or Commonness, we infer, that, How things seem according to their frequent or rare Contingences, we may perhaps say; but simply, what these exter-

nal

* This Ninth place Laertius saith that *Phavorinus* reckons the eighth, and Sextus and *Æncidemus* the tenth; and that which is the tenth, Sextus makes the eighth, *Phavorinus* the ninth. But in the Editions, and MSS. of Sextus, the ninth is the same as with Laertius; the tenth is with Laertius the fifth.

nal Objects are in themselves, we cannot; and therefore suspend.

C H A P. XXII.

The Tenth Common-Place.

THE Tenth Place chiefly concerns *Morals*, as being drawn from *Institutions, Customs, Laws, Fabulous Persuasions, and Dogmatick Opinions.*

Institution is the Election of a Course of Life, or any other thing, which is done by one or many; as by *Diogenes*, or the *Lacedaemonians*.

Law is a Covenant written by the Magistrate, which whosoever transgresseth is punished.

Custom (ἔθος or ἐνέθεια, they differ nothing) is the Approbation of something by the common Consent of many, which he who transgresseth is not punished; as, it is a *Law* that we commit not Adultery; a *Custom*, that we lie not with our Wives in publick.

Fabulous Persuasion is the Approbation of feigned Things which never were; such are the Stories of *Saturn*, which yet some believe true.

Dogmatick Opinion is the Approbation of something which seems to be confirmed by some Reason or Demonstration; as that Atoms, Homoiomeria's, Least-parts, or the like, are the Elements of Things.

Of these, we oppose sometimes one of the same kind to another of that kind; sometimes one kind to another. For Example, *Custom* to *Custom*, thus; Some *Ethiopians* paint the Skins of their Children, we do not so. The *Persians* think it decent to wear Garments stained like Flowers, we think it indecent. Some *Indians* lie with their Wives in publick, most People think it unseemly.

Law to *Law*, thus: Amongst the *Romans*, he who quits his Inheritance doth not quit his Father's Name; amongst the *Rhodians* he is forced to quit it. At *Tauris* in *Scythia*, there was a *Law*, That Strangers should be sacrific'd to *Diana*; amongst us, it is prohibited to put a Man to Death in a Temple.

Institution to *Institution*; as, that of *Diogenes* to that of *Aristippus*; that of the *Lacedaemonians* to that of the *Italians*.

Fabulous Persuasions to *Fabulous Persuasions*; as, when we say, that *Jupiter* is sometimes called Father of Men and Gods; sometimes the Ocean is so called, as,

Ocean the Sire of Gods, Thetys the Mother.

Dogmatick Opinions, one to another; as when we say, Some assert one Element, others infinite; and some hold the Soul to be mortal, others immortal; some hold the World to be governed by Providence, others not.

Again, we oppose *Custom* to something of different kind, as to *Law*; when we say, Adultery is forbidden amongst us, used amongst the *Massagets* as a thing indifferent; according to *Eudoxus* the *Cnidian*, in his first Book. It is prohibited amongst us to lie with our Mothers; in *Persia* nothing so frequent as to marry them. The *Egyptians* marry their Sisters, which we are forbidden by Law.

To *Institution*; as there are very few who will lie with their Wives in publick; yet *Crates* did so with *Hipparchia*. *Diogenes* wore his upper Coat continually; it is not our use to do so.

To *Fabulous Persuasions*: As it is fabled, that *Saturn* eat his Children; but with us it is a Custom to bring up our Children. Again, we use to worship the Gods, as good, not subject to ill; but the Poets feign them to be wounded, to envy, and the like.

To *Dogmatick Opinion*: It is a Custom with us to pray to the Gods for good Things; but *Epicurus* denies the Gods take any care of us. Again, *Aristippus* thought it an indifferent thing to wear a Woman's Garment, we think it indecent.

We oppose *Institution* to *Law*, thus: There is a *Law*, that no Man shall strike a free Person; yet Wrestlers strike one another, following the Institution of their Life. *Homicide* is forbidden, yet *Gladiators* kill one another, upon the same ground.

Fabulous Persuasions to *Institution*; as when we say, Fables tell us that *Hercules* served *Omphale*, spun, and did other Actions of a most effeminate Person; but *Hercules*'s Institution of Life was generous.

To *Dogmatick Opinion*; as Wrestlers addicted to the Pursuit of Glory, as of a good thing, chuse a laborious kind of Life; but many Philosophers assert Glory to be an ill thing.

We oppose *Law* to *Fabulous Persuasion*; as, The Poets introduce the Gods committing Adulteries, and the like; but, with us, the Law prohibits such things.

To *Dogmatick Opinion*; as, *Chrysippus* holds it a thing indifferent to lie with Mothers or Sisters; the Law forbids it.

We oppose *Fabulous Persuasions* to *Dogmatick Opinion*. As, the Poets say, *Jupiter* came down on Earth to lie with mortal Women; but the *Dogmatists* think this impossible. Again, the Poets say, that *Jupiter*, through excessive Grief for *Sarpedon*, let fall Drops of Blood upon the Earth; but it is a Tenet of Philosophers, that the Gods are not subject to any Passion. Likewise the *Dogmatists* take away *Hippocentaurs*, insinuating them as Examples of Inexiguity. Many other Presidents might be alleged, but let these serve.

Now there being so great difference, (as appeareth also by this Place) what the Subject is in its own Nature, we cannot say; but only what it seems as to that Institution, this Law, this Custom, &c.

Wherefore,

Wherefore, upon this ground also we suspend concerning the Nature of external Objects.

C H A P. XXIII.

The Five Common-Places.

THE ^a later *Scepticks* deliver Five Common-Places of Suspension; the first *from Disagreement*; the second *reducing to Infinite*; the third *from Relation to something*; the fourth, *Hypothetick*; the fifth *Alternate*.

The first Place, *from Disagreement*, is that by which we find an indetermined Disagreement concerning the thing in the Practice of Life, and amongst Philosophers; whence, not being able to prove or disprove either side, we are reduced to Suspension.

The second Place, *from Infinite*, consisteth in this; whatsoever is alledged in proof of the Thing proposed, we say requireth something else whereby that may be proved; and that likewise something else, and so to infinite; so that not having a ground whereon to fix our Beginning, we suspend.

The Third, *from Relation*: Of this Place we have treated already.

The Fourth, *Hypothetick*, is when the *Dogmatists*, perceiving themselves reduc'd to infinite, begin upon some ground which they prove not, but would have it simply granted without Demonstration.

The Fifth, *Alternate*, is when that by which we should prove a thing, requireth itself to be proved by that thing; then, because we cannot assume either to maintain the other, we suspend.

That all Questions may be reduced to these Places, we shew briefly thus. Whatsoever is propounded, is either sensible or intelligible; but which soever it be, there is Disagreement concerning it. Some hold that Sensibles only are true, some that Intelligibles only; others, that some Sensibles, and some Intelligibles. Whether will they say, the Controversy is judicable, [capable of Decision] or indjudicable? If indjudicable, is it fit we suspend; for in things indjudicably repugnant, it is not possible to assert: But if judicable, we ask how it shall be judged? As a Sensible, (for we will first take that for Instance) whether by a Sensible or by an Intelligible? If by a Sensible, so far as we disagree concerning Sensibles, even that Sensible will require another for its Proof; which other, if it be Sensible, will require another, and so to infinite: But if a Sensible require to be determined by an Intelligible, so far as Intelligibles also are controverted, that (as being intelligible) will require Adjudication and Proof; which way shall it be proved? If by an Intelligible, they run, as before, into infinite. If by a Sensible, for-

asmuch as Intelligible was assumed for proof of a Sensible, and a Sensible for proof of an Intelligible, the *Alternate Common-place* is brought in.

But if to avoid this, the Disputant would assume something as granted, without demonstrating it, whereby to demonstrate the Consequent, the *hypothetical Place* occurs, which is inextricable. For if he be creditable in Things which he requires to be granted and supposed, we likewise may be creditable, in requiring their Contraries to be granted. If that be true which he supposeth, he renders it suspicious by supposing (not proving) it; if false, his Foundation is unfound. Further, if such a Supposition conduce any thing to Proof, let him suppose the Thing in Question, rather than another Thing by which he would prove it. If it be absurd to suppose the thing controverted, it is also absurd to suppose the ground upon which we build it. That all Sensibles are *Relatives* is manifest, for (as such) they relate to those who have Sense. It is therefore evident, that whatsoever sensible Thing is proposed to us, may easily be reduced to one of these five Places.

So likewise we argue concerning Intelligibles. If the Controversy be indjudicable, we shall be allowed to suspend; if judicable by an Intelligible, it runs into *Infinite*; if by a Sensible, we drive them to the *Alternate Place*: For the Sensible being controverted, as not capable of being judged by itself, because of running into infinite, will require an Intelligible, as the Intelligible the Sensible. He who hereupon would assume any thing as granted, is as foolish on the other side. Further, an Intelligible is relative, for it is such in reference to the Intelligent; and if it were indeed such as it is named, it would not be controverted. Thus we reduce Intelligibles also to these five Places. Whereupon we are necessitated to suspend our Assent upon any Proposition. These are the five Places introduced by the later *Scepticks*, not to exclude the other ten, but more variously to relapse the Temerity of the *Dogmatists*.

C H A P. XXIV.

The two other Common-Places.

THEY likewise deliver two Places more of Suspension; for seeing that whatsoever is comprehended, seems to be comprehended (or understood) either *through itself*, or *through some other*; they seem to introduce an absolute Inextricability of all Things. That nothing is comprehended *through itself*, they say, is manifest, from the Controversy amongst natural Philosophers, concerning (I think) all Sensibles and Intelligibles: which Controversy is indjudicable, (not to be determined) by reason that we cannot use either a Sensible or an Intelligible *Criterion* for,

^a Laertius ascribes these to *Agrippa*.

for, whichever we take, it will be uncreditable, as being controverted.

For the same Reason they conceive that nothing can be comprehended *through some other*; for if that through which it is comprehended, will continually require to be comprehended through some other, they run into the *Alternate Place*, or into *Infinite*. But if a Man will assume any thing as comprehended thro' itself, by means whereof he would comprehend some other thing, to this it is repugnant, that nothing can be comprehended through itself for the Reasons before alledged. But how that which is repugnant can be comprehended either through itself, or any other, we doubt, since there appeareth no Criterion of Truth or Comprehension; but without Demonstration, signs are destroy'd, as we shall prove hereafter. Hitherto of the Places of Suspension.

C H A P. XXV.

The Places for Confutation of Ætiologicks.

IN like manner, as we have delivered these Places of Suspension, some have laid down others, particularly against Ætiologies, (Allegations of Causes or Reasons) because the Dogmatists please themselves exceedingly therein. *Ænesidemus* delivers eight Places, whereby he conceives all Dogmatick Ætiology may be refell'd, as defective.

The *First*, for that the kind of Ætiology, which is conversant in Things not apparent, hath not an acknowledged Proof from apparent Things.

The *Second*, for that there are many great Reasons to induce an Inclination, and but one alledged.

The *Third*, for that of Things done orderly, Reasons are given that shew no Order.

The *Fourth*, for that taking *Phænomena's* as they are, they think they comprehend Things not apparent, as they are likewise; for Things not apparent are perhaps effected the same way as *Phænomena's*, perhaps some other peculiar way.

The *Fifth*, for that all (very nigh) give Reasons, according to their own particular supposed Grounds, not according to the general and universally received ways of Disputation.

The *Sixth*, for that they often take for granted such Things as are easily comprehensible; but omit their Contraries, tho' equally probable.

The *Seventh*, for that they alledge Reasons not only repugnant to *Phænomena's*, but even to their own Suppositions.

The *Eighth*, for that the Things which appear, and those which are controverted, being equally dubious, they would prove their Opinion concerning doubtful Things, by Things as doubtful.

He addeth, that it is possible, in Ætiologicks

some may err by other Places dependent upon these.

But perhaps, the five Places of Suspension are sufficient against Ætiologicks. For a Man must either alledge a Reason which agreeth with all Sects of Philosophy, and with *Scepticism*, and with *Phænomena's*, or not: But to alledge such a Reason is impossible, for all *Phænomena's* and Non-apparents disagree; and disagreeing, it will be required that a Cause or Reason thereof be given. Now if he alledge a *Phænomenon* for Reason of a *Phænomenon*, or a Not-apparent for Reason of a Not-apparent, he runs into *Infinite*. If he prove one kind by the other, he incurs the *Alternate Place*. If he make a stand any where, or say, that the Cause (or Reason) is such, as that it consists with the thing by him alledged, he falleth into the Place of *Relation*, taking away that which is according to the proper Nature of the Thing; or if he assume something by way of Supposition, we shall disallow it. Thus also may the Temerity of the *Dogmatists* in Ætiology be confuted.

C H A P. XXVI.

The Phrases of the Scepticks.

FORasmuch as in using these Places of Suspension, we express ourselves by some particular Phrases, which declare the sceptical Affection, and our own Passion, as, *Not more*, *Not to be defined*, and the like, it follows, that we treat of these.

Let us begin with this, *Not more*, for which sometimes we say, *Nothing more*; not using (as some conceive) *not more* in particular Questions; and *nothing more*, in the general; but both promiscuously. We therefore will treat of them both under one. It is an imperfect Expression, as when we say *διπλῆ*, we imply *ἕνα διπλῆ*; and when *πλατεια*, we imply *πλατεια ἐξ ἑς*; so when we say, *Not more*, it is as much as to say, *Not more this than that*, upwards nor downwards. There are some Scepticks, who for the Interrogation use *ἢ*, *Which more*, *this or that*? taking *ἢ* casually, as if they should say, *ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ* more this than that? Interrogations are commonly used for = Axioms; as,

To what Man is the Wife of Jove unknown?

And Axioms for Interrogations, as, *I would know where Dion dwells?* and, *I demand for what Cause a Poet is admir'd?* Menander useth *ἢ* for *ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ*; as *Τὶ ἢ ἰσοπεταίμην*.

This Phrase, *Not more this than that*, declareth likewise our Affection, by which we are brought, by reason of the Equivalence of contrary things, to *ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς*; we mean *Equivalence*, in that which appeareth probable to us. Contraries are those which generally

* What Axioms are, see in the Doctrine of the *Sorites*.

generally oppugn one another; 'Απὸ-ψία is an inclining to neither. Now this Phrase, *Not more, tho'* it seem to imply Assent or Denial, we use not that manner, but indifferently and improperly, either by way of question, or for *I know not to which of these I should assent, and to which I should not assent.* But being requir'd to declare what seemeth to us, we use the Phrase by which we declare it indifferently. Know likewise, that when we say, *Not more*, we assert not that the Doubt is true, but only express what appeareth to us.

The next is *Aphasia*; *Phasis* is taken two ways, generally and particularly: generally for any Speech, declaring Assertion or Denial, as, *It is Day, It is not Day*: particularly, for Assertion only; in which Acceptation, the Negatives are not called *αδενσις*. *Aphasia* therefore is a Renunciation of *Phasis*, in the general Signification, which comprehends both Affirmation and Negation. It is that Affection by which we neither assert a thing, nor deny it. We assume *Aphasia*, not because the Nature of things is such, as necessarily move it; but declaring, that at present we are thus affected, as to these or those Questions. Always remember, that we neither assert nor deny any thing unapparent, but yield to those which move us pathetically, and necessarily compel us to assent.

These Phrases, *ἴσως ἢ ὀυκ*, *ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστι*, *ἰσχυρῶς ἢ οὐκ ἰσχυρῶς*, *Perhaps*, and *Not perhaps*, we use for, *Perhaps it is, Perhaps it is not.* Thus, for brevity, we take, *Not perhaps*, for, *Perhaps it is not.* Here again we contest not about Words, nor enquire what they naturally signify, but take them indifferently. These Phrases declare an *Aphasia*; for he who saith, *Perhaps it is*, implies its contrary to be as probable, because he assents not that this is. The same of the rest.

Ἐμψω, *I suspend*, we take for, *I cannot say whether I ought to believe or disbelieve the thing proposed*, declaring, That the things seem equal to us, as to Belief and Unbelief; whether they are equal in themselves, we assert not, but speak of the *Phænomenon*, as it incurs into our Sense. *Ἐμψω*, *Suspension*, is so called, *καὶ τὸ ἐμψωχὸν ὁ διανοία*, from the *Mind's being held in Suspension*, betwixt asserting and denying, through Equivalence of the thing question'd. The same we say concerning

Ὁοδιν ὁ λόγος, *I determine nothing*; *Ἐξέω*, we conceive to be, not simply to speak a thing, but to pronounce an unmanifest thing with Assent. Thus perhaps the *Sceptick* will be found to determine nothing, not so much as this, *I determine nothing.* For it is not a dogmatical Opinion, (that is, an Assent to something not manifest) but a Phrase declaring our Affection. When therefore the *Sceptick* saith, *I determine nothing*, he meaneth, *I am so affected at the present, as not dogmatically to assert or deny any of the things controverted.* This he saith, as expressing how they appear to him, not pronouncing it enunciatively with Persuasion.

Ἀσέσις is a Passion of the Mind, whereby we neither assert nor deny things dogmatically controverted, that is, not manifest. When therefore the *Sceptick* saith, *All are undefinable*, he taketh *are* for *appear* so to him; he saith *All*, not *Beings*, but those *not manifest*, controverted by the *Dogmatists*. *Indefinable*, that is, *Not to be preferred before their Contraries, or common Repugnants, by Belief or Disbelief.* And as he who saith, *Ambulo*, implieth, *Ego ambulō*; so he who saith, *All things are indefinite*, implieth, *as to us, or, as it seemeth to me.* The Meaning therefore is this, *All things controverted by the Dogmatists appear so to me, as that I think none of them more worthy Belief than its contrary.*

The same is our Meaning when we say, *All are incomprehensible*; we take [all] in the same Sense, and imply [to me;] as if we should say, *All things controverted among the Dogmatists seem to me incomprehensible.* We affirm not, they are incomprehensible in their own Nature, but declare our own Affection, that we conceive we understand them not, by reason of the Equivalence of Contraries.

Likewise the Phrase, *ἀκαταληπτόν*, and *ἡ ἀκαταληπτός*, declares our own Affection; by which the *Sceptick*, for the present, neither asserts nor denies any of the things not manifest that are in Controversy. This is evident from what hath been said upon the other Phrases.

When we say, *To every Speech an equal Speech is opposite*, we mean, to every Speech that we have examined. *Speech*, we take not simply, but for that which asserteth something dogmatically, that is, of a thing not manifest, not only by Premises and Conclusion, but any other way. *Equal*, we take not simply, but as to Belief and Disbelief. *Is opposite*, we take generally for is repugnant, implying, *as I think.* When therefore we say, *To every Speech there is an equal Speech opposite*; the Meaning is, *To every Speech that I have examined, which asserteth any thing dogmatically, there seemeth to me to be opposite another Speech, asserting likewise dogmatically, equal to it for Belief or Disbelief.* Thus this Expression is not dogmatical, but the Signification of an human Affection, which is that which appeareth to the Person affected. Some there are who pronounce it thus, *To every Speech, to oppose an equal Speech*; laying this down as a Precept, That to every Speech dogmatically asserting any thing, we should oppose the Speech which dogmatically asserteth its contrary. Thus, addressing their Words to the *Sceptick*, they use the Infinitive for the Imperative, *To oppose*, for, *Let us oppose.* They advis'd the *Sceptick* not to be deceived by the *Dogmatists*, nor to give over his Inquiry; for the Indisturbance which they conceive accompanies those who suspend their Assent in every thing, as we said before.

It is not necessary to alledge more of these Phrases; even of these alledged some might have been spared;

spared; but take it for a Rule, In all the Sceptical Phrases, we affirm not that the Phrases themselves are true; for we say, that some may be taken away by others, and are circumscribed by those very things of which they are spoken; as purgative Medicines expel not only Humours, but, together with the Humours, themselves out of the Body. Moreover, we say that we use them not, as properly signifying the thing to which they are applied, but indifferently, or (if they will so call it) improperly; for it becomes not the *Sceptick* to contest about Words. This we may the better do, in that the Words are said not to signify any thing purely in themselves, but relatively, and therefore as well in reference to the *Scepticks*. Furthermore, it must be remember'd, that we pronounce them not generally of all things, but of the not manifest, and those which are dogmatically controverted. The *Phænomenon* (that which appeareth to us) we declare; but of the Nature of the external Object, we affirm nothing. By what hath been said, I conceive, that all Sophisms brought against the Sceptical Phrases may be resolved.

C H A P. XXVII.

Wherein Scepticism differs from those Philosophical Sects which are most like it; and first, wherein it differs from the Philosophy of Heraclitus.

HAVING declared the Signification of Scepticism, its *Parts*, its *Criteria*, its *End*, its *Places of Suspension*, its *Phrases*, and its *Character*; it followeth that we explicate briefly, *wherein it differs from those Sects which seem most like it*, that by this means we may the better understand it.

We will begin with the Philosophy of *Heraclitus*. That this differs from our Institution, is evident; for *Heraclitus* asserteth dogmatically concerning many things not manifest, which (as I said before) we do not. But so far as the Followers of *Ænesidæmus* said, the *Sceptick* Institution is the Way to the *Heraclitian* Philosophy; because that *Contraries appear in the same thing*, is precedent to *Contraries are in the same thing*: But the *Scepticks* say, *Contraries appear in the same thing*; and the *Heraclitians* go on farther, affirming, *Contraries are in the same thing*: we answer, That *Contraries appear in the same thing*, is not a Doctrine of the *Scepticks*, but a thing evident by Sense, not to the *Scepticks* only, but to all other Philosophers and Men; as none dare deny, but Honey to the Sound is sweet; to such as have the Overflowing of the Gall, bitter. Hereupon, the *Heraclitians* begin from the common Prænotion of Men, as we do also, and perhaps other Sects: Wherefore if they had taken this Sentence, *There are Contraries in the same thing*, as from this Saying, *All are incomprehensible, or from, I determine nothing, or*

some other of that kind, perhaps they might collect rightly what they say; but since they have some Principles incident not only to us, but to other Philosophers, and even to the Course of Life itself, why should any say our Institution is preparative to the Philosophy of *Heraclitus*, more than to any other Sect, or to the Course of Life itself, seeing all of us use these in common? Neither know I whether the *Sceptical* Institution divert not from the *Philosophy of Heraclitus*, rather than conduce to it; since the *Sceptick* reprehends, as temerarious, all that *Heraclitus* asserted dogmatically, contradicting his *Conflagration*, contradicting also his Tenent, *That there are Contraries in the same thing*; and to every Doctrine of *Heraclitus*, (deriding the Temerity of the *Dogmatists*) he saith, *I comprehend not, I determine not*, (as before) which oppugns the *Heraclitians*. But it is absurd to say, That an Institution, which oppugns another, is the Way preparative to the Discipline it oppugns. Therefore it is absurd to say, That the *Sceptical* Institution is the Way to the *Heraclitian* Philosophy.

C H A P. XXVIII.

Wherein Scepticism differs from the Philosophy of Democritus.

I N the like manner, the Philosophy of *Democritus* is said to be all one with *Scepticism*, in that it seems to use the same Matter; for from the Appearance of Honey, to some sweet, to some bitter, *Democritus* argued, that in itself it is neither sweet nor bitter, and thereupon used to say, *Not more*, a *Sceptick* Phrase. But this Phrase, *Not more*, is taken by the *Scepticks*, and by the *Democritians*, after a different manner. The *Democritians* signify by it, that *neither is*; but we, *that we know not whether both of the Phenomena's are, or whether neither is*: Herein we dissent from them. But far greater is the Difference in that *Democritus* saith, *Atoms and Vacuum truly are*; that herein he differs from us, (though he begin with the Inequality and Disagreement of *Phænomena's*) I conceive it needless to prove.

C H A P. XXIX.

Wherein Scepticism differs from the Cyrenaick Sect.

SOME affirm the *Cyrenaick* Sect to be the same with *Scepticism*, so far as it holds, *that the Affections themselves only are comprehended*. Nevertheless it is different from *Scepticism*; for it holds *Pleasure, and a light Motion of the Flesh*, to be the *End*; we, *Indisturbance*, to which the *End* they propose is contrary. For whether Pleasure be present or absent, he who asserts it to be the *End* is disturbed, as we said before. Besides, we suspend only

from asserting any thing concerning external Objects; but the *Cyrenaicks* affirm they are of an incomprehensible Nature.

CHAP. XXX.

Wherein Scepticism differs from the Institution of Protagoras.

*P*rotagoras will have Man to be μέτρον χρημάτων πάντων, the Measure of all things; of Beings, as they are; of not Beings, as they are not. By μέτρον, he means the Criterie; by χρημάτων, πραγμάτων, of Things; which is as much as to say, Man is the Criterie of all things; of Beings, as they are; of not Beings, as they are not. Hereupon he asserts the *Phænomena's* to be particular to every one, and thus brings in the relative Common-place, whereby he seems to have Community with the *Pyrrhonians*; but he differs from them, as we shall easily find in explicating his Opinion. He saith, Matter is fluid, and being in perpetual Fluxion, Affections are made instead of Substractions, and the Senses are transmuted and changed, according to the several Ages and Constitutions of the Body. He saith also, The Reasons (or Powers) of all *Phænomena's* are subjected in Matter; so that Matter, in itself, is all things which it appears unto all. But Men at different times perceive things different, by reason of their different Habits: He whose Constitution is sound, of the things which are in Matter, perceiveth those which are capable of appearing to such Persons; they who are otherwise disposed, perceive the things which are capable of appearing to Persons of a contrary Constitution. The same Reason there is in the Difference of Ages, in Sleeping and Waking, and in all kinds of Habits. Man therefore, according to him, is the Criterie of things that Are; for all things which appear to Men, Are; those which appear not to any Man, Are not. Thus, we see, he dogmatically asserted, That Matter is fluid, and that the Reasons of all *Phænomena's* are subjected in it; wherein we, as being things not manifest, suspend our Assent.

CHAP. XXXI.

Wherein Scepticism differs from the Academick Philosophy.

*S*OME hold the Academick Philosophy to be the same with Scepticism; let us therefore examine it. It is said, there were no more than three Academies; One, the most ancient, instituted by Plato; the Second, and middle Academy, by Arcesilaus, Disciple of *Peleman*; the Third, and new Academy, by *Carnæades* and *Clitomachus*. There are who reckon a

Fourth, instituted by *Philo* and *Charmides*; some also a Fifth, by *Antiochus*. We will begin with the most ancient. Some hold Plato to be Dogmatick, others Aporetick (dubitative;) others, in some things, Dogmatick; in some, Aporetick. For in his Gymnastick Discourses, where *Socrates* is introduced deriding or disputing with the *Sophists*, they say he hath a Gymnastick and Aporetick Character; but when he declareth his own Opinion in the Person of *Socrates*, *Timæus*, or the like, a Dogmatist. As for those who say he is a Dogmatist, or in some things Dogmatick, in others Aporetick, we shall not need to meddle with them; for they acknowledge that he dissents from us. Whether he be purely Sceptick, we discourse at large in our *Hypomnemata*; we shall now only examine it briefly, according to *Permedius* and *Ænæsiædemus*, (for they chiefly undertook this Task) who say, that Plato, when he asserted concerning *Idea's*, or that there is Providence, or that Life joined with Virtue is to be preferred before Life joined with Vice: If he assent to these as existent, he averrth dogmatically; if he assent as to the more probable, he differs from the Sceptick Character, in preferring one before the other, as to Belief and Disbelief, as is manifest from what hath been said already. Nor though he pronounce things sceptically in his *Gymnasticks*, is he therefore a Sceptick; for he who asserteth any one thing dogmatically, or preferreth any Phantasy before another, for Belief or Disbelief of a thing not manifest, followeth the Dogmatick Character, as *Timon* sheweth, speaking of *Xenophanes*: For (having often commended him, inso much that he writes his *Silli* in his Person) he maketh him to complain, and say,

*I wish my Soul were subtle, and her Eye
So sharp, as might both Sides at once descry.
Lost in the doubtful Way, I long have straid;
Even though (grown old) I had with Care essay'd
Every Opinion, search'd all Theory:
For unto which could I my Mind apply?
All into one Resolve; and this One ever
Drawn into One like Nature dath persevere.*

Whence he also calls him *ὑπερήφανος*, and not absolutely *ἄνυστος*, void of Pride, thus;

Ἐ Xenophanes, not wholly free from Pride,
The Fictions of old Homer did deride;
And from'd a God, a whose Figure dath dissent
From Men; equal each way; intelligent.

He calls him *ὑπερήφανος*, as being not quite *ἄνυστος*; and *Ὀυμνοποιὸν ἄνθρωπον*, for that he reproached and blamed the fabulous way of *Homer*. Now *Xenophanes*

^a M. S. Ἀποκριτικόν.

^b Laert. *Ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστιν.*

^c M. S. *Ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστιν.* perhaps *ἔστιν.* Laertius saith, He held that God is of a

Spheric Form, nothing like to Men. This seems to be meant *ἀνθρώπου*, to the Figure refer *ὡς ἀνθρώπου*, such is a Globe.

^d Stories concerning the Gods. Laert. in *Xenoph.*

^e His

Xenophanes asserted, besides *Prænotions* (as others also) that the *Universe* is one, and that *God* is of the same Nature with all things; that *He* is *Spherical*, *Immobile*, *Immutable*, and *Rational*: Whence it is easy to these that *Xenophanes* differs from us. Moreover, from what we said, it is manifest that *Plato*, though of some things he doubt, yet because in others he asserts, concerning the Essence of things not manifest, and of things not manifest, preferreth some before others, is no *Sceptick*.

Those of the new *Academy*, though they say all things are *incomprehensible*, differ from the *Scepticks* perhaps in saying, that all things are *incomprehensible*; for they assert this, but the *Sceptick* admits it possible that they may be comprehended. But more apparently they differ from us in the Dijudication of Good and Evil. For the *Academicks* say, that something is Good and Ill, not after our manner, but as being persuaded, it is more probable, that what they call Good is Good, than the contrary: Whereas we say not that any thing is Good or Ill, as thinking what we say is probable; but without Opinion, we follow the ordinary Course of Life, or otherwise we should do nothing. Moreover we hold *Phantasies* to be equal, as to Belief and Disbelief; but they, that some are *Credible*, others *Incredible*. The *Credible* also they subdivide into many Kinds; some they hold to be *Credible* only; some to be *Credible* and *Circumcurrent*; some to be *Credible* and *Circumcurrent*, and *Undistracted*; as, a Rope lying loose in a dark Room, a Man receives a *Credible* Phantasy from it, and runs away; another considering it more exactly, and weighing the Circumstances, as that it moves not, that it is of such Colour, and the like, to him it appears a Rope, according to *Credible* and *Circumcurrent* Phantasy. *Undistracted* Phantasy is after this manner. It is reported, that *Hercules* brought *Alceſtis* back from the *Inferi* after her Death, and shew'd her to *Admetus*. He receiv'd a true and *Circumcurrent* Phantasy of *Alceſtis*; but remembering she was dead, his Phantasy was distracted from Assent, and inclined to Disbelief. Now the new *Academicks*, before Phantasy, which is simply *Credible*, prefer that which is *Credible* and *Circumcurrent*; and before both, that which is *Credible*, and *Circumcurrent*, and *Undistracted*. For though both *Academicks* and *Scepticks* say they believe some things; yet herein is a manifest Difference between their Philosophies: To believe, is taken several ways; sometimes for not to resist, as a Boy is said to believe his Master; sometimes for assenting to another, with an earnest resolute Desire of the thing; as a Prodigal believes him, who persuades him to live sumptuously: Now *Carnades* and *Clitomachus* using the word *Believe* and *Credible*, as with vehement Inclination, we only for yielding, without Propensity to any thing; herein also we differ from them.

We differ likewise from the new *Academy*, as to

what belongs to the End: They use in the Course of Life what is *Credible*, we following Laws, Customs, and natural Affections, live without engaging our Opinion. We might add more Instances of the Difference between us, if it were not too large for our Design.

But *Arcesilaus*, Institutor and President of the middle *Academy*, seems to me to participate so much of the *Pyrrhonian* Reasons, as that his Institution and ours is almost the same. For neither is he found to assert concerning the Existence or Inexistence of any thing, neither doth he prefer one thing before another for Belief or Disbelief; but in all things he suspends, holding *Suspension* to be the End; which, as we said, brings us to *Indisturbance*. He likewise holds particular *Suspensions* to be good, particular Assertions to be ill. But if we may believe what is related of him, they say, at first Sight he appears a *Pyrrhonian*, but was indeed a *Dogmatist*; and that making trial, by Doubts, of his Disciples, whether they were capable of *Plato's* Doctrine, he was thought to be *Apoietick*, but that to his more ingenious Friends he taught the Doctrine of *Plato*: Whence *Aristo* of him;

*Pyrrho behind, Plato before,
And in the middle, Diodore.*

For, though a *Platonick*, he used the *Dialectick* of *Diodorus*.

Plato saith, As to (the Stoical Criterie) comprehensive Phantasies, things are *incomprehensible*; as to the Natures of the things themselves, *comprehensible*. *Antiochus* transferr'd the Stoick Sect into the *Academick*: whence it was said of him, That he taught the Stoick Doctrine in the Academy; for he shewed, that the Stoical Tenets were in *Plato*. Hereby it appears, the *Sceptick* Institution is different from the fourth and fifth *Academy*.

C H A P. XXXII.

Whether Empirical Medicine be the same with Scepticism.

SOME hold *Empirical Medicine* to be the same with the *Sceptick Philosophy*; but we must know (notwithstanding it holds, that things not manifest are *incomprehensible*) it is not the same with *Scepticism*, neither is this Sect fit for a *Sceptick*, who, in my Opinion, ought rather to pursue that which is called *Metabodick*; which alone, of all the Sects of Medicine, seems to behave itself not temerarily in things not manifest; nor arrogantly to determine whether they are *comprehensible* or *incomprehensible*; but following *Phænomena's*, it takes from them what seemeth profitable, according to the Course of the *Scepticks*. For, as we said before, the common Life of a *Sceptick* consists of four Parts, conversant

in the *Instruction of Nature*, in the *Impulsion of Passions*, in the *Constitutions of Laws and Customs*, and in the *Tradition of Arts*. As a *Sceptick* therefore, by the *Impulsion of Passions*, is brought from *Thirst to Drink*, from *Hunger to Meat*, and the like; so a *Methodick Physician* is guided by the *Passions* to that which is convenient, from *Constriction of the Pores to Relaxation*, as when we shun the *Condensation of Cold*, by going into the *Sunshine*; from *Relaxation of the Pores to Constriction*, as when sweating immoderately in a *Bath*, we retire to the cooler *Air*. That the things contrary to *Nature* lead him to those that are agreeable to *Nature*, is manifest even from a *Dog*, who having got a *Thorn* in his *Foot*, endeavours presently to get it out. Not to reckon up every thing, which were to exceed the *Scope of a Summary*, I conceive, that all things said in this

manner by the *Methodicks*, may be referred to the *Impulsion of our Passions*, as well those which are agreeable to *Nature*, as those which are not. Herein indeed these two *Institutions* agree, both disclaim *Opinion*, and both use *Words* indifferently; as the *Sceptick*, *I design nothing, I comprehend nothing*; the *Methodick*, *κένεσις, διακωρ*, and the like. The word *ἡσυχία* also he takes, without *Opinion*, for an *Action*, whereby we are deduced from apparent *Passions*, natural and preternatural, to those which seem convenient, as I shewed in *Thirst and Hunger*. The *Methodicks* therefore are nearer ally'd to the *Scepticks* than any other *Medicinal Sect*, as appears by comparing them. Thus having discoursed of those, which are of nearest Resemblance to the *Sceptick Institution*, we conclude the general Part of *Scepticism*, and the first Book of our *Summary*.

OF DIALECTICK.

The SECOND BOOK.

CHAP. I.

Whether a Sceptick can examine and dispute against Assertions.

HAVING undertaken an Inquisition of the *Dogmatists*, we will briefly, and by way of *Summary*, examine every Part of that which they call *Philosophy*. But first let us answer them who cry, *A Sceptick is not capable to examine or comprehend Dogmatick Assertions*. They argue thus: *A Sceptick either comprehends Assertions, or not; if he comprehend them, how can he doubt of that, which by his own Confession he comprehends? If he doth not comprehend them, he cannot discourse upon that which he comprehends not. For, as he who knows not (for Example) what is τὸ αἰὸς ἀεὶ αὐτῶν, or, a Theorem by two Topics, is not able to say any thing of them: So, he who knows not the particular Assertion of the Dogmatists, cannot dispute against that, of which he knows nothing; therefore a Sceptick cannot examine or dispute gainst the Assertions of Dogmatists.*

Who argue thus: Let them say in what Sense they use the word [*comprehend*] whether simply, for to understand without affirming ought concerning the Beings of the things whereon we discourse; or not only to understand, but to grant the being of those things. If they say, To comprehend, is by Discourse to assent to comprehensive Phantasy, so far as much as comprehensive Phantasy proceeds from a thing that hath Being, im-

pressed and sealed according to the Being thereof, in such manner as cannot be derived from that which hath no Being, perhaps even they themselves will not be capable of examining or disputing against that which they comprehend not: As when the *Stoick* disputed against the *Epicurean*, who affirms that *Substance is divided*; or, that *God orders not the World by Providence*; or, that *Pleasure is a Good*; Doth he comprehend, or not? If he comprehend, he, in saying these things arse, wholly subverts the *Stoick Doctrine*; if he comprehends not, neither can he say any thing against it. The same may be objected to those of all other Sects, when they offer to dispute against Opinions, which they conceive heterodox; so as none of them can dispute against another, upon any pretence whatsoever. Besides, (not to trifle) in a word, all their *Dogmatick Learning* will be subverted, and the *Sceptick Philosophy* firmly established, if it be granted, that none can dispute of any thing, which is not thus comprehended. For whoever asserts *dogmatically* concerning a thing not certain, asserts, either as having comprehended it, or not; if he hath not comprehended it, what he saith will not be credible; if he hath comprehended it, he must say, that he did it either through the very thing

thing itself, and by some Act incident to it, or by some Inquisition and Examination. If *through itself* by some Act incident to it a thing not manifest be comprehended, it cannot be said to be not manifest, but equally apparent to all, granted and not controverted. But concerning every thing not manifest, there is an irreconcilable Difference amongst them; wherefore the *Dogmatist*, who asserts concerning the Being of a thing not manifest, doth not comprehend it through itself, and by an Act incident to it. But, if by some Inquisition, how is he capable of enquiring or disputing, before he comprehends the thing itself, according to the Hypothesis proposed? For Inquisition requiring that the thing after which we enquire be exactly comprehended; and on the other side, the Comprehension of the thing whereof we enquire, requiring first Inquisition, by the alternate *Common-place* of Suspension, it will be impossible for them to enquire and assert dogmatically concerning things not manifest. If they would begin from *Comprehension*, we object, that they must first enquire before they can comprehend; if from *Inquisition*, that they must comprehend before they can enquire. Wherefore they can neither comprehend, nor positively affirm concerning things not manifest. So that this foolish *dogmatick* Flourish will be taken away, and, as I conceive, the *Ephectick* Philosophy come in of itself.

Now if they say, They conceive it not necessary, that such Comprehension precede Inquisition, but simple Intellection only; it is not impossible but they, who suspend as to things not manifest, may dispute also; for the Sceptick, as I think, is not excluded from Intellection, which ariseth from Phenomena's that occur, and actually affect us. Neither doth this necessarily infer, that Intelligibles are existent; for we understand not only things existent, but the in-existent; whence the *Ephectick*, whether enquiring or understanding, continueth in his Sceptick Institution. For, that he assents to things that occur to him by passive Phantasy, as they appear to him, is manifest.

Let us now see, whether the *Dogmatists* themselves are not excluded from Inquisition. It is not incongruous, that they who confess themselves ignorant of the Nature of things, should yet enquire after them, but that they who think they know them exactly should do so; for these are arrived, as they think, at the End of Inquisition, the others still retain the Ground of Inquisition, to think they have not found. We shall briefly enquire into every Part of that which they call Philosophy. And forasmuch as there is great Controversy among the *Dogmatists*, concerning the Parts thereof; some asserting one, others two, others three, (which it is to no purpose here to enlarge,) we will explain the Opinion of

those who seem most perfectly conversant therein, and accommodate our Discourse to that.

CHAP. II.

From whence the Inquisition against Dogmatists should begin.

THE Stoicks and some others say, The Parts of Philosophy are three, *Logick, Physick, Ethick*; they begin with the *Logick*, teaching that first (yet there is no little Controversy, which of them they should begin withal.) These we shall follow, without engaging our Opinion. And because the Assertions in these three Parts require Judgment and a Criterie, and the Discourse concerning the Criterie seemeth to belong to *Logick*, we will begin with the logical Part; and first of the Criterie.

CHAP. III.

Of the Criterie.

Whereas they call a Criterie, *that whereby Essence and Existence* (as they say) *are judged*; as also, *that wherein we acquiesce in the Course of Life*: Our purpose now is to discourse of that which they call, *The Criterie of Truth*; for of Criterie in the other Sense, we discoursed formerly * in the first Book,

The Criterie of which we now discourse is taken three ways, *Commonly, Properly, Most properly*. Commonly, for every Measure of Comprehension; in which Sense *Naturals* also are called Criteries, as, *Sight*. Properly, for every artificial Measure of Comprehension; as, a *Ruler, a Pair of Compasses*. Most properly, for every artificial Measure of Comprehension of a thing not manifest; in which Sense, those things which belong to the Actions of Life are not called Criteries, but the rational only, and those which *dogmatick Philosophers* alledge for *Invention of Truth*. Our Design is, as we said, to discourse of the rational Criterie; and of this also there are three Kinds; in which, by which, according to which; as, in which, the Man; by which, the Sense, or the Intellect; according to which, the Application of the Phantasy; according to which a Man attempts to judge by one of the fore-named. This it was necessary first to lay down, for understanding the Subject of the Question. It remains we confute those, who unadvisedly affirm they comprehend the Criterie of Truth; we will begin with that.

CHAP. IV.

Whether there be any Criterie of Truth.

OF those who have discoursed concerning the Criterie, some hold, that it is, as the Stoicks and others;

others; some, that there is none, as (among the rest) *Xenades of Corinth*, and *Xenophanes of Colophon*, who saith,

— in every thing Opinion's fram'd.

But we suspend, whether there be, or be not.

This Controversy they must hold to be either judicable, (that is, determinable) or indjudicable, (indeterminable.) If indjudicable, they grant, we ought to suspend in it; if judicable, let them say whereby it shall be judged, when as we have not a Criterie acknowledged by all, neither know we whether there indeed be one, but enquire.

Moreover, to judge this Controversy of the Criterie, it is requisite we have a Criterie acknowledged, by which we may judge it; and to have a Criterie acknowledged, it is necessary, that the Controversy concerning the Criterie be first judged. The Dispute thus incurring the *alternate Common-place*, it cannot be resolved whether there be a Criterie or no. For we grant them not a Criterie by supposition; and if they judge a Criterie by a Criterie, force them to go on into infinite.

Again, Demonstration requiring a Criterie demonstrated, and the Criterie a Demonstration dijudicated, they fall into the *alternate Common-place*.

This we conceive sufficient to confute the Confidence of the Dogmatists, in what they assert concerning a Criterie. It is not from the purpose to insist longer hereon, and to shew several other ways, whereby they may be confuted; but we shall not mention all their particular Opinions herein, (for it cannot be expressed, how much they differ among themselves concerning it; and this would put us out of the right Method in our Dispute.) Because therefore the Criterie after which we enquire seems threefold, in which, by which, according to which, we shall examine every one of these apart, and shew its Incomprehensibility. Thus our Discourse will be most methodical and perfect. We will begin with that in which, for the rest seem in some manner dubious by reason of it.

CHAP. V.

Of the Criterie, In which.

NOW *Man*, (in my opinion) by what the Dogmatists say, is not only not to be comprehended, but not to be understood; for we hear *Socrates* (in *Plato*) plainly confessing, *he knows not whether he is a Man or some other thing*. And when they would declare the Notion of *Man*, they first disagree among themselves, next they speak foolishly; for *Democritus* saith, *Man is that which we all know*; by which we cannot know what *Man* is; for we

know a Dog, and according to this, a Dog should be a Man; some Men we know not, and therefore they should not be Men. But indeed, according to this Notion there will be no Man at all; for if it be necessary that a Man be known by all, there is no Man known to all Men, and consequently there is no Man at all. That we say not this sophistically, but as a Consequence to his Doctrine, is apparent; for he holds, that *nothing really exists but Atoms and Vacuum*, which (he saith) *exist not in Animals only, but in all compounded things*; by these we cannot understand the Property of Man; for they are common to all, but there is in these nothing else within our Capacity; we have nothing therefore whereby we may distinguish Man from other Creatures, and understand him simply.

Epicurus saith, that *Man is such a kind of figured animate Being*: Now, according to this, seeing Man is only such a kind of Being, as is shewn, (by him, who thus describes him) that Person who is not such as is thus shewn, is not a Man: and if a Man (in describing Man after this manner) shew a Woman, the Man himself will not be a Man; or if a Woman shew a Man, the Woman will not be of Mankind. The same we may argue from the Difference of *Circumstances* mention'd in the fourth *Common-place* of Suspension.

Others say, a *Man is an Animal, rational, mortal, capable of Understanding and Science*: Now having shewn in the first *Common-place* of Suspension, that no Animal is irrational, but that all are capable of Understanding and Science, by their own Confession, we know not what they mean. Again, the Accidents which are inserted into a Definition, are meant either actual or potential. If actual, he is no Man who hath not attained perfect Science, and hath not perfect Science or Discourse, and is not in the State of Death, for that is to be mortal actually. If potential, he who hath perfect Reason, and hath attained Understanding and Science, is no Man; which were more absurd than the former.

Plato, who will have a Man to be an Animal without Feathers, with two Feet, with broad Nails, capable of political Science, dares not affirm this positively. For if a Man be, as he holds, one of those things which are generated, but indeed are not; it is impossible (as he acknowledgeth) to affirm positively concerning things that are not. Neither doth *Plato* himself lay down this Position as certain, but discoursing, as he useth, according to the most probable.

But though we should grant, that *Man* may be understood, we shall nevertheless find that he cannot be comprehended. For we consist of Soul and Body, but neither Soul nor Body (perhaps) can be compre-

* So *Plato* distinguisheth often, especially in *Timæus*, where he at large explained *τι τι ἐστὶν αἴτιον, γινώσκον ὃ ἄνθρωπος, &c. τι γινώσκον* *αὐτοῦ, ὃ δὲ ἄνθρωπος*.

prehended, therefore not Man. That the Body is not comprehended, appears from this; that the Accidents of a thing are distinct from the thing to which they are Accidents; now when Colour, or the like, presents itself to us, the Accidents of the Body are presented to us, but not the Body itself. A Body, they say, hath three Dimensions; we must therefore, to comprehend the Body, comprehend the Length, Breadth, and Depth; but if this did present itself to us, we might discern Silver that is gilt: Therefore the Body cannot be comprehended.

Besides this, a Man shall be found to be incomprehensible, because his Soul is incomprehensible. That his Soul is incomprehensible, is manifest, thus. Of those who have discoursed concerning the Soul, (to omit the great undetermined Contest amongst them) some said that there is no Soul, as the Followers of *Diocærus* the *Messianian*; others, that there is; others suspended. This Controversy therefore, if the Dogmatists acknowledge to be indjudicable, they grant the Incomprehensibility of the Soul; if judicable, let them say, by what they judge and determine it. By Sense they cannot, for they hold the Soul to be intelligible; if by Intellect, we object, the Intellect is the most unmanifest thing in the Soul; as they shew, who agree in the Existence of the Soul, but disagree concerning her Intellect. If therefore they would comprehend the Soul, and determine the Controversy concerning her by Intellect, they would determine that which is less in Controversy, by that which is more in Controversy, which is absurd. Therefore neither by Intellect can the Question concerning the Soul be judged and determined, therefore by nothing; therefore it is incomprehensible, and consequently Man cannot be comprehended.

But tho' we should grant, that Man may be comprehended, yet perhaps it cannot be proved, that Things should be judged (and determined) by him. For he who saith, that Things should be judged by Man, saith it either without Demonstration or with Demonstration. Not with Demonstration, for Demonstration ought to be true and adjudged; but, we knowing none, who by the Consent of all, is able to judge the Demonstration, (for the Criterie in which is in question) we are not able to judge the Demonstration, and consequently cannot demonstrate the Criterie in which, the Subject of our Discourse. If it be said, that Things may be judged by Man without Demonstration, it will be incredible, because we have not any thing whereby to ascertain, that the Criterie in which is Man. From what shall it be judged, that the Criterie in which is Man? For if they say it without Judgment and Determination, it will not be admitted; if as determined by Man, the Question is begged; if, as by any other Creature, how can any such be allow'd, to determine that Man is the Criterie? If without Determination,

it is of no credit; if with Determination, that Criterie must again be judged by some other, to be capable of determining; if by itself, the Absurdity continues, for the Thing in question is determin'd by the Thing in question. If by Man, the alternate Common-place comes in. If by any other besides these, we shall again require a Criterie in which, and so to infinite. Therefore, we cannot say, Things are to be determined by Man.

But if it be granted, that Man ought to determine Things; yet seeing there is so great Dissention amongst Men, the Dogmatists must agree amongst themselves, what one Man they ought to follow, before they impose it upon us. Otherwise, if,

As long as Streams shall flow, and tall Trees bloom,

they are like to disagree upon this, why do they press us so earnestly to assent to any one Person? If, say they, we must believe a wise Man; we shall ask, What kind of wise Man, whether an *Epicurean*, or a *Stoick*, or a *Cynick*? They cannot agree which. If any require us to lay down this Question concerning the wise Man, and simply to believe him who is wiser than all others; first, they will herein also disagree, who is wiser than the rest; and, tho' they could agree in some one Person, acknowledging him wiser than all that are, or ever were, yet neither will he be worthy to be credited; for there being a great, and, almost infinite Intension and Remission, as to Wisdom, we say, it is possible, there may be another wiser than this Man, whom they hold to be wiser than all that either are or were. As therefore they require of us to give credit to him, that is said to be wiser than all that are, or ever were, in respect of his Wisdom; so, if one comes after him wiser than he, this last is to be believed before him; and whilst this second lives, we may hope for another wiser than he; after whom, another; and so to infinite. Now whether these will agree with one another, no Man knows. So that tho' it were granted, that there is one Man wiser than all that are, or ever were; yet because we cannot affirm, there shall never be any one wiser than he, (for that is uncertain,) we ought always to expect the Judgment of that future wisest Person, and not assent to him who is wisest at present.

But tho' we should grant, that there is not, was not, nor ever shall be, any Person wiser than him whom they suppose, yet neither is it convenient to believe him; for wise Persons affect most (in the Construction of Things) to maintain Paradoxes, making the unsound seem sound and true. When therefore the sagacious Person says any thing, we cannot tell whether he speaks it according to the Nature of the Thing itself, or alledgeth a Falsity as if it were a Truth; persuading us to believe it, he being wiser than all Men, and therefore we not able to contra-

dict him. Thus ought we not to assent to him, as judging Things rightly, because we may imagine, the Things which he saith are not true, but represented as such, by the extraordinary Advantage he hath over us in Sagacity. For these Reasons, we ought not, in the Judgment of Things, to believe him, who seemeth the most sagacious of all Men.

If any shall say, we ought to believe the Agreement of many. We answer, That to do so is foolish; for first, Truth perhaps is rare, and therefore one may be wiser than many. Again, every Criterie hath more Adversaries than those who agree in defence thereof. For all those who maintain any other Criterie whatsoever, oppose them who agree in the Defence of one, and are therefore of much greater Number than the others. Besides, they who agree, either are in different Affections, or in one. In different they are not, at least as to this, for then they would not agree in it. If in one, seeing that he who affirmeth any thing, different from this which they agree in, hath one Affection, and all they who agree in it have but one; as to the Affections which we follow, there is no Advantage in the Number: Wherefore we ought not to follow many rather than one. As also, because the Difference of Judgment, as to their Multitude, is incomprehensible, as we shewed from the *fourth Common-place* of Suspension; for there are infinite Men, if we consider them singly, neither are we able to examine the Judgments of all, and so to say what the greater part holds, what the fewest. It is therefore in this respect absurd also, to prefer some Judges before others, because of their Number. And if the Judgment of all in general is not to be followed, neither shall we find any at all by whom Things may be judged, tho' we should grant never so much otherwise. Wherefore by all this, the Criterie in which all Things are judged appears to be incomprehensible; and the other Criteries being circumscribed by this, (for each of them is either a part, or a Passion, or an Action of Man) it followeth, we need not perhaps speak of them, having here discoursed of them already. But lest we should seem to decline the Confutation of every one in particular, we will say something over and above of them; and first of the Criterie called, *By which*.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Criterie, By which.

GREAT, almost infinite, is the Disagreement amongst the Dogmatists concerning this; but we, observing our first Method, shall only say; Forasmuch as, according to them, Man is the Criterie in which Things are judged, but he hath nothing by which he can judge (as they all agree) besides Sense

and Intellect; if we shew he cannot judge neither by Sense alone, nor by Intellect alone, nor by both together, we shall compendiously refute all their particular Assertions.

Let us begin with the Senses. Whereas some hold, that the Affections of the Senses are vain, (and that none of those Things which we think that we perceive, are subjected to them.) Others, that all the Things by which the Senses think they are moved, are subjected to them. Others, that some of them are subjected to the Senses, others not. We know not to which of these we should assent, for we cannot determine the Controversy, neither by Sense, (for the Question is, whether that be vainly affected, or comprehended truly) nor by any other; for there is no other Criterie whereby it ought to be determined, (according to the Hypothesis); it will therefore be indeterminate and incomprehensible, whether Sense be vainly affected, or comprehendeth any thing. Whence it followeth, that we ought not to rely wholly upon Sense in the Determination of Things, when as we cannot say that it comprehendeth any thing.

But let us grant the Senses to be comprehensive, yet will they be found to be nothing the less uncredible, as to Determination concerning external Objects. The Senses are contrarily moved by Externals, as the Taste by the same Honey is sometimes affected sweetly, sometimes bitterly. The Sight thinketh the same Colour sometimes red, sometimes white. Neither doth the Smell agree with itself. He who hath some kind of Obstructions in the Head, thinketh Unguents not to be sweet; he who hath not, saith they are sweet. Persons divinely inspired, and fanatick, imagine they hear others discoursing with them, whom we hear not. The same Water, to those who are troubled with an Inflammation, seems excessive hot, to others moderately warm. Now whether shall we say, All these Phantasies are true, or all false; or some false, some true? To say, that all are false, is impossible, for we have not any Criterie uncontroverted, whereby to determine that which we prefer; neither have we any true determined Demonstration, seeing that the Criterie of Truth, whereby true Demonstration ought to be determined, is still in question. For this Reason, he who conceived we ought to give credit to those who are well, and not to those who are not, speaks absurdly; for saying this without Demonstration, he shall not be believed; but a true adjudged Demonstration he cannot have, for the Reasons alledged.

But though we should grant that the Phantasies of those who are well, are creditable, others not; nevertheless it will be found, that external Objects cannot be judged by the Senses only. The Sight, in Persons that are well, judgeth the same Tower

some

sometimes to be round, sometimes square; the Taste judgeth the same Meats upon Repletion sower, in Hunger pleasant; the Hearing perceiveth the same Voice in the Night loud, in the Day low; the Smell, what most Men declare to be stinking, in Tanners commonly denies it; the same Touch when we enter a Bath is warmed by the Parasits, when we come out cooled by it. Wherefore seeing the Senses of such as are well, disagree amongst themselves, and their Disagreement is indeterminable, (for we have not any thing universally acknowledged, whereby they may be determined) the Doubt must necessarily be insolvable. Many other Things might be alledg'd out of the Common-places of Suspension. Thus perhaps it is not true, that Sense alone can judge of external Objects.

Let us now come to *Intellect*. They who conceive, that Intellect only is to be followed in the Judication of Things; First, they cannot demonstrate it to be comprehensible, that there is Intellect; for *Gorgias*, in saying, *There is nothing*, saith, that there is not Intellect. Others assert, *It exists*. How will they determine this Controversy? Not by Intellect, (for that were to beg the Question) nor by any other; for they say, there is no other (according to the Hypothesis) by which the Things may be judged. It remains therefore indeterminable and incomprehensible, whether there be Intellect or not. Whence it followeth, that we ought not to rely upon Intellect only, in the Dijudication of Things, being itself is not yet comprehended.

But let us admit Intellect to be comprehended, and grant, by way of Supposition, that it exists; notwithstanding, I say, it cannot determine of Things; for it seeth not itself exactly, but disagrees concerning its own Essence, and the manner of its Generation; how then can it exactly comprehend other Things? Besides, though we grant Intellect to be capable to determine of Things, yet we shall not find how to determine by it. For there being much Difference as to Intellect; one Intellect of *Gorgias*, according to which he saith, *Nothing is*; another of *Heraclitus*, according to which he saith, *All Things are*; another of those who affirm, *Some things are, others are not*: We shall not find any way to adjudicate these Differences of Intellects, nor be able to say, This Intellect is to be preferred before that, or that not to be preferred before this. For if we would judge it by any Intellect, we yield to Parties in the Difference, and beg the Question; if by any other than by Intellect, we are deceived, because we ought to judge things by Intellect only. Moreover, from what we said upon the Criterie by which, may be demonstrated, that we can neither find a Sagacity exceeding the Sagacity of others; nor

if we could find an Intellect more sagacious, than any ever had, or have been; yet, (so far as it is uncertain whether there will not be one more sagacious than it) we ought not to follow it. And though we should suppose an Intellect more sagacious, than any shall ever be hereafter, yet ought we not to follow him who judgeth by it, lest alledging some false Reason, he persuade us, by the Acuteness of his Wit, that it is true. Therefore neither doth Intellect only judge things.

It remaineth we say, that Things are judged by both, which likewise is impossible; for the Senses are so far from guiding the Intellect to Comprehension, that they contradict one another. Honey seems sweet to some, bitter to others; *Democritus* held, it is neither sweet nor bitter; *Heraclitus*, that it is both: 'Tis the same in other Senses, and other Sensibles. So as the Intellect, impelled by the Senses, is constrained to affirm things different and repugnant. But such a kind of Criterie is far from comprehensive.

Moreover, they must say, That they judge Things either by all the Senses, and all Intellects; or, by some. By all, it is impossible; there appearing so great Controversy amongst several Senses and Intellects, (likewise the Intellect of *Gorgias* declaring, that neither the Judgment of Sense or Intellect ought to be followed, the Argument will be retorted:) If by some, Who can judge, that we ought to adhere to the Senses, and this Intellect, and not to those, not having an acknowledged Criterie, by which to judge different Senses and Intellects. If we say, that they judge Senses and Intellects by Intellect and Sense, they beg the question, which is, Whether we can judge by these.

Again, either he judgeth Senses and Intellects by Sense, or Senses and Intellects by Intellect; or Senses by Sense, and Intellects by Intellect; or Intellects by Sense, and Sense by Intellect. If they say, they judge these by Senses or Intellect, they judge not by Sense and Intellect, but by one of them, which they make choice of, and consequently incur the Difficulties alledged formerly. If Senses by Sense, and Intellects by Intellect, there being so great Repugnance of Senses to Senses, and Intellects to Intellects, which soever they take of the repugnant Senses to judge the rest of the Senses, they beg the question; for they assume Part of the Difference, as creditable, for Dijudication of Things equally controverted with it. It is the same in Intellects. If they judge Intellects by Senses, and Senses by Intellects, the alternate Common-place occurs, shewing, that to judge Senses we prejudice Intellects, and to examine Intellects we must prejudice Senses. Wherefore seeing that Criteries of one kind cannot be judged by Criteries of the

^b Read here and after, *proinde*. * Betwixt *spiritus* & *visus*, there is a Breach and Defect, in the *M. S.* of Mr. *Casselman* and Sir *Henry Savile*; which the printed Edition not taking notice of, confounds the Sense.

same kind, nor both kinds by one kind, nor reciprocally one kind by the other kind; nor can we prefer Intellect before Intellect, or Sense before Sense; it follows, That we have not any thing whereby to judge. For if we cannot judge by all Senses and Intellects, nor know by which we ought to judge, and by which not to judge, we shall not have any thing by which to judge things. Wherefore there is no *Criterie by which*.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Criterie, According to which.

LET us next examine the *Criterie according to which Things are judged*. In the first place we may hold that Phantasy is unconceivable; for they say *Phantasy is an Impression in the Hegemonick part of the Soul*. Seeing therefore that the Soul and the Hegemonick is a Spirit, or something more subtle than Spirit, as they themselves hold; no Man can conceive that there is in himself an Impression, either by Extubérance and Depression, as we see in Scales; or by the wonderfully invented Heteræotick; for he could retain in Memory so many Theorems, as make up an Art, because by succeeding Heteræotes, the precedent would be defaced.

But tho' there were such a thing as Phantasy, yet would it be incomprehensible, for it is a Passion of the Hegemonick; the Hegemonick, as we shew'd, is not comprehended; therefore neither can we comprehend its Affection.

Moreover, tho' we should grant that Phantasy is comprehended, yet Things cannot be judged according to it; for it doth not (say they) apply itself to Externals, and conceive Phantasies in itself, but by the Senses. Now the Senses comprehend not the external Objects, but their Affections only: For Honey, and my being sweetly affected, are not all one thing; neither is Wormwood the same with my being bitterly affected; they differ. But if the Affection differ from the external Object, the Phantasy will not be of the external Object, but of some other thing different from it. Therefore if the Intellect judge according to the Phantasy, it will judge amiss, and not according to the Object; whence it is absurd to say, external Objects are judicated according to the Phantasy.

Neither can it be said, that the Soul comprehends sensible Objects by sensible Affections, because the Affections of the Senses are like their external Objects; for how can the Intellect know whether the Affections of the Senses are like the sensible Objects, when as itself meddles not with external Objects, neither do the Senses declare the Natures of them to her, but only their own Affections, as we argued in the *Common places of Suspension*? For as he who knows not *Sacrares*, if he look upon his Picture knows not whe-

ther it be like *Sacrares*; so that Intellect, beholding the Affections of the Senses, but not seeing the external Objects themselves, cannot tell whether the Affections of the Senses are like their external Objects. Therefore neither by Affirmation can it judge those things according to the Phantasy.

But let us grant that the Phantasy cannot only understand and comprehend, but is able also to judge things of itself, (tho' we have proved the contrary) it follows that either we must believe all Phantasies, (one whereof faith, that all Phantasies are incredible, by which means the Argument will be retorted, that all Phantasies, by their own Acknowledgment, are not capable to judge things) or if we must believe only some, How shall we judge, which Phantasies are to be believed, which not? If without Phantasy, then they grant, that Phantasy is not requisite to the Judgment of Things, inasmuch as they say they can judge things without it. If with Phantasy, How will they assume that Phantasy by which they mean to judge all other Phantasies? Or again, they will need another Phantasy to judge the Phantasy by which they judge all Phantasies, and another to judge that, and so to infinite; but it is impossible to judge to infinite; therefore it is impossible to find what Phantasies ought to be used as *Criteries*, what not. Since therefore, which way soever we grant that things ought to be judged according to Phantasies, the Argument will be retorted, whether by all, or by some only; we conclude, that Phantasies ought not to be used as *Criteries*, to judge things.

This may serve for an Answer, by way of Summary, to the *Criterie, according to which*: But take notice that our Purpose is not to prove there is no *Criterie of Truth* existent (for that were dogmatical) but because the Dogmatists seem probably to have evinced that there is a *Criterie of Truth*, we have proposed Arguments that seem probable against them; not that we think them true, or more probable than the contrary; but so far as these Arguments, and those of the Dogmatists, seem alike probable, we are driven to Suspension.

CHAP. VIII.

Of True and Truth.

THOUGH we should grant, (by way of Supposition) that there is some *Criterie of Truth*, yet will it be useless and vain, if we prove, (even out of what the Dogmatists themselves say) that Truth is not, neither can it be. We shew it thus: *True is said to differ from Truth three Ways; by Essence, by Constitution, by Power. By Essence, for True is incorporeal, (as being an Axiom and a Dialectic) but Truth is a Body, as being the enunciative Science of all true things; but Science is the Hegemonick after such a manner, as the Fist is the Hand after such a manner, but the Hegemonick*

gemmatic is a Body, for (according to them) it is a Spirit.

By Constitution; for True is something simple, as, I discurse; but Truth consists of the Knowledge of many true Things.

By Power; for Truth adhereth to Science; True doth not absolutely; whence they say that Truth can only be in a wise Person, but True in a wicked; for a wicked Man may speak something that is true. Thus the Dogmatists.

But we continuing our first Design, will discourse only concerning True: For Truth, which is said to be the Science of the Knowledge of Things True, is included therein. Again, so far as much of Arguments, some are general, by which we take away the Substance of True; others particular, whereby we shew that Truth is neither in Speech, nor in a Dicible, nor in the Motion of the Intellect, we conceive it sufficient to use only the General. For, as when the Foundation of a Wall is taken away, all the Superstructures fall; so the Subsistence of True being taken away, the particular Conceits of the Dogmatists are thereby excluded also.

CHAP. IX.

Whether True be something in Nature.

There being a Disagreement amongst the Dogmatists concerning Truth (some holding, that True is something, others that it is not) the Controversy is not capable to be judged. For he who saith, that *True is something*, if he say it without Demonstration, will not be credited, because of the Disagreement; if he alledge a Demonstration, and acknowledge it to be false, he is incredible; if he say, that it is True, he runs into the alternate Common-Place. It will be required of him, that he produce a Demonstration to demonstrate that to be True, and another to prove, and so to infinite; but it is impossible to demonstrate Infinities, therefore it is impossible to know whether *True be something*.

Again, this *something*, which they hold to be the most General of all things, is either true or false, or neither true nor false, or both true and false. If they say, it is false, they confess that all things are false: For, as because an Animal is something Animate, therefore every Animal in particular is Animate; in like manner, if this *something*, being the most General of all Things, be false, all Things in particular will be false, and nothing true. Whence also may be inferred that *nothing is false*; for this Proposition, *all Things are false*, this other *something is false*, including all Things, will be false. And if something be True, all Things will be True, and consequently nothing will be True; for this Proposition, *Nothing is true*, will be True.

If something be both true and false, every thing in particular will be both true and false; whence it will follow, that nothing is in its own Nature true; for that which is true in its own Nature, cannot by any means be false.

If something be neither true nor false, they confess, that all things in particular being said to be neither true nor false, are not true, and therefore it is not manifest to us whether this be true.

Moreover, either things manifest only are true, or only Things not manifest; or of true Things, some are manifest, others not manifest: But neither of these, as shall be proved; therefore nothing is True. If only Things manifest are true, they must say that all the manifest are true, or some only; if *all*, the Argument will be retorted, saying it is manifest, that *nothing is True*; if *some*, none can say, without Dijudication, *this is True, that false*. If he use a Criterie, he must grant it to be either manifest or unmanifest; not unmanifest, for the manifest only are now supposed true; if manifest, we demand, which manifest things are True, which false? The Thing manifest, assumed to judge Things manifest, will itself require another Criterie, and that another, and so to infinite; but it is impossible to judge to infinite; therefore it is impossible to comprehend, which manifest Things only are True.

He who saith, *only unmanifest Things are True*, holdeth not that all Things are True, (for he will not say, that the Stars are even and that they are odd, is alike true); if *some*, by what shall we judge that these unmanifest Things are true, those false? Not by any thing manifest, and if by any thing unmanifest, that unmanifest Thing will require another to judge, and this another, and so to infinite. Wherefore, neither are only Things unapparent True.

It remains, that we say of the True, some are manifest, others unmanifest, which also is absurd. For either all things both manifest and unmanifest, are True, or some of the manifest, and some of the unmanifest. If all, the Argument will be retorted, granting it to be True, that *nothing is True*. He likewise grants it to be True, that the Stars are even, and that they are odd. If of the manifest some only are True, and of the unmanifest some only, by what shall we judge that of the manifest, these are True, these False; if by a thing manifest, we run into infinite. If by an unmanifest, so far as much as the unmanifest requires Dijudication also, by what shall that unmanifest be judged? If by a manifest, the alternate Common-place occurs; if by an unmanifest, the Common-place of infinite. The same may be said of the unmanifest; for he who undertakes to judge it by an unmanifest, is forc'd to run into infinite; he who by a manifest, either assuming a manifest, runs into the Common-place of infinite, or passing to an unmanifest, into the alternate. It is therefore

therefore false to say, that of the True some are manifest, others not manifest.

Now if neither the manifest only are true, nor only the unmanifest, nor some of the manifest, and some of the unmanifest, then nothing is True; and if nothing be True, the Criterie conducing to the Judgment of Truth, would be usefess and vain, tho' we should grant it had a Being. Now if we must suspend concerning this Question, *whether True be something*, it will follow, that they who say, *Dialectick is the Science of Things True, False, and Neuter*, speak rashly; since the Criterie of Truth appears to be undeterminable; neither can we affirm any thing, either concerning those Things which seem evident, as the Dogmatists call them, or concerning the unmanifest; for since the latter, (as the Dogmatists conceive) are comprehended by the former, if we are enforced to suspend concerning the Evident, how dare we assert concerning the Unmanifest?

But we shall (over and above) alledge our Arguments against particular Things; and so far as these seem to be comprehended by *Signs*, and *Demonstration*, we shall shew that we ought to suspend our Assent concerning Sign and Demonstration. We will begin with *Signs*, for Demonstration is a Species of Sign.

CHAP. X.

Of Sign.

Of Things (according to the Dogmatists) *some are manifest, others unmanifest. Of the unmanifest, some are absolutely unmanifest, others unmanifest for a Time, others unmanifest by Nature. Manifest they hold to be those things which of themselves come into our Knowledge, as, it is Day. Absolutely unmanifest, those which come not within the Reach of our Comprehension, as, that the Number of the Stars is even. Unmanifest for a time, those which are manifest in their own Nature, but by reason of some external Circumstances, they are for a time not manifest to us, as the City of Athens is to me at this present. Unmanifest by Nature, are those which have a Nature not subject to be manifest to us, as Pores; for these never appear to us of themselves, but are comprehended from some others, as by Sweat or the like. Manifest things, say they, require not a Sign, (for they are comprehended of themselves); neither those which are absolutely unmanifest, for they are no way to be comprehended; but the unmanifest for a Time, and the unmanifest by Nature, are comprehended by Signs, yet not by the same; the unmanifest for a Time, by the Hypomnestick, (admonitive) the unmanifest by Nature, by the Endictick (indicative.) Of Signs therefore, some are according to them, Hypomnestick, others Endictick. A Hypomnestick*

Sign, they call that which being observed to be together with a Significate, evident, as soon as ever the Sign evidently incurrerth to our Sense, tho' the Significate appear not, yet it causeth us to remember that which was concomitant to it, tho' at present not evident, as Smoke and Fire.

An Endictick Sign (say they) *is that which is not observed together with an evident Significate, but of its own Nature and Constitution signifieth that whereof it is a Sign; thus the Motions of the Body are Signs of the Soul.*

Hereupon they define Sign thus, *Sign is a demonstrative Axiom, antecedent in a sound Connex, detective of that which followeth.*

Of these two kinds of Signs we oppose not both, but only the Endictick, as seeming to be forged by the Dogmatists; the Hypomnestick is creditable in the Course of Life; for whosoever sees Smoke knows that Fire is signified; and seeing a Scar, faith, it had been a Wound. So as we not only not contradict the common Course of Life, but maintain it, assenting, inopinatively, to that in it which is creditable, but opposing what is particularly forged by the Dogmatists. Thus much it was requisite to say for Explication of the Question. We now proceed to Confutation, not endeavouring to shew that the Endictick Sign is wholly inexistant, but the apparent Equivalence of Arguments on both Sides, for its Existence and Inexistence.

CHAP. XI.

Whether there be any Endictick Sign.

A Sign therefore, by what the Dogmatists speak of it, is unintelligible. The *Stoicks*, who have discoursed with most Exactness hereupon, to shew the Notion of Sign, say, "A Sign is an Axiom antecedent in a sound Connex, detective of that which follows. Axiom, they say, is a Dialectic, Self-perfect, Enunciative as it is within itself. A sound Connex is that which beginneth not from true, and endeth in false; for a Connex either beginneth from true, and endeth in true; as if it is Day, it is Light; or it beginneth from false, and endeth in false, as, if the Earth syeth, the Earth has Wings; Or, it beginneth from true, and endeth in false; as, if the Earth is, the Earth lies; Or, it beginneth from false and endeth in true; as, if the Earth syeth, the Earth is. Of these they hold that only to be unfound which beginneth from true and endeth in false, the rest are all true. Antecedent they call that, which goeth foremost in a Connex, beginning from true and ending in true; it is detective of that which followeth, for in this Connex, if she hath Milk, she hath conceived; " Their

Part XII.

"These Words, She hath conceived, are declared by
"those, She hath Milk." Thus they.

Now we first say, That it is uncertain whether there be a *Dicible*: For seeing that of the Dogmatists, the *Epicureans* say, there is no *Dicible*; the *Stoicks*, that there is; when the *Stoicks* say, that a *Dicible* is something, either they use Assertion only, or Demonstration also. If Assertion only, the *Epicureans* will oppose it with the contrary Assertion, that a *Dicible* is nothing. If by Demonstration, so far as much as Demonstration consists of dicible Axioms, nothing that consists of *Dicibles* can be affirmed to prove that a *Dicible* is something. For he who allows not a *Dicible* to be, How will he grant a Collection of *Dicibles* to be? Thus, whosoever shall endeavour by a Collection of *Dicibles* to prove that there is a *Dicible*, goes about to prove a thing controverted, by a thing controverted. If therefore neither simply, nor by Demonstration, it cannot be proved that there is a *Dicible*, it is not manifest that there is an Axiom; for, an Axiom is a *Dicible*.

Yet, though by way of Supposition, we should grant, that there is a *Dicible*; an Axiom will be found notwithstanding to be inexistant, which consists of *Dicibles* not coexistent with one another. As for Example in these, *If it is Day, it is Light*; when I say, *it is Day*, I have not yet said *it is Light*; and when I say *it is Light*, I had before said that *it is Day*. If therefore whatsoever is compounded of any thing cannot exist unless its Parts coexist with one another, but the Parts whereof an Axiom is compounded coexist not with one another, therefore an Axiom will not exist.

But besides all this, a sound Connex will be found to be incomprehensible. For, *Philo* saith, *That is a sound Connex which beginneth not from true and endeth in false, as (it being Day and I disputing) this, If it is Day, I dispute*. But *Diodorus* saith, *That beginning from true it neither could nor can end in false, according to whom that Connexion seemeth to be false; for it being Day, and I being silent, it will begin in True and end in False*. But this is a true one. If the Elements of Things are not indivisible, the Elements of Things are indivisible, for beginning always from false (the Elements of Things are not indivisible) it will end in true, the Elements of Things are indivisible. But they who introduce Syncretism, say, *That is a sound Connex, when that which is contrary to that which ends in it, is contrary to that which is antecedent in it, according to whom these Connexes which we have instanced are unfound; but this is a true one, If it is Day it is Day*. They who judge by Emphasis, say, *That is a true Connex whose Consequent is potentially contained in the Antecedent; according to whom this, If it is Day it is Day; and every Reduplicate connex'd Axiom perhaps will be false, for a Thing cannot contain itself*. Thus this Controversy seems indeterminable; for nei-

ther shall we be creditable, if we prefer any of the fore-mentioned Propositions without Demonstration, nor with Demonstration; for the Demonstration seemeth then to be found, when its Conclusion followeth the Conjunction of its Sumptions or Premises, as the Consequent the Antecedent. As thus; If it is Day it is Light; but it is Day, therefore it is Light. But if we demand how the Consequence of the Consequent to the Antecedent shall be judged, they incur the Alternate Common-place; for to demonstrate the Judication of the Connex, the Conclusion as we said must follow the Sumptions of the Demonstration. Again, that this may be credited, the Connex and the Consequence ought to be determined, which is absurd. Therefore a sound Connex is incomprehensible.

Likewise the Antecedent is undeterminable. For the Antecedent, (say they,) is that which goeth foremost, in such a Connex as beginneth from true and endeth in true. Now if it be a Sign detective of the Consequent, either the Consequent is manifest or unmanifest; if manifest, it needs no detective, for it will be comprehended together with the other; neither is it a Significate, and therefore this is not its Sign; if unmanifest, so far as much as there is an undetermined Controversy concerning Things not manifest, which of them is true, which false, and whether any of them be true, it will be unmanifest whether the Connex speak true; whence it followeth, that it is also unmanifest, whether the Antecedent in it preceede (rightly.)

But besides this, Though there be a Significate to the Sign, yet it cannot be detective of the Consequent, even for this Reason, because it is comprehended together with it: For Relatives are comprehended together; as Right cannot be comprehended before Left, as being Right in relation to Left, not on the contrary Right without Left. The like in all other Relatives; so it is impossible that the Sign can be comprehended before the Significate; but if the Sign be not comprehended before the Significate, it cannot be detective of it, the Significate being comprehended together with it, and not after it. Thus from their disagreeing Opinions, we may gather that a Sign is unintelligible, for they say that it is Relative, and Detective of the Significate to which it is Relative; whence it followeth, That if it be Relative to the Significate, it must necessarily be comprehended together with the Significate, as Right with Left, Upwards with Downwards, and the like: But if it be detective of the Significate, it is necessary that it be comprehended before it, that, being first known, it may bring us to the Notion of the Thing which is known by it; but it is impossible to understand a Thing which cannot be known but by the Fore-knowledge of another thing which cannot be known before it. Therefore it is impossible to understand any thing which is not only relative to, but detective also of, that to which

which it is relative: But a Sign, say they, is both relative to, and detective of the Significate, therefore it is impossible to understand the Sign.

Moreover, it was a Controversy before our Time, some affirming, that there is an Endiſtick Sign, others that there is none; now he who ſaith that there is an Endiſtick Sign, either affirmeth it barely without Demonſtration, or with Demonſtration. If with bare Affirmation, he will not be creditable; if he would demonſtrate it, he begs the Queſtion. For the Genus of Demonſtration being Sign, when we queſtion whether there be Sign, we queſtion whether there is Demonſtration; as, If we queſtion whether there be an Animal, we queſtion whether there be a Man, for Man is an Animal; but to demonſtrate a thing controverted by a thing controverted, or by itſelf, is abſurd; therefore it cannot be demonſtrated that there is a Sign. And if it can neither be affirmed ſimply nor demonſtratively, it is impoſſible to frame a comprehensive Enunciation of it. Now if Sign be not exactly comprehended, neither can it be ſaid to be ſignificant of any thing, it not being acknowledged itſelf; therefore there will be no Sign. Whence, according to this Argument, Sign is inexiſtent and unintelligible.

Again, Signs either are apparent only, or unapparent only, or ſome apparent, others unapparent; but none of theſe is true, therefore there is no Sign. That Sign is not unapparent, is ſhewn thus. What is unapparent is not maniſteſt by itſelf, according to the Dogmatiſts, but occurrcth to us through ſome other; a Sign therefore if it be unapparent will require another Sign, which alſo will be unapparent (for according to the propoſed Hypotheſis, no Sign is apparent) and that another, and ſo to infinite: But it is impoſſible to take infinite Signs, therefore it is impoſſible to comprehend a Sign, it being unapparent. For which Reaſon it will be inexiſtent, not capable to ſignify any thing, as to be a Sign, becauſe it cannot be comprehended. On the contrary, If all Signs are apparent, forasmuch as the Sign is relative to the Significate, and Relatives are comprehended together with one another, the Significate being comprehended together with the Apparent, will be alſo apparent. For as Right and Left incurring to us together, Right is not ſaid to be more apparent than Left, or Left than Right; in like manner the Sign and the Significate being comprehended together, it cannot be ſaid that the Sign is more apparent than the Significate: But if the Significate be apparent, it is not a Significate, as not needing any to ſignify and detect it. Whence taking away Right, we take away Left alſo; ſo taking away the Significate, the Sign cannot exiſt. Thus the Sign will be ſound to be inexiſtent, if we ſay that Signs only are apparent. It remains, we ſay, that of Signs ſome are apparent, ſome un-

parent; but this alſo incurs the ſame Difficulties; for the Significates of apparent Signs will be apparent; as we ſaid, not requiring any thing to ſignify them, and conſequently they will not be Significates. Whence neither will the other be Signs, as ſignifying nothing; the unmaniſteſt Signs requiring ſomething to detect them. If they ſay, they are ſignified by unmaniſteſt, the Argument running into Infinite, they will be found to be incomprehenſible, and conſequently inexiſtent, as we ſaid. If by apparent, they will alſo be apparent, as being comprehended together with their apparent Signs, and conſequently will alſo be inexiſtent, for it is impoſſible a thing ſhould be by Nature apparent and unapparent; but the Signs, of which our Diſcourſe is, being ſuppoſed unapparent, will be found to be apparent, by retorting the Argument. If therefore neither all Signs be apparent, nor all unapparent; nor ſome apparent, others unapparent; and that there be nothing more than this, as they acknowledge, what they call Signs will be inexiſtent. Theſe few Arguments, alledged out of many, may ſuffice to ſhew, that there is no Endiſtick Sign.

Let us now lay down the Arguments of thoſe who hold a Sign to be, that we may ſhew the Equivalence of contrary Reaſons. Either the Words alledged againſt Sign ſignify ſomething, or they ſignify nothing; if ſignificant, how can they take away the Exiſtence of Sign: If they ſignify what Sign is, they are demonſtrative againſt Sign, or not demonſtrative; if not demonſtrative, they do not demonſtrate that Sign is not; if demonſtrative, Demonſtration being a *Species* of Sign, detective of its Concluſion, Sign will be. Whence is argued thus, If Sign be ſomething, there is Sign; and if there be not Sign, there is Sign; for that there is no Sign muſt be proved by Demonſtration, which is a Sign. Now either Sign is, or it is not, therefore it is not.

Upon this Argument followeth another in this manner; If there be not ſome Sign, there is no Sign: and if a Sign be that which the *Dogmatiſts* hold it to be, it is no Sign; for the Sign of which we diſcourſe, according as it is underſtood, and as it is relative to, and detective of, the Significate, is found to be inexiſtent, as we ſhewed before. Now either Sign is, or it is not; therefore it is not.

As concerning the Words which are ſpoken of Sign, let the *Dogmatiſts* answer, whether they ſignify any thing, or not; if they ſignify nothing, they prove not that there is Sign; if they ſignify, the Significate followeth them, which is, there is Sign; whence it followeth, as we ſhewed, that this is Sign, by retorting the Argument. Since therefore Reaſons equally probable may be alledged, to prove there is Sign, and that there is not Sign, we ought not to ſay either rather than the other.

C H A P. XII.

Of Demonstration.

FROM what hath been said, it is manifest that neither is Demonstration a thing acknowledged. For if we suspend as to Sign, and Demonstration be a Sign, we must necessarily suspend as to Demonstration; for we shall find that the Arguments alledged against Sign will serve also against Demonstration: It seemeth to be relative to, and detective of, its Conclusion; upon which will follow almost all that we alledged against Sign. But if something must be said of Demonstration in particular, I will comprize the Discourse in a narrow Compass, first laying down what Demonstration, according to them, is.

"Demonstration (as they say) is a Reason which, by Collection of acknowledged (indubitate) Sumptions, detecteth a thing unmanifest. *But clear will it seem by this that followeth:* Reason (or Argument) is that which consists of Sumptions and a Conclusion: Its Sumptions are said to be the Axioms taken suitably for Construction of the Conclusion concordantly.

"Inference or Conclusion is the Axiom framed out of the two Sumptions, as in this: If it is Day, it is Light; but it is Day, therefore it is Light: Therefore it is Light, is the Conclusion, the rest are the Sumptions. Of Reasons, some are conclusive, others not conclusive: Conclusive, when the Connex, beginning from Complication of the Sumptions of the Argument, and concluding in the Inference thereof, is found; as the instanced Reason is conclusive, because to this Complication of its Sumptions, it is Day; and if it is Day, it is Light; it is consequent, it is Light, in this Connex, if it is Day; and if it is Day, it is Light. Not conclusive are those, which are not after this manner.

"Of the conclusive, some are true, others not true: True, when not only the Connex, as to Complication of the Sumptions and the Inference, is, as we said, found; but the Conclusion, and that which is a Complication of the Sumptions is true, which is the Antecedent, and the Connex. A true Complication is that which hath all true, as, It is Day; and, if it is Day, it is Light. Not true, is, when they are not thus; for this Reason, if it is Night, it is dark, but it is Night; therefore it is dark; is indeed conclusive, because the Connex is found, if it is Night, and if it is Night, it is dark; but it is not true; for the consequent Complicate is false, it is Night, and if it is Night it is dark; it containing this Falsity, for it is a false Complicate whatsoever containeth in itself a Falsity. Whence they say, A true Reason is

"that, which, from true Sumptions, inferreth a true Conclusion.

"Again, of true Reasons, some are (*Apodeictick*) demonstrative, others not demonstrative. Demonstrative are those, which, from things manifest, collect something not manifest; not demonstrative are those which are not so; as this reason, If it be Day, it is Light; but it is Day, therefore it is Light, is not demonstrative; for its Conclusion, it is Light, is manifest. But this, if Sweat pierce through the Skin, there are Pores intelligible; but Sweat pierceth through the Skin, therefore there are Pores intelligible, is demonstrative; for its Conclusion, therefore there are Pores intelligible, is unmanifest.

"Again, of those which collect something unmanifest, some bring us by the Sumptions to the Conclusion inductively only, others inductively and detectively. Inductively, those which seem to depend upon Belief and Memory, as this; if one tell you, that such a Man shall grow rich, he shall grow rich; but this God (as supposing *Jupiter*) tells you, that such a Man shall grow rich, therefore he shall grow rich. We assent to the Conclusion not so much for any Necessity of the Sumptions, as for that we believe what the God saith. Others not only inductively, but detectively also lead us to the Conclusion; If Sweat issue through the Skin, Pores are intelligible; but the first, therefore the second; for this, Sweat issueth forth, is detective of the other, there are Pores; forasmuch as we preconceive that moisture cannot penetrate through a Body not porous.

"Thus Demonstration must be a Reason conclusive and true, and have an unmanifest Conclusion detective by the Power of the Sumptions; and therefore Demonstration is said to be a Reason, having indubitate Sumptions, and by Collection detecting an unmanifest Inference." By this we may understand the Notion of Demonstration.

C H A P. XIII.

Whether there is Demonstration.

THAT Demonstration is not, may be argued from what they themselves say, by overthrowing every Particular that is included in the Notion. For Example; A Reason or Argument consists of Axioms, but a compound thing cannot exist, unless the things whereof it is compounded coexist one with another (as a Bed, and the like:) But the Parts of a Reason are not coexistent one with another; for whilst we are speaking the first Sumption, the other Sumption nor the Inference do not yet exist; and while we are speaking the second, the first is no longer existent, and the Inference exists not yet; and when we pronounce the Inference, the Sumption

ons are no longer existent. Thus the Parts of a Reason are not coexistent with one another, and therefore the Reason itself seemeth not to exist.

Besides, *A conclusive Reason* is incomprehensible; for, if it be judged from the Consequence of the Connex, but the Consequence of the Connex be undeterminably controverted, and perhaps is incomprehensible, (as we shewed in our Discourse concerning a Sign;) conclusive Reason will also be incomprehensible.

Moreover the *Dialecticks* say, that "A not conclusive Reason is made, either by Incoherence, or by Defect, or by being in an ill Figure, or by Redundance. By Incoherence, when the Sumptions have no Coherence with one another, nor with the Inference; as, If it is Day, it is Light; but Corn is fold in the Market, therefore *Dion* walks.

"By Redundance; when there is found some redundant Sumption superfluous to Collection of the Reason; as, If it is Day, it is light; but it is Day, and *Dion* walks, therefore it is light.

"By being in an ill Figure; for these are as they call them *Syllogisms*. * *If it is Day, it is light; but it is Day, therefore it is light; And, If it is not light, it is not Day; but it is not light, therefore it is not Day.* But this is an inconclusive Reason, If it is Day, it is light; but it is Day, therefore it is light; because the Connex promising that its Consequent is in its Antecedent, the Antecedent being assumed, the Consequent is also assumed; and the Antecedent being taken away, the Consequent is also taken away; for if the Antecedent be, the Consequent must be also. But assuming the Consequent, the Antecedent is not always assumed also; for the Connex doth not promise that the Antecedent shall follow upon the Consequent, but only the Consequent upon the Antecedent. Hereupon a Reason, which collects the Consequent from the Connex of the Antecedent, is said to be Syllogistical; and that which from the Connex, and from the contrary of the Consequent collects the contrary of the Antecedent: But that which from the Connex and the Consequent collects the Antecedent is inconclusive, as we said before. Whence its Sumption being true, it collects a Falsity, if it be spoken in the Night-time by the Light of a Candle: for this, If it is Day, it is light, is a true Connex; and so is this Assumption, But it is Light; but the Inference, Therefore it is Day, is false.

"By Defect; a Reason is faulty, when there is omitted something of those which are requisite to Collection of the Conclusion; as this Reason being, as they conceive, sound, Riches are either good, or ill, or indifferent; but neither ill nor

"indifferent, therefore good. This other is unfounded by Defect, Riches are either good, or ill, or indifferent; but not ill, therefore good."

Now if I shall shew, that, according to them, no Difference of inconclusive Reasons can be judged by the conclusive, I shall have cleared, that the conclusive Reason is incomprehensible, and that all their Offentation in *Dialectick* is Folly. I prove it thus, *A Reason inconclusive by Incoherence, is said to be known from its Sumptions, not having any Coherence one with another, and with the Conclusion; now so far as much as the Knowledge of Coherents must precede the Judgment of the Connex, the Connex will be indjudicable, (according to our usual Argument) and consequently so will the Reason, Inclusive by Incoherence, be also. For he who saith, That a Reason is inconclusive by Incoherence, if he do it by simple Enunciation, we oppose the contrary Enunciation; if he demonstrate it by a Reason, we shall tell him, he must first demonstrate that Reason to be conclusive, and afterwards prove the Sumptions of a Reason defective by Incoherence, to be incoherent; but whether his Reason be demonstrative we cannot know, not having a generally acknowledged Judgment of the Connex, whereby to judge, whether the Conclusion cohere with the Complication of the Sumptions in the Reason. Therefore we have not whereby to judge the Difference betwixt the conclusive Reason, and the defective by Incoherence.*

The same we object to him, who saith, that a Reason is faulty by being in an ill Figure: For he that goeth upon this Ground, that there is some Figure ill, will not have acknowledged conclusive Reason, whereby to collect what he saith.

In the same manner may those be confuted, who say, that a Reason is inconclusive by Defect: for if the Perfect be indjudicable, the Defective must be so also. Again, he who would prove by some Reason, that there is something wanting to Reason, unless be hath an acknowledged Judication of the Connex, whereby he may judge the Coherence of the Reason which he alledgeth, he cannot judiciously and rightly say, that the other is defective.

Likewise, that Reason which is said to be faulty by Redundance, is not judicable by the Demonstrative; for as to Redundance, even those very Reasons which the *Sticks* cry up as *Indemonstrable*, will be found to be inconclusive; which, if they should be taken away, all *Dialectick* will be overthrowen. These are they which (they say) need no Demonstration to establish them, but by them are demonstrated the other conclusive Reasons. That these are redundant, will appear plainly if we lay them down and discourse upon them. They dream, that there are many *Indemonstrables*, but assert chiefly Five, whereto all the rest seem to be

"be referred. The First, from the Connex and
 "the Antecedent, collects the Consequent; as, If
 "it is Day, it is light; but it is Day, therefore it
 "is light. The Second, from the Connex and the
 "contrary of the Consequent, collects the contrary
 "of the Antecedent; as, If it is Day, it is light;
 "but it is not light, therefore it is not Day. The
 "Third, from the negative Complicate, and one
 "of the Parts of the Complicate, collects the con-
 "trary of the other Part; as, It is not Day and
 "Night also, but it is Day, therefore it is not
 "Night. The Fourth, from the Disjunct and one
 "of the Conjuncts, collects the contrary of the
 "other; as, Either it is Day, or it is Night; but it
 "is Day, therefore it is not Night. The Fifth,
 "from the Disjunct and the contrary of one of the
 "Conjuncts, collects the other; as, Either it is
 "Day, or it is Night; but it is not Day, therefore
 "it is Night." These are the Reasons which they
 cry up as indemonstrable; but they all seem to me
 inconclusive by Redundance. For to begin with the
 first; Either it is acknowledged [as undoubted] that
 this Part, *it is Day*, followeth upon this other, *it is*
light; which is the Antecedent in this Connex, *if it*
is Day it is light; or, it is not manifest: If unmani-
 fest, we shall not allow the Connex as acknow-
 ledged; but if it be manifest that if this be, *it is Day*,
 this other must necessarily be also, *it is light*, in say-
 ing, *it is Day*, we collect the other, *it is light*; and
 this Connex, *it is Day, it is light*, is redundant.

The same may be said of the *second Indemonstrable*;
 for either it is possible the Antecedent may be, the
 Consequent not being, or it is not possible. If possi-
 ble, it is not a sound Connex; if not possible, as
 soon as ever the word *Not* is spoken in the Conse-
 quent, it declareth the *Not* in the Antecedent, so as
 this is a redundant Connex, *It is not light, therefore*
it is not Day.

The same may be said of the *third Indemonstrable*;
 either it is manifest, that those which are in the Com-
 plication cannot possibly coexist, or not manifest; if
 not manifest, we shall not allow the Negative of the
 Complication; if manifest, as soon as one is laid
 down, the other is taken away, whereby the Nega-
 tive of the Complicate is redundant, thus: *It is Day,*
therefore it is not Night.

The like we say of the *fourth and fifth Indemon-*
strables; either it is manifest, that in the Disjunct
 one is true, the other false, with perfect Opposition,
 (as the Disjunct promisseth) or it is not manifest. If
 unmanifest, we shall not grant the Disjunct; if ma-
 nifest, as soon as one is laid down, the other is taken
 away; and one being taken away, it is manifest that
 the other is; as, *It is Day, therefore it is not Night*;
It is not Day, therefore it is Night.

The like may be said of the *Categorick Syllogisms*
 used chiefly by the *Peripateticks*, such as this; *Just is*
Honest, Honest is Good, therefore Just is Good; either

it is manifest that *Honest is Good*, or it is doubted
 and unmanifest: If unmanifest, it will not be grant-
 ed upon this Argument, and consequently the *Syllo-*
gism will not convince; if it be manifest, that *what-*
soever is Honest is Good, in saying, *It is Honest*, is
 implied, it is *Good* also; so that this were enough,
Just is Honest, therefore Just is Good; and the other
 Sumption, in which *Honest* is said to be *Good*, is re-
 dundant. The like in this Reason, *Socrates is a*
Man, every Man is a living Creature, therefore So-
crates is a living Creature. If it be not manifest in
 itself, that whatsoever is *Man* is also a living *Crea-*
ture, the universal first Proposition will not be ac-
 knowledged, neither shall we grant it in the Argu-
 ment. But if from being a *Man*, it followeth that
 he is a living *Creature*, and therefore the first Propo-
 sition, *Every Man is a living Creature*, is acknow-
 ledged true; then, as soon as ever *Socrates* is said to
 be a *Man*, it is imply'd, that he is a *living Creature*;
 and therefore the first Proposition is redundant, *Every*
Man is a living Creature. The like Method may be
 used against all categorical Reasons, not to insist
 longer hereon. Seeing therefore these Reasons where-
 upon the Dialectick ground their Syllogisms are re-
 dundant, as to Redundance all Dialectick will be sub-
 verted, we not being able to judge the redundant in-
 conclusive Reasons, from the conclusive, called Syl-
 logisms. And if any will not allow *Monolemma's*
 Reasons, (that have but one Sumption) they will not
 be more creditable than *Antipater*, who allows them.

Thus a true Reason is impossible to be found, as
 well for the Causes alledged, as because it ought to
 end in true; for the Conclusion, which is said to be
 true, must be either apparent or unapparent; not
 apparent, for then it would not require the Sumpti-
 ons to detect it, it being of itself manifest to us, and
 no less apparent than the Sumptions themselves; if
 unapparent, so far as there is an undeterminable
 Controversy concerning Unapparents, (as was said
 formerly) it is therefore incomprehensible. Thus
 the Conclusion of the Reason which they call true,
 will be incomprehensible; and if that be incompre-
 hensible, we shall not know whether that which is
 collected be true or false, therefore we shall not know
 whether the Reason be true or false; and consequen-
 tly the Reason which they call true cannot be found.

Moreover, that Reason which collects a thing un-
 manifest from a manifest, cannot be found out; for
 if the Inference follow the Complication from its
 Sumptions, that which followeth [the Consequent]
 is relative to the Antecedent; but Relatives are com-
 prehended together with one another, as we said be-
 fore. If therefore the Conclusion be unmanifest, the
 Sumptions will also be unmanifest; if the Sumptions
 are manifest, the Conclusion will also be manifest, as
 being comprehended together with the manifest
 (Sumptions.) So as nothing unmanifest can be col-
 lected from what is manifest. Hereupon the Inference

rence cannot be detected by the Sumptions, whether it be unmanifest and not comprehended, or manifest and not needing Detection. Now if *Demonstration* be said to be a *Reason according to Connexion*, that is, *conclusive by some acknowledged true thing, detesting an unmanifest Inference*; and we have proved, that it neither is a Reason, nor conclusive, nor true, nor by some things manifest collecting an unmanifest, nor detective of the Conclusion; it appeareth there is no such thing as *Demonstration*.

Likewise we shall otherways find *Demonstration* to be inexistant and unintelligible: for he who saith there is *Demonstration*, asserts either general *Demonstration* or particular; but neither general nor particular *Demonstration* are possible, (as we shall prove;) and besides these, there is no other can be understood; therefore no Man can assert *Demonstration* to be existent.

That there is no general *Demonstration*, we prove thus: Either it hath Sumptions and an Inference, or it hath not; if it hath not, it is no *Demonstration*; if it hath, forasmuch as every thing that is demonstrated, and also that which doth demonstrate is particular, it will be a particular *Demonstration*, therefore there is no general *Demonstration*.

But neither is there any particular *Demonstration*. For either they must say, it consists of Sumptions and an Inference, or of Sumptions only; but neither of these, therefore there is no particular *Demonstration*. That which consists of Sumptions and an Inference, is not a *Demonstration*: First, as having one Part unmanifest (the Inference) it will be unmanifest, which were absurd; for if the *Demonstration* be unmanifest, it rather will require to be demonstrated by something, than be capable to demonstrate by something. Again, forasmuch as they say the *Demonstration* is relative to the Inference, and Relatives, as they also say, are different from one another; the thing demonstrated must be different from the *Demonstration*. If therefore the Conclusion be the thing demonstrated, the *Demonstration* will not be understood together with the Conclusion. For either the Conclusion conferreth something towards demonstrating itself, or no; if it confer, it will be detective of itself; if it confer not, but be redundant, it will be no Part of the *Demonstration*, for such a *Demonstration* will but fortify Redundance. Neither is that which consists of Sumptions only a *Demonstration*; for who will say that this, *If it is Day, it is light*; but it is *Day, it is light*, either is a Reason, or indeed inferreth any thing? Wherefore neither is that which consists of Sumptions only a *Demonstration*; whence it follows, that there is no particular *Demonstration*. Now if there be no particular *Demonstration*, nor no general, and besides these is no *Demonstration* intelligible, there cannot be *Demonstration*.

Moreover, the Inexistence of *Demonstration* may

be proved this way: If there be *Demonstration*, either an apparent detects an apparent, or an unmanifest an unmanifest, or an unmanifest an apparent, or an apparent an unmanifest; but none of these can be understood; it is therefore unintelligible. For if an apparent detect an apparent, the thing detecting will be at once apparent and unmanifest; apparent, or being supposed such; unmanifest, as requiring something to detect it, and not manifestly of itself incurring to us. If an unmanifest an unmanifest, itself will require something to detect it, rather than be capable of detecting another, which is inconsistent with the Nature of a *Demonstration*. Neither can an unmanifest be the *Demonstration* of a manifest, nor a manifest of an unmanifest, for this reason, because they are relative. Relatives are comprehended together with one another; if that which is said to be demonstrated be comprehended together with the manifest *Demonstration*, it is manifest itself. Thus the Reason will be retorted, and it will not be found, that the manifest can demonstrate the unmanifest. If therefore there be not *Demonstration*, neither of an unmanifest by an unmanifest, nor of an unmanifest by a manifest, nor of a manifest by an unmanifest, and more than these, they say, there is not any, we must say, that *Demonstration* is nothing.

Moreover, there is Controversy concerning *Demonstration*; some say, that it is not; as they who hold, that there is none; others, that it is, as most of the *Dogmatists*; we say *neither* rather that it is, or that it is not. Again, *Demonstration* must necessarily contain some Doctrine; but every Doctrine is controverted, and therefore every *Demonstration* must be controverted. For if, for Example, the *Demonstration* to prove Vacuum being acknowledged, Vacuum also be acknowledged, it is manifest, that they who doubt whether there be Vacuum, doubt also the *Demonstration* thereof. It is the same in all other demonstrated Doctrines. Thus all *Demonstration* is doubted and controverted. Since therefore *Demonstration* is unmanifest, as appears by the Controversy concerning it, (for things controverted, inasmuch as controverted, are unmanifest) it is not evident in itself, but must be evinced to us by *Demonstration*. Now an acknowledged indubitate *Demonstration* to prove *Demonstration*, there cannot be (the Question being, Whether there be any *Demonstration* at all?) but if it be controverted and unmanifest, it will require another *Demonstration*, and that another, and so to infinite; but it is impossible to demonstrate Infinites, therefore it is impossible to prove there is *Demonstration*.

Neither can it be detected by a Sign; for it being questioned whether there be a Sign, and the Sign consequently requiring a *Demonstration* of itself, it runs into the *Alternate* Common-place; the *Demonstration* requiring a Sign, the Sign a *Demonstration*, which is absurd. Neither can the Controversy concerning

cerning Sign be judged, because Dijudication wanteth a Criteriy, it being controverted, as we shewed, whether there be a Criteriy; and the Criteriy consequently requiring a Demonstration to prove that there is a Criteriy, it runs again into the alternate Place. If therefore neither by Demonstration, nor by Sign, nor by Criteriy, it can be proved that there is a Demonstration, and it be not manifest of itself, as we have shewn, it will be incomprehensible whether there be Demonstration; therefore Demonstration is inexistit: for it is understood by demonstrating, but not being comprehended it cannot demonstrate, therefore there will be no Demonstration. This, by way of Summary, may serve against Demonstration.

But the Dogmatists, on the other side, say, The Reasons alledged against Demonstration, either are demonstrative, or not demonstrative; if not demonstrative, they are not able to prove there is no Demonstration; if demonstrative, they themselves, by Retortion, prove the Subsistence of Demonstration. Hereupon they argue thus, If there is Demonstration there is Demonstration; if there is not Demonstration there is Demonstration, therefore there is Demonstration. Upon the same Grounds they also propose this Reason, That which followeth from Contraries is not only true, but necessary; but there is Demonstration, and there is not Demonstration, are opposite one to another; from both which it followeth, that there is Demonstration, therefore there is Demonstration.

But this may be contradicted; as for Example, if we say thus: Forasmuch as we conceive that there is not any Reason demonstrative, neither do we conceive that the Reasons alledged against Demonstrations are absolutely demonstrative, but that they seem probable to us; but Probables are not necessarily demonstrative; therefore if the Demonstratives are (which we allow not) necessarily true, but true Reasons collect true from true, their Inference is not true; and if not, it is no Demonstration; therefore (by way of Retortion) there is no Demonstration. Besides, as purgative Medicines expel themselves, together with the Humours which they purge, it is possible that these Reasons may exclude themselves, together with those which are said to be Demonstratives. For this is not absurd, seeing that this Sentence, *That there is nothing true*, not only takes away all other things, but itself amongst the rest. Moreover, this Argument (If there be Demonstration there is Demonstration, if there is not Demonstration there is Demonstration; but either there is, or there is not, therefore there is) may many ways be shewn to be inconclusive; but, for the present, we shall be contented with this Epichorem. If this Connex (If there is Demonstration there is Demonstration) be not faulty, the contrary of its Consequent (that is, there is not Demonstration) must be repugnant to its Antecedent, there is Demonstration, for

that is the Antecedent of the Connex: But, according to them, it is impossible that a Connex can be found, if it consists of contrary Propositions; for a Connex promisseth, that if its Antecedent be, its Consequent is also; but in Opposites quite contrary, which of them soever is, the other must not be. Therefore if this be a true Connex, If there is Demonstration, there is Demonstration, this other cannot be true, If there is not Demonstration there is Demonstration.

Moreover, If we grant by Supposition that this is a sound Connex, If there is not Demonstration there is Demonstration, this Part, if there is not Demonstration, may coexist with the other, there is Demonstration: But if it may coexist with it, it cannot be repugnant to it; so that in this Connex, if there is Demonstration there is Demonstration, the contrary of the Consequent is not repugnant to the Antecedent, therefore it is not found. Again, If this Connex, which, by way of Concession, is laid down for sound, and this Part, there is no Demonstration, be repugnant to that Part, there is not Demonstration, neither will this be a good Disjunct. Either there is Demonstration, or there is not Demonstration; for a good Disjunct promisseth that one of its Parts is true, and that the other is false and repugnant. Or if the Disjunct be found, this, If there is not Demonstration there is Demonstration, will again be found to be faulty, a Connex consisting of Repugnants. Wherefore the Sumptions in the fore-said Reason are inconsistent, and destroy one another, therefore the Reason is not found. But neither can they shew that something followeth upon Repugnants, not having a Criteriy of the Consequents, as we argued before. But this is said over and above. Now if the Reasons for Demonstration be probable, and the Reasons against Demonstration be probable also, we must suspend, saying no more, that there is Demonstration, than that there is not.

C H A P. XIV.

Of Syllogisms.

Concerning those which they call *Syllogisms*, perhaps it were superfluous to discourse, as well for that they are subverted by taking away Demonstration, (for if there be no Demonstration, there is no demonstrative Reason) as also, forasmuch as what we have already said may serve for Confutation of them; whereas we over and above deliver'd a Method, to shew, that all the demonstrative Reasons of the *Stoicks* and *Peripateticks* are inconclusive. But perhaps it would not be amiss to say something in particular concerning these, especially seeing they have a high Concern of them. But whereas many things might be alledged, to shew they cannot exist; yet we, pursuing our Design of a Summary, will use our first Method.

Let us first speak of Indemonstrables; for if they be taken away, all other Reasons are overthrowed, as being by them demonstrated to be Conclusive. Now this Proposition, *Every Man is a living Creature*, is inductively proved by Particulars; because from *Socrates's* being a Man, and a living Creature, and so *Plato's* and *Dion's*, and every one in particular, it seemeth possible to be proved, that every Man is a living Creature. For if there be but one Particular, which seemeth contrary to the rest, the universal Proposition will not be found. As for Example, Although the greatest Part of living Creatures move the lower Jaw, only the Crocodile the upper, this Proposition is not true, All living Creatures move the lower Jaw. When therefore they say, *Every Man is a living Creature*, *Socrates is a Man*, therefore *Socrates is a living Creature*; intending from this universal Proposition, *Every Man is a living Creature*, to collect this particular Proposition, therefore *Socrates is a living Creature*: This being one of those by which the universal Proposition was (as I said) inductively proved, they fall into the *alternate Common-place*, proving the universal Proposition by the Particulars, and the Particular by the Universal. In like manner, in this Reason, *Socrates is a Man*; but *no Man is four-footed*, therefore *Socrates is not four-footed*: This Proposition, *No Man is four-footed*, endeavouring to prove inductively by Particulars, and to prove every particular syllogistically out of this, they run into the *alternate Common-place* inextricably.

In like manner, let us examine the rest of the Reasons, which the *Peripateticks* call demonstrable; for this, *If it be Day, it is Light*, they say, is conclusive of this, *it is Light*; and again, this, *It is Light*, together with the other, *It is Day*, is confirmative of this, *If it is Day, it is Light*: For the aforesaid Connex would not be thought found, if the first Part, *It is Light*, were not always coexistent with, *It is Day*. If therefore it must first be comprehended, that when there is Day there is necessarily Light, for the framing of this Connex, *If it is Day, it is light*; hence is inferred, that in these, *When it is Day, it is light*: This Connex, *If it is Day it is light*, (as far as concerns the present indemonstrable Reason) proving the Co-existence of this, *It is Day*, and of this, *It is light*; and reciprocally their Existence, confirming the Connex here again, by the *alternate Common-place*, the Existence of Reason is subverted.

The same may be said of this Reason, *If it is Day, it is light*; but it is not light, therefore it is not Day: For, inasmuch as there cannot be Day without Light, this is conceived to be a found Connex, *If it be Day, it is light*; but if we should suppose some Day to be, and Light not to be, it will be said to be a false Connex. Now as to the foreaid Indemonstrable, that, *If there is not Day, there is not Light*,

is collected from this, that, *If there is Day, there is Light*; so as either is requisite to the Proof of the other, and incurs the *alternate Common-place*.

Likewise, sofarasmuch as some things are inconsistent one with the other, as Day and Night, and the Negative of the Complicate, (*It is not Day, and it is not Night*), and the Disjunct is thought to be found; but that they are inconsistent, they conceive to be proved by the Negative of the Complicate, and by the Disjunct, saying, *It is not Day and Night*; but *it is Night, therefore it is not Day*. Or thus, *Either it is Day or Night*; but *it is Night, therefore it is not Day*. Or, *but it is not Night, therefore it is Day*. Whence we again argue, that if to Confirmation of the Disjunct, and of the Negation in the Complicate, it be necessary that we first comprehend the Axioms contained in them to be inconsistent; but that they are inconsistent, seems to be collected from the Disjunct, and the Negative of the Complicate, they run into the *alternate Common-place*, seeing that we can neither credit the foreaid Modals, unless we first comprehend the Inconsistence of the Axioms that are in them, nor can affirm their Inconsistence, before we can affirm the Coagulation of the Syllogisms which is made by the Modals. Wherefore not having whereupon to ground our Belief first, (they being reciprocal) we must say, that neither the third, nor fourth, nor fifth, of the Indemonstrables (as far as appeareth by this,) have Subsistence. Thus much for Syllogisms.

CH A P. XV.

Of Induction.

Induction, as I conceive, may easily be overthrowed; for, seeing that by it they would prove an Universal from Particulars, either they must do it, as having examined all Particulars, or only some. If some only, the *Induction* will not be valid, it being possible, that some of the omitted Particulars may be found contrary to the universal Proposition. If they would examine all, they attempt Impossible, for Particulars are infinite, and undeterminate. Thus it happens, that *Induction* cannot subsist either way.

CH A P. XVI.

Of Definitions.

Forasmuch as the *Dogmatists* are highly conceited of themselves, as to the framing of *Definitions*, (which they rank under the Logical Part of Philosophy) let us discourse a little hereupon. The *Dogmatists* say, that *Definitions* conduce to many things, but perhaps all their necessary use may be reduced to two general Heads; they shew that *Definitions* are necessary, either to Comprehension or to Instruction.

on. Now if we prove they are useful to neither, we overthrow their vain Labour. We argue thus: If he who knoweth not that which is defined, cannot define that which he knoweth not; and he who knoweth first, and afterwards defineth, comprehends not, by the Definition, that which is defined, but applies the Definition to that which he already comprehends; then Definition is not necessary to the Comprehension of Things. And forasmuch as if we would define all Things we cannot define any, because we shall run into infinite; and if we say, that some things may be comprehended without Definitions, we shew that Definitions are not necessary to Comprehension: As those which are not defined are comprehended, so we might comprehend all the rest without Definitions, either we shall define nothing at all, because of proceeding to infinite, or we alledge Definitions not necessary.

For the same Reasons shall we find, that neither are they necessary to Instruction: For, as he who first knoweth a thing, knoweth it without Definition; in like manner, he who teacheth it, may teach it without a Definition.

Moreover from the Things defined they judge Definitions, saying, Those are faulty Definitions, which include something which is not in the Things defined, either in all or in some. So as if we say, *A Man is a living Creature, Rational, Immortal*; or, *A living Creature, Rational, Mortal, Learned*; forasmuch as there is no Man immortal, and that there are some Men not learned, they say it is a faulty Definition. Therefore Definitions, perhaps, are indjudicable, by reason of the Infinity of the Particulars by which they ought to be judged. Besides, they cannot make us comprehend and learn the things of which themselves are judg'd, inasmuch as they are already known and comprehended. Is it not therefore ridiculous to say, That Definitions conduce to Comprehension, or Instruction, or Declaration, when they involve us in such Obscurity? As for Example, (to sport a little) if one Man meaning to ask another, Whether he met a Man on Horseback, with a Dog following him, should do it after this manner: *O living Creature, Rational, Mortal, capable of Intellect and Science, Didst thou not meet a living Creature, Visible, Broad-nail'd, capable of political Science, mounted upon a living Creature that hath the Faculty of Neighing, leading a four-footed living Creature that hath the Faculty of Barking.* Who would not laugh to see a Man, that knows the Things themselves, puzzled by their Definitions? We must therefore acknowledge Definitions to be unnecessary, whether it be a Speech, which, by a short Explication, brings us to Knowledge of the Thing meant by the Words, (which, by what we have said, it appeareth, that it doth not) or whether it be a Speech declaring what a thing is, *τι τι ἐστιν*, or even what they please. For when they go about

to shew what Demonstration is, they fall out among themselves irreconcilably, of which, for Brevity's Sake, we will not take notice.

C H A P. XVII.

Of Division.

FORasmuch as some of the Dogmatists say, That *Dialectick is a Science Syllogistick, Inductive, Demonstrative*; after our Discourse of the *Critery*, and of *Demonstration*, and of *Syllogisms*, and of *Inductions*, and of *Definition*, we will come to say something of *Division*, conceiving it not to be from our Purpose.

They say, That of *Division*, there are four Kinds; *Of the Word into Significations*; *Of the Whole into Parts*; *Of the Genus into Species*; *Of the Species into Individuals*. But that there is not a divisive Science of any of these, I think may easily be shewn, by examining them severally.

C H A P. XVIII.

Of the Division of a Word into Significations.

THE Sciences they hold to be by Nature, not by Imposition; and justly, for Science must be a thing stable and unmovable: But those things which are by Imposition, are very subject to Mutation, being varied according to the Diversity of Impositions which are in our Power. Now forasmuch as Words signify by Imposition and not by Nature, (otherwise all Men would understand all Languages, both *Greeks* and *Barbarians*, besides it is in our Power to declare our Meaning by other Words) how is it possible there should be a divisive Science of the Word into Significations? Or how can *Dialectick* be (as some conceive,) the Science of Significants, and Significates?

C H A P. XIX.

Of Whole and Part.

CONCERNING *Whole and Part*, we shall discourse in that which they call *Physick*; at present, we shall only speak of the Division of the Whole into its Parts. We say thus, When the *Decad* is said to be divided into *One*, and *Two*, and *Three*, and *Four*, it is not divided into these; for as soon as the first Part (granting this by the way of Supposition) is taken away, (as the *Monad*), there is no longer the *Decad*, but the *Ennead*, a thing quite different from the *Decad*; therefore the Substraction and Division of the rest concerns not the *Decad*, but other Numbers according to the several Substractions.

Let us now see, whether it be possible to divide the Whole into those Things which they say are its Parts. If the Whole is divided into its Parts, the

Parts

Parts before the Division either are contained in the Whole, or not contained: To use our first Example, the *Decad*; They say, that 9 is one of its Parts, for it is divided into 1, and 8; so 8 also, for it is divided into 8 and 2. So also is 7, and 6, and 5, and 4, and 3, and 2, and 1. Now if all these are contained in the *Decad*, and compounded with it, they making 55, the *Decad* must contain 55, which is absurd. Therefore are not the Parts, as they call them, contained in the *Decad*; neither can the *Decad* be divided into them, as a Whole into Parts, since they are not to be found in it. The same may be objected against Magnitudes, as if we should divide a Magnitude into ten Cubits; perhaps therefore it is not possible to divide the Whole into Parts.

CHAP. XX.

Of Genus and Species.

IT remains to treat of *Genus* and *Species*, of which elsewhere we shall speak more largely, but now compendiously. If *Genus* and *Species* are Notions, the Arguments which we brought against the Hegemonick and Phantasy, subvert them; but if they allow them to have a peculiar Subsistence, What will they answer to this? If there are *Genus's*, either there are as many as there are *Species*, or there is one common *Species*, or *Genus*, in all those which are called *Species*. If there be as many *Genus's*, as there are *Species* of them, there will not be one common *Genus* which is divided into them; but if it be said, there is one *Genus* in all its *Species*, then every *Species* must participate of the Whole *Genus*, or of Part thereof; but not of the Whole, for it is impossible, for one thing contained at once, in one, and another, to be wholly in one. If of Part only, first, the whole *Genus* will not follow the *Species*, as they conceive it doth, for Man will not be a living Creature, but Part of a living Creature, as a Substance, but neither animate nor sensible. Again, either all the *Species* will be said to participate of the same Parts of their *Genus*, or some of some Part, others of others. That they should participate of the same is impossible, for the Reason aforesaid. If some of some, others of others, the *Species* will not be like to one another, according to their *Genus*, (which they will not admit) and besides, every *Genus* will be infinite, being divided into infinite, not only as to *Species*, but as to Particulars, in which it is consider'd with those *Species*; for *Dion* is not only said to be a Man, but a living Creature. But if these things be absurd, neither do the *Species* participate of Part of their *Genus*, it being one; but if neither doth every *Species* participate of its *Genus* in Whole, nor in Part, how can one *Genus* be said to be in all its *Species* so as to be divided into them? None sure can say any thing hereof, unless he frame some kind of Images; and

yet even those will be subverted, according to the sceptical Method, by their own indeterminate Consequences.

We shall add this; *Species's* are either such or such, their *Genus's* are either such and such, or they are such and they are not such, or they are neither such nor such. As for Instance; Forasmuch as of these or those, some are Corporeal, others Incorporeal, and some True, others False, and some peradventure White, others Black, and some very Great, others very Little: This word *Thing*, for Example, which some say is most general, will either be All, or Some, or Nothing; but if it be absolutely Nothing, neither will it be *Genus*, and so there is an End of the Controversy. If they say it is All, besides that it is impossible it should be so, it must be all the *Species*, and every particular in them. For because an Animal, as they say, is an Animate, Sensitive Substance, therefore each of its *Species* is said to be both a Substance, and Animate, and Sensitive: So if *Genus* be both Body, and Incorporeal, and False and True, and Black and White, and Little and Great, and all the rest, each of its *Species* and Particulars will also be all; which we do not find to be so; therefore this also is false. But if it be only some, then that which is the *Genus* of those, will not be the *Genus* of the rest; as if *Thing* be Body, it will not be the *Genus* of Incorporeals; and if living Creature be Rational, not of Irrationals; so that neither will an Incorporeal be a *Thing*, nor Irrational a Creature. Therefore *Genus* is neither such and such, nor such and not such, nor neither such nor such: And if so, neither is *Genus* any thing at all.

If any shall say, that *Genus* is all Potentially; we answer, that what is any thing Potentially, must be something Actually also; as none can be a *Grammarian* Potentially, if he exist not Actually; now if *Genus* be all things Potentially, we demand of them what it is Actually; and thereupon occur the same inextricable Difficulties, for it cannot be all Contraries Actually. Again, neither can it be some Actually, others Potentially, only as a Body Actually, Incorporeal Potentially; for a thing is Potentially, such as it may be Actually, but what is Actually a Body cannot be Actually Incorporeal; so as, for Example, If it be a Body Actually, it is Incorporeal Potentially, and on the contrary. Wherefore we cannot say that *Genus* is some things Actually, others Potentially, only. Now if Actually it be nothing at all, it exists not; and therefore the *Genus*, which they affirm to be divided into its *Species*, is nothing.

This likewise is worthy Consideration, That as because *Alexander* and *Paris* are the same, therefore it is impossible, if it be true that *Alexander* walks, it should be false that *Paris* walks. In like manner, If to be Man, be the same thing in *Them*, and in *Dion*,

Dion, this Appellation, *Man*, alledged in the framing of any Axiom will make the Axiom either true or false in both; but this we find not to be so; for when *Dion* sitteth, and *Theon* walketh, this Axiom, *a Man sitteth*, spoken of one, is true; of the other, false; wherefore this Appellation, *Man*, is not common to both, not one and the same in both, but proper to each.

C H A P. XXI.

Of Common Accidents.

THE like may be said of *Common Accidents*. For if one and the same Accident belong to *Dion* and *Theon*, for Example, *Seeing*; if *Dion* die, and *Theon* survive and see, either they must say, that the Sight of *Dion* is not subject to perish, which is absurd, or that the same Sight is perished, and not perished, which is irrational also: Therefore the Sight of *Theon* is not the same with the Sight of *Dion*, therefore proper to each. For if the same Respiration happen to *Dion* and *Theon*, it cannot be that it should be in *Theon*, and not in *Dion*; but one may die and the other survive, therefore it is not the same. But of these, let what we have briefly said suffice.

C H A P. XXII.

Of Sophisms.

IT will not haply be absurd to insist a little upon *Sophisms*, in regard that they who cry up *Dialectick* so much, say, it is necessary for the Solution of them. For, say they, *If it discern Speeches, true and false; and Sophisms be false Speeches; it is disjunctive of these, which corrupt Truth with an apparent Likelihood*. Wherefore the *Dialecticks*, as assisting and underpropping the failing course of Life, with much Labour, teach the Inferences, and Solutions of Sophisms, saying, *A Sophism is a Reason probable and deceitful; so as it receives an Inference, either false, or like to false, or uncertain, or otherwise not to be received. False, as in this Sophism,*

*No Man giveth a Categorem to be drunk;
But this, to drink Wormwood, is a Categorem;
Therefore, No Man giveth Wormwood to be drunk.*

*Like to False, as in this;
That which could not be, nor cannot be, is not absurd;
But this, a Physician, as a Physician, kills; neither could, nor can be;
Therefore this [Proposition] a Physician, as a Physician, kills, is not absurd.*

Uncertain, as this;

*I did not ask thee something first, and the Stars are not even in Number;
But I did ask thee something first;
Therefore, the Stars are not even in Number.*

*Not otherwise to be received; as those Speeches which are called Solacisms, as,
That which thou seest, is;
But thou seest him mad,
Therefore he is mad.*

Again,

*That which thou seest, is;
But thou seest many Houses burning,
Therefore many Houses are burning.*

Then they endeavour to shew their Solutions, saying, That "in the first Sophism, one thing is granted by the Sumptions, another inferred; it is granted that a Categorem is not drunk, and that to drink Wormwood is a Categorem, but not the Wormwood itself. So that, whereas the Inference ought to be, Therefore no Man drinks this [Categorem,] To drink Wormwood; which is true; it inferreth, Therefore no Man drinketh Wormwood; which is false, and is not collected from the granted Premises.

"As to the Second, It seems to lead to False, (inasmuch as they who mind it not well, doubt whether they ought to assent to it or not,) but it collects Truth, therefore this is not absurd. A Physician, as a Physician, killeth; for no Proposition is absurd; but this, A Physician, as a Physician, killeth, is a Proposition; therefore it is not absurd.

"That which leadeth to Uncertainty, is, they say, of the Nature of reciprocal Reasons; for if nothing were asked before, then the Negative of the Connex were true, the Connex itself being false, *because this*, [I asked thee something first] which is false, is inserted into it; but after asking, (the Assumption being true, [I asked thee first] by reason the asking was before the Assumption) the Negative of the Connex is false; so that a Conclusion cannot any way be gather'd, the Negative of the Connex being inconsistent with the Assumption.

"The last Kind being by Solacism, (some say) infers absurdly, and contrary to common Use.

Thus some *Dialecticks* discourse of *Sophisms*, (others otherwise) which may perhaps tickle the Ears of the lighter sort of Persons, but are indeed superfluous, and forged by themselves to no purpose. This perhaps may be observed, from what was said formerly; for we shewed, that neither True nor False can be comprehended, according to the *Dialecticks*, as many other ways, so particularly, by overthrowing Demonstration, and indemonstrable Reason.

Reasons, the Props of their Syllogistick Faculty. Many other things might be allegd'd against the Subject in hand, of which we shall only say briefly thus.

Of all those *Sophisms*, which *Dialectick* seems properly to confute, the Solution is unprofitable; but those, the Solution whereof is profitable, it is not within the Power of a *Dialectick* to solve, but of those who are conversant in the particular Arts of each several thing. As for Instance; If this *Sophism* were propounded to a Physician, "In the Remission of a Disease, there ought to be Variety of Diet, and Wine allowed; but on the third Day, there usually happens a Remission; therefore before the third Day, there ought to be Variety of Diet, and Allowance of Wine." A *Dialectick* can say nothing to all this; but the Physician can solve the *Sophism*, knowing that Remission is taken two ways, either of the whole Disease, or for any particular Inclination towards Amendment. Before the first third Day it happens for the most part, that there is a Remission of some particular Intenfeness; now we approve not Variety of Diet in this Remission, but in the Remission of the whole Disease. Whereupon he will say, That one of the Sumptions of the Argument is disjoint from the other, viz. that which concerns the whole Disease, from the other which concerns part: Again, to this Argument concerning an intense Fever, "Contraries are the Remedies of Contraries; but Cold is contrary to the Heat of the Fever, therefore cold things are convenient for the Cure of it;" a *Dialectick* will not know what to say. But the Physician, knowing that some are Affections adherent to the Disease, others Symptoms of those Affections, will answer, That the Question is not to be understood of the Symptoms, (for it usually happens that Heat is increased by pouring on cold things,) but of the adherent Affectedness; and that Contipation is an adherent Affection, which requires not Condensation, but rather Opening; but the Heat which follows upon it, is not primarily adherent, wherefore that which is Cold is not convenient to be applied. Thus to *Sophisms*, whose Solution is profitable, the *Dialectick* will not know what to say; but to such as these, "If thou hast not large Horns, and hast Horns, thou hast not Horns; but thou hast not large Horns, and hast Horns; therefore thou hast not Horns. And, If a thing be moved, either it is moved in the place wherein it is, or in that wherein it is not; but neither in that wherein it is, (for there it rests;) nor in that wherein it is not, (for it cannot act, where it is not;) therefore nothing is moved: And, Either that which is generated, or that which is not, but that which is not generated (for it is already) not that which it is not; for that which is generated suffers something, that which is not, suffers

not; Again, Snow is Water congeal'd; but Water is black, therefore Snow is black. And a great many such Fooleries gathering together, he knits his Brows, and produceth his *Dialectick*, and with a great deal of Gravity, endeavours to shew us by Syllogistick Demonstrations, that something is generated, and that something is moved, and that Snow is white, and that we have not Horns; when perhaps, if he did only oppose the Evidence of the contrary to them, it would suffice to overthrow their *Theses* by the Testimony of their Contraries, which are manifest. Whence a Philosopher, to whom the Argument against Motion was objected, said nothing, but walked. And Men, in the ordinary Course of Life, travel by Sea and Land, build Ships and Houses, and beget Children, never minding the Arguments against Motion and Generation. There is also a facetie Apothegm of *Erophilus* the Physician, (contemporary with *Diodorus*, who introduc'd into his foolish Logic many sophistical Arguments, as about other things, so particularly concerning Motion,) *Diodorus* having put his Shoulder out of joint, *Erophilus* coming to set it, derided him, saying, "Either the Bone slipped out of the Place in which it was, or out of that in which it was not; but neither out of that in which it was, nor out of that in which it was not, therefore it is not slipped. So as the *Sophist* was fain to intreat him to let his Arguments alone, and to betake himself to the Cure. For it is sufficient (I conceive) to live experimentally, and inopinatively, according to common Observations and Assumptions, suspending our Assent in all dogmatical Superfluities, and especially those, which are besides the Use of Life. If therefore *Dialectick* cannot solve those *Sophisms*, whose Solution is useful; and of those which some think it doth solve, the Solution is useless, *Dialectick* is of no Benefit in solving *Sophisms*.

Moreover, even from what the *Dialecticks* themselves say, it may be proved, that their Art concerning *Sophisms* is superfluous. They say, That they applied themselves to *Dialectick*, not only to learn what may be gathered from it, but proposing to themselves chiefly, to know how to judge true and false by demonstrative Reasons. Whence they affirm *Dialectick* to be the Science of True, and False, and Neuters. When therefore they assert that to be a true Reason, which by true Sumptions collecteth a true Conclusion, as soon as any Reason, which hath a false Conclusion, is brought against us, we shall know it is false, and therefore will not assent to it; for of necessity, the Reason must either be not conclusive, or not have true Sumption, which is manifest from hence. The false Conclusion which is in the Reason, is either Consequent to the Connexion made by its Sumption, or not Consequent; if not Consequent, the Reason is not Conclusive; for they say, a conclusive Reason is that which followeth the

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Connexion made by its Sumptions; if Consequent, the Connexion which is made by its Sumptions must necessarily be false, by their own Rules; for they say, False is consequent to False, but not True. Now that a Reason which is neither conclusive nor true, is, according to them, not demonstrable, is manifest from what was formerly said. If therefore a Reason being propounded, in which there is a false Conclusion, we know even by itself, that it is neither True nor Conclusive; inasmuch as it hath a false Conclusion, we will not assent to it, though we do not know where the Falacy lies. For, as we believe not the Tricks of Jugglers to be true, but know that they deceive, though we know not which way they do it; so neither do we credit false Reasons, which seem true, though we know not which way they are fallacious.

Or because *Sophisms* lead us not only to one Fallacy, but to many Absurdities besides, we may argue more generally thus: The Reason proposed either leadeth us to something unexpected, or to something that we must have expected; if to the latter, we shall not do absurdly in assenting to it; if to something beyond our expectation, we ought not to assent to an Absurdity rashly, upon a Probability; but they rather ought to withdraw their Reason, which compelleth Assent to an Absurdity, if they intend not to trifle childishly, but to make a serious Enquiry into the Truth, as they profess. For if there be a Way leads to some Precipice, we will not run upon the Precipice, because there is a Way that leads to it, but rather go out of the Way, because of the Precipice. In like manner, if there be a Reason which bringeth us to something, acknowledged to be absurd, we must not assent to the Absurdity because of the Reason, but reject the Reason because of the Absurdity. When therefore a Reason is objected to us, we will suspend to every Proposition; and then, when the whole Reason is laid down, we will bring in that which appeareth to us. For if the Followers of *Chrysippus*, being *Dogmatists*, upon a *Series* proposed, say, They must put a stop to the Progress of the Reason, and suspend their Assent, lest they fall into an Absurdity; certainly we, who are *Scepticks*, and jealous of Absurdities, ought much more to take heed, lest we be betray'd by Sumptions, and therefore suspend upon every one, until we hear the whole Argument. Besides, we, without Opinion, being only informed by the common Observations of Life, thus avoid fallacious Reasons: But the *Dogmatists*

cannot discern a *Sophism* from a true Reason, seeing they are constrained to judge dogmatically, whether the Form of the Reason be conclusive, and whether the Sumptions be true or not; but we have formerly shewn, that they cannot comprehend what Reasons are Conclusive, nor judge Truth in any thing, as having neither a *Criterion* nor *Demonstration*, which we proved from their own Words. Hence it appears, that the artificial Forms of *Sophisms*, so much cry'd up by the *Dialecticks*, are superfluous.

CH A P. XXIII.

Of *Amphibolies*.

WE say the same concerning Distinction of *Amphibolies*. For, if *Amphiboly* be a Word which signifies two or more things, and Words signify by Imposition, it is fit they be distinguished by those who are of the several Arts to which they belong; they having had experience of the positive Use of the Words, which they applied to the things that they signified; but a *Dialectick* hath not, as in this *Amphiboly*; In the Remission of Diseases, Variety of Diet, and Wine is allowed.

Moreover, we see, that in common Life, even Children distinguish those *Amphibolies*, the Distinction whereof seemeth useful to them. For if a Man, having two Servants of the same Name, shall bid a Child call *Manus* to him, (let us suppose that to be the Name of both) the Child would ask, Which? And if one having several Sorts of Wine, shall bid a Child fill him some Wine, the Child will ask, Of which sort? Thus in all things, Experience of that which is useful introduceth Distinction; but those *Amphibolies* which come not within the Experience of Life, and are perhaps only in the Sayings of the *Dogmatists*, and nothing useful to living without Opinion, the *Dialectick* being particularly employed in these, will be necessitated even in them to suspend after the *Sceptical* way, according as they are annexed to things uncertain, or incomprehensible, or in-existent. But of these we shall discourse again. Now if any *Dogmatist* attempt to say any thing against this, he confirms the *Sceptick* Reason, and by the Allegation of Arguments on both Sides, and their indeterminate Difference, will settle *Suspension* as to the thing controverted. Having spoken thus much concerning *Amphibolies*, we close our Second Book of *Hypotyposes*.

Of *PHYSICK*.The *THIRD BOOK*.

Hitherto, by way of Summary, we have spoken of the *Logical* Part of Philosophy; we shall observe the same Course in examining the *Physical* Part; not confuting every Particular, but endeavouring to overthrow the more general, wherein the others are comprehended. We will begin with the *Principles*. And so far as much as the greatest part hold, that some of them are Material, others Efficient; we will first speak of the Efficient, those being said to be Principles more properly than the Material.

C H A P. I.

Of *G O D*.

NOW seeing that most of the Dogmatists hold God to be the most efficient Cause, let us first enquire concerning God; professing, that, following the Course of Life, we say, (without engaging our Judgment) that there are Gods, and we worship the Gods, and we say, that they have Providing. Only to confute the Temerity of the Dogmatists, we say as followeth.

Of the things which we understand, we ought to consider the Substances, as, whether they are Bodies, or Incorporeal; likewise their Forms. For none can understand a Horse, if he hath not first learnt what the Form of a Horse is. Likewise, that which is understood, must be understood as being somewhere. Now so far as much as, of the Dogmatists, some say, That God is a Body; others Incorporeal; some, that he hath a human Form; others, not; some, that he is in Place; others, that he is not in Place: And of those who say, he is in Place; some, that he is in the World; others, that he is beyond it: How can we have a Notion of God, not having an indubitate Knowledge of his Substance, nor of his Form, nor of the Place wherein he is. Let them first agree amongst themselves, What God is; and then they may represent him to us, and require, that we receive such a Notion of God; for, while they disagree irreconcilably amongst themselves, we cannot receive any thing from them as undoubtedly true. But, say they, conceive with yourself something incorruptible and blessed, and think God to be such. This is foolish. For, as he who knoweth not *Dion*, cannot know the Accidents that are competent to

him, as *Dion*; so, not knowing the Substance of God, neither can we know his Accidents.

Moreover, let them tell us what is blessed: Whether that which acts according to Virtue, and hath a Providence over the Things subordinate to it; or that which is unactive, and neither hath any Business itself, nor affords Business to any other. For, differing irreconcilably even, about this, they shew, that what they call blessed is not to be found out, and consequently not God himself.

But though we should admit the Notion of God, yet is it necessary we suspend, whether he is, or he is not, even from what the Dogmatists say; because it is not manifest that there is a God; for, if that were self-evident, the Dogmatists would have agreed, Who, and What, and Where he is; whereas on the contrary there is an undeterminable Controversy amongst them, whereby we see, that his Being is unmanifest to us, and requireth Demonstration. Now he who saith, that there is a God, must either demonstrate it by a thing manifest, or by an unmanifest; not by a thing manifest, for if that were manifest which demonstrates there is a God, so far as much as that which demonstrateth is relative to that which is demonstrated, and consequently is comprehended together with it, (as we have formerly proved) that there is a God will be manifest also, as being comprehended together with the manifest thing that demonstrates it. But this is not manifest, therefore neither can it be demonstrated by a manifest thing.

But neither by an unmanifest, for the unmanifest that should demonstrate there is a God will require a Demonstration. If demonstrated by a manifest, it will no longer be unmanifest, but manifest, that there is a God. Therefore the unmanifest demonstrative cannot be demonstrated by a manifest. But neither by an unmanifest; for he who saith so, will be driven into *infinite*, we continually requiring a Demonstration of the unmanifest, that is alleged for Demonstration of the thing proposed. Therefore it cannot be demonstrated from any other, that there is a God; and if it neither be manifest in itself, nor demonstrable from any other, it will be incomprehensible whether there be a God.

Moreover, he who saith there is a God, holds either, that he is provident over the things in the World, or not provident. If provident; either over
all,

all, or over some. If over all, there would be no Ill or Wickedness in the World; but all things (as they confess) are full of ill; therefore God cannot be said to be provident over all. If over some only, Why is he provident over these and not over those? For either he both will, and can be provident over all; or he will, but cannot; or he can, but will not; or he neither will nor can. If he both will and can, then he would be provident over all; but he is not, as is manifest from what we last alledged; therefore that he both will and can provide over all, is not so. If he will, but cannot, his Power is exceeded by that Cause, which hinders him from being provident over the things over which he is not provident; but it is absurd to imagine God to be weaker than some other. If he can be provident over all, and will not, he may be thought envious: If he neither will nor can, both envious and infirm; which to affirm of God, were impious. Therefore God is not provident over the things of the World; and if he is not provident over them, neither performeth any Work or Effect, none can say by what means he comprehends there is a God, seeing that it neither is manifest in itself, nor comprehended by any Effects. For these Reasons therefore it is incomprehensible, Whether there be a God or No.

Hence we also argue, That perhaps they who say there is a God, cannot be excused from Impiety; for in affirming, That he is provident over all Things, they say, that God is the Author of Evil; and in saying, that he is provident over some, and not over all, they will be forced to confess, That God is either envious or infirm; which cannot be said without manifest Impiety.

C H A P. II.

Of Cause.

BUT that the *Dogmatists*, not being able to extricate themselves out of these Difficulties, may not charge us with Blasphemy; we will in general examine *Efficient Cause*, first, endeavouring to lay down the Notion thereof.

From what the *Dogmatists* say, none can understand what *Cause* is. Some hold it to be a Body; others, Incorporeal. It seems to be, according to their most general Opinion, *That by which the Effect is operated*; as the Sun, or the Sun's Heat is Cause that the Wax is melted, or Cause of the Liquefaction of the Wax; for even here they differ. Some will have the Cause to be of the Abstract, as Liquefaction; others of the Concrete, as to be liquified. Thus, as I said, according to the most general and received Opinion, a Cause is that by which the Effect is operated.

Of those Causes, they hold some to be Continent (or Solitary); others, Con-causal; others, Co-operative.

Solitary are those, which being present, the Effect is present; and being taken away, the Effect is taken away; and being diminished, the Effect is diminished. Thus, the knitting a Halter about the Neck is the Cause of Suffocation. Con-causal is that which joineth with another Con-causal, towards Production of the same Effect; thus, Every one of the Oxen that draw the Plough, is cause of the drawing thereof. Co-operative is that which affords Assistance, but very little to the Effect; as when two Men carry a Burthen, and a third helps them a little.

Some say, That things present are impulsive Causes of the future, as the vehement Heat of the Sun is of a Fever; but some will not admit these; for that a Cause, being relative to its Effect, cannot, as Cause, precede it.

C H A P. III.

Whether there be any Cause of a Thing.

IT is probable, there is such a thing as Cause: For how can Augmentation, Diminution, Generation, Corruption, Motion of natural and spiritual Agents; in a word, the ordering of the whole World be, if not from some Cause: For, if none of these be really such in their own Nature, we must say, That they seem to us, by reason of some Cause, to be such as indeed they are not. Again, All Generations would be promiscuous if there were no Cause; Horses, of Mice; Elephants, of Pisimires. At *Thebes* in *Egypt*, there would be great Showers of Rain and Snow; in the Southern Parts none, unless there were some Cause that produced extraordinary cold in the Southern Parts, and made the Eastern dry and hot.

Again, he who saith there is no Cause, is confused either way: If he say it simply, without a Cause, (or Reason) he is not worthy credit; if upon any Cause, let him shew a Cause where there is no Cause, and by that very reason he will prove that there is a Cause.

That they likewise speak probably who deny Cause, we shall shew, by alledging some Reasons out of many. As thus: It is impossible to understand the Cause, before we comprehend the Effect as its Effect; but neither can we comprehend the Effect of the Cause as its Effect, if we comprehend not the Cause of the Effect as its Cause; for then we seem to know that it is its Effect, when we comprehend the Cause as its Cause. Now if to understand the Cause, it be necessary that we first know the Effect; and to know the Effect (as I said) it be necessary that we first know the Cause, the *alternate Commence* comes in, to shew, that neither of them can be known; not the Cause as Cause, nor the Effect as Effect; for each of them requiring the other to its credit, we shall not know upon which to ground our

Knowledge first. Wherefore we are not able to assert, that there is any Cause of a Thing.

But though we should grant there is a Cause, yet will it appear to be incomprehensible, from the Contradictions about it. For he who saith, That there is Something Cause of Something, either saith it simply, not moved by any Cause or Reason, or else is moved to this Assent by some Cause. If simply, he will be nothing the more creditable, than he who saith, There is no Cause of any thing. If he alledge any Cause, why he thinks there is a Cause, he endeavoureth to prove that which is in question by that which is in question. For the Question being, Whether there be any Cause of a Thing, he takes it for granted that there is a Cause, when he alledgeth a Cause, why there is a Cause. Moreover, the Question being concerning the Existence of Cause, if we prove it by any Cause, it will be requisite to alledge another Cause to prove that, and so to infinite; but to alledge infinite Causes, is impossible. It is therefore impossible to assert, That there is something Cause of another.

Moreover, a Cause produceth the Effect, either when it already is, and exists as Cause, or when it is not a Cause. Not the latter. And if when it already is, it must first exist, and be a Cause, and then produce the Effect, which is said to be the Effect thereof, the Cause already existing: But Cause being relative to the Effect, it is manifest, that, as Cause, it cannot exist before it. Therefore a Cause, even when it is already a Cause, cannot produce that whereof it is Cause. And if it produceth not any thing, neither when it is not a Cause, nor when it is a Cause, then there is no Cause at all; for a Cause cannot be understood as Cause, unless it produce something.

Whence some argue also thus: A Cause must exist either together with the Effect, or before it, or after it. Now to say, that the Cause begins to exist after the Production of the Effect, were ridiculous. Neither can it exist before it, as being understood in relation to it; but Relatives, as Relatives, coexist, and are understood together; but neither can it co-exist with the Effect, for if it be its Efficient, and that whatsoever is effected, must be effected by some other that hath a Being, it is necessary, that a Cause first be a Cause before it produce the Effect. Therefore if a Cause exist not either together with, or before, or after the Effect, it exists not at all.

Moreover, the Notion of a Cause may haply be overthrown thus. For if we cannot understand a Cause (so far as much as it is relative) before its Effect; and to understand it, as Cause of the Effect, it be necessary to understand it, as being before the Effect: But it be impossible to understand any thing to be before that, before which we cannot understand any thing to be, then it is impossible to understand that there is Cause.

Hence we argue thus: Forasmuch as the Reasons by which we proved that there must be a Cause, are probable; and those also are probable on the other side, which prove there is no Cause; and of these Reasons we cannot possibly know which ought to be preferred, since we neither have a Sign, nor Criterey, nor Demonstration, acknowledged indubitate, (as we shewed formerly:) Therefore we must necessarily suspend, as to the Existence of Cause, saying, That from what the *Dogmatists* affirm of it, it appears *nothing rather* to be, than not to be.

CHAP. IV.

Of material Principles.

Hitherto of the *Efficient*; we shall next speak briefly of those which are called *material Principles*. That these are incomprehensible, is manifest from the Disagreement of the *Dogmatists* about them. *Pherecydes* the *Syrian* asserted Earth to be the Principle of all things; *Thales* the *Milesian*, Water; *Anaximander*, his Disciple, Infinite; *Anaximenes* and *Diogenes Apolloniates*, Air; *Hippasus* the *Metapontine*, Fire; *Xenophanes* the *Colophonian*, Earth and Water; *Empedocles* the *Chian*, Fire and Air; *Hippocrates*, Fire and Water; *Onomacritus*, in his Orphicks, Fire, Water, and Earth; not to speak of Matter void of Quality, (which some have prodigiously fancied, but not understood;) the Followers of *Aristotle* (the *Peripateticks*) a circular moving Body, consisting of Fire, Air, Water, and Earth; *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, Atoms; *Anaxagoras* the *Clazomenian*, Homoiomeria's; *Diodorus Cronus*, least and indivisible Bodies; *Heraclides* of *Pontus*, and *Asclepiades* of *Bithynia*, uncompounded Bulks (or little Bodies;) the *Pythagoreans*, Numbers; the *Mathematicians*, the Terms of Bodies; *Strato* the Naturalist, Qualities.

Such (or, yet greater) being the Controversy amongst them concerning the material Principles, we must either assent to all their Opinions, or to some. To all is impossible; for we cannot hold with *Asclepiades*, that they are tangible and qualited; and with *Democritus*, that they are Atoms, and void of Quality; and with *Anaxagoras*, who ascribes all sensible Qualities to his *Homoiomeria's*. But if we must of our own Judgments make choice of some of these Opinions, we must do it either without Demonstration, or with Demonstration. If without Demonstration, it will not be credited; if with Demonstration, that Demonstration must be true: But it will not be granted to be true, unless it be judged and determined by a true Criterey; but the Criterey must be proved to be true by an adjudged Demonstration. If therefore, to prove that which preferreth one Opinion before the rest to be true, it be requisite that its Criterey be demonstrated; and to demonstrate that

the Criteriy is true, it be requisite that its Demonstration be first adjudged; it runs into the *alternate Common-place*, which will suffer the Argument to proceed no further, the Demonstration continually requiring a Criteriy; and the Criteriy, adjudged Demonstration: But to judge a Criteriy by a Criteriy, and a Demonstration by a Demonstration, were to run into infinite. Now if we cannot assent to all Opinions concerning the Elements, nor to some of them, we must necessarily suspend.

This perhaps is sufficient to shew the Incomprehensibility of the Elements and material Principles. But to refute the *Dogmatists* more fully, we will insist longer hereupon. Their Opinions concerning Elements are so many, that to examine every one in particular is more than our Design will allow, but what we shall allege may serve to confute all: For seeing that in all Controversies concerning the Elements they are held either to be Bodies or Incorporeal, we conceive it sufficient to prove that both Bodies and Incorporeals are incomprehensible; for thence it will follow, that the Elements must be incomprehensible.

CHAP. V.

Whether Bodies be incomprehensible.

A Body (some of them say) is that which (they think) *dash, or suffereth*: But according to this Notion it is incomprehensible, as we have shewn. For not being able to say whether there be a Cause, we cannot say whether there be a Patient, for the Patient suffers from the Cause: Thus both the Cause and the Patient being incomprehensible, a Body also must be incomprehensible.

Some say, A Body is that which hath a triple Dimension and Resistance: For a Point (they say) is that which hath no Part, a Line is a Length without Breadth: Now when these have received Depth also, and Resistance, it then becomes the Body we speak of, consisting of Length, Breadth, Depth, and Resistance. But these are easily disproved; for either they must say, that a Body is nothing but these, or that it is something else different from these. * That it is something else different from these, we cannot conceive; for we cannot conceive that there is a Body, where there is not Length, Breadth, Depth, and Resistance. But if a Body be these, and we prove that these are not existent, we take away Body; for the Whole, if you take away all its Parts, is taken away also. These may be confuted several ways, of which we shall only allege this: If there are Terms, either they are Lines, or Superficies, or Bodies. If they shall say that there is Line or Superficies, they must grant that each of them can exist by

itself, or is considered only in the Bodies. That a Line or Superficies exists by itself, none perhaps is so foolish as to imagine. If they say that they exist not by themselves, but in the Body: First, They must grant that Bodies are made of them; for then they must first have had a Subsistence by themselves, and afterwards concur to the making of a Body. Again, neither do they exist in the things which are called Bodies, as (to omit other Instances) we shall shew from Contact only: For if the Bodies which are clapp'd together touch one another mutually, they must touch mutually by their Terms, that is, by their Superficies; but the Superficies touch not each other in whole, for then they would be united one to the other by the Act of touching, the Touch would confound the Substances; so as to divide two things that touch one another, would be a Divulsion. Neither doth a Superficies by some Parts touch the Superficies of the Body which is applied to it, and by others is united to the Body, whose Term it is; certainly no Man can consider this to be without Depth, and consequently not a Superficies, but a Body. In like manner, if we suppose two Superficies, laid one upon the other, according to their Terms or Bounds; it follows, that, according to that which is called their Length, (that is, according to their Lines) those Lines, by which the Superficies are said to touch one another, shall not touch one another totally, for then they would be confounded: Neither doth any one Line of them touch, by some Parts, the Line to which it is applied, and by others is united to the Superficies, whose Bound it is; for then it would not be without Breadth, and consequently no Line. Now if in a Body there is neither Line nor Superficies, there is neither Length, Breadth, nor Depth in a Body:

If any shall say these Terms are Bodies, they may be confuted briefly thus: If Length be a Body, it is divided into its three Dimensions; and each of those being a Body, is again divided into its three Dimensions, and so into infinite. Thus a Body will be of infinite Magnitude, being divided into infinite; but that is absurd: therefore the foresaid Dimensions are not Bodies: And if neither Bodies, nor Lines, nor Superficies, it may well be conceived that they are not at all.

Resistance likewise is not to be comprehended or understood; for if it might be comprehended, it would be comprehended from the Touch. Now if we shew that the Touch itself is incomprehensible, it will appear that it is impossible to comprehend Resistance: That Touch is incomprehensible, we collect thus; Whatsoever things touch one another, either touch one another mutually by their Parts; or the Whole, the Whole. Not the Whole, the Whole; for that were not to touch, but to be made one; neither

* The Text seems defective, and to be thus supplied out of his Chapter concerning Body, *adversus Mathematicos*, p. 368.

rather the Parts, the Parts; for those Parts, though in respect of their Wholes they are Parts, yet in respect of their own Parts are Wholes, for they have Parts within themselves. But Wholes touch not Wholes, for the Reason alleged; and consequently neither do Parts touch Parts; these Parts, in respect of their own Parts, being Wholes. Now if we cannot comprehend, that Touch may be made either by Whole, or by Parts, Touch must be incomprehensible, and consequently so must a Body; for if it be nothing more than these three Dimensions and Resistance, and we have shewn that each of these is incomprehensible, Body also is incomprehensible. Thus therefore, as to the Notion of Body itself, it is incomprehensible, whether there is a Body.

Moreover, of Bodies, say they, some are sensible, others intelligible; these are comprehended by Intellect, those by the Senses. The Senses are simply passible, but the Intellect cometh to the Comprehension of intelligible things through Comprehension of Sensibles. If therefore a Body be something, it must either be sensible or intelligible: Sensible it is not; for it seemeth to be comprehended by Collection of Length, and Breadth, and Depth, and Resistance, and Colour, and such like, together with which it is considered; but the Senses they hold to be simply *passive*. If they say, a Body is intelligible, there must be something in the Nature of sensible Things, by which Bodies, being intelligible, may be understood: But there is nothing besides Body and Incorporeal, whereof the Incorporeal is itself intelligible; the Body therefore is not sensible, as we proved; and there not being in the Nature of things any Sensible, by which Body might be understood, neither will Body be intelligible; and if neither sensible nor intelligible, and there be nothing besides these, we may say, a Body is nothing. Wherefore opposing these Reasons, which prove there is no Body, to those which prove that there is a Body, we suspend.

Now, from the Incomprehensibility of Body, will be inferred also that Incorporeal is incomprehensible; for Privations are understood to be the Privations of Habits, as, of Sight, Blindness; of Hearing, Deafness, and the like. Wherefore to comprehend the Privation, we must first comprehend the Habit, whereof it is a Privation; for he who understands not what Sight is, cannot say, This Man hath not Sight, that is, he is blind. If therefore the Privation of a Body be incorporeal, and the Habits being incomprehensible, it is impossible to comprehend their Privations; but Body, as we have shewn, is incomprehensible; Incorporeals also will be incomprehensible. For either it is sensible, or intelligible; if sensible, it is incomprehensible, by reason of the Difference of living Creatures, and of Men, and of Senses, and of Circumstances, and by reason of Commixion, and the like, mentioned in the ten Common-places of Suspension; if intelligible, there

not being granted a Comprehension of sensible things, by which we may be carried to Intelligibles; neither will there be granted a Comprehension of things intelligible, and consequently not of an Incorporeal. Besides, he who saith that he comprehends an Incorporeal, must say, that he comprehends it either by Sense or by Reason; not by Sense, for the Sense seemeth to perceive sensible things by Intromission and Insinuation; as the Sight, (whether it be made by a conick Impression, or by Emission, or Immission of Species, or by Effusion of Rays and Colours) and the Hearing (whether it be that the Air is struck, or that the parts of the Voice are carried to the Ear, and strike the Sense, so as to cause a preception of the Voice;) likewise Odours to the Nostrils, and Sapours to the Tongue, and tangible things are derived to the Touch in the same manner. But Incorporeals are not capable of receiving such Impressions, therefore they cannot be comprehended by Sense. But neither by Discourse (or Reason;) for if Discourse be a Dicable and Incorporeal, (as the Stoicks hold) he who saith Incorporeals are understood by Discourse, begs the Question: For when we demand, Whether an Incorporeal can be comprehended, he, taking Incorporeal simply, would thereby shew the Comprehension of Incorporeals; whereas Discourse itself, if it be incorporeal, is a Part of the thing controverted. How then can any shew that this Incorporeal (Discourse) is comprehended first? If by any Incorporeal, we shall require a Demonstration of its Comprehension, and so to infinite. If by a Body, the Comprehension of Bodies is the thing in question. By what then shall we demonstrate, that a Body is comprehended, which is assumed to demonstrate the Comprehension of Discourse and Incorporeal? If by a Body, we run into *Infinite*; if by an Incorporeal, we run into the *Alternate Common-place*. Thus Discourse being, if Incorporeal, comprehensible; none can say, that an Incorporeal may be comprehended by it. But if Discourse be a Body, so far as there is Controversy concerning Bodies, whether they are comprehended or not, because of the continual Effluxion (as they call it) of them; in respect whereof, they neither can admit Demonstration, nor are conceived to be; inasmuch as *Plato* termeth Bodies, *γενεα, βίη, καὶ ἀκίνητος*, Generated, Not being. Hereupon I doubt which way the Controversy concerning Body determineth, since neither by a Body, nor by an Incorporeal, for the Inconveniences alleged. Therefore neither is it possible to comprehend Incorporeals by Discourse; but if they neither incur to Sense, nor are comprehended by Discourse, they cannot be comprehended at all. Now if we can neither assert the Existence of a Body, nor of an Incorporeal, we must suspend as to the Elements; and perhaps we must suspend also concerning those things, which are after the Elements; if, of them

some

some are corporeal; others, incorporeal, and both these are controverted. Moreover, seeing we ought to suspend concerning efficient and the material Principles, for the precedent Reasons, the whole Discourse concerning Principles will be inextricable.

C H A P. VI.

Of Temperament.

BUT, setting this aside, how can they say that Temperaments are made of the first Elements, when as there is not any Touch, nor Contact, nor Temperament, nor Mixture at all? That Touch is nothing, we shewed lately, in discoursing concerning the Existence of Bodies. And that Temperament also, from what they say, is not possible, we shall briefly declare. They speak much concerning it, and almost innumerable are the Controversies of the Dogmatists about it, so as from the Indjudicialness of the Controversy may be argued the Incomprehensibility of the Subject. To confute them all in particular, would be beyond our Design; this which we shall say, we conceive, may suffice.

All conperated things consist, as they say, of Substance and Qualities. They must therefore either hold, that either the Substances are mingled, and not the Qualities; or the Qualities, but not the Substances; or neither with the other; or both with one another. But if neither Substance nor Qualities are mingled one with the other, Temperament will be unintelligible; for how can one Sense be made of the things tempered, if the things tempered be not mingled together by any of the foresaid ways? If they say, that the Qualities are simply adjacent one to another, but the Substance is mingled, this also is absurd; for we comprehend not Qualities in Temperaments, as separate, but we feel them as made one by the things tempered. If they say, that the Qualities are mingled, but not the Substances, it is impossible; for the Subsistence of the Qualities is in the Substance. Wherefore it is ridiculous to say, that the Qualities are separated from their Substances, and so mingled with one another, and the Substances left deprived of their Qualities. It remains to say, that the Qualities and Substances of things tempered pass through one another, and being mingled, make the Temperament; which is more absurd than the former; for such a Temperament is impossible. For example; If with ten Pints of Water there be mixed one Pint of Hemlock, the Hemlock will be said to be commixed with all the Water; for if a Man take never so little of this Mixture, he will find it full of the Powers of the Hemlock. Now if the Hemlock be mixed with every Part of the Water, and co-extended with it, the whole with the whole, by mutual Permeation of the Substances and Qualities one through another, that so the Temperament

may be made; and things, co-extended with one another in every Part, take up equal Place, and consequently are equal to one another, the Pint of Hemlock shall be equal to the ten Pints of Water; so that the Mixture must either be twenty Pints or two Pints, according to this Hypothesis of the manner of Temperament. And again, one Pint of Water being put to twenty Pints of Water, according to this Hypothesis, must make the Measure either of forty Pints, or of two only; because we may either conceive the Pint to be twenty Pints, as being co-extended with so many; or the twenty Pints to be that one, with which they are co-equaliz'd. In like manner a Man, adding but one Pint, may argue, that the twenty Pints, which we see, ought to be twenty thousand, or more, according to this Hypothesis of Temperament, and that the same are but two only; than which, nothing is more absurd: Therefore this Hypothesis of Temperament is absurd. Now if Temperament neither be by mixing the Substances only, nor Qualities only, nor both, nor either; and besides these, nothing can be imagined; the manner of Temperament, and of all Mixtures, is not to be understood. Wherefore if those things which are call'd Elements, are not capable of making Contemperations, neither by touching one another, nor by being blended or mingled, the Physiology of the Dogmatists, as to this thing, is unintelligible.

C H A P. VII.

Of Motion.

BESIDES what hath been said, the Physiology of the Dogmatists may be conceived to be impossible by discoursing upon Motions; for all Commixtions must be made by some Motion of the Elements, and the efficient Principle. If therefore we prove, that there is no generally acknowledged Species of Motion, it will be manifest, that though all which we formerly oppos'd should, by way of supposition, be granted; yet that, which the Dogmatists call Phyllick, serves to no purpose.

C H A P. VIII.

Of Local Motion.

THEY who seem to have discoursed most exactly of Motion, say there are six kinds thereof, Local Motion, Alteration, Augmentation, Diminution, Generation, and Corruption. We shall examine each of these particularly, beginning with Local Motion. This according to the Dogmatists, is that, by which that which moveth, passeth from Place to Place, either according to its Whole, or according to Part; according to its Whole, as in them who walk; according to Part, as in a Sphere that moves

moves about its Center; for the Whole remaineth in the same Place, the Parts only change Place.

Three, as I conceive, are the principal Controversies concerning Motion. *Bias*, and some other Philosophers, hold that there is Motion; *Parmenides*, *Melissus*, and others, that there is not Motion; the Scepticks *nothing rather* that it is, than that it is not. For as to the *Phænomena's*, it appeareth that there is Motion; but as to philosophical Discourse, that there is not. If therefore, upon Examination of the Arguments on both sides, we shall find them to be of equal weight, we shall not assent to either. Let us begin with those who hold that it is.

These insist most upon Evidence: For if, they say, there is no Motion, How doth the Sun appear now in the East, anon in the West? or, How doth he make the Seasons of the Year, which are according as he is nearer to, or further from us? Or, How do Ships put off from one Port, and reach another far distant? Or, how does he, who denies Motion, go abroad and come home? These they conceive cannot be answered, and therefore one of the Cynicks, an Argument being propounded to him to take away Motion, made no Answer, but rose up and walk'd, shewing by Action and Evidence, that there is Motion. Thus they endeavour to silence the contrary Party.

But they who take away the Existence of Motion, argue thus. If a thing be moved; it must be moved either by itself, or by some other; but neither by itself, nor by any other. For that which is said to be moved not by itself, must be moved either by some Cause, or by none: by no Cause, they say, nothing is done; if by some Cause, the Cause by which it is moved will be its Mover, and so they will run into infinite, according to our usual way of Argument. Again, if that which moveth, effects, and that which effects, is moved, that will also require another to move it, and this a Third, and so to infinite; so that Motion shall be without any Principle of first Beginning, which is absurd. Therefore every thing that moveth, is not moved by another. But neither by itself; for every thing that moveth either impelleth forward, or draweth backward; or upward, or downward; therefore whatsoever moveth itself, must do it after one of these ways. If by impelling forward, it must be behind itself; if by drawing back, before itself; if upwards, below itself; if downwards, above itself. But for a thing to be either above, or before, or below, or behind itself, is impossible; it is therefore impossible for any thing to be moved by itself. But if neither by itself, nor by any other, then nothing at all is moved. If any recur to Appetite and Election, we must let him know, that the Question is concerning that which is in our power, and that this Question is undeterminable, so far as we have not yet found a Criterion of Truth.

Again, if a thing be moved, it is either moved in the Place in which it is, or in which it is not. But not in the Place wherein it is; for if it be in it, it continues in it. Nor in the Place in which it is not; for where a thing is not, there it can neither act nor suffer. This was the Argument of *Diadorus Crenus*. But it is answered several ways, of which we shall only allege those which we conceive to be of greatest Force, together with the Judgment which appeareth for the present to us. Some say that a thing may be moved in the Place where it is, for the Spheres which roll about their Centers are moved, and yet continue in their Place. In answer to whom, the Argument should be transferred to the several Parts of the Sphere, and we must shew by this Argument, it is not moved as to its Parts, if we will prove that nothing is moved in the Place wherein it is.

The same Answer may be made to those, who say that a thing moved must touch two Places, that wherein it is, and that to which it goes. We shall ask them, seeing that what is moved is carried from the Place wherein it is to another, Whether this be when it is in the first Place, or when it is in the second? But whilst it is in the first, it passeth not to another, for it is yet in the first; and when it is not in this, it passeth not out of it. Besides this, the Question is begged. For in the Place wherein it is not, it cannot act; for no Man will grant simply, that it is carried to any Place, who grants not that it is moved.

Some there are who distinguish thus: Place is taken two ways, largely, as my House; strictly, as the Air, which encloseth the Superficies of a Body. Now when a thing that is moved, is said to be moved in Place, we mean not Place in the large Sense, but in the strict. To these may be answered, by subdividing Place largely taken; that in one Part thereof the Body is said to be moved properly, as being its exact Place; in the other, not so, this being the rest of the Parts of Place largely taken. Then inferring that nothing can be moved, neither in the Place wherein it is, nor in the Place wherein it is not, conclude, that neither in Place at large, improperly taken, can any thing be moved. For it consists of two Parts, of that wherein the thing exactly is, and of that in which exactly it is not; in neither of which can any thing be moved, as was proved.

It may be argued also thus: If any thing be moved, either it is moved from some Part of the Space, and then another; or it is moved all at once, over the whole divisible Interval: But neither can any thing be moved from some first Part of the Space, and then another, not all at once, over the whole divisible Interval, therefore nothing is moved. That nothing is moved from some first Part of the Space, is manifest from hence; for that if the Bodies, and the Places, and the Times, in which

which these Bodies are said to be moved, be divided into Infinite, there will be no Motion, it being impossible to find in Infinites a First, from which First (Part) that with is said to be moved shall be moved. But if the things aforesaid end in an Indivisible, and every thing that is moved pass the first divisible Part of its Place, in like manner as the first indivisible Part of its Time, all things will be of equal Celerity; as the fleetest Horse, and a Tortoise which is abstruder than the former. Therefore Motion is not made from some first Part of the Space. But neither all at once over the whole divisible Interval: For if apparent things must, as they say, clear things unapparent; when a Man should go the Space of a Stadium, it is requisite that he first perform the first Part of the Stadium, and then the second, and so the other Parts in order. So every thing that is moved according to the First, must first be moved; for if that which is moved be said to pass at once over all the Parts of the Place in which it is moved, it will be in all its Parts at once; and if one Part of the Place be cold, another hot; or one black, another white, so much as to qualify the things that are in it; that which moveth will be at once hot and cold, and black and white. Besides, let them say, how much of the Place at once that which is moved passeth. If they say it is indefinite, they grant, that something may be moved over the Face of the whole Earth at once; if they deny that, let them define the Quantity of the Place; for to endeavour exactly to define such a Place, than which the thing moved cannot pass, at once, any (though never so little) greater Distance, besides that it is absurd and ridiculous, will perhaps incur the former Inconveniences; for all things will be swift alike, seeing that every thing passeth alike through determinate Places. But if they shall say, that what is moved all at once, is moved through a little, but not exactly determinate Place, we shall confound them by a Sorites, continually adding to the supposed Magnitude, another very little Magnitude of Place. For if at any time they make a Stand, then they fall into their former Determination of the Place, and strange Conceits: But if they admit an Increase, we shall force them to grant that a thing may be moved all at once over the whole Earth. Wherefore neither are those things which are said to be moved, moved at once over the whole divisible Interval; and if neither all at once, nor from some Part, then nothing is moved. This and much more is alledged by those who take away local Motion: But we (not being able to disprove either these Arguments, or the Phenomena which they follow, who say there is no Motion, as to the Opposition betwixt the Phenomena's and the Arguments) suspend, Whether there be Motion or not.

C H A P. IX.

Of Augmentation and Diminution.

UPON the same Ground we suspend as to *Augmentation and Diminution*: For Evidence seems to prove that they are, but Discourse (or Reason) to overthrow them; as thus: That which is augmented, being already an *Ens* and Subsistent, must be moved further as to Quantity (for if any shall say that by Apposition of one thing another is augmented, he speaketh falsely:) Since therefore Substance never is at a Stand, but always in Fluxion, and some are insinuated into others, that which is augmented hath not its first Substance with the addition of some other, but a Substance wholly new. As therefore (for Instance) If there being a Piece of Wood three Foot long, some Man putting to it a Piece ten Foot long, should say he hath augmented the Piece of three Foot, he shall say falsely, (inasmuch as this is wholly another thing from the other:) So in every thing that is said to be augmented, the former Matter flowing out, and new Matter flowing in, if that be added which is said to be added, none will say, that this is Augmentation, but Alteration of the Whole.

The same may be said of Diminution; for how can that which subsists not, be said to be diminished? Besides if Diminution be made by Detraction, Augmentation by Addition; but neither Detraction nor Addition be any thing, neither is Diminution nor Augmentation any thing.

C H A P. X.

Of Detraction and Addition.

THAT Detraction is Nothing, they argue thus: If Something be detracted from another, either an Equal is detracted from an Equal, or a Greater from a Lesser, or a Lesser from a Greater: But none of these; therefore Detraction is not possible. That Detraction is not made by any of these ways, is manifest: That which is detracted from another, before it is detracted, must be contained in that from which it is detracted; but an Equal is not contained in a Equal, as Six in Six; for that which containeth, ought to be greater than that which is contained; and that from which something is detracted, ought to be greater than that which is detracted, that after the Detraction there may be something remaining; for herein Detraction seems to differ from quite taking away. Neither is the Greater contained in the Lesser, as Six and Five; that were absurd. Neither is the Lesser contained in the Greater; for if Five were contained in Six, as the fewer in the more, by the same Reason, in Five will be contained Four, and in Four Three, and in Three Two, and in

Two One; thus Six shall contain Five, Four, Three, Two, One, which being put together, make Fifteen, which must be contained in Six, if it be granted that the Lesser is contained in the Greater. In like manner, in the Fifteen which is contained in Six, will be contained Thirty five; and so, by Progression, infinite Numbers: But it is absurd to say, that infinite Numbers are contained in the Number Six, therefore it is absurd to say, that the Lesser is contained in the Greater. If therefore it be requisite, that what is detracted from another, by contained in the thing from which it is detracted, but neither Equal is contained in Equal, nor the Greater in the Lesser, nor the Lesser in the Greater; Nothing certainly is Detracted from any Thing.

Again, if Something be detracted from Something, either the Whole is detracted from the Whole, or Part from Part, or the Whole from the Part, or Part from the Whole. But to say, that the Whole is detracted from the Whole, or from Part, is absurd; it remains therefore to say, That the Part is detracted from the Whole, or from Part, which is absurd also. We will instance (not to change our Example in Numbers, as being most perspicuous,) in the Number Ten, and let us suppose One to be subtracted from it. This One cannot be subtracted from the whole Ten, nor from the remaining part of it Nine, as I shall prove; therefore is it not subtracted. For if One be subtracted from the whole Ten, so far as Ten is nothing else but Ten Unites, not any one of the Unites, but a Combination of all, this Unity to be subtracted out of the whole Ten, must be subtracted out of every Unite: But first, from a Unite nothing can be subtracted, for Unites are indivisible, and therefore One cannot be subtracted from Ten in this manner. But if we grant an Unite may be taken from every Unite, an Unite will have Ten Parts, and having Ten Parts, will be an Unite; now there being Ten other Parts remaining from which were subtracted the Ten Parts of that which is called an Unite, those Ten will be Twenty: But it is absurd to say, that One is Ten, and that Ten is Twenty, and that what is indivisible (according to them) is divided; therefore it is absurd to say, That an Unite is subtracted from the whole Number Ten. But neither is the Unite subtracted from the remaining Number Nine; for that from which a Thing is subtracted remaineth not entire, but the Nine remaineth entire after the Subtraction of the Unite. Besides, the Nine being nothing else but nine Unites, if the Unite be said to be taken away from the Whole, the Nine itself will be taken away; if from a Part of the Nine, as from Eight, the same Absurdities will follow. If from an Unite, which is the last, they must say that an Unite is divisible, which is absurd; therefore the Unite is not subtracted out of the Nine. Now if it

neither be subtracted from the whole Ten, nor from a Part thereof, neither can a Part be subtracted from the Whole, nor from a Part: If therefore neither Whole can be subtracted from Whole, nor Part from Whole, nor Whole from Part, nor Part from Part, Nothing is subtracted from another.

Likewise Addition is reckoned by them amongst Things impossible: For say they, That which is added, is either added to itself, or to some Subject præ-existent, or to that which consists of both; but none of these is true, therefore nothing is added to another. For Instance; Suppose the Quantity of four Pints, and thereto let be added one Pint, I demand, To what it is added? To itself it cannot; for that which is added, is diverse from that to which it is added, but nothing is diverse from itself. But neither is it added to that which consists of both, the measure of four Pints and one Pint; for how can any thing be added to that which is not yet? Besides, if to the four Pints, and to the one Pint, be added a Pint, it will make up Six Pints, from the Quantity of four Pints, and the one Pint, and the additional Pint. Now if to the four Pints only, be added one Pint; so far as that which is co-extended with another, must be equal with that to which it is co-extended; if one Pint be co-extended with four Pints, it will double the Quantity of the four Pints, so as the whole Measure will be eight Pints, which we see to be otherwise. If therefore that which is said to be added, be neither added to itself, nor to some other Subject, nor to that which consists of both these, and besides these, there be nothing; certainly there is no Addition of one thing to another.

CHAP. XI.

Of Transposition.

TRansposition comes within the Camps of Addition, and Detraction, and Local Motion; for it is Detraction from one thing, and Addition to another, transiently.

CHAP. XII.

Of Whole and Part.

THE like may be said of Whole and Part; for the Whole seemeth to be made by Convention, and Addition of the Parts; but by Detraction of any one, or more of them, it leaveth to be Whole.

Besides, If there be a Whole, either it is a thing diverse from its Parts, or its Parts are the Whole; but it seems not to be diverse from its Parts: For the Parts being taken away, nothing remaineth whereby we may think that the Whole is any thing besides them. Now if the Parts are the Whole, the Whole is only a Word, and an empty Name, but hath no pro-

proper Subſtance; as Diſtance is nothing more than things diſtant, and Contiguity nothing but things contiguous; therefore the Whole is not any thing. But neither the Parts alſo; for if there are Parts, either they are Parts of the Whole, or Parts of one another, or each is Part of itſelf. Not of the Whole, for that is nothing more than the Parts themſelves. Beſides, the Parts would then be Parts of themſelves, becauſe every Part is compſetive of the Whole. Neither of one another, for a Part ſeemeth to be contained in that whereof it is a Part; and it were abſurd to ſay, that the Hand (for example) is contained in the Foot. Neither is each of them a Part of itſelf; for then, as containing, and contained by, a thing will be greater, and leſſer than itſelf. Now if thoſe which we call Parts, neither be Parts of the Whole, nor of themſelves, nor of one another, they are not Parts of any thing; and if Parts of nothing, neither are they Parts, for Relatives are taken away together. This, by way of Digreſſion; for we treated of Whole and Part once before.

C H A P. XIII.

Of Alteration.

SOME alſo deny that there is any Alteration or natural Mutation, (as they term it) arguing thus: If Something be changed, either that which is changed is a Body, or Incorporeal; but neither of theſe is determinable, therefore Alteration itſelf is indeterminable. If any thing alter by operating as a Cauſe, it alters as being the Patient; and the Subſtance of it, as Cauſe, is ſubverted, together with which the Patient alſo is ſubverted, not having a thing from which to ſuffer, therefore nothing is altered.

Moreover, if there be Alteration, it is either of a Being, or of a Not-Being; but a Not-Being is inſubſiſtent, and can neither ſuffer nor act, therefore it is not capable of Alteration. If that which is changed be a Being, it is either changed as a Being, or as a Not-Being. As a Not-Being it is not changed, for Not-Beings are not. If it be changed as a Being, it becomes different from a Being, that is, it will not be a Being: But to ſay that a Being is a Not-Being, is abſurd. Therefore a Being is not changed. Now if neither a Being be changed, nor a Not-Being, and beſides theſe there is nothing, it remains to ſay, that nothing is changed.

Some argue thus: That which is changed, muſt be changed in ſome Time; but neither is any thing changed in the time paſt, nor in the future, nor in the preſent, (as we ſhall ſhew;) therefore nothing is changed. In Time paſt or future, nothing is changed; for neither of theſe is preſent; but it is impoſſible for any thing to act or ſuffer in a non-exiſtent and

not-preſent Time. But neither in the preſent, for perhaps the preſent alſo is inexiſtent. This *τὰ νῦν*, Now, is indiviſible: But it is impoſſible to imagine that Iron (for Example) can be changed from hard to ſoft, or that any other Alteration can be made in indiviſible Time, for they ſeem to require Succeſſion. Now if nothing be changed either in the Time paſt, nor in the preſent, nor in the future, nothing at all is changed.

Moreover, If there be Alteration, * either it is ſubject to Senſe, or to Intellect; not to the Senſes, for they receive only ſingle Notions; but Alteration hath a twofold Reſpect, both to that out of which the Alteration is, and to that into which it is. If they ſay, It is intelligible, ſo far as there is an indeterminable Controverſy concerning Intelligibles, as we have already ſaid, we cannot aſſert the Being of Alteration.

C H A P. XIV.

Of Generation, and Corruption.

Generation and Corruption are ſubverted together with Addition, and Detraction, and Alteration; for without theſe, nothing can be generated nor corrupted. As for Example: Of the Corruption of the Number Ten, ſay they, is generated the Number Nine, by Subtraction of One; and of Nine corrupted is generated Ten, by Addition of One; and Canker (by Alteration) of Braſs corrupted; therefore the forenamed Motions being taken away, perhaps it neceſſarily followeth, that Generation and Corruption are alſo taken away.

Moreover ſome argue thus: If *Socrates* were generated, he was generated either when he was not *Socrates*, or when he was *Socrates*: If when he was, he muſt have been generated twice; if when he was not, he was, and was not, at the ſame time. He was, as being generated; he was not, according to the *Hypotheſis*. Again, If *Socrates* died, either he died when he lived, or when he was dead; not when he lived, for ſo the ſame Perſon ſhould be both dead and alive; neither when he was dead, for ſo he ſhould die twice. Therefore *Socrates* died not. By this Argument, upon every thing that is ſaid to be generated or corrupted, Generation and Corruption may be ſubverted.

Some argue thus: If there be Generation, that which is generated is either a Being, or a Not-Being; not a Not-Being, for to that which is *not*, nothing can happen, not ſo much as *to be*. Neither a Being; for if a Being be generated, it is generated either as it is a Being, or as it is a Not-Being. As it is a Not-Being, it is not generated; and if it be generated as a Being, ſo far as as a thing is genera-

* The Text requires to be ſupplied to this effect.

ted of something different from it, that which is generated must be different from a Being, that is, a Not-Being. Therefore that which is generated shall be a Not-Being, which is absurd. Now if neither a Being, nor a Not-Being be generated, nothing at all is generated.

Upon the same Grounds also nothing is corrupted. For if something be corrupted, it is either a Being, or a Not-Being; not a Not-Being, for that which is corrupted must suffer Something; not a Being, for either it is corrupted, as continuing in the State of a Being, or as not continuing. If as continuing in the State of a Being, the same will be at once a Being and a Not-Being; because it is not corrupted as a Not-Being, but as it is a Being; and as it is corrupted, it is different from a Being, and consequently a Not-Being. But it is absurd to say, the same thing is a Being and a Not-Being; therefore a Being is not corrupted whilst it continueth in the State of a Being. But if a Being be corrupted, not whilst it is in the State of a Being, but first reduced to a Not-Being, and afterwards corrupted; it is not a Being, but a Not-Being, that is corrupted; which (as we said before) is impossible. If therefore neither a Being is corrupted, nor a Not-Being, and besides these there is Nothing, Nothing is corrupted. This may serve, by way of Summary, to say of Motions; whence it followeth, that the Physiology of the *Dogmatists* is inexistant, and unintelligible.

C H A P. XV.

Of Rest.

IN like manner some doubt as to the Nature of Rest, saying, That whatsoever moves, rests not; but every Body continually moveth, according to the Opinions of the *Dogmatists*, who say, That Substance is fluid, and hath continual Evacuations and Recruits: (Whence the *Platonicks* chuse rather to call Bodies, Things generated, than Beings; and *Heraclitus* compared the Mobility of our Matter to the rapid Course of a River:) Therefore no Body rests.

Again, That which is said to rest, seemeth to be contained by the things that are about it; that which is contained suffers, but there is no Patient; for, as we proved before, there is no Cause, therefore nothing rests. Some argue thus: That which rests, suffers; that which suffers is moved; therefore that which is said to rest, is moved; and if moved, it rests not. Hence also it is manifest, that an Incorporeal rests not; for if that which rests suffers, and to suffer be proper to Bodies, and not to Incorporeals, no Incorporeal either suffers or rests; therefore nothing rests.

Now sofar as none of the fore-named are understood without Place or Time, we must proceed to

Disquisition of these; and if we prove that these exist not, the others will appear to be inexistant upon that Account also. Let us begin with Place.

C H A P. XVI.

Of Place.

Place is taken two ways, Properly and Improperly; Improperly, for Place at large, as a City; Properly, for that in which we are exactly contained. We enquire of Place in the proper exact Sense; some have asserted it, others deny'd it, others suspended. Of these, they who assert it, recur to Evidence: For who is there, say they, who will affirm there is not Place, when they behold the Parts of Place, as Right, Left; Upwards, Downwards; Before, Behind? and that the same Person is at several times in several Places? and that where my Master taught, there do I now teach? They argue also, That there is Place, because things are naturally light or heavy; and for that the Antients said, *Chaos was first*; for they hold, That Chaos is Place, because it contained all things that were made in it. And if a Body be anything, say they, so is Place also; for without this, there will be no Body: And if there be a *from which*, there is also an *of which*, and an *in which*, that is, Place. The first is in either, the second therefore in both.

But neither do they who take away Place-grant, that the Parts of Place are; for Place is nothing else but its Parts: And he who asserts that Place is, if he takes for granted that its Parts are, endeavours to make good the thing in question by itself. In like manner they do foolishly, who say, That something is in a Place, whereas Place itself is absolutely deny'd to be: They take away together with it the Existence of Place, which of itself is not granted, and the *of which*, and the *from which*, are proved to be inexistant, as well as Place; and disallow *Hesiod*, as not a competent Judge in Philosophy. And thus overthrowing the Arguments alledged for the Existence of Place, they, with greater Subtily, prove it to be inexistant, converting to their own Use those Opinions of the *Dogmatists* concerning Place, which seem of greatest Weight; as that of the *Stoicks*, and that of the *Peripateticks*, in this manner: The *Stoicks* say, *Vacuum is that which is capable of being contained by a Being, but is not contained; or a Distance void of Body; or a Distance not contained by a Body: But Place is a Distance which is contained by a Being, and is adequate to that which containeth it; they call a Body a Being; the Distance, which is partly contained by the Body, partly not contained, Region.* Whereas others by Region understand the Place of a great Body, so as Place and Region differ in Magnitude. Now it's objected, when they say, *Place is the Distance contained by a Body*; how do they mean it to be

be a Distance, (or Dimension) whether the Length of a Body, or the Breadth, or the Depth only, or whether all three together? If they mean but one of these, the Place will not be adequate to that whose Place it is. Besides, that which containeth will be Part of that which is contained, which were absurd. If all the three Distances, so far as in that which is called Place there is not *Vacuum*, nor any other Body that hath Dimensions; but that Body which is said to be in the Place, consists not of Distance, (for that is Length, and Breadth, and Depth, Resistance also comes within these) the Body itself will be its own Place; and that which containeth will be the same with that which is contained, which were absurd. There is not therefore any Distance of the Place, and consequently Place is nothing.

There is also an Argument to this Effect: Forasmuch as in a thing that is said to be in Place, there are not seen double Dimensions, but one Length, and one Breadth, and one Depth; Whether are these Dimensions of the Body only, or of Place, or of both? If of Place only, then the Body will have no proper Length, Breadth, or Depth, and consequently it will not be a Body, which is absurd. If of both, so far as *Vacuum* hath no Subsistence besides the Dimensions, and those of the *Vacuum* subjected to the Body; of whatsoever Dimensions the Body consists, of the same will the *Vacuum* consist also. For of the Existence of Resistance, nothing can be positively asserted, as we formerly shewed. Now seeing that the Dimensions which belong to the *Vacuum*, and are the same with the *Vacuum*, appear only in the Body, which is visible, the Body will be *Vacuum*; which is absurd. If the Dimensions are of the Body only, then there will be no Dimension of Place, and consequently no Place; if therefore the Dimension of Place be not found by any of the foregoing ways, there is no Place.

This is likewise alleged: When a Body enters into a *Vacuum*, which thereby becomes a Place, either the *Vacuum* suffers, or yields, or is destroyed; but if it suffers, the same will be full and vacuous; if it either yields, being * moved locally, or is destroyed by Motion, *Vacuum* will be a Body, for these are proper Affections of a Body. But it is absurd to say, the same is vacuous and full, or that *Vacuum* is a Body; therefore it is absurd to say, that a *Vacuum* may be occupied by a Body, and become Place. Whence it is also found, that *Vacuum* is absolutely inexistant, if it cannot be occupied by a Body, so as to become Place; for *Vacuum* was said to be that which may be occupied by a Body.

Hereby also is subverted *Region*; for either it is a great Place, or is circumscribed with the Place; but if it be partly occupied by Body, and partly a vacuous Distance or Dimension, it is taken away with both. This, and much more, is alleged against the

Opinion of the *Stoicks* concerning Place, wherein they dissent from others.

But the *Peripateticks* say, That Place is the Term (or inmost Superficies) of that which containeth, inasmuch as it containeth; so that my Place is the Superficies of the Air which incloseth my Body. But if this be Place, the same will be and not be; for when a Body is about to go into some Place, so far as nothing can be in that which is not, it is necessary that Place first exist; and then that Body be in it; so that there must be Place, before there can be a Body that is said to be in Place. But inasmuch as Place is made, by accommodating of the Superficies of the thing containing, to the thing contained, Place cannot exist before there be a Body in it, and therefore will not have been before. But it is absurd to say, that the same is Something, and is not; therefore Place is not the Term of a Thing continent, inasmuch as it containeth.

Moreover, if Place be Something, it is either Generate or Ingenerate; not Ingenerate, for they say it is made, whilst it is conformed to the Body which is in it: But neither is it Generate; for either when the Body is in Place, then is made the Place, in which that which is in Place is now said to be, or when it is not in it. But neither when it is in it, (for it is already the Place of the Body that is in it) seeing that which containeth is adapted, as they say, to that which is contained, and so becometh Place. But nothing can be adapted round about that which is not in it. Now if Place be neither made when the Body is in it, nor when it is not in it; and besides these, we know not any way, then Place is not generated; but if it be neither Generated nor Ingenerated, it is not at all.

More generally may be argued thus: If there be Place, it is either a Body, or Incorporeal; but both these are doubtful, as we discoursed formerly, therefore Place itself is doubtful. Place is understood with reference to the Body whereof it is Place; but that which is alleged concerning the Existence of a Body is uncertain, therefore that which is said of Place. The Place of every particular thing is not eternal; but if it be said to be generated, it will be found to be inexistant, so far as Generation itself is not. Much more might be said; but not to insist longer hereon, we shall, from what hath been said, infer, That the *Scepticks* ought not to assent to any thing that is said by the *Dogmatists* concerning Place, but to suspend.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Time.

THE same we do in the Question concerning Time: For by *Phænomena's*, Time seemeth to be Something; but by that which is said of it, it seems

* Reading *misdeed*.

seems to have no Being; for some affirm, That Time is the Interval of the Motion of Time, (by Time understanding the World;) others, That it is the Motion of the World. *Aristotle*, or, as some, *Plato*, That it is the Number of *Prius & Posterius* in Motion. *Strato*, or, as some, *Aristotle*, That it is the Measure of Motion and Rest. *Epicurus*, (as *Demetrius* the Lacedemonian saith) That it is an Accident of Accidents, accompanying Days, and Nights, and Hours, and Affections, and Apathies, and Motions, and Rests. As to its Essence, some affirm it is a Body, as the Followers of *Ænæsidemus*; for they hold, it differs nothing from Being, and from the first Body; others, that it is Incorporeal. Now therefore, either all these dissident Opinions are true, or all are false; or some are true, some false. But all cannot be true, for most of them are repugnant to one another; neither will the *Dogmatists* yield that all are false. Besides, if we should grant it to be false, that Time is a Body; and false likewise, that it is Incorporeal; it must immediately be granted, that Time is not at all; for besides these, there can be nothing. Neither is it possible to comprehend which are true, which false, by reason of the Equivalence of the Arguments on both Sides, and the Uncertainty of the Critery and the Demonstration. For these Reasons therefore we cannot assert any thing concerning Time. Moreover, seeing that Time exists not without Motion or Rest; if Motion and Rest be taken away, Time also is taken away. Nevertheless, some bring these Arguments against Time:

If Time be, either it is determinate, or infinite; if determinate, it began from some Time, and will end in some Time; and consequently there was once a Time, when Time was not, that is, before it began to be; and there will be a Time when Time shall not be, that is, when it shall have ceas'd to be, which is absurd; therefore Time is not determinate. Now if it be infinite, sofar as one is said to be Past, another Present, another Future; the Future and Present either are or are not; but if they are not, seeing there only remains the present, than which nothing can be shorter, Time will be determinate, and consequently there will arise the same Difficulties as at first. But if the Past exists, and the Future exists, they must both be Present; but it is absurd to say, That that which is Past and Future is Present, therefore Time is not infinite. Now if it be neither infinite nor determinate, it is not at all.

Moreover, if Time be, 'tis either divisible or indivisible; indivisible it is not, for it is divided, as they say, into Present, Past, and Future; but neither is it divisible, for every Divisible is measured by some Part of itself, that which measureth being applied to every Part of the Thing measured, as when we measure a Cubit with a Digit. But Time can-

not be measured by any part of itself; for if the Present (for Example) measureth the Past, it must be in the Past, and consequently Past; and, if the Future, it must be in the Future, and consequently Future. In like manner the Future, if it measure the others, must be Present and Past, and the Past must be Future and Present, which is a Contradiction; therefore it is not divisible. Now, if it be neither divisible nor indivisible, it is not at all.

Again, Time is said to have three Parts, the Past, the Present, and the Future; of which, the Past and Future are not, (for if the Past and Future were now, each of them would be the Present); neither is the Present also. For if the present Time be, it is either indivisible or divisible; indivisible it is not, for things that are changed, are said to be changed in present Time; but nothing is changed in indivisible Time, as, I am softened, or the like; therefore the present Time is not indivisible. But neither is it divisible; it cannot be divided into Presents; for, by reason of the swift Fluxion of Things in the World, the Present is imperceptibly changed into the Past. Neither is it divided into Past and Future, for then it were inexistant, as having one Part no longer existent, the other not yet existent. Whence neither can the Present be the End of the Past, and Beginning of the Future, for so it will be, and not be; it will be, as it is Present; and not be, because its Parts are not; therefore it is not divisible. Now if the Present be neither divisible nor indivisible, it is not at all. But if there be neither Present, nor Past, nor Future, Time is not; for that which consists of what is not, itself is not.

Against Time is also brought this Argument: If Time is, it is either generate and corruptible, or ingenerate and incorruptible. Ingenerate and incorruptible it is not, for Part is past, and hath no longer Being; Part is Future, and hath no Being yet. But neither is it generate and corruptible; for things that are generated, are generated of some Being, and Things that are corrupted, are corrupted into some Being, according to the Tenet of the *Dogmatists*. If therefore it be corrupted into the Past, it is corrupted into a Not-being; and if it be generated of the Future, it is generated of a Not-being, for neither of these is. But it is absurd to say, that a Thing is generated of a Not-being, or corrupted into a Not-being; therefore Time is not generate and corruptible. Now if Time be neither ingenerate and incorruptible, nor generate and corruptible, it is not at all.

Moreover, sofar as every thing that is generated, seems to be generated in Time; if Time be generated, it is generated in Time; it is therefore either generated in itself, or one time in another: But if in itself, the same will be and not be; for since that in which any thing is generated, must be pre-existent to that which is generated in it; Time generated

rated in itself, if it be generated, is not yet; and if it be generated in itself, it is already; wherefore Time is not generated in itself. But neither is one Time generated in another; for if the Present be generated in the Future, the Future must be Present; and if in the Past, the Past. The same may be said of other Times; therefore one Time is not generated in another. Now if Time be neither generated in itself, nor one Time in another, it is not generate at all. But that it is not ingenerate, we shewed also. Therefore seeing it is neither generate nor ingenerate, it is not at all; for every Being must either be generate or ingenerate.

C H A P. XVIII.

Of Number.

FORasmuch as Time seemeth not to be considered without *Number*, it will not be from the Purpose, to speak something briefly concerning Number. As to common Conversation, we say, without Opinion, that we number something; and allow it to be said, that Number is something: But the superfluous Curiosity of the *Dogmatists* urgeth us to dispute against it. The *Pythagoreans* assert Numbers to be the Elements of the World, for they say, that *Phænomena*'s must consist of something, but the Elements must be simple, therefore the Elements are unapparent. Now of things unapparent, some are Bodies, as Vapours, and little Bulks; others incorporeal, as Figures, and Ideas, and Numbers, of which Bodies are compounded, consisting of Length, Breadth, Depth, Resistance, and Gravity. The Elements therefore are not only unapparent, but incorporeal. Moreover, Number is considered in every Incorporeal, for it is either one, or two, or more; whence it is gathered that the Elements of all things are Numbers, which are unapparent and incorporeal, and consider'd in all things; and this not simply, but by the *Monad*, and the * indefinite *Duad*, made by Composition of the *Monad*, by Participation whereof, all particular *Duads* are *Duads*. Of these are made the other Numbers, which are considered in things enumerate, and they say, frame the World. For the Point is correspondent to the *Monad*, the Line to the *Duad*, (for it is considered, as lying betwixt two Points) the *Superficies* to the *Triad*, (for they say, it is the Fluxion of a Line into breadth to another Point over against it.) The Body of the *Tetrad* to the *Tetrad*, for it is made by elevating the *Superficies* to a Point over it. These Fictions they make of Bodies, and of the whole World, which they affirm to be governed according to the harmonical Propositions; the *Diatessaron*, which is *Sesquialtera*, as 8 to 6; the *Diapente*, which

is *Sesquialtera*, as 9 to 6; and the *Diapason*, which is double, as 12 to 6. These things they dream, asserting Number to be something distinct from the Things numbred, arguing thus; If an Animal be in its own proper respect One, a Plant, not being an Animal, will not be One; but a Plant is One, therefore an Animal is not One, * in its own proper respect, but according to something extrinsical that is considered in it, whereof every thing partakes, and is made One by it. And if Number be the Things numbred, forasmuch as the things numbred are (for Example) Men, and Oxen, and Horses, Number must be Men, Horses, and Oxen; and Number must be white, and black, and bearded; if the things numbred happen to be such; but this is absurd: Therefore Number is not the things which are numbred, but hath a peculiar Existence distinct from them, according to which it is consider'd in the things numbred, and is also an Element.

The *Pythagoreans* having thus collected, that Number is not the things numbred, there comes in the insoluble doubt concerning Number; for Number is said to be Number, therefore is either the things numbred, or some extrinsical thing distinct from them; but neither is Number the things numbred, as the *Pythagoreans* have demonstrated; nor is it any thing distinct from them, as we * shall declare; therefore Number is nothing. That Number is nothing extrinsical, distinct from the Things numbred, we shall prove, instancing in the *Monad*, for the better Explication hereof. For if the *Monad* be something in itself, by Participation whereof, every thing that participates of it becomes One, either the *Monad* itself is but One, or it is as many as there are things which participate of it: But if it is One, Whether doth each of those Things which are said to participate of it, participate of the Whole, or of Part thereof? For if one Man (for Example) hath the whole *Monad*, there will be no more *Monad*, whereof one Horse, or one Dog, or any of those things which we affirm to be one, can communicate. For, supposing one Garment to be amongst many naked Men, if one of them put it on, the rest must remain naked, and without any Garment; now if every one participates of part thereof, first, a *Monad* will have a Part, and consequently infinite Parts into which it is divided, which were absurd. Again, as a Part of the *Decad* (as a *Duad*) is not a *Decad*, so neither will a part of the *Monad* be a *Monad*, and therefore nothing participates of the *Monad*: Therefore there is not one *Monad*, of whose Parts all Singulars participate. Now if the *Monads* are equal in Number to all numerate Things, of which the Word One is predicated, by Participation of which *Monads* every Particular is said to be One, there will be infinite *Monads* thus participated. And these either partici-

participate

* Read ἀπὸ τοῦ.

* Inserting καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν.

* Reading οὐκ ἐν ὁμοτιμῇ.

part of a transcendent *Monad*, or of *Monads* which are of equal Number with them, and are for that reason *Monads*; or they participate not, but are *Monads*, without any Participation. If these can be *Monads* without Participation, every sensible Thing may in like manner be one without Participation; and then the *Monads*, which is considered in itself, is overthrowed. But if these *Monads* also are by Participation, either they all participate of one, or there is one peculiar to each; if all participate of one, each participates of Part thereof, or of the Whole; whereupon follow the former Absurdities: But if each hath a peculiar to itself, we must consider over each of these another *Monad*, and over each of those another, and so to infinite. If therefore to comprehend, that there are some *Monads* in themselves, by participation whereof every thing that is one, it be requisite to comprehend infinitely infinite intelligible *Monads*; but it is impossible to comprehend infinitely infinite intelligible *Monads*; by consequence it is impossible to assert, that there are certain intelligible *Monads*, and that every Being is one, being made one by Participation of its proper *Monad*. Therefore it is absurd also to say, there are as many *Monads* as there are things participant of them. Now if that which is said to be *Monad* in itself, neither is one, nor so many as are the things which participate of it, there is no such thing as a *Monad* in itself. In like manner, neither will there be any of the other Numbers in itself; for the same Argument which we have brought against the *Monad*, will hold against them all. But if Number be neither in itself, as we have shewn; nor Number be the things numbered, as the *Pythagoreans* approved; and besides these there is nothing; we must say, that Number is not.

Moreover, how do they, who conceive Number to be something extrinsecal, distinct from the things numbered, affirm, That the *Duad* is generated of the *Monad*? For when we add a *Monad* to another *Monad*, either something extrinsecal is added to the *Monads*, or is subtracted from them, or is neither added nor subtracted; but if nothing be added or subtracted, there will be no *Duad*. For neither will the *Monads*, being separate from one another, have a *Monad* considered as above them, according to their peculiar Respects; neither is any thing added to them from without, (nor taken away, according to the *Hypothesis*.) So that the Addition of a *Monad* to a *Monad*, there being no Addition nor Subtraction from without, will not make a *Duad*; but if there be Subtraction, there will not only be no *Duad*, but the *Monads* themselves will be diminished; and if from without a *Duad* be added to them, that of the two *Monads* there may be made a *Duad*, seeming to be two they will be four; for there is first laid down one *Monad*, and another *Monad*, to which a *Duad* from without being added, the Number four is made. It is the same as to all other Numbers, which are

said to be made by Composition. If therefore those Numbers which are said to be compounded of transcendent Numbers, are made neither by Subtraction nor Addition, nor without Subtraction and Addition, the Generation of that Number, which is said to be by itself, and about numerate things, will be insubstantial. But that the Numbers which are by Composition, are not ingenerate, they themselves declare, affirming, That they are compounded, and made of those which are transcendent, as of the *Monad* and indefinite *Duad*; therefore Number hath not a Subsistence of itself. And if Number hath not a Subsistence, neither considered in itself nor in thing numbered, Number is not any thing, according to the superfluous Curiosity of the *Dogmatists*. Thus much may serve for a brief Account as to that which is called the *Physical Part* of Philosophy.

C H A P. XIX.

Of the Ethical Part of Philosophy.

THEre remains the *Ethical Part*, which seemeth conversant about *Goods*, and *Ills*, and *Indifferents*. That therefore we may treat of this also, by way of Summary, we will enquire into the Existence of *Goods*, *Ills*, and *Indifferents*, having first explained their Notions.

C H A P. XX.

Of Goods, Ills, and Indifferents.

THE *Stoicks* say, that *Good* is *Profit*, or, that which differeth not from *Profit*, calling *Profit*, *Virtue*; and virtuous Action, that which is not different from *Profit*, a virtuous Man, and a Friend; for *Virtue* being the *Hegemonick Part* of the Soul, consistent after such a manner; and virtuous Action, being an Operation according to *Virtue*, is plainly *Profit*; and a virtuous Man and a Friend, is not different from *Profit*. For *Profit* is a Part of virtuous, as being the *Hegemonick* thereof; now the Wholes, they say, are neither the same with their Parts, (for a Man is not a Hand;) nor different from their Parts, for they subsist not without their Parts: Wherefore they say, the Whole is not different from its Parts, consequently, a virtuous Man being the Whole, in respect of its *Hegemonick*, (which the say is *Profit*) is not different from *Profit*.

C H A P. XXI.

That Good is taken three Ways.

HENCE, *Good*, they say, is taken three Ways: One Way, *Good* is said to be that from which *Profit* cometh; this is the most principal, and the Virtues:

uses: The Second, is that by which Profit cometh, as Virtue and virtuous Actions. The Third, is that which is able to profit, as Virtue, and virtuous Actions, and a virtuous Man, and a Friend, and the Gods, and good Demons: Thus the Second Signification includes the first; and the Third, both First and Second.

Some say, Good is that which is expetible for itself; Others, that which affiseth to Felicity, or compleateth it. Felicity, according to the Stoicks, is 'Εὐεστία ἢ, a good Current of Life.

These Things are said to explain the Notion of Good; but whether a Man saith, Good is that which profiteth, or that which is expetible in itself, or that which co-operates towards Felicity, he declareth not what Good is, but something accident to it, which is frivolous. For the fore said are either accident to Good only, or to other things also. If to other things also, they are not Characteristicks of Good, so far as they are made common. If to Good only, we cannot by these understand Good; for as he who understands not what a Horse is, knoweth not what Neighing is, nor can by that come to the Notion of a Horse, if he first light not upon a Horse neighing: So he who enquireth what is good, so far as he knoweth not what Good is, he cannot know what properly and solely belongs to it, that thereby he might come to understand Good itself. For first he must learn the Nature of Good itself, and then understand, that it profiteth, and that it is expetible for itself, and that it is effective of Felicity. But that the fore said Accidents are not sufficient to declare the Notion and Nature of Good, the Dogmatists manifest in effect: For, that Good profiteth, and that it is expetible (whence called ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀρετὴν) and effective of Felicity, all perhaps grant: But being demanded, What that is to which these are accident? they run into an incredible Contest; some saying that it is Virtue, others Pleasure, others Indolence, others something else: whereas, if by the fore said Definitions it were determined what Good is, they would not fall out among themselves, as ignorant of its Nature. Thus the most eminent among the Dogmatists differ concerning the Notion of Good. They likewise differ about Ill, saying, that Ill is Hurt, or not different from Hurt; others, that which is avoidable for itself; others, that which is effective of Infelicity; whereby perhaps declaring not the Essence of Ill, but some of the Things accident to it, they fall into the fore said Inextricability.

C H A P. XXII.

Of Indifferent.

Indifferent is taken three Ways: First, for that which moveth neither Appetite nor Aversion; as,

that the Stars or the Hairs of our Head are of even Number. Secondly, for that which moves the Appetite or Aversion not one more than the other, as in two Tetradrachms nothing different, when one of them is to be chosen: There is an Appetite to chuse one of them, but not this more than that. The third Kind of Indifferent is, that which conduceth neither to Felicity nor Infelicity; as Health, Wealth: for that which sometimes may be used well, and sometimes ill, this, they say, is indifferent. Concerning this last chiefly they discourse in Ethicks.

What to conceive of this Notion, is manifest from what we said before from Goods and Ills. They bring us not to the Notion of each of these Things; but it is not strange, that they fail in Things indifferent. That nothing by Nature is good, ill, or indifferent, some argue thus.

C H A P. XXIII.

Whether there is any thing naturally good, ill, or indifferent.

Fire being hot by Nature, appeareth to all to be heating; Snow being cold by Nature, appeareth to all to be cooling; all Things which affect by their Nature, affect all that are according to Nature, or well, after the same Manner; but none of those which are called Good, affect all Men as good (as we shall shew) therefore there is nothing good by Nature. That none of those which are called Goods, affect all Men alike, is manifest; for (to pass by the ordinary People, whereof some think a good Habit of Body to be Good; others, veneral Pleasures; others, Eating; others, Drinking; others, Dicing; others, Riches; others, something worse than these) some Philosophers, as the *Peripateticks*, say, There are three Kinds of Goods, some in the Soul, as the Virtues; some in the Body, as Health, and the like; others, external, as Friends, Wealth, and the like. The Stoicks also affect three kinds of Goods, some in the Soul, as the Virtues; some external, as a virtuous Man, and a Friend; some, neither in, nor without the Soul, as a virtuous Man as to himself. But those which are in the Body or external, which the *Peripateticks* account Goods, they deny to be Goods. Some there are who hold Pleasure to be a Good; others on the contrary say, it is an Ill; whence one of the Philosophers cried out, *I had rather be mad than be pleased.* Now if all things, which move (or affect) by Nature, move all Men alike, but by those which are called Goods, all Men are not affected alike, nothing is good by Nature. For neither can we believe all the fore said Opinions, by reason of their Repugnance, nor some one of them; for he who saith we must believe this Sect, and not that, seeing he is opposed by the Reasons of the other side, becomes a Party in the Controversy, and will him-

self need a Judge, but shall not judge others. Now there neither being an acknowledged Criterie, nor a Demonstration, by reason of the indjudicable Controversy concerning these, he must come to Suspension, and hereupon will not be able to assert what is good by Nature.

Moreover some argue thus: Good is either the Desire itself, or that which we desire: The Desire itself is not good, in itself; for then we would not endeavour to obtain that which we desire, lest having obtained it we lose the Desire. For Example; if to desire Drink were good, we would not endeavour to get Drink; for, as soon as ever we have obtained it, we leave to desire it. 'Tis the same in Hunger, Love, and the like; therefore the Desire is not a thing expetible in itself; rather on the contrary, perhaps troublesome. For he who is hungry, endeavours to obtain Meat, that he may be freed from the Trouble of Hunger; the like doth he who loves and he who thirsts. Neither is that which is desired, the Good itself; for either it is without us, or above us. If it is without us, either it causeth in us some pleasing Motion, and such a Constitution as we willingly embrace, and consequently is a delightful Affection, or it affects us not at all; but if it be not delightful it is not good, nor can incite us to its Appetition, nor can be any way expetible. If there be ingenerate about us extrinsically some delightful Constitution and Affection, which we willingly embrace, that which is without us, shall not be expetible in itself, but for the Affection which is raised in us thro' it. But neither about us, for then it must either be about the Body, or about the Soul, or about both. If about the Body only, we cannot know it, for all Knowledge they attribute to the Soul, the Body they say in itself is irrational. Now if it be said to proceed as far as the Soul, it will seem to be expetible to the Comprehension of the Soul, and to its delightful Affection: For that which is judged to be expetible, is judged (according to them) by the Intellect, not by the irrational Body. It remains therefore to say, that Good is about the Soul only: But even this, according to the Grounds of the *Dogmatists*, is impossible; for perhaps the Soul itself is not existent, or if it exist, it is not (from what they themselves say) comprehended, as we have proved in the Discourse concerning the Criterie. But how will any venture to say, that something is produced in a thing, which comprehends it not?

Besides all this, How do they say that Good is in the Soul? If *Epicurus* say, That Pleasure is the End, and that the Soul (for so do all things,) consists of Atoms, how Pleasure, and an Assent or Judgment, that this is expetible and good, that-avoidable and ill, can be in a Heap of Atoms, is not possible to be resolved?

C H A P. XXIV.

What that is which is called Art about Life.

AGAIN, the *Stoicks* say, That the Goods in the Soul are certain Arts, the Virtues. Art, they say, is a System of coerced Comprehensions; Comprehensions are made in the Hegemonick. Now how in the Hegemonick, which, according to them, is a Spirit, there is a storing up of Comprehensions; and a Coacervation of them, so as to make an Art, is not possible to be understood; forasmuch as the latter Impression still defaceeth the foregoing, since they say it is a Spirit, and moved totally, according to every Impression. For to say that *Plato's* *ἀσυνάλυσις* can demonstrate Good, I mean that Temperament of divisible and indivisible Substance, and of the Nature of Alterity and Identity, or Numbers, is merely to trifle; whence neither can Good be in the Soul. Now if neither the Desire be the Good, nor the extrinsical Subject which is expetible for itself, nor in the Body, nor in the Soul, as I have proved, there is nothing naturally Good; and for the same Reasons, neither is there any thing naturally ill: For those things which to some seem ill, are pursued by others for good; as Lasciviousness, Injustice, Covetousness, Intemperance, and the like. Whence if those which are naturally good, affect all Men alike; and those which are said to be ill, affect not all alike, there is nothing ill naturally.

Neither is there any thing naturally indifferent, by reason of the Controversy about Indifferents; as for Example: The *Stoicks*, of Indifferents, say, That some are preferred, others rejected; others neither preferred, nor rejected. Preferred are those, which have a sufficient Dignity, as Health, Riches; rejected, those which have not a sufficient Dignity, as Poverty, Sickness. Neither preferred, nor rejected; as to stretch, or bend the Finger. But some hold, that, of Indifferents none is absolutely preferred or rejected; for every Indifferent seemeth sometimes preferred, sometimes rejected, according to various Circumstances. For if (say they) a Tyrant plots against the rich, whilst the poor are suffered to live quietly, there is none but had rather be poor than rich; so as Riches in this Case will be in the Number of the rejected. Thus each of these which are called Indifferents, is by some held to be good, by others to be ill; but if it were indifferent by Nature, all Men would alike conceive it to be indifferent. Therefore there is nothing indifferent by Nature. Again, if some shall argue, that Courage is expetible by Nature, because Lions, and Bulls, Cocks, and some Men are naturally inclined to it, we reply, that, for the same Reason, Timidity ought to be reckoned amongst things expetible in their own Nature; for Harts and Hares, and many other Creatures, are addicted to it by Nature. Even a great

Part of Mankind are such. For it seldom happens, that a Man gives up himself to dye for his Country, or, courageously attempts some bold Action, as being with-held by effeminate Timidity; the greater part of Men decline all these. Whence the *Epicureans* conceive it to be proved, that Pleasure is expetible in its own Nature; for living Creatures, say they, as soon as they are born, being yet unperverted, desire Pleasure and decline Pain. To these may be objected, That whatsoever causeth ill, cannot be good by Nature; but Pleasure causeth ill, for to all Pleasure is annexed Pain, which, according to them, is ill in its own Nature: For Example; a Drunkard hath Pleasure in drinking, a Glutton in eating, a luxurious Person in wantoning; but these cause Poverty and Sickness, which are painful and ill, as they conceive; therefore Pleasure is not good in its own Nature. Besides, that which causeth good, cannot be naturally ill; but Pains cause Pleasures; by Labour we attain Science and Riches; by Labour a Man obtains the Enjoyment of his Love; by Pain is acquired Health; therefore Labour is not ill naturally. For if Pleasure were good in its own Nature, and Labour or Pain ill in its own Nature, all Men would be alike affected with them: But we see many Philosophers embrace Labour and Pain, and contemn Pleasure.

In the same manner may they be overthrown, who say, That a Life conjoined with Virtue is good by Nature, because some Philosophers have made choice of a voluptuous Life; so as by the Disagreement amongst them is subverted, that a thing is such or such in its own Nature.

It will not perhaps be from our Purpose, to propose briefly some more particular Opinions of things honest and dishonest, of the lawful and unlawful, Laws and Customs, and Devotion to the Gods, and Piety to the Dead, and the like; for by this means we shall find a great Difference amongst things to be done, and not to be done. With us ἀνευνομία is held dishonest and unlawful; with the *Germans*, not dishonest, but an allowed Custom. Neither did the *Thebans* of old esteem it dishonest; and *Merione the Cretan*, they say, was so called, by Emphasis of the *Cretan* Nation. Some also refer to this *Achilles's* fervent Friendship to *Patroclus*. And no wonder, when the *Cynicks*, and *Zeno the Cittisan*, and *Cleanthus*, and *Chrysippus* say, It is an Indifferent. Again, for a Man to lie with his Wife in publick, though we esteem it unseemly, yet some in the *Indies* do not so, for they make no Distinction of Places therein; as *Crates* the Philosopher is also said to have done. For Women to prostitute themselves, with us, is dishonest and shameful, but with many of the *Egyptians* honourable; for it is said, that those who have lain with many Men, used to wear a Bracelet

about their Anles as a Mark of Honour. Moreover, amongst them, Virgins before Marriage gain'd a Dowry by prostituting themselves. The *Stoicks* say, That it is no Shame to cohabit with a common Woman, or to be maintained by what she gets. To be stigmatiz'd, with us, is shameful and dishonourable; but many of the *Egyptians* and *Sarmatians* stigmatiz'd their Children. For Men to wear Earrings is, with us, accounted shameful; but with some *Barbarians*, as with the *Syrians*, it is a Mark of Nobility; inasmuch as some extending this Mark of Nobility, bore Holes in the Nostrils of their Children, in which they hang Rings of Silver or Gold, which none amongst us do. As neither to wear a Mantle stain'd and dy'd with Flowers; for though the *Persians* esteem this an Ornament, we think it undecent. When at a Feast made by *Diemysius* Tyrant of *Sicily*, such a kind of Robe was offered to *Plato*, and to *Aristippus* the Philosophers, *Plato* refus'd, saying,

*I will not with a Female Robe myself disgrace,
Who am a Man, and of a manly Race.*

But *Aristippus* took it, with these Words;

*If she come pure, a Bacchanalian Feast
Never corrupts a modest Woman's Breast.*

Thus even of the wise Men, to some it seem'd decent, to others indecent. With us it is unlawful to marry our Mother or Sister; but the *Persians* (of whom the *Magi*, who make greatest Profession of Wisdom) marry their Mothers, and the *Egyptians* their Sisters, and all; as the Poet,

Jove to his Wife and Sister Juno, said.

Zeno the *Cittisan* saith, That it is not dishonest, τὸ σωφρονεῖν ἢ σωφρονεῖν τὸ σωφρονεῖν τοῦ σώματος, no more than if it were to rub any other Part of the Body. *Chrysippus*, in his Treatise of Policy, asserts, That the Father may lie with the Daughter, and the Mother with the Son, and the Brother with the Sister. But *Plato* more universally saith, That all Wives ought to be in common. With us it is detestable, ἀδελφικὸν, *Zeno* approves it; and are informed that some there are, who use this Evil as a Good. To eat Man's Flesh with us is unlawful; whereas amongst the *Barbarians* there are whole Nations which use it as a thing indifferent. What need we instance *Barbarians*, when *Tydeus* himself is said to have eaten the Brains of his Enemy? And the *Stoicks* say, it is not unfitting to eat not only the Flesh of other Men, but our own. Moreover, to defile the Altar of God with Blood, with most People, as with us, is

• With *Laertius*, χρηστὸν. See the Life of *Diogenes*.

held impious; but the *Lacedæmonians*, at the Altar of *Orthesia* and *Diana*, whipp'd themselves cruelly, so as much Blood run down upon the Altar of the Goddess. Besides, some sacrifice a Man to *Saturn*, as the *Syrians* do Strangers to *Diana*; but we, on the contrary, think the Temples are defiled with human Blood. With us there is a Law for Punishment of Adulterers; but some hold, that to lie with other Mens Wives, is a thing indifferent: Even some Philosophers say, that to lie with other Mens Wives is indifferent. With us, Children are bound by Law to take care for their Parents; the *Scythians*, when they exceed threescore Years, cut their Throats. And what wonder, when *Saturn* himself with a Sickle emasculated his Father; *Jupiter* threw down *Saturn* into *Tartarus*; *Minerva* joined with *Jupiter* and *Neptune* to fetter her Father; *Saturn* devoured his own Children. Moreover, *Salon* the *Athenian* made a Law concerning indemnate Persons, whereby any Man was permitted to kill his Son; but with us, the Laws forbid to kill our Sons. The *Roman* Lawgivers order the Children to be under the Power of the Parents, and to be their Servants; and the Children not to be Masters of their own Estates, but the Parents, until they are manumitted after the same manner as purchased Slaves. Others reject this Custom as tyrannical. There is a Law to punish Homicides; but *Gladiators*, when they kill a Man, are many times honoured for it. The Laws forbid to strike a free Person; but Wrestlers, beating Freemen, sometimes killing them, are rewarded with Honours and Garlands. The Law commands every Man to have but one Wife; but amongst the *Thracians* and *Getulians*, a People of *Lybia*, every one hath many. To rob is with us held unlawful and unjust; but with many of the *Barbarians*, not so: On the contrary, the *Cilicians* esteem it honourable; whereupon such as die in Robbing, they judge worthy of Honour. *Nisitor* in the Poet, after he had kindly received those who were with *Telemachus*, says,

—Do you uncertain stray
As Thieves?

But if to rob had been dishonourable, he would not have entertained Persons that might be suspected for Thieves, with so much Humanity. Besides, to steal, is, with us, unjust and unlawful; but those who say *Mercury* is a thievish God, do not conceive it unjust; for how can a God be wicked? Some also say, That the *Lacedæmonians* punish'd Thieves, not for Stealing, but for being Taken. A Coward that throws away his Shield is in many Countries punished by Law; (whence the *Lacedæmonian* Woman, giving her Son a Shield, said to him, "Thou Son, or this, or upon this;") but *Archilochus* brags,

that he had thrown away his Shield, and run away, writing of himself in his Poems thus:

Some Sajan doth perhaps himself adorn
Now with the Shield which once by me was born,
And left behind (though sore against my Will)
To save my Life ———

The *Amazons* maim their Male-Children, that they might not be fit for War, and they themselves underwent all military Business; whereas we think the contrary to be the best Order. The Mother of the Gods admits Eunuchs, which a God would never do, if it were ill by Nature not to be perfectly virile. Thus concerning things Just and Unjust, and Virility, there is great Disagreement.

Likewise, concerning Devotion, and the Gods, there is much Controversy: The greater Part hold, that there are Gods; but some, that there are none, as the Followers of *Diagoras* the *Melian*, and *Theodorus*, and *Critias* the *Athenian*. Of those who affirm there are Gods, some worship the Gods of their Country, others those which the Sect of *Dynastis* have framed; as, *Aristotle* held God to be incorporeal, the Boundure of Heaven; the *Stoicks*, a Spirit, penetrating even through things horrible to behold; *Epicurus*, of human Form; *Xenophanes*, an impassible Sphere: Some, that he is provident over our Affairs; others, that he is not provident over them: For that which is blessed and incorruptible, faith *Epicurus*, neither hath any Trouble itself, nor causeth any to others. Whence also, of those according to Life, some say that there is one God; others, that there are many, and of different Forms; so as they run into the Opinions of the *Egyptians*, who conceived the Gods to be faced like Dogs, and formed like Hawks, and Oxen, and Crocodiles, and what not. Whence also there happen'd a great Difference as to Sacrifices, and the Worship of the Gods. Things that are sacred in some Temples, are profane in others; whereas this could not be, if there were any thing sacred or prophane in its own Nature. For Example: None sacrifice a Swine to *Serapis*, but to *Hercules* and *Æsculapius* they sacrifice them. 'Tis unlawful to sacrifice a Sheep to *Isis*; but to her who is called the Mother of the Gods, and to other Gods, they are sacrificed. To *Saturn* they sacrifice a Man, which to most is impious. In *Alexandria* they sacrifice a Cat to *Heru*, a Moth to *Thetis*, which amongst us none do. To *Neptune* a Horse is sacrificed, but to *Apollo* the *Didymæan* especially, this Creature is abominable. To sacrifice Goats to *Diana* is pious, but not to *Æsculapius*. Many others might be alledged, which, for brevity, I omit. Now if there were any Sacrifice pious of impious in its own Nature, all Persons would have the same Opinion of it.

Like

* Either bring it home, or, Be brought home dead upon it.

Like to these we shall find the things that concern the Diet of Men, as to Worship of the Gods. A Jew, or an Egyptian Priest, will die, rather than eat Swine's Flesh; a Libyan thinks it most unlawful to eat the Flesh of Sheep; some of the Syrians, that of a Pigeon; others, of Victims; in some Temples, it is lawful to eat Fish; in others, unlawful. Of those who amongst the Egyptians were thought to be wife, some conceived it abominable to eat the Head of a Creature; others, the Shoulder; others, the Foot; others, other Parts. None eat Onions, who are initiated in the Rites of Cæcian Jupiter at Pellusium. The Priest of Libyan Venus never eats Garlick. In some Temples they abstain from Mint; in others, from Marjoram; in others, from Smallage. Some affirm it better to eat the Heads of our own Parents than Beans; others hold the eating of these indifferent. We think it abominable to eat the Flesh of Dogs; but some among the Thracians are reported to feed thereon. Perhaps also it was in Use amongst the Grecians; whence Diocles, following the Æsculapians, prescribed to some sick Persons the Flesh of Puppies. There are, who, as I said, eat Man's Flesh indifferently, which we think unlawful. Now if these Rules of Worship, and things unlawful, were by Nature, all Men would have the like Opinion of them.

The same may be said concerning Piety towards the Dead. Some cover the Bodies of the Dead with Earth, thinking it impious to shew them to the Sun: The Egyptians, drawing out the Entrails, embalm them, and keep them amongst them above Ground. Amongst the Ethiopians, the Ichthyophagi throw them into Ponds to be eaten by the Fishes; the Hircanians give them to be devoured by Dogs; some of the Indians to Vultures. It is reported, that the Troglodytes bring the dead Body to a Hillock, tie it Head and Heels together, and throw Stones at it, laughing, with which when they have covered it, they depart. There are some Barbarians, who sacrifice and eat those who out-live three-score Years; but such as die young, they bury in the Ground. There are who burn their Dead; of whom, some gathering their Bones, preserve them, others cast them away. The Persians, it is reported, hang up their Dead, and embalm them with Nitre, and then wrap Cloaths about them. We see with what Mourning some follow the Dead: Some esteem Death horrible, and to be shunned; others, nothing such. Euripides:

*If Life be Death who know,
And Death a Life below?*

And Epicurus saith, *Death concerns us not. For what is dissolved is insensible; but what wants Sense concerns us not. They say moreover, If we consist of Soul and Body, and Death be a Dissolution of the Soul and Body, then when we are, Death is not; for we are not*

dissolved; and when Death is, we are not; for this Composition of Soul and Body consisting no longer, neither are we. Heraclitus saith, That to Live is to Die, and that whilst we Live we are Dead; for whilst we Live, our Souls are Dead, buried in us; but when we die, our Souls revive and live. There are who conceive, that to die is better than to live; whence Euripides,

*We New-born Infants rather should lament,
Pitying the Miseries to which they're sent:
But him who Dies, yet from all Labours free,
Bear to the Grave with Joy triumphantly.*

To the same Effect is also this;

*Of wretched Mankind, the most happy State
Were never to be born, nor see the Day:
Next which, as soon as born to pass the Gate
Of Pluto, and their Bones in Dust to lay.*

We know the Story of Cleobis and Biton, related by Herodotus, concerning the Argive Priests. It is said, amongst the Thracians there are some that mourn over a Child as soon as it is born. Therefore ought not Death to be reckoned amongst things horrible in their own Nature, nor Life amongst things good in their own Nature? Nor is there any of the forementioned things such or such in their own Nature, but all are such by Opinion and Reference. The same kind of Argument we might deduce from many other things, which, for brevity, we omit. And if we cannot immediately instance a Contrariety to something, we may say, It is possible, that in some Nations which we know not, there may be a different Opinion. For if we did not (for Example) know, that the Custom of the Egyptians is to marry their Sisters, we might falsely affirm, that it is a thing acknowledged by all, that we ought not to marry our Sisters. In like manner, in such things as have not a Difference known to us, it is not fit to affirm, that there is no Controversy concerning them; it being, as I said, possible, that some other Nations which we know not, may hold the contrary.

Hereupon the Sceptick observing so great Difference of things, suspends as to what is good or bad in its own Nature, or what is absolutely to be done, or not to be done: herein declining the Temerity of the Dogmatists; but he follows the common Course of Life without being positive; whence it comes, that in things Opinionative, he remains void of Passion; in things Compulsive, he is moderately affected: As being a Man, sensible, he suffers; but not taking the Opinion, that which he suffers is ill in its own Nature, he is moderately affected: for to have such an Opinion is worse than the suffering itself; inasmuch as they who suffer the Amputation of some Limb, or the like, many times bear it well, whilst

the

the Standers-by, out of an Opinion that it is ill, faint. For, doubtless, he who propoſeth to himſelf that ſomething is good or ill in its own Nature, and to be done or not to be done, is troubled many ways. When the things are preſent, which he conceives ill by Nature, he ſeems to be tormented; and when he poſſeſſeth thoſe which ſeem to him good, through his being exalted in Mind for it, and his Fear of loſing it, and Care left he ſhould fall again into thoſe things which he conceives ill by Nature, he is involv'd in no ſmall Trouble. For thoſe who ſay that Goods cannot be loſt, are to be ſilenced by the Inſolubility of the Queſtion. Hence we argue, If what cauſeth ill be ill, and to be avoided; but the Perſuaſion that ſome things are ill, ſome good, in their own Nature, cauſeth Troubles; then that Perſuaſion is ill, and to be avoided. Thus much of Goods, Ills, and Indifferents.

CHAP. XXV.

Whether there be an Art about Life.

From what hath been ſaid it is manifeſt, That there is not an Art about Life; for if there be ſuch an Art, it is converſant in the Contemplation of Goods, Ills, and Indifferents; but theſe being in-exiſtent, the Art about Life will be in-exiſtent alſo. Beſides, the *Dogmatists* not agreeing concerning this Art about Life, ſeveral of them being of ſeveral Opinions, they are ſubject to the Controverſy and Argument from *Diſagreement*, which we alledged in the Diſcourſe concerning Good.

But though we ſhould ſuppoſe all to agree in one Art about Life; as for Example, That celebrated Prudence which the *Stoicks* dream of, and ſeem to preſs more than the reſt, many Abſurdities will nevertheless follow. For ſeeing that Prudence is a Virtue, and a *wiſe Man only hath Virtue*, the *Stoicks* not being wiſe, will not have the Art about Life. And ſeeing, according to them, the Art cannot ſubſiſt, there will be no Art about Life, if we follow what they ſay. For they affirm, *Art to be a System of Comprehenſions, Comprehenſion to be an Aſſent to comprehensive Phantaſy*. But comprehensive Phantaſy cannot be found; for neither is all Phantaſy comprehensive, nor can it be known what Phantaſies are comprehensive, and what not: but needing comprehensive Phantaſy to diſcern what Phantaſy is comprehensive, we run into *infinite*; another comprehensive Phantaſy being required, for the diſcerning of the comprehensive Phantaſy which we aſſumed. The *Stoicks* give ſuch a Notion of comprehensive Phantaſy as is not right; for ſaying, *comprehensive Phantaſy is that which ariſeth from a Being, and a Being is that which is able to move comprehensive Phantaſy*, they run into the *Alternate Common-place*. If therefore that there be an Art about Life, it is firſt requiſite that there be an Art; and that there be an Art, it is

firſt requiſite that there be Comprehenſion; and that there be Comprehenſion, it is firſt requiſite that there be an Aſſent to comprehensive Phantaſy; but comprehensive Phantaſy cannot be found, therefore the Art about Life cannot be found.

Again, every Art ſeems to be comprehended from thoſe things which it properly delivers; but there is no Work proper to that Art which is about Life; for whatſoever Work ſhall be inſtanced, it will be found common with the Vulgar, as, to honour Parents, to reſtore a *Depositum*, and the like; therefore there is no Art about Life. Neither, as ſome maintain, from that which ſeemeth to be ſaid or done through a prudent Habit of Mind, can we know what is the Work of Wiſdom; for a prudent Habit of Mind itſelf is incomprehenſible, it neither being manifeſt in and by itſelf ſimply, nor by its Words, for thoſe are common with the Vulgar. And to ſay, that we comprehend him who hath the Art about Life, by the Equality of his Actions, is to ſpeak above human Nature, rather to be wiſhed than aſſerted:

*For every Man's endu'd with ſuch a Mind,
As ſeveral Days are by the Gods aſſign'd.*

It remaineth to ſay, That this Art about Life is comprehended from their Writings; which being many, and all of one kind, we ſhall inſtance only ſome few. The Prince of their Sect, *Zeno*, in his *Exercitiations concerning the Inſtitution of Children*, amongſt other things, ſaith thus, "To diſtinguiſh " nothing more or leſs, Childiſh or not Childiſh, " Maſculine or Feminine; for there is no Difference " between (*Manners*) Childiſh and not Childiſh, " Maſculine and Feminine, the ſame become both. " Alſo, of Piety towards Parents, *he ſaith*, ſpeaking " of *Jocasta* and *Oedipus*, That it was not abominable, &c. *With this agrees Chryſippus*, in his *Treatiſe of Policy*, ſaying, Theſe things in my " Judgment ought ſo to be ordered as they are uſed " not amiſs with ſome, that the Mother ſhould " have Children by the Son, and the Father by the Daughter, and the Brother by the Siſter. In the " ſame Book he alloweth to eat Man's Fleſh; for he " ſaith, If any Part be cut off from a Body living, " which is fit for Food, we ſhould not bury it, nor " careleſſly throw it away, but ſo conſume it, that " it may become another Part of uſ. In his Books " of Office, treating of the Burial of Parents, he expreſſy ſaith, When our Parents are dead, we muſt " provide for them the moſt ſimple Tombs; for the Body (no more than Nails, or Teeth, or " Hair) pertaining nothing to uſ, we need not to " have any Reſpect or Care of it. If the Fleſh be " found, it may be converted into Aliment, (in " like manner, as if ſome Limb of our own Body " were cut off, as the Foot) but if unfound, it is to

"be buried, or burnt, or thrown away without any regard, as our Nails and Hair." Much more of this kind is said by Philosophers, which they could not have the Heart to do, unless they had been brought up among the *Cyclopes*, and the *Leſtrigones*. Now if they do none of these, but their Actions are common with the Vulgar, there is no particular Work proper to them, who are thought to have the Art about Life. If therefore it be absolutely necessary, that Arts be comprehended from their proper Works; but there is no Work proper to the Art about Life, it is not comprehended. Wherefore none can say, that it is existent.

C H A P. XXVI.

Whether there is in Men an Art about Life.

NOW if there be in Men an Art about Life, either it is ingenerate in them by Nature, or acquired by Discipline and Doctrine. If by Nature, either it is ingenerate in them as they are Men, or as they are not Men. Not as they are not Men, for they are Men; If as they are Men, this Wisdom would be in all Men, inasmuch that all Men would be prudent, virtuous, and wise: But the greater Part of Men, they say, are evil; therefore the Art which is according to Life is not in them, as they are Men, and therefore not by Nature. Besides, so far as they hold an Art to be a System of unexercised Comprehensions, they seem rather to conceive both this and other Arts to be comprehended by Experience and Discipline.

C H A P. XXVII.

Whether the Art about Life can be taught.

NEither is it understood by Doctrine and Discipline; for before these are, there must be three things acknowledged; the Thing taught, the Teacher, and He who learneth the manner of Discipline; but none of these are, therefore not the Doctrine.

C H A P. XXVIII.

Whether there be any thing taught.

FOR what is taught, is either true or false. If it be false, it cannot be taught, for that which is false, is not; that which is not, cannot be taught. But neither, if it be said to be true; for that true is existent, we proved in our Discourse concerning the Critery. If therefore neither false nor true is taught, and besides these there is nothing docible, (for these not being docible, no Man will say that things indeterminable are docible) nothing is taught.

Again, that which is taught is either manifest or unmanifest; if manifest, it needs not be taught, for things manifest are alike manifest to all. If unmanifest, so far as such things are unmanifest, by reason of the indjudicable Controversy concerning them, are incomprehensible, they cannot be taught; for how can any Man learn, or teach, that which he comprehends not. Now if neither that which is manifest, nor that which is unmanifest is taught, nothing at all is taught.

Besides, that which is taught is either a Body or Incorporeal; but neither of these, whether manifest or unmanifest, can be taught, for the foreſaid Reason; therefore nothing can be taught.

Moreover, either that which is, is taught, or that which is not. If that which is not be taught, so far as such Doctrines are conceived to be of things true, that which is not, will be true; and if true, it will be existent; for Truth, they say, is that which exists, and is opposed to something. But it is absurd to say, that which is not, exists; therefore that which exists not, cannot be taught. Neither can a Being be taught. For if a Being be taught, it must either be taught as a Being, or according to some other thing. If, as it is a Being, it is docible, it is a Being, and consequently not docible; for Doctrines must be made of things indubitate and indocible, therefore a Being, as a Being, is not docible. But neither according to some other thing, for a Being hath nothing accident to it, which is not a Being. Therefore if a Being be not taught, as it is a Being, neither can it be taught according to any other thing; for whatsoever is accident to it, is a Being. Besides, whether the Being which they say is taught, be manifest or unmanifest, it appears by the foreſaid Difficulties to be indocible. Now if neither that which is, nor that which is not, be taught, nothing is taught.

C H A P. XXIX.

Whether there be a Teacher and a Learner.

BY the foreſaid Difficulties are also subverted the Teacher and the Learner; nevertheless, we will question them more particularly. Either the Artift teacheth the Artift; or the Ignorant, the Ignorant; or the Ignorant, the Artift; or the Artift, the Ignorant. The Artift teacheth not the Artift, for, both being Artifts, neither needs teaching. The Ignorant cannot teach the Ignorant, no more than the blind can lead the blind. The Ignorant cannot teach the Artift, that were ridiculous. It remains to say, that the Artift teaches the Ignorant, which likewise is impossible. For there can be no such thing as an Artift, seeing that no Man is an Artift naturally, and born such, neither is an Artift made of one that is not an Artift: For either one Theorem, and one Comprehension is sufficient to make an Artift of him that

that was not an Artift, or not; but if one Comprehenfion can make an Artift of him that was not an Artift, Firft, we may fay, that Art is not a Syftem of Comprehenfions; for he that before knew nothing at all, if he have learnt one Theorem of Art, may thus be faid to be an Artift. Next, if any fhall fay, that he who hath attained fome Theorems of Art, but as yet wanteth one, and therefore being not an Artift, fhall, as foon as he hath attained that one, be made an Artift of a Not-Artift, he holds that it is completed by one Comprehenfion. But if he come to Particulars, he cannot fhew a Man that is yet no Artift, but fhall be an Artift as foon as he hath attained one Theorem more; for no Man can number the Theorems of every Art, fo as having numbred the Theorems known, he fhall be able to fay, how many there are behind to compleat the Number of the Theorems of the Art; therefore the Knowledge of the Theorem maketh not a Man an Artift who was not an Artift before. But if this be true, Forasmuch as a Man comprehends not all the Theorems of Arts together, but one by one, (as muft be granted) he who attaineth every Theorem of Art diftinctly by itfelf, cannot become an Artift; for we have fhewed, that the Knowledge of one Theorem cannot make him an Artift who was not an Artift; therefore he, who is not an Artift, cannot be made an Artift. So as from hence it appeareth, that there is no Artift at all, and confequently no Teacher.

But neither can he who is faid to learn, not being an Artift, learn and comprehend the Theorems of Art, whereof he is ignorant: For as he who is blind from his Birth, as being blind, cannot comprehend Colours; nor he who is deaf from his Birth, Sounds; fo neither can he who is not an Artift, comprehend the Theorems of Art whereof he is ignorant. Otherwife, the fame Perfon might be both an Artift, and ignorant of Art; ignorant of the Art, for he is fupposed to be fuch; An Artift, for he comprehends the Theorems of the Art. Wherefore neither doth an Artift teach him who is not an Artift. Now if neither the Artift teacheth the Artift; nor the Ignorant, the Ignorant; nor the Ignorant, the Artift; nor the Artift, the Ignorant; (and befides thefe there is nothing) neither is there a Teacher, nor a Learner; and there being neither a Teacher nor a Learner, the way of learning likewife is fuperfluous.

C H A P. XXX.

Whether there is a Way of Learning.

N^Everthelefs, againft this alfo are raifed Doubts; for the Way of teaching is either by Evidence or by Difcourfe; but neither by Evidence, nor by Difcourfe, as we fhall prove; therefore the Way of teaching is inextricable. Learning is not acquired

by Evidence; for Evidence is of things fhewn, but that which is fhewn is apparent to all; that which is apparent, inasmuch as it is apparent, is perceptible by all; that which is commonly perceptible by all, is not to be learned; therefore nothing is to be learned by Evidence.

But neither is there any thing learnt by Difcourfe; for Difcourfe either fignifies fomething, or fignifies nothing; but if it fignify nothing, it teacheth nothing. If it fignifies fomething, it fignifies it either by Nature, or Imposition; by Nature it fignifies not, for all Men understand not all Men, as *Greeks; Barbarians; and Barbarians Greeks*. If it fignifieth by Imposition, it is manifold, that the Makers of thefe Words, firft comprehending the things to which they accommodated them, understand them, not as being taught by thefe Words the Things which they knew not, but as being put in mind of the things which they knew. Now they who have need to learn that which they know not, not knowing to what things the Words are accommodated, will understand nothing at all; wherefore there can be no way of Learning. For the Teacher ought to innuinate into the Learner, an Understanding of the Theorems of the Art which is to be learnt, that fo he, comprehending the Collection of them all, may be made an Artift. But Comprehenfion, as we fhewed already, is nothing, therefore there cannot be a way of teaching. Now if there be nothing taught, nor a Teacher, nor a Learner, nor a Way of Teaching, there will neither be any Difcipline nor Doctrine. Thefe Arguments are in general alledged againft Difcipline and Doctrine.

Another Difficulty may be raifed againft that which is called, The Art concerning Life. Thus: The thing taught, that is, Wifdom, we have formerly proved infubfiftent; the Teacher likewife, and Learner are infubfiftent: For either the wife teacheth the wife the Art concerning Life; or the foolifh the foolifh; or the foolifh the wife; or the wife the foolifh; but none of thefe teacheth another; therefore the Art concerning Life is not taught. To fpeak of the reft were fuperfluous. But if the wife teach the foolifh Wifdom, and Wifdom be the Science of Good, and Ill, and Indifferent; the foolifh, not having Wifdom, will be ignorant of the things Good, and Ill, and Indifferent; and, being ignorant of them, whilft the wife teacheth him things Good, Ill, and Indifferent, he can only hear the Things he faith, but not know them. For if he did understand them whilft he is in his Folly, Folly alfo might contemplate things Good, Bad, and Indifferent: But according to them, Folly contemplates not thefe, (otherwife a foolifh Perfon were wife) therefore the foolifh understand not by learning the things faid or done by the wife; but if he understands not, he cannot be taught by him any way, but by Evidence and Difcourfe, as we faid before. Now if that

which

which is called the Art concerning Life, is neither communicated by Learning and Discipline, nor by Nature, it is not to be found out by the Philosophers, who cry it up so much.

C H A P. XXXI.

Whether the Art concerning Life be profitable to him who hath it.

MOREOVER, though we should grant, that the Art which they dream of concerning Life, may be communicated, yet it will rather appear hurtful and troublesome to those that have it, than beneficial. We will take but one Instance for brevity. The Art concerning Life may be profitable to a wife Man in giving him Continence in Appetition of Good, and Aversion from Ill. For he, whom they call continent, is said to be such, either for that he hath no Appetition to Ill, nor Aversion from Good; or for that he hath ill Appetitions and Aversions, but masters them by Reason: But as far as he is not in ill Judgments, he is not continent; for he is not continent in that which he hath not. And as no Man saith, an Eunuch is continent in venereal Pleasures; or, he who hath no Appetite, continent in eating, (for they have not those things that by Continence might be subdued) in like manner, a wife Man cannot be said to be continent, because he hath not in himself the Passion whereof he should be continent. But if they will say, he is continent, for that he is in ill Judgments, but overmasters them by Reason: First, they must grant, that Wisdom hath profited him nothing; forasmuch as he is still in Trouble, and needeth Help: Next he will be found to be more unfortunate than those who are said to be bad. For if he hath an Appetite towards any thing, he is wholly disturbed; if he overmasters it with Reason, he containeth the Ill within himself, and thereupon is more troubled than the ill Person, who suffereth not this; for if he hath an Appetite to any thing, he is troubled; but if he obtain his Desire, the Trouble ceaseth. A wife Man therefore, either is not continent as to Wisdom;

or if he be, he is of all Men the most unhappy; so that the Art concerning Life affords him not Benefit, but extraordinary Trouble. Now that he, who conceiveth that he hath the Art concerning Life, and thereby knoweth what things are good and ill in their own Nature, is exceedingly troubled, as well when the good are present as when the ill, we shewed heretofore. We must therefore say, If the Subsistence of things Good, Ill, and Indifferent, be not undoubtedly a Knowledge, and the Art concerning Life be perhaps insubsistent also; and though it were granted by Supposition to subsist, yet would it bring no Profit to those who have it, but on the contrary, great Trouble; the Dogmatists look superciliously, and take pride in vain, in the Ethical Part of that which they call Philosophy. And with this Disputation (not to exceed the Limits of a Summary) we shall close our third Book of *Pyrrhonian Hypotheses*, adding only this.

C H A P. XXXII.

Why the Sceptick, sometimes on set purpose, alledgeth weak Arguments.

THE Sceptick, by reason of his great Humanity, endeavours with Discourse to remedy, as far as in him lies, the Arrogance and rash Insolence of the Dogmatists. As therefore Physicians, in corporeal Diseases, have Remedies of different sorts, applying violent to those who are violently sick, but gentle to those whose Disease is more gentle: In like manner, the Arguments proposed by the Sceptick are not all of equal Force; but the more solid, which are best able to overthrow the Affection of the Dogmatists, he useth against those who are most violently affected therewith; the lighter against those who have it more lightly and superficially; so as that they may be overthrown by lighter Probabilities. Whence it happens that the Sceptick, sometimes, alledgeth stronger Probabilities and Arguments; sometimes, on set purpose, weaker, as often perceiving them sufficient to compass his Design.

THE
HISTORY
OF
PHILOSOPHY.

THE THIRTEENTH PART,
Containing the *EPICUREAN* Sect.

EPICURUS.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, Brethren.

E*PICURUS* is by some conceived to have been a *Samian*, for *Timon* (in * *Laertius*) saith, he was the last of the Natural Philosophers that came out of *Samus*. And † *Constantinus Porphyrogeneta* conceives, that he derived his Original from *Samus*, as well as *Pythagoras*. But the Occasion of this was, for that he passed the first Part of his younger Years at *Samus*, with his Father and Brethren; for thither came his Father, *Agripeta*, as † *Cicero* terms him, (that is, one who claimeth a Portion in the Division of Lands.) Upon the like ground † *Strabo* conceives him a *Lampsacene*, for he lived at *Lampsacum*, and conversed with the chief Personages there. But *Epicurus* indeed was by Country an *Athenian*, as † *Laertius*, † *Suidas*, and infinite other Writers affirm; whence † *Laertius*, about to praise him, begins thus:

*First Ceres Gifts to human Indigence,
Renowned Athens did long since dispense:
And Mens disorder'd Ways by Laws redrest,
And first our Life with greatest Comfort blest;
When it produc'd a Person of such worth,
Whose Breast contain'd, whose Lips all Truth
brought forth.*

Now forasmuch as the *Athenian* People, being distinguished by Tribes, were dispersed into τῶν ὀψών, the adjacent Towns, which were made free Corporations, even from the time of *Theseus*; *Epicurus* was born at *Gargettus*, a Town (as *Hesychius* † and *Favorinus* describe it) belonging to the *Ægean* Tribe, where (saith † *Plutarch*) *Theseus* overcame the *Palantidae*, who conspired against him and *Ægeus*; and where *Eurytheus* (as † *Stephanus* relates) was buried. For this reason, he is said, by † *Laertius*, to have been

* Lib. 10. 3.
† Lib. 6.

† Lib. 1. de-Themat.
† In Lexicis.

† De Nat. Deor. l. 1. 26.
† De Urb.

† Lib. 14.

† Loc. Cit.

† In voce *Epicurus*.

been *ἄνθρωπος ταπεινός*; by *Stattius* termed, the *Gargettick Author*, and the *Gargettick old Man*; by *Cicero*, *Ælianus*, and others, simply the *Gargettician*.

Laertius (out of *Metrodorus*, in his Treatise of *Nobility*) writes, that *Epicurus* was, of the Family of the *Philaids*; the *Philaids* were denominated from *Philaus*, the second Son of *Ajax*, who dwelt in *Melitis*, and is mentioned by *Plutarch*, who adds, that *Pisistratus* also was of the *Philaids*. Of this Family was the Father of *Epicurus*, (according to *Laertius* and others) named *Neocles*, his Mother *Chærystrate*. He is also frequently cited, after the Greek Fashion, *Epicurus Neocles*, sometimes simply termed *Neocles*, as when compared by *Menander* with *Themistocles*, whose Father was named *Neocles* also. I omit, that his Father was (according to *Strabo*) one of the two thousand Citizens, whom the *Athenians* sent to *Samus* to share the Land by Lots, whither they had before sent *Pericles* and *Sophocles*, who strictly besieged the revolted *Samians*. I omit also, that he was a Schoolmaster, which (besides *Strabo*) *Cicero* observes, when proceeding to reproach him, *But his little Farm, saith he, not being sufficient to maintain him, as I conceive, he became a Schoolmaster*.

Suidas mentions only two Brethren of *Epicurus*, *Neocles* and *Chæredemus*; but *Laertius* (out of *Phileides* the *Epicurean*) adds a third, *Aristobolus*, whom *Plutarch* sometimes seems to call *Agathobolus*. By what Care and Benevolence *Epicurus* gained their Reverence and Affection, is excellently declared by *Plutarch*, who conceives it worthy Admiration, how he came so to win them, and they to be won. That all these died before *Epicurus*, may be inferred from his Will, wherein he ordereth nothing, either to them, or of them, as alive; but only appointed a Day to be celebrated for his Brethren in the Month *Pysidæon*. And though of *Chæredemus* there is no further Testimony, yet of *Aristobolus* it is more apparent from *Plutarch* who writes, that *Epicurus* was wholly taken up about *Metrodorus*, *Polyæmus*, and *Aristobolus*, tending them in their Sickness, and mourning for them when they died. But of *Neocles* it is most manifest, from the same *Plutarch*, relating, that *Epicurus* broke forth into a kind of Joy, mixt with Tears, upon the Remembrance of the last Words of *Neocles*. Of how great and painful Sicknesses they died, is sufficiently aggravated by *Plutarch* and *Suidas*.

CHAP. II.

The Time of his Birth.

E P I C U R U S was born (as *Laertius* relates out of the Chronology of *Apollodorus*) in the 3d Year of the 109th Olympiad, the 7th Day of the Month *Gamelion*; at whose Birth, *Pliny* saith, the Moon was twenty Days old. *Hecatomæon* (the first Month) this Year falling in the Summer of the Year 4372. of the *Julian* Period, (now used by Chronologists) it is manifest, that *Gamelion* the same Year, being the 7th Month from *Hecatomæon*, fell upon the Beginning of the Year 4373. which was before the ordinary Computation from Christ, 341 complete Years. Now so far as in *January*, in which Month the Beginning of *Gamelion* is observed to have fallen, there happen'd a New Moon in the Arctic Horizon, by the Tables of Celestial Motions, the fourth Day, in the Morning, (or the third Day, according to the *Athenians*, who, as *Censorinus* saith, reckon their Day from Sun-set to Sun-set) and therefore the twentieth Day of the Moon, is coincident with the three and twentieth of *January*; it will follow, that *Epicurus* was born on the 23d Day of *January*, if we suppose the same Form of the Year extended from the Time of *Cæsar*, upwards. And this in the old Style, according to which the Cycle of the Sun, or of the Dominical Letters for that Year, (it being Bissextile) was *B. A.* whence the 23d Day of *January* must have been *Sunday*. But if we suit it with the *Gregorian* Account, which is ten Days earlier, (now in use with us) we shall find that *Epicurus* was born on the 2d of *February*, which was *Sunday*, (for the Dominical Letters must have been *E. D.*) in the Year before Christ, or the Christian Computation, 341, and consequently in the 1974th Year, complete, before the Beginning of *February* this Year, which is from Christ 1634. Some things here must not be passed by.

First, That *Laertius* observes *Sofigènes* to have been *Archon* the same Year, wherein *Epicurus* was born, and that it was the 7th Year from the Death of *Plato*. Moreover, it was the 16th of *Alexander*; for it was, as the same *Laertius* affirms, the Year immediately following that in which *Aristotle* was sent for to come to him, then 15 Years old.

Secondly, That *Eusebius* can hardly be excused from a Mistake, making *Epicurus* to flourish in the 112th Olympiad; for at that time, *Epicurus* scarce had pass'd his Childhood, and *Aristotle* began but to flourish in the *Lycaean*, being returned the foregoing Olympiad out of *Macedonia*, as appears from *Laertius*.

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Thirdly,

¹ Silv. l. 1. 2 and 2. ² Lib. 15. Ep. 16. ³ Var. Hist. 4. 13. ⁴ Lib. 10. ⁵ In Anthol. ⁶ Loc. Cit. ⁷ Adv. Colot. l. 2. ⁸ De Amor. Fratr.
⁹ Lib. 5. 10. ¹⁰ In Chron. ¹¹ Loc. Cit. ¹² Lib. 10. 1. 4. ¹³ Lib. 35. c. 2. ¹⁴ D. Die Nat. c. 1. ¹⁵ Lib. 10. 10.

Thirdly, That the Error which is crept into *Suidas*, and hath deceived his Interpreter, is not to be allowed, who reports *Epicurus* born in the 79th Olympiad. I need not take notice, how much this is inconsistent, not only with other Relations, but even with that which followeth in *Suidas*, where he extends his Life to *Antigenes Gonatas*; I shall only observe, that, for the Number of Olympiads, *Suidas* having doubtless set down 75, which denote the 109th Olympiad, the end of the 7 was easily defaced in the Manuscript, so as there remained only 5, by which means of 5, was made the 75th Olympiad.

Fourthly, That it matters not that the *Chronicon Alexandrinum*, *Georgius Sincellus*, and others, speak too largely of the time wherein *Epicurus* flourished, and that we heed not the Errors of some Persons, otherwise very learned, who make *Aristippus* later than *Epicurus*, and something of the like kind. Let us only observe what *St. Hieron* cites out of *Cicero*, *pro Gallio*; A Poet is there mentioned, making *Epicurus* and *Socrates* discoursing together, *Whose Times*, saith *Cicero*, *we know were disjoined, not by Years, but Ages*.

Fifthly, That the Birth-day of *Epicurus*, taken from *Laertius* and *Pliny*, seems to argue, That amongst the *Athenians* of old, the Civil Months and the Lunar had different Beginnings. This indeed will seem strange, unless we should imagine it may be collected that the Month *Gamelion* began only from the Full Moon that went before it: For, if we account the 14th Day of the Moon to be the 1st of the Month, the 1st of the Moon will fall upon the 7th of the Month. Not to mention that *Epicurus* seems in his Will to appoint his Birth-day to be celebrated on the first Decad of the Days of the Month *Gamelion*, because he was born in one of them; and then ordaineth something more particularly concerning the 20th of the Moon, for that it was his Birth-day, as we shall relate hereafter. Unless you think it fit to follow the anonymous Writer, who affirms, *Epicurus* was born on the 20th Day of *Gamelion*; but I know not whether his Authority should outweigh *Laertius*. Certainly, many Errors, and those very great, have been observed in him, particularly by *Meursius*. I shall not take notice, that the *Ætas* of *Gamelion* might perhaps be understood of the 20th of the Moon, happening within the Month *Gamelion*, from *Cicero*, whose Words we shall cite hereafter. But this by the way.

CHAP. III.

Where he lived in his younger time.

LAERTIUS, out of *Heraclides*, in his Epitome of *Sotion* relates, that a Colony being sent

by the *Athenians* to *Samus*, *Epicurus* was bred up there till the 18th Year of his Age, in which he went to *Athens*; *Xenocrates* living in the Academy, *Aristotle* at *Chalcis*. ¹ *Strabo* adds, that being first brought up, partly at *Samus*, partly at *Teas*, he spent the first part of his Youth at *Athens*, growing up together with *Menander*, the comick Poet. ² *Laertius* further relates, That *Alexander* dying, and the *Athenians* being oppress'd by *Perdiccas*, he went to *Colophon* to his Father, (about the 23d Year of his Age) and that he lived a-while there. And adds afterwards, out of *Apollodorus*, that from the 32d Year of his Age to the 37th he lived partly at *Mitylene*, partly at *Lampacum*, (whither he made a dangerous Voyage, as ³ *Plutarch* observes.) *Suidas* sets down how much time he bestowed in each of these Places, one Year at *Mitylene*, four at *Lampacum*. *Laertius* adds, that he returned to *Athens*, when *Anaxicrates* was Archon. Now sofar much as *Anaxicrates* (who succeeded *Charinus*, in the Year of whose Magistracy, as *Seneca* notes, ⁴ *Epicurus* writ to *Polyænus*) was Archon in the 2d Year of the 118th Olympiad, and consequently the 36th of *Epicurus*'s Age, there must necessarily be here a Metachronism of one Year.

Hitherto of the Places where *Epicurus* lived in his younger Times, partly learning, partly teaching, before he settled at *Athens*, where he instituted a Sect.

CHAP. IV.

His Masters.

AS for the Masters which he had, we read, in ¹ *Laertius*, that some relate, *Epicurus* was Auditor of *Pamphilus* the *Platonick*; ² *Suidas* saith the same; ³ *Cicero* also mentions *Epicurus*; ⁴ *himself* acknowledging, that he heard him at *Samus*, but exceedingly slighted his Doctrine. Others also report the same.

Moreover, ⁵ *Clemens Alexandrinus* and others, report *Nauphanes* the *Pythagorean*, Disciple of *Pyrho*, to have been his Master; though ⁶ *Sextus Empiricus* writes, That he himself deny'd he had been Disciple to *Nauphanes*. *Apollodorus*, in his Chronology, reports, That *Epicurus* heard *Lyfiphanes* and *Praxiphanes*; but this, saith ⁷ *Laertius*, he doth not himself acknowledge, in his Epistle to *Euridicus*.

He might indeed have heard *Xenocrates*, and some there are (saith ⁸ *Cicero*) who think he did hear him, (as *Demetrius* the *Magnesian* in *Laertius*) but *Epicurus* himself will not allow it.

I would mention *Democrates*, with whom, ⁹ *Plutarch* saith, *Epicurus* contested about Syllables and Accents; but that I suspect *Democrates* to be falsely read instead

¹ In voc. Epic. ² De Vit. Cler. ³ This anonymous Writer is no other than *Seeliger*, whose Mistakes for the most Part, *Meursius* is fit unhappily followed, and taken Pains to confute the rest, conceiving him some antient Author. ⁴ Lib. 10. 1. ⁵ Lib. 12. ⁶ Lib. 10. 1. ⁷ In Epist. ⁸ De Nat. Deor. 1. 25. ⁹ Loc. Cit. ¹⁰ Adv. Col. 1. 2. ¹¹ In Epist. ¹² Lib. 10. 13. ¹³ In Epist. ¹⁴ De Nat. Deor. 1. 26. ¹⁵ Adv. Col. 2. ¹⁶ Strom. 1. 1. ¹⁷ Adv. Mat. 1. ¹⁸ Loc. Cit. ¹⁹ De Nat. Deor. 1. 1. 26. ²⁰ Adv. Col. 2.

instead of *Democritus*, even from this, that *Plutarch* adds, That *Epicurus* stole all his Opinions from him; which was the common Objection concerning *Democritus*, as shall be shewn hereafter.

I should mention also *Metrodorus*, whom *Stobaeus* calls, *μετροδωρος*, his Interpreter; *Doctorem*, the Master of *Epicurus*; and should suspect he were the same with him, whom *Solinus* makes Contemporary with *Digenes* the Cynick; did not the Opinion, attributed to him of the Infinity of Worlds, and of Atoms, argue, that this was *Metrodorus the Chian*, Disciple of *Democritus*, whom *Epicurus* might have, not as *Doctorem*, a Teacher by Word of Mouth; but as *Ductorem*, a Leader by Writing.

Thus also is *Lucian* to be taken, when he saith sportingly, that *Epicurus* was Disciple to *Democritus*, making him to be Disciple of *Aristippus* also, by reason of his Opinion of Pleasure, wherein yet there was a great Difference between them, as we shall shew in its due Place. But notwithstanding all we have alledged, *Cicero*, *Plutarch*, *Empiricus*, and others, write, that *Epicurus* used to boast, That he never had any Master, but was *αυτοδιδασκαλος*, his own Teacher, and attained Philosophy by his own Wit and Industry. And though they seem to mention this, not without some Disparagement of him, yet it will easily be granted, that he found out many things of himself, since this was that wherein he took most Delight at his last End; and withal, seeing he writ so many Books, filled only with his own Sayings, as we shall shew hereafter. And indeed *Athenaeus*, delivering in an Epigram an excellent Sentence of his, concludes, as if *Epicurus* learnt it not from any other, than from the Muses and *Apollo*. Hither also conduce these Commendations of *Laertius*:

Dispensing Gifts acquir'd by his own Breast ;
And,

He rou'd his Soul to break the narrow Bonds
Which fatter Nature ———

And others of the same kind.

As for those whom *Epicurus* particularly esteemed, *Laertius* (citing *Diocles*) affirms, he was chiefly addicted to *Anaxagoras*, (though in some things he contradicted him) and *Archelaus*, who was Master to *Socrates*. Of *Democritus* we shall speak hereafter. I only add, that *Epicurus* much admiring the Conversation of *Pyrrho*, continually question'd his Disciple *Nauphranes* concerning him; as *Laertius* saith in the Life of *Pyrrho*.

CHAP. V.

When, and upon what Occasion, he addicted himself to Philosophy, and instituted a Sect.

SUIDAS saith, That he began to apply himself to Philosophy in the 12th Year of his Age, which is confirmed by others, who wrote his Life, as *Laertius* relates. But *Epicurus* himself (alleged by the same *Laertius*) attesteth, That he did not addict himself to Philosophy till he was fourteen Years old. *Hermippus* (in *Laertius*) saith, that, lighting accidentally upon the Books of *Democritus*, he betook himself to Philosophy. But *Apollodorus the Epicurean*, in the First Book of the Life of *Epicurus*, affirms, he applied himself to Philosophy, upon Dislike of the Sophists and Gramurians, for that they could not explain what *Hesiod* meant by *Chaos*. *Sextus Empiricus* having related this more fully, it will not be amiss to transcribe his Words. Having proposed some Doubts concerning these Verses of *Hesiod*,

First, Chaos, next broad-breasted Earth was made,
The Seat of all ———

He adds, And some affirm, That this was the Occasion of *Epicurus's* sudden applying himself to Philosophy; for being yet very young, he asked a Grammarian who read to him [*Chaos* was first made:] Of what was *Chaos* made, if it was first made? The other answering, That it did not belong to him to teach such things, but to those who were called Philosophers. Then, saith *Epicurus*, I must go to those, for they are the Persons that know the Truth of Beings.

To omit, what some affirm, that he was, as *Hermippus* (in *Laertius*) relates, before he addicted himself to Philosophy, a Schoolmaster: And though the *Stoicks*, who were much his Enemies, reproached him, that with his Father he taught Boys for a small Stipend, and that with his Mother he went from House to House reading expiatory Prayers; I observe, that after he had applied himself to Philosophy, he instituted a School, being thirty-two Years old, as *Laertius* relates, and this first at *Mitylene*, afterwards at *Lampacum*, as may be collected from the Relation of *Suidas*, but had Disciples also from *Colophon*, as *Laertius* relates.

Returning to *Athens* in the 36th or 37th Year of his Age, He a-while discoursed (saith *Laertius*) of Philosophy in publick with others, but afterwards instituted a *Sect* in private, denominated from him. At first indeed, admiring the Doctrine of *Democritus*,

he

^a Eccl. Phys. 1.

^b Lib. 10. 14.

^c Cap. 1.

^d Ibid.

^e Locis citatis.

^f Adv. Phys. l. 2.

^g Apud Laert. l. 10.

^h Loc. Cit.

ⁱ Loc. Cit.

^j Ibid.

^k Lib. 9. 64.

^l Ibid.

^m In Epici

ⁿ Lib. 2.

he professed himself a *Democritian*, as *Plutarch* * relates; but afterwards, for that he changed or added many things, his Followers were from him called *Epicureans*.

CHAP. VI.

His School.

Whereas other Professors of Sects made choice of particular Places in *Athens*, as the *Academy*, the *Lycæum*, and the like, he purchased a very pleasant Garden, for fourscore *Minæ*, where he lived with his Friends and Disciples, and taught Philosophy. Thus, amongst others, * *Laertius*, citing *Apollodorus*, *Pliny* † writes, that *Epicurus* first brought into *Athens*, the Custom of having under the Name of *Hortus*, a Garden, the Delights of Fields and Country Mansions within the City itself; whereas, until his Time, 'twas not the Fashion to have those Kinds of Mansions (*Rura*) in Towns.

Hence we may conjecture, that this was the Place which † *Pausanias* reports to have been called, even in his time, the *Gardens*; adding, That there was in it a Statue of *Venus*, made by *Alcamenes*, one of the most eminent things in *Athens*, (as may be gather'd also from † *Lucian*) and that the Temple of *Venus*, with the Statue of celestial *Venus*, did join to it. This Garden is often mention'd in the plural Number by † *Cicero*, † *Juvenal*, and others, and sometimes diminutively, *Hortulus*, as *Virgil*; but howsoever it be us'd, it is commonly taken for the Sect or Doctrine deliver'd in that Place by *Epicurus* and his Scholars. When *Seneca* *Empiricus* calls the *Epicureans* the *Philosophers of the Garden*, (as the *Stoicks*, the *Philosophers of the Stoa* or *Cloister*) and *Apollodorus* being in his Time the Master of the Garden, was, as *Laertius* affirms, called *κηρυτρεγος*, the *Garden King*.

Besides this Garden, which, with Houses belonging to it, joined upon the City, *Epicurus* had a House in *Mitie*, which was a Town of the *Cecropian* Tribe, as † *Suidas* affirms, inhabited by *Phileus*, one of the Ancestors of *Epicurus*, as was formerly said, having (according to † *Phavorinus*) a famous Temple dedicated to *Hercules*. Hither *Epicurus* sometimes retir'd with his Disciples, and at last bequeathed it to his Successors, as we shall declare hereafter.

CHAP. VII.

How he lived with his Friends.

Epicurus after his Return to *Athens*, at what Time *Anaxiarces* was Archon, went only twice or

thrice to *Ionia* to visit his Friends, but lived all the rest of his time at *Athens*, unmarried; nor would ever forsake his Country, though at that time reduc'd to great Extremities, as † *Laertius* observes. The worst of which was when *Demetrius* besieged *Athens*, about the 44th Year of *Epicurus's* Age. How great a Famine at that time oppress'd the City, is describ'd by † *Plutarch*. But it is observable, that having related a Story of the Contest between a Father and his Son, about a dead Mouse which had fallen from the Top of a House; he adds, *They say that Epicurus the Philosopher sustain'd his Friends with Beans, which he shared equally amongst them.*

Epicurus therefore lived all the rest of his Time at *Athens*, together with so many Friends and Disciples, whom he conversed with, and instructed, as that whole Cities were not sufficient to contain them (they are the Words of † *Laertius*) who resorted to him, not only from *Greece*, but all other Parts, and lived with him in his Gardens, as he cites out of † *Apollodorus*; but especially from *Asia*, and particularly from *Lampyræum* and from *Egypt*, as may be collected out of † *Plutarch*. Of the Temperance and Frugality of his Diet we shall speak hereafter. As to his living with his Friends, it is remarkable what *Diocles* in *Laertius*, and others, relate, That *Epicurus* did not, as *Pythagoras*, who said the Goods of Friends ought to be in common, appoint them to put their Estates into one joint Stock, (for that imply'd a Distrust, not a Friendship) but that any one upon occasion should be freely supply'd by the rest. This will appear more manifest hereafter. In the mean time, we must not omit an eminent Place of † *Cicero*: "Neither (*sait he*) did *Epicurus* approve " Friendship in Discourse only, but much more by " Life, Actions, and Manners, which how great a " thing it is, the Fables of the Ancients declare. " For amongst the many various Stories repeated " from utmost Antiquity, there are hardly found " three Pair of Friends from *Theseus* his Time down " to *Orestes*. But how many great Companies of " Friends, and how unanimously loving did *Epicurus* keep in one House, and that very little? " Which is done even unto this Day by the *Epicureans*." Thus *Cicero*.

Amongst the rest of his Friends, † *Laertius* mentions *Polystratus*, who seems to be the same; of whom, together with *Hippocides* another *Epicurean*, † *Valerius Maximus* gives a strange Account. I shall insert the Words of *Valerius*, the rather because they will serve to illustrate Part of *Epicurus's* Will hereafter, concerning Communication of the Goods of his Disciple. They are these: "Hither may apply " be referred *Polystratus* and *Hippocides*, Philo-

phers,

* Ad. Col. 1.

* Loc. cit.

† Lib. 19. 4.

* In Attic.

* In Imag. T. 2.

* Ad Attic. Eph. 2. 24.

* Sat. 14.

* In Lexic.

* Ibid.

* Lib. 10. 10.

* In Demetr.

* Loc. cit.

* De coc. viv.

* P. 4.

Ann. lib. 1. c. 20.

* Cap. iv. 25.

* Lib. 1. c. 8.

"phers, who, born the same Day, Followers of
"the Sect of the same Master, *Epicurus*, joined to-
"gether in the common Possession of Estate and
"Maintenance of that School, died very old, in the
"same Moment of time. So equal a Society of
"Fortune and Friendship, who thinks not to have
"been begotten, bred, and ended, in the Bosom of
"celestial Concord?" Thus be.

C H A P. VIII.

His Friends and Disciples.

Being now to give a Catalogue of the chiefest of
his Friends and Disciples, we must not, in the
first place, pass by the three Brethren of *Epicurus*,
mentioned in the Beginning; for they by his Advice
studied Philosophy with him, as *Philodemus* (in "*La-
ertius*") affirms. * *Plutarch* adds, That they took in
the Philosophy of their Brother, as greedily as if they
had been divinely inspir'd, believing and professing
from their first Youth, That there was not any Man
wiser than *Epicurus*. The most eminent of the
Three was *Neocles*: He declaring from a Boy,
That his Brother was the wisest of Mortals; added,
as a Wonder, That his Mother could contain so
many and so great Atoms, as, by their Convection,
made up such a wife Man, as * *Plutarch* relates.
Hence it appearing that *Neocles* followed not any
Philosophy of his own, but that of his Brother, I
know not why * some affirm, that he introduced a
Sect like that of his Brother, unless perhaps they
ground it upon that Place of * *Suidas*, where he
saith that *Neocles* writ concerning his Sect. But
who sees not it may be understood, that he writ
concerning the Sect which he himself professed, but was
instituted by another, especially for that there is no-
thing said any where of the Sect of the *Neoclidæ*.

Observe by the way, that this Saying (*καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν
ζῆν ἐσθλόν*) which * *Plutarch* oppugns, and is brought
in amongst the proverbial Speeches) did belong to
this *Neocles*, as the same * *Suidas* affirmeth.

To his Three Brethren may be added those Three
Friends, who (as we read in * *Seneca*) became great
Persons through the Conversation of *Epicurus*.

Metrodorus is to be first nam'd; for he was, as
* *Cicero* saith, almost another *Epicurus*. * *Strabo*
plainly declareth he was of *Lampfacum*. For where-
as *Laertius* seems to say he was an *Athenian*, the
Place is very corrupt; especially seeing it is manifest
he was not an *Athenian*, from this Antithesis of * *Ci-
cero*: How much was *Epicurus* happier for being in
his Country, than *Metrodorus* for being at Athens;
because Athens was not the Country of *Metrodorus*.

The Text of * *Laertius* is this: "He had many
"Disciples; but the most eminent were *Metrodorus*,
" * *Anaxagoras*, and *Timocrates*, and *Sandes a Lampfa-
"cene*, who from his first Acquaintance with the
"Man, never left him," &c. For my part I am
of Opinion, that these Words * *Ἀναξαγόρας, ὁ Τίμακρος,
καὶ Σάνδης* should be quite expunged; for if you
take them away, the rest joins together very well;
if you admit them, they will not hang together: for
it was *Metrodorus* that was indeed a *Lampfacene*, and
with whom all the rest that follows agreeth; not
Sundes, whom; besides other things, it is false, that
Epicurus should mention in his Will. And though
* *Cassaubon* conceives, that * *Ἀσπάζιος* may be the pro-
per Name of a Man, yet is it strange that we hear
nothing elsewhere, as well of *Athenaeus* as of *Sandes*,
as *Epicureans*, since *Laertius* in this Place reckons up
his most eminent Disciples; but taking these away,
the Three, viz. *Metrodorus*, *Polyænus*, and *Her-
machus*, are described in a continued Series; who, as
we said, are put together by *Seneca* as most eminent.
As for *Timocrates*, he is mentioned afterwards by the
way, when he comes to name *Metrodorus* as his
Brother, and seems here to be inserted amiss. The
Occasion upon which these Names crept into the
Text I suspect to be, that, perhaps, some Transcriber
had noted in the Margin, that what was deliv-
er'd in the Text was confirmed also by *Athenaeus*
(Author of the *Deipnosophistæ*); for in him there is
something concerning the *Epicureans* and by *Timoc-
rates* (for he is also cited by *Laertius*) and by one
Sandes (perhaps *Suidas*, or some other.) That many
things have heretofore been inserted out of the
Margins into the Texts themselves by Carelessness of
the Transcribers, is most manifest.

Metrodorus therefore was by Country a *Lampfacene*
(not the same with that Friend of *Anaxagoras*, whom
* *Laertius* mentions of the same Name) born in the
12th Year of *Epicurus*'s Age; for dying in the 53d
Year of his Age, (the Coherence of the Words and
Sense makes me think it should be read *Μετὰ τὸν
ἄγωνα*) and that being the 7th before the Death of
Epicurus, who lived to the 72d Year, it is evident,
that the Year of his Birth must fall upon the 12th of
Epicurus's. From the first time that *Metrodorus* be-
came acquainted with *Epicurus*, (which might hap-
pen in the 22d Year of his Age, at what time *Epi-
curus* lived at *Lampfacum*) he never (as we began to
say out of *Laertius*) parted from him but one fix
Months, in which time he was absent at home, and
thence returned to *Epicurus*. He had a Sister, *Batis*,
whom he married to *Idomeneus*, and a Concubine
named *Leontium*. He had Children, whom *Epicu-
rus* recommended in his Will, and in the Epistle
which

* Lib. 10. 3. * De Amor. Fra. * Adv. Col. 2. * At Geneb. Lib. 2. Chronol.
* Erafm. Chil. 2. Centu. 70. * In Neocl. * Epist. 6. * De fin. lib. 2. 28. * Lib. 13. * Loc. cit. * Lib. de Co.
* In Not. ad Laert. * Lib. 11. 22. * Lib. 10.

which he writ dying; and particularly a Son, named *Epicurus*. He was a very good Man, undaunted with Troubles, or Death itself, as *Epicurus* himself in *Laertius* attests. He had the Dropsy; * for *Cornelius Celsus* writes, That whilst he was sick of that Disease, and could no longer abstain, as was convenient, from drinking; he used, after he had forborn a great while, to drink, and cast it up again. But whether it was of this Disease, or of some other, that he died, is not certain. The Books which he writ are, by *Laertius*, reckoned to be these: *Against Physicians* III. *Of the Senses*, to *Timocrates*. *Of Magnanimity*. *Of the Infamety*, if *Epicurus*. *Against the Dialecticks*. *Against the Sophists* IX. *Of the Way to Wisdom*. *Of Alteration*. *Of Riches*, which *Democritus*. *Of Nobility*. Besides which, *Plutarch* cites his Books, *Of Philosophy*. *Of the Parts*. *Against Timarchus*. Likewise *Charmus* *Ambrasius* cites a Treatise, *That the Cause of Felicity, which comes from ourselves, is greater than that which comes from other things*. But of *Metecrotrus* enough.

Polynaxus was Son of *Athenodorus*, a *Lampsacene* also. He was a great Mathematician, to use the Words of *Cicero*, and to comprize much in little: Modest and amiable, as *Philodemus* in *Laertius* saith.

Hermachus was Son of *Agemarchus*, a *Mitylenean*, his Father of mean Quality. At first he studied Rhetorick; but afterwards became so knowing in Philosophy, that *Epicurus* dying, committed the Government of the School to him. He died at *Lysias*. There is a great Mention of him in *Epicurus's* Will. His Writings, which *Laertius* commends for excellent, these. *Epistols* concerning *Empedocles*, XXII. *Of Disciplines*, (for *Cassaubon* well reads, not *Μαθηματικά*, but *Μαθηματικόν*) Two Books. *Against Plato*. *Against Aristotle*.

To these must be added *Leontius*, a *Lampsacene*, whom *Plutarch* calleth one of the most eminent Disciples of *Epicurus*; adding, That this was he who writ to *Lycophron*, that *Epicurus* honoured *Democritus*.

Moreover, *Colotes* and *Idomeneus*, *Lampsacenes* also. Of the former we shall have Occasion to speak oftner, especially because of the two Books which *Plutarch* writ against him. *Laertius* elsewhere writes, that *Menedemus* the Cynick was his Disciple, (unless perhaps there were some other *Colotes* of *Lampsacum*.) The same *Colotes* it is, who, cited by *Macrobius*, argues, that *Plato* ought not to have invented the Fable of *Erus*, because no kind of Fiction agreeth with the Professors of Truth. The later, *Idomeneus*, *Epicurus* design'd to make famous by his Letters; as indeed he did, which appears from *Sene-*

neca: "I will alledge, saith he, *Epicurus* for an Example, who writing to *Idomeneus* (then a Minister of State employ'd in great Affairs) to persuade him, from a specious kind of Life, to true settled Glory. If, saith he, you affect Glory, my Epistles will make you more famous, than all those things which you esteem, and for which you are esteemed. Who would have known *Idomeneus*, if *Epicurus* had not graved his Name in his Letters? All those Magistrates and Princes, even the King himself, from whom *Idomeneus* derived his Title, are now superseded by a deep Oblivion." Thus he. "And these (saith *Laertius*) were the more eminent Disciples."

But to these may be added two out of *Valerius*, already mentioned, *Polystratus* and *Hippolides*; especially seeing *Laertius* reckons *Polystratus* as Successor to *Hermachus*; unless the *Polystratus* who is joined to *Hippolides*, were not the same with him that succeeded *Hermachus*.

We might add *Timocrates* of *Lampsacum*, Brother of *Metecrotrus*; but he seems to have fallen off, not brooking the Reprehensions of his Brother. We shall therefore rather join to these *Mus*, the Servant of *Epicurus*, who, as *Laertius* affirms, became an eminent Philosopher; not omitted by *Agellius* and *Macrobius*, in reckoning up those, who, of Servants, became famous for Philosophy.

To omit *Apelles*, somewhere derided by *Plutarch*, we must here mention three Women, who, together with others of the same Sex, learnt Philosophy of *Epicurus*. One *Leontium*, who studied Philosophy under *Epicurus*, as *Athenæus* recites; and may also be collected from *Cicero*, who saith she wrote a Book against *Theophrastus*, in an elegant Style, and in the *Attick* Dialect. The second, *Themista*, Daughter of *Zoilus* a *Lampsacene*, Wife of the forementioned *Leontius*. Of her, besides the Testimonies which we shall hereafter alledge, *Clemens Alexandrinus* taketh express Notice. The third, *Philenis*, whom *Athenæus* affirms to have written many things; adding, that the obscene Books ascribed to her, were put forth under her Name by *Rolycrates* the Sophist, to discredit the Woman.

To these may be added *Herodotus*, to whom *Epicurus* writ a little Epitome of Physick, extant in *Laertius*; and who, amongst other things, according to the same *Laertius*, writ a Book, *Of the Youth* of *Epicurus*.

Pithecus, to whom *Epicurus* writ of superior Things; extant in *Laertius*, and who affirmed, that when he was but 18 Years old, he had not his Equal for Ingenuity in all *Greece*, as *Plutarch* relates.

Menedemus,

* Lib. 3. c. 21. † Adv. Col.
roz. In Soma. Scip. lib. 1.
De or. 1. 33. ‡ Strom. 1. 4.

§ Strom. 2.
¶ Epist. 11.
* Lib. 8. & 10.

† Acad. 3.
‡ Lib. 1. c. 12.
§ Laert. 20. 33.

¶ Lib. 20. 24.
* Satur. 1. 12.

† Adv. Col. 1. 1.
‡ Lib. 13.

§ Lib. 6.
¶ De Nob.

Menæceus, to whom *Epicurus* writ that Epistle concerning *Morality*, which is extant in *Laertius*; its Beginning recited also by *Clemens Alexandrinus*.

Timocrates, Son of *Demetrius*, a *Potamian*; and *Anonymachus*, Son of *Philocrates* of *Bate*, whom *Epicurus* made the Executors of his Will.

Nicanor, whom *Epicurus* recommended to the Care of the said Executors.

Eurydicus, one of those to whom, as *Laertius* saith, he writ Epistles.

Dositheus, and his Sons *Pyrrho* and *Hegesinax*, to whom *Epicurus* wrote a consolatory Letter upon the Death of their Father, as we find in *Plutarch*.

I omit *Polymedes*, *Antidorus*, and others, to be mentioned hereafter in treating of his Books.

CHAP. IX.

How much he wrote.

NEither did *Epicurus* spend the Time in giving his Disciples only Oral Instructions, but bestowed much Pains in composing several Books. But to understand how much he labour'd herein, by Comparison with other Philosophers, hear but *Laertius* in his * Preface: *Many things*, saith he, *Zeno* writ; *more*, *Xenophanes*; *more*, *Democritus*; *more*, *Aristotle*; *more*, *Epicurus*; *more*, *Chrysippus*. Where we see that *Epicurus*, as to Multitude of Writings, came short only of *Chrysippus*. But observe, that elsewhere * *Laertius*, to shew he may be thought to have exceeded *Chrysippus* herein, cites *Apollodorus* the *Debanian*; who, saith he, to shew that what *Epicurus* writ of himself, not borrowed from any other, did far exceed the Books of *Chrysippus*, saith expressly thus: *If a Man should take out of the Books of Chrysippus the things which he hath borrowed of others, the Paper will be left blank*. But that this may not seem strange, the same † *Laertius* elsewhere relates, that *Chrysippus*, for his Emulation of *Epicurus* in writing much, was called by *Carneades* the *Parasite of his Books*; because, if *Epicurus* writ any thing, (read *νεστω*, not *νεστω*) he would affect to write as much. Hence it came to pass, that he often wrote the same things over again, and whatsoever came next to hand, and presently thrust it in for haste without Correction; and brought in so many Testimonies of other Writers, that his Books were filled up only with them, as may be found in *Zeno* also, and *Aristotle*. Thus *Laertius* of *Chrysippus*: but of *Epicurus* not so; for † he relates, that his Volumes amounted to three hundred, in which, saith he, there is no Testimony of any other Author, but they are all the very Words of *Epicurus*. Which I observe, to shew (seeing *Epicurus* wrote so many things, * a great Writer, as he terms

him, and exceeding for multitude of Books; so as * *Origen* charging *Celsus* with Temerity, objects as a thing he conceives impossible, *There is not any of us, who, saith he, knows all that Epicurus writ*) his fluent Vein, and how he was chiefly employ'd.

CHAP. X.

What Writings of his are particularly mentioned by Authors.

HERE it is fit we give a kind of Catalogue of his Books, not of all he wrote, but of those whose Titles are extant in other Authors. I say, their Titles; for the Books themselves have so miscarried by the Injury of Time, that besides some few Compendiums preserv'd by *Laertius*, and some Fragments scatter'd up and down amongst several Writers, there is not any thing of them remaining, at least, as yet known to us.

To begin with those which * *Laertius* accounts the best, they are ranked thus:

Of Nature, XXXVII. They are sometimes cited simply, *Of Nature*; sometimes with the Number of the Books, as when *Laertius* hereafter in his Life cites the Ith, XIth, XIVth, XVth. † *Galen* also mentions the Title and Number of the Books.

Of Atoms and Vacuum, so usually cited. * *Cleomedes* seemeth to mean the same under another Name, *Of the Principles of all things*.

Of Love.

An Epitome of things appertaining to natural Philosophers. This Epitome was twofold, Great and Little; both are cited by * *Laertius*: the Lesser, that which is written to *Herodotus*.

Against the Megarick (or Dialectick) Philosophers Doubts. These Doubts seem chiefly to have concerned certain moral Arguments, as concerning Justice, Marriage, and Dower: For this seems to be the same which *Laertius* and † *Plutarch* cite under the Name of *Doubts*, without adding, *To the Megaricks*.

Kύειν δὲ τὰς, Maxims; or, as † *Cicero* interprets, *Maxime ratæ Sententiæ*; because, saith he, they are Sentences briefly express'd, which conduce exceedingly to living happily. He † elsewhere calls them *select and short Sentences*. † *Sextus* seems to call them *Memorable Sayings*. *Laertius* hath put them at the End, and † *Lucian* somewhere commends them, as † *Cicero* the Book of *Crantor*; which is, saith he, not Great indeed, but Golden, and, as *Panætius* advis'd *Tubero*, to be gotten by heart. He was in Opinion different from *Suidas*, who calls them *wicked Nations*.

* Lib. I. 16.

* Lib. v. 132.

* Lib. 10. 26.

* Ib'd.

* Ib'd.

* Adv. C. li. I. 1.

* Laert. 10.

† Comment. in 1. lib. lib. de nat. hom.

† De Nat. Dvor. 22.

* Adv. Phy. I. 1. 2.

* Lib. 2. c. 1.

† In Picusid.

* Lib. 4. Adv. 44.

† De fin. I. 2.

Περὶ ἀφαιρέσεων, Of Elections; so I conceive it ought rather to be render'd than of Sects; because in this Book *Epicurus* seems not to design a History of Sects, but moral Institution, which is conversant about the Choice of things, as *Laetius* declares at the End of *Epicurus's* Epistle to *Menæceus*. Not to mention that he teacheth the Ethick Kind to consist only of Election and Avoidance. For which reason the Book, which is ordinarily and next to this cited,

Περὶ φυγῆς, Of Plants, ought rather to be entitl'd, *Περὶ ἀποφεύξεως, Of things to be avoided*; as well for Coherence of the Title, as for that *Epicurus*, almost wholly taken up with moral Philosophy, scarce treated of any particular Subject in Physick, unless they were such as conduced to take away vain Terrors from the Minds of Men; of which Kind, this of *Plants* could not be. Moreover, because in Manuscripts this Title is connected to the former by the Conjunction &, we may conjecture that the Inscription was, *Περὶ ἀφαιρέσεων & ἀποφεύξεως*; or under a single Title, *Περὶ ἀφαιρέσεων, & φυγῆς; Of Election and Avoidance*. Yet might the Inscription have been in the plural Number, so far as much as it is afterwards said, *Elections and Avoidances are judicated from Pleasure and Grief*.

Of the End; so this Book is generally cited, as amongst others, by *Plutarch*. Neither doth *Cicero* seem to mean any other, though he cite a Book, *Of the Ends of Good and Evil*.

Of the Criteri, or the Canon; or, as *Cicero* translates it, *Of the Rule, and of Judgment*. But if instead of Judgment we render it Judicatory, the Force of the Word will be more fully express'd.

Chæredemus; or, *Of the Gods*. This is one of those Books which *Epicurus* entituled by the Names of his Brethren and Friends, that, being dead, their Names might not be forgotten, as *Plutarch* observes.

Of Sanctity, or Hegesianax. This perhaps is he, whom *Plutarch* terms *Hegesianax*; concerning whose Death, *Epicurus* wrote to his Parents; unless perhaps it were he who wrote Histories, and *Trœica*, cited by *Athenæus*; for he was of *Alexandria*, and *Epicurus* had Friends out of *Egypt*.

Of Lives, IV. Which is all one as if the Inscription had been, *Of Life and Manners*. Neither doth *Epicurus* seem in these Books to relate the Story of some eminent Persons, as *Plutarch* and *Laetius* have done in their Books of *Lives*, but to give Rules whereby to lead a quiet Life; as may plainly enough be collected from the Catalogue of the moral Treatises, and the Places cited out of this by *Laetius*. The word *Lives* seems here to be taken in the same Sense as with *Plutarch*, when he speaketh of the *Difference of Lives and Politicks*, which the Inter-

preter well renders, *Of Manners and publick Institutes*. Of these Books are hereafter cited by *Laetius* the first and second.

Of Just Action.

Neocles to Themista. This seems to have been that *Neocles* who was Brother to *Epicurus*, not his Father; for in like manner he called other of his Books after the Names of his Brothers.

The Banquet, cited by *Plutarch*, *Athenæus*, and others. *Plutarch* mentions Questions handled in it, concerning the Heat of Wine, the Time of Coition. *Laetius*, concerning Troubles about Marriage, &c.

Eurylochus to Metrodorus. I guess that this *Eurylochus* was the same with that *Eurylochus*, to whom, as we said formerly, *Epicurus* writ; but the thing is uncertain.

Of Seeing.

Of the Angle, which is in the Atom.

Of Teaching; or perhaps, *Of the Tangibility of Atoms*: for *Epicurus* called Vacuum τὸ ἀσάφη, that which cannot be touched.

Of Fate.

Of Passions, Sentences to Timocrates.

Προγνωστικόν, Præcognitorium; so I render it, because he seemeth in this to have discours'd of the Præcognitive Faculty.

Protreptick (Exhortatory) that is, *Discourse*; for so *Isocrates* and *Clemens* expressly.

Of Images, εἰδωλα, Simulacra, Imagines, Speciei, Formæ, Species; so several Persons variously interpret them, which are now commonly termed *Intentional Species*.

Of Phantasy, or the Impression thereof, which appeareth in the knowing Faculty; for neither did *Epicurus*, nor most of the ancient Philosophers, understand by this Word, as we now for the most part do, the Faculty itself.

Aristobolus; this Book bears the Name of *Epicurus's* third Brother.

Of Music, viz. as it conduceth to Manners; for this may be collected from *Plutarch* and *Empiricus*.

Of Gifts and Gratitude, mentioned by *Empiricus*, who cites something grammatical out of it.

Polymedes. He seems to have been some Friend or Disciple of *Epicurus*.

Timocrates, III. Whether meaning the Brother of *Metrodorus*, or the Executor of his Will, or some other. Hence I should believe, that by *Laetius* was cited the third Book of *Timocrates*, or written by *Timocrates*; but that instead of *Τιμοκράτης*, I suspect it should be written *Τιμοκράτης*, relating to the third

^a Laert. ibid.
^b In Lycurgo.
^c Adv. col. 2.

^d Adv. col. 2.
^e Symp. quest. 1. 1.
^f Adv. Math.

^g De Nat. Deor. 1. c. 16.
^h Deipn. 5.
ⁱ Adv. Gram.

^k De oc. viv.
^l Adv. col. 1. Symp. quest. 3. 3.

^m Adv. col. 2.

ⁿ Lib. 3. & 9.
^o Apud Laert. 10. 28.

third Book, which, by *Epicurus*, was so entitled. This the Text seems to confirm.

Metrodorus, V. That this was the same *Metrodorus*, of whom we have spoken formerly, cannot be doubted. From the first Book, cited by *Laertius*, may be collected, that *Epicurus* related the Story of *Metrodorus*'s Life.

Antidorus, II. This *Antidorus* is mention'd by *Plutarch*, and perhaps by *Laertius* also, in the Life of *Heracleides*, if we there read *Antidorus* for *Autodorus*.

Ἡεὶς ἰσὺν δὲξαι οὖς Μίθρην, *Of the South Winds, Sentences to Mithres*. But perhaps the Title ought rather to be read, οὖς νόσων, *Of Diseases*, as well for the Reasons alledged about the Title οὖς οὐρανῶν, as for that these Sentences seem not to have been several Opinions concerning some particular Winds, as moral Sentences to moderate the Pain of Diseases. This seems to be the same *Mithres*, a *Syrian*, whom *Metrodorus* relieved, as *Plutarch* hath several times deliver'd; and the same whom *Laertius* relates to have been the Steward of *Lyfimachus*'s House; adding, that *Mithres* saying to *Theodorus*, Thou seemest not only not to acknowledge Gods, but Kings also: *Theodorus* reply'd, How can I but acknowledge Gods, who think thee an Enemy to the Gods?

Callistolas; who, it may be presumed, was some Friend of *Epicurus*'s.

Of a Kingdom, mention'd by *Plutarch*.

Aneximenes; perhaps the same *Lampiscene* who is mention'd by *Strabo*, and whom both *Plutarch* and *Laertius* seem to mean; for though he were one of *Alexander*'s Masters, yet did he survive him, (for he wrote his Actions) and was, according to *Suidas*, Disciple to *Diogenes the Cynick*, and consequently younger than he; whereas *Diogenes* died in the eighteenth Year of *Epicurus*'s Age, viz. in the Beginning of the 114th Olympiad.

Epistles. Of these, four are extant in *Laertius*; one to *Herodotus*, which was, as we said, the lesser Epitome, and under that Name cited by *Achilles Tattius*, *Of natural things*. The second to *Pythacles*, *Of Meteors*, or superior things, as well celestial, as all others above the Earth. The third to *Menæceus*, *Of Manners*. The last is very short, which he writ, dying, to *Idomeneus*. That, besides these, he writ innumerable others, may be collected from *Plutarch*, *Laertius*, and others. For *Plutarch*, for Example, cites an Epistle of his, To *Anaxarchus*; *Laertius* his Epistle, To *Arifobolus*; also an Epistle, To his Friends at Mytilene. This seems to be the same with that which *Sextus Empiricus* cites thus, To the Philosophers at Mytilene. But *Laertius* im-

plieth, there were more which bore that Inscription, Ἐν τῷ οὖς καὶ ἐν Μιθρῶνι φιλοσόφῳ; so as there might be one of them supposititious. In the same Rank may be reckon'd his Epistles concerning several Institutions of Life, hinted by *Laertius*, cited by *Athenæus* and *Eusebius*. I omit that the same *Athenæus* mentions his Epistles to *Hermachus*; and not to enquire after any more, the highest in Repute were those written to *Idomeneus*, as we may understand from *Seneca*, who also citeth something excellent out of his Epistles to *Polyæmus*. Amongst those to *Idomeneus* was that, out of which *Michael Apollolius* cites a Fragment, containing the Original of the Proverb, These shall be to thee both Pythian and Delian, apply'd to those that shall die within a short time; though *Erasmus* affirms the Proverb itself to be cited out of *Menander*.

As to the Epistles, we shall by the way observe, that *Epicurus* used to write, by way of Salutation in the Beginning of his Epistles, sometimes χαίρειν, Joy; sometimes ἐν περὶ ἡμῶν, well to do; sometimes ἐν διαγνῆναι, sometimes ἀνδραγαθῶν, well to live; ὑγιαίνειν, Health. For that which we read in *Laertius*, ἡ ἐν τῷ δὲξασθαι ἀντὶ τοῦ χαίρειν, ἐν περὶ ἡμῶν ἀνδραγαθῶν, is defective; there seems some Word wanting to the Sentence; neither doth the word δέσσειν seem to belong to the Form of Salutation. And besides, these Words, ἀντὶ τοῦ, exclude χαίρειν from the *Epicurean* Form of Salutation; whereas this Word is not only put before his Epistles, extant in *Laertius*, but it is render'd by *Cicero* also, when he alledgeth that which he wrote at his Death. For this Reason, when heretofore I would, in the room of these two Words, have put ἰσθῆναι, (as a less Alteration than if I should have substituted πρὸ ἡμῶν, or the like) the learned *Putæmus* approved it; but withal conceived δέσσειν ought to be retained: But the excellent *Menagius* was of Opinion, that since a Word is wanting, for δέσσειν should be read ὑγιαίνειν, used on the like Occasion by *Laertius*; but that ἀντὶ τοῦ ought to be retained, forasmuch as *Epicurus* seemeth not to have used the Word χαίρειν, it being mentioned as proper to *Cleon*, both by *Lucian* and *Laertius* himself. Or whether instead of δέσσειν might we not put ἀρεσχεσθαι, or, with the least Alteration, ἀρεσσειν; signifying, that for Salutation, he was best pleas'd with these Words, ἐν περὶ ἡμῶν, and ἀνδραγαθῶν, or might not ἀντὶ τοῦ be retained, implying, that he did not quite cast aside the word χαίρειν, but instead of it sometimes used the other two, as it ποῦν were either wanting or imply'd. Indeed *Lucian* seems not obscurely to hint as much, when relating that *Epicurus* was extremely delighted with the

* Adv. col. 1. * Lib. 5. 22. * Adv. col. 28. * Lib. 10. * Adv. col. 2. * Lib. 14. * In Plin. 1.
* Lib. 1. 31. * In Phæn. Arat. * Adv. col. 1. * Lib. 7. 9. * Lib. 10. 7. * Adv. Matth. 1. * In
Protag. lib. 9. * Deign. 8. * De Præp. lib. 15. * Deign. 13. * Epist. 15. * Cent. 16. Parm. 95. * In 1.
24. * De fin. 3. 30. * De Lap. in Salut. * Lib. 3. 61. * Lib. 2.

word *χαίρειν*, he adds, that sometimes he used other Words, and that sometimes in his more accurate and profound Epistles, (which yet, he saith, were not many) or when he writ to his most intimate Friends, he chiefly used *ὕμνηεν*. *Laertius* therefore attributing the word *ὕμνηεν* to him, may as well be thought to have intended *χαίρειν* as used by him; since attributing *ὕμνηεν* to him also, he makes *ὕμνηεν* as peculiar to *Plato*, as *χαίρειν* to *Clean*.

This Catalogue of his Books is compiled by *Laertius*: But besides these, there are others, cited both by *Laertius* himself, and other Writers. *Laertius* formerly cited his Book, *Of Rhetoric*, mentioned also by the Scholiast of *Hermogenes*. But that which is cited, *Of Perspicuity requisite to Discourse*, belongs to *Cannick*, which he substituted in the room of *Dialectick*.

He likewise seems to cite his *Προγύσματα*, *Antecedentia*, or *Præcipua*; things precedent or preferred, in the Sense of the *Sticks*. I should think it meant of some of the Books before cited, if amongst them there were any, wherein that which is alleged were written by *Epicurus*.

There are cited also *Stœchiastes*, *Institutions* or *Elements*, XII.

There seems also to be cited, *Of Worlds*, XII. For, describing several Worlds, he is said to have done it in the XIIth *αἰώνων*, or, as the Manuscripts, *αἰώνων*, upon this very Subject; the rather, because it seems not meant of those XXXVII which are constantly cited, *Of Nature*.

I should add his *Physical Problems* and *Ethical Doctrines*; but that under these Names may be comprised, all that *Epicurus* wrote concerning *Nature* and *Morality*.

Moreover, *Cicero* cites his Book, *Of the chief God*; unless it be the same with that, *Of the End*, already mentioned.

By the same also is cited his Book, *Of Pleasure*: This perhaps *Laertius* meant, when he said, It was objected by some against *Epicurus*, that he usurped the Treatise of *Aristippus* concerning Pleasure, as if it had been his own.

Besides these, *Cicero* cites his Book, *Of Piety towards the Gods*, distinct, as it seems, from that *Of Sanctity* reckon'd by *Laertius*. *Of Sanctity*, saith he, *Of Piety towards the Gods*, he wrote Books.

Again, *Plutarch* declares that he wrote Books against *Theophrastus*; for the second of them, he faith, contained a Discourse concerning Colours. Hitherto of his Books.

CHAP. XI.

His Will.

EPICURUS having employed his Life in teaching and writing, and being now grown old, made, as the Custom was, his Will; which being preserv'd entire by *Laertius*, we shall not need to have Recourse to those Fragments of it, which lie dispers'd in *Cicero*, and other Writers. It was in this Form.

" Thus I bequeath; I give all my Estate to *Amynomachus*, Son of *Philocrates*, of *Batis*, (a Town of the *Ægean* Tribe, as *Hesychius* describes it) and to *Timocrates* Son of *Demetrius*, a *Potamian*, (of *Potamus*, a Town belonging to the *Leontian* Tribe, *Phavorin.*) according to the Donation which hath already been made, and is recorded among the Deeds in the *Metroum*, (a Temple of the great Goddess at *Athens*, seated upon the Haven, in God's the Laws, Judgments, and other Acts were preserved, as *Athenæus*, *Suidas*, and others affirm) with this Condition, that they bestow the Garden, and all that belongs to it, on *Hermachus*, Son of *Ayemarchus*, a *Mitylenian*, and those that shall study Philosophy with him; and on those whom *Hermachus* shall leave his Successors in Philosophy, and to those who shall succeed us in the Profession of Philosophy, for ever. And that it may be preserved with all possible Care, I assign the School to *Amynomachus* and *Timocrates*, and to their Heirs, according to the surest Form of Law, that they may keep the Garden, and deliver it to those who shall profess Philosophy after us. The House which is at *Melite*, let *Amynomachus* and *Timocrates* deliver to *Hermachus*, and to those that study Philosophy with him, to dwell in it as long as he shall live. Of the Revenues made over by us to *Amynomachus* and *Timocrates*, let them set apart as much as shall be sufficient (advising with *Hermachus*) to celebrate the Exequies of my Father, Mother, and Brethren; and to keep, as they have done hitherto, my Birth-day, in the first Decad of the Month *Gamelion*; as also to provide a Feast for Entertainment of all those who study Philosophy with us, every Month on the twentieth Day of the Moon, in Commemoration of us, and of *Metrodorus*. Let them also keep a Day in Memory of my Brethren in the Month *Posideon*, as we used to do; and another to *Polyæus*, in the Month *Metagitnion*. Let *Amynomachus* and *Timocrates* take care of *Epicurus*, Son of *Metrodorus*, and of the Son of *Polyæus*; and let them study

* Tusc. 3. 13.

* De divin. 2. 27.

* De nat. deor. 1. 41.

* Lib. 10. 16.

* In Lex.

* Ibid.

"Philosophy, and live with *Hermachus*. In like manner, let them take care of the Daughter of *Metrodorus*; and so soon as she shall be marriageable, bestow her upon him of the Students of Philosophy, whom *Hermachus* shall chuse, provided he be modest, and obedient to *Hermachus*. Let *Amynomachus* and *Timocrates*, out of our Revenues, bestow yearly so much as shall be sufficient for their Maintenance, with the Consent of *Hermachus*. For let them so esteem *Hermachus*, having an equal Share in our Revenues, and grown old in studying Philosophy under us, and left by us Guide of those that studied Philosophy under us, that all things be done by his Advice. As for her Portion, when she shall come to be marriageable, let *Amynomachus* and *Timocrates* take as much as they shall think convenient, with the Consent of *Hermachus*. Likewise, let them take the same Care of *Nicanor* as we did, that all they who, studying Philosophy with us, have communicated the Use of their Estates, and expressing all Friendship, have chosen to grow old with us in Philosophy, want not any Necessaries to the utmost of our Power. All my Books I bequeath to *Hermachus*; but if any thing of Mortality happen to *Hermachus*, before the Children of *Metrodorus* arrive at full Age, let *Amynomachus* and *Timocrates* take care, that all Necessaries be decently provided for them, as much as shall be necessary, out of the Revenues left by us. Let all the rest be divid'd as we have appointed, as much as is possible. I manumit of my Servants, *Mus*, *Licias*, *Lycon*. *Phaedia* also I set free."

C H A P. XII.

The Manner of his Death.

AS concerning his last Sickness and Death, we must know that *Epicurus* was of a Constitution not very strong. This is implied even by the Title of the Book written by a *Metrodorus*, *Of the Infirmity (or Unhealthfulness) of Epicurus*. It is implied also by the envious Exaggeration of *Suidas*, that *Epicurus* could not endure to put on his Cloaths, nor to rise out of Bed, nor to look upon the Sun, and the Fire, and the like. These may at least persuade, that *Epicurus* was of a Complexion not strong; and as in the whole Course of his Life, he had not a constant Health, so at last he died of a painful Disease, the Stone, whereof it is probable he had many Fits. *Laertius*, out of *Hermachus*, in his Epistles, relates that he died of the Stone, stopping his Urine, having lain sick 14 Days.

It is memorable, that being near Death, he writ

that Epistle which *Laertius* mentions, as written to *Idomeneus*; ⁴ *Cicero*, to *Hermachus*; perhaps it was sent to both, because of the *τὸ ὑμῖν*; or to *Idomeneus*, rather than to *Hermachus*, because the Children of *Metrodorus* were sufficiently recommended to *Hermachus*, by his Will. Moreover, it is not likely that *Hermachus*, his next Successor, was absent at that time, especially seeing he sent a Relation of *Epicurus*'s Death in Letters; not to press, that he from his Youth was more addicted to Rhetoric than Philosophy, as appeareth from *Laertius*. The Epistle is this.

"Leading a most happy Life, and withal dying, we writ this to you, seized by the Strangury, and Dyfentery, beyond Expression; but all these were counterpoised by the Joy of Mind, which I conceive in remembering our Discourses and Inventions. But thou, as becomes the Good-will which thou hast had from thy Youth to me and Philosophy, take care of the Children of *Metrodorus*."

⁵ *Laertius* adds, (out of *Hermippus*) that *Epicurus* went into a Bath of warm Water, called for Wine, drank it off, and exhorting his Friends to be mindful of his Doctrine, whilst he was discoufing, died. Upon which *Laertius* hath this Epigram:

*Farewel, and bear my Doctrine in your Minds,
Said dying Epicurus to his Friends:
Into a warm Bath going, Wine he quafft,
And then from Pluto took a colder Draught.*

C H A P. XIII.

The Time of his Death.

E P I C U R U S died in the 2d Year of the 127th Olympiad, *Pytharatus* being Archon. After *Strabon* ⁶ *Laertius* cites out of *Apollodorus*'s Chronology, *Casaubon* rightly reads *ἔτι μὲν ἐστὶν ἀπομνημονεύματα τῶν Ὀλυμπιάδων*; for in the ordinary reading *ἔτι μὲν* being wanting, who could imagine that *Epicurus*, born in the 109th Olympiad, could die in the 107th? And indeed, the 72d Year of *Epicurus*, in which he is said to have died, falls upon the 127th Olympiad.

The Month and Day of the Year, in which *Epicurus* died, is told by *Clemens Alexandrinus*, who saith, that *Antiochus*, from the Time of *Pythagoras* to the Death of *Epicurus*, reckoned 312 Years, adding, that the Death of *Epicurus* happened on the 10th Day of the Month *Gamelion*. Where observe, if the Time of *Pythagoras* be reckoned from the 60th Olympiad, in which *Laertius* saith he flourished; there will be found to be but 270 Years from thence to the Death of *Epicurus*, and consequently the Account

¹ *Laert.* l. 10. 24.² *In Lex.*³ *c.* 10. 15.⁴ *De fin.* l. 2. 30.⁵ *Loc. Cit.*⁶ *Lib.* 10. 15.⁷ *Strom.* l. 1.

count of *Antiochus* will fall short 42 Years. Wherefore this *Antiochus* must be taken from the Birth of *Pythagoras*, who began to flourish in the 40th Year of his Age.

Now whereas *Apollodorus* saith, that *Epicurus* lived 72 Years, which is confirmed also by *Cicero*, saying, *It always was true, that Epicurus shall dye, having lived 72 Years; Pythagoras being Archoi; (whence some conjecture, Epicurus died in his Climacterical Year, which is commemorated by 9.) the last, or 72d Year, is not to be understood as complicated, for Epicurus had but newly enter'd into it, there being but three Days over and above the 71 Years; for he was born on the 7th, and dy'd on the 15th, of the Month Gamelion, there being, between the Time of his Birth and his Death, 18 compleat Olympiads, except one Year. Wherefore, this is in the same manner, as when Pliny, Lucian, and Censorinus affirm the Sicilian (or Leontine) Gorgias did live 108 Years; whereas Cicero, and Valerius Maximus* say, he completed but 107. Here is observable, the Comparison which Plutarch makes between Epicurus and Gorgias; for after he had said that Alexis, the Comick Poet, (Son of Menander, and Father of Stephanus the Comick Poet, as Suidas relates) lived double the Time of Metrodorus, that is 106 Years, Metrodorus living, according to Laertius, 53. he adds, that Gorgias the Sophist outlived Epicurus, πλεον ἢ διπλοῦν, more than one third; for if we take the Number 36, it will be the same which Epicurus lived double, Gorgias treble; and whereas Plutarch says more, perhaps he reflected upon the Opinion which Quintilian and Suidas afterwards followed, that Gorgias lived 109 Years.*

I see not why the Interpreter of *Clement Alexandrinus* should render *Gamelion* *October*; for though there be some Controversy about the Order of the Greek Months, yet shall we not find any but make *Gamelion* the 6th, 7th, or 8th, from *Hecateμβæon*; which seeing it cannot begin higher than *June*, certainly *Gamelion* will be far distant from *October*. But since by many Arguments it is evinced, that *Gamelion* is the 7th from *Hecateμβæon*, it ought rather to be reduced to *January*. Now because the 2d Year of the 127th Olympiad began in Summer, in the 4443d Year of the Julian Period, the *Gamelion* of that Year must fall upon *January*, in the Beginning of the 4444th Year of the Julian Period. Upon what Day of *January* the 10th of *Gamelion* might fall, it is not easy to determine. But if we may make *Gamelion* commence (as is done in the time of the Nativity,) from the 14th Moon, or from the 7th Full Moon, after the Summer Solstice, forasmuch as the New Moon happened upon the 30th of

December, and consequently the 14th Moon upon the 12th of *January*; hereupon, if we make that the 1st of *Gamelion*, the 10th will fall upon the 21st of *January*, upon which the Death of *Epicurus* might fall. Where we must further observe, that whereas *Epicurus* is said to have lived 72 Years, it must be understood of the Grecian Years, not Julian, for so it would fall short two Days, it being already proved, he was born the 23d of *January*. Now to reduce the Death of *Epicurus* to our Account is easy: For if we subtract ten Days, and for the Cycle of the Sun that Year which is 20, and, for the Dominical Letter D, according to the Old Style, put G, according to our own, it will appear that *Epicurus* died the 31st of *January*, it being the 4th Day of the Week, or *Wednesday*, before the Computation of Christ 270 Years.

CHAP. XIV.

How dear his Memory was to his Followers.

IT remains that we briefly tell how the Memory of *Epicurus*, after his Death, was respected by his Followers. For to omit that his Country honoured him with brazen Statues, as Laertius writes, I observe, that the Set-Days and Ceremonies appointed in his Will were punctually kept by his Followers. Pliny, (writing 350 Years after upon this thing) On his Birth-day, saith he, the twentieth Moon, they sacrifice, and keep Feasts every Month, which they call *Icades*; whence it may be conceived, that the Epicureans were by Greek Writers, as Athenæus, termed *ἱκαδίσται*, from observing *ἱκαδίας*, as Rhodiginus also takes notice. Although some there are who think they were called *Icadistæ*, from *ἱκαῖ*, an Image, because there was not one of them but had the Picture of *Epicurus*. And of these Images, Pliny also thus; They keep (saith he) the Countenance of *Epicurus* in their Chambers, and carry it up and down with them: And Cicero, in the Person of *Atticus*, "Neither, saith he, can we forget *Epicurus* of any Man; whose Representation we have not only in Pictures, but in Cups, and Rings also." There are a who add, that "some took great care to have Pictures of *Epicurus*, not only in Rings, but in Cups, as conceiving it a fortunate Omen to the Nation, and their own Name." As for the Affection which they bare to him, hear *Varro*, *Honori*, saith Cicero, "Office, Right of Wills, the Authority of *Epicurus*, the Attestation of *Phædrus*, the Seat, House, Footsteps of excellent Persons, he saith, that he must preserve; But especially Torquatus. "Owe we not much to him, saith he, who, as if

b De Fato. c Lib. 7. cap. 48. d In Macrobo. e De Die Nat. f In Cat. Majore. g Lib. 8. cap. 13. h De Ont. Def. i In Lex. j Lib. 10. 15. k Lib. 3. cap. 1. l In Lex. m Hermetus. n Lib. 10. 9. o Lib. 35. cap. 2. p Lib. 7. 15. q Rivier. r Lect. Citat. s De fin. 2. 7. t Alex. ab Alex. 2. 19. u Epist. 15. 1. v De fin. 1.

"he had heard the Voice of Nature herself, did so firmly and soundly comprehend her, as that he brought all ingenious Persons into the way of a peaceful, calm, quiet, happy Life?" And "again, Who, faith he, I think only saw Truth, and freed the Minds of Men from the greatest Errors, and delivered all things pertaining to well and happy living."

And because Epicurus dying, advised his Friends to be mindful of his Doctrines, "Cicero faith, that all of them got by heart his *Maxims*; and some there were who learned without Book all his Doctrines, as particularly *Scyro*, mention'd in his Academics. But let it suffice, to alledge some few Verses of ' *Lucretius*, by which we may perceive how affectionate they were to the Memory and Doctrines of their Master. He begins his third Book thus:

*Who first from Darkness could'st a Light so clear
Strike forth, and make Life's Benefits appear;
Great Ornament of Græcia, I am led
By thee, and in thy sacred Footsteps tread:
Not to contend, but kindly imitate,
For how can chattering Swallows emulate
The Swans? Or tender Kids keep equal Pace
With the stout well-breath'd Steed's impetuous Race?
From thee, O Father, every thing receives
Invention; thou giv'st Precepts from thy Leaves.
As Bees skip up and down and sweetly suck
In flow'ry Groves, we golden Sayings pick:
Golden, deserving an eternal Life.*

And again,
*By these a Pleasure I receiv'd from thee
Divine; withal, a Reverence, to see
That Nature every way thou hadst unveil'd.*

And afterwards,
*Great Epicurus died, his Life's Race run,
Whose Wit Mankind exceed'd, as the Sun
Eclips'd by his rising all the Stars.*

CHAP. XV.

With what Constancy and Unanimity the Succession of his School flourish'd.

IT deserves to be taken notice of, not only that the Succession of his School was constant, but that his Successors and Followers did always agree, as was indeed wonderful. As concerning the Constancy, it is known that the Presidents of the Gardens, or Masters of the School, from the Death of Epicurus to the Times of *Julius Cæsar*, and *Augustus*, succeeding one another in a continued Series, were, according to *Suidas*, XIV. and that for 337 Years: In which later time, many *Epi-*

cureans there were, eminent Persons, and of great Account in the State, appears from *Cicero*. *Lucian* also writes, that in his time there was a Stipend allowed to the *Epicureans*, by the Emperor, no less than to other Philosophers; adding, that when any one of them died, he, whom they most approved of was substituted in his room. *Laertius* who lived after *Lucian*, declares, that whereas the Successions of the other Philosophers did almost quite fail; yet the Succession of *Epicurus* did constantly persevere; so many succeeding one another in Government of the Disciples, as could not be reckoned up. *Numenius* (cited by *Eusebius*) adds, that this Succession lasted till his time, and that so perfectly, as it was likely to endure a great while after. After these *Lactantius*; *The Discipline* of Epicurus, faith he, was much more celebrated. In a word, as long as Learning flourish'd in Greece, and Rome was preserved from the Barbarians, the School and Discipline of Epicurus continued eminent.

As for their Unanimity, to omit that of *Cicero*, "I will maintain the Epicureans who are so many my Friends, Men that are so loving to one another," and the like Places; and shall rather observe, that whereas other Sects almost at their very Beginning were distracted with intestine Dissentions; the Epicurean was far from suffering any such thing. For *Themistius* * writes, that the Opinions of Epicurus were kept by all the Epicureans, as Laws of Solon or Lycurgus. And, as if they had all one Soul amongst them, faith *Seneca*, *Whatever* Hermachus affirmed, whatsoever Menodorus, is referred to one. All things that any Man delivers in that Society, go under one Man's Name: This will appear more plainly, if we alledge the Words of *Numenius*, the *Pythagorean*, in *Eusebius*; who after he hath complain'd, that the Successors of *Plato* did not preserve that Unanimity for which the *Pythagoreans* were esteemed, adds, "After this manner the Epicureans being instituted (though unworthy,) seeming not in any thing to dissent from Epicurus, and professing to have the same Tenets with their wife Master, have not unjustly attained their Scope. Hence it hath happened to the Epicureans for a long time, that they never, in any thing worth notice, contradicted either one another, or Epicurus. Amongst them it is an Offence, or rather Impiety, and Sin, to bring in any Innovation; wherefore none dares attempt it. Hence, by reason of their constant Agreement among themselves, they enjoy their Doctrines peaceably and quietly: And this Institution of Epicurus resembles the true State of a perfect Commonwealth, which being far from Sedition, is governed by one joint Mind and Opinion. For which Reason, there have not, nor are not, nor,

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^a De fin. 1.

^b De fin. 2.

^c Lib. 4.

^d In Epic.

^e In Eub.

^f Lib. 10. 9.

^g Præp. 1. 14.

^h Lib. 3. cap. 27.

ⁱ Orat. 4.

^j Epil. 35.

^k Par. 1. 14.

"in likelihood, will be wanting, those that shall willingly follow it, but amongst the Stoical Factious, &c." One would think there were nothing wanting to this Testimony, but to say of all the Epicureans, as *Valerius* (before cited) did of two of them, that "Such a Society might be thought to have been begotten, nourish'd, and terminated in the Bosom of Celestial Concord."

C H A P. XVI.

The Successors and Followers of Epicurus.

IT remains, that we give a Catalogue of those who were eminent in that Sect, after the Death of *Epicurus*. We have already said, that *Hermachus* succeeded *Epicurus*, and *Polystratus Hermachus*. It also is manifest from *Laertius*, that *Dionysius* succeeded *Polystratus*; and *Basilides, Dionysius*. But who those ten Successors were from *Basilides*, to him who govern'd the School in the Time of *Augustus*, we cannot easily say. Perhaps after *Basilides*, succeeded *Protarchus Bargyleites*, whom *Strabo* terms an illustrious Person. The same *Strabo* saith, that Disciple to *Protarchus* was *Demetrius*, surnamed *Lacon*, who is mentioned also by *Laertius*, and was, as *Sextus Empiricus* saith, eminent amongst the Followers of *Epicurus*. Perhaps after him succeeded *Diogenes of Tarsus*, Author of the *Select Schools*, whereof *Laertius* mentions XX Books. He also cites an Epitome of Moral Doctrine, written by the same Person. *Laertius* mentions also, (but whether they belong to this Series of Successors, is uncertain) two *Ptolemius of Alexandria*; whether from Differences of Complexion, or some other respect, one surnamed black, the other white. He mentions also *Oron*, and seems to mention one *Democritus*, who, in his *Timocrates* takes notice of *Phaëre* after *Epicurus's* Doctrine.

There follow two out of this Rank, named *Anthanas*; the first, *Diogenes of Seleucia near Babylon*, whom he describes to have been eloquent, but of an ill Life; the other, *Lysias*, who, as he saith, (governed at *Tarsus*; and being chosen by the Country, *Stephanus* (Priest of *Hercules*) he enjoy'd the supreme Government, and wore regal Ornaments. This is he, who distributed the Estates of the Rich amongst the Poor, and put many of them to Death for refusing to part with them. At what Time he lived, we cannot certainly determine; but *Diogenes* being contemporary with *Alexander King of Syria*, and *Antiochus* his Successor, may be referred to the 135th Olympiad.

About the same Time seemeth to have flourish'd *Eueratides*, to whom belongs this Inscription, reci-

ted by *Janus Gruterus*; At Brundisium, before the Gate of *Diomedes Athenæus*, a Physician, on the Basis of; EUCRATIDAS Son OF PISADAMUS, A RHODIAN, AN EPICUREAN PHILOSOPHER. THIS PLACE APPOINTED FOR BURIAL BY THE SENATE OF BRUNDISIUM.

Not long after seems to have flourish'd in the School that *Apollodorus*, whom *Laertius* termeth eminent, αὐστηράγανος, for that (as I conceive) he bore such sway in the Garden, as *Demosthenes* is said to have done in Courts of Judicature. He wrote about 500 Books, amongst which were some concerning the Life of *Epicurus*, cited by *Laertius*. It may be conjectured, that he was the same, whose Chronology is cited by *Laertius*, and others.

Auditor of *Apollodorus* was *Zeno the Sidonian*, according to *Laertius*, who adds, that he wrote much, and that he was famous both for Philosophy and Rhetorick; whence I conjecture, it is the same *Zeno* of whom *Cicero* saith, he spoke distinctly, gravely, and neatly; and that he was chief of the *Epicureans*; unless both he and *Apollodorus* lived earlier; which if it were so, this other belongs to the Times of the Emperors, for *Cicero* heard him, and writing concerning him to *Atticus*; *Zeno*, saith he, I love as well as thou dost.

C H A P. XVII.

Laertius, his Pindication of Epicurus.

Diotymus the Stoick, much maligning *Epicurus*, traduced him exceedingly, "producing fifty Epistles, very lascivious, as written by *Epicurus*;" to which he added, as *Epicurus's* also, the short Epistles, commonly ascribed to *Chrysippus*. No less disaffected to him were *Posidonius* the Stoick, and *Nicolaus*, and *Socius*, in the 12th of his *Dioclean Constitutions*, (which are in all XXIV) and *Dionysius Halicarnassæus*. For they say, "he went from House to House with his Mother reading expiatory Prayers; and that with his Father he taught Children for a small Stipend; that one of his Brothers was a Pandor; that he himself used the Company of *Leontium*, a Courtesan; that he ascribed to himself the Books of *Democritus* concerning Atoms, and of *Aristippus* concerning Pleasure; that he was not a true Native of the City, as *Timocrates* acknowledgeth, and *Herodotus*, in his Book of the Youth of *Epicurus*; that he basely flattered *Mithres*, Steward of *Lysimachus*; calling him in his Epistles, *Apello* and King; that *Idomeneus*, *Herodotus*, and *Timocrates*, who published some obscure Pieces of his, did commend "and

* Lib. 1. c. 8.
* De Nat. D. c. 1. 21.

* Lib. 10. 27.
* Luc.

* Lib. 14.
* Lib. 3. Epist. 11.

* Lib. 10. 26.

* Adv. Log. 2.

* Deipn. 3.

* Lib. 7. 17.

“and flatter him for the fame: that in his Epistles, “he writes to *Leontium*, thus; O King *Apelle*, may “dear little *Leontium*; how were we transported “and filled with Joy at the reading of thy Letter! “To *Themista*, Wife of *Leontius*, thus; If you “come not to me, I shall roll to you whithersoever “you call me. And to *Pithecles*, a handsome “Youth; I consume in Expectation of your amiable and divine Company. And again, writing “to *Themista*, he thinks to persuade her: as *Theodorus* affirms, in his fourth Book against *Epicurus*. “That he wrote to many other Courtezans, especially to *Leontium*, with whom *Metrodorus* also “was in Love. That in his Book concerning the “End, he writes thus; Neither know I what is this “Good, if we take away the Pleasures of the “Taste; if we take away those of Coition; if we “take away those of Hearing; if we take away “those of the Sight. That in his Epistle to *Pithecles* he writes; Happy Youth, fly as fast as thou “canst from all Discipline. *Epicurus* calls him, “*Cinnadologum*, and rails at him exceedingly. *Timocrates*, Brother of *Metrodorus*, who was a while “a Disciple of *Epicurus*, but at last forsook the “School, saith, that he vomited twice a day, upon “overcharging his Stomach; and that he himself had “much ado to get away from their nocturnal Philosophy, and Conversation in secret. That *Epicurus* “was ignorant of many things belonging to “Discourse, but much more of those which belonged “to Life. That he was of such a miserable “Constitution, that he was not able of himself for “many Years, to get out of Bed, or rise out of the “Chair in which he was carried. That he spent “every Day a Mina at his Table, as he himself writeth in his Epistle to *Leontium*, and in his Epistles to the Philosophers at *Mitylene*. That he “and *Metrodorus* also used the Company of Courtezans; amongst others, *Marmarium*, *Hedia*, *Erotium*, *Nicidium*. That in the thirty Books which “he writ concerning Nature, he saith most of the “same things over and over; and that in them he “writes against many Persons, and, amongst the rest, against *Naufiphanes*, and that in these very “Words: But this Man, if ever any, had a way “of teeming, a sophistical Brag, like many other “Slaves. And that in his Epistles he writes thus “concerning *Naufiphanes*: This so far transported “him, that he railed at me, and called himself my “Master. Likewise that he called himself *Naufiphanes*, Lungs (as senseless) and unlearned, and deceitful, and lascivious: The Disciples of *Plato*, “*Dionysius*’s Parasites; *Plato* himself, Golden; *Aristotle*, a Prodigal, that, having wasted his Patrimony, was fain to turn Soldier and Apothecary; “*Protagoras*, a Basket-carrier, an *Amanuensis* to “*Democritus*, and a Highway Schoolmaster; *Heraclitus*, *κακῶν*, a Cauler of Confusion; *Demo-*

“*critus*, *Αναισθητος*, Purblind; *Antidorus*, *Ξανδογης*, “a Fawner upon Gifts; the *Cyrenaicks*, Enemies “to *Greece*; the *Dialecticks*, Envious; *Pyrrho*, “Unlearn’d and Unmanner’d. “But these Men are mad; for of the excellent “Candor of *Epicurus* towards all Men, there are “many Witnesses; his Country, which honour’d “him with Statues of Brass; his Friends, who were “so many, that whole Cities could not contain “them; his Disciples, who were also taken with “his Sittenical Doctrine, except *Metrodorus* the “*Stratonicean*, who, perhaps over-burthen’d with “his excessive Goodness, revolted to *Carneades*; “the Succession of his School, which, when all the “rest were almost quite worn out, remained constant, and ordained so many Masters one after “another, as cannot be number’d; his Piety towards his Parents, his Kindness towards his Brethren, his Meekness towards his Servants, (as “may appear by his Will, and their studying Philosophy with him, amongst whom *Mus* formerly “mention’d was most eminent;) and, in general, “his Humanity towards all, his Devotion to the “Gods, and Love to his Country, was beyond Expression. He would not accept of any publick “Office, out of an excessive Modesty; and, in the “most difficult troublesome Times, continued in “*Greece*, where he lived constantly; except that “twice or thrice he made a Journey to his Friends “on the Borders of *Ionis*. But to him they resorted “from all Parts, and lived with him (as *Apollodorus* relates) in the Garden which he purchased “with 80 Minæ. *Diocles* in his third Book, *De Incuriositate*, saith, They used a most frugal spare “Diet; for they were contented with a Pint of small Wine, and for the most part they drunk “nothing but Water. And that *Epicurus* would “not have them to put their Estates into one common Stock, as *Pythagoras* ordained, saying, The “Goods of Friends are common; for this argued “Distrust, and where there is Distrust, there is no “Friendship. As for himself, in his Epistles, that “he was contented with Water only, and coarse “Bread: And send me, saith he, a little Cytheridian Cheese, that I may feast myself when I have “a mind. Such was he, who profess’d that Pleasure is the End, or chief Good; for which, *Athenæus* in an Epigram thus commends him:

*Man’s most unhappy Race for worst things toils,
For Wealth (unsatiated) raises Wars and Brails.
Nature to Wealth a narrow Bound assigns’d,
But vain Opinions Ways unbounded find.
Thus Neocides, whom the sacred Choir
Of Muses, or Apollo, did inspire.*

But this we shall understand better from his own
Doctrine and Way. Hicet to Laertius in Vindication

tion of *Epicurus*; which Subject is more fully *De Vita & Moribus Epicuri*, in the six last and rhetorically handled by the learned *Gaffendus*, Books.

The Doctrine of *E P I C U R U S*.

Of *PHILOSOPHY* in general.

“**P**hilosophy^a (or the Love of Wisdom) is an “exercising of the Reason; by which, in “meditating and discoursing, it acquireth “happy Life, and enjoyeth it. For^b Philosophy “hath this Propriety above other Arts, that its End “is the End also of Reason, which so tends to it, “that it may rest in the Enjoyment of it.”

Now happy Life consisting in the Tranquillity of the Mind, and Indolency of the Body, but especially in the former, (in regard the Goods of the Mind are better than those of the Body, and the Ills thereof worse;) it comes to pass, that Philosophy is chiefly the Medicine of the Mind, in regard it both makes and preserves it found; its Soundness or Health being nothing else but its Tranquillity.

Hence it followeth, That “neither ought a young “Man to delay Philosophizing, nor an old Man to “be wearied therewith: for to rectify and cure his “Mind, no Man is too young; and he who pretends, “that the time of Philosophizing either is not “yet, or is past, doth, as he who saith the time to “live well and happily either is not yet come, or is “quite gone.

“Both young and old therefore must Philosophize; the one, that whilst he is growing old, he “may persevere to advance himself in good things, “to continue the Excellence of his former Actions; “the other, that, though aged in Years, he may “yet be youthful in Mind, remaining secure from “future eminent Harms.”

For it is Philosophy alone, which breeds in its Followers an Assuredness and an Immunity from all vain Fear; whence we ought to devote ourselves to it, that we may be truly free.

Happy they, who are of such a Disposition of Body or Mind, or born in such a Country, as they can either of themselves, or by the Instigations of others, addict themselves to Philosophy, and pursue Truth; by Attainment whereof, a Man is made truly free or wise, and absolute Master of himself.

They who apply their Minds hereto, are of three

sorts: Some address themselves to enquire after Truth without the Assistance of any; some require Help, and would not go, if none had gone before, but follow well; some may be compelled to the Right, who need not so much a Leader, as an Assistant; and, as I may call it, a Driver.

The first are most to be commended; yet the Ingenuity of the second is excellent likewise; and the third not to be contemned. Of the second was *Metrodorus*; of the third, *Hermachus*. As I highly praise the Fortune of the former, so I no less admire and value the latter; but although both of them arriv'd at the same End, yet he deserv'd the greater Praise, who, their Performances being equal, broke through the greater Difficulties.

Now whereas to a Philosopher nothing ought to be more valuable than Truth, let him proceed to it in a direct Way, “and neither feign any thing, nor admit any thing that is feign'd by another; for no kind of Fiction becometh Professors of Truth. Neither is that perpetual Irony of “*Socrates* to be approved, whereby he extolled to the Skies *Protagoras*, *Hippias*, *Prodicus*, *Gorgias*, and the rest, but pretended himself rude and ignorant of all things.

“How much less was it becoming a “Philosopher to have feign'd that Fable concerning *Erus Arminius*? For why (if he had an Intent to teach us the Knowledge of celestial things, and the Disposition of Souls) did he not perform this by naked plain Instruction, but rather chose to introduce a Person; by which Carriage the Newness of the Invention, and the formal Scene of a Fiction, represented on the Stage, contaminated the very way of seeking Truth with a Falshood?

For this reason^c a wife Man will neither hearken to the Fables of Poets, nor will himself labour in composing fabulous Poems; nay rather, “he will have an Aversion from the juggling Tricks and Sophistications of Orators: And as he exacts no more from Grammar than Congruity, so neither will he exact more from Rhetorick than Perspicuity of Speech,

^a Sext. Emp. adv. Eth.
in Summ. l. 1. c. 2.

^b Sext. Emp. adv. Math. 1.
Viz. Plato in Rep. l. 10.

^c Laert. 10. 122.
Plut. de audient. Post.

^d Ibid. ^e Cic. in Bruto.
Laert. 10. 13.

^f Macrobi.

Speech, but will use a plain familiar Style; whether he profess to Teach, or write Books, or explicate to the Multitude any thing already written, he will be wary that he do it not panegyrically and hyperbolically.

But seeing that of Philosophers there are some, who assert nothing of Truth, but doubt of all things; others, who imagine they know all things, and assert without any Distinction: A wise Man ought not to behave himself so, as that he assert not at all, but * only maintain some positive Maxims which are indisputable.

For when there are divers ways whereby some things may be performed, as the Eclipses of the Stars, their Rising, Setting, and other superior things, so to approve one way as to disapprove the rest, is certainly ridiculous. But when we speak of things that cannot be any way but one, (such as are these Maxims:.) *Of nothing is made nothing; the Universe consists of Body and Vacuum; the Principles of things are indivisible*, and the like; then it is very absurd not to adhere firmly to them.

Hence it is proper for a wise Man to maintain both the manifold Ways in those, and the one single Way in these, and not to stagger nor recede from Science once obtained. Not like those, who, as if prescribed by a Law, philosophize concerning Nature, not in such manner as the things themselves require, but go out of the right way, and run into Fables; never considering that to vent, or vainly boast our own Opinions, conduceth nothing to happy Life, but disturbeth the Mind.

Now whereas the principal Parts of Philosophy are held to be two; one *Physick*, consisting in Contemplation of Nature; the other *Ethick*, which treats of directing of Manners in order to happy Life, it is manifest, either that *Ethick* comprehends all Philosophy, or that *Physick* comes to be a Part thereof, only inasmuch as it conduceth to happy Life.

"For" if those things which we suspect and dread from the superior Bodies, and even from Death itself, breed no Disturbance in us, as things unconcerning our Condition; if also we could sufficiently comprehend what are the just Bounds of our Desires, and to what Degree the Grief which springs from them is to be alluaged, there were no need of Physiology, or the Explication of Nature."

But because it is not possible we should arrive at so great a Good, without having first surveyed the Nature of things: but, as Children in the Dark tremble, and are afraid of every thing; so we, miserably groping in the Darkness of Ignorance, fear things that are fabulous, and no more to be dreaded than those which Children fear in the Dark, and fancy to themselves will happen. It is therefore necessary, that this Terror and Darkness of the Mind be dispelled, not by the Beams of the Sun, but by Impressions from Nature and Reason, that is, by Physiology. Whence all Physick is to be esteemed a Part of Philosophy.

Dialectick, which some add as a third Part, is to be rejected; because, as ordinarily taught, it doth nothing but beget thorny Questions, being an empty Bubbling and Forge of Cavils. Moreover, because it is superfluous to that End which they propose, that is, to the Perception and Dijudication of the Reasons of Naturalists: for there needs no more thereto, than, like the natural Philosophers themselves, to use Terms ordinary and perspicuous.

If, besides this, there may seem any thing of Use, it can be nothing but a Collection of some few *Canons* or *Rules*, both concerning Terms, and the *Criteria* whereby we use to dijudicate.

Thus may this short Canonick, or Treatise of Rules, serve instead of a laborious and prolix *Dialectick*, and be reputed either a distinct Part of Philosophy (though least considerable) or, *An Addition to Physick*, by way of Introduction.

* Laert. 10. 13.

† Senec. Epist. 89.

‡ Laert. 1. 63.

§ Laert. Ibid.

¶ Senec. Ep. 89.

The First Part of PHILOSOPHY.

CANONICK of the CRITERIES.

FORasmuch as every Question in Philosophy is either of the Thing, or of the Word, to Solution whereof many Canons may be given; hence the first Part of Philosophy which compriseth them, may be termed *Canonick*.

* Laert. 10. 122.

† Ibid

But because of the Word, nothing more is sought than the Use or Signification; but of the Thing, the Truth, which is of an abstruse Nature: therefore we will, in the second Place, comprehend in a few

Canons all that belongs to the Use of the Words: But in the first place lay down those of Truth, and its Criteries (which in Number exceed the other,) premising some few Notes concerning them.

CHAP. I.

Of Truth and its Criteries.

FIRST then, Truth is twofold, one of *Existence*, the other of *Enunciation* or Judgment.

Truth of *Existence* is that, whereby every thing which exists in the Nature of things, is that very thing which it is, and no other. Whence it comes to pass, that there is no Falsity opposite to this Truth, (for *Orichalcum*, for Example, is not false Gold, but true *Orichalcum*;) and therefore it is all one, whether we say a thing is *Existent* or *True*.

Truth of *Enunciation*, or Judgment, is nothing else but a Conformity of an Enunciation pronounced by the Mouth, or a Judgment made in the Mind, with the thing enunciated or judged.

This is that Truth to which Falshood is opposite; for as 'it is true that the thing is so as it is said to be, so is it false that it is not so as it is said to be.

As for that which they call a future Contingent, those *Disjunctions* which are made of *Contraries* (or rather those Complexions which are made by disjunctive Particles, are true; as if we should say, 'either *Hermachus* will live To-morrow, or will not live; but 'neither of the Parts in this disjunctive Proposition, taken singly, is true; for neither is there any Necessity in Nature, that *Hermachus* shall live To-morrow; nor, on the contrary, that he shall not live.

Moreover, because as the thing whose Truth is sought, belongs either to Speculation only, or to Action, (the first of which appertains to Physick, the latter to Ethick;) we must for this Reason have a Criterium, or Instrument of judging, whereby it may be examined, judged, and discerned, in order to both these.

But so far as natural things affect the *Sense* or *Intellect*, and moral things the *Appetite* or *Will*; for this reason, Criteries are to be taken from both these.

From the *Sense*, nothing can be taken more than its Function, Sensation, which likewise is called *Sense*.

From the *Intellect*, so far as besides the Function which it hath, whilist like the *Sense* it contemplateth the thing, as if it were present and apparent, (whence the Perception of a thing's appearing, which

appeareth to be as well to the Intellect as to the *Sense*, is called a *Phantasy*, or *Appearance*;) so far as much, I say, as besides this Function, it is proper to the Intellect to ratiocinate or discourse; there is therefore required a *Prænotion* or *Anticipation*, by looking upon which, something may be inferred.

Lastly, From the *Will* or *Appetite*, whose Property it is to pursue or shun something, nothing else can be taken, but the Affection or Passion itself; and that either *Attractive*, as *Pleasure*; or *Aversive*, as *Pain* or *Grief*.

There are therefore in all three Criteries; *Sense*, or *Sensation*; *Prænotion*, or *Anticipation*; and *Affection*, or *Passion*. Concerning each of these, some Canons are to be prescribed.

CHAP. II.

** Canons of Sense, the First Criterium.*

TO begin with the Canons which concern *Sense*; of these there may be laid down four.

CANON I.

Sense is never deceived; and therefore every Sensation, and every Perception, of an Appearance is true.

This is proved, First, because "All *Sense* is "void of Ratiocination, and wholly incapable of Reminiscence. For neither being moved by itself, nor by any other, is it able to add or detract any thing; or to join or disjoin by enunciating or concluding, so as thereby it might think any thing, and be mistaken in that Thought. The Intellect indeed can do this, but the *Sense* cannot, a *whole Property* it is only to apprehend that which is present, and moveth it; as the *Sight*, *Colour* presented it; but not to discern, that what is here presented is one thing, what there, another. Now where there is a bare Apprehension, not pronouncing any thing, there is no Error or Falshood.

Next, because "there is nothing that can refute or convince the *Senses* of Falshood, (for neither can *Sense* of a like kind refute *Sense* of a like kind; as, "the *Sight* of the *Right Eye* the *Sight* of the *Left*, "or the *Sight* of *Plato* the *Sight* of *Socrates*; and "this, by reason of the Equality of their Credits) "or that there is the same Reason for both:" For a pur-blind Man doth not less see that which he sees, than *Lyneæus* seeth that which he seeth. "Neither "can that which is of an unlike kind refute that which is

³ Emp. loc. cit.

² Cic. de Fato.

¹ Cic. Acad. 4. 5.

⁴ Cic. de Fato. Loc. cit.

⁵ Laert. 10. 31.

⁶ Cic. Acad. 4. 5.

* Quales Epicurus videtur posse intelligi; collecta by Gassendus, ne Canonica censetur id nomen haud jure adepta, p. 157.

⁷ Laert. ibid.

⁸ Sext. Emp. ad Laert. 10. 126.

⁹ Lucret. l. 4. v. 482.

¹⁰ From

"is of an unlike kind, as the Sight the Hearing, and the Taste the Smelling; because they have different Objects, and serve not to give Judgment of the same things. Neither can one Sensation of the same Sense refel another, because there is not any Sensation wherewith we are not affected; and to which, whilst we are affected with it, we do not adhere and assent; as whilst we see a Staff one while strait, out of the Water; another time, part under the Water, crooked; for we cannot by any means see it crooked in the former Condition, or strait in the latter. Lastly, "neither can Reason or Ratiocination refel the Senses; because all Ratiocination depends upon previous Senses, and it is necessary the Senses first be true, before the Reason which is founded on them can be true."

This is confirmed; soasmuch as Sense is the first of the Criteries, to which we may appeal from the rest, but itself is self-evident, and of manifest Truth. For if we say every Sense is deceived, you will want a Criterium to determine and make good even that very Saying upon any particular Sense; or, if some one only, you will entangle yourself in an intricate Dispute, when you shall be demanded, Which Sense, how, and when it is deceived, or not deceived? So as the Controversy not being determinable, you must necessarily be deprived of all Criterium. Whence may be inferred, that, if any Appearance to Sense be false, nothing can be perceived, or, (to express it in other terms) unless all Appearances and bare Perceptions of a thing be true, there were no Credit, Constancy, and Judgment of Truth. For, "They who alledge the Contradiction of Appearances one with another, can never prove even this Contradiction of them, or, that some are true, others false; they cannot prove it by any thing that is apparent, for the Question is of things apparent; nor by any thing unapparent, for that which is unapparent is to be demonstrated by something else that is apparent."

Again, this is confirmed; because, taking away the Certainty of the Senses, and by that means the genuine Knowledge of things, we take away all Rule of Life and Action. For as in a Building, if the first Rule be amiss, the Square untrue, the Plummets faulty, all things must necessarily be defective, and awry, and disproportioned; so must all things in Life be preposterous, and full of Trouble and Confusion, if that which is to be esteemed, as it were, the first Rule, Square, and Plummets, for discerning things good and bad, done or not to be done, be unfixed or perverse, that is, if it want the Certainty which is, as it were, its Rectitude. Whence it cometh to pass, that though Reason (for Example) cannot explain the Cause why things near at hand

are square, but seem round afar off; yet it is better to hesitate and alledge some wrong Cause, rather than to overthrow the first Faith and Foundations whereon the Constancy and Security of Life is so grounded, that unless you dare credit Sense, you will not have any way to shun Precipitation and Destruction.

Thirdly, "Because the Truth of the Senses is manifest even from this, in that their Functions exist in Nature, or really and truly are. For that we see and hear, is as truly something indeed existing, as our very feeling Pain; and there is no Difference (as even now we said,) between saying a thing is existent and true.

To speak more fully, "As the first Affections, Pleasure and Pain, depend upon some Causes which produce them, and are, by reason of those Causes, existent in Nature, (that is, Pleasure depends on pleasant things, Pain on painful; and it neither cometh to pass, that what produceth Pleasure is not pleasant, nor that what causeth Pain is not painful; but that which produceth Pleasure, must necessarily be pleasant; that which Pain, painful and offensive to Nature,) in like manner, as to the Affections of the Appearances produced in us, whatsoever is the efficient Cause of them, is undoubtedly such as makes this Appearance; and being such, it cannot come to pass, that it can be any other than such as that is conceived to be which makes this Appearance. The same is to be conceived of all the rest in particular; for that which is visible not only seems visible, but is such as it seems; and that which is audible, not only seems audible, but is indeed such, and so of the rest: Wherefore all Appearances are true, and conformable to Reason.

Hence it is manifest, that the Phantasies even of those who doat and dream, are, for this Reason, conceived to be true, for that they truly and really exist, seeing that they move the Faculty; whereas, that which is not cannot move any thing." So that there is a Necessity in Nature, that the Species of things which are received in the Intellect, or Imagination, being in this manner moved, mingled, and disturbed, that such Phantasies cannot but be, whatsoever Opinion follows them, whereby things are judged to be such in themselves; of which we are to speak next.

C A N O N II.

Opinion follows upon Sense, and is superadded to Sensation, and capable of Truth or Falshood.

This is proved, because when a Tower (for Example) appeareth round to the Eye, the Sense indeed is

* Laert. ibid.

* Laert. ibid.

* Sext. adv. Log. 2.

* Lucret. l. 4. 510.

* Laert. 10. 32.

* Sext. Emp. adv. Log.

† Laert. ibid.

‡ From Lucretius, 10. 33. &c.

is true, for that it is really affected with the *Species* of Roundness; which *Species* is truly such, and hath a necessary Cause for which it is such, at such a distance; and withal it is not deceived, for it does not affirm that the Tower is such, but only behaves itself passively, receiving the *Species*, and barely reporting that which appeareth to it. But Opinion, or the Mind, whose Office it is to conceive or judge, inasmuch as it adds, as it were from itself, that what appeareth to the Sense is a Tower, or that the Tower really and in itself, is round; Opinion, I say is that which may be true or false.

Whereence may be inferred, that "all Phantasies (or Sensations,) whereby *Phanomena*'s (things apparent,) are perceived, are true, but Opinions admit a Difference; for some are true, others false, inasmuch as they are our own Judgments superadded to the Appearances; and we judge some things aright, others amiss, by reason that something is added, and imputed to the Appearances, or something detracted from them: And generally Sense which is incapable of Ratiocination charged with Falshood.

"But some are deceived by the Diversity of those Appearances, which are derived from the same sensible Object, as in a thing visible, (for Example) according as the Object seemeth to be either of another Colour, or of another Figure, or some other way changed; for they conceive, that of contrary Appearances, one must necessarily be true, and the other which is opposite thereto false. Which certainly is very foolishly, and proper to such Men as consider not the Nature of Things: For (to continue our Instance of Things visible) it is not the whole Solid, or the whole Solidity of the Body which we see, but the Colour of the solid Body. Now of the Colour, that which is in a solid Body, and appeareth in those things which are seen nigh at hand, is one; that which is without the solid Body, as a *Species*, or Image flowing from it, and is received into Places situate one beyond another, such as appeareth in those things which are beheld at a great Distance, is another. This latter being changed in the intermediate Space, and assuming a peculiar Figure, exhibits such an Appearance as itself indeed is.

"Whence, neither the Sound which is in the Brats that is struck, nor the Voice which is in the Mouth of him who crieth aloud, is heard, but that Sound of Voice which lights upon our Sense; for the same thing cannot be in two distant Subjects. And as no Man saith, that he hears falsely, who perceiveth the Sound to be but small at distance, because coming nigher, he perceiveth it as if it were greater; so neither can we say, that the Sight is deceived, for that afar off

"it seeth a Tower, little and round; near, great and square; but rather that it is true. For when the sensible Object appeareth to it little, and of such a Figure, it is in that Place little indeed, and of such a Figure, the Extremities of those Images being broke off, whilst they are conveyed thro' the Air, and thereupon coming into the Eye in a lesser Angle. And again, when it appeareth great and of another Figure, it not being the same in both Places; for here the Extremities of the Images are more entire, and come into the Eye in a greater Angle; but it is a great Mistake to think, that it is the same thing which appeareth to Sight, and affecteth the Eye near and afar off."

"Neither can we say, that the Sight is deceived, when we see a Shadow in the Sunshine to move, to follow our Footsteps, and imitate our Gestures. For Shadow being but Air deprived of Light, and the Earth, as we go, being now here, now there, successively deprived of the Sun's Light, and successively recovering that whereof it was deprived, it comes to pass that the Shadow seems to change place, and to follow us; but the Eyes are not therefore deceived, it being only their Office to see the Light, and to see the Shadow in whatsoever Place it is. But to affirm, that the very Light or Shadow which is here, is the same, or distinct from that which even now was there, this belongs not to them, but to the Mind, whose Office it is to determine and judge. So that whatsoever of Falsity happens to be here, it is to be attributed to Opinion, not to Sense.

"The same Answer may be given to a thousand other Objections; as of a Ship which seems to stand still, and the Land to move; of the Stars, which seem to rest; of Mountains far asunder, which yet seem to be nigh; of Boys, who having made themselves giddy by running, think the Roof itself runs round; of the Sun appearing to be near the Mountains, when as so great Spaces divide them; of the Appearance of a Space under Water, as large as from above it to the Sky; of a River, which to those who pass over it, seemeth to flow back towards the Spring; of a Gallery, which seems narrow at the further End; of the Sun, who seems to rise out of the Water, and to go down into the Water; of Oaks, which seem crooked or broken; of Stars in the Night, which seem to glide over the Clouds; of Things, which, by drawing the Eye on one Side, double.

C A N O N III.

All Opinion attested, or not contradicted by the Evidence of Sense, is true.

Evidence of Sense, I here call that kind of Sensation or Appearance, which, all things obstructive to Judgment

1 Sext. Emp. adv. Log. 1.

2 Lucret. l. 4. v. 365.

3 Lucret. loc. cit. v. 388.

4 Laert. 10. 34.

Judgment being removed, as Distance, Motion, Indisposition of the Medium, and the like, cannot be contradicted. Whence to the Question, Whether a thing be such as it appears? We ought not to give a sudden Answer, but to observe that which I call *expectation*, *expectable*, in regard that we must stay, until the thing be fully examined and sifted out, according to all the Ways that it can possibly happen.

"Attestation I call Comprehension, made by Evidence, that the thing conceivable is such as we before conceived it; as *Plato* coming towards me from afar off; I conjecture, and think, as far as I can guess at such a Distance, that it is *Plato*; but when he draws nigher, and the Distance is taken away, by the Evidence of the Thing, then is there made an Attestation that it is *Plato*.

"Not-Contradiction is said to be the finding out of a thing not manifest, which we suppose and conceive by reflecting on something manifest or evident; as when I say, there is *Vacuum*, which indeed is unmanifest, I am induced thereto by something manifest, that is, by Motion; for if there were no *Vacuum*, there would be no Motion, seeing the Body that should be moved, would not have any Place to go into, all things being full, and close pack'd together. Whence that which is apparent or manifest doth not contradict that which is unmanifest, since indeed there is Motion."

The Attestation and Not-contradiction are the Criteria whereby a thing is proved to be true.

C A N O N IV.

An Opinion, contradicted or not attested by Evidence of Sense, is false.

In which Words, "Contradiction is something opposite to Not-attestation, it being the joint Destruction of a manifest thing together with another supposed unmanifest; as for instance, some affirm, there is not *Vacuum*; but together with this Supposition must be subverted a thing manifest, *viz.* Motion. For if there be no *Vacuum*, Motion likewise cannot be, as we have already shewed.

"In like manner, Contradiction is opposed to Attestation; for it is a Subversion, whereby it appeareth that the thing conceivable is not such as it was conceived in the Opinion; as a Man coming towards us from afar off, we at that Distance guess he is *Plato*, but the Distance being taken away, it appeareth to us by Evidence that he is not *Plato*. This is Contradiction, for the thing manifest contradicts the pre-conceived Opinion. Thus as Attestation and Not-contradiction are the Criteria by

which a thing is proved to be true; so Contradiction and Not-attestation are the Criteria by which a thing is evinced to be false." Evidence being the Basis and Foundation upon which all right Opinion of True and False is grounded.

To omit, that Evidence is sometimes had by one Sense, and about some proper Sensible; sometimes by many, as when the Sensible is common, as Magnitude and Figure, Distance and Position, Rest and Motion, and such like, which may be perceived both by the Sight and Touch, and become manifest, if not to one Sense, at least to the other. Whereupon it sometimes happens, that by reason of several Qualities, several Senses may be summoned, that the Evidence which cannot be got by one, may be obtained by the other; as when we cannot discern by Sight, whether the Bread that is offer'd to us be true or counterfeit, we may summon our Taste, whereby it will evidently appear, which of the two it is.

But this I advise, that, after we have exactly considered all, we adhere to those things which are obvious to us; using our Senses, either the common about common Sensibles, or the proper about the proper. Since we must hold generally to all Evidence which is freely presented to us by every Criterion, but especially by this; "and tenaciously stick to it, as to an infallible Principle, lest either the Criteria which are established by Evidence be overthrown, or Error, being established as strong as Truth, turn all things upside down."

I need not repeat or give particular Advice what is to be done about the Instance alledged of a Tower, which at distance seems round, but nearer, square: For, from what is deduced it is manifest, that before we assert any thing, we must expect or pause, and approach nearer, and examine and learn whether the Tower be such when we come at it as it appeared far off.

I shall only give this general Rule. That unless (the Truth of the Senses being preserved after the manner aforesaid,) you distinguish that which is opinable or conceivable into that which is expectable or requireth time, before it be asserted what it is, as being not yet duly perceived, and into that which is present and proposed to us, and thoroughly examined, it will come to pass, that you will perpetually be disquieted with deceitful or vain Opinions. But if, when the things opinable are agitated in your Mind, you firmly esteem all that is here called expectable as such indeed, and pass not lightly by it, as if that which is false, not having the Attestation of any Evidence, were firm and allowable; in this Case you will behave yourself as one that is cautious of all Ambiguity, and solicitously takes heed to every Judgment, which is rightly or falsely passed of an opinable thing.

¹ Laert. Ibid.

² Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem.

³ Out of Sext. Empir. adv. Mathem.

⁴ Sext. Ibid.

C H A P. III.

Canons of Prænotion or Anticipation; the second Criterij.

OF Prænotion or Anticipation may be given four Canons;

C A N O N I.

All Anticipation or Prænotion, which is in the Mind, depends on the Senses, either by Incurfion, or Proportion, or Similitude, or Composition.

I mean, that the Notion (or Idea, and Form as it were, which being anticipated is called Prænotion) is begotten in the Mind by *Incurfion* (or Incidence,) when the thing incurreth into the Sense directly and by itself, as a Man juſt before our Eyes. By *Proportion*, when the Prænotion is amplified or extenuated, but the Number, Situation, and Figure of the Parts, with a convenient Bignefs of each, is retain'd; as when having ſeen a Man of due Magnitude, we from thence form in our Mind the *Species* of a Giant, by Amplification; or of a Pigmy, by Extenuation. By *Similitude*, when according to a thing firſt perceived by the Senſe, we fancy another like it; as when we imagine a City unſeen, like to ſome that we have ſeen. Laſtly, by *Composition*, when we put as it were into one the diſtinct Notions which we have of two or more things; as when we ſo unite the Notions of a Horſe and a Man, as that the Notion of a Centaur ariſeth out of them, but 'not without ſome Aſſiſtance of Ratiocination.

C A N O N II.

Anticipation is the very Notion, and (as it were) Definition of the Thing; without which, we cannot enquire, doubt, think, nor ſo much as name any thing.

For * by the Word Anticipation, or Prænotion, I underſtand a Comprehention of the Mind, or a ſuitable Opinion or Underſtanding fixed in the Mind, and, as it were, a certain Memory or Monument of that thing which hath often appeared from without, (which the Mind hath repreſented in itſelf after ſome one of the forementioned manners:) Such for Example is the Idea, or Form and Species, reflecting upon which we joy to ourſelves that thing is Man. For as ſoon as ever we hear this Word Man pronounced, immediately the Image of a Man is underſtood, according to the Anticipation formed in the Mind by the foregoing Senſations.

"Wherefore that thing which is primarily and chiefly meant by and couch'd-under every Word, and ſo apprehended by the Mind is ſomething perſpicuous and manifeſt: For when we enquire after any thing, or doubt of it, or think ſomething; we ſhould not do it, unleſs we already had a Prænotion of that thing; as when we enquire, whether that which appeareth afar off, be an Horſe or an Ox, it is requiſite that we ſhould firſt have ſeen and known by Anticipation the Figure of an Horſe and Ox. Indeed we could not ſo much as name any thing, unleſs we firſt had ſome Image thereof known by Anticipation."

Hence it comes to paſs, that, if it be demanded what any thing is, we define or deſcribe it in ſuch manner as it is, according to the Anticipation thereof we have in our Mind. Neither do we thus only, being demanded what ſome ſingular thing is, as what Plato is, but alſo what an Univerſal is, as Man, not this or that, but conſidered in general; this is brought to paſs according as the Mind, having ſeen many Singulars, and ſet apart their ſeveral Differences, formeth and imprinteth in herſelf the Anticipation of that which is common to them all, as an univerſal Notion; reflecting upon which, we ſay, Man (for Example) is ſomething animate, and endued with ſuch a Form.

C A N O N III.

Anticipation is the Principle in all Diſcourſe, as being that to which we have regard, when we infer that one is the ſame or divers, conjoined with or dijoined from another.

For * whiſt we conceive any thing, either by E-nunciation or Ratiocination, it depends upon ſomething firſt evident, unto which thing we having regard, and referring our thought, infer that thing of which the Queſtion is, to be ſuch, or not to be ſuch; that is, the ſame, or another; coherent, or not coherent with it. Thus, if we are to prove that this thing which we behold is a Man, we ſo look back upon the Prænotion which we have of Man, as that without any ſtop we ſay, Man is ſomething animate and endued with ſuch a Form; this that I ſee, is animate and endued with ſuch a Form, therefore this that I ſee is Man; or it is not animate, nor endued with ſuch a Form, therefore it is not Man.

But it is not neceſſary to confirm all things with exquisite Reaſons or Arguments, and ſcrupulous Forms of Reaſoning, which are cried up by the Diſtincticks: For there is this Difference betwixt an Argument and the Concluſion of the Reaſon, and between a ſlender Animadverſion and an Admonition; that in one, ſome occult, and (as it were) involved things

* Out of Laert. 10. 32.

* Laert. ibid.

* Laert. 10. 33.

* Ibid.

things are unfolded and opened; in the other, things ready and open are judged. But where there are such Anticipations as ought to be, then what will follow or not follow from them, or what agrees or disagrees with them, is perspicuously discerned, and naturally inferred, without any Artifice, or Dialectick Construction; wherefore we need only take care, that the Anticipation which we have of things be clear and distinct.

C A N O N I V.

That which is unmanifest ought to be demonstrated out of the Anticipation of a thing manifest.

This is the same we said even now,* That the Anticipations of Things from which we infer something, and thinking upon which we make Sumptions or Propositions, which are Maxims or Principles, by which that which is inferred or concluded is conceived to be demonstrated, be perspicuous and manifest. For, *Demonstration* is a Speech, which collecting by granted Sumptions (or Propositions), brings to light a Truth not manifest before. Thus, to demonstrate that there is Vacuum, which is not manifest. supposing the Anticipation of Vacuum, and the Anticipation of a manifest thing (Motion) these Sumptions are premised, If there is Motion, there is Vacuum, but there is Motion, and then is inferred, therefore there is also Vacuum.

In this place, Motion is taken for the Argument, Medium, or Sign, which properly ought to be a sensible thing: For the Sense is that, according to which it is necessary to make a Conjecture by Ratiocination, ultimately to that which is unmanifest, altho' such a Sign or Medium hath not always a necessary Connexion with that which is inferred, but is sometimes only contingent, or probable, and might be otherwise.

Of this kind are many, from which we argue chiefly in superior things, those being such as may be brought to pass, not one way only, but many, as was hinted formerly.

Hither also may be * referred that which I use to term *Isophras*, Equivalence, by which it is inferred, that one of the Contraries being, the other also must be: And when I argue thus, if the Multitudes of Mortals be so great, that of Immortals is no less; and if those things which destroy be innumerable, those which preserve ought also to be innumerable.

Against those who deny there is any Demonstration, may be brought this Argument; * Either you understand what Demonstration is, or you understand it not? If you understand and have the Notion thereof, then there is Demonstration; but if you un-

derstand it not, Why do you talk of that, whereof you have not any Knowledge?

* They who take away the Credit of the Senses, and profess that nothing can be known, being in the same Ranks, do they not, when they confess that they know nothing, imply they know not this very thing, Whether any thing can be known? We should not therefore contend against them, that they walk backwards upon their Head: Yet if they affirm they do, and I thereupon grant, that this is known by them, I have a fair Occasion to ask them, how, since before they saw nothing true in the things themselves, they came to understand what it was to know, and what to be ignorant?

C H A P. IV.

Canons of Affection or Passion; the third Criterium.

LASTLY, concerning Affection (or Passion) which is, as I said, Pleasure and Pain, there may be Four ^c Canons.

C A N O N I.

All Pleasure, which hath no Pain joined with it, is to be embraced.

C A N O N II.

All Pain, which hath no Pleasure joined with it, is to be shunned.

C A N O N III.

All Pleasure, which either hindreth a greater Pleasure, or procureth a greater Pain is to be shunned.

C A N O N IV.

All Pain, which either putteth away a greater Pain, or procureth a greater Pleasure, is to be embraced.

Of these we shall speak more largely in the *Ethicks*. In the mean time, I shall give this general Advertisement concerning Pleasure: Pleasure is desirable of itself, because it is Pleasure; Grief or Pain is always abhorred and avoidable, because it is Pain; whence, I conceive, a wise Man will have an Eye to this Exchange or Recompence, that he shun Pleasure, if it procure a Pain greater than itself; and undergo Pain, if it produce a greater Pleasure. As for my own Part, I should forsake Pleasure, and covet Pain, either if Remorse were annexed to the Pleasure.

* Sext. Empir. adv. Mathem.

* Ibid.

* Cic. de Nat. 1. 19.

* Sext. Emp. adv. Log.

* Lucret. l. 4. v. 471, &c.

* Or. of Laetius, to. 118.

sure, or a lesser Pain might be taken instead of a greater.

CHAP. V.

Canons concerning the Use of Words.

I Shall add something concerning the Use of Words, (which I design'd to speak of last) and ^a especially that which concerns Discourse; for which, two Canons may seem sufficient, one for the Speaker, the other for the Hearer: They are these;

CANON I.

When thou speakest, make use of Words common and perspicuous, lest either thy Meaning be not known, or thou necessarily waste the time in Explication.

CANON II.

When thou hearest, endeavour to comprehend the Power and Meaning of the Words, lest either their Obscurity keep thee in Ignorance, or their Ambiguity lead thee into Error.

Above all, "we" must know what things the "Words signify; that we may have something, re-

^a Laert. 10. 34.

* Laert. 10. 37.

"flecting upon which, we may safely discern what-
"soever we either conceive, or seek, or doubt;
"otherwise, if all things should escape us undetermi-
"ned, they who would demonstrate any thing to us,
"will proceed to infinite, and we ourselves gain no-
"thing by our Discourse, but Words and empty
"Sounds. For it is necessary, we have regard to
"the Notion and primary Signification of every
"Word, and that we need not any Demonstration
"to understand that thing, in case we can pitch up-
"on any thing, to which we may refer that Point,
"about which our Enquiry, Doubt, or Opinion are
"bused."

Hence it is, that the Method of enquiring after Truth, which is performed by a certain orderly Procedure, ought first to prescribe certain Rules, by which that Affair may be performed, that so the Discourers may agree, what it is concerning which they discourse. So that if any Man shall not first agree to this, but hath a Mind rather to cavil and trifle in wordish Equivocation, he is not to be discoursed with, or still to be preft to explain himself, what 'tis he would be at; for by this means his juggling will be discovered, and his Cavils will solve themselves: Nor will he be able to intangle his Adversary, but rather discover himself a ridiculous Sophister.

The Second Part of PHILOSOPHY.

PHYSICK; or of NATURE.

WE now come to *Physick*; which I usually term *Physiology*, for that it is a Discourse and Ratiocination about the Nature of things, in the Contemplation whereof it is wholly employ'd.

We have already said our Scope to be, that thro' Perspection of the Nature of things, nothing of Disturbance, either from Meteors, or from Death, or from the unknown Ends of Desires, or any other way, may arise unto us. Now the things which this Contemplation fathoms being so many, and so various, it seems very profitable, that (some being engaged in the more profound Study of the liberal Disciplines, or, through some other Business, not having Leisure to know every thing particularly and exactly,) we have ready at least ^a "some proper

^a

* Laert. 10. 35.

"Compendium of the whole Science of Nature, that
"whenever they will apply their Minds to the
"chief Arguments of things, they may be assistant
"to themselves, according to the Measure of their
"Knowledge, in Contemplation of Nature.

"Besides, to those who have made a greater Pro-
"gress in the Speculation of all things, whereof Phy-
"siology treateth, it is very useful, by some com-
"pendious Idea, to preserve the Memory of the
"things themselves digested under Heads: For it of-
"ten happens, that we need a general Inspection of
"things, but not a particular Disquisition. This
"Way therefore is to be observed, and this Kind of
"Study continually used in exercising the Memory,
"that our Attention to things may be constant and
"ready; and in the Forms of things or Notions, ge-
"nerally

" nerally comprehended and imprinted in the Mind,
 " and elsewhere thoroughly examined, according to
 " the first Principles, and the Terms whereby they
 " are explained. If any thing be particularly inquir-
 " ed, it may be found; for where such a Constancy
 " and Readiness is gotten, and the Mind is endu'd
 " with a general and exquisite Information, we are
 " able to understand of a sudden whatsoever we
 " please. I add, *according to the Words*; Foras-
 " much as it is not possible, that a coherent Sum of
 " general Heads can be frequently repeated by Heart,
 " unless it to contain every thing, as that it may be
 " explicated in few Words, even if any thing come
 " to be examined particularly.

" Hence it is, this Course being most profitable
 " to those who are inclin'd and addicted to Physio-
 " logy, that I would advise them therein, (especi-
 " ally if they enjoy a happy Life) that they frame
 " to themselves some such Epitome and Information
 " by general Heads." But if they are not able of
 " themselves, that they get one elsewhere; of which
 " kind we have freely compos'd, for the Benefit of the
 " Studious; hoping, that if what we have laid down
 " be exactly remember'd as much as possible, although
 " a Man runs not out into all particular Arguments
 " that may be discuss'd, yet shall he obtain a copious
 " Knowledge of Physiology, incomparably beyond
 " other Men; for he will of himself understand many
 " things in the more general Work, and, committing
 " those to Memory, will help himself, and continual-
 " ly profit.

For these are of such a Kind, that such as have
 made no little Discussion of Particulars, and addic-
 ed themselves perfectly to these Contemplations, may
 thereby be enabled to raise and compleat more Dis-
 sertations of all Nature; and whosever of them are
 thoroughly vers'd in these, revolving them tacitly
 within themselves, may be able in a moment, and
 quietly, to over-run whatsoever is most considerable
 in Physiology.

But not to stay longer in the Entry, there being
 so many (as I say) and various things contained in
 Physiology, it will be convenient to divide them in-
 to some principal *Sections*, which may afterwards be
 pursued particularly; and every thing which especi-
 ally belongs to any one of them, may be referred to
 it.

These Sections may be Four. The First, Of the
Universe, or the Nature of Things, which compris-
 eth this World, and all other things that are beyond
 it. The Second, Of the *World*, this wherein we
 are, and by which we may conjecture of the innum-
 erable others. The Third, Of *inferior Things*, the
 Earth, to which we adhere, and of the things in it.
 The Fourth, Of *sublime Things*, which are seen and
 produced above the Earth, and upwards from it.

S E C T. I.

Of the Universe, or the Nature of Things.

TO begin then with the *Universe*: It is manifest,
 that it is so named, sofar as it containeth
 all things, even others besides this World. Whence
 it is also termed the *Whole*, and the *All*; and we
 usually call it, the *Sum of Things*, and the *Nature of*
Things.

We must first speak generally, Of the things where-
 of the *Universe* consists; Next, Of what the *so many*
Things in the Universe are made; Thirdly, By what
they are made; Fourthly, What Kind they are of
when made; Fifthly, How they are made; Lastly,
How they perish.

C H A P. I.

*That the Universe consists of Body, and Vacuum,
 or Place.*

FIRST therefore, *a the Universe consists of Body*
and Vacuum^b; neither can there be conceived
 any third Nature besides these.

Now *a Body* is understood by conceiving a certain *vast*
Heap (as it were) of *Magnitude* (or *Bigness*) likewise
 of *Figure*, *Resistance*, (that is, *Solidity*, and *Impe-*
neetrability) and *Gravity*; withal, to be such, as it
 only can touch and be touched.

a Emptiness, or *Vacuum*, which is oppos'd to *Bo-*
dy, and only or properly, and in itself, is *incorporeal*,
 is understood by Negation of these; and chiefly from
 being of an intangible Nature, and void of all *Solidity*,
 and can suffer nor act any thing, but only afford a *most*
free Motion to *Bodies* passing through it.

For this is *a that Nature*, which being destitute of
Body, is called *Vacuum*; taken up by a *Body*, *Place*;
 pass'd through by a *Body*, *Region*; consider'd as diffu-
 sed, Interval or Space.

a That there are Bodies in the Universe, Sense at-
tests; whence it is necessary to deduce Conjecture from
 other Principles, to that which is unmanifest, as I for-
 merly touch'd. Certainly, all these things which we
 behold, which we touch, which we turn up and
 down, which we ourselves are, are nothing but *Bod-*
ies.

But that there is *Vacuum* also, is hence manifest,
 that if it were not in Nature, *Bodies* would neither
 have where to be, nor any way to perform their *Moti-*
ons; whereas that they are moved, is evident.

a Doubtless if all were full, and the Matter of
 things crowd'd, as it were, together, it could not be,
 but that all things must be immovable; for neither
 would any thing be moved, but it must thrust forth

4 L 2 ward

^a Laert. 10. 30.

^b Ibid.

^c Sext. Emp.

^d Laert. 10. 40.

^e Plot. Plac. 1. 30.

^f Laert. 10. 39.

^g Lucret. lib. 1. v. 483.

ward all things; nor would there be Place left, whereinto any things might be thrust. For whereas some answer, That Fishes therefore can move, because they can leave a Place behind them, into which the Water, being thrust forward, and giving place, are received; they observe not, that the first Impulsion forward could never begin, because there is not yet any Place, neither behind, nor beside, whereinto the Water may be received. So as it is necessary, there should be little empty Intervals of Space within things, especially the fluid, into which the little Particles being driven may be so received, that, by the Compression, Place may be made; towards which, the impelling Body may be moved forward, and, in the Interim, leave Place behind, into which the compressed Fluid may dilate itself, and, as it were, flow back.

^b I pass by other Arguments, as, That Thunder or Sound were not able to pass through Walls, nor Fire to penetrate into Iron, Gold, and the rest of Metals, unless in these there were some vacuous little Spaces intermingled. Besides, so far as Gravity is proper to Bodies, the Weight of things could not be made greater or lesser, if it were not according to their having more or less Vacuity intermixed.

Now *Vacuum* being incorporeal, is so penetrated by Bodies, whether existing in it, or gliding by it, that it remains unchanged, and preserves the same Dimensions to which it is adequate. Whence a straight Line, taken in *Vacuum*, is indeed straight; but not so, that it becomes crooked with the Body which fills it, because *Vacuum* is neither moveable in whole nor in part.

Whence it comes, that whereas the Notion of Place is, to receive the things placed to be co-extended with it; not to be moved with it, nor to forsake it; left either the Body be moved, yet not change Place; or change Place, yet not be moved: It therefore is only compatible to *Vacuum* to have the Nature of Place, so far as it only, both by its corporeal Dimensions, Length, Breadth, and Depth, is co-extended with the thing placed in Length, Breadth, and Depth, and exactly adjusted to it. Besides, it is so immovable, that whether the Body come to it, or go from it, or stay in it, it continueth the same, and invariable.

That I said, ^c *No third Nature beside can be conceived*, it is for this Reason, that whither we take to be conceived *comprehensibility*, (in which manner the things, which by themselves, and directly fall into our Knowledge, are perceived) or comparatively to those things which are conceived, (after which manner those things are understood, which are known only by Proportion, as was said about Anticipation) whatsoever it be that is conceived, either it hath some Bulk and Solidity, and so is a Body; or it is void of

all Bulk and Solidity, and so it is *Vacuum*; which is to be understood, in case you conceive it as certain by its self-existent, subsistent, coherent Nature, and not as some Adjunct or Accident thereof.

For since ^d an Adjunct is a Property, which cannot be taken from the thing to which it belongs, without Destruction of the thing; as Tacitility from Body, Intactility from *Vacuum*; and in a more familiar Example, as Weight from a Stone, Heat from Fire, Moisture from Water: But an Accident is that, whose Presence or Absence violates not the Integrity of the Nature, as Liberty and Servitude, Poverty and Riches, War and Peace, &c. Therefore they constitute not some third Nature, distinct from corporeal and incorporeal, but only are as something appertaining to one of these.

CHAP. II.

That the Universe is Infinite, Immoveable, and Immutabile.

NOW ^e the Universe, consisting of *Vacuum* and Body, is Infinite; for that which is Finite hath a Bound; that which hath a Bound, is seen from some other thing; or may be seen from out of an Interval beyond, or without it. But the Universe is not seen out of any other things beyond it; for there is no Interval, or Space, which it containeth not within itself, otherwise it could not be an Universe, if it did not contain all Space; therefore neither hath it any Extremity. Now that which hath no Extremity hath no End, and that which hath no End doubtless is not Finite, but Infinite.

This is confirmed; ^f for if you imagine an Extremity, and suppose some Man placed in it, who with great Force throws a Dart towards its utmost Surface, the Dart will either go forward, or not, but be forced to stay. If it go forward, there is Place beyond; wherefore the Extremity was not there where we defined it: If not, therefore there is something beyond which hinders the Motion, and so again the Extremity was not in the fore-designed Place.

Moreover, ^g this Infinity belonging to the Universe is such, both in the Multitude of Bodies, and the Magnitude of *Vacuum*; nay, in Infinites thrusting themselves forward mutually, alternately, or in order. ^h For if *Vacuum* were Infinite, and Bodies Finite, then Bodies, which are in perpetual Motion, (as we shall anon declare) would rest no where, but be dispersedly carried through the infinite *Vacuum*, as having nothing to stop them, and restrain them, by various Repercussions. But if the *Vacuum* were finite, the Bodies infinite, then there would not be Place large enough for the infinite Bodies to exist in.

ⁱ Hence

^a Lucret. l. cc. cix.

^b Lucret. l. 431.

^c Lucret. l. 5. v. 456.

^d Lucret. l. cc. 43.

^e Lucret. l. v. 967.

^f Lucret. l. cc. 42.

C H A P. III.

Of the Divine Nature in the Universe.

"Hence^a we ought not so to attribute to the Universe, or infinite Space, the being above or below, as if there were any thing in the Universe highest, or any thing lowest; the former, by conceiving the Space over our Head not to be extended to infinite; the latter, by imagining that which is under our Feet not to be of infinite Extent; as if both that which is above, and that which is below, were terminated with some one and the same Point; as it happens with us, or the Middle of this World, one of its extreme Parts being imagin'd highest, the other lowest; for in Infinite, which hath neither Extremes nor Middle, this cannot be imagin'd.

"Wherefore it is better to assume some one Motion, which may be understood to proceed upwards into Infinite, and in like manner another which downwards; although that Moveable, which from us is carried up towards the Places over our Heads, meet a thousand times the Feet of those who are above, and (conceiving other Worlds) think it comes from below; or which from us is carried towards that Quarter, which is under our Feet, to the Heads of those who are below us, and who are thence apt to imagine, that it comes from above: Notwithstanding which Imagination of theirs, either of these opposite Motions, taken entirely, is rightly conceived to be of infinite Extent.

"To these is consentaneous, That^b the Universe was ever such as it now is, and such as it now is shall ever be; for there is nothing into which, *leaving the Nature of the Universe*, it may be changed; and besides the Universe, which containeth all things, there is nothing, which by assailing it, can cause an Alteration in it."

Rightly therefore is the Universe esteemed as *immovable*, there being no Place beyond it, into which it may be moved. So also immutable, forasmuch as it admits neither Decrease nor Increase, and is void of Generation and Corruption; and therefore is eternal, not having Beginning, nor End of Duration.

And indeed many things in it are moved and changed; but whatsoever Motions and Mutations you conceive, they bear no Proportion, if compar'd with the Immenity of the Universe itself. Nor is therefore the whole Universe either moved into any other Place, or changed into any other thing; does it therefore not persevere to be ever the same which it ever was? For the Motions and Mutations in it were always alike; so as it may be said, *That there is nothing new done in the Universe, more than what was already done in the Infinity of Time.*

BUT before we speak of things in the Universe which are generated and corrupted, and of the Principles whereof they are made, it is fit to premise, and put, as a By-dicourse, a Treatise concerning Divine Nature; as well for the Excellency of that Nature, as for that, although it be of the same with corporeal Nature, yet is it not so much a Body, as a certain thing like a Body, as having nothing common to it with other Bodies, that is, with transitory, or generated, and perishable things. Now it first being usually question'd concerning the Divine Nature, whether there be any in the Universe; yet the thing seems as if it ought not at all to be called in question, forasmuch as Nature herself hath imprinted a Notion of the Gods in our Minds: For what Nation is there, or what Kind of Men, which without Learning have not some Prænotion of the Gods?

Wherefore, seeing it is an Opinion not taken up by any Institution, Custom, or Law, but the firm Consent of all Men, none excepted, we must necessarily understand that there are Gods, because we have the Knowledge of them ingrafted, or rather innate in us. But that, concerning which the Nature of all Men agreeth, must necessarily be true; therefore it is to be acknowledged, that there are Gods.

Indeed Men may seem, when they behold the Course of the Heavens, and the various Seasons of the Year, to wheel about, and return in certain Order, and were not able to know by what Causes it were performed, to have recurr'd to this Refuge, to attribute all things to the Gods, and make them obey their Beck, placing them withal in Heaven, for that they beheld in Heaven the Revolution of Sun, Moon, and Stars; but how could they attribute these to the Gods, unless they had first known that there were Gods?

"Did they not rather derive a Knowledge of the Gods from the Apparitions of Dreams? Certainly they might by some great Images incurring to them under human Forms, by Dreams, conceive that there are indeed some Gods endued with such a human Form; they might, I say, not so much in Sleep, as when awake they called to mind, that those excellent Images had appeared to them in Sleep so majestic, of so subtle a Composure, and so well proportion'd in Shape, conceive that there is no Repugnance, nay, that there was a Necessity, that somewhere there should be things of like Nature with these, capable also of Sense or Understanding, because they fancied them moving their Limbs, and speaking.

^a Laert. libid.^b Laert. Io. 41.^c Lucret. l. 5. v. 1162.^d Sext. Emp. adv. Math.^e Lucret. 5. v. 1162.

speaking. And those also Immortal, because their Shape was always present to their Apprehensions, because their Form remain'd still the same, and was of such Grandeur, that they seem'd not easy convincible but there were such; moreover, Blessed, forasmuch as they neither fear Death, nor take any pains in effecting their Works.

"They might also by Discourse use that *torreque*, or *Equivale*nce, by which when we treated of the Criteries, we affirmed it was concluded, that if the multitude of Mortals were so great, that of Immortals was not less; and if those things which destroy be innumerable, those which preserve ought also to be innumerable.

"Which way soever it came, we have this certainly by Prænotion, That we think the Gods are blessed and immortal: "For the same Nature which gave us Information of the Gods themselves, imprinted also in our Minds, that we esteem them "Blessed and Eternal." Which if it be so, our Opinion is truly laid down, "What is Eternal and "Blessed, neither is troubled with any Business itself, nor troubles any other; therefore not possessed with Favour or Anger: for all such are weak."

And if we sought no further than to worship the Gods piously, and to be free from Superstition, what we have said were sufficient; for the excellent Nature of the Gods is worshipped by the Piety of Men, as being Eternal and most Blessed. For to whatever is excellent, Veneration is due; and all Fear, proceeding from the Power and Anger of the Gods, would be expelled; for it is understood, that Anger and Favour are far separate from a blessed immortal Nature; which being removed, no Fears hang over us as to the Gods. But for Confirmation of this Opinion, the Soul enquires after the Form and the Life, and the Action of Mind, and Agitation in God.

"As to the Form, Nature partly instructs us, partly Reason; for by Nature, all of us, of all Nations, have no other Form but human of the Gods. For what other Forms ever occur to any Man, waking or sleeping? But not to reduce all things to their first Notions, Reason itself declares the same. For seeing it is proper to the most excellent Nature, either because it is blessed, or because it is sempiternal, that it be most beautiful, what Composition of Limbs, what Conformity of Lineaments, what Figure, what Form can be more beautiful than the human?

"Now if the Figure of Men excelleth the Form of all things animate, and God is animate, certainly he is of that Figure which is the most beautiful of all. And forasmuch as it is manifest, that the Gods are most blessed; and none can be blessed without Virtue, nor Virtue consist without

"Reason, nor Reason consist in any Figure but that of Man, we must acknowledge, that the Gods are of human Form."

But when I say, that the Gods are of the Form of a Man, and of an animate Being, Do I therefore attribute such a Body to them, as ordinarily Men and animate Beings have? By no means: "For God is not a thing, as *Plato* says, merely incorporeal; because what kind of thing that is, cannot be understood; for then he must necessarily want Sense, he must want Prudence, he must want Pleasure; all which we comprehend together with the Notion of the Gods:" But neither is he therefore a gross Body, no not the most subtle that can be cogmentated of Atoms; but he is altogether a Body of his own Kind, which indeed is not seen by Sense, but by the Mind; nor is he of a certain Solidity, nor composed of Number, but consists of Images perceived by Comparison; and which, compar'd with those that ordinarily occur, and are called Bodies, may be said "to be (not Body, but) as before I said, Resemblance of Body; and (for Example) not to have Blood, but a certain Resemblance of Blood."

In the mean time, I must intimate by the way, that he is not such a Kind of Body as is cogmentated of Atoms; for then he could not be sempiternal, and upon his Generation would follow Corruption; upon his Concretion, Diffipation; and so he could not be sempiternal. Thus there are four things to be esteemed *Eternal* and *Incorruptible*: the *Universe*, which hath no Place into which it can fall; *Vacuum*, which cannot be touch'd, nor receive any Blow; the *Matter* of things, which unless it did subsist unchanged, those things which are dissolved would go away into nothing; and the *Divine Nature*, which is inconcrete, and, by reason of its Tenuity, cannot be touched nor struck.

Hence one of the Natural Philosophers was in a great Error, when he said, That the Nature of the Gods is such, as to diffuse, and send forth Images out of itself; for in this manner, somewhat might be so taken out of it, as that it might be admitted dissolvable. But some have misinterpreted our Meaning, when, upon our admitting many Worlds, and saying, that there are *Intermundia*, that is, Intervals between the Worlds, they affirm we place the Gods in the *Intermundia*, lest they should receive any Injury by the World's Ruin. For as *Vacuum*, so is the Nature of the Gods more subtle, than to fear any harm from Bodies; which if it did fear, in no Place were it more to be feared than in the *Intermundia*, when the World should come to be dissolved.

Neither can we design in what Places the Gods live, seeing that this our World is not a Seat worthy of

* Cic. de Nat. Deor. 1. 19.

* Ibid. 1. 17.

* Laert. ibid.

* Cic. de Nat. Deor. 1. 18.

* Laëtant. de gra. Del.

of them: But we can only say in general, such as the Poets describe *Olympus*; such are, wheresoever they be, the blessed and quiet Seats of the Gods.

*Where Showers not fall, nor Winds unruly blow,
Where neither blasting Frost, nor hoary Snow
Rifle the Place; but Heaven is ever bright,
Spreading his glorious Smiles with cheerful Light.*

“ Hereupon it being further demanded, what kind of Life that of the Gods is, and what State of Age they enjoy, it may be answered, That certainly, than which nothing can be more happy, nothing more abundant in all Goods, can be imagined. For God doth nothing, he is not entangled in any Employments, he undertakes no Works, but joyeth in his own Wisdom and Virtue. He knows for certain that he shall ever be in Pleasures, both greatest and eternal. This God we justly stile Blessed, who ourselves place a blessed Life in Serenity of Mind, and in Disengagement from all Business; but not, such as others do describe him, Laborious, involved in great and troublesome Employments.”

CHAP. IV.

Of First Matter, or of the Principles of Compound Things in the Universe.

NOW to resume and pursue our Discourse: Forasmuch as in the first place 'tis manifest by Sense, that in Nature many things are generated, and many corrupted; therefore we must conclude, that hereto is requir'd Matter, of which things may be generated, and into which they may be resolv'd: for *nothing, nothing is made; and into nothing, nothing goes away. For if something were made of nothing, every thing might be produced from any thing, as not requiring Seeds; and if that which perisheth did go into nothing, all things would perish absolutely, there not remaining those things into which they were dissolv'd.*

Besides, forasmuch as we affect to know the Nature of any thing generated or made, it is first demanded, whether it be some thing one and simple, or compounded of some things which themselves are simple and precedent. It is manifest, that nothing generated or made can be one and simple, seeing that it hath Parts of which it was made up, and into which again it may be dissolved, which therefore are precedent and more simple; and if they still be compounded, they may be conceived to consist of those, which at length are the first and most simple.

Thus again it appears, that *of Bodies, some are Concretions, or (if you like it better) concrete or*

compounded Bodies; *others, of which Concretions, or compounded Bodies, are made.* These, if first and simple, are the first Matter of Things, and are termed Principles, and, by the later Authors, Elements also.

These Principles, or first Things of all, must be simple uncompounded Bodies, (or rather Atoms) and indivisible, or not resolvable by any Force, and consequently immutable, or in themselves void of all Mutation. I mean, *if it shall so come to pass*, as that in the Dissolution of Compounds, *all things go not into nothing, but that there consist and persevere a certain Nature, full, or void of Vacuity*, and therefore solid; which being such, it cannot in any part, or by any means, admit a Diversion, and so be dissolved.

Wherefore it is necessary, that those which are called the Principles of compounded Bodies, be, as of a Nature, full, solid, and immutable, so wholly indivisible; whence we use to call them *Atoms*. We term it an Atom, not as being the least, that is, as it were a Point, (for it hath a Magnitude) but for that it cannot be divided, it being incapable of suffering, and void of Vacuity. So that he who saith, *Atom*, names that which is free from a Blow, and can suffer nothing; and which is invisible indeed by reason of its Littleness, but indivisible by reason of its Solidity.

CHAP. V.

That there are Atoms in Nature, which are the Principles of Compound Bodies.

THAT there are Atoms, the Reason alledged sufficiently convinceth: for, seeing that Nature makes nothing of nothing, and reduceth nothing to nothing, there must remain in the Dissolution of compound Bodies something that is incapable of further Dissolution. Certainly, if you say that it is still dissolvable, or divisible, it will be necessary, by subdividing, to come at last to something that is solid, and incapable of Division; since that neither Nature itself doth dissolve things infinitely, but stays in some last things; nor can Body admit of an infinite Division.

“ In a finite Body, doubtless there cannot be Parts of infinite, either Multitude or Magnitude; wherefore there cannot be understood to be performed in it, not only that Division into infinite, which is made into less, or by Parts always lesser, and proceeds, ever observing the same Proportion of Division; but also that Progression into infinite, which is made by proceeding not always by lesser, but by equal, or those which are called determinate Parts.” For since infinite Parts must needs be admitted to serve for an infinite Division, how can there be infinite of them in a finite Body?

“ He

^a Lucr. v. 3. 20.

^b Cic. loc. cit.

^c Laert. 10. 38.

^d Ibid. 10. 40.

^e Ibid. 10. 38.

^f Ibid. 10. 36.

"He certainly who once hath said, that in every thing there are Parts infinite in Number, is not able further to understand and declare how that Magnitude, whereof he speaks, comes to be finite. For whether the Parts that a Division or Progression may be made into infinite be determinate, (that is, equal among themselves) or indeterminate, (that is, always lesser) it is manifest that the Magnitude, whose Parts they are, and which consists, and is compounded of them, must indeed be infinite.

"And since on the other side, a finite Magnitude manifestly hath an Extreme or Last Part, easy to be perceived and shewn, unless this Part may be seen by itself, and as the last, we cannot, *although we should subdivide it*, understand any other Part, which should be thought the last rather than this; for that with as much Reason will be divisible. Whence it will come, that by proceeding further, and consequently towards an extreme Part into infinite, we can never arrive, not even by thought, to that part which is the last, nor be able to over-run, by Progression, even the least Space."

Add - to this, That unless in Dissolutions there did remain little Bodies, so solid as that they cannot be dissolved by any Force, the Difference between Body and Vacuum could not be sufficiently understood, inasmuch as nothing of Body, by infinite Attenuation, would be capable to resist; by which means too all things would become weak or soft, and nothing could be made hard, seeing that Solidity only is the Foundation of Hardness. Neither need we scruple, as if because Atoms are solid, soft things cannot be made of them, for they may be made soft by Intermission only of Vacuum, into which the compressed Parts retire, and yield to the Touch.

Add - also the diverse Sorts of Constancy in Nature, as in carrying on Animals always to certain Bounds of Strength, Augmentation and Life; in imprinting always the same Distinctions and Marks of every particular Kind; which she could not do, if she did not use Principles certain and constant, and therefore not obnoxious to Dissolution and Mutation.

C H A P. VI.

Of the Properties of Atoms; and first, of their Magnitudes.

Although all Atoms, by reason of this Solidity, may seem to be of one and the same Nature, yet have they some Adjuncts or Properties, and certain Qualities, by which they may differ among themselves; such only are Magnitude, Figure, and Weight; and if there be any beside which are necessa-

rily ally'd to Figure, as roughness and smoothness; for Colour, Heat, Cold, and the rest of the Qualities, are not such as are proper to Atoms, but to Compounds, and arising partly out of the Adjuncts, partly the Accidents of Atoms, of which we shall speak hereafter.

This in brief, at present: If * Colour (for Example) were in the Atoms themselves, it would be as intranfinite as they are; and so the things consisting of Atoms, that are of one Colour could not change that, and appear under another; whereas we observe the contrary happens; for the Sea foaming looks white, it being otherwise of a green Colour; which doubtless if it were in it by reason of green Atoms, could not be changed into a white Colour. For whereas some say, That Contraries are made of Contraries, it is so far from being so, that White will sooner be produced out of no Colour at all, than out of Black. Better they, who conceive the Matter of Things, that it may undergo Variety of Colours and other Qualities, ought to be void of them; as we chuse that Oil which is most free from any Scent to make Perfumes of.

But to touch a little every Property of the Atoms: Whereas in the first place I attribute Magnitude to Atom, I mean not any Magnitude; for the largest Atom is not so great as to be perceptible by Sight; but that Magnitude which, altho' it be below the Reach of Sense, yet is of some Bigness, (for if Atoms were Points void of all Magnitude, no Body of any Magnitude could be made up of them.) Whence I use to lay of an Atom, that it is some small thing, thereby, as it were, not excluding all Magnitude from it, but the larger Size only.

Neither can it be objected, That the Magnitude of Atoms is not perceived by the Senses, since we must necessarily confess, there are innumerable things invisible; for can we see the Wind, Heat, Cold, Odour, Sound, or the little Bodies, by whose Arrival to the Sense these are perceived? Can we see the little Bodies of Moisture, by which Garments hung by the Water-side are moistened, yet being spread abroad are dried? Can we see those which are rubb'd off from a Long Ring-worm, from a Wheel that turns round, from a Plough-share in ploughing, from a Stone which a Drop hollows, which a Tread diminisheth, or those by which a Plant or Animal grows in its Youth, decays in its old Age, and the like?

"Yet * we must not think that all Atoms are of the same Magnitude; it is more consonant to Reason, that amongst them there be some greater, others lesser; and, this admitted, a Reason may be given of most things that happen about the Passions of the Mind, and about the Senses."

That

* Lucret. l. 1. v. 548.

† Ibid. v. 578.

‡ Lucret. l. 44. 54.

§ Lucret. l. 2. v. 729.

¶ Ibid. l. 1. v. 268.

■ Lucret. 10. 35.

That * there may be an incomprehensible Variety of Magnitudes beyond the Reach of Sense, may also be understood even from this, forasmuch as there are some little Animals, whose third part, if we imagine them divided, would be invisible; nevertheless, to the Composition of them an incomprehensible Number of Parts is necessary. For how many must there be to make the Entrails, the Eyes, the Joints, the Soul; to constitute all Parts, without which we cannot understand there should be any living, sensitive, moving Animal?

Whether may not (to use a gross Example,) this Variety be comprehended from those dusty Motes which the Beams of the Sun, coming in at a Window, discover? For whereas without such Beams all things are alike dark, yet they coming in, there appeareth an innumerable Company of little Bodies, in such manner, as that there is an evident difference between the greater and the lesser; nevertheless, I say not, (as some conceive) that these Kinds of little Bodies are Atoms, for in the least of them are contained many Myriads of Atoms; I only use them by way of Comparison, that whereas the whole Nation (as it were) of Atoms is impervious, and dark, even to the sharpest Sight, yet we may understand it to be so illustrated by the Beams of Reason, that the Atoms may be perfectly seen by the Mind, and that we may conceive there are several Degrees of Magnitudes in them.

Hence * it happens, that as in a great and measurable Magnitude we take something, which, that it may be the common Measure, must have the Proportion of the least, as a Foot, a Digit, a Barly-corn; and in sensible Magnitude, we take also something which is accounted the least as to Sense, as the little Creature called *Acaris*; so in intelligible Magnitude, such as is that of the Atom, we may take something which in it is esteemed (as it were) the least; such as in an Atom may be conceived the very Point in which a sharp Angle is terminated.

But † this Difference there is between the least, under the Notion of Measure, and the least of those which are sensible and intelligible, that the former, by its Repetition, may be understood to be adequate to the whole Magnitude; but these latter are conceived as certain individual Points, which either are Bounds of Magnitudes, or certain Connexures (as it were) so interpos'd between the Parts, as that they have only certain Respects to the Parts connected on each Side, though they are such, that a Beginning of Mensuration cannot be made from them. For nothing hinders but that we may, by the Mind, frame some Dimensions in an Atom.

Although, when as we say, there are Parts or Connexures in an Atom, it is not so to be under-

stood, as if at any time they were disjoined, and afterwards united; but we do it, to declare that in an Atom there is a true Magnitude consisting of Parts, though withal they have that Difference from compound things, that their Parts can only be distinguished by Designation, not by Separation; forasmuch as they cohere by a natural, indivisible, and perpetual Connexion.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Figure of Atoms.

AS † concerning *Figure*, which is the Bound of Magnitude, it is first necessary, that in Atoms it be manifold; or, that Atoms amongst themselves be variously figured. This is proved, forasmuch as all natural things framed of them, Men, Beasts, Birds, Fishes, Plants, &c. are variously figured, not only in respect of their *Genus*, but of every particular *Species* or *Individuum*; for there are not any two so like one another, but that if you mind them exactly, you will find some Differences by which they are distinguished.

Again, *Forasmuch* ‡ as the *Kinds of Figures in Atoms* are incomprehensible for Number, for they are round, oval, lenticular, flat, gibbous, oblong, conical, hooked, smooth, rough, bristly, quadrilateral, &c. as well regular as irregular, without any Determination possible to the Intellect, yet they are not to be esteemed simply infinite in Number: *For there would not be so many and so great Differences in concrete things, if in the Atoms, of which they are compounded, there were such a Diversity of Figure as could be comprehended by the Mind.* Yet the *Diversities of Atoms cannot be absolutely infinite, unless a Man conceive in Atoms a Magnitude*, which is not only so small as to escape Sense, but it is in reality infinitely little: *For in Magnitude, or the Superficies of Magnitude, which is finite, cannot be understood Diversities, which are infinite.*

But thirdly, although the *Kinds of Figure* be not infinite, yet are there in every *Figuration*, or *Kind of Figure*, *Atoms simply infinite in Number*; that is, there are infinite round Atoms; infinite oval, infinite pyramidal; for otherwise the Universe would not be infinite in Multitude of Atoms, as was already declared, unless the Atoms which are like to one another in Figure, were absolutely infinite in Number.

But † take notice, That though there are Atoms corner'd and hooked, yet can they not be conceived to be worn away or broken, because both the Corners and Hooks, as also the middle little Bodies themselves are of one Nature, and kept together with equal Solidity and Necessity, inasmuch as no Force

* Lucret. 4. v. 115.
Lucret. Instit. 3. 17.

† Lucret. 10. 58, &c.

‡ Ibid.

§ Lucret. 1. 2. v. 333.

¶ Lucret. 10. 42.

* Plut. plac. 1. 4.

whatsoever can compress an Atom, either as to the whole, or as to its Parts, even to its very Points.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Gravity (or Weight) and manifold Motions of Atoms.

LASTLY, I attribute to Atoms *Gravity*, or *Weight*; for, whereas they are perpetually in Motion, or striving to move, it is necessary that they be mov'd by that internal Impulse which is called Gravity, or Weight.

There ' first presents itself to us in the Atoms a twofold Motion, one of the Gravity or Weight itself, whereby the Atom is carried after its own way; the other, by Percussion or Reflection, whereby one Atom, being driven upon another, is beaten back again. And as for the Motion of Gravity or Weight, that Motion is first conceived, whereby the Atom is carried on in a *straight* or perpendicular Line. By this Motion are all heavy things moved. But because if all Atoms should be moved in a straight Line, or downwards, and, as it were, straight on, it should come to pass, that one could never overtake the other; it is therefore necessary, that Atoms should go a little *aside*, the least that may be, that so may be produced the Complications, and Adhesions, and Copulations of Atoms to one another, of which may be made the World, and all the Parts of the World, and all things in it.

When I say, That otherwise the Atoms would not overtake one another, and consequently not meet, the Reason is, That the Universe, being infinite, hath no middle or centre towards which they may tend, and so meet; but only there may be conceived, according to what hath been said, some Region above, out of which, without any Beginning, all Atoms, by their Gravity, would descend like Drops of Rain, that is, by Motions in themselves parallel; the other below, into which all, without any Bound, would be carried by the same Motions.

Motion * from Reflection may be understood to be made, as well when the Atom rebounds by great Leaps, as when being impell'd and repell'd within short Spaces, it doth, as it were, quake and tremble. Whence also * it comes to pass, that while it happeneth that the Atoms run into certain Meetings and Complications of many obviating to, and entangling one another, (which is chiefly done in those Compounds where they seem to rest,) yet then they are still unquiet, and, as much as they can, and according as they are further from, or nearer to one another, they get an Agitation, or kind of Palpitation, being bent down, or repress'd by the rest, which make up that Association.

The Cause of this not only longer rebounding, but also shorter Agitation, or, as it were, inward Palpitation, continuing still in those Compounds, is partly the Nature of *Vacuum*, which, being intercepted even within the most compact Bodies plucks all the Atoms asunder from one another, either in whole or in part, not having Power to stay or fix them; partly the Solidity connatural to the Atoms, which by Collision and Repercussion cause a trembling, as much as that Complication will suffer that Motion to be kept still continued by the Stroke of the descending Atoms. Now since Weight or Gravity is a certain Vigour, or Energy, as it were ingenerate in Atoms; and, as I said, an Impulsion, whereby they are fitted for Motion, we must therefore take it for certain, that * Atoms are moved (even with both kinds of Motion, of Weight, and Reflection,) continually, and through all Eternity, because there is no first instant, since which they began to be made; not only Atoms, but also *Vacuum*, which serves for both Motions, being eternal.

We must also take it for certain, that * that " Motion of Atoms, to which nothing occurs, " which may divert it by beating against it, is of so " great Swiftness as it over-runs any imaginable Space in a Moment, that is, in time unimaginably short; for they ought in Velocity to " out-run those Beams of the Sun, which make not " their Course thro' pure Vacuum; I say, to which no " thing occurs that beats it back; for otherwise, this frequent Reverberation makes a kind of Slowness, " as want of Reverberation makes a kind of Swiftness.

" Yet doth not hereupon the Atom, which suffers several Repulsions, arrive at divers Places in " such times as may be discerned by the Mind, for to " discern those Times is not within the Power of the " Mind. Besides, it may so happen, that the same " Atom, though diverted by several Repulses, may " be so carried, as that from whencesoever it comes, " out of that Immenity of Space, we shall not be " able to assign any Place or Term, which in that " time it hath not over-passed. For the Repercussion " on may be such, (that is, so little frequent, and so " little diverting,) that it may in some measure equal " the Swiftness of that Motion which is free from " Repercussion.

" We must lastly take it for certain, That Atoms " are equally swift, soasmuch as they are carried " through Vacuum, neither is there any thing that " resists their Progress: For neither are the heavy " carried on more swiftly than those which are conceived light, seeing nothing occurs that may hinder either; nor the lesser more than the greater, " soasmuch as the Passage is equally free to all, according to their several Magnitudes. Neither do

* Lucret. l. 2. 217.

* Ibid. 2. 1069.

* Plat. plac. 2. 22.

* Lucret. 2. 43.

* Ibid.

* Ibid. 2. 46.

* Ibid.

* Ibid. 2. 43. 61.

"the Motions which are made, either upwards, or obliquely by Collisions, or downwards by their natural Gravity, differ in Swiftneſs; ſince an Atom as long as it is not thruſt on either ſide, ſo long keeps on its way, and that by a Swiftneſs equal to Thought, until being driven on, either extrinſically, or by its own Gravity, it meets with the Reſiſtance or Aſſault of the Atom that ſtrikes it.

"Moreover, as concerning compound Bodies, ſo far as much as Atoms are in their own Nature equally ſwift, therefore one cannot be ſaid to be ſwifter than another; as if the Atoms that are in Compounds, and hurried away by the common Motion of them, were carried away, ſometimes into one Place by a ſenſible Motion, and that continuous, and in ſucceſſive Time, as whiſt ſuch Motion is flow; ſometimes whether into one or more Places, they ſhould be carried in times ſo ſhort, as can only be conceived by Reaſon, as when the Motion is moſt rapid. But we ſhall only ſay, that which way ſoever the Atoms are carried with the Compounds, they are all the while exagitated with inteliſt, moſt frequent, or rather innumerable, and therefore not ſenſible, Repercussions; until the Perpetuity or Succeſſion of the Motion of the whole Body come to be ſuch, as that it may fall under the reach of Senſe.

"For what we fancy concerning the imperceptible Motion of Atoms, as if Times conceived by Reaſon might reach the moſt ſwift Succeſſion of their Parts, is no way true; but rather, whatſoever our Mind, attending to the very Nature of the thing, apprehends, that is to be eſteemed true.

C H A P. IX.

That Atoms (not the vulgar Elements or Homoiomera's) are the firſt Principles of Things.

THIS premifed concerning Atoms, we now muſt ſhew how they are the Principles, or firſt Matter of Things: But becauſe that cannot be done without treating at the ſame time of Generation and Corruption; and that cannot be performed, unleſs we firſt ſpeak of the Qualities of Things, and even before that, of the firſt Cauſes which produce theſe; it is ſufficient in this place to take notice, that Atoms are the Principles and firſt Matter of Things, becauſe they are that firſt and moſt ſimple, of which all generated Things are compounded; as alſo the laſt and moſt ſimple, into which all corruptible Things are reſolved.

I ſay, the firſt and the laſt; for beſides other greater Bulks, of which that which is generated may more nearly be compacted, and into which that which is corrupted may be reſolved, there are little

Lumps, or certain ſmall thin Compounds, which being made by ſome more perfect and indifſoluble Coalitions, are, as it were, long durable Seeds of things; ſo that Things may alſo be ſaid to be generated of Seeds, not as of firſt Principles, becauſe even theſe Seeds are generated of Things precedent, that is, of Atoms. And likewiſe Things may be ſaid to be reſolved into Seeds, but not ultimately, becauſe even theſe may ſtill further be diſſolved into Atoms.

In like manner, the four vulgar Elements commonly admitted, Fire, Air, Water, Earth, may be called Principles, but not the firſt. They may alſo be called Matter, but not the firſt Matter; ſo far as much as they have Atoms precedent to them, of which even they themſelves are compounded.

And they who aſſign one Element only for Principle, will, that of it, by Rarefaction and Condensation, the three other be made, and of theſe afterwards the reſt of things. But how if it be one, and nothing mix'd with it, can any thing be generated? For of Fire (for Inſtance) rarefied, nothing elſe will be produced, but a more languid, or a ſtronger Fire.

And beſides, that they who teach this admit not *Vacuum*, without which, neither Rarefaction nor Condensation can be made. They ſeem not to obſerve, that Fire cannot be ſaid to be changed by Extinction into ſome other thing; becauſe that which is ſimple cannot be changed, unleſs by going away into nothing. Or at leaſt, if they admit that Something common remains, which is firſt Fire, afterwards Air; ſince this Something is the firſt and common Matter, the firſt Matter is not of itſelf either Fire or Air, but rather thoſe Atoms, which being put together on one Faſhion, may make Fire; being put together after another Faſhion, may make Air.

They who admit many, or all things, to be equally firſt, run moreover into this Inconvenience, that making them contrary to one another, they by conſequence make them ſuch, as either can never join to make one Compound; or, if they do, muſt deſtroy one another.

There was a natural Philoſopher, who conceived that all things are generated of tenuous little Bodies, which he called *Homoiomera's*, ſimilar, or like Parts, as it were, viz. to the things generated; ſo as thoſe (for Example) of which hot things are made, are hot; thoſe of which fleſhy things, fleſhy; thoſe of which bloody things, bloody; and ſo of the reſt. But if Principles were of the ſame Nature with the things generated, they might, as well as they, be altered and loſe their Qualities, and ſo be changed, and being of a ſimple Nature go into nothing.

Not to preſs, that if the things, whereby ſomething is made hot, muſt be hot; as if things alike be

4 M 2 not

* Laert. 62.

* Ibid.

* Lucret. l. 1. v. 636.

* Ibid. 636.

* Ibid.

* Ibid. 733.

* Ibid. 830.

* Ibid.

not generated but of their like; there must also be things laughing, that a laughing Animal may be made of them; and things weeping, that a weeping Animal; and the like.

CHAP. X.

Of the first and radical Cause of Compounds, that is, of the Agent or Efficient.

IT followeth, that we speak of *Causes*, since to the making of any thing, is necessary, not only Matter, *of which*, but a Cause, *by which*, it may be made: wherefore to say a Cause, is no other, than to say, that which in the Production of a thing is the Agent, or Efficient.

Now of the things that are made, no other first and radical Cause is to be requir'd, than the same Atoms themselves, as they are endued with that Vigour, by which they are moved, or continually tending to Motion. Neither is it absurd to make Matter active: it is rather absurd to make it unactive; because they who make it such, and yet will have all things to be made out of it, cannot say, from whence the things that are made have their efficient Power, since they cannot have it elsewhere than from Matter.

Therefore, as the first little Compounds made up of Atoms have in themselves a certain Energy or Power to move themselves, and to act, consisting of the Vigors of each several Atom, but variously modify'd; as some of them, mutually entangling one another, are carried hither, others thither; so the greater Compounds, made up of the lesser, have some Power also, and that modify'd according to their Variety; and every natural Body, consisting of those greater and lesser Compounds and Atoms, have a particular Energy, or Power of moving themselves and acting, modify'd by a certain Reason. Thus, Motion or Action ascends to, and proceeds from its very Principles.

Yet we must observe, That though all Atoms are moved alike swiftly, yet within the Compounds themselves, those which are more corner'd and hooked, are entangled and hinder'd, and so made as it were more sluggish and dull, than the smoother and rounder. Wherefore the Energy, or Power of acting, which is in compound Bodies, chiefly comes of these. And because those, of which Fire, the Soul, and those which are more generally termed Spirits, consist, are of this Nature; hence it comes, that the chiefest Energy in Bodies is from those very Spirits; which, as they have Liberty of running up and down, so they have also Dominion within those Bodies.

But forasmuch as all 'Effection, or Action, where-

by Something is made, is either from an internal, or external Principle, it is manifest, that artificial Things, whose Nature is sluggish, and merely passive, own all their Production to the efficient or external Agent. But natural Things, although they borrow some Part of themselves, or some Principle of acting, from an extrinsecal Cause; yet they owe their Production to the Principles contained within themselves, as from which intrinsically, according to all their Parts, they are ordered and co-apted.

Moreover, the very Action of the external Agent is from its own internal Principles, which always fo turn and direct the Action, as that it may with greater Strength sustain the Violence of most things. For even in sensitive Creatures, where there is a kind of voluntary Action, it is therefore such, and carried rather this way than that way, because there occurs to the Mind a *Species* inviting it, rather this way than that way; and the Mind, through the Dominion whereby it ruleth the Spirit contained in the Body, leads them this way, and not that way; and together with them, the Members in which they are.

CHAP. XI.

Of Motion, which is the same with Action, or Effection; and of Fortune, Fate, End, and sympathetic and antipathetical Causes.

IN the mean time, I shall not need to make any Excuse, for that I confound the Action or Effection of a Cause with Motion; since it is known, that both of these are one with Motion, and only add the Connotation; and for that it must be terminated to the thing done or effected.

I understand here no other Motion, than that which is Migration from Place to Place, which for the most part is called Lation, and transient Motion, and local Motion. For thus they name it in Distinction from that Motion, which some use to call Mutation and Alteration; that whereby a thing remaining unmoved, according to its internal Nature, is, as they conceive, changed or altered through Acquisition, or Loss of some Quality, as Heat or Cold.

This Mutation or Alteration is not a *Species* of Motion, distinct from that which is called local Motion or Transfition. Local Motion or Transfition is the *Genus*, this Mutation or Alteration is nothing but a *Species* thereof, to wit, that whereby Moveables are carried through short and undiscernible Intervals. "For whatsoever compound Body is changed according to Quality, is changed altogether by the local and transitive Motion of the Atoms and little Bodies, creating a Quality; whether they be transposed in Place and Situation in the Body itself, or come into it, or pass out of it.

For

For Example: *That of sweet, something bitter be made; or of white, black; it is requisite, the little Bodies which constitute it be transposed, and one come into the Rank of another. But this could not happen, unless those little Bodies themselves were moved by transient Motion. Again, That of hard, something soft be made; and of soft, hard; it is requisite, those Particles whereof it consists be moved locally, so much as by Extension of them it is softened, and by Condensation hardened; whence the Motion of Mutation is not generally different from the Motion of Transposition.*

But to return to that Motion which is proper to the Cause or Efficient, we may observe, that to some Things the Name of Cause is attributed, for that they excite Motion. For *Fortune*, which is a Cause of some Things, can no other way be admitted, than as it is the fame with the self-moving and agent Cause, and only denotes Ignorance of the Effect connected with it, and intended by it. Otherwise, so far is it from being fit to make it a Goddess, as the ordinary Sort of Men do, (for by God nothing is done disorderly) that it is not to be esteemed so much as an unstable Cause.

Even *Fate* also is no other than the self-moving Causes that act by themselves, as they are connected among themselves, and the latter depend on the former; albeit this Connection and Dependence be not of that Dependence and Necessity which some natural Philosophers would persuade; for there is no such Necessity in Nature, since the Motion of the Declination of Atoms, of which we already spoke, breaks it off, so as it intercurs neither in a certain Line, nor in a certain Region of Place.

Likewise an *End* is said to be a Cause, so much as it produceth something, or not produceth it, no otherwise than because it moveth. It moveth, I say, by sending a *Species* into the Soul, which draws and allures it by invisible, yet physical little Hooks and Chains, as it were; by which, for the most part, together with the Soul, the Body also is attracted. Certainly no such Attraction can be understood to be made, unless by some Rebouncings and Intanglings of Atoms.

Informus as even all those things which are said to be done by Sympathy or Antipathy, are performed by physical Causes, that is, by some (unseen indeed, but) very small Organs, which intervening, some things are as truly attracted to, or repelled from one another, as those things which are wrought upon by sensible and grosser Organs are attracted and repelled.

For to explain this by an Example: How think we comes it to pass, that a Lion is not able to endure the Sight of a Cock, but as soon as he sees him runs away? unless there are some little Bodies in the Body of the Cock, which being, as in Looking-glasses, imitted into the Eyes of the Lion, so pierce

his Eye-balls, and cause so sharp Pain, that he is not able to withstand or endure it, how fierce and furious soever he be. But in our Eyes, those Bodies produce nothing like this, being they are of a different Contexture, as shall be shewed when we come to discourse of the Senses.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Qualities of Compound Things in general.

AS concerning the Qualities belonging to compound Things, it is known, that under this Term are comprehended all, as well Adjuncts as Accidents of Things; but chiefly the Adjuncts, whether they be properly Adjuncts, that is, constantly abiding in a compound Body, as long as it perseveres, and not separable from it without destroying: Or more properly and largely taken, that is, as a Mean between Adjuncts, properly so termed, and Accidents, so much as, like these, they exist in them; but in those they come and go, may be with or from a Body, without the Corruption thereof.

The most obvious Question concerning them, is, How it comes to pass that they are in compound Things, when, as we said before, they are not in Atoms, of which compound Things consist? That they are not in Atoms, is already shewn; so much as every Quality that exists in Atoms, as Magnitude, Figure, and Weight, is so natural to them, that it can no more be changed than the very Substance of the Atoms; and this, because in the Dissolution of compound Things, there must needs remain something solid and undissolved; whence it comes, that all Motions which are made, are neither into nothing, nor out of nothing.

We answer, That Qualities arise in compound Things, as well from the Transposition that is made of the Atoms, now fewer, now more; which in one Position afford one Quality; in another, another; as from the Accession that is made of some Atoms wholly new, and the Discession of some pre-existent. Whence these Qualities again are varied, or seem different from what they were at first.

For as Letters give a divers Representation of themselves, not only those which are of different Figure and Form, as *A* and *N*, but even the same Letters, if their Position or Order be changed; Position, as in *N* and *Z*; Order, as in *AN*, and *NA*: So, not only Atoms, which are of divers Figures, (as also of different Bulk and Motion) are naturally apt to affect divers Senses; and, in one, to exhibit Colour; in another, Odour; in a third, Sapor; in a fourth, another: But also those which are of the same, if they change the Position or Order among them, affect the Senses in such manner, that those

(for

(for Example) which now exhibit one Colour, presently exhibit another; as we before instanc'd in the Water of the Sea, which, being still, seemeth green; troubled, white; and, as is ordinarily instanc'd, the Neck of a Pigeon, which, according as it is variously placed towards the Light, receiveth a great Variety of Colours.

And as there is made a Diversity, not only when the same Letters which compose one Word are so transpos'd, as that they exhibit divers Forms, but much more, when some are added to them, and some taken away from them; in like manner it is necessary, that Colours, Odours, and other Qualities, be changed, not only when the same Atoms change their Position and Order, but likewise when some come to them, some depart from them; as is manifest from the softning, hardning, crudescence, ripening of things, and the like.

Briefly, as it is of great Concernment amongst Letters, with what other Letters they are joined, and in what Position and Order they are among themselves; since, by so small a Number of Letters, we signify the Heaven, the Earth, the Sun, the Sea, Rivers, Fruits, Shrubs, living Creatures, and innumerable such like: So is it of great Concernment amongst Atoms, with what others they are joined, and in what other Position, and in what Intervals and Connections, what Motions amongst one another they give or receive; so far as by this means they are able to exhibit the Variety, as of all things, so of all Qualities in them.

To speak more particularly: Some Qualities first seem to arise out of Atoms, as consider'd according to Substance; and being in such Position amongst themselves, as that they have a greater or lesser *Vacuum* intercepted or excluded. Other Qualities are made of them, as they are endued with their three Properties, some from a single Property, others from a Conjunction of more.

CHAP. XIII.

Qualities from Atoms consider'd, according to their Substance, and Interception of Vacuum.

AND after the first manner arise *Rarity* and *Density*; for it is manifest, that no Dense thing can be made Rare, unless the Atoms thereof, or the Parts of which it is compounded, (they themselves being compounded of Atoms) be so put asunder from one another, that, being diffus'd into a larger Place, they intercept within it more and larger Vacuities. Neither can any thing Rare be made Dense, unless its Atoms or Parts be so thrust up together, as that, being reduced into a narrower Place, they comprehend it in fewer, or more contracted Vacuities. Moreover it is manifest, that, according to the more

or lesser Vacuum which is intercepted, the Air (for Example) or Light is said to be Rare; but a Stone, Iron, and the like, said to be Dense.

Together with these seem to arise *Perfpicuity* and *Opacity*; for every thing is so much more perfpicuous (other Respects being equal) by how more it is too Rare; so much more opacous, by how much it is more Dense: Because the more Rare is the more patient to lucid and visible Beams; the more Dense, the more obstructive of them. But I say, (other Respects being equal) a more thick Body, as Glass, may have little vacuous Passages placed in so straight a Line, that the Beams may pass more easily thro' it, than through a rarer Body; as a Leaf of Colewort, whose small Pores are peeter'd with little Bodies variously permix'd; even the Beams themselves are cut off, unless they pass through straight Holes, such as are in Glass.

Again, there ariseth also *Fluidity*, *Liquidity*, and *Firmness*: For a Body seemeth to be fluid for no other Reason, than because the Atoms, or Parts whereof it consists, have little Vacuities lodg'd within them, and are withal so dissociated from one another, as that they are easily moveable, one in order to another, through the Non-resistance of the little Vacuities. Neither doth any thing seem to be firm from any other Cause than the contrary hereof; that is, the Atoms and Parts touch one another so closely, and are so coherent to one another, that for the same Reason they cannot be moved out of their Situation; for such Atoms there may be, as, being more hooked, and as it were more branching, may hold the Body more closely compacted. How Water, in particular, being liquid, becomes harden'd into Ice, shall be said hereafter.

Likewise those Qualities which depend of these, *Humidity* and *Siccity*. *Humidity* is a kind of Fluidness; only it superadds this, That the Parts of a humid Thing, touching some Body, or penetrating into it, are apt to stick to it, thereby rendering it moist. *Siccity* is a kind of Firmness, adding only this, That a dry Body is void of Humidity.

Moreover, *Softness* and *Hardness*, which cohere with these, and, upon another Account, agree also with *Rarity* and *Density*; inasmuch as (other Respects being equal) every Body is so much the more soft, by how much the more rare; and so much the more hard, by how much the more compact; I say (other Respects being equal) because Dirt is soft, and a Pumice hard, by reason of the greater Cohesion of the Parts, which peeter the Cavities, and resist the Touch, and cannot retire into the hindermost Cavities, as otherwise they would.

There are others which depend upon these; as, *Flexility*, *Tactility*, *Ductility*, and others, from Softness; their Opposites, from Hardness: but 'tis enough to have hinted them.

C H A P. XIV.

Qualities springing from Atoms, considered according to the Properties peculiar to each.

IN the second Manner, and as far as the Properties of Atoms are considered particularly: In the first place, the Magnitude, Quantity, or Bulk of every Thing ariseth no other way than from the coacervate Magnitude of the Atoms of which it is compounded. Whence it is manifest, that *Augmentation* and *Diminution* of Bodies is therefore made, because Atoms, wheresoever they arrive, give to the Things an Increase; wheresoever they go away, they diminish them.

Not to mention, that according as the Atoms are greater or lesser, may be made that which we call *Bluntness* or *Acuteness*. And thence a Reason may be given, why the Fire of Lightning is more penetrative than that of a Taper: Or how it comes, that Light passeth through Horn, which resists Rain, and the like.

Besides, the very Figure of Things, though it did not depend upon the Figure of Atoms, (whereas it seems to depend upon them, in all Things which are constantly produced in the same Figure) yet it is generally at least true, that every Body is therefore figured, because it consists of Parts terminate and figure; for Figure is a Term, or Bound.

Thus, though out of Smoothness, and Roughness, (which, as I said, are allied to the Figure of Atoms) it doth not necessarily follow, that Things smooth are made of smooth, rough Things of rough: Yet in general, nothing can be conceived to be smooth, but whose Parts to the least of them are smooth; nor rough, but whose Parts are rough.

Here observe, that as well from the Figure, as from the Magnitude, the Reason may be given, why Wine floweth easily through a Strainer; but Oil more slowly, which is, that the Oil may consist not of greater Atoms only, but also of more hooked and much intangled among themselves.

Lastly, *Weight*, or the Motive Faculty which is in every Thing, can rise no other Way than from the Weight or Mobility of Atoms. But that being declared formerly, we shall here only observe, that all Atoms are heavy, and none light; wherefore every compound Body is heavy, there is none that is light; or that is not of itself ready to tend downwards. Here presently comes in Fire for an Objection; but although it foregoeth not its Propension downwards, yet it therefore tendeth upwards; forasmuch as it is driven that way by the ambient Air: After the same manner as we see with great Force the Water resist Logs and Beams, Things otherwise heavy; and the deeper we plunge them, the more eagerly it casts them up, and sends them back. Whence it comes that those Things, which we call

light, are not absolutely light; as if, of their own accord, they did tend upwards, but only comparatively. that is, as they are less heavy, and extruded by the more heavy, which press themselves down before them. So as Earth being the most heavy, Water less heavy, Air yet less heavy than that, and Fire least of all; the Earth drives the Water upwards, and far from the Middle; Water the Air; Air the Fire: But if we suppose the Earth to be taken away, the Water will come to the Middle; if the Water, the Air; if the Air, the Fire.

C H A P. XV.

Qualities from Atoms, considered according to their Properties taken together.

BUT Properties of Atoms being taken together, and those things especially of which we have hitherto spoken, Rarity, Density, and the rest, being commixt and varied, there arise Faculties of Things, which being active and motive, have it from the Weight and Mobility of the Atoms: And whereas some act one way, some another, they must of necessity have it, as well from the peculiar Magnitude and Figure of the Atoms, as from their various Order and Position amongst themselves, as from their Looseness, Compactness, Connection, Separation, &c.

Of this kind, are not only in Animals, the Faculties of Sense, Sight, Hearing, Smelling, Tasting, Touching, wherewith they can perceive sensible things; but also, in the things themselves those very Qualities which are called sensible. These are, in Things, the Faculties of striking, and affecting the Senses, after a certain manner, to the end they may be perceived by them; as Colour and Light, the Sight; Sound, the Hearing; Odor, the Smell; Sapor, the Taste; Heat and Cold (above the rest) the Touch. Whence it comes, that being to speak of those hereafter, we ought not here to omit these: To treat of which will be worth our Pains.

To begin from Heat: We cannot treat of it, without joining Light to it, for without Light there are no Colours, the Variety of Colours being taken away by Night; whence in the Internal Region, all things are said to be black. But though in Darkeness, all things are alike discolour'd, nevertheless, in themselves, or in their Superficies, there are Dispositions of extreme Particles, by reason of which the assued Light is so variously modify'd, that, together with this Modification reflected on the Eye, it exhibits various Colours in the Eye; as white, for Example, when the Ball receiveth into itself one kind of Blow or Stroke; black, when another, &c.

For though Colours are not coherent to Bodies, but generated according to some respective Sites, Orders, and Positions, yet are they not generated, unless

less Light also be adjoined to the Dispose of their Superficies, to compleat or make up the perfect Nature of Colour. Neither, setting this aside, do I see how it can be said, that Bodies which are in the dark invisible, have Colour.

And indeed, since not only a Pigeon's Neck, a Peacock's Train, and the like, exhibit several Colours, according to their several Positions to the Light; but also even all other things appear sometimes in some Colours, sometimes in others, according as they are placed in several Degrees of Light, what else should we conceive, but that generally it is Light, by whose coming things put on Colours, and by its Departure lose them.

In the mean time, Light itself, being nothing else but a substantial Effluxion from a lucid Body, is not visible of itself, but only in Colour, as that is a Part of it; for neither is it seen through a pure or liquid Medium; neither when we imagine that we see it, either in a lucid or an illuminate Body, is it beheld as a thing distinct from the Colour of the thing lucid or illuminate. In fine, neither is Shadow (the Privation thereof) in any other manner, than as because it is withal the Privation of Colour in a thing shadowed, which loseth Colour always by the same Proportion as it loseth the Light. How it comes to pass, that Shadow, though it be a mere Privation, yet seems to be moved, was declared in the Canonick.

Sound is nothing but an Effluxion of tenuous little Bodies, sent out from the Thing (speaking, sounding, or what way soever making a Noise, and apt, by entering into the Ear, to affect the Hearing.

That it is a corporeal Effluxion, is proved, in that it moveth the Sense, and that either by touching it smoothly and delightfully, or roughly and unpleasantly, according to the Smoothness or Roughness of the little Bodies. Also in that it is moved through the Air, and being driven against solid Bodies, leaps back, whence Echo is made, viz. by Reason of the Solidity of the little Bodies. Also in that it is diminished, and becomes confused, in regard of the long Train of little Bodies, when it goes forward, or their swerving while they go overthwart, through some thicker Partition, and the like.

If you demand, why Sound can pass, where Light and the Species of Colour cannot, as when we speak, the Doors being shut; the Reason is, because Light, or the Images of Colour, cannot pass but in a direct Line; but Sound can insinuate itself thro' oblique Tracks. For being excited, it leaps forward in little Bodies which turn upwards, downwards, forwards, backwards, on the right Side, and every Way; in like manner as a Spark of Fire sometimes scatters itself into little Sparkles, which take a direct Course towards all sides.

The same may be said of *Odor*. For this also is

an Effluxion, which going out of the odorous thing, is diffused every way, and, arriving at the Nostrils, moveth the Sense of Smelling, either by stroking, or pricking it. This is corporeal also, even more than Sound, in that it passeth more slowly through Space, and cometh not from so great a Distance, and penetrates not through those Partitions, through which Sound doth penetrate.

As concerning *Sapor*, there is this Difference, that tho' it consist in little Bodies, contained in the thing it's self sapid; yet they issue not forth into the Tongue and Palate at a Distance; but then only, when the thing sapid is applied to the Tongue, they so insinuate themselves into it, that they affect the Texture of it, either mildly, and then make a sweet Taste; or roughly, and so they make a fowre Taste.

As for *Heat* and *Cold*, that Sensation which they cause, is to be referred to the *Touch*. But though many of the foresaid Qualities properly appertain to the Touch, as Hardness, Softness, Humidity, Siccity, and the rest, which require Application of the Thing touched to the Hand, or to some other part of the Body; yet, these too may be felt, not only when the hot or cold thing is applied to the Hand, or some other part; but also when it is remote, and at such a Distance as it can transmit some little Bodies out of itself into it.

Heat indeed is chiefly an Effluxion of little Bodies or Atoms, in Bulk slender, in Figure round, in Motion swift. For as they are slender, there is no Body compacted, that they find not little Pores, through which they insinuate into it; as they are round, they are easily moved, and insinuate themselves every where; as they are swift, they rapidly are impelled, and enter into the Body, and more and more still succeeding one another, they are so pressed, as that they penetrate thro' the whole; and if they proceed in acting, they sever and dislocate the parts thereof, and at last dissolve the whole. Such the Effects of Heat, and chiefly the fiery, (for Fire is nothing but intense Heat) towards all Bodies, and in a living Creature is only added the Sense of Heat, which is from the plucking asunder, and loosening what before was continued.

Cold is an Effluxion also, but of Atoms, whose Bulk is greater, their Figure more corner'd, their Motion slower; for, the Effects being contrary, the Principles must also be contrary. So that whereas Heat disgregates and disperses, Cold compresseth and configures: And in a sensitive Creature, it doth this with a particular kind of Sensation; for, entering into the Pores of the Skin, it keeps back, and drives in again the little Bodies of Heat, by opposing the Bodies of Cold, and with its little sharp Corners, it tears and twingeth all things wheresoever it passes.

C H A P. XVI.

Of those Qualities which are esteemed the Accidents of Things; and particularly of Time.

IT remains, that we a little touch those Qualities which are not so much Adjuncts as Accidents, and therefore affect not the thing internally, but externally only, and qualify them with a certain kind of respect to some extrinsecal thing. Not but that within the things themselves also there are some Accidents (such are Position, Order, Intervals of Parts or Particles, and the like) but that being such, they are Accidents of the Parts themselves, not of the whole, which consists of them.

Accidents of this kind, are all those generally out of which ariseth some Relation, for which every thing is said to be such or such, in order to another; as like, unlike; greater, lesser; many, few; superior, inferior; right, left; cause, effect; giving, receiving, and innumerable of the same kind.

But it is known, that Relation is a Work of the Mind, referring and comparing one to another; so that, setting aside the Mind, every thing is that only which it is in itself, but not that which it is in respect of another. Whence, to Accidents we formerly referred Liberty and Health, Riches and Poverty, &c. because, setting the Mind aside, a Man is nothing but a Man; not free or subject, rich or poor, &c.

Now of all Accidents, there is one which may be termed the *Accident of Accidents*, that is *Time*, from which all things are denominated, either present or past or future, lasting or little, durable or momentary, sometimes also swift or slow.

For first, that Time is an Accident, is manifest in that it is not any thing by itself, but only attributed to things by Cogitation, or the Mind, as they are conceived to persevere in the State in which they are, or to cease to be, and to have a longer or shorter Existence, and to have it, or to have had it, or to be to have it. Whence it comes, that *Time is not to be enquired after the same manner as we enquire after other things, which are in some Subject, setting aside the Mind; and therefore, neither to understand what it is, must it be referred to the Productions of Things which occur to our Sight; but we ought to discourse of it according to Evidence, using familiar Speech: And not entangling ourselves in Circumlocutions, we say, Time is long or short.*

Moreover, we call it the *Accident of Accidents*; because, whereas some things cohere by themselves as a Body, and as a *Vacuum* or Space; others happen, or are accident to the Coherent, as Days, Nights, Hours; as also Passions and Exemptions from them, as Motion, Rest, &c. Time, by the Assistance of the Mind, presupposeth all these Accidents, and supervenes to them.

For Day and Night are Accidents of the ambient Air; Day happens by the Sun's Illumination; Night by Privation of the solar Illumination. Hour being a part of Night or Day, is an Accident of the Air also, as likewise are Night and Day; but Time is co-extended with every Day, and Night, and Hour; and for this Reason a Day or Night is said to be long or short, whilst we are carried by Thought to Time that supervenes to them according to the former Notions.

In the same manner happen Passions, and Inclinations, and Grievs, and Pleasures to us; and therefore they are not Substances, but Accidents of those things which are affected by them; to wit, by Sense of Delectation, or of Trouble. But these Accidents cannot without Time.

Moreover, the Motion and Rest, as we have always declared, are Accidents of Bodies, neither are they without Time; wherefore we measure the Swiftness and Slowness of Motion by Time, as also much or little Rest. And forasmuch as none understand Time by itself, or separate from the Motion and Rest of things; therefore by understanding things done, as the *Trojan War*, and the like, which are done with Motion, and are Accidents partly of the Men acting, partly of the Places in which they are acted; together with them is understood their Time, as they are compared to our Affairs, and the Existence of the things intervening betwixt those and us.

C H A P. XVII.

Of the Generation and Corruption of Compounds.

IT remains that we add, how things are generated and corrupted, either of which is some kind of Mutation or Alteration. But whereas by other Mutations, a Body is not made and exists new; but only that which now is, acquires a new Quality, and a new Denomination from it; *Generation* is a Mutation, whereby every Body is first produced, and begins in Nature to be, and to be denominated such. *Corruption* is a Mutation, whereby it is at last dissolved, and ceases to be in Nature, and to be denominated such; for thus Fire, a Plant, an Animal, and whatsoever is in a determinate Genus of Bodies, when it first ariseth into the Light, and beginneth to be denominated such, is said to be generated; when it goeth out of the Light, and can no longer be denominated such, to be corrupted.

When I say, that a Body is first produced, or beginneth to be, I mean not, but that whatsoever is in it of Substance, Body, or corporeal, was before; for all the Atoms, and little Bulks or Seeds, of which it is compounded, were before. As when a House is said to be made, the Stones, Wood, and the

rest whereof it is said to be built, are understood to be pre-existent. But I only mean, that the Atoms and Seeds thereof are so commixt, and so united, as that they are in a new Manner, or in a new Form, wherein they were not before; and therefore a Body resulting thence, then first begins to be, and be denominated such.

Hence, because there ariseth not so much a new Substance, as a new Quality in Compounds, it cometh to pass, that Generation is a *Species* of Mutation or Alteration; and so is Corruption likewise, but in a contrary manner. Wherefore also it comes to pass, that Generation and Corruption are performed only by conjoining and disjoining those Principles, and not by changing them, because the Atoms, as we said, are incapable of Change.

"And indeed,* seeing all change, (as we have already said, and shall shortly say again,) is performed either by Transposition, adding, or taking away of Parts; it followeth, that Atoms, being so compact and solid, as that none of their Particles can be transposed, added, or taken away, are immutable and incorruptible, and such also are their Properties; of which sort are those little Magnitudes, and little Figures peculiar to them; for it is necessary that these also remain with the Substance of the Atoms when the Compounds are dissolved; and with good reason, seeing that also in those things which we transform at our Pleasure, as when a Man, of standing or upright, becomes sitting, or bowed, (or, if you will, is made black or hot,) it is ever understood, that the same Magnitude, Figure, and Order of Parts are in them.

"But the Qualities that are not in them, or proper to them, as standing, straightness, white, cold, &c. remain not in the Subject, after its Transmutation, as the others do, but perish, or are lost to the whole Body, or to the part wherein they were."

Since therefore Principles are intransmutable, and in Generation are no other than mingled and put together, it follows that no such Mixture can be made, as is a perfect Confusion by Coalition, but only that which is a compounding by Apposition; and this, whether those little Bulks made up of Atoms are only mingled, or whether also the Atoms themselves be mingled with those little Bulks resolved into their Atoms, or first Principles; whence it follows that the Destruction of those little Bulks, and of the Bodies consisting of them, as Wine, and Water, Honey, and the like, goeth accompanied with the Generation of the mixt Body, and of the other little Bulks, which are proper to it; not as if Water and Wine, (for Example) but as if aqvifying and vinifying Atoms (as I may say) were mingled together.

And to the Generation, which is made in an infinite *Vacuum*, we must conceive, that the Atoms se-

vered from one another, and differing amongst themselves in Figure, Magnitude, Position and Order, are carried thro' the *Vacuum*, and, where they concur, being mutually entangled, are condensed; whence it happens, that a different Temperature of the thing results; for they are conjoined according to Proportion of Magnitude, Figures, Positions, Order, and by this means the Generation of compound things comes to be perfected.

But where the Generation of one is made out of the Corruption of another, that usually happens after a threefold manner, which we touched, speaking of Alteration; either only by *Transposition* of the Parts or Atoms, as when a Frog is generated of Dirt, a Mite of Cheese; or by *Addition* of Things accessory, as when, by Accession of the Seed to a greater Mass, (as of Rennet into Milk, or of Leaven into Dough) there is begotten a Plant or Animal; after which manner also Augmentation is made, by which the generated thing becomes bigger: Or lastly, by *taking away* something pre-existent, as when Fire is generated by the severing of watery, airy, or other Parts which were in Wood; Wax, by the severing of Honey which was in the Comb; and so of the rest.

Here the former Comparison of Letters will serve to make us understand two things. One, that the particular Manners of Generation, and their opposite Corruptions, which may be comprehended under any of these three manners, are (if not infinite, at least) innumerable, inexpressible, and incomprehensible, since of four and twenty Letters only, which are in the Alphabet, there may be produced a Multitude of Words almost incomprehensible.

The other is, that as Words, accommodated to Pronunciation and Reason, are not made of every Combination of Letters; so in natural things, all things are not made of all things; nor are all Atoms fit, by being joined together, to constitute any *Species* of compound things. For every thing requires such a Disposition, as that the Atoms constituting it match, and, as it were, associate themselves with those which are agreeable to them, but pass by, and, as it were reject others. Whence again it comes to pass, that when a thing is dissolved, all the agreeing Atoms draw from one another mutually, and disengagethemselves from those which are disagreeing. This is manifestly seen in Nutrition, which is Aggeneration, and is evident even from this, that otherwise Monsters would be ordinarily generated, as half Men, half Beasts; Chimera's, and Zoophytes.

In a word, certainly he never had the least Taste of Physiology, who conceiveth, that any thing which is generated can be eternal; for what Composition is there which is not dissolvable? Or what is there that hath a Beginning and no End? Though there were no external Causes to destroy its Frame,

yet

yet wants there not an intestine Motion, and, even within the most compact and durable Bodies, an unvanquishable Inclination of Atoms downwards, whence their Dissolution must necessarily follow.

Yet, this Dissolution is not always immediately made into Atoms, but, for the most part, into little Bulks, or parts compounded of them; which are certain kinds of compound Bodies, as when there is a Dissolution of Wood, partly into Fire, partly into Smoke, partly into some waterish Moisture, partly into Ashes. But what way soever it be done, we must always hold, that in Generation there is no new Substance made, but præ-existent Substances are made up into one; so in Corruption, no Substance absolutely ceaseth to be, but is dissipated into more Substances, which remain after the Destruction of the former.

C H A P. XVIII.

Whence it comes, that a generated Body is in a certain kind of things, and distinguished from other things.

Moreover, seeing that every Body is generated only of the Aggregation of Matter, or of material and substantial Principles, knitting together in a certain Order and Position; therefore, that which is concrete or generated, is understood to be nothing else but the Principles themselves, as they are knit together in such an Order or Position, and thereupon are exhibited in such a Form or Quality.

This Form or Quality, whereby a thing generate is established in such a certain kind of things, as of Metal, or of Stone, or of Plant, or of Animal, and is distinguished from all the *Species* and *Individuums* of the *Genus* wherein it is; this Form, I say, is not one and simple, but rather, as it were, an Aggregation and Collection of many, which Collection cannot be found in any thing but in this.

“Wherefore we must here observe, that the Figures of things, their Colours, Magnitude, Gravity, and (in a word) all other Qualities which are usually predicated of a compound Body, as its Accidents, whether perceived by Sight, or by other (Senses) are so to be understood; not as if they were certain Natures or Substances, existent by themselves, (for our Understanding cannot reach this;) nor, on the other side, as if truly they did not exist, or were absolutely nothing; neither again, as if they were such, as are those other incorporeal things which are accident to it; nor, lastly, as if they were Parts of the Body. But they are thus to be esteemed, that whereas a Body may be disposed after several manners, the whole Complex gains, by the Aggregation of them, a certain Nature proper and peculiar to its kind.

“Not that a Body comes to be such, as is a greater Bulk made up out of a lesser, whether those be the first, least, greatest, or in general made up of others more minute; but only, as I said, that of all these joined together, and by this Conjunction on differing it from others, it possesse a Nature proper to itself, and distinct from any other.

“All these are comprehended by certain special Notions and Conceptions, but so, that still the Body which results out of them as a certain Whole, and is not divided in itself, but conceived as one undivided thing, obtains the Denomination of a Body, which is reckon’d up in such a certain kind of things.”

The same may, in a manner, be conceived to happen, by the Concurrence of certain Accidents, which are found the same in no other Body; that is, the things indeed to which those Accidents agree, may be distinguished and denominated from the Notions of them, but yet only then, when each of those Accidents is conceived to be there: For these are not of that kind of Accidents, which, existing in the thing, become therefore necessarily and perpetually conjoin’d to it, and consequently bestow on it a perpetual Denomination.

Here it may be demanded, Whether, if we were dissolved by Death, it might happen, in Process of Time, that the very same Principles, of which we consist, might, by some odd Chance, be ranged and ordered again in the same manner as they are now; and so we come to be denominated the same which we are at this present? To which we answer, That it is doubtless true, but still so, that to have been formerly would nothing appertain to us, because in our very Dissolution, every Disposition which we had, and all Memory of those things which compounded us, and which we were, would utterly be lost; by which means, all our Remembrance too would so have been totally decay’d, that it were impossible it should come into our Minds that we had ever had a Being. Thus much concerning the Universe.

S E C T. II.

Of the World.

IT followeth, that we speak of the World, which is a Portion of the Universe, or Infinity of things, and may not unfitly be described, *The whole Circumference of Heaven, containing the Stars the Earth, and all things visible.*

When I say, the *Circumference of Heaven*, I imply, that Heaven is the utmost Part of the World, which may also be called *Æther*, and the Region of Fire, from the Stars which it containeth, and are, as it were, Fires lighted there.

When I say the *Earth*, I mean the lowest, or, as it were, the middle Part of the World, in which also there is the Water, and next over it the Air, immediate to the Region of Fire. And because the things which we see created of these, and in these, are various, therefore we comprehend them under the Name of *things visible*.

But seeing it may, and useth to be demanded concerning the World, What Form it hath within, what Figure without? Whether it be Eternal, or had a Beginning? Whether it require any other Author than Nature or Fortune? In what manner was the Production of the Whole, and of its Parts? Whether it require any Ruler, or perform its Vicissitudes by itself? Whether, How, and When it shall perish? Whether it be One, or, besides it, there be Innumerable? We must therefore speak a little of each.

C H A P. I.

Of the Form and Figure of the World.

AND, as to the first Head, the World, by its internal Form or Constitution, is not animate, much less a God, as some think; but whereas what is conceived to be one in its Form or Constitution, is such, either for that its Parts are contained under one Disposition, as a Plant or Animal; or, that they are artificially joined one to another, without mingling their Tempers, as a House, or Ship; or, that they are discretely distinguish'd from one another, yet have some mutual Relation to each other, as an Army and a Commonwealth; the World is only to be conceived one, partly the second way, partly the third.

The second way it may be esteemed one, in regard between the Sun, the Moon, and the rest of the more solid and compacted Parts of the World, there is intercepted either Air or *Æther* diffusive, whereby a kind of Coherence is made. It may also be esteemed one the third way, in regard the Sun, Moon, Earth, and other compacted Bodies, are so separated from one another, that, after a determinate Order, they possess the Situations or Seats of Superiors and Inferiors, Antecedents and Consequents, Things Illustrating and Things Illustrated.

But to say, that the World is one the first way also, How can it be made good? Since that if it were so, that the World, as some will, were animate, nothing could be thought inanimate; not a Stone, not a Carcase, not any thing whatsoever; that same Disposition, called Soul, being diffused through all things.

Neither do they, who assert the World to be animate and wise, sufficiently mind and understand, what kind of Nature that must be to which such Expressions are proper, since as a Tree is not produced in the Air, nor a Fish on dry Ground, nor Blood

in Wood, nor Moisture in a Furnace; so neither can the Mind or the Soul be produced, or be, indifferently, in any kind of Body. But seeing it must be determinately ordered where every thing shall grow and inexist, the Nature of the Soul must be looked for about the Nerves and Blood, not in putrid Globes of Earth, in Water, in the Sun, in the Sky, &c.

Now whereas some hold, That the World is not only endued with Mind and Senses, but that also it is a round burning God, and ever moving with restless Circumvolutions; these are Prodigies and Monsters, not of Philosophers discoursing, but dreaming. For who can understand, what this ever-moving and round God is, and what Life is ascribed to him, to be turned about with so great Swiftnesse, as is unimaginable to be equalld? With which I see not how a constant Mind and a happy Life can consist.

But granting the World to be a God, not only the Sun, Moon, and the rest, are Parts of God, but even the Earth itself, as being a part of the World, must be also a Part of God. Now we see, there are very great Regions of the Earth uninhabitable, and uncultivated, part of them being burnt up by the Approach of the Sun, part being oppressed with Snow and Ice through his Distance from it. If then the World be God, these, being the Parts of the World, are to be termed, some, the burning; some, the frozen Members of God.

As to its external Form or Figure, it seems, in the first Place, certain, that there is some Extremity of the World, because the World is a kind of Segment of the infinite Universe; but what that is, who is able to tell, unless he came thence?

For whereas it seems to be Heaven, there is nothing in all apparent things hinders, but that it may be Rare, nor nothing hinders but that it may be Dense; Rare, so far as the Stars which are in it, and appear to be moved, perform their Motions through it; Dense, so far as itself is able to move the Stars fixed in it.

Again, nothing hinders but that it may be either quiescent, if the Stars are moved through it; or circularly moved, if the Stars are carried round about with it.

Besides, nothing hinders but that it may be round, oval, or lenticular, especially if it be moved. Again, nothing hinders but that it may be triangular, pyramidal, square, hexadrical, or of any other plain Figure, especially if it be unmoved.

As for them, who, being persuaded by some Arguments, assert the World so to have one determinate Figure, as that it can have no other, we cannot but wonder at their Stupidity. For most maintain the World to be, as immortal and blessed, so also round, because *Plato* denieth any Figure to be more beautiful than that. But, to me, that of the Cylinder, or the Square, or the Cone, or the Pyramid,

ramid, seem, by reason of the Variety, more beautiful.

CHAPTER II.

Of the late Beginning of the World.

AS for the second Head. The World is not Eternal, but began to be at some time.

For first, seeing that the Nature of the Whole and of the Parts is the same; and we observe that the Parts of the World are obnoxious both to Generation and Corruption, it follows, That the whole World must be subject to Generation and Corruption. That the Parts of the World are generated and corrupted, is demonstrated even by the Sense, and shall be proved hereafter.

Neither let any say, that the Mutations which are made in the Parts of the World are not of the more principal Parts, as of the Sun, the Moon, the Earth, and the rest; but of the lesser only which are but Particles, whereof the Principal consist; for he ought to conceive, that if the principal Parts consist of Parts subject to Mutation, those whole Parts themselves are subject to Mutation; and though ordinarily there occur not Causes so powerful as to change them, nevertheless nothing hinders, but that such may sometimes occur; as even among the lesser Parts, some continue safe a great while, which, at last, in Progress of Time, find Causes of Mutation.

Besides, seeing that the most ancient Histories of all Things exceed not the *Thban* and *Trojan* Wars, what is the Reason of this, but because the World is not old, so far is it from being eternal? For if eternal, why did not other Poets celebrate other things? How came the memorable Acts of so many eminent Persons to perish? Why are the Records of eternal Fame no where extant?

In like manner, seeing that we have all Arts newly invented, and their Inventors are not unknown, (for, that daily many Arts are advanced and receive Increase, is very manifest,) how comes this to pass, but because the World had not its Beginning long ago? For the World could not be so long without Arts, which are of so great Importance to Life.

If you believe that in Times past there were such Records and Arts as now, which perished by some great Conflagrations, Deluges, Earthquakes, being subverted, together with the Cities and Nations themselves, do you not acknowledge it necessary, that there must be at some time to come a Destruction of Earth and Heaven, as it had happen'd, if in those Cases some greater Causes had lighted? For we ourselves think ourselves mortal, for no other Reason, but for that we perceive ourselves to fall into the same Diseases as they whom we see die.

The World therefore had a Beginning; nor was, as may appear by what we said, of very great Anti-

quity. But whensoever it begun, it is most probable it begun in the Spring, because then all things sprout, flourish, and bring forth; and the Newness of the World required a temperate Heat and Cold for the cherishing of its young Brood, before it should pass to either of the Extremes.

CHAPTER III.

Of the Cause of the World.

AS to the next Head, we must first acquit the divine Power from the Solitude and Labour of framing the World, for it could not be a Cause blessed and immortal that made it.

With what Eyes could *Plato* look upon the Fabrick of so great a Work, as to conceive the World made and built by God? What Designs, What Tools, What Beams, What Engines, What Ministers, in so great a Task? How could Air, Fire, Water, Earth, obey and serve the Will of the Architect? Whence sprung those five Forms, of which the rest also are framed, lighting aptly to make up Mind and Senses? It were too long to repeat all, which are rather in our Wish, than in our Power to find out.

Again, this God, of whom he speaks, either was not in the former Age, wherein Bodies were either immovable, or moved without any Order; or he then slept or wak'd; or did neither. The first cannot be admitted, for God is Eternal; nor the second, for if he slept from Eternity he was dead, Death being an eternal Sleep. But neither is God capable of Sleep, for the Immortality of God, and a thing near Death, are far asunder. Now if he were awake, either something was wanting to his Felicity, or he was perfectly happy. But the first would not allow him to be happy; for he is not happy who wants any thing to make up his Felicity: The latter is absurd, for 'twere a vain Action for him who wants nothing, to trouble himself with making any thing.

To what End then, should God desire to adorn the World with fair Figures and Luminaries, as one that dresseth and sets out a Temple? If, to the End that he might better his Habitation, it seems then, that for an infinite time before, he lived in Darkness as in a Dungeon. Again, can we think, that afterwards he was delighted with the Variety wherewith we see the Heaven and the Earth adorned? What Delight can that be to God, which, were it such, he could not so long have wanted it?

But some will say, That these were ordained by God for the sake of Men. Do they mean of the Wise? Then this great Fabrick of Things was made for a very few Persons. Or of the Foolish? There was no Reason he should do such a Favour to the Wicked. Again, What hath he got by doing

fo, ſince all Fools are even in that regard moſt miſerable; for what more miſerable than Folly? Beſides, there being many Inconveniences in Life, which the Wife ſweeten by Compensations of the Conveniences; Fools can neither prevent the future, nor ſuſtain the preſent.

Or, Did he make the World, and, in the World, Men, that he might be worſhipped by Men? But what dorth the Worſhip of Men advantage God, who is happy and needeth nothing? Or, if he reſpect Man ſo much, as that he made the World for his ſake, that he would inſtruct him in Wiſdom, that he would make him Lord over all living Creatures, that he would love him as his Son; Why did he make him mortal and frail? Why did he ſubject him, whom he loveth, to all Evils? Seeing rather a Man ought to be happy, as conjoined with, and next unto God, and immortal, as he himſelf is, whom he is made to worſhip and contemplate.

For theſe Reaſons ought we to ſay, that the World rather was made by Nature; or, as one of the natural Philoſophers ſaid, by Chance.

By Nature; for ſuch is the Nature of the Atoms, running through the Immenſity of the Univerſe, that in great abundance running againſt one another, they can lay hold of, entangle, and engage one another; and variously conmixing themſelves, firſt roll up a great kind of Chaos, in manner of a great Vortex, (Clue or Bottom) and then after many Convolutions, Evolutions, and making ſeveral Efforts, and as it were Attempts, trying all kinds of Motions and Conjunctions, they came at laſt into that Form which this World bears.

By Chance; for the Atoms concur, cohere, and are co-apted, not by any Deſign, but as Chance led them. Wherefore, as I ſaid, Chance is not ſuch a Cauſe, as directly, and of itſelf, tends to mingle the Atoms, and diſpoſe them to ſuch Effect; but the very Atoms themſelves are called Chance, inasmuch as meeting one another, without any Premeditation, they fallen'd on one another, and make up ſuch a Compound, as chanceth thence to reſult.

C H A P. IV.

Of the Generation of the World.

BUT to diſcuſs this Matter more narrowly, and to come to another Head; the World ſeemeth to have been elaborated and molded into this round Figure, by a certain kind of Reaſon, without Bellows, Anvil, or other Inſtruments.

Fiſt, Whereas the Atoms, by an inconfiderate and casual Motion, were continually and ſwiftly carried on, when they began to run in multitudes into this immenſe Place, in which the World now is, and to ſaſten upon one another, they preſently became heaped into one rude and indigeſted Maſs, in

which great things were mingled with ſmall, round with corner'd, ſmooth with hooked, others with others.

Then, in this confuſed Croud, thoſe which were the greateſt and moſt heavy began by degrees to ſettle down; and ſuch as were thin, round, ſmall, ſlippery, theſe, in the Concurrence of the others, began to be extruded and carried upwards; as in troubled Water, until it reſts and groweth clear, the earthy Parts ſettle downwards, the watry are as it were thruſt upwards; but after the impulſive Force which drove them upward, grew languid, nor was there any other Stroke which might toſs them that way, the Atoms themſelves, endeavouring to go down again, met with Obſtacles from others; whereupon they flew about with greater Activity to the utmoſt Bounds; as alſo did others, which were reverberated by them, and reſſed by others that cloſely followed them; whence was made a mutual Implication, which did generate Heaven.

But thoſe Atoms, which were of the ſame Nature, (there being, as we ſaid, many Kinds of them) and carry'd round about in Heaps, whilſt they were thruſt upwards, made the Sun, and Moon, and other Stars. Theſe were chiefly called Signifying Atoms; thoſe which they left, as not able to riſe ſo high, produced the Air.

At length, of thoſe which ſettled down the Earth was generated; and ſeeing there yet remained much Matter in Earth, and that condenſed by the Beatings of the Winds and Gales from the Stars, that Figure of it which conſiſted of leaſt Particles, was ſqueezed forth and produced Moiſture. This being fluid, either run down into hollow Places, fit to receive and contain it, or, ſtanding ſtill, made hollow Receptacles for itſelf. And after this manner were the principal Parts of the World generated.

To ſay ſomething of the leſs principal, the Particles as it were of the former Part; there ſeems in that firſt Commiſſion to have been made the divers Seeds of generable and corruptible Things, of which Compounds of divers Natures were firſt framed, and afterwards in a great degree propagated.

Stones, Metals, and all other Minerals, were therefore generated within the Body of the Earth at the ſame time it was formed, becauſe that Maſs was heterogeneous, or conſiſting of Atoms and Seeds of different Natures; and in that the Bulks of Stones did diverſly ſwell out to the very Superſicies. Whereupon Mountains came to be made, and conſequently Vallies and Plains muſt needs have been between them.

Soon after, about the Mountains and the Hills, and in the Vallies, and in the Fields, grew up Herbs, Shrubs, Trees, almoſt in the ſame manner as Feathers, Hair, Briſtles, about the Bodies and Members of Birds and Beaſts.

Part XIII.

But as concerning Animals themselves, it is likely that the Earth, retaining this new genital Seed, brought out of itself some little Bubbles, in the Likeness of little Wombs; and these when they grew mature (Nature fo compelling) broke, and put forth young little Creatures. Then the Earth itself did abound in a kind of Humour, like to Milk, with which Aliment living Creatures were nourished.

Which Creatures were so framed, that they had all Parts necessary for Nutrition, and all other Uses. For as when *Nilus* forsakes the Fields, and the Earth beginneth to grow dry through Heat of the Sun, the Husbandman turning up the Glebe finds several living Creatures, Part begun, Part imperfect and maimed; so that in the same Creature one Part liveth, the other is mere Earth. In like manner, amongst those first Efforts of the Earth, besides the living Creatures perfectly formed, there were some produced wanting Hands, Feet, Mouth, and other Parts; without which, there is no way to take Nourishment, or to live long, or to propagate their Kind.

What I say of other living Creatures, I hold also in Man, that some little Bubbles and Wombs sticking to the Roots of the Earth, and warmed by the Sun, first grew bigger, and by the Assistance of Nature afforded to Infants sprung from it a connatural Moisture, called Milk; and that those thus brought up, and ripen'd to Perfection, propagated Mankind.

Two things I add; One, That it is by no means to be allowed, what some affirm, that at that time were produced *Centaurs*, *Sylla's*, *Chimera's*, and other Monsters, consisting of Parts of different Kinds. For how in a *Centaure* (for Example) could the Limbs of a Man and of a Horse be joined together, when at the third Year of his Age, at what time a Child is hardly weaned, a Horse is in full Vigor? And at what time a Horse languisheth with Age, a Man flourisheth in the Prime of his Youth.

The other, That in the Earth there were created new living Creatures, and more and greater than now, by more and more vigorous Seeds, and amongst those, Men too; so as that Race of Men was more hardy, as consisting of greater and more solid Bones and Nerves: And so at last the Earth, her Seeds being exhausted, like a Woman too old to bear Children, left off to produce voluntarily such living Creatures. Whence it comes to pass, that now Men are no where generated on this fashion; but both they, and other more great and perfect Animals, spring up only by way of Propagation.

C H A P. V.

Of the Vicissitudes in the World.

THERE followeth a Question, Whether the World be governed by itself, or by the Providence of any Deity?

First therefore, we ought not to think that the Motion of Heaven, or the Summer and Winter, Course of the Sun, or the Eclipse of the Sun and Moon, or the Rising and Setting of the Stars, or the like, happen, because there is some Ruler over them, who disposeth, and hath dispos'd of them; and withoutal possesseth Beatitude and Immortality: for with Felicity agree not Business, Solitude, Anger and Favour; these happen through Imbecility, Fear, and want of external Help.

Neither ought we (it being a troublesome Employment, and wholly averse from a happy State) to think, that the Nature which possesseth Felicity is such, as that (knowing and willing) it undergoes these Commotions or Perturbations of Mind; but rather to observe, out of respect to it, all Veneration, and to use some kind of Address to it, suggesting such Thoughts, as out of which arise no Opinions contrary to Veneration.

We should rather think, that, when the World was produced, there were made those Circumplexions of Atoms, involving themselves about one another, that from thence the celestial Bodies being framed, there was produced in them this Necessity, whereby they are moved in such a manner, and perform such Periods: and after the same manner all the rest perform their Tasks, in order to the Course of things once begun.

And why should we not rather think thus? For whether the World itself is a God, as some conceive, What can be less quiet, than incessantly to roll about the Axis with admirable Swiftnes? But unless it be quiet, nothing is happy. Or whether there be some God in the World, who rules, governs, conserves the Courses of the Stars, the Mutations of Seasons, the Vicissitude and Order of Things, who is present in all Places, and at all Times; and, how great soever is the Variety, or rather Innumerability of all particular Things, is distracted by so many Cares, by taking Order that they be done this way, and no other: Indeed he is, as I before objected, involved in Businessess troublesome and laborious.

Besides, though it were but only supposed, that God doth not take care of things, Shall we not find, that all things happen no otherwise than as if there were no Providence? For some fall out well, but the most ill, and otherwise than they ought. To omit the rest; if *Jupiter* himself did thunder, or guide the Thunder, he ought at least to spare Temples, though it were only not to give occasion of doubting, whether it proceed from Fortune, or divine Counsel; that is, all things, in a manner, holding in their Course as it was at first begun.

This also is of no little Weight, that they assert a special Providence in respect of Men. For (not to repeat what I even now said, That a happy and immortal Nature cannot be possess'd with Anger or Favour) put case, that God takes no Care of the Af-

fairs

fairs of Men, How can they come to be otherwife than they are? In them there is an equal, or rather greater Imbecility than in other Creatures, equal Inconveniences, equal Ills. Some of them making Vows are preferved from Shipwreck; How many have mane Vows, and yet perish'd? Many pray for Children, and obtain them; How many pray for Children in vain?

But to be brief; Why, if God takes care of the Affairs of Men, is it ill with the Good, well with the Bad? Truly it is an Argument with me, when I fee Croffes always happen to the Good, Poverty, Labours, Exile, Lofs of Friends; on the other fide, wicked Perfons to be happy, to increafe in Power, to be honoured with Titles; that Innocence is unfafe, wicked Actions go unpunifhed; that Death exercifes his Cruelty without obferving Manners, without Order and Difinction of Years; fome arrive at old Age, others are fcatch'd away in their Infancy, others in their full Strength; others in the Flower of their Youth are immaturrely cut off; in War, rather the beft are vanquifhed and perifh. But that which prevails moft with me, is, that the moft religious Perfons are afflicted with the greateft Ills; but to them, who either wholly neglect the Gods, or worfhip them not religiously, happen either the leaft Miffortunes, or none at all.

Moreover, I think it may not be ill argued thus: Either God would take away Ills and cannot, or he can and will not, or he neither will nor can, or he both will and can. If he would and cannot, he is impotent, and confequently not God; if he can and will not, envious, which is equally contrary to God's Nature; if he neither will nor can, he is both envious and impotent, and confequently not God; if he both will and can, which only agrees with God, Whence then are the Ills? Or, why doer he not take them away?

C H A P. VI.

A Digreffion, concerning Genii or Dæmons.

IT is all one, whether God takes care of things by himfelf, as fome will have it, or (as others hold) by Minifters, whom they generally call *Genii* or *Dæmons*; for things happen no otherwife, than as if we fhould fuppofe no fuch Minifters; and tho' it were granted, that there are fome, yet can they not be fuch as they feign them, that is, of a human Form, and having a Voice that can reach to us: To omit, fince for the moft part they are faid to be ill and vicious, they cannot be happy and long-liv'd, fince both much Blindnefs and a Pronenefs to Deftitution perpetually attends Wickednefs.

How much were it to be wifhed, that there were fome who might take care of us, and fupply what is wanting to our Prudence, and to our Strength? Ef-

pecially how much were it to be wifhed, by fuch as are Leaders in War, of moft pious and honeft Attempts, that they might not confide not only in Arms, Horfes, Ships, but alfo in the Affiftance of the Gods themfelves?

Add indeed, fome are faid to appear fometimes to fome Perfons; and why may it not be, that they who affirm *Dæmons* to have appeared to them, either lye and feign, or are melancholy, and fuch, that their diftemper'd Body either strangely raifeth, or diverts their Imagination to extraordinary Conceits. It is well known, that nothing is more apt to be moved and transformed into any Species (altho' there be no real Ground) than Imagination. For the Impreffion made upon the Mind is like that in Wax, and the Mind of Man having within itfelf that which represents, and that which is represented, there is fuch a Power in it, that, taking even the very leaft of things feen or heard upon fome occafion, it can of itfelf eafily vary and tranfigure the Species, as is manifefted by the Communications of Dreams which are made in Sleep, from which we perceive, that the imaginative Faculty puts on all Variety of Affections and Phantafies; fo that it is no wonder, if, where the Faculty is unfound, they feem to fee *Dæmons*, or other things, of which they have had any foretaken Conceit.

Moreover, they ufe to alledge Divination as an Argument to prove both Providence and the Exiftence of the *Dæmons*; but I am affham'd at Human Imbecility, when it fetcheth Divinations even out of Dreams, as if God walking from Bed to Bed did admonifh fupine Perfons, by indireft Vifions, what fhall come to pafs; and out of all kinds of Portents and Prodigies; as if Chance were not a fufficient Agent for thefe Effects; but we muft mix God, not only with the Sun and the Moon, and feveral other living Creatures, but alfo with all Brafs and Store.

But to inftance in Oracles only: Many ways may it be evinced, that they are mere Impoftures of Priests, as may particularly be difcover'd; for that the Verfes which proceed from them are bad, being, for the moft part maimed in the Beginning, imperfect in the Middle, lame in the Clofe; which could not be, if they came from Divine Infpiration, fince from God nothing can proceed but what is well and decent.

And I remember, that, when in my younger Days I lived at *Samus*, that Oracle was much cried up, by which (as they reported) *Polycrates*, King of that Ifland, celebrating the *Pythian* and *Delian* Games, fent at the fame time to *Delus*, demanding of *Apollo*, Whether he fhould offer Sacrifice at the appointed time? *Pythius* answered, *Thofe to thee are the Pythian and the Delian*; whereby, faid they, it was fignify'd, that thofe fhould be his laft, for foon after he happened to be flain. But how could it be fignify'd by that Answer, That thefe Sacrifices fhould

should be the last rather than the middle? But that the vulgar sort of Men are most commonly led by Hearsay, and are greedy of strange Stories.

C H A P. VII.

Of the End, or Corruption of the World.

THAT the World shall perish, and have an End, is consequent, so far as it was generated, and had Beginning; for it is necessary, that all compounded Things be also dissipated and resolved into those things of which they are compounded; some by some Causes, others by others; but still all from some Cause, and at some time or other. Whence it is the more to be admired, that there should be some, who, not only broaching the Opinion, that the World was generated, but even in a manner made by Hands, thence deduce, that it shall be ever. For as I argued before, What Coagmenation can there be indissoluble? Or, What is there that hath a Beginning, but no End?

Certainly, the World seems like an Animal, or Plant, as generated so subject to Corruption, as well because, no otherwise than they, it consists of Atoms, which, by Reason of the intestine Motion, wherewith they are incessantly moved, at length must cause a Dissolution; as also because there may happen both to them and the World, some extrinsecal Cause, which may put them to Destruction: Especially it being known that every thing is produced but one way, but may be destroyed by many; as also, because, there are three Ages in them, Youth, Middle State, and Old Age; so the World first began to grow up; (as also after the Time of its Generation, there came extrinsically from the Universe, Atoms which insinuated into the Pores, as it were, of the World; and by which, Heaven, the Stars, the Air, the Sea, the Earth, and other Things were augmented, the congruous Atoms accommodating themselves to those that were congruous to them;) then, because there ought to have been some End of growing, it rested in a kind of perfect State; and at last began so to decay, as plainly shews, that it declines towards its last Age.

This is first proved, because, as we see, in Progress of Time, Towers fall, Stones moulder, Temples and Images decay, whereby at last they come to be dissolved: So we may perceive the Parts of the World sensibly to moulder, and wear away; a great Part of the Earth goes away into Air, (not to say any thing of those greater Concussions, which makes us fear sometimes, lest the whole should fall, and sinking from under our Feet, sink, as it were, into an Abyss) the Water also is partly exhaled into Air, partly so distributed through the Earth, that it will not at all flow back again: The Air is continually changed, many Things going forth into it, and ma-

ny produced again out of it. Lastly, the Fire, (not only ours, but the starry Fire also, as that which is in the Sun) sensibly decays by the Emanation, and casting forth of Light. Wherefore, neither is there any Reason to think, that these Bodies of the World will continue ever.

Again, because we see there is a continual Fight amongst the Bodies of the World themselves, thro' which sometimes happen Conflagrations, sometimes Deluges, as it were, with equal Strength: But, as in Wrestling, so is it necessary, that in the World one of the Contraries prevail at last, and destroy all Things. If any shall demand, which of the two is the more likely to prevail, it may be answer'd, The Fire, as being the more active, and receiving particular Recruits from the Sun and Heaven; so as, at last, it will come to get the upper hand, and the World thereupon, perish by Conflagration.

Lastly, because there is nothing indissoluble, but either as it is solid, as an Atom; or intangible, as Vacuum; or hath nothing beyond it, whence either a dissolving Cause may come, or whither itself may go forth, as the Universe. But the World neither is solid, by Reason of Vacuum intermix'd; nor intangible, by Reason of corporeal Nature; nor hath nothing without it, by Reason of its Extremity: Whence it follows, that a Destruction may happen extrinsically, by Bodies incurring to it, and breaking it, but, both extrinsically and intrinsically, it is capable of being dissolved.

This I add, because the World may perish, not only by Conflagration, or, if you will, by Inundation also, but by many other Ways; amongst which the chief is, that, as a living Creature (to which I already compar'd it) the Frame of the Soul being untied, is dissolved into several Parts, and these at length are quite dissolved also, either by being dissipated, and turning into the Air, and the most minute Dust, or serving again for the Production of some other living Creatures: So the Walls, as it were, of the World decaying and falling, the several Pieces of it are dissolved, and go at length into Atoms; which having gotten into the free Space of Vacuum, rush downwards in a Tumult, and recommence their first Motions; or run forward, far and long; or soon fall upon other Worlds; or meeting with other Atoms, join with them to the Production of new Worlds.

And though indeed, as a living Creature may be sooner or later dissolved by Departure of the Soul, so may either of these happen to the World: Yet it is more probable, that it will so come to pass, as that in a Moment of Time, nothing thereof shall remain except Atoms, and a desolate Space; for which way soever the Gate of Death, as it were, shall be first opened, thither will all the Crowd of Matter throng to get out.

That the World, as I said, is declining towards its last Age is probable; for that the teeming Earth, as I lately touched, scarce bringeth forth even little Animals, when as formerly she produced large; and that she, not without extream Labour, brings forth Corn and Fruits, whereas at first she brought them forth of her own accord, in great Plenty. Whence it comes, that there are frequent Complaints, praising the former Ages, and accusing the present; for that they perceive not that it is the Course of Things that all Things should decay by little and little, and, weary'd with long space of Age, tend as it were to Destruction. I with Reason, rather than the Thing itself did persuade, that within a short time, we shall see all things shattered in pieces.

C H A P. VIII.

Of Infinite Worlds.

Moreover, as to demand, Whether there are, besides this, not only other Worlds, but many, even infinite: This seems to be the Answer, 'That there are infinite Worlds. For *the Atoms bring infinite, as we formerly shew'd, are carried through infinite Spaces; and that several Ways in far Distances from this World, and there meeting one another in Multitudes, may join to the Production of infinite Worlds. Since the Atoms, being of this Nature, that a World may be made up, and consist of them, cannot, by Reason of their Infinity, be consumed or exhausted by one, nor any determinate Number of Worlds; whether these Worlds be supposed framed after one Fashion, or after divers. It is not impossible therefore, but that there may be infinite Worlds.*

And indeed it is as absurd for a single World to be made in an infinite Universe, as for one Ear of Corn to sprout up in the vast Field, sowed with many Grains; for as in the Field there are many Causes, to wit, many Seeds apt to grow up, and Places to produce them; so in the Universe, besides Places, there are Causes, not many, but infinite, namely Atoms, as capable of joining as those of which this World was made up.

' Besides, we see not any generable thing, so one, as that it hath not many like itself, in the same kind, (for so Men, so Birds, so Beasts, so Fishes, are multiplied each under their particular Species.) Wherefore, seeing that not only the Sun, the Moon, the Earth, the Sea, and the rest of the Parts of the World were generated; but even the whole World itself, which consists of them; we must acknowledge, that not only the Parts, but the World itself, are not single, but many, as to Number, and (for the Reasons alledged) infinite.

Now there being nothing to hinder, but that some

Worlds may be like this of ours, others unlike it; for there may be equal, there may be greater, there may be lesser; there may be, that have the same Parts, disposed in the same Order; there may be, that have different Parts, or disposed in a different Order; there may be, that have the same Figure; there may be, that have a different, (for though Atoms cannot have an infinite Variety of Figures, having a determinate Space in their Superficies, yet may they be of more Figures than we can number, as round, oval, pyramidal, &c. altho', I say, there be no Repugnance in this, yet all these Diversities are only certain kinds of Conditions, which vary the common Quality and Nature of the World,

But it seems, that each of the other Worlds, as this of ours, and every Compound which is made in that vast Vacuity, and hath any Resemblance with those things which fall under our Observation, is generated apart, and after a fashion peculiar to itself, by certain *Convulsions, and Intestures of Atoms proper to it; and this, whether it be generated in the Intermundia, (so we term the Interval, included betwixt two or more Worlds, not far distant from one another) or in a multivacuous Place, (that is, in which, though there be great and little Bodies, yet Vacuities take up the greater Share of it) or lastly, in a great unmixt and pure Vacuum, though not as some (who assert such a Vacuum) describe it.*

For we are to understand, contrary to them, that *these flozeth together, if not from infinite, at least from one, or more Worlds, or Intermundia, some apt Seeds, that is, a congruous Heap of Atoms, or little Bodies, which are by degrees mutually adjoined here and there, and variously formed, and change Place diversly, according as it happens, and winnal receive from without some irriguous, as it were, Accretions; until a Bulk, consisting of the whole Assembly of all these, be made up, and gain a Consistency, as much as the Principles, of which it was made, can well bear.*

' For it is not sufficient, for the Generation of a World, that a great Heap of Atoms be thrown together in a Vacuum, and by the Accession of others, grow bigger, till it roll into another Vacuum, in the same manner, as a Heap of Snow, being tumbled upon Snow, gathers still more, and grows bigger, as was the Opinion of a certain Philosopher, holding the Necessity of such a Method: Since this is repugnant to our daily Experience. For a Heap, whose innermost Kernel, as it were, is solid, and its outermost Shell solid also, can neither be rolled up and down, nor increased, if the Part intercepted betwixt the Kernel and the Shell be fluid, as in the World it is.

Finally, That the other Worlds also are, because generated, subject to Corruption, is too manifest to be mentioned; that some may be dissolved sooner, others later; some by some Causes, others by others,

* Laert. 10. 45.

* Lucret. 2. v. 1047.

* Lucret. loc. cit.

* Laert. ibid.

* Laert. 10. 89.

* Ibid.

is a thing necessarily consequent to the peculiar Diversity of every one.

CHAP. IX.

Of inferior Terrestrial Things.

BUT that (omitting the rest) we may speak more particularly of this our World, since all things in it are either contained within the Compass of the Earth, or exceed not the Height of the Ground, or are placed on high, that is, raised above the Earth's Superficies, and therefore may generically be divided into the low or terrestrial sort of Things, and those which are sublime, celestial, or aerial: Let us then so order our Discourse, as to speak first of the former; in regard, that as they are nearer, and more familiar to us, so we may thence ascend by orderly Degrees to discourse and define what we should most rationally conjecture of the latter, which are more remote from us, and less visible to us.

In the first place, we are to take a general View of the Body of the Earth, next of the Water, a considerable part of this Mass, and mingled diversly with the Earth, partly in its Superficies, partly in its very Bowels; afterwards of these lesser Bodies, with which we see that whole Mass replenished, whether inanimate, as Minerals, Stones, and Plants; or animate, usually called Animals.

CHAP. I.

Of the Earth situate in the Middle of the World.

FIRST then, as to the Earth, we have already said, how it was framed together with the other parts of the World; for it had been to no purpose to form it first, beyond the utmost Surface of the World, and then convey it into the World already framed, since it was sufficient for that Effect, that there were such Seeds found in the universal Mass, of which it, with the other parts of the World, might be generated; in the same manner as it would be unnecessary that living Creatures should first be separated from, and carried beyond this Infinity of things, and be formed there, that, being now perfected, they might be brought thence into this our Region. Nor was it needful, that they should first be exactly wrought in Heaven, and thence transmitted to our Earth; seeing no Man can shew, why there must needs be found such Seeds there, of which Animals, Plants, and other visible Compounds are made up, and could as well be found here; or, whence Heaven hath this Privilege, of having sufficient Conveniences for their Generation and Nutrition, more than our Earth.

It is already said, That the Earth, when the Hea-

ven, and other higher Bodies, did fly, as it were, upwards, settled into the Middle of the World, and there rested as in the lowest Place. We add now, That as it is the middle Part of the World, towards which all heavy things fall; it follows not, that there is also a middle Part of it, called the Center, towards which, all things that ponderate are directed in a strait Line; for all heavy things fall in parallel Motions, without any Endeavour to meet in any Angle; there being, as in the Universe, so also in our World, one Region above, from which all heavy things come, and only one below, towards which they tend.

Whence, as they are nor to be approved of, who say, there are Antipodes, or Men so situated in a strange Region of the Earth, that they walk with their Feet diametrically opposite to ours, in like manner as we see the Images of Men, or other things, either stand or go with their Heads downwards under the Water; for these Philosophers endeavour to maintain, contrary to the Laws of Nature and of heavy Things, that Men, and other terrestrial Bodies placed there, tend upwards, or towards the Earth; and that it is equally impossible they should fall down from the Earth to the inferior Places of the Sky; as that Bodies amongst us here should unimpell'd mount up to Heaven. However, upon another Account they speak consequently to their Hypothesis, that it is Day with the Antipodes when it is Night with us, and Night with them when it is our Day.

The Earth then is framed indeed after a circular Figure, but yet as a Dish or a Drum is, not like a Sphere or Bowl; for this Surface of it which we inhabit, and which indeed is only habitable, is flat or plain, and not globous, and such as all heavy things are carried to it in a strait Line, or perpendicularly, as was formerly declared.

This being so, here ariseth a great Difficulty, How can it then be, that it should stand steady, and not fall downwards into that Region, into which the Antipodes would slide? But, *the Reason why the Earth falls not, is, because it rests upon the Air, as ally'd to it in Nature; nor doth it any more burthen the Air than Animals, which are of like Nature with the Earth, burthen the Earth.*

Nor is it hard to conceive, that in the Air beneath there is a Power to sustain the Earth, because the Air and the Earth, by the general Contexture of the World, are things not of different Extraction, but ally'd to one another by a certain Affinity. Whence, as being Parts of the same Whole, one cannot be burthenome to the other, but are held by a mutual Embrace, as if they had no Gravity at all; especially since this Earth, however in this upper Part of it more compacted and heavy, may, descending lower, be, by degrees, less solid, and so less weighty; till at length, in its lowest Part of all, it approach

very near the Nature of the Air which supports it.

And for this Reason I said, that the Earth was not made in some Place out of the World, and thence brought into it, because then it would have pressed the Air with its Weight, as our Bodies are sensible of the least Weight, if imposed from without; whereas, neither the Head, nor other Parts are heavy to one another, by Reason that they are agreeable to one another in Nature, and knit to one another by the common Law of the same Whole.

And that it seem not incredible, a thing so tenuous as Air should be able to uphold so gross a Bulk; do but consider how subtle a thing the Soul or Animal Spirit is, and yet how gross and weighty a Bulk of the Body it upholds and governs; and that only by this, because it is a thing joined to it, and aptly fitted to it, as the Air is to the Earth.

For we must not therefore conceive the Earth to be so minute, much less a Goddess; for we have formerly said the contrary: The Earth indeed many times is the Seat of several living Creatures, yet not as being itself Animate; but because, containing various atoms and divers Seeds of Things, she produces many Things many Ways; of which, Animate Kingdoms are formed. Some there are, who call the Earth, *The Great Mother of the Gods, and Benefactress*. That to the Earth these Names be attributed, if it be intended to make use of divine things thereby to signify natural things, may perhaps seem tolerable; but to believe, that there is a Divinity in the Earth, is no way allowable.

CH A P. II.

Of Earthquakes, and the Flames of Ætna.

IT seems wonderful, how it come to pass, that the Earth is sometimes shaken, and trembles; but this is an Effect which may happen from divers Causes: Supposing that the Earth, as I see no Reason to doubt, is in all Parts alike, and that below as well as above, it hath Caverns, Breaches, and Rivers, rolling great Billows, vast Stones, &c.

For the Water may move the Earth, if it hath with'd or worn some Parts, which being made hollow, it can no longer be held up, as it was whilst they were entire; or if some Wind drive upon Channels and Lakes, or standing Waters within the Earth, and the [Blow] Impulsion, either shake the Earth from thence, or the Agitation of the Wind increasing with its own Motion, and stirring up itself, be carried from the Bottom to the Top; as a Vessel cannot stand steadfast, until the Water which hath been troubled in it give over moving.

Likewise the Earth may receive a Shock, by some Part thereof suddenly falling down, and thereby be moved; seeing that some of its Parts are upheld, as it were, with Columns and Pillars, which decaying

and sinking, the Weight that is laid on them quakes: For we see whole Houses shake, by Reason of the jumbling, and Succussion of Carts and Chariots.

Also the very Wind itself may move the Earth, either if the Earth (its interior and lower Parts being full of Crannies and Chinks) be shaken by some Wind variously dispers'd, and falling into those hollow Caverns, and so tremble in such manner as our Limbs, by Insinuation of Cold, tremble and are moved, whether we will or no; or, if the Wind, getting in at the Top, and driving downwards, the Earth is driven upwards by the Air under it, which is somewhat gross and watery, (for it sustains the Earth) and shaken as it were from beneath, leaps up, which happens to all things; not only to those which are forced against any thing, hard or firm; or so stretched or tent, that being prest upon it, recoils; but also against a fluid thing, if it be able to strike it back, as when Wood is plung'd into Water.

The Force of this Wind, if we conceive it turn'd into Fire, and resembling Thunder, may be carried on with a great Destruction of all Things that oppose its Passage. For as Lightning, engender'd in a Cloud, breaks thorow it, and shakes the Air with wonderful Violence; in like manner, may the Fire, generated within the Caverns of the Earth of a coarsetate and exagitated Wind, break thorow it, and make it tremble.

Now as there appears not any Cause more likely than that which is taken from the Wind, and chiefly in this last manner; either by distributing itself into many several Cavities of the Earth; it causeth a trembling only, and (as if there were a Transpiration through the looser Earth) the Earth is so broken thorow as that there is a Breach made, or something overthrow, or turn'd awry; or else by its being heaped up together in greater Caverns, there may follow such a Succussion and Impulsion, as may heave up, and cleave asunder the Earth, and make Gaps big enough to entomb whole Cities, as in divers Places it hath often happened.

What I say concerning the Force of the Wind, which being turned into Fire, breaks thorow, and shakes the Earth, may serve to make us understand, that the Eruptions of Fire which often happen in the same Places, as at *Ætna*, proceed from the same Cause.

For this Mountain is all hollow within, and so underpropped with Vaults of Flint, that the Wind shut up in them, groweth hot, and being enkindled, forceth its Way through the Breaches which it finds above, and eats into the Sides of these Caverns; whence (together with Flame and Smoke) it casts up Sparkles and Pumices.

And the better to bring this to pass, the Sea lies at the Foot of the Mountain, which rolling its Waves to and from the Shore, unto which the Caverns of the Hill extend, thrusts in, and drives forward the Air, whereby

whereby the Fire is augmented and cherish'd, as with the blowing of Bellows.

C H A P. III.

Of the Sea, Rivers, Fountains, and the overflowing of Nilus.

AS for those Waters which are on the Earth, (for of those which are generated on high, and thence fall down in Rain, we shall speak more opportunely hereafter;) First, there is a vast Body of them, which we call the Sea: For besides those Inland Seas which wash our Shores, there is also an external Sea, or Ocean, which flowing about all the habitable Earth, is believed by some to be so immediately placed under the Arch of Heaven, that the Sun and other Stars rise from it, and set in it, as we shall have occasion to shew elsewhere.

And indeed, the Vastness of the Sea being such, it may be esteem'd not the most inconsiderable Reason, why the Sea seems not to be increased by the flowing of so many Rivers into it; for all the Rivers are hardly like a Drop, compared to so immense a Body. And withal, the Sun, who with his Beams so soon dries wet Garments; although he suck not up much Moisture from every Place, yet from so large a Compass cannot but take away a great deal. Not to mention how much the Winds, which in one Night many times dry up the Ways, and harden the Dirt, may in sweeping along the Sea, consume of it.

But, the chiefest Reason seems to be this. The Earth being a rare Body, and easily penetrated, and withal, washed on all Sides by the Sea, the Waters, as well as they are poured from the Earth into the Sea, so must they also soak down from the Sea into the Earth, that they may rise up in Springs and flow again.

Neither need it trouble us, that the Water of the Sea is salt, and the Waters of Springs and Rivers fresh; because the Water, passing out of the Sea into the Earth, is strained in such manner, that it puts off the little Bodies of Salt, and returns quite stripp'd of them. For the Body of the Sea being commix'd of Salt and of Water; so far as much as the Seeds of Salt are more hooked, and those of Water more smooth, therefore these glide easily away, whilst the others cannot but be entangled, and are all along left behind.

Hence appeareth the Cause (which seemeth the principal) of the perpetual flowing of Springs: Where they rise up, there may indeed be some great Quantity of Water gathered together, which may serve for Supply: But upon another Account, they may be supplied, so far as much as there is something continually flowing from beneath into them. And tho' these subterraneous Rivulets (as it were,) might be

made up of the several Seeds, which are dispersed thro' the Earth, yet must these Seeds be supplied by the Sea, which soaks into the Earth.

Whence it comes to pass, as was said, that those Rivulets, dispersing themselves into lesser Streams, and running down into lower hollow Receptacles, and meeting there, at last join together in great Channels, and make large Rivers, which continually renew and supply the immense Sea.

But since there is not any River more wonderful than *Nilus*, for that every Summer it overfloweth and watereth *Egypt*, we must not therefore omit to say, that this may happen by reason of the *Etesian* Winds which at that Season blowing towards *Egypt*, raise up the Sea to the Mouths of *Nilus*, and drive up Sands thither, so as *Nilus* cannot but stop and swell, and rising above its Channel, overflow the Plain which lies beneath.

Perhaps also it happens, for that the *Etesian* Winds blowing from the North carry the Cloud; into the South beyond *Egypt*, which, meeting at some very high Mountains, are there crouded together, and squeeze forth Rain, by which *Nilus* is increased.

It may happen also, that the exceeding high Mountains of *Ethiopia*, may be cover'd with Snow, which being dissolved by the Sun's excessive Heat, fills the Channel of *Nilus*.

C H A P. IV.

Of the Properties of some Waters, and of Ice.

BUT that we may select besides some Properties of Water, which seem wonderful to the Vulgar, I omit, at present, that Property which is of kin to those we last mentioned; That although the Water so easily dissolves Salt, and admits to be imbued by it; yet there are some sweet Fountains which spring out of the midst of the Sea. For this plainly happens hence, That the Water bursting forth from the Bottom of the Sea, riseth up with so great Vehemency, that it drives away on all Sides the Sea-water, and neither suffers it nor its Salt to be mingled with it.

Wonderful is that Fountain in *Epirus*, over which Flax or a Taper is no sooner put, but it is presently set on Fire and flames. It seems, that from the Earth which is beneath it, so many Seeds of Heat are breathed forth, as that, though they are not able to heat the Water in their Passage through it, yet as soon as ever they get out of it into the open Air, running into the Flax and Tapers, they associate themselves with the fiery Seeds wherewith such things abound, and break forth into Flame; in the same manner, as when putting Flame to a Candle newly extinguish'd, you may see it light before the Flame touches it.

But

But what shall we say of that Fountain which is reported to be at the Temple of *Jupiter Hammon*, cold in the Day-time, and hot in the Night? Certainly the Earth about this Fountain, tho' it be looser than other Earth, yet being compress'd by the cold of Night, it strikes out, or squeezeth forth, and transmits into the Water many Seeds of Fire which it contains, whereby the Water groweth hot; but being loosened by the Heat of Day, it sucks back again, as it were the same Seeds, whereby the Water becometh cold.

It may likewise come to pass, that the Water which is made hot through the same Seeds, which are repress'd in the Night-time, by reason of the cold Air, may become cold in the Day-time, the Beams of the Sun passing so through the Water, that they afford to those Seeds a free Vent into the Air. just as Ice is dissolved by the same piercing and rarifying Beams; and though the Effects are contrary, yet may they proceed from the same Cause, as the melting of Wax, and hardening of Clay.

'Tis from the same Cause, that Water in Wells is hot in the Winter, cold in the Summer. For in Summer, the Earth is rarify'd by Heat, and exhaleth the Seeds of Heat which are in her; by which means the Water, which is kept close within her, becomes colder. But in Winter the Earth is compress'd and condens'd with Cold; whence, if she hath any Heat, she squeezeth it forth into the Wells.

These put me in mind to speak of Ice, by which the Water, forgetting, as it were, its natural Fluidity, grows solid and hard. Here we must conceive, that those Bodies only are capable of being made solid, which are made up of Parts of little Bodies, that have plain Surfaces; because, by Exclusion of Vacuity, the Parts cohere best with one another; whereas if those little Bodies be round, or joined to round, or intermingled with plain, there is a *Vacuum* contained round about them, into which the round may roll, and the plain bend; whence followeth Softness, and (unless there be some Hooks that stay it,) Fluxibility.

Ice therefore is made, either when the round little Bodies, which cause Heat, are thrust out of the Water, and the plain which are in the same Water (part whereof are acute-angled, part obtuse-angled) are thrust up close together: Or, when those little Bodies are brought thicker from without, (and that for the most part from the Air, when it is made cold by them,) which being closely prest, and thrusting out all the round that they meet, bring Solidity into the Water.

CHAP. V.

Of Things Terrestrial Inanimate.

OUR Method leading us to speak of those things which are generated of Earth and Water; it is in the first place manifest, that those things are either Animate or Inanimate. Animate things are those which have Sense, and are vulgarly called Animals; Inanimate things are those which want Sense, whence, under this Name are comprehended all those, to which the Name of Animal is not applied.

Of this sort are, first, certain moist things which are grown consistent, as we see Salt, Sulphur, and ill-scented Bitumen generated in the Earth. Now these are the chief Cause, not only of subterraneous Heat, and ignivomous Eruptions, as that of *Ætna*, already spoken of; but also of pestiferous Exhalations, which, being carried on high, cause venereal Lakes and Diseases. Wherefore we will speak more amply of these when we treat of Meteors. Concerning Amber, which attracteth Straws, we shall say something hereafter.

Of this sort also are Metals, which were first found out upon occasion of some Woods being burnt by Lightning, or some other Fire, which being quite burnt up, the Metals were melted and stuck to the Roots, and thereupon dazzled the Eye with their Splendour, and were observed to retain the same Figure with the things in which they flowed. Whence Men conjectured, That the same Metals, being melted by the Force of Fire, might be formed into any Figure, even, acute, or pointed; and by reason of the Solidity they had acquired, might be made fit to malleate, or to strike, or for other Uses.

Moreover, not only Lead, but also Gold and Silver lay neglected, as being found less commodious for those Uses, and Brass only was in esteem, of which were made Darts, Swords, Axes, Ploughshares, and the like, until Iron came to be found out; of which then, they chose rather to make these things, by reason it was of greater Hardness.

Of this sort also are Stones, whereof many are daily generated, many broke off from Rocks; but the main Bodies of Rocks and Stones were made from the Beginning; for by this means, as we said formerly, Mountains were first occasion'd; and sometimes we find, that the Earth encloseth in her Bowels, Caverns, Rocks, and broken Stones, as well as Rivers, Channels, and Winds.

Now as Stones are ordinarily discerned by their Hardness and Solidity, so in the first Rank, as they were, may be reckoned Adamants, not damnify'd by Blows, (for a Trial of them being made upon Anvils,

Anvils, they split the Iron,) and huge Flints, out of which, by the Stroke of Iron, Fire flieth; for they contain Seeds of Fire close hidden in their Veins; neither doth the cold Force of the Iron hinder, but that being stirred up by its Stroke, they meet together in one Body or Spark.

Lastly, of the inanimate kind are Plants, that is, Herbs and Trees; for the Soul is not without Sense. And we see, that of animate Beings, which from thence are called Animals and living Creatures, some have a moving and desiderative Soul; others a diffusive; but Plants neither have Sense, nor either of those Souls, and therefore cannot be called animate things.

Something indeed they have common with living Creatures, that is Nutrition, Augmentation, Generation; but they perform these things by the Impulse of Nature, not by the Direction of a Soul, and therefore are only Analogically, or for Resemblance sake, said to live and die as Animals. Whence also whatsoever may be said of them, may be understood by Parity, and in some Proportion, by those things which shall be said of living Creatures.

I would add, that the original of sowing and grafting was upon the Observation Men took, that Berries and Acorns shedding, and falling to the Ground, sprung up again, and begot new Plants, like those of which sort they themselves were. But it is enough to have hinted this.

CH A P. VI.

Of the Loadstone in particular.

BUT we must insist a little longer upon a thing inanimate indeed, yet very admirable; I mean the *Herculean Stone*, which we call also Magnet, for that it was first found in *Magnesia*. It is much wondered at, by reason of its singular Power (or Virtue) in attracting Iron.

To explicate this Power, we must suppose three or four Principles; One is, That there is a continual Effluxion of little Bodies out of all things; as, out of coloured and lucid Bodies, flow such as belong to Colour and Light; from hot and cold Bodies, such as belong to Heat and cold Bodies; from odorous Bodies, such as belong to Smell; and so of the rest.

A second is, That there is no Body so solid but hath little Vacuities contained within it, as is manifest by all Bodies through which passeth Moisture, (or Sweat) Light, Sound, Heat, or Cold.

The third, That these effluent little Bodies are not alike adaptable to all things. The Sun, by Emission of his Beams, hardens Clay, melts Snow; Fire resolves Metal, contracts Leather; Water makes hot Iron harder, Leather softer; the Olive-

tree is bitter to the Taste of Man, pleasing to Goats; Marjoram is sweet to the Smell of Man, hateful to Swine, &c.

The fourth, That the little Vacuities are not of the same Compass in all things, wherefore neither can the same be accommodated to all little Bodies. This is manifest from the Contextures of the Sense; for the little Bodies which affect these, move not those; or those which affect some one way, affect others another; as also from the Contextures of all things else, for what will penetrate one, will not penetrate another.

From these it is understood, that the Loadstone may attract Iron (and Amber, Straw) upon a double Account. For first, We may imagine the Atoms that flow out of the Stone, so to suit with those which flow out of the Iron, that they easily knit together; wherefore being dashed on both Sides on the Bodies of the Iron and the Stone, and bounding back into the middle, they intangle with one another, and draw the Iron along with them.

But so far as we see, that the Iron, which is attracted by the Stone, is itself able to attract other Iron; Whether shall we say, that some of the Particles flowing out of the Stone, hitting against the Iron, bound back, and these are they which catch hold of the Iron; others, insinuating into it, pass with Swiftnes through the empty Pores, and being dashed against the Iron that is next, into which they could not all enter, although they had penetrated it; from thence leaping back to the first Iron, they made other Complications like the former; and if any happen'd to penetrate farther, they likewise might attract another Iron, and that another, upon the same ground.

Moreover, it may be conceived in this manner, that there flow certain little Bodies, as well out of the Magnet, as out of Iron, but more and stronger out of the Magnet; whereby it comes to pass, that the Air is driven away much farther from about the Magnet, than from about the Iron; whereupon there are many more little Vacuities made about it than about the Iron. And because the Iron is placed within the Compass of the dispelled Air, there is much *Vacuum* taken up betwixt it and the Magnet. Whence it happens, that the little Bodies leap forward more freely to be carried into that Place, and thereupon run towards the Magnet; but they cannot go thither in a great and extraordinary Company, without enticing along the things that cohere with them; and so the whole Mass, consisting of such coherent things, goes along with them.

It may also be said, that the Motion of the Iron is assisted by the Air, through its continual Motion and Agitation. And that first from the outward Air, which continually pressing, and pressing more vehemently where it most abounds, cannot but drive the Iron into that part where there is less, or which is

more

more vacuous, as towards the Magnet. Next from the inward, which in the same manner continually agitating, moving, and deriving, cannot but give it a Motion into that part where there is greatest Vacuity.

C H A P. VII.

Of the Generation of Animals.

WE come now to speak of Animals, which are of so different Natures, some walking, others flying, others swimming, others creeping; some being greater, some lesser; some more perfect, some less perfect, (even we ourselves also being Animals) and yet withal still of one Nature; that Nature discovers an admirable Power in the Composure of them.

For since Nature is, as it were, instructed by the things themselves, and from their orderly Procedure, and compelled by a kind of Necessity, or by the Concatenation of Motions, to perform these so many and so different Effects, which we call the Works of Nature; this especially appears in Animals, because the Concatenation of Motions shews itself to be artificial, chiefly in them, although proceeding from a Substance utterly void of Reason.

And although the Atoms themselves be not endowed with Reason, nor their Motion govern'd by a rational Conduct; yet the Nature of every living Creature in the Beginning of the World grew to be such, that, according to the Temperature of those Motions which the Atoms then had, other Motions still, and others followed; which being caused after the same manner, still produced their Like. By which means those Motions, which in the Beginning were merely casual, in process of time became artificial, and succeeded after a constant and determinate Order.

But to discourse more fully hereupon: Divers Kinds of Animals being produced in the Beginning of the World, it came to pass, first, by their receiving congruous Aliment, that those Atoms, which are adaptable to one another, were attracted and entangled by their Fellow-Atoms, which were already in the Animal, (those which were not adaptable being cut off) so that a peculiar Nature to every one of them, viz. such a Compound of such Atoms grows up first, and at length becomes confirmed.

Next, That by the perpetual Motion of Atoms, and their intricate Ebbulition, some of them being still thrust out of their Place, and running into the genital Parts, meet there from all Places; and, there being a Distinction of Sexes, after mutual Appetition and Coition, are received in the Womb.

After this, that the Atoms, or seminal Bodies compounded of them, and flowing from all Parts, (whence therefore the Seed may be conceived as

something incorporeal; not in Rigor indeed, because only Vacuum is truly such, but in the most familiar Sense of the Word, by which we term any thing incorporeal, which easily penetrates through the most solid Bodies); that the Atoms, I say, are those seminal little Bodies, which thus flowed from all Parts, did therefore (this Motion continuing) withdraw them from the Tumult of others, and, like Atoms, drawing their Like; therefore those that come from the Head would betake themselves to one place, those from the Breast into the next place, and those which come from every other Part, each rank themselves in their distinct Situation; and so at length a little Animal is formed like that whence the Seed was taken.

Moreover, That this little Animal is nourished, and increaseth by the Attraction of like Atoms, or little Bodies meeting together in the Womb; until the Womb being wearied, and no longer fit to nourish them, slackens its Motions, or rather opens the Door, and gives them leave to go out.

Further, That this Animal being after the same manner fully grown up, and the continual Agitation of the Atoms pursuing one another, not ceasing, it begetteth another like thing, and that other consequently another.

At length, That Nature being by little and little accustomed hereto, learneth, as it were, so to propagate Animals like in their Kinds, as that from the Motion and perpetual Series of Atoms, it derives a Necessity of operating continually in this manner.

Thus much for the Generation of those Animals which are made by Propagation; as for those which we sometimes see produced otherwise, they may be generated after the same manner, as all things at first were; whether some Seeds of them were remaining, formed from the very Beginning; or whether daily formed, either within or without the Animals themselves; and if within, then thrust out, (as in the Generation of Worms and Flies, leaving behind them some Remains, either in the Earth, or elsewhere; of which, other Animals, of the same Kind, are begotten.)

What I said of the Diffusion of Seed, I mean not only on the Parts of the Male, but of the Female also, seeing that she likewise emiteth, having *Parastatae*, or Testicles, though placed in a contrary way, and therefore is the desirous of Coition.

And this indeed seems necessary to be granted towards giving the Reason, why a Male or Female is formed; for nothing can be alledged more proper than this, that whereas the young one consists of the Seeds both of its Sire and Dam, if that of the Sire predominate, it proves Male; if that of the Dam, Female.

Hence also may be given a Cause of the Resemblance which it hath to either, or both its Parents; for

for if the Female with a sudden Force attracts, and snatcheth away the Seed of the Male, then the young one becometh like the Dam; if both alike, it becometh like both, but mixtly.

If you demand, Why Children are sometimes like their Grandfathers, or Great Grandfathers? the Reason seems to be this; the Seed is made up of many little Bunks, which are not always all of them dissolved into Atoms, or nearest to Atoms, in the first or next Generations; but at length, in some one of the following Generations, they unfold themselves in such manner, as that, what they might have done in the Immediate, they exhibit only in the Remote.

But whence comes Barrenness? From the Seed's being either thinner than it ought, so as it cannot fasten on the Place; or thicker, so as it cannot easily be commixed: For there is requisite a due Proportion betwixt the Seeds of the Male, and of the Female; whence it happens, that many times the same Man or Woman, who are incapable of having Children by one, may yet have them by another. I omit other Reasons, as from the Aliment, since it is manifest, that Aliment, by which Seed is increased, differs from that whereby it is attenuated and wasted.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Use of Parts in Animals.

HENCE follows, That the Parts of Animals were not from the very Beginning of Things framed, after the Fashion they have now, for those Ends and Uses whereto we see them now serve, (for there was no Cause to foresee this End, nor any things precedent to which that Cause attending, and thence taking a conjectural Aim, might design any such Fashion;) but because it happen'd that the Parts were made, and did exist as we now see them, therefore they came to be applied to these Uses rather than to others, and being first made, themselves became afterwards the Occasion of their own Usefulness, and insinuated the Knowledge of it into the Minds of the Users.

The Eyes therefore were not made to see, nor the Ears to hear, nor the Tongue to speak, nor the Hands to work, nor the Feet to go; for all these Members were made before there was Seeing, Hearing, Speaking, Working, Going: but these became their Functions after they had been made.

For the Soul being form'd together with and within the Body, and moreover being capable of Sense, the Eye happen'd to be made of such a Contexture, that the Soul, being applied unto it, could not but produce the sensitive Act of Seeing; and the Ear of such, as that being joined to it, it could not but produce Hearing; and there being within the Body, made together with it, an animal Spirit ca-

pable to impel and move; the Tongue happen'd to be framed after such a Contexture, as that this Spirit coming to it, could not but move it, and break the Air (which at the same time it breathed forth) into Words. In like manner, the Hands, the Feet, and the rest of the Limbs were so fashion'd, as that this Spirit rushing into them could not but give this Motion to one, and that to the other.

As for the Tendons, which are plainly the Organs by which the Parts are stirr'd, it is evident that the Actions are not strong, because these are big; nor remiss, because they are small; but the Actions are such or such, according to the Occasions of frequent or seldom using them: But the Bigness of the Tendons follows the Quantity of the Motion, so that those which are exercised are in good plight, and grow conveniently bigger; those which lie idle thrive not, but waste away.

Wherefore the Tendons were not so formed by Nature, as if it were better that they should be strong and big for the Discharge of vehement Functions; weak and slender for the weaker, (for we see even Apes have Fingers fashion'd like ours;) but, as was said before, those which are exercised must of necessity be big, because they are well nourish'd; and those which are not exercised, small, because they are less nourish'd.

For Confirmation hereof may be alledged, that most Parts are sometimes directed to those Uses for which no Man will say they were design'd; and this, when either Necessity, or Occasion, or some Conjecture taken elsewhere, lays them open to us. Men would not so much as dream of fighting with Weapons, if they had not first fought with their Hands; nor of holding Shields before them, if they had not first felt Wounds that were to be avoided; nor of making soft Beds, if they had not first slept on the Ground; nor of making Cups, if they had not drunk Water first out of their Hands; nor of making Houses, if they had not been acquainted with the Use of Caves; and so of the rest.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Soul, the intrinsecal Form of Animals.

LET us now come to the Soul, by which Animals are, and from it have their Denomination. In the first place we must conceive it to be corporeal, ^{some most tenuous or subtle Body, made up of most subtle Particles.} Doubtless they who affirm it is incorporeal, besides that they abuse the Word, play the Fools exceedingly: for except it were such, it could neither act nor suffer; it could not act, for it could not touch any thing; it could not suffer, for it could not be touch'd by any thing, but would be as a mere Vacuity, which, as I said before, is such that it can nei-

ther act nor suffer any thing, but only affords a free Motion to Bodies passing through it.

Now that the Soul acts and suffers something, is manifestly declared by those things which happen about its Senses and Affections; as also by the Motions wherewith it impels the Members, and, from within, governeth the whole Animal, turneth it about, transports it with Dreams; and, in general, by its Union and Consent, to mix in one Compound with this grosser Matter, which usually, upon this Occasion, is more particularly termed the Body.

I say it is a most tenuous and subtle Body, for that *it is made up of most tenuous, or most subtle little Bodies; which, as they are for the most part exceeding smooth, so are they very round; otherwise they could not permeate and cohere intrinsically with the whole Body, and with its Parts, as with Veins, Nerves, Entrails, and the rest. Which is manifest even from hence; for that when the Soul goeth out of the Body, we find not that any thing is taken off from the Whole, neither as to its Figure nor Weight; but like Wine, when its Flower or Spirit is gone; or Unguent, that hath lost its Scent; for the Wine and Unguent retain the same Quantity, as if nothing of them were perished. So that the Soul, if you should imagine her to be rolled up together, might be contained almost in a Point, or the very leaf of Places.*

Nevertheless, though it be of such a subtle Texture, yet is it mixed and compounded of four several Natures: for we are to conceive it a thing made up and contempered of something fiery, something aerial, something stenuous, and a fourth which hath no Name; by means whereof, it is endued with a sensitive Faculty.

The Reason is this, because when a thin Breath departs out of the Body of a dying Person, this Breath is mixed with Heat, and Heat attracts Air, there being no Heat without Air. Thus we have three of those things which make up the Soul; and because there is none of these three from which the sensitive Motions can be derived, we must therefore admit a fourth, though without a Name, whereunto the sensitive Faculty may be attributed.

This may be confirmed from hence; for that there is a certain Breath or Gale, as it were, and Wind, which is Cause of the Body's Motion; Air, of its Rest; something hot, Cause of the Heat that is in it; there must likewise be some fourth thing, the Cause of its Sense.

Now the Necessity of this fourth being manifest, upon another Account, Anger, by which the Heart boils, and Fervor sparkles in the Eyes, convinceth that there is Heat in it; Fear, exciting Horror throughout the Limbs, argues a cold or copious Breath or Wind; and the calm State of the Breast, and Serenity of the Countenance, demonstrates there is Air.

Whence it comes to pass, that those Animals in which Heat is predominant are angry, as Lions; those in which a cold Breath, are timorous, as Harts; those in which an aerial Portion, are more quiet, and, as it were, of a middle Condition between Lions and Harts, as Oxen. The same Difference is also to be observ'd amongst Men.

Lastly, Although the Soul be a mix'd and compounded thing, and this fourth nameless thing, or sensitive Faculty, be the chief of its Parts, (it being, in a manner, the Soul of the Soul; for from it the Soul hath that it is a Soul, and it distinguishes Animals from other things, as their intrinsic Form and essential Difference) nevertheless these Parts are so perfectly contempered, as that of them is made one Substance, and that most subtle and most coherent; neither, as long as the Soul is in the Body, can these four be separated from one another, any more than Odor, Heat, or Sapor, which are natural to any inward Part of the Body, can be separated from it.

Now this Substance being contained in the Body, and coherent, as it were, with it, is in a manner upheld by it; and is likewise the Cause of all the Faculties, Passions and Motions in the Body, and mutually containeth the Body, and governeth it; and is moreover the Cause of its Health and Preservation, and can no more be sever'd from the Body without the Dissolution thereof, than Scent can be divided from Frankincense without Destruction of its Nature.

I shall not need to take notice, that one of the natural Philosophers seems, without any Reason, to conceive, that there are as many Parts of the Soul as of the Body, which are mutually applied to one another. For the Substance of the Soul being so subtle, and the Bulk of the Body so gross, doubtless its Principles must be more subtle and fewer than those of the Body; so that every one of these coheres, not with another, but each of them to little Bulks and Heaps, as it were, that consist of a greater Number. Whence it comes to pass, that sometimes we feel not when Dust, or a Gnat lights upon the Body, nor a Mist in the Night, nor the Spider's Thread, nor Feathers, nor Thistle-down, or the like, when we meet with them; it being requisite, that more of the little Bodies which are mingled with the Parts of the Soul be stirred up, before they can feel any thing that toucheth or striketh them.

We must further observe, that there is some internal Part of the Body of such a Temperature, as that where the Soul adheres to it, it receives an extraordinary Perfection. This Perfection is the Mind, the Intellect, or that which we call the rational Part of the Soul; because (the other Part diffused through the whole Body being irrational) this only discourses.

Now so far as such as the irrational Part is twofold, Sense, and Affection or Appetite; and the Intellect is between

between both; for it hath the Sense going before it to judge of things, and the Appetite coming after it, that by its own Judgment it may direct it; we shall therefore, being to speak of each, begin with the Sense.

C H A P. X.

Of Sense in general, which is the Soul (as it were) of the Soul.

TO speak therefore first of Sense in general; we must observe, that the Soul possesseth it after such a manner, as that both to have it, and to use it, it requireth the Body, as being the Thing wherein it is contained, and with which it operates. Now the Body affording this to the Soul, viz. *That it hath a Principle of Sensation, and is able to use it, becometh itself also participant of this Effect, which dependeth upon that Principle,* (that is to say, it feelth or perceiveth) but not of all things that belong thereto, as of Tenuity, and the like.

Wherefore it is not to be wonder'd at, that the Body, when the Soul is departed, remaineth void of Sense; for it did not of itself possess this Faculty, but only made it ready for the Soul, which was congenious with it; which Soul, by means of the Faculty co-affected in the Body, exercising, by a peculiar Motion of hers, the Act of Sensation, giveth Sense, not only to itself, but to the Body also, by reason of their Neighbourhood, Cohesion, or Union with one another.

Thus it comes to pass, that not the Soul alone, nor the Body alone, perceive or feel, but rather both together. And though the Principle of Sensation be in the Soul, yet whoever holds, that the Body doth not perceive or feel together with the Soul; and believeth that the Soul, intermingled with the whole Body, is able of herself to perform this Motion of Sensation, he oppugns a thing most manifest.

* And they who say, (as some do) that the Eyes see not any thing, but it is the Soul only that seeth through them, as thro' open Doors, observe not, that if the Eyes were like Doors, we might see things much better if our Eyes were out, as if the Doors were taken away.

Now, that which here seems the greatest Difficulty being this, How it comes to pass that a thing Sensitive, or capable of Sense, may be generated of Principles that are wholly insensive, or void of Sense, we are to take Notice, that this is to be ascribed to some necessary and peculiar Magnitude, Figure, Motion, Position, and Order of those Principles, as was before declared when we treated of Qualities; for the Faculty of Sense is one of the Qualities, which, that it appear where it was not, requireth that there be some Addition, Detraction, Transposition, and, in a word, a new Contexture, able to do that which the former could not.

Yet we must not therefore believe, that Stones, Wood, Clods of Earth, and such like Compounds, perceive or feel; for, as other Qualities, so this also is not begotten of every Mixture, or of the Mixture of any kind of things, but it is wholly requisite, that the Principles be endued with such a Bigness, such Figures, Motions, Orders, and the like Accidents; whence it comes to pass, that even Clods of Earth, Wood, and the like, when putrified by Rain, and heated by the Sun, the Position and Order of their Parts being changed, turn into Worms, and other sensitive things: This may be understood from the several Aliments, which being applied to the Bodies of living Creatures, and variously altered, do, in like manner, of insensive become sensitive; as Wood applied to Fire, of not-burning becometh burning.

And that it may appear, how much some are mistaken, who assert, that the Principles whereof Sense and sensitive things consist, must be sensitive; consider, that if they were such, they must be soft; forasmuch as no hard, or solid thing is capable of Sense, and consequently, as we argued before, they must be corruptible; because, unless they are solid, they may be diminished, and so lose their Nature, whereas the Principles of things, as we have often heretofore alleged, must be incorruptible and permanent.

It may otherwise be proved thus: If we allow the Principles to be incorruptible, we cannot conceive them to be sensitive; neither as Parts, for Parts severed from the Whole, feel not; neither as Wholes, for then they would be Animals, and consequently mortal, or corruptible, which is contrary to the Hypothesis. Moreover, if we should admit, that they are both Animals, and immortal, it would follow, that no such Animals as we now behold (that is, of a peculiar kind, and agreeing in one Species) could be generated, but only a Heap of several little Animals.

Furthermore, if sensitive things must be generated of sensitive, that is, like of like, it will be necessary, as we said before, that a Man (for Example) consist of Principles that laugh, weep, ratiocinate, discourse of the Mixture of Things, and of themselves, enquiring of what Things they consist, and these being like to corruptible Things, must consist of others, and those likewise of others, into infinite.

Now it being well known, that in the Bodies of Animals there are five distinct Organs of Sense, by which the Soul (or the sensitive Faculty in her) apprehends, and perceives sensible Objects several ways, that is, by Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Tasting, Touching; nothing hinders, but that we allow five Senses, the Sight, the Hearing, the Smell, the Taste, and the Touch.

All this Diversity ariseth from hence, that on one side the Species of Colours, and visible Things, as also Sounds, Odors, Savors, and other Qualities;

* Laert. 20. 64.

† Ibid.

‡ Lucret. 3. v. 351.

are made up of little Bodies, endued with particular Magnitudes, Figures, Positions, Orders, and Motions. On the other side, the Organs of Sight, Hearing, and the rest of the Senses, are of such Contextures as contain little Vacuities or Pores, which have likewise peculiar Magnitudes, Positions, and Orders; and these Organs being various, have several Aptitudes and Proportions, to which the several little Bodies of the Qualities are commensurated, so as some can receive into themselves these, others those; whence it happens, that only these little Bodies, of which the Species of Colour consist, are capable of penetrating into the Organ of Sight, and to move and affect it after that manner; but so are not the little Bodies, which are only capable of piercing, moving, and affecting the Organ of Hearing, or those which can only affect that of the Touch; and so of the rest.

Hence also, when we observe, that not only Animals of different kinds, but even amongst Men themselves, some are not affected with the same sensible Objects, we may understand that there is not in them the same kind of Contexture. And since in all little Bodies blended and mingled together, some will naturally agree with others, some not; therefore, neither can the Impression and Apprehensions, or Sensation of the same Quality be made in all Animals; neither can a sensible Object affect all Animals alike with all its Parts, but each one with those Qualities only which are suitable to their Senses, and convenient to affect them.

I shall add nothing concerning the common Objects of Sense, as Magnitude, Figure, Motion, and the like, which are perceptible by more Senses than one; for what we said of them in the Canonick, is sufficient.

C H A P. XI.

Of Sight, and of the Images which glide into it.

BEING to speak something of every Sense, we must begin with Sight, whose Organ manifestly is the Eye; nor is it less evident, that the external Appearances and Forms of Things, are therefore seen by us; because something glides from without, or from the Object's into us, that is, into our Eye. But before we undertake to shew, that this is far more probable than what others assert, we must declare, whether there be any thing which comes from the things themselves into our Eye, and of what Nature it is.

First then we affirm, that nothing hinders, but that certain Effluxions of Atoms, perpetually flying in an uninterrupted Course, are sent from the Surfaces of Bodies, in which also the same Position and same Order may be preserved, which was found in the Superficies and Solids of the very

Bodies themselves; whence such Effluxions are as it were Forms, Figures, or Images of these Bodies from which they are derived, and resembling them in all their Lineaments; and, moreover, are far more subtle than any of the things themselves, which by them are made visible to us. This then is the Nature of those Forms or Figures which we use to call Idols or Images.

Nor is it difficult, that such kind of Contextures should be found in the middle Air, or ambiently diffused Space; nor, that there should be in the things themselves, and especially in the Atoms, certain Dispositions, rendering them apt to make Representations, which are only meer empty Cavities, and superficial Tenuities of no determinable Depth. But in this Place, we speak of those Effluxions, which are as it were thin Films, or Skins stript from the remaining Bodies.

Nor yet is it difficult, that Images of this Nature should flow from the outsidess of Bodies, as is hence proved, that there flowing ever something from the inner Parts of Bodies, as Smell, Heat, Cold, (as we hinted formerly) it is far more easy, that something should flow, or be carried away from their outmost Parts; since the Atoms, as well in one as the other, are in a perpetual Endeavour of disentangling themselves to get away: But in the former Case, being covered with other Atoms, they find Resistance; whereas, in the latter, being placed in the Fore-front of the Body, they find none. Add, that hence also they gain the Advantage of flying out from the Superficies in the same Order and Rank which they held there; whereas, those which come from within, cannot but change their Postures, being often disturbed in the way, by their anfractuons Passages.

Now, that there are indeed such Effluxions, may hence be proved, that if the Sun-beams pass thorough Curtains, red, (for Example,) or if any other Colour, drawn before the Theatres, such subtle Emissions are sent from them, as make all things behind them appear so colour'd. But the Experiment from Looking-glasses is more than sufficient; for these clearly shew, that there are indeed such Effluxions emitted from Bodies, in regard, the Bodies being present, they light upon the Glass; if any thing intervene, they are hindered from coming thither; if the Bodies be moved, they move also; if inverted, they also are inverted; if the Bodies retire, they also go back; if they are taken away, they wholly disappear.

But inasmuch as there is no Point of Time, in which these Images flow not into the Medium, doubtless their Production must be made in a Point of Time, and be perpetually flowing out at the Superficies in a continued Stream. For the Reason why they cannot be discerned apart, is, because, when one Image goes away, another coherently

¹ Laert. 10. 49.

² Laert. 4. 46.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Lucret. 4. v. 35.

⁵ Lucret. loc. cit.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Laert. 10. 48.

"rently succeeds, and supplies its room; and instantly preserves the same Order and Position of Atoms, which is in the Superficies of the solid Body, and that for a long time, and at a great distance, (although at last they are confounded.)" Whence it comes to pass, that the Body always appeareth with the same Accidents, and in the same Form.

I mean here, that Form which is proper to the Body, and is conceived to be a Collection (as it were) of Parts, disposed in a certain Order, or, (as it were) the Superficies left behind by the Image, which flies away from it.

It may here seem strange, that the Body seemeth no more to be diminished, than as if nothing at all were taken off from it; but this is by reason of their extraordinary Tenuity, which cannot be understood, without first conceiving the Tenuity of the Atoms. Concerning this, we instanc'd formerly, in an Animal so small, as if we suppos'd it divided into three Parts, each of them will be indiscernible; and yet for Performance of those animal Functions which it dischargeth, it must necessarily be made up of such Parts and Particles as can hardly be form'd without innumerable Myriads of Atoms.

Not to mention, in Confirmation of the Probability hereof, that there are many odorous things, out of which, though something incessantly flows, yet for a long time nothing appeareth to be diminished, either as to their Figure or Weight, notwithstanding that the Effluviuums out of them are far grosser, and more numerous than these Images which flow out along with them; yet are so inconsiderable a Part of the Things that flow out as no Man can express.

Wonderful also may seem their Celerity in flying out; but this must be understood by the Celerity of the Atoms, formerly declared; for these Images, by reason of the Tenuity we spoke of, being nothing else but certain Contextures of simple Atoms, "have a Celerity beyond all Imagination, and their Passage through the transparent Place, which is round about them, is like that which is through the infinite Spaces, there being not much Difference; because they meet few or no Obstacles in the Space which surrounds them." Certainly, if the Light of the Sun and other Stars can come so swiftly (as we observe) from Heaven, the Celerity of these Images ought to be, if not greater, yet not less, by reason of the Atoms which stand in the Surface of the Body, ready for Motion, and have nothing to retard them.

CHAP. XII.

That Seeing is performed by means of those Images.

THESE ' things presupposed, some conceive, that "external and distinct things are therefore seen by us, because they imprint in our Eye the Image

"of their Colour or Figure; the Air intervening between them and us, performing the Office of a Seal, by means of which this Impression is made. Others think, that this is effected by the Rays or Effluviuums sent from us or our Eyes to the Object; it is far more probable, that it is performed by these Images we spoke of, which coming from the things, or their Colour and Figure, flow into us, and preserving a congruous Magnitude, enter into our Eyes, and strike our Sight with a very swift Motion."

This Sigillation (or Impression) indeed is a thing extream hard, and perhaps impossible to be explicated; and as for the Emission of Rays out of our Eyes, it is unimaginable what the Looking-glasses send out of them, that they also should have Images painted in them; or what that is, which in a Moment is sent from the Eye into the whole vast Circumference of the Heavens.

To omit, that since in Hearing, Smelling, Tasting, Touching, we send nothing out of ourselves, but receive something from without, which causeth a Sensation of itself, (for of itself a Voice comes into the Ears, Odors into the Nostrils, Saps into the Palate, and things which may be touched, are applied to the Body) it is obvious to be conceived, that neither is any thing sent out from our Eyes, but that something (*viz.* those Images) comes into our Eyes from the things themselves.

But the Soul, inasmuch as it is in the Eye, cannot but see, that is, apprehend the Colour and outward Form of that thing which is presented to it: For by reason of the polite and perspicuous Contexture of the Organ, it receiveth the Image of the thing, and is struck by it according to all the presented Parts.

And so far as those things are beautiful which delight the Sight, those deformed which offend it; how should we imagine this to be, but that the Images which come from the one consist of Bodies, which, by their Smoothness, are gently accommodated to the Contexture of the Eye; but those which come from the other, consist of such, as by their ugly Figure, rend the Contexture?

And when the Eye is troubled with the Jaundice, how comes it, that all things seem yellow? but that the Images, in their Application to the Eye, receive a Tincture; or they may be stain'd also without the Eye, coming amongst the yellow little Bodies or Images, which proceed in like manner from the Eye.

But how happens it, that we see not only the Colour and Form of a Body, but we discern its Distance also? This proceeds from the Air, which the Image drives on before it; for though it comes to the Eye exceeding swiftly, and in imperceptible time; yet it comes thither, and touches upon it orderly; and

¹ Laert. 10. 50.

² Laert. 10. 47.

³ Laert. 10. 49.

⁴ Lucret. lib. 4. v. 333.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid. 270.

and by how much the longer it is in doing so, so much the more distant the thing appears to be; by how much the sooner, so much the nearer.

Hence also may be given a Reason, * why an Image seems to be beyond the Looking-glass; for as when a Man, from any Place within a House, looks upon a thing that is without Doors, the Air cometh to him imprinted, as well that without to the Door, as that within from the Door: So to him who looketh in a Glass, cometh successively as well that Air which is from the Glass to the Eye, as that which is from the Object to the Glass.

Hence also may be given a Reason, why, * being in the dark, we can see the things that are in the Light; but being in the Light, cannot see those that are in the dark. For the enlightened Air succeeding the dark, the Eye informed by it is enabled to see; but not when the dark succeedeth the enlightened.

How comes it, † that the Images in a Glass seem to walk as we do? This happens, by reason of the varied Parts of the Glass, from which several Parts there must necessarily be made a Reflection upon the Eye, and thereupon the Images seem to walk as we.

If you ask, * why the Image which goeth from us to the Glass represents not the Back-side, but the Fore-side, and that so, as that the right Part is on the left Side, and the Left on the Right; take notice, that this happens on the very same Fashion as if the Image of a Man, made of Chalk or Clay, not quite dried, should be clapt to a Ball or Pillar.

But if the Image be reflected † from one Glass to another, and thence to the Eye, the Situation of the Parts is restored, so as the right Parts appear on the right Side, and the Left on the Left, (and by this means it may be brought to pass, especially if there be many Glasses, that such things as are hidden behind something, and out of Sight, may be brought to View) which may also happen even in one Glass, if it hath little Sides, whereof one reflects the Image to the other.

Thus much concerning the Sight; to which also some things, formerly hinted in our Discourse of the Criteries and of Qualities, have Reference.

C H A P. XIII.

Of Hearing.

Concerning Hearing, we must repeat what we have touched formerly, that, it being confess'd, the Ear is the Organ of the Hearing, as Seeing is perform'd by the coming of something into the Eye; * so Hearing also is † perform'd in the Ear by an Emission of something convey'd thither from the thing that speaks, sounds, makes a Noise, or is some other way dispos'd to stir up the Sense of "Hearing." This kind of Effluvium, as it affects this Sense, is called Sound.

Moreover, this † Effluvium, either in the Mouth of the Speaker, or generally in the thing struck upon and making a Noise, is scatter'd there by Motion into innumerable little Pieces of the same Figure, (* round, if the whole Effluvium were round; inequilateral and triangular, if the first Effluvium were such,) in like manner as we observe, that little Drops are made when we pour any thing out of Bottles, or when Cloth-workers spirt Water upon their Cloaths.

"These little Pieces, * or small Bulks, are thereupon dispersed in such manner, as that they preserve a certain mutual Conformity to one another, (and strike the hearing of several Persons alike, so as they all seem to hear one and the same Sound, though it be not the same, but like only,) and keep fast also within themselves, each by a particular Coherence, whereby it comes to pass that they are known to have reference to that thing from which they were sent forth; and, for the most part, make such a Sensation as was first made by that which sent forth the Sound, (as when the Sound comes not from far into the Ear, and passeth through a free Space.) But otherwise, (as by reason of a great Distance, or some Partition,) something from without bringeth in the Sound confusedly only. For without a kind of Conformity and Coherence, deduced and preserv'd from the very thing sounding, there could never be any distinct hearing.

"Yet † must we not imagine, that when the Voice (for Example,) is once sent forth into the Air, the Air is presently imprinted or formed, either by that Voice, or by some others made by it, into like Voices; which (as one † expresseth it, fly away together, as one Jay with another, as saith the Proverb.) It were too great a Task, that the Air should be designed for any such Employment; but as soon as ever the Blow is made within us when we speak, the Voice being articulated out of certain little Pieces, of a most spiritual and nimble Effluxion, fit for the Office, and arriving at the Ear, causeth hearing in us."

That these little † Pieces which insinuate into the Ear have a Figure, may be argued, by reason that Sound could not affect the hearing pleasantly and unpleasantly, if it had not such a Smoothness as suits with the Contexture of the Organ, nor such a Roughness as rends the Organ. This may better be understood, by comparing the grating of a Saw with the Sweetness of a Lute, or the hoarse cawing of a Crow with the sweet Melody of a dying Swan.

Not to repeat some things spoken † heretofore, which seem to conduce hereunto, I shall only touch this Difficulty, How it comes to pass, that Sounds in the Night-time are both louder and clearer than in the Day? To solve this, we must assume what is

* Ibid.
Plat. Princ. Phil.

* Ibid.
Laert. ib.

† Ibid.
Ibid.

* Ibid.
Democr.

* Ibid.
Laert. ib.

† Laert. 10. 52.
Rust. Symp. quæst. 8. 37.

* Laert. loc. cit.

is manifest from our Discourse formerly, That Motion is made through Vacuum, and that there is much of Vacuum scattered up and down through the little Bodies, or Bulks of Air, which are made up of Atoms; and that in the Day-time it being hot, and these little Bodies rarify'd, and the Atoms diffused, the little Vacuities contained in them must necessarily become narrower and straiter; but in the Night, it being cold, and these little Bodies prest up close, and the Atoms crowded together, the Vacuities become larger. This is evident from all things, which in a Vessel are boiled, softned, and melted; but if they take up a larger Place, they cool, return to their Temper, and become contracted.

Hence therefore it happens, that * the Sound in the Day-time passing thorough the dilated Air, and lighting upon many Bodies in its way, is either quite stopp'd, or torn, and much knock'd and worn away. But when in the Night it passeth through a Space free from Bodies, it arrives at the hearing by a full, ready, and uninterrupted Career, and with that Swiftnes preserves its Clearness and Distinction.

From the same Ground it springs, that empty Vessels, being struck, sound; the full sound not; and that the more small Bodies, as Gold, make a low dull Noise; the less compact, as Brass, a greater and clearer.

C H A P. XIV.

Of Smelling.

AS concerning Smelling, we must understand, that Odor (as was in * Proportion declared concerning Sound or Voice, when we treated of hearing) would not make any Impression or Stamp of itself, unless from the odorous thing there were deduced some little Bodies or Bulks, so commensurated to the Organ of Smelling, (the Nostrils) as to be able to move and affect it.

That Odors flow and come out of things, is manifest, so far as all things esteemed odorous have a stronger Scent, being broken, pounded, or dissolved by Fire, than whilst they are whole. For the Stock of these little Bodies, which are fit to move the Smell, is pent up, as it were, within the odorous Body, and bound; but the Body being broken, pounded, or burnt, it leaps forth, and spreads itself like a Vapour or Cloud, and affects the Smelling, if it can light upon it.

It useth to affect the Smell two * ways, either *unquietly and unsuitably*, whence proceed unpleasant Odors; or *smoothly and aptly*, whence pleasant Odors. For some of the little Bodies of Odor having a smooth and even Surface; others, more or greater Angles than is fit; thence it happens, that some Odors affect the Organ with Delight, as touching it smoothly; others, with a kind of Pain, as if they tore it.

There * must needs be a Difference betwixt the Penetrations of these little Bodies into the Nostrils, when Carcasses are burnt, and when the Theatre is newly strew'd with Saffron. And it may be conceived after this manner. As the Hand, if we put Down to it, presseth upon it; but if a Nettle, snatcheth itself back; (for the Smoothness of the one, and the Roughness of the other, by its Prickles, affect two different Ways,) in like manner the little Bodies which proceed out of the Saffron, are smooth; those which out of the Carcass, prickly; so as the first gently stroke and delight the Nostrils, the other prick them, and make them draw back.

Moreover, * there being so great Variety of Tempers amongst Animals, (even amongst Men, one in respect of another) and the Contexture of the Organ of Smelling being different in several Persons, it ought not to seem strange, that some Scents please some; others, others; by reason of the Dissimilitudes of the Figures of the little Bodies of which they consist; nor that Bees delight in Flowers, Vultures in Carrion; or that Dogs find out by the Scent which way Beasts have gone, which we cannot perceive; as if in passing they left a Steam which cannot strike our Smell.

C H A P. XV.

Of Tasting.

WE come next to speak of *Tasting*: Whereas it is manifest, that the Organ thereof is the Tongue and Palate; and that * we then taste and perceive the Sapor in our Mouth, when chewing the Meat, we squeeze out the Juice, (as when we press with the Hand a Sponge full of Water) and thereupon the Juice which is squeezed forth, is distributed through the Pores, or complicated Holes of the Tongue and Palate; we may in general assert the Sapor to be sweet, the little Bodies whereof are accommodated to the Organ, gently and smoothly; on the contrary, that to be bitter, salt, sharp, acid, fowre, hot, &c. which roughly and unsuitably. For neither could Honey or Milk affect the Tongue pleasantly, nor Wormwood or Centory unpleasantly, if it were not that those consist of smoother and rounder little Bodies, these of more harsh and hooked; so as those touch it gently, these prick and rend it.

He therefore * not defines the thing amiss, who saith, That the Atoms, which make a sweet Sapor, are round, and of a convenient Size; those which a fowre, large, those which a harsh, multangular, and nothing round; those which a sharp, acute, conical, crooked, not slender, nor round; those which an acid, round, slender, corner'd, crooked; those which a salt, corner'd, distorted, aequicrural; those

* Ibid.
v. 632.

* Ibid.

* Lucret. 10. 53.

* Lucret. lib. 4. v. 680.

* Lucret. lib. 2. v. 414.

* Lucret. lib. 4.

* Lucret. lib. 4. v. 621.

* Theophrast. lib. 4. de Sens. & Sens.

those which a bitter, round, smooth, distorted, little; those which a fat, slender, round, little.

But, more particularly, seeing that the Tempers, not only of Animals, but even of Men among themselves, are so various, and that as they differ in the outward Lineaments of their Bodies, so they cannot but differ also in their inward Contextures; hence we may say, that the Savors that are pleasing to some Animals or Men, are displeasing to others, by reason that the little Bodies, of which they consist, are suitable, and accommodated to the Contexture of the Organs of those, but unsuitable and unaccommodated to the Contexture of the Organs of these; since the round Pores, that in the Organ can receive the round Atoms smoothly, but the triangular difficultly; and the triangular Pores can receive the triangular smoothly, but the round difficultly.

Hereby also it is understood, how it comes to pass, that the things which were formerly pleasant to us, are in a Fever distasteful; for the Texture is so disordered, and the Figures of the Pores so alter'd, that the Figures of the little Bodies which insinuate into them, though formerly they were adaptable, now become unsuitable and incongruous.

From the same Reason it is, that the Meat which agreeth with one Animal, is Poison to another; as Hemlock or Hellebore is destructive to a Man, yet it fattens Goats and Quails. This happens, by reason of the interior Contextures, which differing from one another, that which is accommodate and adaptable to one, is inadaptable to another.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Touching.

Lastly, concerning the *Touch*, I mean not that touch is common to all Bodies, as they are said to touch one another by their *Superficies*, (contrary to the Nature of *Vacuum*, which can neither touch, nor be touched) but that which is proper to Animals, not performed without Perception of the Soul; and hath not one, but all Parts of the Body for its Organ. Concerning this *Touch*, I shall only declare, that what is perceived by it is perceived three ways.

For first, A thing is perceived by the *Touch*, when it is extrinsically applied, or, from without insinuates itself; applied, as when the Hand feels a Stone clapp'd to it; insinuated, as when a hot thing emitting Heat, or a cold thing Cold, certain little Bodies get into the Pores, which, according to the State wherein the Body is, either refresh or disturb it.

Secondly, When a thing which is within is driven out, which sometimes happens with Pleasure, espe-

cially when the thing itself was burthenfome and incommodious, *ad dum semen exornitur*; sometimes with Pain, as when by reason of the Angles of the little Bodies, it excoriates the Passage, as by the Strangury, or Difficulty of Urine.

Lastly, When some things within the Body take some of these Motions, as by Impulsion, Diduction, Distraction, Convulsion, Compunction, Rapture, Excoriation, Inflation, Tension, Breaking, and innumerable other Ways, it disturbs the natural Constitution, and confounds and troubles the Senses. Thus all Aches and Pains of the Head, and other Parts within, are caused; and the Animal doth in such manner affect itself, as if a Man should with his own Hand strike a Part of his Body.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the Intellect, Mind, or Reason, and its Seat.

Hitherto of the *Sense*. We must now speak of the *Intellect*, which is also usually called, *Mind*, *Reason*. The rational and hexegemonick Part; sometimes Cogitation, Imagination, Opinion, Counsel: Its Property is, when the Sense strikes it, to think, apprehend, understand, revolve, meditate, discourse, or deliberate something.

The Contexture of the *Intellect* consists of little Bodies, the most subtle, smooth and round of all, so far as nothing can be more subtle, nor of quicker Motion. Neither is there any thing that can stir up itself sooner, or perform any thing quicker than the *Intellect*, which if it design or begin any thing, brings it to pass in a Moment; whence all acknowledge, that nothing can be swifter than (her Action) Thought.

And certainly, as Water is much apter to move, and more fluent than Honey, by reason that it is made up of little Bodies, which are smoother, lesser, rounder; nothing consequently can consist of rounder, lesser, and smoother, than the Mind, for nothing can be readier for Motion, quicker, or more pliant.

And in whatsoever Part of the Body the *Intellect* inheres, it so cohereth to the Soul, or to that Portion of the Soul which coexists with it in that Part, as that it is indivisibly conjoined to it, and constitutes one Nature with it; yet it always so preserves and retains its own Nature, as that it is the Property of the *Intellect*, to think; of the Soul, to undergo Affections; though, by reason of their Cohesion, it be conceived, that the Soul thinks, and the *Intellect* is affected.

Indeed, the *Intellect* is void of Affection or Passion; but (because, as the Passions depending on Sense, are stirred up in the Soul about those Parts wherein the Sense is seated; so those which depend on

Cogitation

Cogitation, are stirr'd up in the Soul about that Part where Cogitation is, and in which Part the Soul is one thing with the Intellect thinking:) Hence it cometh to pass, that as if the Aggregate or Compound of the Intellect and the Soul residing in that Part made up only Intellect, the Passions come to be attributed to the Intellect itself.

Thus, whether the Intellect be taken distinctly or jointly, it hath this Property beyond the other Part of the Soul, that, as when the Head or Eye acheth, we are not thereupon pain'd all over the Body; so sometimes the Intellect is affected with Grief or Joy, when the other Part of the Soul, which is diffused through the Body, is free from this Affection. I say sometimes, because it may happen that the Intellect be seiz'd with a Fear so vehement, as that the rest of the Soul may be struck together with it, and thereby may be caus'd Sweating, Paleness, stopping of the Speech, the Eyes grow dim, the Ears possess'd with a humming, the Joints grow faint, and, in a word, the Man may fall into a Swoon.

Moreover, the Intellect may be conceived to partake of Life more perfectly than the Soul, or the other Part of the Soul, so far as the Soul cannot subsist never so little in the Limbs without the Intellect; but the Intellect, though the Limbs round about it were cut off, and thereby a great Part of the Soul taken away, would nevertheless subsist and preserve Life: Like the Ball, which conducteth more to Sight than all the rest of the Eye; because the Ball being hurt, though the rest of the Parts be sound, the Sight is destroy'd; but as long as the Ball is sound, though the other Parts be destroy'd, the Sight continueth.

* It seemeth not, that there can be any other Seat assign'd for the Intellect, or rational Part of the Soul, than the middle Part of the Breast, and consequently the Entrails, or the Heart, which is in the midst of the Breast. This is manifest from the Affections of Fear and Joy proceeding from Cogitation, (or the Intellect thinking) which we perceive to be in the Breast.

CHAP. XVIII.

That the Soul thinketh by Images, which glide into it.

THERE is only this Difficulty, 'How the Intellect can be stirr'd up to think something? But it being manifest, that things are thought by the Intellect, in the same manner as they are seen by the Eye; it is also evident, that as Sight, so Thinking or Cogitation is made by Images which glide into it.

* For besides those Images which glide into the Eye, and being of something a grosser Bulk, are accommodated to the Contexture of the Eye, and produce in it the Act of Seeing, there must necessa-

riely wander through the Air an innumerable Company of others, far more subtle; and those either peel'd off from Bodies, or form'd in the Air itself, as was formerly said; which penetrating through the Body, and being adaptable to the Contexture of the Intellect, as soon as they arrive at it, move it to Think.

* Whence it comes to pass, that as we see (for Example) a Lion, because the Image thereof glides into our Eyes; so we think a Lion, because the Image of a Lion glides into our Mind. That we think or imagine Centaurs, Scyllia's and the like, which neither are, nor ever were; this may happen, not so much by Images framed on purpose, as for that when the Images (for Example) of a Man and of a Horse are presented to us, they, by reason of their Tenuity or Subtlety, like a Cobweb, or a Leaf of Gold, are joined together, and made one, such as is attributed to a Centaur.

* But take notice, that when sometimes we persevere in the same Thought, whether waking or sleeping; this happens not, for that we use some one Image of the same thing, but that we use many Images succeeding in a continual Fluxion; which if they come to us in the same Posture, the thing thought or imagin'd seemeth unmoved; if in a varied, it seems moved. Which is the Reason why, in Dreams especially, Images seem to us to be moved, and to stir their Arms and other Limbs one after another.

* But how comes it to pass, that whatsoever any Man would, his Mind or Intellect thinks that very thing? Because, though there are every where Images of all sorts, yet the greatest Part passeth by unthought of; and those only move the Mind which she herself takes notice of, or would observe, or frames herself to think of. And observe we not, that the Eyes, when they begin to have a Sight of something very little, bend and fix themselves upon it; and till they see something plainly, all other things are as if they were not, although they receive their Images also?

Now as there is some Intentiveness requisite to the Mind, that it may apprehend things distinctly; so much more that it may simply think, or give some Judgment, by affirming or denying; but most of all, that it may discourse of them, as if its greatest Care were not to be deceived.

But this we declared formerly, in treating of the Criteries. It will be sufficient, as to the Speculation of natural things, here to observe, that *human Discourse first admireth the things that are produced by Nature, and next enquires into them, and finds out their Causes; but in some sooner, in others later; and sometimes evinceth this, or arrives at the full Knowledge in a longer time, sometimes in a shorter.*

* Lucret. l. 3. v. 441.

* Lucret. l. 4. v. 728.

* Ibid. 736.

* Ibid. 772.

* Ibid. 780.

* Ibid. 801.

C H A P. XIX.

Of the Affections or Passions of the Soul.

THERE is besides Sense another Part of the irrational Soul, which may be called Affectuous, or Passionate, from the Affections or Passions raised in it. It is also termed the Appetite or Desire, from the chief Affection which it hath, called Appetite or Desire; some distinguish it into Concupiscible and Irascible.

Now whereas it was already said, that the Affections which follow Sense are produced in the Organs of Sense, those which follow Opinion, in the Breast: Hereupon there being two principal Affections, Pleasure and Pain; the first, familiar, and suitable to the Soul; the other, incommodious, and unsuitable to Nature; it is manifest, that both these are excited, not in the Breast only, where Pleasure, for the most part, comes under the Name of Joy, Gladness, Exultation, Mirth; and Pain, under that of Grief, Sorrow, Anguish, &c. but also in the other Parts, in which, when they are removed from their natural State, there is raised Pain or Grief; when they are restored to that State, Pleasure.

If all the Parts could continue in their natural State, either there would be no Affection, or if there were any, it must be called Pleasure, from the Quiet and Calmness of that State. But because either by reason of the continual Motion of Principles in the Body of an Animal, some things depart from it, others come to it; some are taken asunder, others put together, &c. or by reason of the Motion which is in the things round about, some things are brought which insinuate into them, change, invert, disjoin, &c. Pain is caused (from the first Occasion, as by Hunger, Thirst, Sickness; from the second, as by Burning, Bruising, Wrestling, Wounding) therefore the Affection of Pain seems to be first produced: and withal, because it is of an opposite Nature, that of Aversion or Avoidance of it, and of the thing that bringeth it; to which, for that reason, is attributed the Name of Ill.

Hereupon followeth a Desire of Exemption from Pain, or of that State which is void of Pain, and consequently of the thing by which it may be expelled, and to which, for that reason, is given the Name of Good; and then the Pain being taken away, and the thing reduced into a better, that is, into its natural State, Pleasure is excited, and goeth along with it; so as there would not be Pleasure, if some kind of Pain did not go before, as is easily observable even from Hunger and Thirst, and the Pleasure that is taken in eating and drinking.

For this Pleasure is only made, because (most of the Parts being dissipated by the Action of the intrin-

secal Heat, by which means the Body itself becomes rarify'd, all Nature destroy'd, and the Stomach especially grip'd; or otherwise some little Bodies of Heat rolling about it, make it glow, whereby is caused Pain;) because, I say, Meat cometh, and supplieth the Defect, supports the Limbs, stoppeth the Desire of eating, which gapeth throughout the Members and the Veins; Drink comes and extinguishes the Heat, moistneth the Parts which before were dry, and reduceth them to their first State. And besides, both are made with a smooth and pleasing Sense of Nature, which it is manifest is then absent, when a Man eats, not being hungry; or drinks, not being athirst.

Thus the general Affections of the Soul seem to be these four, Pain and Pleasure, the Extreme; Aversion and Desire, the Intermediate. I say, General; because the rest are Kinds of these, and made by Opinion intervening, and may be reduced principally to Desire and Avoidance.

For Desire is particularly called Will, when the Mind wills that which it thinks, and conceiveth it to be good; and Avoidance is called Aversion, when it turneth away from that which it thinketh, or conceiveth to be ill. Hereupon, Love (for Example) is a Will, whereby we are carried to the Enjoyment of something. Hate is an Aversion, whereby we withdraw ourselves from conversing with something. Again, Anger is nothing but Desire, whereby we are carry'd on to Vengeance. Fear is an Avoidance, by which we shrink at some future Ill, and retire, as it were, within ourselves; and so of the rest.

But so far as Desire (as also in proportion Avoidance too) is partly excited by Nature, and by reason of some Indigence, which must necessarily be supplied, that Nature may be preserved; partly is begotten by Opinion, which is sometimes conformable to the Design of Nature, and so tends to remove her Indigence, as that yet it is not necessary it should be quite taken away. Lastly, it sometimes conduces nothing either to Nature, or to the taking away of its Indigence. Hence it comes to pass, that of Desires, some are Natural and Necessary; others Natural, but not Necessary; others, neither Natural nor Necessary, but Vain.

Natural and Necessary are those, which take away both the Indigence, and the Pain proceeding from the Indigence; such is that of Meat, of Drink, of Cloathing, to expel the Cold. Natural, but not Necessary, are those which only vary the Pleasure, but are not absolutely Necessary to the taking away of the Pain; as those which are of delicate Meats, even that which is of venereal Delights, to which Nature gives a Beginning, but from which a Man may abstain without Inconvenience. Lastly, neither Natural nor Necessary are those, which contribute nothing to the taking away of any Pain, caused by some Indigence

Indigence of Nature, but are begot only by Opinion; such are, for Instance, those of Crowns, Statues, Ornaments, rich Cloathing, Gold, Silver, Ivory, and the like.

Moreover it is to be observed, That whereas Pleasure consists in the Fruition of Good, Pain in suffering Ill; for this reason, the first is produced with a kind of Dilatation and Exaltation of the Soul, the other with a Contraction and Depression thereof; and therefore it is not to be wonder'd at, if the Soul dilates herself as much as she can, to make way for the Good to come into her, and contracts herself to prevent the Ill.

There is a Diffusion, or Dilatation; for as soon as ever the Form of a good and pleasing thing strikes the Sense, or moveth the Mind, the little Bodies, of which it consists, to insinuate into the Organs of Sense, or into the Heart itself, as that being accommodated as well to the Soul as to the Body, they, in a more particular manner, gently stroke and delight the Soul, and, like little Chains, allure and draw it towards that thing out of which they were sent: Whereupon the Soul being turned towards, and intent upon that thing, gives a great Leap, as it were, towards it, with all the Strength it hath, that it may enjoy it.

On the other side there is Contraction; because as soon as ever the Form of a painful thing strikes the Sense, or the Mind, the little Bodies of which it consists, as to many little Darts or Needles, prick the very Soul together with the Organ, in such manner, that they loosen its Contexture; while she, to prevent them as much as she can, shuts herself up, and retires to her very Centre or Root, where the Heart or Intellect is placed.

It will not be necessary to repeat what we formerly said, that it depends upon the Contexture of the Soul, why one Animal is more inclined to Anger, another to Fear, a third to calm smooth Motions; nor to add, that this Difference is found in Men also, according as their Souls participate more of a fiery, or a stultous, or of an aerial Principle. Or we may observe even in Men that are politer'd by Learning, these Seeds cannot be so rooted out, but that one is more propense to Anger, another more subject to Fear, a third more prone to Clemency than he ought. Moreover, the Difference of Manners, which is observed to be so great, not amongst Animals only, but in Men from one another, is plainly enough derived from the various Commixtion of these Seeds.

C H A P. XX.

Of voluntary Motion, and particularly of Speaking, and Imposition of Names.

NOW the Soul being naturally stirring, and ready for Motion, and able to move the Body

wherein it exists, and the Members thereof; it is well known, that whensoever the moveth the Body, or its Members, with any Motion whatsoever, the therefore doth it, because she hath a Will to move them, and that this Will is stirr'd up by the Intellect imagining; and that this Imagination is caused by the Image that strikes it: for the Intellect, or Mind, never doth any thing, but first she foreseeth it; nor foreseeth it, unless the first have the Image of that Thing.

¹ Thus, when we move (for Example) the Thighs, and walk, this is therefore done, because first the Images of walking coming to the Mind strike it, thence proceeds a Will to walk; then when the Mind hath so mov'd itself, as that it wills to walk, it instantly strikes the Soul in that Part whereto it is joined; that Part strikes the rest of the Soul, which is diffused through the whole Body, and especially through the Thighs and Feet. Thus the whole Frame is by degrees thrust forwards, and moved: Not to mention that the Air conduceth something thereto, by reason that as the whole Body becomes rarify'd, the Air insinuates into its Parts. The Body therefore is moved from two Causes, like a Ship, which is driven on by Oars and Wind.

² That the Beginning of Motion proceeds from the Heart, where the Mind is seated, is manifest; for that we see sometimes Horses (for Example) cannot, as soon as ever the Barrier is let down, break forth, nor start away so suddenly, as their Will prompts them; because the whole Substance of the Soul diffused through all the Limbs must first be summoned, that, being stirr'd up, it may follow the Design of the Mind. Thus it proceeds first from the Will of the Mind, and then through the Body and Limbs.

³ It may perhaps seem strange, that so little Bodies as those, whereof the Mind consists, should be able to move, wrest, and turn about so great a Weight, as is that of the Body. But what wonder, when the Wind, a thing so subtle, can with so great a Force drive forward a vast Ship; and one Hand, one Rudder, turn it about and guide it, though under full Sail? And are there not Engines, which by Pulleys and Screws move and draw up huge Weights, and that with no great Force?

But so far much as of the Motions with which we move the Parts of the Body as we will ourselves, that of the Tongue is most considerable, which is called Speaking, it seems requisite to say something of this in particular.

⁴ The Tongue being framed in breathing Animals after such a manner, as that it can break, and, as it were, mould the Air, which is vehemently breathed forth, and thereupon causeth a Sound: Hence it happeneth, that, as because every Animal perceiveth its own Power, by which it can do something, and

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¹ Lucret. 4. 879.

² Ibid. l. 4. v. 884.

³ Ibid. 4. 896.

⁴ Ibid. 5. 1027.

hereupon the Bull butts with his Horns, the Horſe ſtrikes with his Heels, the Lion teareth with his Teeth and Claws, the Bird truſts to her Wings; hence it happeneth, I ſay, that Animals, and chiefly Men, perceiving the Ability of their Tongue to expreſs the Affections of the Mind (even when they would ſignify ſomething that is without them) they ſend out a Sound which is called Voice, and by the Interpoſition of the Tongue, and other Parts ſerving for that Variation, bend and mould it in ſeveral Faſhions.

I inſtance^a Animals alſo, becauſe we ſee that they likewiſe ſend forth ſeveral Voices, according as they are joy'd or griev'd, or fear, or purſue any thing. Dogs, for Example, make ſeveral Noiſes, when they aſſault furiously, when they bark, when they play with their Whelps, when they ſawn, when they are hurt, and cry or howl; a Horſe neigheth after a different manner, when he rouzeth himſelf, when he followeth a Mare, and when he is ſpurr'd by his Rider. And Birds make different Cries when they ſtrive about their Prey, and when they perceive Change of Weather, and when they ſit idly, ſtill.

Now^b Man, above the reſt, perceiving the great Power of his Tongue, and how he can bend it various ways, ſo as to make divers articulate Sounds, which may be accommodated to ſignify ſeveral things, hence proceeds Speech, by which Men ordinarily diſcourſe with one another, expreſſing the Paſſions of the Mind, and other things, no otherwiſe than as by nodding the Head, or pointing with the Finger.

Here, becauſe it is uſually demanded, How Men came at firſt to impoſe Names on Things? We muſt know, that^c Names were not impoſed merely by Invention of Man, nor by ſome Law; but the very Nature, or natural Diſpoſitions of Men, which were in ſeveral Nations, being, upon the Preſentment of Things to them, affected with particular Motions of the Mind, and compelled by Images proper to the Things, ſent forth the Air out of their Mouths, after a peculiar Faſhion, and broke and articulated it, according to the Impulſion of the ſeveral Affections or Phantaſies, and ſometimes according to the Difference of Places, as the Heaven and the Earth is various in different Countries; the Words which were thus pronounced, and particularly with a Will of denoting things to others, became the Names of things.

^d Some alſo deſiring to mention ſome things to others, which were out of their Sight, pronounced certain Sounds or Words, and then were conſtrained to repeat the ſame Words; whereupon the Hearers finding out the thing by ſome Diſcourſe and Conjecture, at laſt, with much Uſe, underſtood what the others meant.

And becauſe ſeveral Men uſed ſeveral Names, to ſignify the ſame things to others, and thereupon there

was a Variety of Names; for this Reaſon, ^eNames proper to ſignify things, were in every Nation by degrees, and, as it were, with common Conſent choſen and appointed, ſo as their mutual Significations might be leſs ambiguous, and things might be explicated by a more compendious way of ſpeaking.

For this Reaſon I conclude, that the firſt Man impoſed Names on things, not out of certain Science, or by the Command or Dictate of any one Man; for how ſhould he come by that Science, or have Power to compel many Men to uſe the Words which he dictated? But rather, that they impoſed them, being moved by a certain natural Impulſion, like thoſe who cough, ſneeze, bellow, bark, ſigh. And therefore we may ſay, that Names are not by Inſtitution, but by Nature, ſeeing they are Effects and Works, as it were, of Nature; for to ſee and hear things (which are certain Effects and Works of Nature) are of the ſame kind, as the giving of Names to things.

C H A P. XXI.

Of Sleep and Dreams.

IT reſts, that we add ſomething concerning Sleep, and the Death of Animals, two things near of kin; for one is an Intermiſſion, the other the Extinction of Senſe, and Death is ordinarily termed an Everlaſting Sleep.

^f Sleep is cauſed, when the Parts of the Soul, which are diffuſed through the whole Compoſition of the Body, are either reſſed or ſegregated; or elſe ſome little Bodies, either from the Air or from Food, light upon the diſperſed Parts, which partly drive them away from the Body, partly crowd them into the Body, and diſpoſe them^g. For hereupon the Body, as deſtitute of its ordinary Support and Government, becometh weak, and all the Limbs grow feeble, the Arms and Eye-lids hang down, the Knees ſink, and, in a word, there is no more Senſe.

For it being certain, that^h Senſe proceeds from the Soul, it is no leſs evident, that when Sleep hindereth the Senſe, the Soul is diſturbed, and thrown out of Doors; not the whole Soul, for then it were not Sleep, but Death; but a Part only, and yet ſo, as that which is left behind is oppreſſed within, and buried like Fire rak'd up in Aſhes. And as, if we ſtir up the Fire, it wakes, as it were, and a Flame ariſes from it, in appearance extinguiſhed; ſo the Senſes are reſtored throughout the Members, and raiſed again out of a thing in appearance dead.

When I ſay, thatⁱ little Bodies coming from the Air cauſe this Diſturbance, I mean, partly the exterior Air, which never ceaſeth to beat and drive againſt the Body, (whereby it comes to paſs, that the outward

^a Lucret. ibid. 1055.
^b Lucret. 4. 914.

^c Lucret. ibid. 1086.
^d Lucret. 4. 918.

^e Lucret. 10. 75.
^f Lucret. 4. 930.

^g Lucret. 10. 76.

^h Lucret. ibid.

ⁱ Lucret. 5. 1040.

outward Part of every Animal becomes solid and hard) partly the interior, or that which is drawn in at the Mouth, and blown out again. For the Stroke of each of these passing through the little Vacuities to the Principles and first Elements of the Body, their Positions are so disordered, that part are cast out, part thrust in, and the rest, which is diffused through the Limbs, are not able to discharge their Office, by reason that they are intercepted, and not joined one to another.

I add, that this happens from the Food also, because the Food being conveyed inwardly by the Veins, performs the same thing as the Air, and that with more abundant and greater Force. Whence it comes to pass, that the Sleep which is caused by Meat, by reason of the greater Disturbance of those Particles, is more found than ordinary, as is that also which proceeds from excessive Weariness, by reason of their greater Dissipation.

Now, so far as it may seem strange, * that Dreams should come to us in Sleep, we must observe what was said not long since, that every where there are Images of innumerable things, continually roving up and down, which, by reason of their Subtlety, are able to penetrate into the Body, and able to strike and affect the Mind, which is seated in the midst of the Breast, so as it is stirred up to think of those things whereof they are the Images. Hereupon, so far as these penetrate and strike the Mind no less in Sleep, than in waking, it comes to pass that we seem to behold things as well in Sleep as awake.

But it happens, that † we receive the things which appear to us in this manner as true, because our Senses being stupified, nothing can occur to us, that may give us Notice of the Error, and convince the Falsity by true things; and besides, our Memory being laid asleep, we esteem (for Example) those Men to be alive who are dead, because their Images are present to us, and we remember not their Death.

If you demand, why ‡ we dream most of those things in which we chiefly delight, or to which we are most particularly addicted when awake (for Orators plead, Soldiers fight, Mariners contest with the Winds, Gamesters play, and so of others; neither is it thus with Men only, but amongst other Animals also; Horses sweat and blow, as if they were running a Race; Hounds stretch their Legs, cry, and snuff up the Air; and so of the rest,) we must say, that this happens; so far as by Reason of the Impression lately made in the Mind, the Passages are left open, into which the same Images insinuate, and above the rest, move the Soul again.

From the same § Ground it seems to proceed, that he who is thirsty, dreams of a Fountain, and that he is drinking; he that hath need to Urine, dreams

of a Chamber-pot, and that he is using it. For the intrinsical Motions open as it were, the Ways into which the Images of things of the same Nature insinuating, strike the Mind. Hence also it comes to pass, that many Images of the same thing meeting together, there are produced certain great Motions in the Mind; and then he who dreameth, imagines that he possesseth great Knowledge, performeth great Actions, speaketh excellent Things, and sometimes crieth out as if his Throat were about to be cut, or himself to be devoured by a Lion or Panther, and is no less affrighted, than if he had cast himself down from a high Mountain, so as when he awakes, he has scarce the Use of his Reason.

C H A P. XXII.

Of Death.

AS for Death, it is nothing but a Privation of Sense, by reason of the Departure of the Soul. By Sense here, I understand not only the Action, of which Sleep also is the Privation; but the Faculty likewise of feeling or perceiving, which perisheth with the Soul, and together with these, the Mind also; so that the Soul going forth, the Mind, which is joined with it, goeth forth also.

For, “as long as the † Soul exists in the Body, “although some other Part fail, yet there is not a “Privation of Sense; but Sense perishes together “with the Soul, as soon as ever that wherein it is “contained, whether it be the whole Body, or some “Part in which it is seated, happens to be dissolved. “Neither can it be objected, that the Body remaineth “a while undissolved, either in whole or in part: “For it is nevertheless void of Sense, as soon as such “a Company of Atoms as is necessary to constitute “the Nature of the Soul goeth out of it.

“Moreover, the ‡ Body being dissolved, the Soul “itself is dissipated, and hath no longer the same Faculties, nor any longer is moved, nor any longer “hath Sense; for we cannot imagine, that the same “thing doth any longer feel or perceive, when it no “longer useth the same Motions, when it no longer “is in the same Compound, when those things no “longer are by which it was cherish’d and preserv’d, “and in which existing it performed such kind of “Motions. Is is the same with the Soul as with the “Eye; which being out, and divided from the Body “in which it was, cannot see any thing.”

When I say, The Soul is dissipated, I imply the Mind also; since the Mind is indivisibly joined with it, neither can it subsist if the Soul perish. So that here it is all one to say, the Mind and the Soul, for the same Dissipation happens to both. Now this Dissolution is made, not into nothing, (as they must necessarily

* Lucret. libid. 957.

† Lucret. libid. 761.

‡ Lucret. libid. 766.

§ Lucret. libid. 659.

¶ Lucret. libid. 1015.

* Lucret. 101.

65. * Ibid.

necessarily affirm, who hold the Soul to be Harmony, or (such a Contemperation as Health) but into the Principles and little Bodies, of which its Contexture is made; and this not so much like Water which runneth about when the Vessel is broken, as like Smoke, or a Mist, which goes away into the Air, but much more easily; its Contexture being more subtle, since it is capable of receiving Impressions from the Images of Smoke and Mist.

That the Soul is dissipated and perisheth, is manifest; for that it is compounded and hath a Beginning. Some indeed there are, who conceive it to be Eternal, denying it to have a Beginning, to avoid its Dissolution; and assuming for granted, that it was before the Body, and came from without into it, that they may maintain, that it survives after the Body, out of which it goes entire. I shall omit, that they seem not observe, that nothing can be durable for ever, unless it be such, either by reason of its Solidity as an Atom; or for that it is incapable of being struck as Vacuum; or for that it wants Place whereinto it might remove, as the Universe. Neither do they reflect how great a Madness it is to conceive, that things so different as immortal and mortal, may be joined together.

I omit this, I say, and demand only, How it is possible the Soul can, from without, be insinuated into the Body, and diffused through its Parts, and yet not be divided and dissolved, as Meat distributed through the Limbs; and must it not dwell in the Body, as a Bird in a Cage, rather than be thought to grow, and be co-extended with the Body? And how then arrives it together with the Body, at the Flower of Age? And why it is, that in old Age it fears, not rejoiceth, to go out of the Body as out of her Prison, and like the Serpent, to cast her decayed Skin? And if forsaking the Body, it leaves some Relicks of itself behind, is it not dissolvable? But if it leaves none, how comes it, that so many Worms are generated in a Carcass?

For to say, that so many Souls flow thither from without, and fly up and down like Shadows, and chuse their own Matter, and frame their own Bodies, and the like, How absurd is it? Neither is it less ridiculous, that there should be a Swarm, as it were, of Souls, hovering round about at the Coition and Birth of Animals, contesting with one another which shall enter into the Body.

And if Souls did so often shift Bodies, would not their Natures, by degrees, become changed, and so the Lion in time not be fierce, the Hart not timorous, the Fox not crafty, the Dog afraid of the Hare, the Hawk of the Dove? And if any shall say, that human Souls only pass into human Bodies, he cannot give a Reason, Why the Soul, of wife, becomes foolish? Why no Children are wise? Why

we, as the first Authors of these Opinions feigned of themselves, never remember our past Life, and the Actions performed in it.

The Soul therefore hath a Beginning, from which, as it groweth up and flourisheth with the Body, so must it necessarily tend to an End, growing old, and decaying by Degrees, together with it.

This I say likewise of the Mind, which by degrees is perfected, and decays; seeing that it not only bears a Share in the Diseases, and Pains of the Body, but suffers Diseases, and Pains of her own, and is cured by Medicine; which could not be, if something were not added to, or taken from, or transposed in her Contexture. We need not instance what happens to her by Drunkenness, the Falling Sickness, or Dotage.

We must observe, that she is affixed to some certain Part of the Body, no otherwise than the Ear or the Eye; so that accordingly she begins and ends with the whole; and this is manifest, so far as every thing (Trees, Fishes, &c.) hath a certain determinate Place in which it is produced, liveth, and at last ceaseth to be, and cannot exist out of it.

And so far as a Man dieth Limb by Limb, and expirith by Degrees, the Soul being as it were divisible; who can say, that the Mind (or Intellect) doth not evaporate out of the midst of the Breast, but goeth entire out at the Throat and Mouth? For that the Soul herself goeth out, sifted as it were, and sever'd thorough the whole Body, is argued, even for that the Stench which after her Departure is in the dead Carcass, proceedeth from no other Cause than that its several Parts are got into that Place, which was taken up by the several Parts of the Soul. Not to mention, that, otherwise, when the Body is suddenly cut asunder, into two or more Pieces, the Soul could not be cut into two or more Pieces as the Body.

As therefore, the Soul was not before the Generation, so neither will it be after the Dissolution, or Death; and as, before that, we did not feel any Pain; so neither shall we know any after this; as well, for that there will be no longer Touch, or any other Sense, which cannot exist in a separate Soul; as for that, it is now without those Organs, in which only the Senses reside, and with which only they can act and suffer.

Hence it is manifest, that all Fears of the Inferi are vain; *Ixion* is not roll'd upon a Wheel; *Sisyphus* does not thrust a Stone up Hill continually; *Prometheus's* Liver cannot be devoured and renewed every Day. These are but Fables, as are also those which are reported of *Tantalus*, of *Cerberus*, of the *Danaides*, of the Furies, and the like; which if they are made good any where, it is in this Life, through the depraved Manners of Men.

S E C T. IV.

Of Superior Things, as well Cælestial, as Aerial.

Hitherto of inferior things; we come now to the *superior*, which appear in the Region above the Earth; such are the Sun, the Moon, and other Stars, and all that belongs to them, as Risings, Settings, Tropicks, Eclipses, and the like. Moreover Clouds, Rain, Wind, Lightning, Thunder, Thunder-bolts, and the like. For tho' some make a distinction, and call these latter only *Meteora*, *superior things*, yet is it convenient to call the former also Meteors, and to include both within Meteorology, that is, a Treatise of superior things.

Here we must repeat what was said at first, that "we must not propose any other End of the Knowledge of superior things, whether they be treated of jointly with others, as here, or separately, and by themselves, as elsewhere we do, than an undisturbed State of Mind, and unwavering Judgment; as also in the rest of the things, of which we use to discourse.

"For superior things being such, as that they either have, or may have a manifold Cause of Generation, and Declaration of their Being, conformable to that which we perceive by the Sense; we ought not to adhere to one particular way, as we do in moral Maxims, or some in Physick, such as are, The Universe is Body and Vacuum; the Principles of things are indivisible, and the like, which agree only one way with the Phenomena's: But firmly hold, that these things are indeed explicable, not one, but many ways; neither ought we to attempt any thing above the Reach of human Power, by defining one certain way, after which only the thing may be performed.

"This, I say, we must repeat; forasmuch as it is requisite to conceive, that it is the Office of Philosophy, accurately to examine the Causes of the chief things which are in Nature, and that from hence proceedeth all the Felicity which consisteth in knowledge of superior things, and in that especially, that we examine what kind of things those are which are discovered in those superior ones, and whatever has Affinity with them. And withal, invariably to observe this Rule, that it is competent to those things, to be done many ways, and not necessarily one way only: but, that they may be brought some other way also."

This, I so expressly inculcate; lest, if we adhere only to one way, and that happen to displease us, we presently recur, not to some other natural Cause, but to the divine; for this were to acknowledge a manifold manner, where there is but one. Thus, to the divine Nature we should attribute Trouble and Business, whereas "it is simply and absolutely neces-

sary, that in an immortal and blessed Nature, there be none of those things which cause Dissolution and Trouble; for the Mind immediately apprehends, and concludes from the Consideration of an immortal and blessed Condition, that it is absolutely impossible, any such thing should happen to it."

And doubtless, for want of this Consideration, it comes to pass, that "the Contemplation and Observation of Rising, Setting, Solstices, Eclipses, and the like, make our Knowledge nothing the happier; but they who have considered these things (yet know not what are the Nature of those Bodies, and what are their chief Causes,) fear as much, and perhaps more, than as if they had not contemplated them at all; by reason that the Admiration which ariseth from their Consideration, cannot be satisfied, as to the Disposition and Manner whereby they are performed. For this Reason we endeavour to find out, and alledge many several Causes of Solstices, Settings, Risings, Eclipses, and the like, conformable to things of the like kind, which happen amongst us on the Earth.

"Besides we must not think, that an accurate Enquiry after these things, conduceth to Acquisition of Tranquility and Felicity. In superior things, and others that are obscure, we ought to seek out Causes, according to the several Ways by which the like things happen amongst us; despising those who neither know one certain way by which a thing is effected, nor a manifold way, but content themselves only with the Appearance of things as presented at that Distance, and yet are ignorant in what consists or not consists Imperturbation. Truly, if we conceive it may fall out, that a thing may be done one certain way, and thereupon we are not troubled; truly I say, knowing on the other side, that the same thing may be effected many several ways, we shall be no less undisturbed, than if we knew it could be done by a certain way.

"But whensoever one has a mind to adhere to, or defend any thing that is likely in itself, that Explication is sufficient in this present Subject which runs congruously, according to the manifold ways the Phenomena's afford us. Yet is it necessary to derive our Conjectures concerning superior things, from those which are done amongst us; from those, I say, which are observed to resemble those in those which are seen above: For those things are effected several ways; wherefore also that which appeareth in every superior thing, is to be considered by those things which agree with it, and which may be effected several Ways amongst us, as several things may happen."

But

Laert. 10. 85.

Ibid. 86.

Laert. 10. 78.

Ibid. 80.

Ibid. 87.

But I insist too much hereupon. To come therefore to the Business. Although the whole Region above Earth is sometimes called Heaven, for even the nearer Part of it, the Air, is sometimes called so too; yet, by the word Heaven and Æther, we will understand the superior Part of the Region, which containeth the Stars; and, by Air, the inferior, in which Clouds, Lightning, and the like are generated. We shall begin with the celestial superior things, and speak afterwards of the aerial.

CHAP. I.

Of the Substance and Variety of the Stars.

WE must first lay down what was formerly touched, that the Sun, Moon, and other Stars, were not made apart, and afterwards brought into the World, but received their Figure, Augmentation, and Magnitude, immediately, and together with the World, (as the Earth, the Sea, and whatsoever is in the World,) by the Coagulations and Convulsions made within it, of some more tenuous Natures, and those either aerial, or fiery, or both; for this our Sense suggests to us.

Hence some Stars seem to be of more fiery Substance, especially the Sun, whose Heat is so manifest to Sense; but withal, they seem not so much to be pure Fires, as some mixed Concretions, to which Fire is annex'd.

Or, it may be, they are, as it were, certain glassy smooth Disks, capable to receive the bright, fiery little Bodies, which coming from the æthereal Region through which they run, light upon them, and so reflect them, and shew them to us in that Form wherein they appear: For the like is done amongst us. Or that they may be Clouds enlighten'd, and, as it were, enkindled; for those Meteors, called the Parheliis, are caused no other way.

Or, it may be, they are, as it were, deep Vessels, containing Fire in their hollow part, like a Lantern, or a Chafing-dish, which holdeth Coals, or melted Metals. Or, they may be, as it were, glowing Plates, or, as it were, Stones burning in a Furnace; for there is nothing in all these that implies a Contradiction.

In like manner, the Sun in particular may be nothing else but a thick kind of Clod, which being like a Pumice, or a Sponge full of Pores, and little Holes, may, containing Fire, dart Light out of them.

Only the most impossible thing seems to be what some assert, that the Stars are animate, or so many Animals, and moreover, so many Gods. For tho' we should grant, that each of them is a kind of

World, or rather, as it were, an Earth, which hath not only an Air, but an Æther peculiar to itself; Nevertheless, as this our Earth, though it produceth Animals, is not therefore itself an Animal; so neither would the Stars be, although we should grant that some Animals may be generated in them.

But if we should admit this, yet what they further press, that there are such a kind of round and rolling Gods, needs to be repeated only; for we formerly proved that these are prodigious Fancies, not of discoursing but dreaming Philosophers, when expressing immortal Beings by the Language proper to mortal, they pronounce things so contrary to the Felicity of the Gods, and which seem so far beneath their excellent Nature.

The Stars have been already distinguished into two kinds; some are fixed, which observe the same Position from one another, and keep the same Course from East to West, never altering it. Others are wandering, whence called Planets or erratick Stars, because they never observe the same Position, either towards one another, nor to the left; and sometimes perform their Courses nigher the North, sometimes nigher the South.

If you demand^m from whence this Diversity proceeds, I shall say, that it may be the Stars were from the Beginning moved round, with such a Necessity, that some took a circular Motion uniform and even; others, an irregular and unequal one.

It may also be, that in the Places through which they move, there may be some even Diffusion of Spaces, which may carry them on the same way one after another, whereby they may move evenly; but that elsewhere they may be uneven for the same Reason; Varietis which we observe in their Motions proceeding from hence.

To alledge one only Cause for these, seeing that the Phenomena argue that the Causes may be many, is Madnesse, and not rightly considered by those who do on vain Astrology, and trivially explain the Causes of some things; and in the mean time will not allow the divine Nature (to which they ascribe most of these) to be free from the Task of several troublesome Offices.

CHAP. II.

Of the Magnitude and Figure of the Stars.

AS concerning the Magnitude of the Sun, and of the rest of the Stars, it may be considered either as to us, or in itself. Asⁿ to us, it is so much as it appeareth to be, for the Sense is not deceived; and whatsoever Magnitude the Eye seeth in them, is such in them, for they have not any other thing immediately encompassing them without, which is visible; nor

^l Lucr. 10. 90.

^m Ibid. 10. 113.

ⁿ Ibid. 10. 91.

nor any thing of their own, which falls not within View of the Eye.

But this Magnitude considered in itself, or as to the thing itself, may be either somewhat greater, or somewhat lesser, or exactly so much as it appears to be. For with such Variety are Fires presented to our Senses; seen at a Distance, in the Day-time, or by Night. For either they are just so big as they seem, as the Light of a Candle if we look near it; or lesser, as when we see the same Light in the Day-time at distance; or greater than indeed they are, as when the same Light is seen in the Night-time afar off.

I say, somewhat greater or lesser, in regard this Diversity betwixt the Appearance and the true Compass cannot be very great, as may be evinced from our ordinary Fires; for, from what Distance soever we perceive the Heat of any Fire, from the same its just Form appeareth to us. In like manner, since we perceive the Heat of the Sun here from the Place where he seemeth to us to be, his just Magnitude cannot be sensibly different.

That nothing perceivable is taken off from the Stars by this Distance, is confirmed, because those things which we behold at a great Distance, and much Air mediating between, are presented to us with a confused Circumference; but the Sun, to those who can look upon him, appears to be of an exact Compass; nor can any thing be seen more distinctly than the Circumference of the Moon. There are indeed some Stars which twinkle, and seem to shoot forth trembling Beams; but upon another account, this argues they are so near as to be seen exactly. For Fires amongst us seem, in like manner, to wave and tremble, when we behold them at a Distance, which, near at hand, seem fixed and constant.

Again, this is confirmed, because, if the Stars did lose their due Magnitude by reason of distance, they would much more lose their Colour; for we know, that a thing at distance ceaseth to be seen in its native Colour, sooner than by reason of its littleness it totally disappears, or comes not to be seen at all. But though there be no distance more capable to effect this, (for there is not any length greater,) yet the Stars do not therefore lose their true Colour.

Many things may be objected against this, but they are easily solv'd, if a Man stick close to those things which are manifest to us, as we have shew'd in our Books concerning Nature; where we bring in this Distinction of Magnitude, considered in itself, and, according to us, we declared, that neither he did absurdly, who said, The Sun is a Foot broad; nor he that said, It was many times bigger than Peloponnesus; nor he who said, It is of equal Bigness with the Earth; forasmuch as of things, which in themselves are greater and lesser, there may be, as to us, one

Magnitude, according as they are nearer and farther off.

As for the Figure, I shall only say, that since it appeareth round to us, it is globous and plain like a Plate; and therefore the Stars are either as Disks, or as Cylinders, or as Cones and Tops, or as certain Nails fixed in the Sky. For none of these hath any thing that implyeth a Contradiction, nor Dissonancy from the Phenomena.

C H A P. III.

How the Stars move, out-run one another, and are turned round.

HAVING said, not long since, that, of the Stars, some are fixed, others errack, and that this Difference proceeds from their having different Motions; we must now say, in general, that the Motions of both may be made either by the turning about of the whole Heaven, in which one or more of them are, supposing it to be solid, and carrying them about with it, like Nails fastned into it; or else, the Heaven standing still, as a fluid or pervious thing, by their being whirled about, and moved through it.

Now forasmuch as whether it be the Motion of the Heaven, or of the Stars, it may have begun from a Necessity made at the very time that the World was generated, and impress'd eastwardly; it might in the first Case, (that is, if it be in the whole Heaven,) both have begun, and be continued by the Hurry of some Air. For there may be a twofold extrinsecal Air; one, pressing from above, and driving the Heaven towards the West; the other lifting it up, as it were, and carrying it on, and that otherwise than the former, which on all sides presses and fixes the Poles. In the second Case, (that is, if the Motion be in the Stars themselves,) it may have been, either by Hurry of Air, or by the Course of the Fire.

For it may have been from the very Beginning, that a great Company of little Bodies, evaporating, and diffusing themselves, might break the Air, and force their Passage through it; and the Air, receiving this Motion of the Wind, and hurrying the Stars along with it, might carry them about, and cause that continual circular Motion, which is still seen above in them. It might also be, that the proper Fire of every Star, either being shut up close and seeking a Vent, might begin to turn about, and continue still as it began; or, being at greater Liberty, might move in this Fashion that way, unto which the Food or Aliment of each invites them, and so go on, through its Heat and Desire of Aliment to the next Bodies, which were Fuel convenient to nourish it.

None of all these is repugnant to the Phenomena's; but otherwise we cannot easily determine from what Cause the Motion of the Stars should proceed.

But how comes it to pass, that some Stars anticipate, or get before others, so as that we see the others left behind them? This may happen, either because the others performing the same diurnal Revolution with them are moved more slowly, as the Moon, which moving more slowly than the rest towards the West, is left as it were behind them Eastward. Or because, being carried about by the diurnal Motion towards the West, they are in the mean time slowly carried on, by a contrary Motion, towards the East, whereby the Moon may not have been left by the rest Eastward, but rather have left them Westward. Or because all things being carry'd about only with a diurnal Revolution and equal Motion, yet some perform a longer, others a shorter Course; and so the Moon, if she be above the fixed Stars, as some conceive, will perform its Revolution more slowly, and be observed to be left behind.

Certainly to assert any thing absolutely in these Matters, becomes those who affect to make Offensation of something magnificent and prodigious before the Multitude.

Again, How comes it to pass that the Sun, Moon and Planets, when they come to the Tropicks or Solstices, turn about and go back again? This may happen, either because such a kind of circular Motion was at the Beginning impress'd upon these Stars, as that they should be carry'd round about after a spiral manner, limited on each Side at the Solstices. Or that they go according to the Obliquity of Heaven, which in process of Time acquir'd a Necessity of that indirect Position. Or because they are repell'd by the Air, which driveth them back on, now to this side, now to that, by reason of its Coldness, Density, or some other Quality. Or because their Allment is conveniently dispos'd all along that way, kindling backward, and sailing forwards.

And these, and those which are like these, have in them nothing repugnant to the Evidence of Things; if a Man, adhering only to the Possibility that is in these things, can reduce each of them to that which agreeth with the Phenomena's, not fearing the groundless Conjectures of Astrologers, who forbear not to build upon and in them a vast Company of concentrick Orbs.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Rising and Setting of the Stars, and of the alternate Length of Days and Nights.

THE Rising and Setting of the Sun, Moon, and the rest of the Stars, may happen three ways.

First, ^a By Appearance above, and Occultation beneath: For that the Stars being always bright and

never extinguish'd, are so carry'd about, above, and below the Earth, that sometimes they rise, sometimes they go down, or set; and the Sun, in particular, when he goeth down causeth Darknes with us; but returning, he enkindleth as it were the Heaven with his Morning-Beams. There is not any thing amongst the Phenomena's which contradicts this.

Again, ^b By being enkindled in the East-Quarter, and extinguish'd in the West: For there may be such a Disposition of the Medium in both these Places, as that, whilst the Stars pass through it, what I affirm may be effected, there being nothing in the Phenomena's that contradicts it; seeing there are not only Fountains that extinguish, but such also as enkindle Tapers, as that at *Epirus*, formerly mention'd. So that the Ocean compassing the Earth, the Sun may be extinguish'd by it in the West-Quarter, and return all along it, passing along the North into the East-Quarter, and from thence arise re-enkindled.

Thirdly, By a new Production every Day; for nothing hindreth, but that there may every Day arise new Suns. For Example: there flowing together to the East several Fires, or Seeds of Fire, which join in one round Body, and shine, and are carry'd on impetuously towards the West. For it is reported that the like happens in the Mountains of *Ida*, and chiefly about the Rising of the *Dog-Star*; and that Fires may meet in great Bodies together at certain Seasons, may be understood from what is observed to be done at some determinate Time in all other Bodies. For from the Conflux and Defluxion of Seed, Trees at a certain Time bring forth Leaves and Fruits, at a certain Time shed them; at a certain Time Teeth are bred, at a certain Time cast; and so in other things, which it were too long to instance.

Now the Sun's Continuance above the Earth making Day, and his Absence Night; How comes it to pass that all Days are not equal, and all Nights equal; but that in Summer the Days are longer, the Nights shorter; in Winter alternately, the Nights longer and the Days shorter? This also may happen three Ways.

First, ^c For that the Revolutions of the Sun above and beneath the Earth are sometimes performed faster, sometimes slower, according to the alternate Lengths of the Paces, or Ways in which the Sun passeth: And this by reason of the Position of the Orb called the *Zodiack*, through which the Sun passeth obliquely, and in two Signs of it makes the Nights and the Days equal. But when from thence he declineth to the North or South, as much of his Journey as he taketh off from one Part, either above or below the Earth, so much he adds to the other.

Secondly, ^d Because there may be certain Places in the *Aether*, which, by reason of their Grossness, and the Resistance which happens thereupon, cannot be pass'd

^a Lucr. 10. 92.

^b Ibid.

^c Ibid.

^d Lucr. 5. v. 679.

jud through so swiftly as others. Such are those which make the Sun stay long beneath the Earth in the Winter, whereby they make the Night longer and the Day shorter than in Summer. Some things of the same kind may be observed amongst us, according to which it is convenient to explicate superior Bodies.

Thirdly, That in the alternate Parts of the Year, the Fires, or Seeds of Fire aforesaid, flow together in such manner, as that they make a Sun sooner or later; and the Sun rises out of that Part from which he begins a longer or shorter Course above the Earth.

They who insist and fix upon but some one particular Way to explicate these Effects, both contradict things apparent, and deviate from that which falls under human Contemplation.

CHAP. V.

Of the Light of the Stars, and of the Changes and Spots in the Moon.

LET us now say something of the Light, not only of the Sun, but of the rest of the Stars, and particularly of the Moon. First, Men admire that the Sun, being so little, should pour forth so much Light out of himself, as sufficeth to enlighten and warm the Heaven, the Earth, the Sea, and yet not be itself exhausted. But the Sun is a kind of Fountain, into which there flow together from beneath on every Side perpetual Rivulets; for the Seeds of Heat throughout the whole World flow so into the Sun, as that immediately from him, as from one Fountain or Head, both Heat and Light overfloweth every way.

Moreover, the Substance of the Sun may be of such Thickness, and the Light and Heat which floweth from him of such Thinness, that as a little Current or a Rivulet, streaming from a Spring, watereth the Meadows and Fields round about it, without any loss to itself; so that of the Sun may be sufficient to irrigate, as it were, the whole World, without any sensible Diminution of the Sun.

Moreover, the Air may be of such a Nature, as that it may be kindled, as it were, by a little Light diffused from the Sun; as a whole Field of Corn may be set on fire by one Spark.

Likewise the Sun may have his Aliment round about him, which may supply what he loseth, as the Flame of a Lamp is fed by the Oil which is put to it. It may happen also many other ways.

As to the rest of the Stars, especially the Moon, it may be that they have their Light from themselves, it may be they borrow it from the Sun; for amongst us we see, that there are many things which shine of themselves, many things which borrow Light from others; and there is nothing appearing in the su-

perior things themselves, which hinders but that either of those Opinions may be true.

If a Man persevere stedfast in his Mind the manifold Ways, and the Suppositions conformable to it, and consider the Causes together with it; lest minding things that are incoherent, he grow vainly proud, and sometimes fall into one particular way, sometimes into another.

As for the Moon, it is in the first place wonderful, how she comes to have so many Changes, or Increase or Decrease of Light. It may be, that being round, and receiving Light from the Sun, she is successively so figur'd, (after the same manner as the Air, when the Sun riseth, is enlighten'd, and when he setteth is darken'd successively) as that going away from the Sun, she seemeth every Day to increase, because she sheweth more and more of her enlighten'd Face to us, until she presents it at full; and then going towards the Sun, decreaseth every Day, because she sheweth less and less of it, until at last she turneth no Part of it towards us, but is quite unseen.

Moreover, it may be that the Moon being round, one Part of her may be bright, another dark, and as she turneth her Body about, may discover to us, alternately, more or less of each Part.

It may also be, that being bright of itself, she may be obscured by an Interposition of some opacous Body coming under her, which is hemispherical and hollow, and, moved along with her, is continually rolled about her.

Neither doth any thing hinder, but that there may every Day (according to what we formerly said) be made a new Moon of a several Form and Figure; as in like manner the Seasons of the Spring, Summer, Autumn, and Winter; and many things in them come and go, are produced and perish, at set Times.

In fine, it may be any way wherein those things which appear to us may be applied to Explication of that Manner; unless some Man, being much in Love with one singular Way, shall vainly reject the rest; not considering what things it is possible for a Man to know, and thereupon aims at the Knowledge of those things which Man cannot attain.

Moreover, they admire in the Moon that there appear Spots in her Face; but her Face may appear so, either from the various and different Nature of the Parts of the Moon, or from the Interposition of some Body, not so much opacous as dusky; not rolling about her, but perpetually adhering to her; and not solid all over, but full of Holes like a Racquet.

Or it may be any other way of all those which are observed to be conformable to things apparent. This is the Course to which we must adhere, concerning superior things; for no Man, if he contest against apparent things, can ever partake of true Tranquility.

* Laert. 10. 94.

* Ibid. 10. 95.

* Ibid. 10. 96.

C H A P. VI.

Of the Eclipses of the Stars, and their set Periods.

BUT there is nothing which useth to strike a greater Terror into Men, than that sometimes they observe Eclipses, and Defects of Light in the Sun and Moon, to happen on a sudden. Yet why may not this also happen many several ways?

For first, the Sun may be eclipsed; for that the Moon being interposed, puts her dark Orb or opacous Body before him, and keeping away his Light from the Earth, causeth Darkeness in her, until by her Removal the Light is restor'd. The Moon may be eclipsed, for that the Earth being interposed betwixt her and the Sun, takes the Sun off from her, and darkens her, while she comes within the Cone of the Shadow, until, passing from out of it, she recovereth Light.

Again, the Sun may be eclipsed, for that some Part of Heaven, or some other opacous Body, such as is the Earth, may move along with the Sun, and at certain Times come underneath him, and intercept his Light. And the Moon in like manner; for that some other opacous Body passing betwixt her and the Sun, keeps off the Beams of the Sun from her; or moving together with her, doth not only perform its Phases slowly, but sometimes overcasts her with a sudden Darkeness. Not to mention, that if she be dark on one Side, and bright on the other, it may happen that she may sometimes on a sudden turn her dark Side towards us.

Moreover, both the Sun and Moon may suffer Eclipse; for that they may pass through Places pernicious to Fire, and thereby their Light become extinguished, until going beyond them they renew and recover it.

Thus ought the several ordinary Ways to be heeded, and some of them also put together, it being possible that many Causes may concur.

The periodical Order, by which Eclipses happen at certain Times, is conceived to be kept in like manner as amongst us in some things, as in the Vicissitude of Seasons. There is no need of recurring to the divine Nature for the bringing of these to pass; let us allow that to be free from all Business, and exquisitely happy.

Unless this be done, all Discourse of Causes in superior things will be vain; as hath already happen'd to Juno, who taking an impossible Course became frivolous, for that they approved only one, and rejected all the rest, though they were possible; and were transported to a dream of that which exceeds the Capacity of the Intellect, and were neither able to admit, as they ought, apparent Signs; nor understand, as they say, how to rejoice with God.

C H A P. VII.

Of the Præsignifications of the Stars.

IT remains we speak of the Præsignifications of the Changes of the Air attributed to the Stars, as Rain, Wind, Drought, Heat, and the like, which happen according to the Time of the rising or setting of certain Stars, as of the Dog, Orion, the Pleiades.

* These Præsignifications may be made either according to the Condition of the Seasons, as it happens in those living Creatures, which being seen at one time with us, at another with others, passing thither and thither, are Signs, not Causes, of the Seasons: for the rising and setting Stars may be not Causes, but Signs of those Mutations; or as it happens not certainly, but casually, at what time the Stars rise or set, there are Causes of some Mutation in the Air.

For neither of these is repugnant with things apparent; and what Cause there may be, besides these, agreeable with things apparent, we cannot perceive.

It is not without some Reason what I hinted of Præsignifications, which are observed in some Animals to be made according to the Condition of the Season which at that time comes in; so as the Motions observed in Animals only declare Tempests, but make them not. As those, for Example, which depart from us in Autumn induce not any Necessity of the Winter's being at that time; neither is there any divine Nature which sits and marks the Departure of living Creatures, that it may make good what is foretold by them.

This is a kind of Folly that cannot fall upon any Animal, in which there were the least Grain of Wit; so far is it from being in that Nature which possesseth all Felicity.

C H A P. VIII.

Of Comets, and those which are called Falling Stars.

WHAT hath been hitherto spoken of the Stars, belongs to the Sun and Moon, and Stars, which having been made from the Beginning of the World constantly inhere and appear in Heaven. But besides these there are other Stars, which sometimes are generated or newly appear, and after some few Days or Months either perish or lie hid. They are called Comets, quasi *Comatæ Stellæ*, hairy Stars, for that they have a long Train like Hair.

Some also there are that last but for a Moment, vanishing almost as soon as they appear; and seeming in some kind of Excurſion to fall down, they are ordinarily termed Falling-Stars.

As

As for the Comets, = "they may be generated; either for that some Fire is sometimes kindled in some of those superior Places, and being kindled is for a time nourish'd and moved, according to the Abundance and Disposition of the Matter. Or else they appear; for that Heaven, as to that Part which is over our Heads, hath some peculiar Motion according to several Vicissitudes, so as these Stars are driven to be made manifest. Or else they come forth by reason of a certain Disposition at some times; and as soon as they come lower towards us they become manifest.

"Comets disappear to our Sight through the Causes contrary to these: Either the Matter convenient for them is not placed all along, as it is in that Place where they are observed to inhere; so as by degrees, through want of Aliment, they consume as it were and go out, or that something opposeth their Motion. And that may happen, not only for that this Part of the World, round about which the rest is turned, remaineth unmoved, as some affirm; but also, for that there may be in the Air some impetuous Gyration, which may hinder their moving round, and drive it another way; as may also happen to the other Stars, which are called Planets, at the Tropicks.

"Moreover this may happen many other ways, if we discourse upon that which is conformable to things apparent.

"As for those which are called Falling-Stars, they may be made either by Pieces broken off from the true Stars, or from the falling down of that Matter whereof there is a kind of Diffusion, as may happen also in Lightning: Or from a Company of ignifying Atoms meeting and joining together to effect it, the Motion being made according as the Force of meeting together was from the Beginning: Or from the driving of Wind up together within certain cloudy Bottoms or Windings, and setting it a-fire whilst it is rolled up and down, and breaking through the Bottoms which restrain them, and moving to that Part towards which that Impulsion carries them.

"There are other Ways not fictitious, by which this may be done. But of celestial Meteors enough."

CHAP. IX.

Of Clouds.

NEXT these are the aerial Meteors, which are made nearer us in the Air. We shall begin with the Clouds; than which nothing is generated above in the Air, or seen more frequently.

"A Cloud therefore may be generated and have its Being by some Accumulation as it were of the Air, the

Winds driving it, so as that a Cloud is nothing but a thickening of the Air. Again, by Implication of some Atoms cohering mutually to one another, and fit to produce such a Compound; and this when they first come together into little Bodies of Clouds, and those are gathered together into greater Bulks, so as at last they become greatest of all.

They most commonly seem to rise at the Tops of Hills; for that the first little Compounds are so subtle as that they escape the Sight, and are carry'd on by the Wind, until being by little and little condensed, they appear on the Tops of the Hills, which by reason thereof seem to smoke.

If any shall doubt, from whence there can come so great a Conflux of Atoms as is sufficient to make such great Bulks of Clouds, let him consider, that if no other way, yet they may at least come from without, out of the Immenity of the Universe, where there is an infinite Multitude of them. And this because there is allowed to the Principles a free Passage in and out, through the Vents of the World, as was formerly declared.

Moreover, a Cloud may be generated by the gathering together of Effluxions and Exhalations out of the Earth and Water, and carried upwards. For that there are many little Bodies drawn out of the whole Sea, appeareth by Garments which being hung upon the Shoar grow moist. Besides, we see that every-where out of Rivers arise Mists, and Exhalations, and Vapours, in such abundance, as that being carried upwards they darken the Sky, and by little and little meeting together turn into Clouds.

Neither doth any thing hinder, but that these Conagments may be made many other ways.

CHAP. X.

Of the Winds, and of Preflers.

WIND may be generated, first, "when the Atoms, or little Bodies, leap out of some convenient Places, and fly through the Air; there being a more vehement Effusion made from some Heaps, which are proper for such kind of Emissions: "When in a narrow Vacuum there are many little Bodies, there followeth Wind; and contrary, the Air is quiet and calm, when in a great Vacuum there are but a few little Bodies.

For, as in a Market-place or Street, as long as the People are but few, they walk without any trouble; but when they run into some narrow Place, they jussle and quarrel with one another: so in this Space which encompasseth us, when many Bodies crowd into one little Place, they must necessarily jussle one another, and be thrust forward, and driven back, and entangled, and squeezed; of which is made the

Wind,

* Lucret. 10. 111.

* Ibid. l. 6. v. 450.

* Lucret. 10. 120.

* Senec. nat. quæst. 5. 2.

* Senec. Ibid.

Wind, when they which contested yield, and having been long told's up and down uncertainly, shrink : But when a few Bodies stir up and down in a large Space, they can neither drive nor be driven impetuously.

Again, Wind may be caused when the Air is driven on and agitated, either by Exhalations coming from the Earth and Water, or by the Sun's pressing upon it from above ; for it is manifest, that where the Air is agitated and stirred, there is caused Wind, so as Wind seems to be nothing else but the Waves of the Air. Whence we may conceive, that the Wind somewhat resembles Water troubled, and that the more violent Winds come from being stirred by some more vehement Cause, after the same manner as Torrents rage and make waste, when there happens a vast Defluxion of Waters by great Showers falling upon the Mountains.

Preflers are windy Whirlings (for the fiery, and those which burn, from which the Name is taken, are a kind of Thunder.) They " may be generated " either from the Depression of a Cloud after various " Fashions towards inferior Places, whilst it is carried down and driven on by Abundance of Wind, " which rolls itself about, and tears away the Sides " of the Clouds ; the Wind also driveth on the " Cloud immediately from without, or from the " Wind standing round about ; whereas the Air " pressing upon it from above, and withal the Air " which is driven on and diffused round about, hinder, by reason of its Density, the great Abundance of Wind knoweth not which way it may " spread itself," and being driven back, as well by the Sides as from above, it necessarily thrusts the Cloud downwards.

When this Prefler is thrust down upon the Land, it causeth Whirlwinds ; when upon the Sea, Whirlpools. Whirlwinds are less frequently seen, because the Mountains snatch them away before they come within our Sight ; Whirlpools more frequently, by reason of the wide Smoothness of the Sea, into which we may behold a Cloud like a Pillar descend from Heaven, and push it down, as it were, with the Force of an Arm or Fist, until the Violence of the Wind breaking thorough it, the Sea works and boils, and the Ships incur a Danger almost inevitable.

C H A P. XI.

Of Thunder.

IT was not without Reason that I said, there are also fiery Preflers, which are not different from Thunder. For *Thunder seems to be caused by the manifest Conglomeration of Blasts, swelling with fiery little Bodies, " within the Bulks of the Cloud ;" and by the Evolution and strong enkindling of them,*

and breaking of the Clouds by the Fire, which is forcibly darted to inferior Places, according as that breaking forth is sometimes directed towards a high Mountain (which kind of Places are oftentimes struck with Thunder) sometimes towards other Things.

For that the Nature of Thunder is fiery is manifest, even because it often burneth the Houses upon which it is darted, and for that it leaveth behind it a Stench like Brimstone. That it is generated within the Clouds, is evident, for that it never thunders when the Sky is clear ; but the Clouds first gather together all along the Air, and darken the Sky, and there ariseth a foul Night, as it were of Showers. Lastly, that many little Bodies or Seeds, as it were, of Fire, are contained within a Cloud, may be argued as well from the Effect, as for that amongst the little Bodies of a Cloud rising up from beneath, are intermingled, not only watery, but fiery also, and of other sorts. Withal, it cannot be but that the Cloud must receive many things from the Beams of the Sun.

When therefore the Blast or Wind, which drove the Clouds together, hath intermingled itself with the Seeds of Fire, that are in the Bosom, as it were, and Cavity of the Clouds, there is caused a whirling or Vortex within it, which being carried about very rapidly, groweth hot by Motion ; and either by Intension of this Heat, or the Contagion of some other Fire, breaketh out into perfect Thunder, and tearing the Cloud ; is darted forth. Now the Cloud is cleft and broken, by reason that the Places round about the whirling or Vortex are taken up, and stuffed thicker with the Part of the Cloud ; neither, by reason of their being squeezed up so close together, is there any Chink open, whereby whilst it is spread with the Wind may insinuate itself, and retire by penetrating into it by degrees. Whereupon it is necessary, that the Fire lately made, being dilated by the Wind, breaks thorough the Cloud with Violence, which makes the Noise of Thunder ; and coming forth, shineth and filleth all Parts with a glittering Light.

It may also be, that the Force of the Wind may light from without upon the Cloud, at such time as the Thunder is mature and perfect, and rending the Cloud, make way for the fiery Vortex to break thorough.

It may also be, that the fiery Vortex, tho' not set on Fire when it breaks forth, may be kindled afterwards in its Passage thorough the Air ; after the same manner as a leaden Slug passing thorough the Air, grows hot, and takes Fire. It may also be, that the Fire is made in the very dashing against the thing which it hits, the Seeds of Fire being struck out of both in the same manner as they are struck by a Flint out of Steel.

" There

* Plin. 2. 33.

† Laert. 10. 104.

‡ Laert. 6. 218.

"There are many^b other Ways by which this Fire may be kindled, or Thunder made; only let us cast away all Fiction, and cast away it will be, if we take our Conjecture of things unseen, from that which is conformable to things apparent."

Hence may be given the Reason, why it comes to pass, that it thunders oftner in the Spring and Autumn than in other Seasons. In Winter, there wants the Seeds of Fire; in Summer, the Blasts and Heaps of Clouds; in the Spring and in Autumn, all things convenient are ready.

But how comes it to pass, that the Motion of Thunder is so swift, and its Stroke so violent? This proceeds from the great Violence of the Eruption, and the Tenuity; by reason of which, nothing in the way resists them; and Force, which is, as it were, doubled by Gravity, and increaseth by Motion.

How comes it to penetrate thorough the Walls of Houses, to melt Metals in a Moment, to draw out all the Wine out of full Vessels? This proceeds from the Tenuity, and quick Motion, and violent Force of the little Bodies, whereby it can in a Moment dissipate and disperse those things which the ordinary Fire of the Sun cannot under a long time.

C H A P. XII.

Of Lightning and Thunder-claps.

ALtho' I hinted by the way how Lightning and how Thunder are generated; yet nothing hinders, but that they may be generated many ways besides.

For "Lightning" may be made either by the "rubbing or striking of the Clouds against one another, such a kind of Figure issuing from them;" or by such a Disposure and Conformation of Atoms heaped up together, as causeth Fire, and generates Lightning; after the same manner as we observe it to be done, when Iron and a Stone are hit against one another.

Or by the Winds stirring up out of the Clouds those Bodies, or little Bodies, that is, Atoms, which cause this glittering Brightness; for that the Wind (and especially if it grow hot like a leaden Slug) strikes off the same little Bodies, which are struck by the mutual Attrition of the Clouds.

"Or by squeezing forth; there being made a Compression either by the Clouds one with another, or by the Winds driving them, which is caused over and above the Force of Collision."

"Or by Interception of the Light which is diffused by the Stars, which thereupon is driven by the Motion of the Clouds and Winds, and falleth out of the Clouds."

"Or by the falling down of some most tenuous Light out of the Clouds, whilst the Clouds are intrinsically gathered together by the Fire; and withal, Thunder is caused like a kind of Bounce by their Motion."

"Or by the enkindling of a Wind, which is caused as well by a vehement Intenfesness, as Convolution of Motion."

"Or by a breaking of the Clouds by the Winds, and falling down of fiery Atoms, which cause Lightning to shine."

That Lightning may be generated many other ways, he will easily perceive, who adheres to things apparent, and is able to understand what suits with them."

Thunder-claps may be made thus, "Either by the Rolling of a Wind within the Cavities of the Clouds, as in ordinary Vessels, when something is rolled in them."

"Or making a Crack by the very Diffiation and Ebullition, as it were, of the Fire within the same Clouds."

"Or by the breaking and tearing of the same Clouds, as when a swollen Bladder cracks, Paper is torn, or a Shrowd rent."

"Or by the same Clouds, rubbing and driving against one another, having acquired an icy kind of Concretion, and this, by reason of the Winds driving them;" as tall Woods crackle at the blowing of the East Wind, Waves unbroken murmur, Garments hung up, and Papers carried away and beaten, as it were by the Winds, make a clattering Noise.

Or by Extinction of the Fire of Thunder, breaking out of one Cloud and lighting upon another which is waterish, whereupon it hisses like red-hot Iron taken out of the Fire, and cast into the Water.

Or by the burning of some dry Cloud, which crackles like a Branch in the Fire.

"In a word, that this also may be explained several Ways, the things which appear evince and teach us;" that we think not, with ignorant and superstitious Persons, that the Noise of Thunder denotes the Appearance of some God, since other Bodies, being struck against one another, make a Sound also, as Mill-Stones in grinding, or the Hands clapped together.

Left any Wonder how it comes to pass, that Lightning is seen before the Thunder is heard, this may happen, "either for that in some certain Disposition of the Clouds, as soon as the Wind lights upon them, there leaps forth such a Configuration of little Bodies, as causeth Lightning;" and thereupon the Wind, by rolling up and down, maketh this Sound.

" Or

^a Lucet.

^b Lucet. lib. 6. v. 163.

^c Lucet. lib. 6. v. 163.

"Or for that they being both generated together, the Lightning is brought to us with a quicker Nimbleſſe; the Thunder cometh later, as happeneth in ſome things which are ſeen at a diſtance, and make a Sound by Blows;" for it is manifeſt, that the Stroke is ſeen before the Sound is heard.

Places beneath. Many things of this kind are done amongſt us, eſpecially in Stoves.

C H A P. XIV.

Of Hail, Snow, and Froſt.

C H A P. XIII.

Of Rain and Dew.

WE muſt now ſpeak of watery Concretions, whereof ſome continue fluid, others acquire ſome Solidity by the Impreſſion of Cold; thoſe which continue fluid are Rain and Dew, whereof one is made, the Heaven being cloudy; the other, when it is clear.

Rain may be made of the Clouds¹, either when being thinner than ordinary, the Wind driving them, or they preſſing upon one another, are ſqueezed together, and knit into Drops; or when being thicker than ordinary, they are rarified and changed by Heat or by the Wind; or, like Wax, melt ſo, that they fall down in Drops.

That there are Seeds of Water contained in the Clouds, is ſo well known, that we need not ſpeak of it. They aſcend together with Clouds, they increaſe together with them, and are diſperſed thorough them, as Blood through the Parts of our Body. Neither doth there aſcend Moiſture into the Clouds from all Rivers only, but the Clouds alſo which hang over the Sea receive Moiſture like a Fleece of Wool.

Wherefore Rain may flow from the Clouds, either when the Force of the Wind thruſteth the Clouds up together, and great Stores of Showers being raiſed above them, preſſeth and thruſts them; or when the Clouds, by the Power of the Winds are rarified, and ſuffer their Moiſture to flow abroad, or by the Heat of the Sun are ſo diſſolved, that they fall down in Drops, and, as I ſaid, like melting Wax.

It may happen, that Rains ſometimes laſt a long while, becauſe it then happeneth, that many Seeds of Waters, riſing up to ſeveral Clouds, and diſperſed every way, may ſupply the Rain. Sometimes alſo the Earth reeking, exhales back again all the Moiſture which the receiveth.

Dew is made, either by the meeting together of the little Bodies in the Air, which are of ſuch a Nature, as to be fit to generate this kind of Moiſture; or by the bringing forth of little Bodies, which chiefly generate Dew above, when they ſo meet together as to make that Moiſture, and flow down into the

OF watery Concretions, which, by Impreſſion of Cold are congealed into ſome Solidity, there are two things which are made when the Heaven is cloudy, Hail and Snow; one, when it is clear, Froſt.

Hail is generated, either when the Congelation is ſtronger, by reaſon of the ſetting of a cold Wind which is on every ſide, and preſſeth the Drippings or Drops of the Clouds, which otherwiſe would go away into Rain; or when the congealed Bulk cleaveth aſunder in many Places, and by a moderate Liquefaction, watery Drops inſinuating into the Chinks by Compreſſion of the Parts, and breaking the whole Frame into Pieces, they cauſe that the Parts exiſt compacted ſeverally by themſelves, and make a Heap of Fragments which are thereupon diſperſed.

That theſe Fragments be in a manner round, nothing hindreth, either for that the outmoſt Corners are cut off on every ſide, by reaſon of their long falling; or, for that in their very forming, ſomething either watery or windy ſurrounds all the Parts evenly, as we ſaid, ſo that their Surface is round, and not uneven.

Snow happeneth to be made either by thin Water poured out of the Clouds, ſo that it froths, (ſome Clouds fit for that Purpoſe preſſing, and the Winds blowing them abroad) and is afterwards congealed in the very Motion, by reaſon of ſome more vehement Cold in the lower Places of the Clouds.

Or by ſome ſmooth congealing, cauſed in the Clouds, unto which, whiſt the little watery Bodies, compreſſed by, and neighbouring to one another, arrive, there is cauſed an Aggregation of ſuch Loofeneſs as the Flocks of Snow have; whereas, the ſame driving one another cauſe Hail, which two things chiefly are made in the Air.

It may alſo be, that a kind of Ejaculation of the Snow, which falleth down in Heaps, may be made, the Clouds, which were firſt congealed, breaking in aſunder.

Laſtly, Froſt is made of the ſame little Bodies as Dew; whereas, the little Drops of Dew made either way, are by the cold Temperament of the Air congealed, and in congealing, receive a light Compactneſs.

C H A P.

¹ Lucret. 10. 99.

² Lucret. lib. 6. v. 496.

³ Lucret. 10. 106.

C H A P. XV.

Of the Rainbow, and Halos.

WE must not here pass by two remarkable things*, which appear in the Clouds or above; the Rainbow, an Arch of various Colours, over-against the Sun; and Halos, which sometimes like a white Crown compasseth the Moon.

The Rainbow is made either for that the moist Air shineth by the opposite Splendor of the Sun, or for that it is the particular Nature of Light, and of the Air, to present such kind of Colours, either all of them, or one only, from which (shining forward) the neighbouring Parts of the Air are so coloured; in like manner, as we observe to be done when the Parts of any thing which is enlightened make the Parts of other things next to it shine also.

As to the Roundness of its Figure, this is caused by reason that it is only conveyed to the Beholders Eye, from a Distance every way equal; or, for that the Atoms, which are carried out of the Air into the Cloud, are so compelled, that every Concretion made of them is formed into this Roundness.

A Halo is made about the Moon, either by the carrying up of a somewhat gross or lightly-cloudy Air towards the Moon, whilst in the mean time, some Effluxions derived from her, do as it were sift it (for they do not absolutely disperse it) in such manner, that they are formed into a Circle about her in this cloudy Figure.

Or by the Air, compelled about the Moon, after such a manner as to make this round and grosser Figure about her; which some conceive to happen according to some of her Parts, or by some Effluxion driving together from without, or, by Insinuation of Heat from beneath, fit to effect this.

C H A P. XVI.

Of Avernall Places.

IT rests, that we speak of some things of Avernall Places; so termed, for that they are pernicious to Birds; for when Birds attempt to fly over them, they instantly fall down and die: As also concerning the Causes of Pestilence, as far as they depend on the Air.

I must here only repeat, that the Earth containeth all kinds of little Bodies so diversly figured, that some are suitable to the Natures of Animals, others hurtful; and by reason that the Contextures of Animals are so unlike to one another, some of these are convenient and wholesome to some Animals, which to

others are inconvenient and pernicious. And why not? when the Contexture and Temper of the same Person being changed by a Fever, the same Wine, which before did him much good, is now as deadly to him as to be stabb'd to the Heart.

It is manifest, that many things unpleasant, troublesome, and pernicious, ordinarily come into the Taste, the Smell, the Touch, and all the Senses; not to mention some Trees which either cause a Heaviness to those who sleep in their Shade, or by an ill Scent kill them; nor strong Wine, or the Fume of Coals and the like. How many Places are there, which exhale strong and hurtful Scents of Brimstone and Sulphur? They who dig in Mines, who look so wan, and die so soon, how many noisome Vapours do they find to breathe out of the inmost Parts of the Earth?

Thus there are some Places out of which these Vapours breathe, which being carried up into the Air, diffused round over it in some manner poison it, and infect it with a deadly Quality; so as that, when Birds come to pass over it, *Veluti si Mulier Mensium Tempore Castoreum osciatur*, they become stupified, and immediately fall down dead.

It may also be, that the Air which lies between the Birds and the Earth, being cleft asunder by the Force of a Vapour breaking forth, and the Place becoming almost vacuous; the Birds may not have a Support upon which to rest their spreading Wings, and continue their Flight, so that they sink and fall, over-burden'd by the Weight of their own Body. Thus much for Avernall Places.

C H A P. XVII.

Of Pestilence.

THough Pestilence, or a mortal Affection of the Air may come from above, like a Cloud or Dew, yet it is most commonly caused, when the Earth is putrify'd by unseasonable Rains and Heats, and such a Vapour ariseth out of it as infects the Air, and killeth far and near, not only Men, but other living Creatures.

That the Air easily entertains the Affection, or Quality of the Vapour breathed immediately out of the Earth into it, is manifest, from the Diseases that are particular to Countries; as here with us the Gout is frequent; among the *Achaens*, Soreness of Eyes; among the *Egyptians*, the Leprosy; as also for that Travellers find it by Experience, acknowledging that the Air in several Places is very different.

That this Affection is sometimes propagated by the Air, the Nature of the Pestilence declareth, as that especially, which, in the Memory of our An-

* Lucr. 10. 109.

† Lucr. 1. 6. 749.

‡ Lucr. 6. 1091, &c.

cestors beginning in *Æthiopia*, ran on into *Lybia* and *Egypt*, and almost over all the Dominions of the King of *Persia*, so as it came into our City and Country also, and quite laid it waste.

This Propagation is made, when the poisonous Vapour intermingling its little Bodies with the Air, doth so disorder, and pervert the Situation of the little Bodies thereof, that whatsoever of them are like its own, it formeth into the same Contexture: As when Fire insinuating with its little Bodies into Wood, so altereth its Composition, that it strikes forth all the fiery little Bodies that are in it; and, out of it, maketh a new Fire like to itself. Moreover, as Fire running along in its swift Motion, is able to spread itself through a whole Wood; so this petulant Affection, by reason of the little Bodies of which it consists, creepeth forward by Degrees, and changeth the Air a great way, until it be represent'd by an Affection quite different; in like manner, as when a Cloud or Mist creeps through the Air, and by little and little, changeth and disturbeth it all along as it goeth.

Not to mention, that when Men by breathing, draw the Air into their Bodies, they suck in at the same time, the little Bodies of this Affection; where-with those which are like them in the Body are transfused, and perverted in the same manner, as we said of the Air; and by contagious Afflation, they are transmitted on to others, which cause the same Perversion, whereby the Disease spreads every where.

Thus much concerning not Meteorology only, but all Physiology: Of which the few things that we have said are such, as that by contemplating them, we may thoroughly understand the things that are done; whereby the things that are of Affinity with them, may be comprehended; and the Causes of particular Effects in Nature, known. For they, who pursue not these with all possible Diligence, are far from understanding them as they ought, and from obtaining the End for which those are to be understood.

And never must we cast out of Mind the Criteries, (nor the Evidence that belongs to every one of them,) because, if we forsake not these, we shall with right Reason find out from whence Perturbations arise, and what it is that causeth Fear, and shall quit ourselves from it, understanding the Cause of superior things, and of all others which ordinarily happen, and strike great Fear into others.

But, presupposing the Criteries, it avails most to apply ourselves to Speculation of the Principles of which all things consist, and of the Infinity of Nature, and other things coherent with these, and with constant Remembrance to preserve the chiefest and most general Maxims concerning them. For by this means, we shall be farthest off from Fables, and obtain that undisturbed State of Mind, which is the true and only Mark, at which, in all this Discourse, we have aimed.

The Third Part of PHILOSOPHY.

ETHICK, or MORALS.

IT is resteth that we speak of *Ethick*, or the Philosophy of *Manners*; neither is it without Cause that we said at first, that this is to be esteemed the principal Part of Philosophy, because that which is of Nature would be useless, unless it conser'd to the End of Life with an Ethical Consideration. Even Prudence itself, which belongs to this Part, therefore excels natural Philosophy, because it rules it, and useth it as a Means to moral Philosophy.

In saying this Part concerns the *End of Life*, I shew why it is commonly called the Philosophy concerning *Life and Manners*, or concerning the Institution of the Actions of Life, (for Manners are no other than the customary Actions of human Life;)

likewise concerning the *End*, that is, the extreme or greatest of the Goods which we pursue; and concerning things eligible and avoidable, inasmuch as it preferibeth the Election of such things as conduce to that End, and the Avoidance of such as divert from it.

For the *End of Life*, by the tacit Consent of all Men, is *Felicity*; and since almost all mis'd of that End, must it not happen either for that they propose not to themselves that Felicity which they ought, or for that they use not the right Means to attain it?

When we behold so many, who, abounding in all things necessary to the Use of Life, (swimming in Wealth, adorn'd with Titles, flourishing in a hope-
ful

ful Issue; in fine, possess'd of all things commonly esteem'd desirable, are notwithstanding anxious and querulous, full of Cares and Sollicitudes, distracted with Terrors, in a word, leading a miserable Life; thence we may infer, that they know not wherein true Felicity consists, and by what Means it may be attained: Their Hearts resembling a Vessel, which either being leaky and full of Holes, can never be filled; or being tainted with ill Liquor, corrupts and spoils whatsoever it receives.

It is therefore worth our Pains, by the Benefit of this Philosophy, (which^b treats of the End and of Felicity,) to cleanse and mend our Heart, that it may be satisfy'd with a little, and be pleas'd in the enjoying of any thing; *we must philosophise not for Show, but seriously; for it is requisite, not that we seem sound, but that we be sound:* We must philosophise forthwith, and not defer it to the Morrow; for even to Day it concerns us to live happily, and it is a Mischievous Folly that it always begins to live, or defers to begin, but in the mean time liveth never.

A strange thing it is! *We^d have been born once, we cannot be born twice, and Age must have an End: Yet thou, O Man, though the Morrow be not in thy Power, in Confidence of living to-morrow, putt'st thyself off to the future, and los'st the present:* So Mens Lives waste with Delay, and hence it is that some of us die in the midst of Business: Every Man leaves the World as if he had but newly enter'd it; and therefore old Men are upbraided with Infancy, because, as if employ'd in Business that concerns them not, they do not take notice that they live, and so their whole Life passeth away without the Benefit of Life.

Let us therefore endeavour so to live, that we may not repent of the time past; and so enjoy the present, as if the Morrow nothing concerned us. He most sweetly attains the Morrow, who least needs or desires the Morrow; and that Hour overtakes a Man most welcome, whereof he had fram'd to himself the least Hope. And since^e it is troublesome always to begin Life, let Life be always to us as it were perfect and absolute, and as if there wanted nothing to its measure. *The Life of a Fool is unpleasant, it is tincrous, it is wretchedly carried on to the future;* let us endeavour that ours be pleasant, secure, not only present, but even now settled in Safety.

Doubtless the way to fly Folly, is to ascend that Watch-tower (as it were) of wise Men, from whence we may behold the rest wandering, and, in Life, vainly seeking Life. If you think it pleasant, from Land to behold Mariners striving with Storms; or, without endangering yourself, see Armies joining Battle; certainly nothing can be more delightful, than from the calm Throne of Wisdom, to view the Tumults and Contentions of Fools. Not that

it is pleasant that others be afflicted, but it pleaseth that we are not involved in the same Evils.

But that we may in some measure, to our Ability, help those who desire to attain this Height of Wisdom, we will collect our Meditations upon these things; treating first of Felicity, which is Man's greatest good, and then of those things which conduce to the making and preserving it, which are nothing else but the Virtues themselves.

CH A P. I.

Of Felicity, or the End of Good, as far as Man is capable of it.

OF Felicity we must first take notice, it is termed the End, that is, the last, the extreme, and greatest of Goods; because since those things are called good which allure the Appetite to pursue them, and of these goods some are desired for themselves, some for other things, Felicity is such a Good as all Goods ought to be referred unto, itself to none.

And though Felicity, or Beatitude, and Happy Life be the same thing, yet that doth not hinder us, but that we sometimes mention the End of happy Life, which we do, according to the vulgar Phrase, talking the End of happy Life, and happy Life, for the same thing; but not implying any further End, to which happy Life may be thought to be referred.

This premised, we must first distinguish Felicity into two kinds; one supreme, incapable of Intension and Remission; the other subalternate, in which there may be Addition and Detraction of Pleasure.

The first is conceived to be a State, than which none can be imagined better, sweeter, more desirable, in which there is no Ill to be feared, no Good wanting: There is nothing that would and may not be done; and which is so sure, that it can at no time be lost.

By the other we understand a State, in which it is as well as may be, or in which there are very many necessary Goods, very few Ills, and in which it is permitted to lead a Life so sweetly, so quietly, and constantly, as the Company, Course of Life, Constitution of Body, Age, and other Circumstances will allow.

Nor without Reason is it I make this Distinction and Definition. For, though it seem manifest, that the first kind is proper only to God; yet there are, who, having a high Opinion of themselves, and of their own Wisdom, dare promise and arrogate it to themselves, and therefore affirm, that they are equal to God; and modest amongst them are they, who repute themselves inferior to none but Jupiter.

^b Stob. I. 134.^c Senec. Ep. 13.^d Plot. adv. Colot. Stob. Serm. 16.^e Senec. Ep. 23.^f Ibid.

But these truly seem forgetful of their own Mortality and Weakness; when as all, who are conscious thereof, cannot but acknowledge, that Men are capable only of the latter, and that Wisdom doth much, if, all Men being in some manner miserable, it place thee in a State, wherein thou shalt be the least miserable of all Men. Or, if among the several Degrees of Miseries, to which thou art obnoxious by Birth, it place thee in that wherein thou shalt be least miserable. For that is to be happy, to be free from those Ills wherewith thou mightest be afflicted; and in the mean time to enjoy such Goods, than which, greater cannot be had in the Condition wherein thou art.

This indeed is the Reason, why I conceive a Man, tho' deprived of Sight and Hearing, may nevertheless partake of happy Life, because he will yet persevere in as many Goods as he can, and be free from those Ills, if not of Body, at least of Mind, which otherwise might have afflicted him.

I further declare, that a wife Man, tho' he should be cruelly tormented, will yet be happy, by Felicity not divine but human; which in a wife Man is always as great as can be for the Condition of the time.

For in Torments he feels the Pain indeed, sometimes groans and cries out; but because there is a Necessity of suffering them, he exasperates not or makes them greater, by Impatience or Despair, but rather, with as great Constancy of Mind as is possible, mitigates and renders them somewhat more easy. Herein certainly he is more happy than if he sunk under them, like those, who, being under the same Torment, bear them not with equal Courage and Constancy, nor have the like Assistance from Wisdom (which confers at least Innocence of Life, and Security of Conscience,) to lighten them.

Therefore neither is there any Reason to cavil, that the Bull of *Phalaris*, and a Bed of Roses, are all one to us; and the wife Man, burning in that Bull, must cry out, *How pleasant is this! How unconcern'd am I! How little care!* Since there are some things which a wife Man had rather should happen to him, as Rest of Body, free from all Disturbance, and Leisure of Mind, rejoicing in Contemplation of its own good: There are other things, which though he would not have them, yet when they do come, he bears them constantly, even commends and approves them, inasmuch as they give him Occasion to please himself in his own Constancy, and to say, I burn, but yield not. Why may it not be wished, not indeed to be burnt, but to be vanquished?

This I say, in regard a wife Man is obnoxious both to the Pains of Sickness, and the Tortures of Tyrants, although he neither invites those, nor provokes these, so far as decently he may. Besides, the

Times are not such always to all Men, as that they may by Indolence live happy.

CHAP. II.

That Pleasure, without which there is no Notion of Felicity, is in its own Nature good.

Seeing that to live without Pain is sweet or pleasant, and to enjoy good things, and be recreated by them; it follows that Felicity cannot consist without both, or at least one of these; (by Pleasure, Suavity, Jucundity, and the like Terms, I understand the same thing:) Yet some there are, who, with great Flourishes, have so discoursed against Pleasure itself, as if it were something ill in its own Nature, and consequently not appertaining to Wisdom and Felicity.

Therefore, before we enquire whether Felicity really consists in Pleasure, we must shew, that Pleasure is in its own Nature good, as its contrary, Pain, is in its own Nature ill.

Certainly since that is good which delighteth, pleaseth, is amiable, and allures the Appetite; that, consequently, ill which harmeth, is unpleasant, and therefore excites Hate and Aversion: That is, nothing pleaseth more than Pleasure, delighteth more, is lov'd more, is desired more; as on the contrary, nothing incommodes more than Pain, displeaseth, is abhorred, and shunned. So as Pleasure seems not only to be a good, but the very Essence of good, it being that by which any thing is good or desirable: Pain not only an ill, but the very Essence of ill, as being that by which any thing is ill or hateful.

For though we sometimes thus Pleasure, yet it is not the Pleasure itself which we thus, but some Pain annexed accidentally to it; as, if at any time we pursue Pain, it is not the Pain itself that we pursue, but some Pleasure accidentally joined to it.

For, (to express this more plainly,) no Man flights, hates, or shuns Pleasure as Pleasure, but because great Pains overtake those who know not how to follow Pleasure with Reason. Nor is there any who loves, pursues, would incur Pain simply as Pain, but because sometimes it so happens, as that with Labour and Pain he must pursue some great Pleasure.

For to instance in the least things; Who amongst us undertakes any laborious Exercise of Body, unless that some Commodity arise by it? Who can justly blame him, who desires to be in that Pleasure which hath no Trouble? Or him, who shuns that Pain which procures no Pleasure? But we accuse and esteem those worthy of Contempt, who, blinded and corrupted with the Blandishments of present Pleasure, foresee not the Troubles that must ensue. Alike faulty are they, who desert their Duties out of Soft-

ness

ness of Mind, that is, the Avoidance of Labour and Pains.

Of these things, the Distinction is easy and ready. For at a free time, when our Election is at Liberty, and nothing hinders, but that we may do what pleaseth us most, all Pleasure is to be embraced, all Pain to be expelled. But at some times it often falleth out, that Pleasures are to be rejected, and Troubles not to be declined.

Thus, altho' we esteem all Pleasures a good, and all Pain an ill, yet we affirm not, that we ought at all times to pursue that, or to avoid this; but that we ought to have regard as to their Quantity, so also to their Quality; since it is better for us to undergo some Pains, that we may thereby enjoy the more abundant Pleasures; and it is expedient to abstain from some Pleasures, lest they prove the Occasion of our incurring more grievous Pains.

Hereupon this was, as it were, the Fountain, from which, in treating of Criteries, we deduced several Canons concerning Affection or Passion, esteeming Pleasure or Pain the Criterium of Election and Avoidance: And not without Reason, so far as we ought to judge of all these things, by the Commensuration and Choice of things profiting or hurting, since we sometimes use a good as an ill; and, on the contrary, sometimes an ill as a good.

Hence therefore, to press this further, I say, that no Pleasure is ill in itself, but some things there are which procure some Pleasures, but withal bring Pains far greater than the Pleasures themselves. Whereupon I add, that if every Pleasure might be so reduced within itself, as that it neither should comprise within it, nor leave behind it any Pain; every Pleasure, by this Reduction, would be no less perfect and absolute than the principal Works of Nature, and consequently there would be no Difference amongst Pleasures, but all would be expetible alike.

Moreover, if those very things which afford Pleasure to luxurious Persons, could free them from the Fears of Meteors, and of Death, and Pain, and could instruct them what are the Bounds of Desires, I could not find any fault, so far as they would be every way replete with Pleasures, and have nothing grievous or painful that is ill.

CHAP. III.

That Felicity consists generally in Pleasure.

NOW to come to what was proposed, Felicity seems plainly to consist in Pleasure. This is first to be proved in general, then we must shew, in what Pleasure particularly it consists.

In general, Pleasure seems to be, as the Beginning, for the End also of happy Life, since we find it to be

the first Good, and convenient to our, and all animal, Nature; and is that from which we begin all Election and Avoidance, and in which at last we terminate them, using this Affection as a Rule to judge every Good.

That Pleasure is the first and connatural Good, or (as they term it,) the first thing suitable and convenient to Nature, appeareth; for that every Animal, as soon as born,^a desireth Pleasure, and rejoiceth in it, as the chief Good; shunneth Pain as its greatest Ill, and to its utmost Ability, repels it. We see that even ^b Hercules himself, tormented by a poisonous Shirt, could not withhold from Tears;

Crying and howling, whilst the Locrrian Stones,
And high Eubæan Hills, retort his Groans.

Thus^c doth every undepraved Animal, its own Nature judging incorruptly and entirely.

There^d needs not therefore any reasoning to prove, that Pleasure is to be desired, Pain to be shunned; for this is manifest to our Sense, as that Fire is hot, Snow white, Honey sweet. We need no Arguments to prove this, it is enough that we give notice of it. For since that if we take away from Man all his Senses, there is nothing remaining, it is necessary, that what is convenient or contrary to Nature, be judged by Nature herself, and that Pleasure be expetible in itself, and Pain in itself to be avoided: For what perceives, or what judgeth, either to pursue or avoid any thing, except Pleasure and Pain.

That Pleasure, as being the first thing convenient to Nature, is also the last of Expetibles, or the End of good things, may be understood even from this, Because it is Pleasure only for whose sake we so desire the rest, that itself is not desired for the sake of any other, but only for itself; for we may desire other things to delight or please ourselves, but no Man ever demanded a Reason, why we would be delighted and pleased? Certainly no more, than for what Cause we desire to be happy; since Pleasure and Felicity ought to be reputed, not only in the same degree, but to be the very same thing, and, consequently the End, or ultimate and greatest Good, on which the rest depend, but itself depends on none.

This is further proved, for that Felicity is, as we hinted formerly, no otherwise, than because it is that State in which we may live most sweetly and most pleasantly, that is, with the greatest Pleasure that may be. For, take from Life this Sweetness, Juncundity, Pleasure; and where, I pray, will be your Notion of Felicity; not of that Felicity only which I termed divine, but even of the other, esteemed human; which is no otherwise capable to receive degrees of more and less, or Intension and Remission,

than

^a Cic. de fin. 1. 9.

^b Laert. 10. 137.

^c Cic. *ibid.*

^d *ibid.*

than because Addition or Detraction of Pleasure may befall it?

To understand this better, by comparing Pleasure with Pain, "let us suppose a Man enjoying many great incessant Pleasures, both in Mind and Body, no Pain hindring them, nor likely to disturb them; What State, can we say, is more excellent, or more desirable than this? For in him who is thus affected, there must necessarily be a Constancy of Mind, fearing neither Death nor Pain, because Death is void of Sorrow; Pain, if long, useth to be light; if great, short; so as the shortness makes amends for its greatness, the lightness for its length. When he arrives at such a Condition, as he trembles not with Horror of the Deity, nor suffereth the present Pleasures to pass away, whilst his Mind is busied with the Remembrance of past, or Expectation of future good things, but is daily joyed with the reflecting upon them; What can be added to better the Condition of this Person?

"Suppose, on the other side, a Man afflicted with as great Pains of Body, and Grievs of Mind, as Man's Nature is capable of, no hope that they shall ever be eased, no Pleasure past, present, or expected; What can be said or imagined more miserable than he?

"If therefore a Life full of Pains be of all things most to be avoided, doubtless the greatest ill is to live in Pain; whence it followeth, that the greatest good is to live in Pleasure. Neither indeed hath our Mind any thing else, wherein, as its Centre, it may rest; all Sicknesses and Troubles are reduced to Pain, nor is there any thing else which can remove Nature out of her Place, or dissolve her."

CH A P. IV.

That the Pleasure, wherein consists Felicity, is Indolence of Body, and Tranquility of Mind.

There being (as before is intimated) two kinds of Pleasures; one in Station or Rest, which is a Placability, Calmness, and Vacuity, or Immunity from Trouble and Grief; the other in Motion, which consists in a sweet Movement, as in Gladness, Mirth, and whatsoever moveth the Sense delightfully, with a kind of Sweetness and Trillation, "as to eat and drink out of Hunger and Thirst: It may be demanded, Whether in both, or in either, and in which, consists Felicity?

We say, that Pleasure, wherein Felicity consists, is of the first kind, the stable, or that which is in Station, and so can be no other than Indolence of Body, and Tranquility of Mind.

When therefore we say in general Terms, Pleasure is the End of happy Life, we are far from meaning

the Pleasures of luxurious Persons, or of others, as considered in the Motion or Act of Fruition, by which the Sense is pleasantly and sweetly affected; as some, either through Ignorance, Diligent, or Ill-will, interpret. We mean no more but this, (to repeat it once more) *Not pained in Body, nor troubled in Mind.*

For it is not perpetual Feasting and Drinking; not the Conversation of beautiful Women; not Rarities of Fish, nor any other Dainties of a profuse Table, that make a happy Life; but Reason, with Sobriety, and a serene Mind, searching the Cause, why this Object is to be preferred, that to be rejected; and expelling Opinions which occasion much Trouble to the Mind.

The better to understand why this Pleasure only is the End, we may observe, that Nature tends to no other Pleasure primarily, as to her End, but to the stable, which followeth upon the Removal of Pain and Trouble. The moveable she proposes not as the End, but provides only as a Means conducing to the stable, to sweeten (as it were) that Operation of hers which is requisite to the Extirpation of Pain and Trouble. For Example, Hunger and Thirst bring Things troublesome and incommodious to an Animal, the primary End of Nature is to constitute the Animal in such a State, as that it may be free from that Trouble and Inconvenience; and because this cannot be done but by eating and drinking, she therefore seasons with a sweet Relish the Action of eating and drinking, that the Animal may apply himself more readily thereto.

Most Men, indeed, live preposterously; transported inconsiderately and intemperately, they propose for their End the Pleasure which consists in Motion; but Wisdom summon'd to our Relief reduceth all Pleasures into decent Order; and teacheth, that Pleasure is to be proposed as the End; but that which is the End according to Nature, is no other than that which we have spoken of: For while Nature is our Guide, whatsoever we do tends to this, that we neither be pained in Body, nor troubled in Mind. And as soon as we have attained this, all Disturbances of the Mind are quieted, and there is nothing beyond it that we can aim at to compleat the good both of our Soul and Body. For we then want Pleasure when its Absence excites Pain in us; but as long as we are not pained, we want not Pleasure.

Hence comes it, that a Motion of Pain, or the State which follows upon that one Word, is the surest Bound or Height of Pleasures; for, wherever Pleasure is, as long as it is there, there is nothing painful or grievous, or both together. Hence also it comes, that the highest Pleasure terminated in Privation of Pain may be varied and distinguished, but not increased and amplified: For Nature, until she hath quite taken away the Pain, increaseth the Pleasure;

sure; but when the Pain is quite remov'd, she permits not the Pleasure to increase in greatness, but only admits some Varieties which are not necessary, as not conducing to our not being pained.

Moreover, hence it appears, that they insult without Cause, who accuse us, that we mean not by want of Pain, some middle thing betwixt Pain and Pleasure, but to confound it with the other Part (in the Division) as to make it not only a Pleasure, but the very highest of Pleasures. For, because when we are delivered out of Pain, we rejoice at that very Freedom and Exemption from all Trouble; but every thing whereat we rejoice is Pleasure, as every thing whereat we are offended, Pain; the Privation of all Pain is rightly named Pleasure. For, when Hunger and Thirst are expelled by eating and drinking, the very Detraction of the Trouble brings Pleasure; so in every thing else, the Removal of Pain causeth Succession of Pleasure.

Hence also may be shewn the Difference, when they object, that there is no Reason why this middle State should rather be esteem'd a Pleasure than a Pain. For Discontent ensues not immediately upon Detraction of Pleasure, unless some Pain chance to succeed in the room of the Pleasure: But on the contrary, we rejoice at the Loss of Pain, though none of those Pleasures which move the Sense succeed. By this we may understand, how great a Pleasure it is, not to be pained; which if any doubt, let them ask those who are oppress'd with sharp Sicknesses.

Some laugh heret, they object that this Pleasure is like the Condition of one that sleeps, and accuse us of Sloth; never considering that this Constitution of ours is not mere Stupidity, but rather a State wherein all Actions of Life are performed pleasantly and sweetly. For, as we would not have the Life of a wife Man to be like a Torrent or rapid Stream, so we would not it should be like a standing dead Pool; but rather like a River gliding on silently and quietly. We therefore hold his Pleasure is not unactive, but that which Reason makes firm to him.

But to omit these, and return to our Subject, there are two good things of which our chiefest Felicity consists; That the Mind be free from Trouble, the Body from Pain; and so as that these Goods be so full, and all Trouble taken away, that they admit not Increase. For how can that increase which is full? If the Body be free from all Pain, what can be added to this Indolence? If the Mind from Perturbation, what can be added to this Tranquility? As the Serenity of Heaven being refined to the sincerest Splendor, admits no greater Splendor; so the State of a Man who takes care of his Body and Soul, and connects his good out of both, is perfect, and he hath attained the End of his Desires, if his Body be neither subject to Pain, nor his Mind to Disturbance. If any external Blandishments happen, they increase

not the chief good, but, as I may say, season and sweeten it; for that absolute good of human Nature is contained in the Peace of the Soul and the Body.

CHAP. V.

Of the Means to procure this Felicity; and of Virtues, the chief.

NOW seeing this Peace of Body and Mind, Tranquility in one, Indolence in the other, is the compleat Felicity of Man; nothing more concerns us than to consider what things will procure and preserve it; for when we have it, we want nothing; while we want it, all we do is to obtain it, and yet (as we said) for the most part we fail of it.

First, therefore, we must consider of Felicity no otherwise than as of Health; it being manifest, that the State in which the Mind is free from Perturbation, the Body from Pain, is no other than the perfect Health of the whole Man. Whence it comes, that as in the Body, so in the Mind also, those things which produce and conserve Health are the same with those which either prevent Diseases, or cure and expel them.

Now seeing that to provide against the Diseases of the Body belongs to the Art of Medicine, as well for the Prevention as Cure of them, we shall not need to say much hereupon, but only give two Cautions which may be sufficient.

One, that for the driving away all Diseases, or at least making them lighter and easier to be cured, we use Temperance and a sober continent Life.

The other, that when there is a Necessity of our suffering them, we betake ourselves to Fortitude, and undergo them with a constant Mind; not exasperating them by Impatience, but comforting ourselves with considering, that, if great, they must be short; if long, light.

Against the Diseases of the Mind, Philosophy provides, when we justly esteem it the Medicine of the Mind: But it is not with equal Facility consulted, nor applied, by those who are sick in Mind. For we judge of the Diseases of the Body by the Mind; but the Diseases of the Mind, we neither feel in the Body, nor know or judge as we ought by the Mind, because that whereby we should judge is distemper'd. Whence we may understand that the Diseases of the Mind are more pernicious than those of the Body; as amongst those of the Body, the worst and most dangerous are such as make the Patient insensible of them; as the Apoplexy, or a violent Fever.

Moreover, that the Diseases of the Mind are worse than those of the Body, is evident from the same Reason which demonstrates that the Pleasures of the Mind are better than those of the Body; viz. because

because in the Body we feel nothing but what is present, but in the Mind we are sensible also of the past and future. For, as the Anxiety of the Mind which ariseth from Pain of the Body may be highly aggravated, if we conceit (for Instance) that some eternal and infinite Evil is ready to fall on us; so (to transfer the Instance) Pleasure is the greater, if we fear no such thing; it being manifest, that the greatest Pleasure or Trouble of Mind doth more conduce to a miserable or happy Life than either of the other two, though they should be equally lasting in the Body.

Now sofar as there are two principal Diseases of the Mind, *Desire* and *Fear*, with their several Off-springs, and accompany'd with Discontent and Trouble, in the same manner as Pain is joined to the Diseases of the Body; it is therefore the Office of Philosophy to apply such Remedies as may prevent them from invading the Mind; or, if they have invaded it, expel them. Such briefly are the vain Desires of Health, of Honours, Fear of the Gods, of Death, and the like, which having but once taken Possession of the Mind, they leave no Part thereof sound.

The Remedies which Philosophy applyeth are the *Virtues*, which being deriv'd from Reason, or the more general Prudence, easily drive away and expel the Affections. I say, from Reason, or the more general Prudence; because, as there is a more particular Prudence, serving for the Directions of all the particular Actions of our Life; so is there a more general Prudence, which is no other than Reason itself, or the Dictate of Reason, and is by most esteemed the same with Wisdom; whereas Virtue is only a perfect Disposition of the Mind, which Reason or Prudence doth create and oppose to the Diseases of the Mind, the *Vices*.

C H A P. VI.

Of Right-reason and Free-will, from which the Virtues have all their Praise.

BEING therefore to proceed in our Discourse to Virtue, and its several Kinds, we must premise something concerning Reason itself, and likewise concerning the Free-will which is in it: for thence is derived all the Praise belonging to Virtue; as also its Opposite, the Reproach due to Vice.

Forasmuch as Reason generally is nothing but the Faculty of ratiocinating, or judging and inferring one thing from another, we here take it particularly for that which judgeth, inferreth, and ratiocinates in things of Action, subject to Election or Avoidance.

But whereas Judgment or Reasoning may be either right or wrong, that Reason, whose Judgment is false, is not properly Reason, and therefore we term it *Opinion*; yet in respect it is the common Phrase, you may call it also Reason if you please, meaning

wrong Reason; as right Reason may be termed *Opinion*, meaning *sound Opinion*.

Right Reason ariseth either from Ingenuity, or Experience, and sedulous Observation. Being grounded upon firm and correct Principles, our Ratiocination becomes solid; and justly do we appeal to the Judgment of him, who is expert and knowing in things. But of this already in the canonick Part concerning the Criteries, which need not Repetition.

When I say things subject to Election and Avoidance, I take for granted that there is in us a free or arbitrary Power or Reason, that is, a Faculty elective and profecutive of that which Reason hath judged good, and of avoiding and shunning what it hath judged ill.

That it really is in us, is proved even by Experience, and by common Sense, which manifests that nothing is worthy of Praise or Dispraise, but what is done freely, voluntarily, deliberately, and by Election; and therefore must depend on something within us which is beyond Compulsion, and in respect whereunto all Rewards and Punishments are rightly ordained by the Laws: Than which nothing were more unjust, if the Actions of Men were to be imputed to that rigid Necessity, which some assert, derived from Fate, as the sole Commanders of all things, declaring, that whatsoever comes to pass floweth from an eternal Truth, and Continuation of Causes.

Truly it is much better to be addicted to the falacious (that is, the common) Opinion of the Gods, than to be Slaves to the Belief of Fate, according as some Naturalists hold it, imposing it upon our Necks as an everlasting Lord or Tyrant, whom we are to stand in awe of Night and Day. For the other Opinion hath some Comfort in it, that the Gods will be moved with our Prayers; but this imports an inexorable Necessity.

True indeed it is, that in things void of Reason some Effects are necessary; (yet not so necessary but that they might have been prevented, as we declared in the Canonick, and where we treated of Causes;) but in Man endu'd with Reason, and as far as he makes use of that Reason, there can be no Necessity. Hence it was we endeavour'd to assert the Declination of Motions in Atoms, that we might from thence deduce, how Fortune might sometimes intervene, and put in for a Share amongst human Affairs, yet that which is in us, our Will, not be destroy'd. It behoves us to employ all our Wit and Endeavours to maintain our own Free-will against that sempiternal Motion, and not to suffer Wickedness to escape us culpable.

But what I say of Fortune, implies not that we ascribe any Divinity to it, not only as the Vulgar, but even as those Philosophers, who esteeming her an unitalable Cause; though they conceive not that the bestows on Men any thing of Good or Ill that may conduce to happy Life, yet think that she gives Occasion

caſion of very conſiderable Goods and Ills. We imply not this, I ſay, but only mean, that as many things are affected by Necessity and Counsel, ſo alſo by Fortune; and therefore it is the Duty of a wiſe Man to arm himſelf againſt Fortune.

Now ſeeing whatever Good or Ill there is in human Actions depends only upon this, that a Man doth it knowingly, and willingly, or freely; therefore the Mind muſt be accuſtomed to know truly, that is, to uſe right Reaſon; and to will truly, that is, to bend the Free-will to that which is truly good, from that which is truly ill. Forasmuch as this accuſtoming begets that Diſpoſition in the Mind, which we deſcribed to be Virtue; as the accuſtoming of it to the contrary begets that Diſpoſition which we may juſtly define Vice.

Not to mention that what produceth Pleaſure, ſincere, without any Pain, Trouble or Repentance attending or enſuing thereupon, is truly good; that which produceth Pain, ſincere, without any Pleaſure, or Joy ſucceeding upon it, is truly ill. I only give this Hint of both, to diſtinguiſh each of them from what is only apparent and diſſembled: Such as that Good which begets preſent Pleaſure, and afterwards introduceth Pain and Trouble; and that Ill which procures Pain or Trouble, but afterwards Pleaſure and Chearfulneſs.

C H A P. VII.

Of the Virtues in general.

Forasmuch as all Virtue is either *Prudence*, or the Dictate of right Reaſon, as we accuſtom ourſelves to it, or is directed by, and dependent on Prudence, and the Dictate of right Reaſon; it is manifeſt, that to this latter Kind belongs, as well that whereby a Man is affected toward himſelf, as that whereby he is affected towards another: ſor by Prudence a Man is made capable to govern not only himſelf, but others.

The Virtue which relates to others, is generally called *juſtice*; that which concerns ourſelf, is ordinarily diſtinguiſhed into *Temperance* and *Fortitude*. But we uſe to comprize both under the Term *Honesty*; as when we ſay to act Virtuously, is no other than to act Prudently, Honesty, Juſtly; they who live Soberly and Continently, are ſaid to live Honesty or Decently; they who do Valiantly, are thought to behave themſelves Honesty or Decently.

Hereupon we (as others) diſtinguiſh Virtue into four Kinds, *Prudence*, *Temperance*, *Fortitude*, and *juſtice*; but ſo, as that we oppoſe not *Prudence* to any Affection ſo much as to *Incontinence*, *Ignorance*, *Folly*, (except by Accident, inasmuch as Perturbation blinds Reaſon, and cauſeth a Man to act imprudently;) nor *juſtice* to any Affection ſo much as to *Malice*, whereby a Man is prone to Deceits, (unleſs by

Accident, in as much as Anger, Hatred, Covetouſneſs, or ſome other Paſſion may cauſe a Man to do unjuſtly;) *Temperance* we oppoſe to *Deſire*; *Fortitude* to *Fear*.

Hence is manifeſt, when I formerly ſaid, A ſober or well-order'd Reaſon procures a pleaſant or happy Life; we are to underſtand, that it procures it by means of the Virtues which it ingenerates and preſerves. And whereas I added, that it ſearched out the Cauſes why things are to be embraced or avoided, and chaſeth away Opinions which occaſion great Trouble in the Mind; we are to underſtand that is all one with general Prudence, the Principle of all things expetible and avoidable, and conſequently the greateſt; becauſe the Virtues which ariſe from it appeaſe Perturbations, teaching, that we cannot live pleaſantly, unleſs prudently, honeſtly, and juſtly; not prudently, honeſtly, and juſtly, unleſs pleaſantly.

By this you find why I conceive that the Virtues are connatural to a happy Life, and that it is impoſſible to ſeparate a happy Life from them. All other things, as being frail and mortal, are tranſitory, ſeparable from true and conſtant Pleaſure; only Virtue, as being a perpetual and immortal Good, is inſeparable from it.

By this alſo you may underſtand, that all the Virtues are connected within one another; and that by one; becauſe to the principal Prudence all the reſt are conjoined, as the Members to the Head, or as Rivers to the Spring from which they flow: the other, becauſe as well Prudence, as all the reſt, cohere with happy Life; there cannot be a happy Life where the Virtues are not; neither can the Virtues be there, where the Life is not happy.

Notwithſtanding that the Virtues are all connected within one another, yet are they not therefore all equal, as ſome conceive, who hold that all Vices and Faults are alſo equal. For a Man may be more inclin'd to Juſtice than to Temperance; and Temperance may be more perfect in one than in another. As for Inſtance, (without Envy be it ſpoke) myſelf, by Length of Time, have made ſo great a Progreſs in Sobriety, as leſs than an *Obolus* ſerves me for a Meal; *Metrodorus*, who hath not yet made ſo great Progreſs, a whole *Obolus*. And it is evident, that of Men one is wiſer than another; and of them who do rightly according to Virtue, equal Rewards are not allotted to all, as neither equal Punishments to all Offenders. Even Senſe and Manners conſute them, who make all equal, and hold that they offend alike; he who beats his Servant wrongfully, and he who his Parent; ſeeing ſome there are who make no Difference betwixt eating a Bean, and the Head of our Father.

Others condemn and exclaim on us for affirming, that the Virtues are of ſuch a Nature, as that they conduce to Pleaſure or Felicity; as if we meant that Pleaſure

Pleasure which is obscene and infamous; but let them rail as they please. For as they make Virtue the chief Good, so do we: If the Discourse be of the Means conducing to a happy Life, neither is there any of so great Power as Virtue, therefore not more excellent, (not Wealth, not Honour, not Friends, not Children, &c.) But if the Discourse be of living happily, or Felicity, why should not this be a Good superior to Virtue, to the Attainment whereof Virtue itself is but subservient.

They exclaim again, that we enervate Virtue, in not allowing her so much Power, as to render a wife Man free from all Passion or Affection, but to permit him to be moved therewith, as (for Instance) to grieve, weep, and sigh at the Death of Friends: But as we set a high Value upon Virtue, as being able to deliver us from vain Terrors and superfluous Desires, the chief Heads of all grievous Perturbations; so likewise not a little esteem it, for that it reduceth the rest of the Affections to such a Mediocrity, in which there remains some Sense as it were of Humanity.

Certainly that total Exemption from Grief which these Men boast of, proceeds from some greater Ill, Cruelty, and immoderate Ambition of Vain-glory, and a kind of Madness. So that it seems much better to feel some Passion, to be affected with some Grief, to shed some Tears, such as proceed from Persons touched with Love and Tenderness, than to be wise as these would have us, and grin like brute Beasts.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Prudence in general.

WE must now say something of every Virtue in particular; beginning with *Prudence*, whose Office being to govern the Life, and so to provide for every Occurrence in Life, as to direct it to Happiness, it seems alone to comprise the Offices of all Virtues.

That the Property of Prudence, is to dispose all Accidents and Actions of Life to Felicity or Pleasure, is most manifest. As we value Medicine, not for the Science itself, but for Health; and the Art of Steering, not for its Ingenuity, but Use in Navigation; so Prudence, the Art of living, would never be desired, if it were nothing efficacious in Life; but being so, it is desired, as the Art by which Pleasure is sought and obtained.

For Prudence, or (if you like the Word better) Wisdom, alone it is, which not only provides that nothing happen which may afflict the Body, but likewise above all, expels Sadness from the Mind, not permitting us to be daunted with Fear: Under which Governess we may live in Tranquility, extinguishing the Ardor of all Desires. For Desires are insatiable, they subvert not only single Persons, but

Families, many times a whole Commonwealth. From Desires arise Hatreds, Diffentions, Discords, Seditions, Wars; neither do these only revel abroad, or with blind Fury assault others only, but likewise shut up in the Breast, they disagree and quarrel with one another, which must necessarily make Life exceeding bitter. Only the prudent and wife Person, cutting off all Vanity and Error, content with the Limits of Nature, can live without Discontent and without Fear.

Now, seeing Life is disturbed by Error and Ignorance, and that it is Prudence alone which rescues us from the Violence of Lusts and Fears, teacheth us temperately to sustain the Injuries of Fortune, and sheweth us all the Ways that lead to Quiet and Tranquility, why should we stick to affirm, that Prudence is expetible in order to Pleasure, and Impudence to be shunned for Trouble's sake?

That we say, a prudent Person temperately sustains the Injuries of Fortune, the Reason is, that he foresees them, if not in particular, at least in the general; neither, if any thing happen contrary to his Expectations or Designs, is he troubled, for that he knoweth it not to be within the Reach of human Industry, Sagacity, or Power, either to foresee, or to prevent, that nothing adverse or troublesome happen. He judgeth it better to be, with well ordered Reason (as far as human Frailty will admit) unfortunate, than with Inconsideration fortunate; and thinks nothing more handsome, than if Fortune bring about a thing fairly and prosperously, that was not undertaken without Judgment and Deliberation.

But indeed, a wife Man orders so himself, that cutting off vain Desires, he contracts himself within Necessaries, which are so few and small, as hardly any Fortune can snatch them from him. Thus, since none, or very little Fortune can intervene to a wife Man, he may say to her, I have seized on thee, (Fortune) and intercepted thee, so as thou canst not come at me.

Concerning the cutting off all Desires, we shall speak hereafter. Now, sofar as Prudence may be considered, either as it governs ourselves, or a House, or a Family, or a City, or a Commonwealth, and so is distinguished into private, domestic, civil, let us say something upon each.

CHAP. IX.

Private Prudence.

PRIVATE Prudence consisteth almost wholly in this, that a Man understand his own *Genius*, and undertake nothing whereto his Nature is averse; that he deliberately pre-examine the State in which he is to spend his whole Life, and to which he must so accommodate all the Actions of Life, as that, as much as possible, he may live in Indolence and Tranquility.

For he ought to have the End or Scope of Life fixed, and constantly set before his Eyes, and consult with right Reason, according to all Evidence, whereby we use to weigh whatsoever we think or determine. For unless this be done, all will be full of indiscreet Temerity and Confusion, and our Designs and Enterprizes will be overtaken by too late Repentance.

Besides, if upon every emergent Occasion, you refer not each of your Actions both to this kind of Scope, and to that End of Nature which you proposed to yourself in designing it, but turn aside to pursue or fly some other thing, the Actions of your Life will not correspond to your own Words. For Example, you extol Tranquility in Words, but in Actions discover yourself busy and obnoxious to Trouble.

He underlands the Bounds prescribed by Nature to those who enter the Course of Life, who discerns how easily procurable that is which is necessary to Life, or what is sufficient to remove any thing that afflicts the Body with Indigence. Thereby he knows so well to order the whole Series of Life, as never to need such things or Business as are contentious, and consequently full of Hazard and Danger.

Hence it is, that a wife Man is not much afraid of Poverty, it happening seldom, that any Man wants the things necessary to Life. Yet if those should chance to be wanting, and he not have Money to procure them, he will not betake himself to beg, as the *Cynick*, but rather apply himself to instruct some Persons in Learning: Thus taking an Employment not misbecoming Wisdom, and at the same time supplying himself with Necessaries from those who have full Estates.

Whilst we are obliged to this or the like Employment; "If Necessaries fail us, and our Business be to entertain daily * Occurrences with a settled Courage, we must have Recourse to Wisdom or Philosophy for Relief. To an ill Counsellor we resign the ordering of the things that concern us, if, what is necessary to Nature, we measure and provide without Philosophy.

"It therefore imports a Philosopher to bestow Time in looking after these things, until by diligent Care he hath furnished himself with them. But as long as he hath so much of these, as that he can spend of them, yet retain perfect Confidence, he is not to apply himself to Acquisition of Wealth and Provisions.

"Thus is Philosophy to be our Guide in these things, by which we shall soon perceive, what a Virtue, and how great a Good it is, to require only what is simple, light, and very small; because what is most sweet and free from Trouble in all a Man's Life, depends upon our being contented with the least. But, by those Impediments which a solicitous Acquisition of things

"draws upon us, being quickly discovered, either by the Pains and Toil of the Body, or by the Difficulty of their Procurement, or by their drawing the Mind away from the most advantageous Speculations, (which we ought evermore highly to esteem) or by some other Cause; we shall clearly find, that it is altogether fruitless, and not of Countervalue with the Troubles which follow it."

I advise, that every Man should examine his own Genius, and advise with himself, that he may apply himself to that which is proper for him, because otherwise, nothing can be more miserable, and more at a distance with Tranquility, than to be engaged in a Course of Life, for which Nature hath rendered these unfit.

For neither is an active Life to be undertaken by an inactive Person, nor an inactive Life by an active Person. To one, Rest is Quiet, and Action Labour; to the other, Rest is Labour, and Action Quiet. A timorous and soft Person must avoid the military Life; a bold and impatient, the easy; for one cannot brook War, nor the other Peace. The same it is in all the rest. So that nothing can be more safe, than to undertake that Course only which thou canst run through, without any Reluctance or Repugnance of Nature.

I shall only add this, That every Man, as far as lies in his Power, to the end the State of Life, which he chuseth, may be more secure and quiet, ought to chuse it mean, neither very eminent, nor very abject. For it behoves him to live in a civil Society, neither as a Lion, nor as a Gnat; left, resembling the one, he be cast out; the other caught in a Snare.

CH A P. X.

Domestick Prudence.

Domestick Prudence being either conjugal and paternal, or dominative and possessory; we shall, in the first, only consider that which ariseth from what hath been said, concerning the Institution of Life.

If you find, that you cannot, without much Trouble, live single; that you can patiently bear with a cross Wife, and disobedient Children; that you will not so much as vex, to behold your Children crying before you; that you shall not be perplexed and distracted with various Sollicitudes, how to provide all things requisite to a married Life, how to prevent all Inconveniencies, and the like: In this Case, to marry a Wife, and to beget Children, for whom you may provide with a conjugal and fatherly Prudence, is lawful. But unless you know yourself to be such, you see, by Marriage and Issue, how much you hinder the Happiness of your Life, true Tranquility.

Presume you may, of having a loving Wife, dutiful Children, Cares neither great nor many; but you can only presume it, there is not any God will warrant the Success of your Presumption. Since therefore the Case is hazardous, it is no Widom voluntarily to undergo the Venture, and throw yourself into a Condition, out of which, should you afterwards repent, you can never retire.

I say, voluntarily; for some Circumstance of Life may exact, that though unwilling, you marry and beget Children; as if your Condition be such, as that it requires you to serve your Country herein. For whereas some pretend Propagation of the Species, to which we are in a manner oblig'd, certainly there is no Danger, that there should be wanting such as will marry, and procreate; so that some few wife Men may be allowed to abstain from this Employment.

But if some Case, or certain Counsel, or Necessity, enforce you to marry, you must so dispose your Wife, as that she may be loving to you, and a Partner in your Cares. You must take such Care for your Children, as is partly prescribed by Nature, which instigates us to love them as soon as born, (common also to Sheep, Wolves, and other living Creatures) partly by Prudence, which adviseth so to bring them up, as they may be obedient to the Laws of their Country, and desirous themselves they may become wife.

Neither is this Care to be taken for our own Children only, but likewise for the Children of our Friends, especially if they are our Pupils; there being nothing more becoming Friendship, than to be a Guardian in the room of a Parent to those whom our deceased Friend entirely loved, and hath left Orphans needing Protection.

For the other kind, as having Slaves and Servants under us, (a Possession, tho' necessary, yet for the most part not very pleasant) a wife Man must take Order they grow not insolent and sroward, that he may behave himself mildly (as far as is fitting) towards them, and chastise the Disobedient, remembering they are Men, with a kind of Unwillingness, being ever ready to forgive, especially if they are diligent, not of an ill Disposition. And not only this, but if he find any inclined to Learning, (such as we had, particularly *Mus*) let him delight to further them, call them Friends, and study Philosophy with them.

As to his Estate, he must take Care of it, and provide for the future, but so, as without Covetousness, and the Desire of growing rich; of which hereafter. A wife Man must not neglect his Estate, because it is his Livelihood; lest, if that be consumed, and he want the Necessaries of Life, his Study of Philosophy be hinder'd, whilst he either gains by Labour what might with little or no Pains have been preserved; or begs, and by Importunity

extorts from another, what every one with little Endeavour might provide for himself; or, growing old, fall sick, and die in want, which not a little hinders the Tranquility of the Mind.

Besides the things necessary to the Uses of Life, there may be others, which, according to the Condition of the Person, Place, Time, must be esteem'd necessary, and therefore not to be neglected. But our chiefest Care must be for things requisite to the Prevention of natural Indigence, without which, Nature herself would suffer; such is the Provision of Corn. Those who store their Houses with Corn, are to be commended above those, who adorn them with rich Furniture. I rejoice exceedingly, that lately in a strict Siege, when many perished in our City by Famine, we were able to sustain so many good Friends with Food (no Delicacies, but a provident Quantity of Beans) which we distributed daily to every one by Tale.

CHAP. XI.

Civil Prudence.

LASTLY, as to civil Prudence we must likewise repeat what we insinuated concerning the Choice of a Course of Life.

They who are naturally ambitious, desirous of Honour, active withal, and fit to manage publick Affairs; as also they, whom the Quality of their Birth, or Fortune, and Opportunity invite, by an easy Accession to publick Government, those Men may decline Quiet, and comply with their own Nature, by addicting themselves to publick Government and an active Life. For their Disposition is such, that a quiet Life gives them Trouble and Molestation, whilst they obtain not what they desire.

But they who either are naturally inclined to Quiet, or have suppress'd Ambition and Vanity by the Power of Reason; or, having made Trial heretofore, have escaped, as out of a Storm, or took Warning by many eminent Precedents; these will justly conceive, that Quiet is much the best for them, and that it is not convenient to exchange it for an active Life, unless by chance some Accident intervene in the Commonwealth, requiring their Industry. Whence we conclude, that a wife Man must not involve himself in publick Affairs, unless from some intervening Necessity.

What else? Since he in pursuing Quiet, may far more easily and safely attain to that End, which the Ambitious aim at by Dangers and by Labours.

For to speak of their Scope, there never wanted some, who, to procure Security of Men (according to the Condition of Sovereignty and Rule, by which they commonly think it gain'd) have affected to excel in Honour, and to become Nurtious, thinking, that by this means, to attain a secure and quiet Estate.

But

But if their Life be secure and quiet, they have acquired the chief Good of Nature; if not secure and quiet, (as indeed it can hardly be) then have they lost it, because they fought that which is convenient to Nature in Dominion.

But the wife Man's Scope being the same, Security and Tranquility of Life, by how much nearer a Way doth he arrive at that End, when flying the Troubles of civil Life, he directly and immediately settles himself in a most profound Quiet, as in a still calm Haven? Happy indeed, who knows, The chief Good and a Blessed Life consists not in Sovereignty or Power, not in numerous Wealth or Plenty, but in Indolence, Composure of Affliction, and such a Disposition of Mind, as circumscribing all things by the Boundaries of Nature, makes him, in being content with little, obtain that which they, who rule over many, and possess great Treasures, desire ever to arrive at.

Truly, if it be fit to speak of myself, I esteem it a great Happiness that I was never engaged in the Factions of our City, and never studied to flatter and please the People. To what end should I, whereas, what I know, the People approve not; what the People approve, I know not? That *Metrodorus* and I lived private, How far was it from doing us Harm, when among the large Goods enjoyed in narrow Gardens, and in obscure *Melite*, *Greece* was so far from knowing us, that she had scarce ever heard of us?

I said, unless something intervene as to the Commonwealth: Because, if the Commonwealth should summon and really need our Assistance, we should be inhuman, where we might benefit many, not to do it; Injurious also to ourselves; for unless the Commonwealth be safe, we cannot be what we most desire, quiet.

A wife Man therefore doth not, like some, who professing Wisdom, have, through excessive Pride, so great an Opinion of their own Judgment in civil Government, that they think they could equalize *Lycurgus* and *Solon*.

But if he be desired to make Laws, and to prescribe a Form of Government, and the Offices of Magistrates, he will not refuse it; knowing that they who first made Laws and Ordinances, and constituted Government and Magistracy in Cities, settled Life in a secure and quiet Condition: For if that be taken away, we shall live like Beasts, and every Man devour the next he meets with.

And if he be called to the Supreme Power, to govern the Commonwealth according to the Laws and Form of Government already established, he shall not refuse; knowing that tho' the thing itself is for the most part full of Hazard, yet a wife Man may have such Regard to all things, and such a provident Care of all, as that little of Fortune, as I said before, shall intervene to him; but the greatest

things, and such as are of the most Concernment be managed by his Advice and Conduct. He will first take Care, that the weaker sort of Men, discharging their Duty towards the more powerful, be neither oppressed by them, nor permitted to want those Necessaries of Life wherewith the others abound; it being the End of every Society and Commonwealth, that by mutual Assistance the Lives of all be safe, and as happy as is possible.

Lastly, if he be summoned by his Prince, and some Occasion require, that he serve him either with his Advice or Help, neither shall he refuse this; knowing that as it is, not only more honourable, but more pleasant to give than to receive a Benefit; it is as the most honourable, so the most pleasant thing to oblige a Prince who confers so many Obligations on others. Hitherto of Prudence.

CHAP. XII.

Of Temperance in general.

NEXT follows Temperance, the first Part, as we said, of Honesty, and which seems to contain the greatest Share of what is honest and decent. For it being the Office of Temperance to suppress the Mind when it desires, as of Fortitude to exalt it when it fears; it is esteemed less undecent to be dejected by Pusillanimity, than exalted by Desire; and therefore to resist Desire, is more decent than to oppose Fear.

Concerning Temperance, we must first observe, that it is desired not for its own sake, but for that it procureth Pleasure, that is, brings Peace to the Minds of Men, pleasing and soothing them with a kind of Concord. For it being employed in moderating Desires, and consequently in advising, that in things to be pursued or avoided, we follow Reason, it is not enough that we judge what is to be done or not to be done, but we must fix upon that which is judged.

But most Men, not able to hold and keep what they have resolved on, being vanquished and debilitated by the Appearance of a present Pleasure, resign themselves to the Fetters of Lust, not foreseeing what will follow; and hereupon for a small unnecessary Pleasure, which might otherwise have been procured, or wholly wanted without incurring Pain, they fall into great Sicknesses, Losses, and Infamy, and many times into the Penalties of Law.

But they who so enjoy Pleasures as that no Pain shall ensue, and who preserve their Judgment constant, nor are overcome by Pleasure, to the doing of what they know ought not to be done; these Men obtain the greatest Pleasure, by premitting Pleasure: They also many times suffer some Pain to prevent falling into greater.

Hence it is understood, that Temperance is to be desired, not for that it avoids some Pleasures, but because

because he who refrains from them declines Troubles; which being avoided, he obtains greater Pleasures. Which it so doth, as that the Action becomes honest and decent; and we may clearly understand, that the same Men may be Lovers both of Pleasure and of Decency, and that such as esteem and practise all Virtues, perform for the most part those Actions, and attain those Ends, as that by them it is manifest, how odious to all Men Cruelty is, and how amiable Goodness and Clemency; and that those very things which ill Men most desire and aim at, happen also to the Good.

Now, so far as much as of the Desires about which Temperance is employed, some are natural, others vain; and of the natural, some necessary, others not necessary (to omit, that, of the necessary) some pertain simply to Life, as that of Meat and Drink, and the Pleasure which consists in Motion; others to Felicity itself (as that of Indolence and Tranquillity, or stable Pleasure :) It is manifest, that not without good Cause, we in our Physiology, distinguished Desires into three kinds, some both natural and necessary; others natural but not necessary; others neither natural nor necessary, but vain, or arising from vain Opinion.

And so far as much as we said, that those are natural and necessary, which unless they be satisfied, cause Damage and Pain in the Body; it is evident that those which infer no Damage nor Pain, tho' not satisfied, yet are accompanied with earnest and vehement Inquiries, are such not by Necessity, but vain Opinion; and tho' they have some Beginning from Nature, yet their Diffusion and Excess they have not from Nature, but from the Vanity of Opinions, which render Men worse than Beasts, that are not obnoxious to such Diffusion or Excess. Likewise, that such Desires are not only not necessary, but not natural, may be proved; for that they have a Diffident, excessive Appetition, very hardly or never to be satisfied; and are, for the most part, justly esteemed Causes of Harm.

But to discourse of some chief kinds of Temperance, according to some chief kinds of Desires, we may make Choice of Sobriety opposed to Gluttony, or the excessive Desire of Meat and Drink; Continence to Lust, or the unbridled Desire of Coition; Mildness, to Anger or Desire of Revenge; Moderation, to Ambition or Desire of Honour; Moderation, to Avarice or Desire of Riches; and lastly, in respect of the Affinity betwixt Desire and Hope, Mediocrity, which consists betwixt Hope and Desperation of the future.

C H A P. XIII.

Of Sobriety opposite to Gluttony.

IT can hardly be expressed, how great a good Sobriety is, which reduceth us to a thin, simple, and

spare Diet, teaching how little that is which Nature requires, and clearly shewing, that the Necessities she lies under may be abundantly satisfied with things light, and easily provided, as Barley Cakes, Fruits, Herbs, and Water.

For these things being every where to be had, and having the simple Nature of moist and dry, moist Aliments sufficiently remove the Trouble of the Body arising from want of Sustenance. Whatever is more than this amounts to Luxury, and concerns only the Satisfaction of a Desire, which neither is necessary, nor occasioned by any thing, the Want whereof doth necessarily infer any Offence to Nature; but partly for that the Want of somewhat is born with Impatience; partly, for that there is Presumption of an absolute Delight without Mixture of any Trouble; partly, (to speak in short,) for that there are vain and false Opinions inherent in the Mind, which serve neither for the supplying of any natural Defect, nor tend to the Acquisition of any thing, by the Want of which, the Frame of the Body would be dissolved.

Those very things which are ready at hand, abundantly suffice to supply all Nature's Wants, and they are such as partly for their Simplicity, partly for their Slowness, are easily made ready. He, for Example, who feeds on Flesh, needs other things inanimate to eat with it; whereas he, who is content with inanimate, needs but half so much as the other, and sustains himself with what is easily got, and cheaply dress'd.

There are four Benefits arising from Sobriety; the first, that to accustom ourselves to a simple Diet brings and preserves Health: For it is sumptuous Feasting and Variety of Meats, which begets, exasperates, and continues Crudities, Head-aches, Rheums, Gouts, Fevers, and other Diseases; not plain and simple Food, which Nature makes both necessary and wholesome, and not only to other Animals, but even to Man himself, who yet depraves them by his Exorbitancy, and corrupts them by such Delicates, as which while he affects he affects only his own Destruction.

Therefore if we are wise, *Let us beware of that Meat which we must desire and long for; but as soon as we have had it, find it was pleasant to us, only to our Harm: Such are all costly and luscious Meats; whence the eating Flesh is left to be approved, as being rather prejudicial to Health than wholesome; as may be argued; because Health is preserved by the same Means whereby it is recovered; but it is manifest that it is recovered by a thin Diet and Abstinence from Flesh.*

Neither is it any wonder, that the ordinary sort of Men conceive the eating of Flesh to conduce much to Health; for they, in like manner think, that the Way to preserve Health is to wallow in Pleasures, even the Venereal; whereof nevertheless there is none benefits any Man, and it is well if it hurt not.

The

¹ Porph. de non usu carn.

² Lucret.

³ Porph. loc. cit.

⁴ Porph. loc. cit.

⁵ Porph.

The second is, that it makes a Man ready and quick in the *Offices necessary to Life*. For if you look upon the Functions of the Mind, it preserves her Serenity, Acuteness, Vigor; if upon the Functions of the Body, it keeps it sound, active, and hardy: But Repletion, Over-fatigues, Surfeiting and Drunkenness, cloud the Mind, make it blunt and languid; the Body diseased, unactive, and burthenfome. What, I pray, can you expect extraordinary from that Man, whose Limbs are unweildy, his Knees feeble, his Tongue faltering, his Head swimming, his Eyes full of Rheum, his Mouth of the Hic-up, Brawling, and Clamour; and all this, through Excess of Wine.

Certainly a wife Man, who ought to content himself with a *Hemina* of small Wine, or to esteem the next Water he comes at to be the most pleasant of all Drinks, will be far from spending the Night in Drunkenness; and as far from stuffing himself with Meats that are high, or burthening his Stomach with such as are luscious and gross, who ought to be content with the most simple, even the very free, Gifts of Nature.

"Indeed such simple and slender Diet will not make a Man as strong as *Milo*, nor conduceth absolutely to an intense Corroboration of the Body; but neither doth a wife Man need such intense Strength, seeing his Employment consists in Contemplation, not in an active and petulant kind of Life."

The third Benefit is, that "if sometimes the Table happen to be more plentifully furnish'd, we shall come much better prepar'd to taste what it yields. Not but that homely Fare affords as much Delight as sumptuous Feasts, when Hunger, which in want of Food troubleth us, is satisfy'd, (for Barley-cakes and Water are highly pleasant, if taken only when we hunger and thirst;) but because they who are daily accusom'd to more costly Viands are not so sensible of their Sweetness, by reason of their being almost continually cloy'd with them; as a wife Man is, who the better to relish them brings along with him a Taste prepar'd by mean Diet. In like manner it comes to pass, that he, if at any time he chance to be present at publick Spectacles, is taken with them more sensibly than are others.

What I affirm concerning the coarsest Meat and Drink, that it affords no less Pleasure than the greatest Delicates, cannot be deny'd by any but by him who deceiveth himself with vain Opinions. Who observes not, that they only enjoy Magnificence with greatest Pleasure, who least need it; who never hath tasted coarse Bread and Water, press'd with Hunger and Thirst? For my own part, when I eat coarse Bread and drink Water, or sometimes augment my Commons with a little *Cytheridian Cheese*, (when I have a mind to feast extraordinarily) I take great Delight in it, and bid defiance to those Pleasures which accompany the usual Magnificence

of Feasts; so that if I have but Bread, or Barley-Cakes and Water, I am furnish'd to contend even with *Jove* himself in Point of Felicity.

Shall I add, that "Magnificence of Feasts, and Variety of Dishes, not only not free the Mind from Perturbation, but not so much as augment the Pleasure of the Body; forasmuch as this also, when that Trouble is removed, hath found its End. For Example; the eating of Flesh (which we lately instant'd) neither takes away any thing particularly that is a Trouble to Nature, nor performs any thing which would occasion Trouble, if not fulfilled. But it hath a forc'd Delight, and perhaps mingled with that which is contrary to these; for it conduceth little to long Life, and serveth only to Variation of Pleasures; like venereal Pleasures, and the drinking of foreign Wines, without which Nature or Life may well subsist: For those things, without which it cannot subsist, are most compendious, and may be obtained easily without Breach of Justice, Liberality and Tranquility.

"Neither is it any matter whether the ordinary sort of Men be of this Belief, or not, since Petulancy and Intemperance abound in such Persons, so that we need not fear, but there will be those who will feed on Flesh. For though all Men had the best and right Judgment of things, yet would there be no need of Fowling or Fowling, or Fishers, or Swine-herds; these Animals, living by themselves, free and without a Keeper, would in a short time be destroyed by others preying upon them, and suppressing the Vastness of their Increase, as happens to infinite others which Men eat not. But since there reigneth always a multiplicitous, or rather universal Folly amongst Men, there will never be wanting an innumerable Company of Gluttons to feed on these."

Lastly, the fourth Benefit, is, that "it renders us fearless of Fortune." For they only must stand in awe of Fortune, who being accusom'd to live sumptuously, conceive their Lives cannot be otherwise than most miserable, unless they are able to spend Pounds, and Talents every Day. Whence it happens, that such Men are for the most Part subject to a troublesome Life, and often commit Rapines, Murders, and the like Villanies. But he who is content with coarse Food, as Fruits and Salads, who is satisfied with Bread and Water, who hath confin'd his Desire within these, what can he fear from Fortune? For who so distress'd, that he cannot easily meet with Beans, Pulse, Herbs, Fruits? As for Water, what need I mention it?

For my own part truly (that I may with Modesty instance myself) I am content, and highly pleas'd with the Plants and Fruits of my own little Gardens; and will that this Inscription be set over the Gate, *Stranger, here you may stay; here the supreme*

preme Good is Pleasure; the Master of this little House is hospitable, friendly, and will entertain you with Potenta, and afford you Water plentifully, and will ask you, How you like your Entertainment? These little Gardens invite not Hunger, but satisfy it; nor increase Thirst with Drinks, but extinguish it with the natural and pleasant Remedy.

In this Pleasure I have grown old, finding by Account that my Diet amounts not fully to an *Obolus* a Day; and yet some Days there are, in which I abate somewhat even of that, to make trial whether I want any thing of full and perfect Pleasure, or how much, and whether it be worth great Labour.

C H A P. XIV.

Of Continence, opposite to Lust.

Moreover, Continence or Abstinence from venereal Pleasures is a great Virtue; for the Use of them, as I said formerly, doth never benefit, and it is well if it hurts not.

Certainly to use them intemperately, is to make a Man destitute of Vigor, anxious with Cares, painful with Diseases, and of short Continuance. Wherefore a wife Man must stand upon his Guard, and not suffer himself to be caught with Love; far from conceiving Love to be something sent from the Gods above, and therefore to be cherished.

And that a Man may be least subject thereto, and want the chief Excitements to venereal Delights, nothing more avails than spare Diet, of which we lately treated: for Excess in eating causeth abundance of that Humour, which is the Food and Fuel of Love's Fire. The next Antidotes are, an honest Employment, (especially the Study of Wisdom) and Moderation upon the Inconveniences to which they, who suffer themselves to be transported with Love, are liable.

The general Inconveniences which attend Love of Women and Boys, are Consumption of Strength, Decay of Industry, Ruin of Estate, Mortgages and Forfeitures, Loss of Reputation. And while the Feet wear *Sappho's* E. skins, the Fingers Emeralds, the Body other Ornaments, the Mind, in the mean time conscious to itself, is full of Remorse, for that the Lives idly, and suffers good Years to be lost, and the like, which it were easy to instance.

But as to Particular, What ill doth it not draw upon a Man to desire the Company of a Woman prohibited to him by the Laws? Doubtless, a wife Man will be very far from thinking of such a thing; it being enough to deter him from it, to reflect upon the vast Solitude which is necessary to Precaution of those many and great Dangers which intervene; it happening, for the most part, that they who attempt such things are wounded, murder'd, imprison'd, banish'd, or suffer some great Punishments.

Whence it comes, that (as we said before) for a Pleasure, which is but short, little, and not necessary, and which might either have been obtained otherwise, or quite let alone, Men expose themselves to great Pain, and sad Repentance.

Besides, to be incontinent, to resign up ourselves to this one kind of Pleasure, were to defraud ourselves in the mean time of other Pleasures, many and great; which he enjoys, who lives continently according to the Laws. He so applies himself to Wisdom, as that he neither blunts his Mind, nor excruciates it with Cares, nor disturbs it with other Affections; and for his Body, he neither enervates it, nor vexeth it with Diseases, nor torments it with Pains. And thus he attains the chief Good, which (as I said) is not gotten by keeping Company with Boys or Women, not having a Table plentifully furnished with Choice of Fish or Fowl.

Yet there is no reason any one, from this Commendation of general Abstinence from venereal Delights, should infer, that therefore a Man ought to abstain even from lawful Marriage. What our Judgment is of that Particular, we have formerly declar'd. I shall only add, that whereas I said, Love is not sent from the Gods, it gives us to understand, that if a Man hath no Children by his Wife, he must not attribute it to the Anger of *Cupid* or *Venus*, or hope to become a Father by Vows, Prayers, and Sacrifices, rather than by natural Remedies.

I shall add, that a wife Man ought not to live after the manner of the *Cynicks*, or to behave himself with such Immodesty as they shew in publick. For whilst they plead they follow Nature, and reprehend and deride us, for esteeming it obscene and dishonest to call things which are not dishonest by their Name, but things which are indeed dishonest we call by their proper Names; as to rob, to cozen, to commit Adultery, are dishonest indeed, but not obscene in Name; whereas to perform the Act of Generation is honest in Deed, but obscene in Name; and alledge divers other Arguments against Modesty: They seem not sufficiently to consider, that they live in a civil Society, not in the Fields like wild Beasts, and therefore ought not to follow Nature exactly.

For, from the Time that we enroll'd our Names in a Society, Nature commands that we observe the Laws and Customs of that Society; to the end, that participating of the common Goods, we draw no Evil upon ourselves: Such as is (besides all other Punishments) the very Infamy or Ignominy which attends Impudence, or the want of such Modesty as is prescribed by the Customs and Manners of the Society wherein we live; and from which, in the Voice, the Countenance, and Behaviour, that modest Respect, which is deservedly commended by all, is denominated.

Lastly,

Lastly, I add, that it not a little conduceth as to Modesty in particular, so to all kinds of Continency, to abstain from Musick and Poetry, for that their pleasing Songs and Airs are no other than Incitements to Lust.

Hence is our Maxim, That a wise Man only can treat of Musick and Poetry aright, and according to Virtue. For others, easily taken with the Allurements of both, indulge to both; only the wise Man, duly foreseeing the Harm that would ensue, casts them away; declaring that Musick is, amongst other things, an Allurement to drink, an Exhauster of Money, a Friend to Idleness, conducing nothing to good, honest, and generous Works; that Poetry hath always made Men prone to all sorts of Vices, especially to Lust, even by the Examples of the Gods themselves, whom it introduceth inflamed with Anger, and raging with Lust; and represents not only their Wars, Conflicts, Wounds, Hatred, Discords, Diffentions, Births, Deaths; but also their Complaints, Lamentations, Imprisonments, Coition with mortal Children of immortal Parents, and the like; which certainly sober Men would abhor.

CH A P. XV.

Of Meekness opposite to Anger.

Moreover, Lenity or Meekness, whereunto are reduced Clemency and Pity, is so excellent an Antidote against Anger, or Desire of Revenge, that it is esteemed a most eminent Virtue; inasmuch as Anger, especially if excessive, causeth Madness for the time. For by Anger the Mind is heated and darken'd, the Eyes sparkling with Fire, the Breast ready to burst with Rage, the Teeth gnashing, the Voice choaked, the Hairs standing an End, the Face glowing, and distorted with menacing Looks, horrid and ugly to behold, so that the Mind seems to have lost the Command of herself, and to have forgotten all Decency. But Lenity cures the Mind, or rather preserves it sound; so that it is neither moved in itself, nor is there any Eruption of Passion into the Body, that may cause the least Undecency.

Now Anger being commonly kindled, and set on fire, by Opinion of some Injury receiv'd; but Men are injur'd through Hatred, Envy, or Contempt; how can a wise Man so bear an Injury, as to behave himself with Lenity and Sweetness towards those who did it? By submitting himself to the Government of right Reason; whereby (as I formerly said) he must fortify himself against Fortune. For he accounts an Injury among things of Chance, and discreetly considers it is not in his Power to make other Men just, and free from Passion; and therefore is as little moved at Injuries done to him by Men, as at the Inconveniences or Losses which happen by Accidents of Fortune, or by any other Cause above, beyond his own Power.

He is not, for Example, troubled at the great Heats or Colds of the Seasons of the Year, because it is the Nature of the Seasons in their Vicissitudes, which he cannot alter. In like manner, neither is he troubled at the Injuries which dishonest and malicious Men do to him; because in doing so, they act according to their own Natures; and to make them do otherwise, and to change their Natures, is not in his Power. Besides, he conceives it not agreeable to Reason and Wisdom to add Ill to Ill, (to add unto the Harm which happens to him from without, Perturbation within by Opinion) or because another Man would afflict his Mind with Vexation, he should be so foolish as to admit that Vexation, and further the ill Designs of his Enemy upon him.

Yet is it fit that a wise Man take such Care of his Reputation, as not to become contemptible; since there are some Pleasures that arise from a good Name, some Troubles from an ill, and the Contempt that follows it: But he must take care of his Reputation, not so much by revenging Injuries, or being offended at those that do them, as by living well and innocently, giving no Man a just Cause of Contumely or Malediction. To do thus, is in our Power; not, to hinder another from exercising his own Malice.

Whence, if one that bears you Ill-will, and is your profess'd Enemy, shall demand any thing of you, you must not deny him, provided what he demand be lawful, and you are nothing the less secure from him: he differs not from the Dog, and therefore must be appeased with a Morfel. Nevertheless, nothing is better or safer than to confront his Malice with Innocence of Life, and the Security of your own Conscience, and withal to shew that you are above Injury.

Especially seeing it may so happen, that a wise Man (as I said before) may be arraign'd, and suffer not only Injury, but Calumny, Accusation, Condemnation: Even then he considers, that to live well and virtuously is in his Power, but not to fall into the Hands of envious, unjust Persons; not to be unjustly accused by them; not to be sentenced by unrighteous Judges, is not in his Power. He therefore is not angry, either with the Accusers, Witnesses, or Judges; but confiding in a good Conscience, loseth nothing of his Lenity and Tranquility; and esteeming himself to be above this Chance, he looks upon it undaunted, and behaves himself in his Trial boldly, and with Courage.

Let not any object, that what I here advise concerning Lenity, is repugnant to what I formerly said of the chastising of Servants; for I limited Castigation only to the Refractory and Perverse. It is manifest, that Punishment ought to be inflicted on Offenders, as well in a private Family, as in a Commonwealth; and that as a Prince or Magistrate punisheth the Offences of his Subjects without Anger,

to the Father of a Family may without Anger, punish the Faults of his Servants.

Moreover, a wife Man must not only bear Injuries, nor only pardon them mildly, but even kindly encourage and congratulate him, who betakes himself to a better Course. For since the Beginning of Reformation is to know our Fault, therefore must this Gratulation and Encouragement be given to the penitent Offender, that, as he is affected with Horror at this Knowledge of his Crime, so the Excellence and Beauty of that which he ought to have done, and thenceforward must do, may be fully represented to him, and the Love of it increase daily in him.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Modesty, opposite to Ambition.

AS concerning *Modesty*, there needs little more to be said, than what we formerly declared, when we shew'd it was not the part of a wife Man to affect high Offices, or Honours in a Common-wealth, but rather to contain himself, as to live in some private Corner: Wherefore, here I shall once more give the same Counsel, which I give to all my Friends. Live close, or private, (provided no Necessities of the Common-wealth require otherwise) for even Experience teacheth, that he hath lived well, who hath well concealed himself.

It is but too frequently seen, that they who climb up to the Top of Honour, are cast down by Envy, as with a Thunder-bolt, and then too late acknowledge that it is much better, quietly to obey, than by laborious climbing up the narrow Path of Ambition, to aim at Command and Sovereignty, and to arrive there, where nothing can be expected, but a great and dangerous Precipitation. Besides, are not they, whom the common People gaze upon with Admiration, glittering with Titles and Honours, the most unhappy of all Men, for that their Breasts are gnawn with weighty and troublesome Cares? You must not imagine that such Persons live quiet and secure in mind; for it is impossible, but that they who are feared by many, should themselves fear many.

And though you see them send out great Navies, command Legions, compassed with Guards, yet you must not think they live all quiet, or indeed do at all partake of any true Pleasure, for all these things are ridiculous Pageantry and Dreams. Fears and Cares are not afraid of the Noise of Arms, nor stand in awe of the Brightness of Gold, or Splendor of Purple, but boldly intrude amongst Princes and Potentates, and, like the Vulture, which the Poets talk of, gnaw and prey on their Hearts.

Neither must you think, that the Body is any thing the better for this, since you see that Fevers go away nothing the sooner, if you lye in a Bed of Ty-

rian Purple, in a Chamber furnished with rich Tapestry, than under a plain homely Coverlet; and that we take no harm by the want of purple Robes, embroidered with Gold and Pearl, as long as we have a coarse plain Garment sufficient to keep away the Cold. And what, if, being cheerful and contented with Rags and a Bed of Straw, you should instruct Men how vain those are, who with astonish'd and turbulent Minds gape and thirst after the Trifles of Magnificence, not understanding how few and small those things are which make a happy Life? Believe me, that which you shall say will appear far more magnificent and high, being delivered from a Matra's covered with coarse Cloth; for it is not only spoken but practised.

Though your House shine not with Silver and Gold, resound not with Musick, hath not any golden Images of Boys holding Tapers to light you at your nightly Revels and Banquets; truly, it is not a whit less pleasant to repose yourself on the soft Grass by a purling Stream, underneath a spreading Tree, and especially in the Spring, at what time the Fields are besprinkled with Flowers, the Birds entertain you with their Musick, the West Wind fans you, and Nature herself smiles on you.

Why therefore should any Man, that may live thus in his own Fields and Garden, pursue Honour; and not rather modestly restrain his Desires within this Compass: For to aim at Glory by Ostentation of Virtue, Science, Eloquence, Nobility, Wealth, Attendants, Attire, Beauty, Mein, and the like, is a ridiculous Vanity: In all these, Modesty requires no more than that we transgress not Decency through Rusticity, Stupidity, or Negligence. It is (as I said) equally base and abject, to grow insolent, upon Possession of these, as to be cast down at their Loss.

Hereupon a wife Man, if he happen to have the Images or Statues of his Ancestors, or other Persons, will be far from taking Pride in them, or shewing them as Badges of Honour; yet on the other side, he will not neglect them, but place and keep them carefully in his Gallery.

In like manner, neither will he be solicitous about his own Funeral, or give order that it be performed magnificently. He will only consider what may be beneficial and pleasant to his Successors, knowing, that as for himself or his dead Body, it is all one what becomes of it. For to propagate Vanity even beyond Death is Madness; and such also is the Fancy of those who would not that their dead Bodies should be devoured by wild Beasts. For, if that be an ill, must it not be very bad to have them burnt, embalmed, and immerfed in Honey, to grow cold and stiff under a Marble-stone, to be pressed and consumed with Earth?

C H A P. XVII.

Of Moderation, opposite to Avarice.

THE next is Moderation, or that Disposition of Mind by which a Man is contented with little, and than which he cannot have a greater Good. To be content with little is the greatest Wealth in the World, forasmuch as a mean Estate proportion'd to the Law of Nature is great Riches. To have wherewithal to prevent Hunger, Thirst, and Cold, is a Felicity equal to that of the Divinity; and who possesses so much, and desires no more, however the World may esteem him poor, is the richest Man.

How sweet a thing is this Poverty, cheerful and contented with what is enough, that is, with those Riches of Nature which suffice to preserve from Hunger, Thirst, and Cold? Truly, seeing the Riches of Nature are finite and easy to be had, but those that are coveted out of vain Opinions, are without measure and infinite, we ought to be thankful to kind Nature, for making those things necessary that are easy to be had, and those that are hard to be got, unnecessary.

“And since it behoves a wife Man to hope he shall never, as long as he lives, want Necessaries, doth not the easy Acquisition of these cheap and common things abundantly cherish that Hope? Whereas, on the contrary, things of Magnificence afford him not the like Hope. And this is the Reason why ordinary Men, though they have great Possessions, yet as if they feared those might fail them, labour still to heap up more, never thinking their Store complete.

“This may teach us to content ourselves with the most simple things, and such as are easily gotten; remembering that not all the Wealth in the World put together is able in the least measure to allay the Perturbation of the Mind; whereas things that are mean, ordinary, and easy to be had, remove that Indigence which is incommodious to the Body, and besides are such that the thought of parting with them is nothing grievous to him who reflects upon Death.”

Miserable indeed are the Minds of Men, and their Hearts blind, inasmuch as they will not see that Nature dictates nothing more to them than this, that they supply the Wants of the Body, and withal enjoy a well pleased Mind, without Fear or Trouble; not that they should employ their whole Life in scraping together that which is necessary to Life, and that with such Greediness as if they were to outlive Death, never thinking how deadly a Cup, from our very Birth, we are design'd to pledge.

What though those things which are purely necessary, and in respect whereunto no Man is poor, yield not the Delights which vulgar Minds dote on? Na-

ture wants them not, and yet she ceaseth not to afford real and sincere Pleasures, in the Fruition of those mean and simple things, as we already have declared. Whence a wife Man is so indifferently affected towards those things, for whose sake Money is coveted, (to supply the daily Expences of Love and Ambition) as that being at a great distance from them all, he hath no reason either to desire or care for Money.

Whereas I said, that the Riches which are coveted through Opinions, have not any Measure or Bound, the Reason is, that though Nature is satisfied with little, yet vain Opinion, uttering in Desire, always thinks of something which we have not, and, as if it were really needful, directs the Desire to that thing. Whence it happens, that he who is not satisfied with a little, can never have enough; but the more Wealth he hath, the more he conceives himself to be in want.

Wherefore seeing there can never be want of a little, a wife Man, possessing that little, ought to esteem it great Riches, because therein is no Want; whereas other Riches, how great soever in esteem, are indeed small, because they want Multiplication to Infinity. Whence it follows, that he who thinks not what he possesseth is sufficient and plenteous, though he were Master of the whole World, would yet be miserable. For Misery is the Companion of Want, and the same vain Opinion which first persuaded him, that his own Estate was not sufficient, will continue to persuade him, that one World is not sufficient, but that he wants more and more to Infinity.

Would you then make a Man rich? Know, that it must be done, not by adding to his Riches, but by detracting from his Desires. For when, having cut off all vain and superfluous Desires, he shall compose himself to the Rules of Nature, and covet no more than she requires, then shall he find himself to be rich indeed, because he shall then find that he wants nothing. Whence also this should be inculcated to him. If you live according to Nature, you shall never be poor; but if according to Opinion, never rich. Nature desires little, Opinion infinity.

Certainly this Disposition or Faculty of the Mind, whereby a Man, moderating himself, cuts off from his Desires whatsoever is not necessary to Nature, and contents himself with such things as are most simple and easy to be got; this Disposition, I say, begets that Security which is found in a quiet Retirement, and Avoidance of the Multitude: moreover, by it, even he who lives with much Company wants no more, than he who lives alone.

Hence also it proceeds, that whosoever endeavours to beget a Confidence and Security to himself out of external things, the best way that may be, seeks after things possible to be got, as being not unsuitable to him: but the impossible he esteems unsuitable.

Besides, even of the possible, there are many which he attains not; and all those which it is not necessary for him to attain, he renounceth.

Now for want of this Renouncing or Detraction, how great Misery is it for a Man to be continually pouring into a bored Vessel, never able to fill his Mind? For not to mention that many, who have heaped up Wealth, have therein found only a Change, not an End, of their Misery; either because they run themselves into new Cares, to which they were not subject before; or because they made way for Snarcs, in which they were entangled and taken: Not to mention this, I say, the greatest Misery is, that the more thou feedest, the more thou art tormented with Hunger.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Mediocrity, betwixt Hope and Despair of the future.

Lastly, seeing that all Desire whatsoever is carry'd to that which is not possessed, but propos'd as possible to be attained, and accompany'd with some Hope of obtaining it; which Hope, cherishing the Desire, is accompany'd with a certain Pleasure; as its contrary, Despair, sowing a Fear that what is desir'd cannot be obtained, is not without Trouble: Something therefore must be added concerning *Mediocrity*, which is of great Use, as well in the general, concerning things hoped or despaired, as in the particular, concerning the Duration, or rather Perpetuity of Life; whereof, as there is a Desire kindled in the Breasts of Men, so the Despair of it tortures them.

In the first place therefore, we must look upon this as a general Rule: In contingents things, that which is to come is neither absolutely ours, nor absolutely not ours; so that we are neither to hope for it, as if it must certainly come to pass, because it may be diverted by some Accident intervening; nor to despair of it, as if it must certainly not come to pass, because it may fall out, that no Accident may intervene to divert it. Thus, not being destitute of all Hope, we shall not be without some Pleasure; nor being quite frustrated of our Hope, we shall not receive any Trouble.

This Difference there is betwixt a wise Man and a Fool; the wise Man expects future things, but depends not on them, and in the mean time enjoys the present, (by considering how great and pleasant they are) and remembers the past with Delight. But the Life of a Fool (as I said before) is unpleasant and tinorous, for that it is wholly carried on to the future.

How many may we see, who neither remember the past Good, nor enjoy the present? They are wholly taken up with Expectation of future things,

and those being uncertain, they are perpetually afflicted with Anguish and Fear, and are exceedingly grieved when they too late perceive, that they have in vain addicted themselves to the getting of Riches, or Honours, or Power, or Glory; for they fail of obtaining those Pleasures, with the Hopes whereof being enflamed, they had undergone many and great Labours. Not to say any thing of those others, who being abject and narrow-hearted despair of all things, and are, for the most part, malevolent, envious, morose, Shunners of the Light, Evil-speakers, misanthropes.

I say, a wise Man remembers the past Goods with Delight and Gratitude: But indeed it cannot sufficiently be lamented, that we are too ungrateful towards the past, in not calling to mind, nor accounting amongst Pleasures, all the good things we have received; inasmuch as no Pleasure is more certain, than that which cannot now be taken from us. The present Goods are not yet consummate and wholly solid, some Chance or other may intervene, and cut them off in half; the future are dependent and uncertain; what is already past is only safe, and out of all Danger to be lost.

Amongst the past Goods, I reckon not only such as we have enjoyed, but even the Avoidance of the Ills that might have befallen us; as also our Deliverance out of such Ills as did fall on us, and might have lasted longer; likewise the Remembrance and Delight that we sustained them constantly and bravely.

As to the Desire of prolonging Life to a vast Extent, I already hinted that a wise Man must cut off that Desire, because there would immediately upon it follow Desperation, which is never without Trouble and Anguish. Hither it conduceth to consider, that no greater Pleasure can be received from an Age of infinite Duration, than may be received from this which we know to be finite, provided a Man measure the Bounds of it by right Reason.

For seeing that to measure the Bounds of Nature by right Reason, is nothing else but to consider, (as I said before) that the supreme Pleasure is no other, than an Exemption from Pain and Trouble, it is manifest, that it can neither be made greater by Length, nor lesser, or more remiss, by Shortness of Time.

And though the Hopes of a more prolonged Pleasure, or of a longer Age, seem to render the present Pleasure more intense; yet it is only so with those, who measure the Bound of Pleasure, not by right Reason, but by vain Desire; and who look upon themselves so, as if, when they die and cease to be, they should yet be troubled at the Privation of Pleasure, as if they had been alive. Whence it happens, that, as I hinted formerly, to understand fully that Death nothing concerns us, much conduceth to our Enjoy-

Enjoyment of this mortal Life, not by adding any thing of uncertain Time, but by casting away the Desire of Immortality.

Wherefore seeing that since Nature hath prescribed Bounds to corporeal Pleasures, and the Desire of eternal Duration takes them away, it is necessary that the Mind or Reason interpose, that by discoursing upon those Bounds, and extirpating the Desire of Semperiternity, it may make Life every way perfect; so that we being content therewith, shall not want a longer Duration.

Moreover, neither shall we be deprived of Pleasure, even then when Death shall summon us, so much as we have attained the perfect and delightful End of the best Life, departing like Guests full and well satisfied with Life, and having duly discharged that Office, to acquit ourselves of which we received Life.

C H A P. XIX.

Of Fortitude in general.

WE come next to *Fortitude*, which I affirmed to be the other Part of *Honesty*, because it withstands Fear, and all things that use to cause Fear; whereby they who behave themselves not timorous and cowardly, but valiantly and stoutly, are said to behave themselves honestly and becomingly. This may be manifested many ways, especially from War, wherein they who behave themselves with Courage and Honesty, get Honour above the rest. Whence Honest is almost the very same with that which in the common Esteem is Honourable.

That this Virtue conduceth also to Pleasure, may be inferred from hence; for that neither the undergoing of Labours, nor the suffering of Pains, are things in themselves allusive, nor Patience, nor Assiduity, nor Watching, nor Industry, though so highly commended, nor Fortitude itself; but we pursue these, to the end we may live without Care and Fear, and so (as much as possible) free both the Body and Mind from Molestation.

For as by the Fear of Death (for Example) all the Quiet of Life is disturbed; and as to sink under Pains, and to bear them with a dejected and weak Mind, is a great Misery, and by such Lowness of Spirit many have quite undone their Parents, Friends, Country, and even themselves: so on the other side, a strong and gallant Mind is free from all Care and Anguish; for it contemns Death, because they who suffer it are in the same Case as before they were born; and is so fortify'd against all Pains, as to remember, that the greatest are determined by Death, the least have many Intervals of Ease, the middle Sort we ourselves can master; if they are tolerable we can endure them, we can contentedly quit this Life, when it no longer pleaseth us, as if we went off from a Stage.

Hence is it manifest, that Timidity and Cowardliness are not dispraised, nor Fortitude and Patience praised, for their own sakes; but those are rejected, for that they cause Pain; and these desired, for that they produce Pleasure.

Whereas I said, that Fortitude withstands Fear, and all things that use to cause Fear, it tends to let us understand, that they are the very same Ills, which torment when they are present, and are feared when expected as future; and therefore we must learn not to fear those Ills, which we either fancy to ourselves, or any ways apprehend as future, but to bear those which are present with Constancy and Patience.

Of the Ills which we fancy to ourselves, but are not really sure, the chiefest are those which we fear either from the Gods, as if they were ill to us; or from Death, as if that brought along with it, or after it, some sempiternal Ill. Of the Ills which we fear, for that they may happen, and yet in the mean time are so present, that they afflict and trouble us, are, those which either cause Pain in the Body, or Discontent in the Mind.

Those which cause Pain are, Sicknesses, Stripes, Fire, Sword, and the like. Those which cause Discontent, are such as are termed external Ills; and of these some are publick, as Tyranny, War, Destruction of our Country, Pestilence, Famine, &c. Others private; of which sort are Servitude, Banishment, Imprisonment, Infamy, Loss of Friends, and the like.

The Difference betwixt all these things on one Part, and Pain and Discontent on the other, is this, that Pain and Discontent are absolute Ills in themselves, the others are not so, but only inasmuch as they relate to Pain and Discontent, as Causes; for if they did not cause Pain and Discontent, there were no Reason why we should shun them.

We shall say something in Order upon these: But first take notice, that Fortitude is not to be looked upon as if ingenerate in us by Nature, but acquired by Reason. Fortitude is different from Audacity, Ferocity, inconsiderate Temerity, for those are found even in brute Animals also; but this is proper to Man, and to such Men only as act advisedly and prudently; and therefore it is to be measured not by the Strength and violent Carriage of the Body, but by the Firmness of the Mind, constantly adhering to an honest Intention or Purpose.

C H A P. XX.

Of Fortitude, as to Fear of the Gods.

WE must first treat of twofold Fear, far transcending the rest. For if any thing ever produced the ultimate Good, and chief Pleasure, proper to the Mind, it was the Expunction of those Opinions (and all allied to them) which have impressed
the

the greatest Fear upon the Mind. Such is the Condition of miserable Mortals, that they are not led by sound Opinions, but by some Affection void of Reason; so that not discerning what is ill indeed, by reason they suffer an equal and no less intense Perturbation, than as if these things for which they are troubled, were indeed such.

That, which in the first Place, useth to possess Men with greatest Fear, and, consequently causes in them the greatest Perturbation, is this, That conceiving there are certain blessed and immortal Natures, they do yet think them to have Wills, Passions, and Operations, plainly repugnant to those Attributes, (of Beatitude and Immortality) as perpetual Solicitude, Business, Anger, Favour; whereby it comes to pass, that ill Men receive great Harms by way of Punishment; the Good, Protection and Benefits from these Natures, that is, from the Gods. Thus Men being nursed up in their own, that is, in human Affections, fancy and admit Gods like to themselves; and whatsoever suits not with their own Dispositions, that they conceive incompetent to them.

Hereupon, it cannot be express'd, how great Unhappiness Mankind hath drawn upon itself, by attributing such things to the Gods, especially Anger and Severity, by reason whereof Mens Minds being dejected, every one trembles with Fear, when the Heaven thunders, or the Earth quakes, or the Sea is tempestuous, or any other thing happens, whereby he is persuaded, that the Gods intend to punish him, miserable Man.

But it is not so with those, who, instructed by Reason, have learned, that the Gods live in perpetual Security and Tranquility, and that their Nature is too far remov'd from us and our Affairs for them to be either pleased or displeased with us. Truly if they were, and did hear the Prayers of Men, how soon would all Men be destroyed, who continually imprecate Mischief on one another?

Therefore, when you conceive God to be an immortal and blessed Animal, (as the common Notion concerning God suggests) take heed of attributing any thing to him, which is either incompetent with Immortality, or repugnant to Beatitude; but let all your Conceptions be such, as may consist with Immortality and Beatitude.

Gods indeed there are, for the Knowledge of them is evident, as we formerly proved; but such as Men commonly conceive them, they are not. For first, they describe them by some Adjuncts or Properties, as when they say, they are immortal and blessed; and then overthrow what they have asserted, by applying other Attributes to them, repugnant to the former; as when they say, that they have Business, or create Business for others; that they are affected with Anger or Favour, which, as I hinted formerly,

imply Imbecility, Fear, and Want of external Assistance.

Neither need you fear, that this will make you esteemed impious; for he is impious indeed, not, who denies the vulgar Gods of the Multitude, but he who ascribes to the Gods the Opinions of the Multitude. For those things which are commonly delivered concerning the Gods, are not genuine Propositions, but false Opinions.

By the same Reason likewise, he is not pious, who out of Fear of the Gods, addresseth himself to every Stone, to every Altar, he besprinkles every Temple with the Blood of Victims: But he, who contemplating all things with a serene and quiet Soul, conceiveth aright of the Gods, and worshipping them in his Mind, not induced thereto by Hope or Reward, but for their excellent Majesty and supreme Nature, observes all kind of Veneration towards them, and useth Expressions suggesting such Thoughts as out of them arise no Opinions repugnant to Veneration; and consequently, suffereth not that which others suffer, in whose Minds this Contrariety causeth an extraordinary Perturbation.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Fortitude, as to Fear of Death.

THAT which next striketh greatest Terror into the Minds of Men is *Death*, for that they expect, and fear, I know not what everlasting Ill, as Fables tell them, (and which is strange, in the very Privation of Sense which then happens, as if they should still have Being); not knowing that all Stories concerning the Infernal Places, (which we spoke of formerly) are mere Fictions of Poets; or if they contain any thing of Truth, it is made good in this Life, by vain Fears, superfluous Cares, insatiable Desires, and other violent Passions, which torture unhappy Men in such manner, that their Life is worse than hellish.

That you may exempt yourself, therefore, from these Terrors, accustom *yourself to this Thought, That Death nothing concerns us*; and to this Argument, *That all Good or Ill that happen to us is with Sense; but Death is a Privation of Sense*, for Death is a Dissolution, and what is dissolved remains without Sense: So that Death seems easy to be contain'd, because it is an ineffectual Agent, and in vain threatens Pain, when the Patient is not.

Indeed the ordinary sort of Men abhor Death, because they look upon it sometimes as the greatest of Pains, sometimes because they apprehend it as the Cessation of all things that we enjoy in Life; but without Cause is it, that not to live, or not to be, is fear'd; for when

it comes to that, we shall not have any Faculty left whereby to know, that not to live, is ill.

Hence we may conclude, that they are very foolish who abhor, amongst other things, to think, that after Death their Bodies should be torn by wild Beasts, burnt by Fire, devoured by Worms; for they do not consider, that then they shall not be, and so not feel nor complain, that they are torn, burnt, devoured, turned into Corruption. As also, those who are troubled to think, that they shall no longer enjoy the Conversation of their Wives, Children, Friends; no longer do them good Offices, nor assist them; for these consider not, that they shall have no Desire of such things.

^a Death therefore, which is esteemed the most horrid of Ills, doth (as I said) nothing concern us, because while we are, Death is not; and when Death is, we are not: So that it concerns neither the Living nor the Dead; the Living it toucheth not, the Dead are not.

Now the assured Knowledge that Death nothing concerns us, makes us enjoy this mortal Life, not adding uncertain Time to it, but casting away the Desire of Immortality. For, in Life, there can be nothing of Ill to him, who perfectly understands, that there can be nothing of Ill in the Privation of Life. Whence, as we make Choice not of the most pleasant, but of the best; so should we covet, not the longest, but most pleasant Life.

Neither can he be acquitted of Folly, who says, he fears Death, for that, when it comes, it brings not any Trouble, but because it afflicts the Mind with Grief before it comes: For, that which brings no Trouble with it when it comes, ought not to make us sad with Expectation. Certainly, if there be any thing of Inconvenience or Fear in this Business, it is the Fault of him that is dying, not of Death: Nor is there any Trouble in Death, more than there is after it; and it is no less Folly to fear Death, than to fear Old Age, since as Old Age follows Youth, so Death follows Old Age.

Moreover, we are to hope at least, that either we shall feel no Pain at the Point of Death, or if any, so short, as the very Consideration of that may comfort us; for no great Pain lasts long, and every Man ought to believe, that tho' the Dissolution of his Soul and Body be accompanied with some Torment, yet that being past he shall feel no more Pain.

^a He also who advised young Men to live well, and old to die well, was very ridiculous, for these are not to be parted; the Meditation of living well and of dying well is one and the same, seeing that a young Man may die suddenly, and an old Man hath something more of Life behind: Besides, the last Act is a Part, even the Crown of Life.

Both young and old ought to consider, that tho' Men may provide for their Security in other things;

yet as to Death itself, all Men live as it were in a City without Walls or Bulwarks.

Besides, a young Man may die happy, if he consider, that he should find nothing more in a longer Life than what he hath already seen and experienced; and an old Man may live unhappy, if, like a Vessel full of Holes, he suffer the Goods of Life only to run thorough him, and so is never full of them, nor, as a sober Guest of Nature, after a plentiful Feast of Life, is willing to go away, and take his Repose.

Think not any old Man happy for dying old, but for dying full, and well satisfied with Goods.

^c Lastly, far more foolish and ridiculous is he, who saith, It is good either not to be born at all, or as soon as born to pass the Gates of Death: For, if he speak this in earnest, why does he not presently rid himself of Life, it being very easy for him so to do, if he hath well deliberated upon it? If in jest, he is perfectly Mad, because these are Things that admit not of jesting. Again, in Life there is something amiable in itself; and therefore they are no less to be reproved who desire Death than they who are afraid of it. What can be so ridiculous as to desire Death, having made your own Life uneasy by Fear of Death? Or, out of a Weariness of Life, to run to Death, when your own imprudent and constant Course of Life is the Cause of that Weariness.

You must rather take care to make Life not tedious to you, that you be not willing to part with it, unless either Nature, or some intolerable Chance summon you to surrender it: And in that respect we ought seriously to consider, whether it be more commodious, that Death comes to us, or that we go to Death. For tho' it be an Evil indeed to live in Necessity, yet is there no Necessity we should live in Necessity; since Nature, tho' she hath given us but one Way into Life, yet hath furnished us with many to get out of it.

But tho' it may sometimes so fall out, that it behoves us to hasten and fly to Death, before some greater Power intercept and rob us of the Liberty to quit Life, yet ought we not to attempt any thing, but when it may be attempted conveniently and opportunely; and when that long-awaited-for Time comes, then to leap out of Life resolutely. For neither is it fit for him, who thinks of Flight, to sleep; nor ought we to despair of a happy Exit even out of the greatest Difficulties, if we neither hasten it before the Time, nor when the Time is come, delay it.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Fortitude against corporeal Pain.

CORPOREAL Pain is that, which alone would deserve the Name of Ill, even of the greatest Ill, did

^a Laert.

^b Laert. ibid.

^c Laert. ibid.

did we not of ourselves add to it the Pain of the Mind, which is worse than that of the Body. For Discontent of Mind, taken at the Loss of Riches, Honours, Children, and the like, many times becomes more intolerable than the greatest corporeal Pains; but this is by reason of our own Opinion, which if it were right and sound, we should not be moved by any such Loss, in regard that all such things are without or beyond us, and touch us not indeed, but only by Mediation of that Opinion which we frame to ourselves. And thereupon we may infer, that there is no real Ill, but the Pain of the Body; and that the Mind ought not to complain of any thing, which is not joined to some Pain of the Body, either present or to come.

He therefore who is wise, will be very cautious that he draw not any corporeal Pain upon himself, or do any thing upon which corporeal Pain may ensue; unless it be done either for Avoidance of some greater Pain, or Acquisition of some greater Pleasure, as we formerly declared. Hence we may well wonder at those Philosophers, who, accounting Health, which is the State of Indolence, a very great Good, as to all other respects, do yet, as to this, hold it to be a thing indifferent; as if it were not a trivial playing with Words, or rather a high Folly to affirm, that to be in Pain, and to be free from Pain, is all one thing.

But if any Necessity, either of the natural Constitution, whereby the Body is obnoxious to Diseases, or of any external Violence done to him, which, as human Affairs stand, cannot sometimes be avoided, (for that a wife and innocent Person may sometimes be arraigned, condemned, beaten and tortur'd, is manifest) if either of these shall bring Pain upon him, then is it his Part to endure that Pain, with a constant and valiant Mind, and patiently to expect, either the Solution or Relaxation of it.

Certainly, Pain never continues long in the Body, but that which is great, or highly intense soon ceaseth; for either it is determined of itself, and succeedeth, if not by absolute Indolence, yet by very great Mitigation, or is taken away by Death, in which there is no Pain. And as for that Pain, which is lasting, it is not only gentle, but hath many lucid Intervals; so that it will not be many Days, nay, not Hours, e'er the Body hath not only Ease, but Pleasure.

And may we not observe, that long or chronical Diseases have more Hours of Ease, and quiet Intervals, than of Pain and Trouble? For (not to mention that the Thirst which they raise, increaseth the Pleasure of drinking) they allow us Time for Repair, Strength to talk, some Recreation and Sports, and for the most part have many long Intermittions, in which we may apply ourselves to Studies and Business. Whence it is evident, that as great Pain usually is short, so long Pain is light; thus the Shortness

makes amends for the Greatness, the Remissness for its Length.

Let us therefore often reflect, that Pain either is not intolerable, or not perpetual; for if it be long, it is light; if great, short. Provided that you remember the Bounds prescribed to the things themselves by Nature, and add nothing through your own Opinion, whereby you may think, and make it greater than it is; and oppressing yourself with Complaints, and impatient Exasperations, help only to render it more insupportable: Whereas, on the other side, nothing doth assuage Pain more than Constancy, and Insurance to Suffering. Whence it comes, that a wise Man, accustomed to Pain, can many times rejoice and smile, even in the Height of his Sickness.

Thus much can we testify of our Friend *Metrastor*, who hath at all times behaved himself undauntedly, as well against Death, as Pain. For concerning myself, I need not say any thing, who frequently suffer such Pain in the Bladder and Bowels, as none can be greater: And yet full amends for all these is made by the Alacrity of Mind, which redounds to us from the Remembrance of our Dissertations and Inventions, and by our constant Patience; whereby we forbear not to esteem those very Days in which we are tormented with those Diseases and Pains happy.

And this indeed is the Reason, why we formerly said, that a wise Man, tho' in Torments, may yet be happy; because he both softens, by his Patience, the Necessity which he cannot break; and, as much as possible, withdraws his Mind from his suffering Body, conversing no otherwise with it, than as with a weak and querulous Part. He bethinks himself, what he hath at any time done honestly and generously; and fixing his Memory upon those things which he hath most admired, and have most delighted him, cheers himself with the past Goods for which he is far from shewing himself, as Fools usually do, unthankful.

He also considers, that he can do nothing more worthy that Virtue and Wisdom which he professeth, than not to yield the Victory to Pain, tho' the most hard to be sustained of all things; to bear up courageously, to repulse by Patience so dangerous an Enemy; and at length, to make so perfect a Conquest, as that the very Remembrance of it will be most delightful, and especially through absolute Indolence, which will be so much the more pleasing, as a quiet Haven is most welcome after a Tempest.

Now, if a wise Man is not without his Alleviations and Comforts in the greatest Pain, what shall we say of him in Remiss and gentle Pains, or at the Loss of some Limb or Sense? Truly, it was not without Reason that I said formerly, a wise Man, tho' depriv'd of the best of Senses, Sight, would yet be happy: For if the Night doth not diminish the Happiness

Happinefs of Life, why fhould Blindnefs, that fo nearly refembles Night? However he may want fome Pleafures that depend upon the Light, yet are there feveral others left him, and what is much above all the reft, he may delight his Mind with many things, and many ways without feeling.

For fince to a wife Man, to live is to think, certainly his Thoughts are not oblig'd to his Eyes in the Bufinefs of fearching into Truth. And that Man, to whose Doctrin I gave up my Name, could live long and happy, without being able to diftinguifh Colours: But without the Knowledge of Things, he could not have lived happy. Moreover, he was of opinion, that the Perfpicuity of the Mind was very much dimm'd by the Sight of the Eyes; and while others could fcarcely be faid to fee things that were before them, he travelled abroad into all Infinity, not ftopping at any Bounds.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of Fortitude, againft Difcontent of Mind.

I Said, that Difcontent of Mind is commonly taken at fuch things as are conceived to be external Ills, and the Contraries to thofe Goods which we moft love and defire. For Men call fome things adverfe, others prosperous: And we may generally obferve, that the Mind which is elevated, and infolent with Profperity, and caft down with Adverfity, is abject and bafe. Hence is it, that all we fhould here fay concerning the Ills which caufe Difcontent, and againft which we have need of Fortitude, may be fufficiently inferred from what we formerly faid, touching thofe Goods which are the general Objects of our Defires or Inclinations, and in refpect whereof we have need of Temperance.

Let it fuffice in general to repeat what we formerly faid, That Difcontent of Mind is not grounded upon Nature, but merely upon Opinion of Ill. Wherefore, whoever conceives himfelf to lie under fome Ill, whether only forefeen and expected, or already come upon him, muft of neceffity be difcontented. For how comes it to pafs, that a Father whose Son is kill'd, and he knows it not, is not a whit lefs cheerful or merry, than if he were alive? Or that he who hath loft much of his good Fame abroad, or all his Goods and Cattle, by Robbery at home, is not at all fenfible of either Losfs till he hear of it? Is it not Opinion only which difcontents him? For, if Nature did it, at the fame Minute wherein the Son was flain, the Father's Mind would be ftruck with a Senfe of his Death; the like wou'd be perceived in the Losfs of Honours or Goods.

Therefore, to raife Difcontent in the Mind, it is neceffary that Opinion, not Nature, intervene. And that you may doubt the lefs of this, obferve, that a Man who thinks a fuppoftitious Child his own, and

his own fuppoftitious; if News be brought him of the Death of his own Son, he will not be moved, but if of his fuppoftitious, he will be exceedingly afflifted; and this comes not from Nature, but Opinion.

But that thofe things which afflift us are not indeed Ills to us, appears even from this, that they are without or beyond us, and cannot reach us of themfelves, but only by our own Opinion are made Ills to us. And hence it was, that I faid, it is Reafon which makes Life happy or pleafant, by expelling Opinions, for which the Mind is poffeffed with Trouble. For it is Difcontent alone which difturbs the Mind, and its Quiet and Content.

But how can Reafon expel thefe Opinions? By teaching a wife Man to arm his Mind againft Fortune. For the external things which we think Goods, and the Losfs of which caufeth Difcontent in our Minds, are termed the Goods of Fortune; becaufe indeed they are not ours, but come and go, as Fortune pleafeth.

For this Reafon, a wife Man esteems them no more belonging to him than to others, nor poffeffeth them fo, as not to be ready to part with them. He hath caft off that Opinion which tells us, Such Goods are our own, and can never be loft; and hath put on the right Opinion, which affures him they are uncertain and tranfitory, as indeed they are. And hereupon he confiders with himfelf before-hand, what he fhall do if he chance to lofe them; he confiders, I fay, before-hand, that when it happens, he may not be afflifted with vain Grief, but take it quietly, that Fortune redemands what fhe gave not, but only lent.

Certainly to thofe who think, that to be deprived of thefe Goods is an Ill, the moft unhappy thing of all is, that Premeditation increafeth the Ills which it might have much diminifhed, if not wholly prevented; and thus becomes only a foolifh Confideration of Ill to come, and which perhaps will never come. Every Ill is of itfelf troublefome enough when it comes; and if it chance never to come, we draw a voluntary Mifery upon ourfelves to no Purpofe, and by that means fhall never be free from Trouble, either by receiving or apprehending fome Ill; for he who always thinks that fome Ill or Adverfity will befall him, to him that very Thought is a continual Ill.

Now if it fhall happen alfo to a wife Man, that, by being long accuftomed to the Poffeffion and Ufe of the Goods of Fortune, he hath not quite blotted that Opinion out of his Mind, and fo fome little of Fortune intervene, and give him a Blow, by reafon whereof, he falls into fome Difcontent, and perhaps grieves: In this Cafe, the Affuagement of his Difcontent confifts in two things, formerly prefcribed as Remedies againft corporeal Pain, viz. Diversion of his Thoughts from his Losfs, or the Cauft of it; and

an Application of them to those things which he knows to be grateful and pleasant to his Mind.

For the Mind of a wife Man is conformed to Reason, and follows the Conduct thereof; but Reason forbids to look on those things which create and nourish Discontent; and thus he abstracts the Mind from bitter Thoughts, to convert it to think upon Goods, either future or past, especially those which he knows please him most.

Those sad and importune Thoughts indeed are very apt to return, but he must insist upon that Diversion and Application of the Mind whereby it is brought by little and little to wear out, and deface its Sorrow. Neither doth Time diminish Discontent any other way, than by exhibiting various Occasions of Divertissement, which, by degrees, take the Mind off, and make her forget, as it were, the things that caused her Discontent.

C H A P. XXIV.

Of Justice in general.

IT rests, we speak of Justice, which, as I said before, wholly relates to others, and therefore belongs to a Man, as living in a civil Society. And certainly it is a common Tye, without which, no Society can subsist, it being a Virtue which gives to every one that which is his, and takes care that none receive Injury.

And to begin with that with which I used to begin, in treating of the other Virtues, truly not unlike are the things that may be said of this. For, as I shewed, that Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude, are inseparably joined to Pleasure; the same may be said of Justice, which not only never hurts any one, but, on the contrary, always preserves and nourisheth something that calms and quiets the Mind; and this, as well by its own Power and Nature, as by Hope, that none shall ever want any of those things which pure undepraved Nature desires.

Now, forasmuch as Temerity, Lust, and Cowardice, always excruciate the Mind, perplex and trouble it; it is impossible, that a Mind in which Injustice dwells, should, for that very Reason, because Injustice dwells in it, be otherwise than unquiet: Because tho' such a Mind should attempt any unjust Action with the greatest Secrecy imaginable, yet can it not persuade itself but that it will at last come to light. And tho' some Men may think their Consciences sufficiently barricado'd and fortified by their Wealth, yet they dread the Divine Power, and imagine, that those very Solicitudes and Troubles, which torture their Souls Day and Night, are sent by the immortal Gods for their Punishment.

But, how can we expect, that unjust Actions should diminish the Troubles of Life so much as Remorse of Conscience, Penalties of the Law, and

the being hated by our Country-men increase them? And yet, in some Men, there is not any Bound or Moderation of Wealth, of Honour, of Power, of Lust, of Gluttony, and other Desires, which nothing that is unjustly gotten diminisheth, but rather increaseth and inflameth, so that they are fitter for Restraint than Instruction.

All sound and judicious Persons therefore, are, by right Reason, induced to Justice, Equity, Honesty; but neither can unjust Actions benefit a Child or impotent Person, for such can neither easily effect what they endeavour, nor obtain their Ends when they have effected it. Besides, Riches are more suitable to Fortune, or a noble Genius, which they who enjoy, procure to themselves a general Respect and Good-will, and (what most conduceth to quiet living) an Endearment from others, especially there being no Cause of offending.

For the Desires which proceed from Nature are easily satisfied, without injuring any Man; those which come from vain Opinions are not to be followed, for they aim at nothing which is desirable, and there is more Detriment in the Injury itself, than Advantage or Benefit in the things that are gained by the Injury.

Nevertheless, no Man can say rightly, that Justice is a Virtue, expetible only for itself, but because it brings great Pleasure along with it; for to be beloved, and to be dear to others, is pleasant, because it renders Life more safe, and Pleasure more full. We therefore conceive, that Injustice ought to be avoided, not only for the Inconveniences which happen to the unjust; but much more, for that as long as it is in the Mind, it never suffers it to take Breath, never to be at rest.

These Considerations might perhaps be sufficient, yet I shall add something partly concerning *Right* or *Just*, from which *Justice* is denominated, that we may come the better to understand what is its Original, among whom it is practised, what are its Benefits; and partly concerning some other Virtues nearly allied to Justice, as, *Benevolence*, *Gratitude*, *Piety*, *Observance*, and *Friendship*.

C H A P. XXV.

Of Jus (Right) or Just, whence Justice is denominated.

FIRST therefore, forasmuch as *Justice* is so named, for that it preserves the *Jus* or Right, due to one another, or performs that which is *just*; it is worth our knowing what that is, which ought to be esteemed *right* or *just*.

Now in regard Justice was instituted in order to the common Good, necessary it is, that Right or Just, to which Justice hath Respect, should be such a Good as is common to all and every Member of the Society.

ciety. And because every one, by the Direction of Nature, desires what is good for himself, it is also necessary, that what is right or just be conformable to Nature, and therefore termed natural.

It is not without Cause that I hint this; for sometimes it happens, that in a Society, something is prescribed as right and just, which is not good for the Society, and so being not natural, or contrary to Nature, it cannot, but by Abuse, and only in Name, be reputed right or just, since that which hath the true Reason of Natural Right or Just, is such as that it is not only prescribed as profitable and good, but is really such.

Wherefore to speak properly, Natural Right or Just is no other than a Symbol of Utility, or such an Utility agreed upon by Concurrence of Votes, as may keep Men from hurting, or being hurt by one another, so that they may live securely: A Good which every Man is taught by Nature to desire.

I here take Profitable and Good for the same thing; and I conceive, that to a Thing's being just or rightly kept, two things are requisite; one, That it be profitable, or respect the common Utility, that is, Security; the other, That it be prescribed by the common Consent of the Society; for nothing is compleatly just, but what the Society, by common Consent or Agreement, hath decreed to be observed.

Hence it is, that the Name of Right or Just is usually given to both these, since not only what is profitable is said to be just, but also the very common Covenant or Prescription of the Society, which is termed Law, as being that which prescribes to every one what is profitable or just.

Some there are, who conceive all things that are just, to be just of their own proper and unalterable Nature; and that Laws do not make them to be just, but only declare and prescribe, according to the Nature which those things have. But it is not so, but rather after the same manner as is observed in other things which are profitable, as in those which concern Health, and many others of the like Nature, which are beneficial to some Men, hurtful to others; by which means they often fail of their Mark, as well in common as in private.

And seeing that every thing is apprehended every where, always, and by all Men, to be really such as it is in its own Nature, because its Nature is unalterable, whether are those things which these Men call just, just in all Places and always, and amongst all Men? Ought they not to have observed, that many of those things that are constituted by Laws, and consequently accounted lawful and just, are not constituted and received amongst all Nations alike, but are neglected by many as things indifferent, rejected by others as hurtful, and condemned as unjust? And are there not some, who account things not generally profitable, to be nevertheless such; and accordingly embrace those things which are not

generally approved, if they find them advantageous in respect of their own Society, and seem but to promise some general Benefit?

In fine, that is universally just, or hath the Nature of Just, which is profitable or conformable to the Praerogative of Right or Just even now described: For particularly, according as Utility is various amongst several Nations, so also is Right or Just, various; inasmuch as what is esteemed just in one is unjust in another. Whence, if it be demanded, whether Just or Right be the same amongst all Men? I answer, that as to the general, it is the same, for it is something that is profitable in mutual Society: But the Differences of several Countries, and various Causes amongst them being considered in particular, it comes to pass that it is not the same amongst all.

And, (to deduce some few Particulars hence,) whatsoever is by Experience found profitable to a mutual Society, or the common Participation of such Things as are esteemed just, that Thing hath the Nature of Just or Right, if it be such as its Utility extends unto all. But if any Man shall establish such a thing for just, and yet it shall happen not to be profitable to the mutual Society, it hath not the true Nature of Just or Right.

Again, tho' sometimes the Utility of that which was esteemed just may fail, nevertheless, if there be sometimes some Utility in it, so that it corresponds to the Praerogative of Just or Right, it is truly just for that Time: They certainly will esteem it so, who confound not themselves with vain Loquacity, but look more generally into human Affairs.

Lastly, where no new Circumstance of things intervening, those very things, which were esteem'd just in the Actions of Men, are found not to correspond with the Notion of just, they are not just at all: But where, upon Innovation or Change of Affairs, those things, which we formerly decreed to be just, cease to be profitable, they were just, as long as they continued profitable to mutual Society, but as soon as ever they ceased to be profitable they ceased to be just.

C H A P. XXVI.

Of the Original of Right and Just.

BUT that we may go higher and deduce the thing from its Original, it appears that Right and Just are as ancient, and Justice hath been kept amongst Men as long as they have had Societies amongst themselves.

For, in the Beginning, Men wandering up and down like wild Beasts, and suffering many Inconveniences, as well from Beasts as from the Injuries of Weather, a certain natural Agreement amongst them (by reason of their Likeness in Form, and Soul, or Manners) persuaded them to join together

in several Companies, and to make some Provision against those Inconveniences, by building Huts or Cottages, and furnishing themselves with other Shelters, as well against wild Beasts as the Weather. But in regard every one was desirous to be in a better Condition than another, hereupon there arose frequent Contentions about Food, Women, and other Conveniences, which they took away from one another; until at length they perceiv'd, that they could not live secure and commodiously, unless they made a Covenant not to injure one another, and that in case any one did harm and injure another, the rest should punish him.

This was the first Band of Society; which, supposing that every one might have something proper to himself, or which he might call his own, as being his, either by first Possession, or by Purchase, or by Acquisition through his own Industry, or otherwise, decreed, that it should remain in the Possession and Disposal of that Person. Now this Band or Covenant was no other than a common Law, which all were equally bound to observe, and which did confirm to every one a certain Right or Faculty of using whatsoever was his own. Whereupon that very Law also came to be (as I formerly intimated) the common Right as it were of the Society.

I need not mention, how the whole Society transferred their Power of restraining or punishing, upon some few wise and good Persons, or else on one, who was reputed the wisest and best among them: I shall only observe, that in the Society those were accounted just or Favourers of Justice, who being content with their own Rights, invaded not those of other Men, but did Injury to none; those unjust, or Doers of Injustice, who being not content with their own Rights, did assault the Rights of other Men; and, harming them by Rapine, personal Violence, or some other Way, became injurious to them.

Thus Men lived a while peaceably and happily, especially being under one or more Kings or Princes, the wisest and best, who being wholly intent upon the Conservation and Utility of the Publick, made, and with Consent of the People, established divers Laws, to prevent Dissentions from arising, or, if any did arise, to compose them. But, such is the Corruption of Mens Manners, in Process of Time the Government fell into the Hands of Princes or Kings that were not good; and those being either deposed or slain, it reverted to the People, whereupon Tumults were raised by the Factions of such as aspired to the Supreme Power until at length, the People languishing under Enmities and Dissentions, and weary of living by Force and Hostility, became willing to submit again to the Government of Magistrates or Princes. But because the Wills of Princes had formerly paid for obsolete Laws, they

made a Covenant with their Governors, about those Laws, according to which they desir'd to be govern'd; and thus brought themselves again under Laws, that is, under strict Rights.

But not to descend to later Times, but to touch only upon that chief Head, which concerns the Preservation of Life, for whose Security (as being the most precious of all things) Care was taken from the Beginning that it might be established by common Covenant or Law; **It appears, that those most wise and good Founders of Laws, having regard to the Security of Life, and to those things which Men usually do to each other, declared it a wicked Act to kill a Man, and decreed, that the Murderer should be punished with more than common Ignominy, and Loss of Life.* And to this they seem to have been induc'd, partly by considering the Conciliation of Men among themselves (of which I treated even now) in respect whereof Men ought not to be as forward to destroy an Animal of their own kind, as one of different kind, which it is lawful to kill; partly, indeed chiefly, by considering, that Men ought to abhor, what is no ways advantageous to Life, but tends only to Evil.

Indeed, from the Beginning, to those who had regard to the Utility of that Constitution, there needed not any other Cause to make them contain themselves from doing any such Act: But they who could not sufficiently comprehend of what great Concernment it was, obtained from murdering one another, only out of a Fear of those great Punishments; both which we may observe to have happened even in our own Days. They who consider the great Advantages of such a Constitution, are sufficiently disposed for a constant Observance thereof; but they, who are not capable of understanding it, conform themselves to it out of Fear of the Punishments threatened by the Law, and ordained by the more prudent, against such as had no Regard to this Utility, the greater Part of the Multitude admitting them as legal.

For none of the Laws written or not written that have been derived to us, and shall be transmitted to our Posterity, did at first justify by any Force or Violence, but, as I said, merely by the Consent of those who us'd it. For it was Prudence, not Strength of Body, or imperious Sway, wherein they who settled these Laws upon the People, transcend the Vulgar; and this, by inducing some Men to consider, what would be profitable (especially when they did not before so well understand it as they ought) and by terrifying others with the Greatness of the Punishments. Nor could they indeed make use of any other Remedy for Cure of the Peoples Ignorance of this Utility, than Fear of the Punishment prescribed by the Law. For even now also, it is Fear alone that keeps the ordinary sort of Men within the Bounds of their Duty, and hinders them from committing any thing against either the publick or private Good.

Now

Now if all Men could alike understand, and bear in mind what is truly profitable, they should need no Laws at all, but would of their own accord beware of doing such things as the Laws forbid, and do what they enjoin; since only to know what is profitable and what hurtful, is more than sufficient to induce them to avoid this, and pursue that. But as for those who discern not what is beneficial, what hurtful, doubtless the Commination of Punishment against such is highly necessary; inasmuch as the Fear of the Punishment impendent causeth them to suppress and bridle those Heats of their Passions, which infligate them to unjust Actions, and in a manner compel them, though against their Will, to do what is right.

Hereupon was it the Law-makers ordained, that even involuntary killing of a Man should not be free from all Mults and Punishment. Not that they might not, to such as were apt to commit wilful Murder, give any occasion of Pretext or Excuse to imitate that on set Purpose, which the others did unwittingly; but lest they might seem not to have used sufficient Caution and Diligence as to this Particular, whereupon many things would fall out, which indeed were not involuntary. Nor could this Course but prove beneficial for the same Causes for which Men were expressly prohibited to kill each other. So that considering, that of these Actions of this Kind that are done involuntarily, some happen from a Cause that could not be foreseen, nor prevented by human Nature; others merely through our Negligence and Heedlessness of the imminent Danger: therefore to prevent Negligence, which might tend to the Destruction of others, they provided that such involuntary Action should not pass altogether unpunished, but took away the Frequency of this Sin by the Fear of Law.

Moreover, I conceive that even these Slaughters of Men, which were permitted by the Law, were made liable to those accustomed Expiations by publick Lustrations, (and that by Order of the same Persons who first ordained them) for no other Cause but this, that they had a mind to deter Men from involuntary Slaughter, which was too too frequent.

For the vulgar Sort of Men stood in need of something to restrain them from doing any thing rashly, which might not conduce to the publick Utility; which these first Law-makers understanding, not only decreed severe Punishments, but withal struck another Fear into their Minds, the Reason of which was not so manifest as the other, declaring that such as had killed a Man, by what Means or Accident soever, should be impure until they had used Lustrations.

Thus the brutish Part of the Soul, in which the Affections and Passions reside, being instructed and reformed, came at length to that Gentleness which now flourisheth amongst us, by applying the Arts of taming and civilizing our savage Affections, which were invented and practised at first by those who ruled the Multitude; of which, this is one chief Act among the

rest, that Men should not destroy one another without any Distinction.

CHAP. XXVII.

Between whom Right and Justice is to be exercised.

NOW since it may be demanded, Betwixt what Persons, as well Right, and the Violation of it, which is Injury, as Justice, and what is opposite to it, Injustice, properly consist? We shall therefore explicate this, by comparing Men with other living Creatures.

As therefore there is no Reason of Right or Injury, or Just and Unjust, betwixt Animals that could not make a common Agreement, not to hurt nor be hurt by mutual Invasion; so neither is there between those Nations which neither would not, or could not, enter into a mutual Engagement, not to hurt, nor be hurt by one another.

For Just or Right, the Conservation whereof is Justice, hath no Being at all, but in mutual Society; whence Justice is the Good of a Society, inasmuch as by it every one of the said associated Persons lives securely, free from that Anxiety, which is caused by the continual Fear of Harm. Whence it follows, that whatever Animals, or what Men soever, either cannot or will not make an Association, nor enter into Covenant among themselves, must want this Good, not being reciprocally oblig'd by any Bond of Right or Justice, whereby they might live securely. And so to them there can remain no other Reason of Security than only this, to do no harm to others: that they be not harmed themselves.

As therefore, when one of those brute Animals, amongst which there hath past no such Agreement or Pact, doth hurt another; though it may be said that one hurts the other, yet it cannot be said that one doth an Injury to the other, because one was not bound by any Right, Compact, or Law, not to hurt the other: In like manner, if one Man of that Nation, among whom there is no Covenant, or Association, hurt another, it may be said that he hurts him, but not that he wrongs or doth him an Injury; because he was not obliged by any Compact or Law, not to hurt him.

I speak of brute Animals, not as if there were any even of those who live in Herds or Flocks, that are capable of entering into Covenant not to harm or be hurt by each other, and so might be conceived to be just if they do not hurt each other, and unjust if they do; but only to the End, that from thence it may be the better understood, that even among Men, Justice in itself is nothing, for that it is found only in mutual Societies, according to the Amplitude of every Country, in which the Inhabitants may conveniently enter into Agreements, and Covenants of not doing, or receiving any hurt; since otherwise,

and

and in a Man singly considered, there is no Justice at all; and what is Justice in one Society of Men, many times is, in respect of contrary Covenants, Injustice in another.

But can there be Justice betwixt Men and other Animals? Certainly not. For if Men could make a Covenant with brute Animals, as they can with other Men, that they should not kill, nor be killed by them, without any distinction; then indeed, might the Reason of Just or Right be founded betwixt them and us, since the End of that Covenant would be the Security of both Parties: But because it is impossible, that Animals void of Reason should be obliged by one Law with us, it must also be impossible for us to obtain more Assurance of Security from Animals, than even from inanimate Beings. So that, there is no other way for us to secure ourselves from brute Beasts, but only to execute that Power of destroying them, which Nature hath given us.

Perhaps you will, by the way, demand, why we kill even such Animals, as can give us no Occasion of Fear? This we may do either through Intemperance, and a certain natural Savageness or Cruelty, as we exercise Cruelty even upon Men who live out of our Society, and cannot give us any Fear. But it is one thing to break the Rules of Temperance, or any of its kinds, as Sobriety, Lenity, or Manufacture, or, (if you please) mere Humanity or Goodness of Nature; another, to violate Justice, which presupposeth Laws and Covenants established by mutual Consent.

Nor can it be alledg'd, that we have a Power granted us by Laws, to destroy any such Animals as are not offensive or destructive to Mankind. I confess, there is not any kind of living Creatures, among all those we are allow'd to destroy, which being permitted to increase to vast Multitudes, would not prove pernicious to Mankind, but being preserved in such Number as ordinarily they are, are not some ways useful to Life.

For Sheep, Kine, and all such like, as long as they are preserv'd to a moderate Number, afford us many Necessaries for Life: But if they were suffer'd to multiply in a far greater manner, certainly they could not but prove very burisful to us, as well in regard of their Strength, as for that they would devour the Fruits of the Earth that should serve for our Subsistence. And for this very Cause is it, that we are not prohibited to destroy such Animals, yet preserve so many of them as may be useful to us, and wisely ruled by us.

For, of Lions, Wolves, and all such as are called wild Beasts, (whether little or great) we cannot take a certain Number, which being preserved, may afford us any Relief necessary to Life, as we may of Kine, Horses, and the rest, that are called tame Creatures. Hence it comes to pass, that we endeavour wholly to

exterminate those, and of these cut off only so many as are over and above a competent Stock.

Hereupon (to touch briefly on this also) we may conceive, that even among those Nations who make their Choice of certain sorts of Animals for Food, the matter was determined and prescribed by certain Laws, grounded upon Reason correspondent to those we have now given. And as for those Animals that were not to be eaten; there was Respect had to their Utility and Inutility, and for some Reason peculiar to each Country; to the Constitutions whereof there is no Necessity for us to adhere, who live not in those Places.

Hence we come to understand, that from the very Beginning a Difference was put betwixt the killing of Men, and the killing of all other Animals; For as to other Animals, it is manifest, that those primitive, wise Persons, who prescribed what we should do, and what not, did not forbid to kill any of them, because the Profit that ariseth from them is perfected by the contrary Action, that is, by killing them. For it could not be, that Men living promiscuously amongst Beasts, could preserve themselves in Safety otherwise, than by expelling or destroying them.

But as concerning Mankind, Some, who at that time were more gracious than the rest (these perhaps were they that persuaded Men first to enter into the Covenant we spoke of) rememb'rd, that in those Places, where Men lived promiscuously, they had sometimes abstained from Slaughter, out of a Respect to that Utility which conduced to their Safety; as also represented to others in their Meetings what had happened, that refraining from Slaughter of an Animal of the same kind, they might defend the Security of Life, which is generally the Cause of every Man's particular Safety. And it was profitable at first to quit the Society of either other Animals, or Men meeting together, at least not to hurt any, to avoid the incensing of, not only other Animals of several kinds, but also Men, who are all of the same, and apt enough of themselves to do harm. Whence, upon this Account, Men refrained laying Hands upon an Animal of their own Species, that offer'd itself to the Communication of Things necessary, and contributed some Benefit to Society.

But in Process of Time, there being a great Increase on both sides, and Animals of different Species being forc'd away, Men began to make use of their Reason (whereas before that Time they had trusted altogether to Memory) and to enter into Consultation what was to be done in order to their Safety, when they should come together, and conjoin their Habitations. For they endeavour'd strongly to restrain those who rashly and imprudently would murder one another, and thereby made the mutual Assistance, that Men were able to afford each other, daily the weaker; and this chiefly, because these great Inconveniences which had frequently fallen out in former Times upon the like Cases, were utterly forgotten.

forgotten. Now whilst they endeavoured to bring this to pass, they at length introduced the *Latus* and *Constitutions* which continue in all Cities and Nations even to this Day; the common People of their own accord consenting to them, as I said; being sensible how much greater Utility would from thence accrue to them, living in mutual Society. In like manner it conduceth also to Security, both to destroy without any Pity what is pernicious, and to preserve whatever is useful to exterminate it.

Thus it is probable, that upon these Considerations, the Slaughter of all other Animals came to be permitted, and that of Men prohibited. But I insist too long hereupon.

C H A P. XXVIII.

With what Right Justice is to be exercised.

JUSTICE being established by a mutual Agreement, it remains, that every Man, whether a Native or Alien, ought, from the time he hath given up his Name to a Society, to account himself a Member of that Society, upon this Condition, either expressly or tacitly, that he hurt none of his Fellow-members, nor be hurt by any other. Wherefore he must either stand to the Covenant, or depart out of the Society; for he is not to be suffer'd to live in the Society upon any other Terms. Whence it follows, since by Nature no Man is willing to receive harm from another, that he do not that to another which he would not should be done to himself.

Hereupon it may be imagined, that the Laws in all Societies were made in Favour of the Wife, not to prevent wife Men from doing unjustly, but that others should not injure them: For as for them, they are so well disposed, as that, if there were no Laws, yet would they not do harm to any. They have prescribed Bounds to their Desires, and accommodate them to Nature, which requires nothing that must be obtained by ways of Injustice; nor indeed is there any of Nature's Pleasures which induceth a Man to do Injury to another, but some exorbitant Desire arising from vain Opinion.

For Nature having (for Example) provided Herbs, Corn, Fruits, for Food, competent and useful, and Water for Drink, Things easy to be had, it cannot be the Pleasure of satisfying Hunger and Thirst, that should cause a Man to rob his Neighbour, or commit any of those Injuries which they usually do: But the vain Desire of living at a higher Rate, more splendidly and wantonly, that so he may acquire Wealth enough to discharge the Expenses of his Luxury. The same may be said also of those, who, not content with plain Apparel, a plain House, a plain Match, and the like, through Ambition, Pride, Lust, and other Passions, desire more than Nature needs,

Moreover, seeing that a wife Man, as I hinted formerly, doth all things for his own sake, nothing certainly can more conduce to his Advantage, than to observe Justice exactly. For in giving to every one his due, and harming no Man, he, to his utmost, preserves and keeps safe that Society, which, unless it be safe, he cannot be safe himself; nor doth he provoke any Man to revenge an Injury suffered at his hand, or fear any Multitude or Punishment to be inflicted upon him by publick Decree. Thus being conscious to himself of no ill done, he remains free from all Perturbation, which is the greatest Benefit and Fruit of Justice; and while he reaps that, what can be more to his own Advantage?

Neither ought you to think, that he, who tho' secretly, and without the Knowledge of any Man, violates Right, or the Covenants ratified by general Consent, to prevent the committing and suffering of Wrong, can live in the same Security and Indisturbance as the just Man doth, because (as I said) he cannot assure himself that his Injustice shall never be brought to light: For Crimes, tho' they may be secret, can never be secure; nor doth it avail an Offender to be concealed from others, while he can never be concealed from himself.

Truly, though his Offence were never so well concealed for a time, yet it is very uncertain, whether it will continue so concealed till his Death. For first, there is a Jealousy and Suspicion that follows upon ill Actions; and again, there have been many who have detected themselves, some in Dreams, others in raving Fits, others in Drink, others thro' Incogitancy. So that a wicked Man, tho' he may for a time lie hid both from Gods and Men, (as they say) yet he hath Reason to mistrust that he will not be concealed for ever.

Hence is it, that notwithstanding Injustice is not an Ill in itself, because what is reputed unjust in one Place, may be just in another; yet it is an Ill in respect of that Fear, which, stinging the Conscience, creates in it a continual Suspicion, that at some time or other his unjust Deeds will come to the Ears of the Avengers of Injustice, and so he be called to a severe Account for them. Thus there is nothing that more conduceth as to Security, so likewise to a quiet and pleasant Life, than to live innocently, and upon no occasion to violate the common Covenants of Peace.

Wherefore since the just and unjust are in this Opposition, that the just, of all Men, are the most free from Perturbations, What can be more profitable to those than Justice? What more hurtful to these, than Injustice? For how can any Anguish of Mind, Solicitudes, daily and nightly Fears, be profitable to any Man?

Justice therefore being so great a Good, and Injustice so great an Ill, let us embrace one, and abhor the

the other. And if at any Time our Mind seem to stagger, and we are in Suspence what to do, let us fix on some grave good Man, and suppose him to be always present with us, that we may live and do all things as if he looked upon us.

By this Means we shall not only avoid the doing of any thing openly against Justice, but also of offending in secret against the Rules of Honesty. This good Man will be to us instead of a Guardian or Tutor, whom, because we reverence, we fear to offend. Following this Counsel therefore, thus argue; If he were present, I would not do it; Why do I do it in his Absence? He would find Fault with it, because it is Ill; Why do not I shun Ill of myself? Thus, do all Things, as if some such Person look'd on; for if you in this manner reverence another, you will soon come to be revered yourself.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of Beneficence, Gratitude, Piety, Obedience.

WE come next to the Virtues which we said were allied to Justice, for that they have Regard to other Persons; and tho' they are not (as Justice is) prescribed by Laws and Covenants, yet they import, out of Decency, a certain Obligation like that of Justice.

The first is *Beneficence*, or the doing Good to others, whereunto those are obliged, who are able to assist or relieve others, either with their Hand or Purse. If they deny the Assistance of their Hands, they are censured as barbarous, cruel, inhuman; if that of their Purse, they are thought the same, as also sordid, tenacious, covetous, and the like. But if they assist others, they are accounted courteous, civil, kind; as also liberal, munificent, magnificent, &c. So that they are obliged for their own sakes to do good to others, so far as may be without Prodigality.

For those who practise this Virtue procure to themselves Good-will, and (what most of all conduces to quiet Living) Dearness or tender Estimation from others: They who use it not, Ill-will, and (what most occasions troublesome Life) Contempt and Hatred. Take heed therefore you omit not to be beneficent, at least in small Matters, that you lose not the Advantage of being accounted ready to gratify others, even in great.

Not without Reason did I say formerly, It is not only more honourable, but also more delightful to give than to receive a Benefit; because the Giver thereby makes himself superior to the Receiver, and reaps moreover the Interest of Thanks; and there is not any thing that joys a Man more than Thanks. A beneficent Person is like a Fountain, which if you should suppose it to have a reasonable Soul, what Joy would it not have at the sight of so many Corn-

fields, and Pastures, which flourish and smile, as it were, with Plenty and Verdure, and all by the Diffusion of its Streams upon them.

The second is *Gratitude*, to which every Man that receives a Benefit is reciprocally obliged, unless he would incur the greatest Hatred and Ignominy. For Ingratitude is worthily hateful to all Men; because seeing nothing is more suitable to Nature, than to be propense to receive a Good, it is highly contrary to Nature, not to be readily grateful towards the Author of that Good.

Now since no Man is more gratefully affected towards his Benefactors than the wife Man, we may justly affirm, that only the wife Man knows how to fulfil the Duty of Gratitude, because he alone is ready upon all Occasions to express his Thankfulness to his Friends, both present and absent, even to those that are dead.

Others pay Thanks only to present Friends, when present, and this perhaps for their own farther Ends, to encourage them to some new Favour; but how few are there, who gratefully commemorate their absent Benefactors? Who require the Good they did them upon their Children, or other Relations? How few who honour their Memory after Death; who rejoice not rather, as if their Obligations were cancell'd? Who love those that were dear to them, respect them, and as far as in them lies, do Good to them?

The third is *Piety*, the most sacred Species of Gratitude. It looks upon our Parents in the first Place, to whom every Man is more obliged than to all the World besides: For to others he may owe other things; but to his Parents he owes himself. Therefore if Ingratitude to others be hateful, that which is shewn to Parents must certainly be the most horrid and detestable.

We say, in the first place; because Piety in the second place extends to Kindred, and chiefly to our Brothers and Sisters, to whom we are obliged by the Interest of our Parents; in such manner, as that we cannot shew ourselves disrespectful and unkind to them, but we must be at the same time highly ungrateful to our Parents, and all our Progenitors, who, in the Circle of their Love and Benevolence comprehended all that were, and should afterwards be derived from them.

Nor is this Piety distinct from that Dearness we are to bear towards our native Country, which comprehends our Parents and all our Kindred, and receives us at our Birth, brings us up and protects us. And as by the Interest of our Parents we are oblig'd to our Kindred, so by the Interest of our Country, we are obliged to respect all our Countrymen; but more especially the Magistrates and Princes, who defend the Country itself, and the Laws of it, and give us this Benefit in particular, that under their Protection we may live securely and peaceably.

The fourth is *Observance*, or that Reverence which we owe to all Persons of Eminency in any kind. This is accompany'd partly with Gratitude and Piety, (for we cannot any way better express the Gratefulness of our Minds, than by giving due Veneration and Worship to our Benefactors, Parents, Governors, Princes, and all Men of Dignity and Power) and partly with Honour and Respect, as it is the best Testimony we can give of our internal Sentiments of their Deservings, who excel in Age, Wisdom, Learning, and Virtue, the most honourable of all things.

To this Observance belongs that which Men call *Religion* and *Sanctity* toward the Gods, whom we are bound to reverence and honour no otherwise than our Parents, nor through Hope of any Reward, but (as I said before) for their transcendent Majesty and the Supremacy of their Nature. Because, whatever is excellent deserves a just Veneration, and no Excellency is greater than that of the Divine Nature, for it is immortal and most blessed.

Thus understanding, that the Gods neither create Troubles themselves, nor give to others, we piously and holily reverence their most excellent Nature.

C H A P. XXX.

Of Friendship.

THE last is *Friendship*, to which all are mutually obliged, who love, and are reciprocally belov'd. And well may it be the Clove and Crown of this Discourse; for amongst all the Means procur'd by Wisdom, to make Life happy, there is not any thing more full and pleasant than Friendship; and the same Reason that confirms the Mind not to fear any lasting or eternal Ill, doth also assure, that, in Life, there is no Sanctuary so safe, no Protection so secure as that of Friendship, which, together with that Security, conferreth also very great Pleasures.

For as Hatreds, Envy, Despites, are Enemies to Pleasure; so are Friendships not only most faithful Conservators, but effectual Causes of Pleasures, as well to our Friend as to ourselves: By which Men not only enjoy present things more fully, but are cheer'd with Hopes of those to come. And a solitary Life, destitute of Reason being full of Fears, and subject to Treacheries, Reason itself adviseth us to procure Friendships, by which the Mind is confirm'd, and possess'd with Hopes of enjoying future Pleasures.

Now, tho' Friendship is contracted in respect of Use and Utility, in like manner as we sow the Earth in hope of a Crop hereafter; and the first Meetings and Conversations of Friendship are made in respect of the Utility and Pleasures which are hoped from thence; yet when this Custom hath gone on to Intimacy, then Love so flourisheth, that tho' there were not any Benefit of Friendship, yet Friends would be loved for their own sakes. If we love

Places, Temples, Cities, Academies, Plains, Houses, Dogs, Sports, out of an habitual Custom of exercising or hunting, how much easier and more justly may we do this in Conversation with Men?

But in the Choice of our Friends, we must be exceeding cautious and prudent; for it concerns us to be more circumspect with whom we eat, than what we eat. And tho' to eat alone without a Friend, be to lead the Life of a Lion or Wolf, yet we must be careful to chuse such a Friend, whose Conversation may be the best Sauce to our Meat. We must seek one to whom nothing is more in Esteem, than Candor, Simplicity, and Sincerity; one that is not morose, querulous, and murmuring at all things, but who, by his Complacency, Alacrity, and Pleasantness, may render our Life sweet to us.

Friendship, I grant, consists in, and is kept alive by the mutual Participation of Pleasures or Goods which we may enjoy whilst we live; yet is it not necessary that the Goods of Friends should be put into one common Stock, as he conceived, who said, *Amongst Friends all things are common*. This implies a Diffidence, (that all their Wills may not continue constant) and they who are diffident are not Friends; such only are Friends, who can with full Confidence and Freedom take and use so much of their Friends Goods or Estate, as they need, altho' kept in several, not in one Joint-stock, no otherwise than as if it were their own, esteeming them to be no less their own, than if they had them in their own Possession and Keeping.

This sounds strange in the Ears of the Vulgar: But what are they to us? There is no Faith or Constancy in their Kindness and Friendship, they being incapable of these things and of the least Part of commendable Wisdom.

Moreover, he that is one of the Vulgar understands not what is profitable in private or publick, nor can distinguish betwixt good Manners and bad.

I speak therefore of the Wise only, amongst whom there is a kind of League and Covenant not to love their Friends less than themselves, which we know may be done and see it often comes to pass; whence is it manifest, that there can be nothing more conducing to pleasant living than such a Conjunction.

Whence also we understand, that the placing of the chief Good in Pleasure is so far from being obstructive hereunto, that without it there can be no Institution of Friendship.

For it being impossible for us to conserve the Sweetness and Security of our Lives firm and lasting without Friendship, and to preserve Friendship, unless we love our Friends as much as ourselves; this therefore and Pleasure are the inseparable Adjuncts of Friendship; for we rejoice in our Friends Joy as much as if it were our own, and are concern'd equally in his Grief.

A wise Man therefore will be alike towards his Friend as towards himself; what Labour and Pains he undergoes for his own Pleasure, the same will he undergo for the Pleasure of his Friend. And as he would rejoice to think, that he hath one that will sit by him, if he should be sick, and relieve him if he were cast into Prison, or fall into Want; so will he rejoice, as having one, by whom, if he should fall sick, he may sit, and whom, if imprison'd, or fallen into Want, relieve. And not only this, but his Love will be so great as to undergo the greatest Torments, even Death itself, for his Friend's sake.

We have known it certainly happen, (and that within the Memory of our Parents) that many, who had the Happiness of procuring to themselves full Confidence and Security in the Society of Men, living in the same Opinions and the same Affections with them, have, in the Assurance of this comfortable League, lived most sweetly together, and been conjoined with so absolute a Nearness as that one could without the least Reluctancy, wish to suffer for the other, condemn'd to die.

This is all I had to say concerning **ETHICK**, which in the Beginning I asserted to be the chiefest Part of Philosophy. You, whoever you are, that aspire to true Wisdom, practise and meditate upon these Rules, considering them as the Grounds of honest, well, and happy living.

Meditate, I say, upon them Day and Night, as well when you are alone, as when in Company of some faithful Companion who is like yourself, and to whom you may say, We are indeed alone, but by this Means we have the greater Opportunity of making Inquisition into Truth without Prejudice. I speak not to many, but to you; and you speak not to many, but to me; and that's enough, since each to other is a Theatre large enough.

Do you not now grant, that no Man can be compared to him, whose Mind is rightly informed as concerning the Gods, and is fearless of Death, and who hath so reasoned concerning the End of Nature, and the ultimate Good, as to understand, that it may be compleated and attained with the greatest Facility imaginable, and that whatever Ill he must endure, either is short, if vehement; if long, gentle; and telleth himself, that there is no such thing as an in-

evitable Necessity of Fates concerning him, but that he hath an absolute Freedom of Will, and that nothing at all, or very little of Fortune can at any time intervene to cross him; and the rest which we have laid down.

Certainly when you shall come to be such a Man as this, you will never be troubled waking nor sleeping (for even in Sleep you will be just as you are when awake, by reason of the well Compos'dness of your Mind) but shall live like some Deity among Men. For that Man who spends his Life in the Enjoyment of immortal Goods, is far different from a mortal Creature. Hitherto *Gassendus*.

C H A P. XXXI.

Wherein Epicurus, asserting Pleasure to be the ultimate Good, differs from the Cyrenaicks.

THOUGH Epicurus agrees with the Cyrenaicks in asserting Pleasure to be the ultimate Good yet concerning this Pleasure, they disagree. The Cyrenaicks admit not Pleasure to consist in Rest, but in Motion only; Epicurus allowed both, as well that of the Soul as of the Body; as he asserts in his Book Of Election and Avoidance, and in his Treatise of the End, and in his first Book of Lives, and in his Epistle to the Philosophers at Mitylene. Likewise Diogenes in the eleventh of his Select Rules, and Democritus in his Timocrates. For thus; *Whereas Pleasure is twofold, one consisting in Motion, the other in Rest, &c.* And Epicurus, in his Treatise Of Elections, expressly thus; *Of Pleasures, Indolence, and Imperturbation, consist in Rest; and Delight, in Motion.*

Moreover he differs from the Cyrenaicks, for that they conceived the Pains of the Body to be worse than those of the Mind; whence it comes to pass, that, upon Malefactors, corporal Punishment is inflicted as being the most grievous. But Epicurus held, that the Pains of the Mind are the greatest, for that no Ill can afflict the Body longer than whilst it is present; but besides the present, the past and future also torment the Mind; and by the same Reason, the Pleasures of the Soul are the greatest. Thus much of the Epicurean, the last of all the Italic Sect.

* Laert. 10. 1382.

* Laert. 10. 136.

A

CHRONOLOGICAL

TABLE.

<i>Olymp.</i>	<i>Archons.</i>	<i>Olympick Victors.</i>
XXX 2 3 4		
XXXI 2 3 4		
XXXII 2 3 4		
XXXIII 2 3 4		
XXXIV 2 3 4		
XXXV 2 3 4	<i>Damastias.</i> See Life of <i>Thales</i> , Chap. 2.	<i>Sphaerus</i> Dion.
XXXVI 2 3 4	<i>Epænetus.</i> Antig. Carist. Hist. Mir. 133.	<i>Pbryno.</i> Euseb. Probably the same with whom <i>Pittacus</i> fought. Pit. c. 1. but <i>Antigonus Caristius</i> calls the Victor this Year, <i>Arylamas</i> .
XXXVII 2 3 4		
XXXVIII 2 3 4		
XXXIX 2 3 4	<i>Draco.</i> Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. Tatian. Suid.	
XL 2 3 4		

1. *Thales* born. See *Thales*, chap. 2.
 2. *Solon* born about this time.

2. *Ancus Martius* King of *Rome*.
Dion. Halic. lib. 3.

4. *Periander* begun to reign at *Corinth*. *Periander*, chap. 2.

Arion. See *Periander*, chap. 4.

<i>Olymp.</i>	<i>Archons.</i>	<i>Olympick Victors.</i>
XLI 2 3 4	<i>Heniocbides.</i> Halic. lib. 3.	<i>Cleonidas.</i> Dion.
XLII 2 3 4		
XLIII 2 3 4	<i>Aristocles,</i> (perhaps) Marm. Arund.	
XLIV 2 3 4		
XLV 2 3 4	<i>Megacles</i> (perhaps) Plut. in Solon.	
XLVI 2 3 4	<i>Philombrotus.</i> Plut in Solone. <i>Solon.</i> Laert. in Solone. <i>Dropides.</i> Phikoftr. in Critia.	
XLVII 2 3 4	<i>Eucrates.</i> Laert in Amachars. <i>Simon.</i> Marm.	
XLVIII 2 3 4	<i>Philippus.</i> Clem. Strom. 1, Euseb. Chron. 1.	<i>Claucias,</i> Pausan. Glycon. Euseb.
XLIX 2 3 4	<i>Damafias</i> the Second. Marm. See <i>Thales's</i> Life, Chap. 2.	
L 2 3 4	<i>Archestratides.</i> Dionys. Halic. lib. 4.	<i>Epistclides.</i>

[illegible]

<i>Olymp.</i>	<i>Archons.</i>	<i>Olympick Victors.</i>
LI 2 3 4	<i>Ariflomenes.</i> Laert.	
LII 2 3 4		
LIII 2 3 4	<i>Hippoclidcs.</i> Marcellin. in Vita Thucyd.	
LIV 2 3 4	<i>Gomiat.</i> Plut. in Solone Marm.	
LV 2 3 4	<i>Hegestratus.</i> Plut. in Solone.	
LVI 2 3 4	<i>Euthydemus.</i> Marm. Laert. See Life of <i>Chilon.</i>	
LVII 2 3 4		
LVIII 2 3 4	<i>Eraxiclidcs.</i> Pauſ. in Phoc. See Thal.	<i>Diognetus.</i>
LIX 2 3 4		
LX 2 3 4		

Æra Phil.

7		
8	<i>Pittachus dies.</i>	
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15	<i>Pythagoras born.</i>	
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		1. <i>Cyrus</i> began his Reign over <i>Persia</i> .
24		
25		4. <i>Cræsus</i> King of <i>Lydia</i> .
26		
27	<i>Chilon Ephorus. Laert.</i>	
28		
29		
30		
31		
32		
33		
34		
35		
36	<i>Pythagoras went into Ægypt.</i>	
37		
38		
39		1. <i>Cyrus</i> vanquish'd <i>Cræsus</i> .
40		
41		
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<i>Olymp.</i>	<i>Archons.</i>	<i>Olympick Victors.</i>
LXI 2 3 4	— <i>næus</i> 1. <i>Marm.</i> <i>Theribles</i> , Diod. excerpt. p. 241. <i>Heraclides</i> , Dionys. Halic. 4. rather	<i>Agatharcu</i>
LXII 2 3 4		<i>Eryxidas.</i>
LXIII 2 3 4		
LXIV 2 3 4	<i>Miltiades</i> , Halic. 7.	
LXV 2 3 4		
LXVI 2 3 4		
LXVII 2 3 4		
LXVIII 2 3 4	<i>Iſagoras</i> , Halic. 1. & 5.	<i>Iſchomachus.</i>
LXIX 2 3 4	<i>Acyflorides</i> , Hal. 5.	<i>Iſchomachus.</i>
LXX 2 3 4	<i>Myrus</i> , Hal. 5.	<i>Nicæas.</i>

Æra Phil.

47		
48		
49		4. <i>Tarquinius Superbus</i> , King of Rome.
50		<i>Halic.</i> 4.
51		
52		
53	(<i>Arist. Pol.</i> 5.	
54	<i>Pisistratus</i> died, having reigned 17 Years.	
55		
56		
57	<i>Cambyſes</i> , conquers <i>Egypt</i> , and ſends <i>Pythagoras</i> Priſoner to <i>Babylon</i> .	2. <i>Amoſis</i> King of <i>Egypt</i> dies, <i>Pſameticus</i> his Son ſucceeds him.
58		
59		
60		
61		
62		4. <i>Darius Hyſtaſpis</i> , King of <i>Persia</i> .
63		
64		
65		
66		
67		
68		
69		
70	<i>Pythagoras</i> went into <i>Italy</i> .	
71		
72		
73		
74		
75		
76		
77		
78		
79		
80		
81		
82		
83	<i>Anaxagoras</i> born.	
84		
85		
86	<i>Pythagoras</i> died. <i>Euseb.</i>	

<i>Olymp.</i>	<i>Archons.</i>	<i>Olympick Victors.</i>
LXXI 2 3 4	<i>Hipparchus</i> , Halic. 6. <i>Pythecritus</i> , Marm.	<i>Tisicrates</i> .
LXXII 2 3 4	<i>Dagoneus</i> , Hal. 6. <i>Phanippus</i> a Plot. in Aristide. <i>Hybridides</i> , Hal. 7. Paus. El. 2. <i>Aristides</i> , Plut. ib. Marm. <i>Timistoches</i> , Thuc. 1. Paus. lib. 27.	<i>Tisicrates</i> .
LXXIII 2 3 4	<i>Anchises</i> , Hal. 8. <i>Lacratides</i> , Schol. Arist. Suid. <i>Phædon</i> , Plut. <i>Philocrates</i> , Marm.	<i>Astylus</i> .
LXXIV 2 3 4	<i>Leogstratus</i> , Hal. 8. <i>Nicodemus</i> , Hal. 8. <i>Calliades</i> , Marm.	<i>Astylus</i> .
LXXV 2 3 4	<i>Xantippus</i> , Marm. <i>Cal.</i> Hal. 9. Diod. <i>Timosthenes</i> , Marm. <i>Xantippus</i> , Diod. <i>Idimantus</i> , Marm. <i>Timosthenes</i> , Diod. <i>Adimantus</i> , Diod.	
LXXVI 2 3 4	<i>Phædon</i> , Hal. Diod. <i>Dromoclides</i> , Diod. <i>Acestorides</i> , Diod. <i>Menon</i> , Diod.	<i>Scamandrus</i> .
LXXVII 2 3 4	<i>Chares</i> , Marm. Halic. Diod. <i>Praxiergus</i> , Diod. (Socr. chap. 1. <i>Aspaphion</i> , Marm. <i>Demotion</i> , Diod. See <i>Theagenides</i> , Marm.	<i>Dates</i> .
LXXVIII 2 3 4	<i>Theagenides</i> , Hal. Diod. <i>Lyfistratus</i> , Diod. <i>Lyfanius</i> , Diod. <i>Lyfithens</i> , Diod.	<i>Parmenides</i> .
LXXIX 2 3 4	<i>Archedemides</i> , Diod. <i>Archim.</i> Paus. <i>Euthippus</i> , Marm. <i>Thepolemus</i> , Diod. <i>Conon</i> , Diod. <i>Euippus</i> , Diod.	<i>Xenophon</i> .
LXXX 2 3 4	<i>Phasclides</i> , Diod. <i>Phraides</i> , Hal. <i>Philocles</i> , Diod. <i>Bion</i> , Diod. <i>Callias</i> 1. Marm. <i>Mnethefides</i> , Diod.	<i>Torymbas</i> .

<i>Æra Phil.</i>		
87		
88		
89		
90		
91		
92		2. The Fight at <i>Marathon</i> .
93		
94		
95		
96		
97		3. <i>Darius</i> dies, <i>Xerxes</i> succeeds.
98		
99		
100		
101		
102		
103	<i>Anaxagoras</i> went to <i>Athens</i> . <i>Laert.</i>	1. <i>Xerxes</i> crost the <i>Hellepont</i> .
104		The Fight at <i>Salamis</i> .
105		
106		
107		
108		
109		
110		
111		
112		
113	<i>Socrates</i> born. A Stone fell from Heaven,	
114	foretold by <i>Anaxagoras</i> .	
115		
116		
117		
118		
119		
120		1. <i>Artaxerxes Longimanus</i> , King of
121		<i>Persia</i> .
122		
123	<i>Democritus</i> born, <i>Anaxagoras</i> being 40 Years	
124	old. <i>Laert.</i>	
125		
126		

<i>Olymp.</i>	<i>Archons.</i>	<i>Olympick Victors.</i>
LXXXI	<i>Collas</i> , Diod. Hal. 2 <i>Sofistratus</i> , Diod. 3 <i>Ariston</i> , Diod. 4 <i>Lyfocrates</i> , Diod.	<i>Polymnestus</i> .
LXXXII	<i>Cherophanes</i> , Halic. 2 <i>Antidamas</i> , Diod. 3 <i>Euthydemus</i> , Diod. lib. 12. 4 <i>Pedius</i> , Diod.	<i>Lycus</i> .
LXXXIII	<i>Philiscus</i> , Diod. Halic. 2 <i>Timarchides</i> , Diod. 3 <i>Callimachus</i> , Diod. 4 <i>Lyfimachides</i> , Diod.	<i>Crisjon</i> .
LXXXIV	<i>Diphilus</i> , Marm. <i>Praxitelles</i> , Diod. 2 <i>Lyfanius</i> , Diod. 3 <i>D. philus</i> , Diod. Halic. 4 <i>Timocles</i> , Diod.	<i>Crison</i> .
LXXXV	<i>Munichides</i> , Diod. 2 <i>Glaucides</i> , Diod. 3 <i>Theodorus</i> , Diod. 4 <i>Euthemeres</i> , Diod.	<i>Crison</i> .
LXXXVI	<i>Naufmachus</i> , Diod. 2 <i>Antiochides</i> , Diod. 3 <i>Chares</i> , Diod. 4 <i>Apudius</i> , Diod.	<i>Theopompus</i> , or, as <i>Plato</i> , <i>Diopompus</i> .
LXXXVII	<i>Pythodorus</i> , Diod. 2 <i>Euthydemus</i> , Diod. 3 <i>Apollidamus</i> , Diod. 4 <i>Epanimachus</i> , Diod.	<i>Sophon</i> .
LXXXVIII	<i>Dionysus</i> , Diod. <i>Life of Eucl.</i> c. 3. 2 <i>Euclides</i> , Diod. <i>Euclees</i> , Arist. See 3 <i>Euthydemus</i> , Diod. 4 <i>Stratocles</i> , Diod.	<i>Symmachus</i> .
LXXXIX	<i>Ijarchus</i> , Diod. 2 <i>Arintis</i> , Diod. 3 <i>Aicarus</i> , Diod. 4 <i>Asthyphilus</i> , Marm. <i>Ariston</i> , Diod.	<i>Symmachus</i> 2.
XC	<i>Aristophilus</i> , Diod. 2 <i>Archias</i> , Diod. 3 <i>Antiphan</i> , Diod. 4 <i>Ephorinus</i> , Diod.	<i>Hyperbius</i> .

<i>Æra Phil.</i>		
127		
128		
129		
130		
131	<i>Xenophon</i> , born about this time.	1. From the Building of <i>Rome</i> 300.
132		<i>Halic.</i>
133	<i>Anaxagoras</i> condemned, and banished <i>A-</i>	
134	<i>thens</i> .	
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151		1. <i>Archelaus</i> King of <i>Macedon</i> .
152		2. The <i>Peloponnesian</i> War; Year 1
153		2
154		3
155	<i>Anaxagoras</i> died.	4
156		5
157		6
158		7
159	The Fight at <i>Delium</i> , in which were <i>Socrates</i> and <i>Xeno-</i>	8
160	<i>phon</i> . The <i>Clouds</i> of <i>Aristophanes</i> acted.	9
161	The <i>Clouds</i> of <i>Aristophanes</i> acted the second time.	10
162	The time of <i>Xenophon's</i> Symposium.	11
163		12
164		13
165		14
166		15

<i>Olymp.</i>	<i>Archons.</i>	
XCI	<i>Aristomnestus</i> , Diod.	
2	<i>Chabrias</i> , Diod.	
3	<i>Pijander</i> , Diod.	
4	<i>Clescritus</i> , Diod.	
XCII	<i>Callias</i> , Diod. Halic.	
2	<i>Theopompus</i> , Diod.	
3	<i>Glaucippus</i> , Diod. Halic.	
4	<i>Diocles</i> , Diod.	
XCIII	<i>Eutemon</i> , Diod.	
2	<i>Antigenes</i> , Diod.	
3	<i>Callias</i> , Diod.	
4	<i>Alexias</i> , Diod.	
XCIV	<i>Pythodorus</i> .	
2	<i>Euclides</i> , Diod.	
3	<i>Micion</i> , Diod.	
4	<i>Exenætus</i> , Diod.	
XCV	<i>Laches</i> , Diod.	
2	<i>Aristocrates</i> , Diod.	
3	<i>Pisbycles</i> , Diod.	
4	<i>Lyfiades</i> , Diod.	
XCVI	<i>Phormio</i> , Diod.	
2	<i>Diophrantus</i> , Diod.	
3	<i>Eubulides</i> , Diod.	
4	<i>Demostratus</i> , Diod.	
XCVII	<i>Philochus</i> , Diod.	<i>Terires.</i>
2	<i>Nicoetes</i> , Diod.	
3	<i>Demostratus</i> , Diod.	
4	<i>Antipater</i> , Diod.	
XCVIII	<i>Pyrrhion</i> , Diod. <i>Pyrgion</i> , Halic.	<i>Sofippus.</i>
2	<i>Theodotus</i> , Diod.	
3	<i>Myftichides</i> , Diod.	
4	<i>Dexitheus</i> , Diod.	
XCIX	<i>Diotrephes</i> , Diod.	<i>Dicon.</i>
2	<i>Phangstratus</i> , Diod.	
3	<i>Menander</i> , Diod.	
4	<i>Demophilus</i> , Diod.	
C	<i>Pytheus</i> , Marm. Diod.	<i>Diomyfidorus.</i>
2	<i>Nicon</i> , Diod. Halic.	
3	<i>Naufinicus</i> , Diod. Halic.	
4	<i>Callias</i> , Marm. Diod.	

<i>Æra Phil.</i>		
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172		<i>Thucydides ends, Xenophon be-</i> 20
173		<i>gins.</i> 21
174		22
		23
175		2. The first Ascent of <i>Cyrus</i> into 24
176		<i>Asia.</i> 25
177		3. <i>Dionysius</i> made King of <i>Syra-</i> 26
178		<i>cuse.</i> 27
179	The 30 Tyrants at <i>Athens.</i> See <i>Socrat.</i>	
180	<i>chap. 9.</i>	
181	<i>Xenophon's</i> Retreat. The 30 Tyrants put	
182	down.	
183	<i>Socrates</i> put to Death. End of <i>Xenophon's</i> Re-	
184	treat.	
185		
186		
187		
188		1. <i>Ageilaus</i> goes into <i>Asia</i> against the <i>Per-</i>
189		<i>sian.</i>
190		2. <i>Ageilaus</i> call'd him, fights with the <i>Dar-</i>
		<i>tians</i> at <i>Coronea.</i>
		3. <i>Cimon</i> re-edifies the Walls of <i>Athens.</i>
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199	<i>Aristotle</i> born. <i>Laert.</i>	
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<i>Olymp.</i>	<i>Archons.</i>	<i>Olympick Victors.</i>
CI	<i>Cariander</i> , Diod.	<i>Damon.</i>
2	<i>Hippodamus</i> , Diod.	
3	<i>Socrates</i> , Diod.	
4	<i>Ayleus</i> , Marm. Diod.	
CII	<i>Aleisphenes</i> , Diod. Demosth. Halic.	<i>Damon.</i>
2	<i>Phrasclides</i> , Marm. Diod. Dem. Pauf.	
3	<i>Dynicetus</i> , Diod. <i>Dysinctus</i> , Pauf.	
4	<i>Lyfistratus</i> , Diod.	
CIII	<i>Naufgenes</i> , Marm. Diod.	<i>Pithostratus.</i>
2	<i>Polycetus</i> , Diod. <i>Polyzelus</i> , Halic.	
3	<i>Cephisodorus</i> , Marm. Diod.	
4	<i>Chion</i> , Diod.	
CIV	<i>Timocrates</i> , Diod. Halic.	<i>Phocides.</i>
2	<i>Chariclides</i> , Diod.	
3	<i>Molon</i> , Diod. Halic.	
4	<i>Nicopbemus</i> , Diod. Halic.	
CV	<i>Callimedes</i> , Diod. Halic.	<i>Porus.</i>
2	<i>Eucharistus</i> , Diod. Halic.	
3	<i>Cephisodorus</i> , Diod. Halic.	
4	<i>Agathocles</i> , Mar. Diod. Halic. Pauf.	
CVI	<i>Elpinus</i> , Diod. Halic.	<i>Porus.</i>
2	<i>Callistratus</i> , Marm. Diod. Halic.	
3	<i>Diotymus</i> , Diod. Halic.	
4	<i>Eudemus</i> , Diod. Halic.	
CVII	<i>Aristodemus</i> , Diod. Halic.	<i>Suerinas.</i>
2	<i>Theofalus</i> , Diod. Halic.	
3	<i>Apollodorus</i> , Diod. Halic.	
4	<i>Callimachus</i> , Diod. Halic.	
CVIII	<i>Theophilus</i> , Diod. <i>Theomnestus</i> , Halic.	<i>Polycles.</i>
2	<i>Themistocles</i> , Diod. Halic.	
3	<i>Archias</i> , Diod. Halic.	
4	<i>Eubulus</i> , Diod. <i>Eudorus</i> , Halic.	
CIX	<i>Lyciscus</i> , Diod. Halic.	<i>Aristolochus.</i>
2	<i>Pythodorus</i> , Diod. <i>Pythodotus</i> , Halic.	
3	<i>Sofigenes</i> , Diod. Halic.	
4	<i>Nicomachus</i> , Diod. Halic.	
CX	<i>Theophrastus</i> , Diod. Halic.	<i>Anticles.</i>
2	<i>Lyfimachides</i> , Dio. Halic.	
3	<i>Charondas</i> , Diod. <i>Chæronidas</i> , Halic.	
4	<i>Phrynichus</i> , Diod. Halic.	

Æra Phil.

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Eudoxus flourished. *Laert.*

Plato died 82 Years old, *Athen.*
Aristotle went to *Hermias* at *Atarne.*
Aristotle went to *Mytilene.* *Laert.*

Aristotle went to King *Philip*, *Alexander*
being 15 Years old. *Laert.*

1. *Diomyfius* the Elder dieth, succeeded
by his Son,

3. *Dion* murdered.

<i>Olymp.</i>	<i>Archons.</i>	<i>Olympick Victors.</i>
CI	<i>Cariander</i> , Diod.	<i>Damon.</i>
2	<i>Hippodamus</i> , Diod.	
3	<i>Socratides</i> , Diod.	
4	<i>Acleus</i> , Marm. Diod.	
CII	<i>Aleisphenes</i> , Diod. Demosth. Halic.	<i>Damon.</i>
2	<i>Phraetichides</i> , Marm. Diod. Dem. Pauf.	
3	<i>Dynicetus</i> , Diod. <i>Dykinetus</i> , Pauf.	
4	<i>Lyfistratus</i> , Diod.	
CIII	<i>Nausigenes</i> , Marm. Diod.	<i>Pithagstratus.</i>
2	<i>Polycelus</i> , Diod. <i>Polyzelus</i> , Halic.	
3	<i>Cyphiodorus</i> , Marm. Diod.	
4	<i>Ghica</i> , Diod.	
CIV	<i>Timocrates</i> , Diod. Halic.	<i>Phocides.</i>
2	<i>Charicliides</i> , Diod.	
3	<i>Molon</i> , Diod. Halic.	
4	<i>Nicophemus</i> , Diod. Halic.	
CV	<i>Callimedes</i> , Diod. Halic.	<i>Porus.</i>
2	<i>Eucharistus</i> , Diod. Halic.	
3	<i>Cyphiodorus</i> , Diod. Halic.	
4	<i>Agathocles</i> , Mar. Diod. Halic. Pauf.	
CVI	<i>Elpinus</i> , Diod. Halic.	<i>Porus.</i>
2	<i>Callistratus</i> , Marm. Diod. Halic.	
3	<i>Diotymus</i> , Diod. Halic.	
4	<i>Eudemus</i> , Diod. Halic.	
CVII	<i>Aristodemus</i> , Diod. Halic.	<i>Suierinas.</i>
2	<i>Theofalus</i> , Diod. Halic.	
3	<i>Apollodorus</i> , Diod. Halic.	
4	<i>Callimachus</i> , Diod. Halic.	
CVIII	<i>Theophilus</i> , Diod. <i>Theomnifus</i> , Halic.	<i>Polycles.</i>
2	<i>Themistocles</i> , Diod. Halic.	
3	<i>Archias</i> , Diod. Halic.	
4	<i>Eubulus</i> , Diod. <i>Eudorus</i> , Halic.	
CIX	<i>Lycifcus</i> , Diod. Halic.	<i>Arsilochus.</i>
2	<i>Pythodorus</i> , Diod. <i>Pythodotus</i> , Halic.	
3	<i>Sofigenes</i> , Diod. Halic.	
4	<i>Nicomachus</i> , Diod. Halic.	
CX	<i>Theophrastus</i> , Diod. Halic.	<i>Anticles.</i>
2	<i>Lyfimachides</i> , Dio. Halic.	
3	<i>Charondas</i> , Diod. <i>Cheronidas</i> , Halic.	
4	<i>Phrynichus</i> , Diod. Halic.	

Æra Phil.

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215	<i>Eudoxus flourished. Laert.</i>	1. <i>Dionysius</i> the Elder dieth, succeeded by his Son.
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229		3. <i>Dion</i> murdered.
230		
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235	<i>Plato</i> died 82 Years old, <i>Athen.</i>	
236	<i>Aristotle</i> went to <i>Hermias</i> at <i>Atarne.</i>	
237		
238	<i>Aristotle</i> went to <i>Mytilene. Laert.</i>	
239	<i>Aristotle</i> went to King <i>Philip, Alexander</i>	
240	being 15 Years old. <i>Laert.</i>	
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<i>Olymp.</i>	<i>Archons.</i>	<i>Olympick Victors.</i>
CXI 1 2 3 4	<i>Pythodorus</i> , Diod. <i>Pythodorus</i> , Halic. <i>Eucæstus</i> , Diod. Halic. <i>Ctesicles</i> , Diod. Halic. <i>Nicærates</i> , Diod. Halic.	<i>Cleomantis</i> .
CXII 1 2 3 4	<i>Niceratus</i> , Diod. <i>Nicetes</i> , Halic. <i>Aristophanes</i> , Diod. Halic. <i>Aristophan</i> , Diod. Halic. <i>Cephalopora</i> , Diod.	<i>Gryllus</i> .
CXIII 1 2 3 4	<i>Euthycritus</i> , Diod. Halic. <i>Chromes</i> , Diod. <i>Hegemon</i> , Halic. <i>Anticles</i> , Diod. <i>Chromes</i> , Halic. <i>Seficles</i> , Diod. <i>Anticles</i> , Halic.	
CXIV 1 2 3 4	<i>Agasias</i> , Diod. <i>Cephalodorus</i> , Diod. Halic. <i>Philocles</i> , Diod. Halic. <i>Archippus</i> , Halic.	<i>Micinas</i> .
CXV 1 2 3 4	<i>Neachmus</i> , Diod. <i>Apollodorus</i> , Diod. Halic. <i>Archippus</i> , Diod. Halic. <i>Demogenes</i> , Diod. Halic.	<i>Dinomenes</i> .
CXVI 1 2 3 4	<i>Democides</i> , Diod. Halic. <i>Praxibulus</i> , Diod. Halic. <i>Nicodorus</i> , Diod. Halic. <i>Theoprostus</i> , Diod. Halic.	<i>Parmenio</i> .
CXVII 1 2 3 4	<i>Polemon</i> , Diod. Halic. <i>Simonides</i> , Diod. Halic. <i>Hieromonon</i> , Diod. Halic. <i>Demetrius Phalereus</i> , Diod. Halic.	<i>Apollonides</i> .
CXVIII 1 2 3 4	<i>Charinus</i> , Diod. <i>Cærimus</i> , Halic. <i>Anaxicrates</i> , Diod. Halic. <i>Corybus</i> , Diod. <i>Coræbus</i> , Halic. <i>Xenippus</i> , Diod. <i>Euxenippus</i> , Halic.	<i>Andromætes</i> .
CXIX 1 2 3 4	<i>Pherecles</i> , Diod. <i>Phericles</i> , Halic. <i>Leistratus</i> , Diod. Halic. <i>Niccles</i> , Diod. Halic. <i>Calliarbus</i> , Halic.	
CXX 1 2 3 4	<i>Hegemachus</i> , Halic. <i>Euclemen</i> , Halic. <i>Mnesidemus</i> , Halic. <i>Antiphanes</i> , Halic.	

*Æra Phil.*247 *Aristotle teacheth in the Lyceum 13 Years.*

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*Aristotle went to Chalcis, and died there,
63 Years old. Laert.*

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1. *Alexander* begun to reign.3. *Alexander's* Expedition into *Asia*,
against *Darius*.

<i>Olymp.</i>	<i>Archons.</i>	<i>Olympick Victors.</i>
CXXI 2 3 4	<i>Niciar</i> , Halic. <i>Nicostratus</i> , Halic. <i>Olympiodorus</i> , Halic. <i>Philippus</i> , Halic.	
CXXII 2 3 4		
CXXIII 2 3 4		<i>Idæus</i> , Pausan. Eliac. 2.
CXXIV 2 3 4		
CXXV 2 3 4		
CXXVI 2 3 4		
CXXVII 2 3 4	<i>Pytharatus</i> . Cic.	
CXXVIII 2 3 4		
CXXIX 2 3 3	<i>Diognetus</i> .	
CXXX 2 3 4		

<i>Æra Phil.</i>		
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<i>Olymp.</i>	<i>ÆraPhil.</i>		
CXXXI	327		
2	328		
3	329		
4	330		
CXXXII	331		
2	332		
3	333		
4	334		
CXXXIII	335		
2	336		
3	337		
4	338		
CXXXIV	339		
2	340		
3	341		
4	342		
CXXXV	343		
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3	345		
4	346		
CXXXVI	347		
2	348		
3	349		
4	350		
CXXXVII	351		
2	352		
3	353		
4	354		
CXXXVIII	355		
2	356		
3	357		
4	358		
CXXXIX	359		
2	360		
3	361		
4	362		
CXL	363		
2	364		
3	365		
4	366		

<i>Olymp.</i>	<i>ÆraPhil.</i>		
CXLI	367		
2	368		
3	369		
4	370		
CXLII	371		
2	372		
3	373		
4	374		
CXLIII	375		
2	376		
3	377		
4	378		
CXLIV	379		
2	380		
3	381		
4	382		
CXLV	383		
2	384		
3	385		
4	386		
CXLVI	387		
2	388		
3	389		
4	390		
CXLVII	391		
2	392		
3	393		
4	394		
CXLVIII	395		
2	396		
3	397		
4	398		
CXLIX	399		
2	400		
3	401		
4	402		
CL	403		
2	404		
3	405		
4	406		
CLI	407		
2	408		
3	409		
4	410		

<i>Olymp.</i>	<i>Æra Phil.</i>		
CLII	411		
2	412		
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CLIII	415		
2	416		
3	417		
4	418		
CLIV	419		
2	420		
3	421		
4	422		
CLV	423		
2	424		
3	425		
4	426		
CLVI	427		
2	428		
3	429		
4	430		
CLVII	431		
2	432		
3	433		
4	434		
CLVIII	435		
2	436		
3	437		
4	438		
CLIX	439		
2	440		
3	441		
4	442		
CLX	443		
2	444		
3	445		
4	446		
CLXI	447		
2	448		
3	449		
4	450		
CLXII	451	<i>Clitomachus flourished.</i>	
2	452		
3	453		
4	454	<i>Carneades died.</i>	

A Topographical TABLE.

A.

Aldera, a City of *Thrace*, situate next beyond the River *Nessus*, toward the East; founded and named by *Aldera*, Sister to *Diomedes*, in the 104th Year after the taking of *Troy*: And afterwards, (*Olymp.* 31.) re-edify'd by a Colony of *Clazomenians*.

Ægina, an Island over-againſt *Epidaurus*, in the *Saronian Bay*.

Ægos Potamos, a River in the *Thracian Chersonesus*, diſtant from *Sestos* 15 Furlongs.

Ægypt, a Kingdom of *Africa*, moſt eminent; divided into the Upper and Lower: It had twenty thousand Cities, the principal were *Memphis*, *Dioſpolis*, and *Heliopolis*; its River, *Nilus*.

Agrianes, a People of *Thrace*, dwelling upon the River *Agrianes*, betwixt the Mountains *Rhodope* and *Hæmus*. Of this Country perhaps was *Hippomedon* the *Pythagorean*, mentioned by *Jamblichus*. [*Deſt. Pyth.* p. 1. chap. 8.]

Agrigentum. See *Pythag.* chap. 10.

Ambracia, an eminent City of *Epirus*, in the Bottom of the *Abzacian Bay*, upon the River *Aracanthus*, not far from the Sea. The *Ambracian Bay* parts *Epirus* from *Acarnania*.

Atarna, a City of *Myſia*.

Athens, the chief City of *Greece*, ſeated in *Attica*; founded by *Cecrops*.

Attica, an eminent Region of *Greece*, bounding on the Territory of *Megara*, on the Shore over-againſt *Salamis*; and on the Territory of the *Bæotians*, by Sea, at *Orpus*; by Land, at *Panacium*, at *Oenæ*, at *Hyſie*.

B.

Bæotia, a Region of *Greece*, between *Attica* and *Phocis*; reaching from the *Ægean Sea* to the *Corinthian Isthmus*.

Brachmanes. See *Pythag.* ch. 5.

Branchidæ, a Town where there was a Temple to *Apollo*, on the *Mileſian Shore*, between the Promontory of *Poſideum*, and the City *Miletus*.

Byzantium, a City of *Thrace*, ſituate at the Entrance of the *Bosphorus*, over-againſt *Chalcedon*; *Conſtantine* afterwards enlarg'd it, from whom it is now called *Conſtantinople*.

C.

Caria, a Region of *Aſia*, bounded on the North by *Ionis*, on the Eaſt by *Lycia*, on the Weſt by the

Carpathian Sea, on the South by the *Rhodian*: Its principal Cities were *Miletus*, *Mindus*, *Halycarnesus*, and *Gnidus*.

Catana. See *Pythag.* chap. 10.

Chalcedon, a City of *Bithynia*, over-againſt *Byzantium* in the Mouth of *Pontus Euxinus*. From its nearneſs to *Byzantium*, which is leſs than a Mile, it was termed (*Pliny* ſaith) *The City of the Blind*.

Chene, an obſcure Village, either belonging to *Oſſæ*, or *Lacedæmonia*; not mentioned (that I know of,) by any Geographer.

Chios, an Island and City of the *Ionians*, diſtant from *Lesbos* about 400 Furlongs, and 900 Furlongs in Circuit.

Cilicia, an eminent Kingdom of *Aſia*, denominated from *Cilix*, Son of *Rhea*; lying betwixt *Pamphylia* to the Weſt, and *Syria* to the Eaſt, and Mount *Taurus* to the North, and the *Cilician Sea* to the South.

Cirrha, a maritime City of *Phocis*, ſeated in the *Corinthian Bay*, at the Foot of the Mountain *Parnassus*, over-againſt *Sicyon*, diſtant from *Delphi* 60 Furlongs. From *Delphi* to *Cirrha* runs the River *Phlœus*: It is the Haven or Town of Shipping for *Delphi*. It bordereth on *Locris*.

Clazomenæ, an *Ionick City* in *Lydia*, ſituate in the *Chersonesus of Erythræa*, confining on the *Erythræans*, theſe being within the *Chersonesus*: the *Clazomenians* without it, in the narroweſt Part of the *Isthmus*.

Cnidus, a City of the *Dorians in Aſia*, by the Sea, called *Tropium*; on the North is the *Cerauntian Bay*; on the South, the *Rhodian Sea*.

Cnoſſus, a City of *Creet*.

Corcyra, an Island in the *Ionian Sea*, over-againſt *Epirus*, from which it is but 12 Miles diſtant.

Corinth, an eminent City near the *Isthmus of Peloponnesus*, governed Democratically.

Cos, an Island of the *Carpathian Sea*, with a City in it of the ſame Name, oppoſite to *Tarmerium*, a Promontory of the *Myndians*. It belonged to the *Dorians of Aſia*, called *Cos Meropeidis*, becauſe inhabited of old by the *Meropeians*. It was moſt eminent for being the Country of *Hippocrates* the Phyſician. [*Heraclit.* chap. 3.]

Crænon, a City of *Theſſaly*, bordering upon *Macedonia*, diſtant from *Crato* an 100 Furlongs.

Crate, an Island in the Mouth of the *Ægean Sea*, between *Rhodes* and *Peloponnesus*; famous for the Birth and Priests of *Jupiter*, and Laws of *Minos*; for both which viſited by many Philoſophers.

Crotone. See *Pythag.* chap. 10.

Cyclades, Islands in the *Ægean Sea*; so called, for that they lye round about the Island *Delos*; their Number and Order, according to *Strabo*, is this, *Helenia*, *Cos*, *Cythus*, *Scriphus*, *Melos*, *Siphnus*, *Cimolia*, *Prospinthus*, *Olearus*, *Naxus*, *Parus*, *Syrus*, *Myconus*, *Tenus*, *Andrus*, *Gyarus*.

Cyprus, an Island in the *Carpathian Sea*, situate betwixt *Syria* and *Cilicia*.

Cyrene, a City of *Africa*, the Metropolis of the *Cyrenaick Province*, which contained besides, *Apollonia*, *Barce*, *Tenchira* and *Berenice*.

Cythera, an Island in the *Ægean Sea*, opposite to *Malea*, a Promontory of *Laconia*, and distant from it 40 Furlongs, opposite directly to the City *Bæa*.

Cyzicus, an Island and City of *Mysia* in *Asia*, seated on the *Propontis*, at the Mouth of the River *Æsopus*; built after *Rome* 70 Years, at the same time as *Miletus*.

D.

Delium, a little Town in *Bœotia*, by the Sea-side, in the Territory of *Tanagra*, opposite to *Chalcis* of *Eubæa*. Here there was a Temple of *Apollo*.

Delos, an Island in the *Ægean Sea*, the chiefest of those that were called *Cyclades*, and in it a City, with a Temple of *Apollo*. It is distant from *Andros* 15 Miles, and as many from *Myconus*; from *Eubæa* 30 Miles to the West.

Delphia, a City of *Phocis* in *Achaia*, at the Foot of the Mountain *Parnassus*, on the South Part of the Hill; famous for the Temple and Oracle of *Apollo*; threescore Furlongs from the Sea.

E.

Ælia, a City of *Magna Græcia*. See *Xenophanes*, chap. 1.

Elis, a Region on the West Part of *Peloponnesus*, bounded on the North by the Promontory *Araxus*, and divided from *Messenia* in the Parts towards the Sea, by the River *Neda*; the principal City thereof bore the same Name, distant from the Sea 120 Furlongs, from *Olympia* almost 300.

Ephesus, a Maritime City of *Ionis*, built by the Amazons, 40 Years after the taking of *Troy*. It was famous for the Temple of *Diana*, burnt by *Hærostratus*, after it had stood 385 Years.

Epidaurum, a City of *Argia* in *Peloponnesus*, seated by the Sea, in the inmost Part of the *Saronian Bay*.

Erebus, a City of *Lesbos*, between *Pyrrha* and the Promontory *Sigium*.

Eretria, a maritime City of *Eubæa*, between *Chalcis* and *Gergusa*, opposite to *Oropus* in *Attica*; distant from *Chalcis* 20 Miles to the East.

Eubæa, a great Grecian Island, opposite to the Continent of *Attica*, and *Bœotia*, and *Locris*, extending from *Sunium* as far as *Thessaly*; the Length

of it is reckoned to be 150 Miles: Its principal Cities, *Chalcis*, *Carystus*, and *Eretria*.

G.

Galatæ, Galli.

H.

Hellas, first signified only a City of *Thessaly*, betwixt *Pharsalus* and *Melissæa*, named from *Hellen* Son of *Deucalion*, *Thucydides*, lib. 1. *Stephanus*: Whence *Eustathius*, throughout *Homer*, interprets *ἡλαδæ* and *ἡλλανας*, only that City of *Thessaly* and *Thessalians*. Afterwards the Word extended to all that Tract of Land, which is from the *Sunian* Promontory to *Acarnania* and *Athamænæ* on the East, and to *Thessaly* on the North, unto the *Mælian Bay*. This is the *Hellas* of *Ptolemy*, who excludes *Thessaly*, which first gave that Name to *Greece*, out of the Name *Hellas*. Thirdly, in a larger Acceptation, besides that Tract, it includes also *Thessaly* and *Peloponnesus*, and most of the Islands in the *Ægean Sea*; and this is the *Greece* of *Strabo*. Lastly, besides those Countries, it implies *Asia* the lesser, and some Parts of the *African Shore*; and, in a word, all Places inhabited by the *Grecians*: In which Sense, it is most commonly used by the later Authors.

Heraclea of *Pontus*, a City of *Bithynia*, the Metropolis of the *Mariandyni*, seated upon the *Euxine Sea*. See *Xenoph.*

Himera. See *Pythag.* chap. 10.

Hyperboreans, a People of *Scythia*, so named from the *Hyperborean Mountains*.

I.

Imbras, an Island in the *Ægean Sea*, not far from the *Thracian Chersonesus*, distant from *Lemnos* 22 Miles.

Ionis, a Region of *Asia*, lying upon the *Ægean Sea*, inhabited by the *Grecians*, reaching from *Pysidium*, a Promontory of *Miletus*, on the South, to *Phocæa*, and the Mouth of the River *Hermus* on the North; its chief Cities, *Miletus* and *Ephesus*.

L.

Lacedæmon, the chief City of *Laconia*, on the West-side of the River *Eurotas*, remote from the Sea, lying beneath the Mountain *Taygetus*; to which was ascribed its Unhealthfulness. *Pyth.*

Lampsacum, a City of *Mysia*, seated on the *Helle-spont*, at the Mouth of the River *Granicus*, having *Parus* on the North, and *Abydus* on the South.

Larissa, there were two Cities in *Thessaly* of this Name.

Lebedus, a maritime City of *Ionis*, between *Colophon* to the South, and *Tes* to the North; distant from each, 120 Furlongs.

Lesbos, an Island in the *Ægean Sea*, over-against *Æolis* in *Asia*, distant from *Lemnos*, *Tenedos*, and *Chios*,

Chios, almost equally ; less than 500 Furlongs from the farthest of them. *Cities*, *Mitylene* and *Methymna*. Promontories ; to the North, *Sigrium* ; to the East, *Melaë*.

Lindus, one of the three chief Cities of the Island *Rhodes*, situate on the right Hand to them that sail from the City of *Rhodes* Southward.

Locri in Italy. See *Pythag.* chap. 10.

Lydia, a Kingdom of *Asia*, lying betwixt *Ionis* to the West, and *Phrygia magna* to the East.

M.

Magna Græcia. *Ovid. Fast.* 4.

For the Italian Land was Greater Greece.

Hither Evander did his Navy steer,

Hither Alcides sail'd ; both Grecians were.

The Club-arm'd Traveller, whose Herd did stray

On Aventine, here drunk of Albula.

That here Ulysses was, Lestrigons best,

And the Shore nam'd from Circe, can attest.

Not long ago, of Telegone appear'd

The Walls, and Tiber, both by Grecians rear'd.

Hither Hæcylus forc'd Atreides Death,

Who to Faliscus did his Name bequeath.

Antenor add, who for Troy's Peace did plead ;

And (Son t' Apulian Daunus) Diomed.

Hither Æneas, since Antenor, came,

And brought his Gods, rescu'd from Ilion's Flame :

Him Solimus from Ida did attend,

From whom to Sulmo did that Name descend.

But though *Ovid* takes it for *Italy* in general, yet *Pliny* more cautiously saith, it comprehended a great Part thereof (quotam Partem.) *Athenæus* almost all Italy. And perhaps no otherwise is *Festus* to be understood, than as of a great Part, when he saith, Italy was called Major Græcia, because the Sicilians possessed it, or because many great Cities thereof were derived from the Greeks. And *Servius*, Italy is called Μαγδαλα *Ἑλλάς*, because from Tarentum to Cumæ, all the Cities were built by the Greeks. More expressly *Strabo*, All that Side of Italy, which lies upon the low Sea, was called Major Græcia. And so indeed is it set out by Geographers, but including also Sicily.

Mantinea, a City of *Arcadia* in *Peloponnesus*, confining on *Argia*, *Tegæa*, *Methydrium*, and *Orchomenus*, near to *Megalopolis*.

Marathon, a Town of *Attica*, over-against *Eratia* of *Eubæa*, between *Rhamnus* and *Brauron* ; distant from *Athens* ten Miles, and as much from *Caristius* in *Eubæa*.

Media, the greatest Kingdom in *Asia*, lying betwixt *Armenia* the Greater, to the West, and *Parthia* and *Hyrcania* to the East ; extending Northward to the *Caspian Sea*, and Southward to *Assyria* and *Susiana*.

Megara, a City confining with *Attica* at *Eleusis*, distant from the Sea eighteen Furlongs.

Memphis, a City of *Egypt*, built by *Ofiris*, at the Point of *Dellia*, over-against *Babylon*.

Metapontum. See *Pythag.* chap. 10.

Miletus, an Ionick City of *Caria*, the furthestmost towards the South, next to *Pesidum*, situate 12 Furlongs from the Mouth of the River *Mæander* ; built by *Miletus*, Son of *Apollon*.

Mitylene, the chief City of *Lebas*, situate between *Methymna* and *Malea*, distant from *Malea* 70 Furlongs, from *Canaë* 120 Furlongs. *Cicero* much commends it for Situation, Beauty of the Buildings, and Fruitfulness of the Soil. *Cic. de leg. agr.* 2.

Munychia, a Promontory of *Attica*, which, with *Piræus*, made the Harbour of the *Athenian* Shipping, with three fair Havens within it. At the Mouth of the River *Lifissus*, on the West is *Firæus* ; on the East, the Promontory *Sunium*.

O.

Ostæa, a City of *Thassaly*, named from the Mountain *Ostæa*.

Olympia, a Place in *Elis*, with a Temple dedicated to *Jupiter*, upon the Side of the River *Alpheus*, distant from the Sea 80 Furlongs. Here were celebrated the Games called *Olympick*.

P.

Parnas, a Mountain of *Attica*.

Paros, an Island in the *Ægean Sea* ; one of the *Cyclades*.

Peloponnesus, a Grecian Peninsula, within the Isthmus of *Corinth*, containing many Regions, whereof the Principal, *Achaia*, *Elis*, *Messenia*, *Laconica*, and *Argia* ; the most eminent Cities, *Messina*, *Corinth*, *Tegæa*, *Lacedæmon*, *Argos*.

Phœnicia, a Region of *Syria* lying next the Sea ; it contained four eminent Cities, *Tripolis*, *Byblus*, *Tyre*, and *Sidon*. The *Phœnicians* were Inventors of Navigation and Arithmetick ; great Merchants, but subtle, deceitful, and thievish to a Proverb, *Phœnicium more*. Whence *Polemo* said of *Zeno*, He came to steal Learning (συνεμάχετο) like a *Phœnician* (not *Phœniceo amictu*, as rendered) *Zen. chap.* 2.

Phlogandros, an Island to the West of the Island *Ios*, of very mean Account, as appears by *Solon's* Expression, *chap.* 2.

Piræus, a Town and Haven of *Attica*, serving for the Shipping of *Athens*, in the midst betwixt *Pegæ* and *Sunium*, distant from *Athens* 40 Furlongs.

Pisa, a City of the *Peloponnesus*, situate at the River *Alpheus* and the *Pisæan* Mountain.

Pesidonia, *Pesstum*, a Maritime City of *Lucania* in *Italy*, betwixt *Salernus* to the West, and *Velia* to the East ; built by the *Dariens* and *Sybarites*.

Priene, a Maritime City of *Caria* in *Ionis*, between the Mouth of *Mæander*, and the Mountain *Mycale*.

Pylus, a City of *Messenia*, in the Promontory *Coryphasium*, distant from *Melitone* 100 Furlongs.

R.

Rhegium. See *Pythag.* chap. 10.

S.

Salamis, an Island in the *Saronick Bay*, betwixt *Peloponnesus* and *Attica*; adjacent to *Eleusis* of *Attica*, and to *Ægina*.

Same, a City in the Island *Cephalonia*, at the Passage between it and *Ithaca*. From hence went *Antæus*, who first planted a Colony in the Island *Samus*, which he so named from *Same*. See *Pythag.* chap. 1.

Samus, an *Ionian* Island, and a City of the same Name; the Island is 600 Furlongs about, and *Possidium*, a Promontory thereof, not above seven Furlongs from the Continent. The City standeth on the South Part of it, at the Sea-side. It was first called *Melampyllos*, as *Strabo*; or *Melampyllos*, as *Jamblichus*. See *Pythag.* chap. 1.

Sardis, the Metropolis of *Lydia*, situate under the Hill *Tmolus*, upon the River *Pactolus*.

Scaphis, a City of *Troas* in *Asia*, seated on *Cottylus*, the highest Part of Mount *Ida*, whence floweth the River *Scamander*.

Sicinus, an Island not far from *Melos*, on the West of the Island *Ios*; obscure, and of no Esteem, as appears by *Solon's* Expression, chap. 2. and *Aristophanes* in his *Clouds*, Act. 1. Scen. 2.

Sicyon, a City of *Peloponnesus*, Metropolis of the Kingdom of *Sicyonia*, between *Corinth* and *Acchaia*, distant 100 Furlongs from *Phlius*.

Senepe, a Maritime City of *Paphlagonia*.

Sparta, all one with *Lacedæmon*.

Stagira, a City of *Thrace*, seated in the Bay of *Strymon*, between *Argilus* and *Acanthus*. See *Arist.* chap. 1.

Sunium, a Promontory in *Attica*, together with a Town of the same Name, between the *Saronick Bay*, and the Sea towards *Lubæa*.

Sybaris. See *Pythag.* chap. 10.

Syrus, an Island in the *Ægean Sea*, one of the *Cyclades*, 20 Miles distant from *Delus*, to the North. The Adjective is *Syrius*; as on the contrary, the Adjective of *Syria* is *Syrus*, which the Interpreters of *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Eusebius*, *Theodoret*, *Diogenes Laertius*, and others, not observed, who, render *σαρκεύδης* ἢν *Σύριον*, *Pherecidem Syrum*; much less they, who, as an Argument to prove that Learning was brought out of *Syria* into *Greece*, instance *Pherecydes*, Master to *Pythagoras*, the first Philosopher.

T.

Tanarus, a Promontory of *Laconia* in *Peloponnesus*, parting the *Laconian* and *Messenian Bays*.

Tarentum. See *Pythag.* chap. 10.

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Taygetus, a Mountain of *Laconia*, at the River *Eurotas*, and the City *Sparta*, which City was subject to Disasters, by reason of that Mountain's hanging over it.

Thebes, a City of *Boeotia*, seated at the River *Asopus* and *Istmenus*; built by *Cadmus*.

Thyatira, a City of *Lydia*, seated upon the River *Lycus*, betwixt *Sardis* and *Pergamum*.

Troas, a Territory of *Asia* the Less, upon the side of the *Ægean Sea*, between *Æolis* and *Helle-spont*; having a City of the same Name.

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Marius entertains *Theodorus*. *Theod. chap. 1.*
 Marks affixed to *Plato's* Writings. *Plat. chap. 15.*
 Mathematick. *Pyth. doct. p. 2. chap. 2.*
 Medicine. *Pyth. doct. p. 3. Sect. 4.*
Megacles. *Sol. chap. 3.*
Megarenses Contest with the *Athenians*, concerning *Salamis*. *Sol. ch. 2.*
Megarenses recover *Salamis*, *Sol. chap. 2.* take
Nysæa. *Ibid. chap. 3.*
Megarenses prohibited by Decree to come within the *Athenian* Jurisdiction. *Euclid. chap. 1.*
Melitus accuseth *Socrates*. *Socr. chap. 11.*
Mentor. *Carn. chap. 4.*
 Middle-Academy, *Arcef. chap. 2.* upon what Occasion *Lacydes* betook himself to it. *Lac.*
 Mill-Song. *Pitt. chap. 1.*
Milo. *Pyth. chap. 23.*
 Mind, *Anaxagoras* so termed. *Anax. chap. 1.*
Mnesarchus, Son of *Pythagoras*. *Pyth. 21.*
 Moral Philosophy, by whom invented. *Archelaus.*
Moses afforded Light to *Plato*. *Plat. chap. 4.*
Munychia, the Haven of *Athens*. *Epim.*
Muses. *Pyth. chap. 13.*
Musick. *Pyth. doct. p. 2. Sect. 2.*

N.

- Neleus*, long before *Thales*. *Thal. chap. 1.*
 New-Academy. *Carn. chap. 2.*
Nichemachus, Son of *Aristotle*. *Arist. chap. 13.*
Noemenia. *Sol. chap. 7.*

O.

- Oath taken by the Senate of *Athens*. *Sol. chap. 7.*
 Oblong-Number, what, *Plat. ch. 7.*
Olympia, Mother to *Alexander*. *Arist. chap. 5.*
 Olympiads,

Olympiads instituted by *Iphitus*, long before *Choræbus*, who is commonly conceived the first Victor. *Thal. ch. 2.*
 Olympick Sect design'd by *Alexinus*. *Alex.*
 Oracle mistaken by *Diogenes*. *Diog. ch. 1.*
 Oracle. *Pyth. ch. 2.*

P.

Palamedes, a Tragedy of *Euripides*. *Socr. ch. 14.*
Panionium, one common Temple belonging to
 12 *Ionian* Cities. *Bias, ch. 1.*
Peeloponnesian War. *Soc. ch. 7.*
Periander, at what time he began to reign.
Per. ch. 2.
Pericles. *Anaxag. ch. 5.*
Peripateticks, whence so called. *Arist. ch. 6.*
Phalaris kill'd. *Pyth. ch. 17.*
Pherecydes, at what time he died. *Pyth. ch. 2.*
Philip receives *Xenocrates* Ambassador from *Athens*.
Xenocr. ch. 3. Sends for *Aristotle*. *Arist. ch. 5.*
Philistus. *Plat. ch. 9.*
Philocyprus, King of *Cyprus*. *Sol. ch. 8.*
 Philosophers banish'd *Athens*. *Theophr. ch. 2.*
 Philosophy, why so called. *Pyth. ch. 8.*
Phryne, an *Athenian* Courtesan. *Xenocr. ch. 2.*
Phryno, slain by *Pittacus*. *Pit. ch. 1.*
Phthiriasts. *Pherec.*
Pisistratus gains the Tyranny of *Athens*. *Sol. ch.*
 10, 12.
Pisthanates, Death's Orator, *Hegesias*: Why so
 called. *Heg. ch. 1.*
Pittaceian Sentence. *Pit. ch. 1.*
Pittaceian Field. *Pit. ch. 1.*
Plato fought not at *Delium*. *Plat. ch. 2.*
Plato not supplanted by *Aristotle*. *Arist. ch. 3.*
 The Word [Poem] by whom first used. *Plat. 1. 7.*
Pompey visits *Pogonius*. *Pogid.*
Potidæa besieged. *Socr. ch. 7.*
 Predictions of *Anaxagoras*. *Anax. ch. 3.*
 Predictions of *Thales*. *Thal. ch. 13.*
 Predictions of *Epimenides*. *Epim.*
 Predictions of *Anaximander*. *Anax. ch. 1.*
 Predictions of *Chilon*. *Chil. ch. 1.*
Primo conquer'd. *Bias, ch. 1.*
 Principle and Element, by whom first distinguish'd.
Plat. ch. 7.
 Principle and Element confounded by the first Philo-
 sophers. *Thal. ch. 6. § 1.*
Prodicus the Sophist. *Socr. ch. 3.*
Protagoras a Sophist. *Socr. ch. 10.*
 Proverb, *Samian* Comet. *Pyth. ch. 2.*
 Proverb, These are under the Government of *Ni-*
no. *Pyth. ch. 18.*
Proxenus accompanies *Cyrus* in his Expedition.
Xen. ch. 2.
Proxenus educated *Aristotle*. *Arist. ch. 2.*
Psamminitus, the same with *Auslæus* and *Semni-*
forteus. *Pyth. chap. 5.*

Ptolomy, Son of *Lagus*, entertains *Theodorus* the
 Atheist. *Theod. chap. 1.*
Ptolomy's Question to *Euclid*. *Eucl. chap. 3.*
 Pyramid's height, how taken by *Thales*. *Thal.*
chap. 7. § 2.
Pythagoras, his Time. *Pyth. chap. 10.*
Pythagoras the Wrestler. *Pyth. chap. 2. bis, ch.*
 6. *ch. 22.*
Pythagoras esteem'd a God. *Pyth. doct. p. 1. ch. 1.*
Pythagoreans Exorcetick. *Pyth. doct. p. 1. ch. 2,*
 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.
Pythagoreans Esoterick. *Pyth. doct. p. 1. ch. 8,*
 9, 10, 11.
Pythagoreans and *Pythagorists*, how distinguish'd.
Pyth. ch. 16.
Pythais, Wife of *Aristotle*. *Arist. ch. 13.*
Pythais, Daughter of *Aristotle*. *Arist. ch. 13.*

R.

Resurrection of the Body. *Thal. ch. 6. § 4.*
Retiarii, Roman Gladiators. *Pitt. ch. 1.*

S.

Saitick Province in *Egypt*. *Plat. ch. 3.*
Salamis reduc'd by the *Athenians* by a Stratagem.
Sol. ch. 1.
Saulius, or *Cadovides*, Brother to *Anacharfis*
 King of *Scythia*. *Anachar. ch. 1.*
Scylla, the Sea-Union, a Book concerning it,
 written by *Pythagoras* the Physician. *Pyth. ch. 22.*
Scyllum, a Town bestow'd on *Xenophon* by the
Lacedæmonians. *Xen. ch. 6.*
 Sentences of the wife Men, set up at *Delphi*.
Chil. ch. 2.
Seuthes, King of *Thrace*, entertains the Grecian
 Army to fight for him. *Xen. ch. 4.*
Sisacchia, what. *Sol. ch. 4.*
 Skin of *Epimenides*, a Proverb. *Epim.*
 Socratick way of Discourse, abrogated by whom.
Arces. ch. 2.
Soleis in *Cilicia* built. *Sol. ch. 11.*
Soli in *Cilicia*. *Chryf. ch. 1.*
Soli in *Cyprus* built. *Sol. ch. 8.*
Solæcism, whence so termed. *Sol. ch. 11.*
Sophocles's Judgment of *Polemo*. *Pol.*
Stagira re-edify'd by *Alexander*. *Arist. ch. 8.*
 Superficies, the Word by whom first used. *Plat.*
ch. 7.
 Superstition, arising from Ignorance of physical
 Causes, confuted. *Anaxag. ch. 4.*
 Style of *Plato*. *Plat. ch. 15.*
Stoe, Πισία, the School of the Stoicks. *Xen.*
ch. 3.
 Stone fell from the Sun at *Ægos*. *Anax. ch. 3.*
 Sun's apparent Diameter. *Thal. ch. 8. § 2.*
Sybarites and *Crotenians* fight. *Pyth. ch. 17.*
Symnefes, King of *Cilicia*. *Thal. ch. 8. § 3.*
Xen. ch. 4.

T.

Tarquinius Priscus, mistaken by *Pliny* for *Tarquinius Superbus*. *Pyth.* ch. 10.

Telauges. *Pyth.* ch. 21.

Tellus. *Sol.* ch. 11.

Temple of *Diana* at *Scilluns*, in Imitation of that at *Ephesus*. *Xen.* ch. 6.

Thales, the elder, confounded with the younger. *Thal.* ch. 2.

Thales, Contemporary with the later Prophets. *Thal.* ch. 2.

Thargelion the sixth, a Day fortunate to the *Athenians*. *Soc.* ch. 1.

Theano, many of that Name. *Pyth.* ch. 21.

Theon Smyrnæus. *Plat.* ch. 7.

Theramen accuseth the six Commanders. *Soc.* ch. 9.

Theramen put to Death. *Soc.* ch. 9.

Thespis, when he first presented Tragedies. *Sol.* ch. 10.

Thetis. *Sol.* ch. 3.

Thirty Tyrants. *Soc.* ch. 9.

Thraibulius's Advice to *Periander*. *Per.* ch. 2.

Thrasymachus, a Sophist. *Soc.* ch. 10.

Taxaris, a Scythian. *Anachar.* ch. 1.

Triops, a Place at *Delphi*. *Pyth.* ch. 6.

Tripod of Gold. *Thal.* ch. 5.

Tropicks imply also *Equinoxes*. *Thal.* ch. 8. § 1.

Tinondas, King of *Eubœa*. *Sol.* ch. 3.

W.

Water, the Principle of all things, held by the *Phenicians* and *Indians*. *Thal.* ch. 6. § 1.

Wise Men, when first so called. *Thal.* ch. 5.

X.

Xantippe, Wife of *Socrates*. *Soc.* ch. 16.

Xeniades buys *Diogenes*. *Diog.* ch. 2.

Xenophon's Armour. *Xen.* ch. 3.

Xerxes's Expedition into *Greece*. *Anaxag.* ch. 1.

Z.

Zamolxis. *Pyth.* ch. 21.

Zeno consults the Oracle. *Zen.* ch. 1.

Zodiac's Obliquity, when found out. *Anaximand.* ch. 1.

Zoroastres. *Pyth.* ch. 5.

Authors that have written the Lives and Doctrine of Philosophers.

D*Anaxiles* (of *Sigeum*, a Promontory of *Troas*) Son of *Dioxippus*, Disciple of *Hellanicus*, wrote *Of Saphists*, (*Suid.*) He lived before the *Peloponnesian* War, (*Diomy. Halic. Epist. ad Pomp.*)

Xenophon, the Philosopher, wrote first, *Of the Lives of Philosophers*; (*Suid.*) perhaps meaning his *Socratical* Apologies and Commentaries.

Anaximander the younger, of *Miletus*, Contemporary with *Xenophon*, for he lived in the time of *Artaxerxes Mnemon*, wrote *An Explication of the Pythagorick Symbols*.

Thesompus, of *Chios*, the most eminent of all *Isocrates's* Disciples, (*Diomy. Halic. Epist. ad Pomp.*) in the time of *Artaxerxes Ochus*, King of *Persia*, and of *Philip* King of *Macedon*, wrote, *Concerning the Exercises of Plato*. *Athen. Deip.* 11.

Timæus the *Lacrian*, a *Pythagorean* Philosopher, wrote the *Life of Pythagoras*, (*Suid.*)

Speusippus wrote, *Of Philosophers*, 1 Book. (*Laert.*)

Xenocrates, the Philosopher, wrote Books, *Of Lives*. (*Laert.*)

Theophrastus wrote of the *Wise Men*. (*Laert.*)

Aristoxenus of *Tarentum*, Disciple of *Aristotle*, wrote, *Of the Lives of Eminent Persons*; amongst whom were *Pythagoras*, *Archytas*, *Socrates*, *Plato*.

Heraclides, of *Pontus*, heard *Speusippus* and *Aristotle*; wrote, *Of the Pythagoreans*, and, *Of Lives*: Which last tho' reckoned by *Laertius* amongst physical Writings, yet, as *Vossius* (*de Hist. Græc.* 1. 9.) conceives, they seem to have been rather historical, because *Eutocius* cites his *Life of Archimedes*, (*in Archim.*)

Dicæarchus of *Messene*, Disciple also to *Aristotle*, (*Athen. Deip.* 11.) wrote *Of Lives*, (*Laert. in Plat.*) *Clearchus* of *Soli*, Disciple also to *Aristotle*, wrote, *Of Lives*, (*Athen. Deip.* 6.) Of this Work *Athenæus* cites the First, Fourth, and Fifth Book; and out of it, *Agellius* takes what he writes of *Pythagoras*, ch. 11.

Phanias of *Eneffus*, Disciple also to *Aristotle*, wrote, *Of the Socratici*. (*Laert. in Arist.*)

Epicurus wrote, *Of Lives*, Four Books: (*Laert.*) But *Gassendus* conceives, they contained not the Stories of any eminent Persons, but moral Rules, whereby to lead a quiet Life. (*Laert.*)

Apollodorus, surnamed *Cepotyranus*, Disciple of *Epicurus*, wrote, *His Life*. (*Laert.*)

Bardesanes, a *Babylonian*, living in the Time of *Alexander Severus*, wrote, *Of the Brachmanes* and *Samanæans*, *Indian Philosophers*, whom the *Grecians* term *Gymnosophists*.

Idome-

Idomenæus of Lampfacum, Disciple to *Epicurus*, wrote Books, *Of the Sacraments*. (*Laert. in Sacrat.*)

Antigonus of Caristus, lived in the time of *Ptolemæus Logi*, and *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*; wrote, *Of Lives*, (*Laert.*) of which were particularly mentioned those of *Polemo*, *Menedemus*, *Dionysius*, *Metabemenus*, *Lycos*, *Zeno*, *Pyrrho*, *Timan*, by *Athenæus* and others,

Callimachus of *Cyrene*, a Poet, lived in the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*; wrote a *Table or Description of those who were eminent in any kind of Learning, and of their Writings*. (*Athen. Dign. 6. & 14.*)

Nemates, of *Cyzicus*, the Orator, (Disciple of *Philiscus the Milesian*, an Orator) who learnt of *Isoocrates*, wrote, *Of eminent Persons*, cited by *Stephanus*, *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Laertius*, *Porphyrius*, and *Hesychius Milesius*.

Hermippus of *Smyrna*, about the time of *Ptolemæus Evergetes*, wrote Books, *Of Lives*, of which are particularly cited the Lives of *Plato*, *Archilæus*, *Aristotle*, *Theophrastus*, *Lycos*, and others; by *Laertius*.

Sphærus, in the time of *Ptolemæus Evergetes*, Disciple to *Zeno the Cittean*, and to *Cleanthes*, wrote, *Of the Eretrick Philosophers*, and of *Lycurgus and Socrates*, Three Books. (*Laert.*)

Chrysippus, the Philosopher, wrote, *Of Lives*; to which, perhaps, appertained that which he wrote, *Of antient Physiologists*.

Sotion wrote a *Succession of Philosophers*, wherein, as *Eunapius* declares, he gave an Account of the Lives of the Philosophers, as they succeeded one another. *Laertius* cites the third Book.

Heraclides, Son of *Serapion*, lived under *Ptolomy Philometor*, wrote a *Succession* in six Books, doubtless of *Philosophers*; perhaps the same with his *Epitome of Sotion*: *Laertius* cites both Titles.

Apollodorus, an *Athenian*, Son of *Asclepiades*; he was a Grammarian, flourished under *Ptolemæus Evergetes*, heard *Aristarchus* the Grammarian, and *Panæus* the Stoick, (*Suid.*) He wrote, *Of the Sects of Philosophers*; and (if it were not the same Work) a *Collection of Doctrines*, both cited by *Laertius* in *Solone*, & in *Chrysippus*.

Clitomachus, Disciple to *Carmades*, flourished about the 162d Olympiad; wrote, *Of Sects*. (*Laertius* in his *Life*.)

Alexander Cornelius, Surnamed *Polyhistor*, flourished in the 173d Olympiad; wrote, *Successions*. (*Laert.*)

Damis, the *Affrian*, wrote the *Life of Apollonius Tyanæus*. (*Hierocles*, cited by *Euseb.*)

Maximus, the *Egiean*, Contemporary with *Damis*, wrote the *Life of the same Apollonius*. (*Hieroc. libid.*)

Mocragenes wrote Four Books of the *Life of the same Apollonius*; discredited by *Philostratus*, lib. 1. cap. 4.

Plutarch (who flourished under *Trajan* and *Hadrian*), wrote of the *Opinions of Philosophers*. Five Books extant.

Digenes Laertius, or, as *Tzetzes* terms him, *Digenianus*, whose ten Books, *Of the lives of Philosophers*, are extant; out of which *Phoebus* affirms, that *Sopater* borrow'd much, (*Timem. 161.*) *Digenes* therefore lived before *Constantine the Great*, who put *Sopater* to Death, (*Suid. in ΑΑΑΓΩΓΕΣ*) but later than *Trajan*; for he mentions *Plutarch*, and *Sextus Empiricus*, and *Saturninus* Disciple of *Sextus*. Whence *Vossius* collects, he lived under *Antoninus Pius*, or somewhat later, *De Natura & const. Rhetor. cap. 9.*

Lucian of Samosata, under *Aurelius* and *Commodus*, wrote the *Life of Demosthenes*, a Philosopher of that time.

Philostratus, flourishing from *Severus* to *Philipus*, (*Suid.*) wrote the *Life of Apollonius Tyanæus*, comprising all that *Maximus* and *Damis* had written before; it consists of eight Books extant.

Philostratus, Uncle and Father-in-Law to the other, living under *Macrinus* and *Helioababalus*; wrote the *Lives of the Sophists*.

Porphyrius, living from *Gallienus* to *Probus*, wrote *ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΩΝ, Historiam Philosophicam*, concluding about the time of *Plato*, (*Eunap. Præm.*) It is mentioned by *Theodoret* and *Tzetzes* under the Title of, *The Lives of Philosophers*. The third Book of it is cited by *Suidas*; part of the *Life of Pythagoras* belonging to it is extant, first set forth by *Kitterhugius*, afterwards by *Lucas Holstenius*.

Soterichus lived under *Diocletian*, wrote the *Life of Apollonius Tyanæus*. (*Suid.*)

Jamblichus, Master to *Julian* the Emperor, wrote the *Life of Pythagoras*, put forth by *Joannes Arcecius*.

Eunapius, living under *Valentinian*, *Valens*, and *Gratian*, an eminent Sophist, Physician, and Historian, wrote, at the Request of *Chrysantius*, *The Lives of the Philosophers and Sophists*, extant.

Marinus, a *Neapolitan*, a Philosopher and Orator, Disciple to *Proclus*, lived about the Times of *Zeno* and *Anastasius*; wrote, the *Life of Proclus*, his Master and Predecessor in the School, in Prose and Verse. That in Prose only is extant.

Hesychius illustris, a *Milelian*, wrote a *Nomenclator*, or *Index of such as were eminent for Learning*, extant.

Damascius, of *Damascus* in *Syria*, lived under *Justinian*, was a Stoick, Disciple of *Simplicius* and *Estamita Phrygians*; wrote a *Philosophical History*. (*Suid. in ΔΑΨΕΙΣ.*)

Of more uncertain Time are these following.

Amphicrates, who write a Book of eminent Persons, cited by *Laertius* and *Athenæus*.

Andron of *Ephesus*, who wrote a Treatise of the *Seven wise Men*; perhaps the same with his *Tripled*, the

the Subject of which was the Story of the Golden Tripod. *Laert. in the Life of Thal.*

Antisthenes, a Peripatetical Philosopher, writ the *Successions of Philosophers*. (*Laert.*)

Apollodorus, who wrote a *Collection of Doctrines*. (*Laert.*)

Aristocles of Messena, a Peripatetical Philosopher, wrote ten Books, *Of Philosophy*, in which he gave account of all the Philosophers and their Opinions. (*Suid.*)

Damas wrote, *The Life of Eudemus*; *Eudemus* was a *Rhodian*, Disciple to *Aristotle*.

Damon, a *Cyrenæan*, wrote a Book of *Philosophers*. (*Laert.*)

Didymus lived in the time of *Julius the Dictator*; wrote, *Of the Pythagorick Philosophy*. (*Suid.*)

Diocles wrote the *Lives of Philosophers*. (*Laert.*)

Eubulides wrote a Book of *Diogenes*; and perhaps of *Socrates*. (See *Laert. Secr.*)

Herodotus wrote, *Of the Youth of Epicurus*. (*Laert. Diogen. Halic.*)

Harou, Son of *Cotys*, an *Athenian* Orator, wrote an *Epitome of the Histories of Heraclides*. (*Suid.*)

Hippobotus wrote, *Of Sects*, (*Laert.*) not only of the Doctrines but *Lives of Philosophers*; for there is cited also his Book, *Of Philosophers*, perhaps the same. (*Laert.*)

Jason wrote, *Successions of Philosophers*. (*Suid.*)
Lycon of Jasia wrote, *The Life of Pythagoras*. (*Athen. 14.*)

Melaeger wrote *Of Opinions*. (*Laert. in Aristip.*)
Nicanor of Alexandria wrote, *Of the Disciple of Aristotle*. (*Suid. in alexandr.*)

Nicias of Nice, wrote the *History*, or *Succession of Philosophers*. (*Athen.*)

Panætius wrote, *Of Sects*. (*Laert. in Aristippo.*)
Satyrus, a Peripatetick, wrote, *The Lives of eminent Persons*; epitomiz'd by *Heraclides*.

Socrates wrote, *Successions*, cited by *Laertius* in *Diogenes*; but perhaps it should be,
Soficrates, a *Rhodian*, who wrote the *Successions of Philosophers*.

Theodorus wrote, *Of Sects*. (*Laert. in Aristip.*)
Timæus, an *Athenian*, wrote, *Of Lives*. (*Laert.*)

Pag. 26. ἥδ' ἐν τῇ ἐκκαθάρσει τοῦτα παρὰ, ἡδ' ἄλλοι, τὸ τῷ Ζηνόδοτῳ; perhaps τῷ Ζηνόδοτῳ καὶ. *Euclid. c. 3.*

Ibid. τὰς δ' ἐνίαιας αἱ ἐμάνων, read τὰς δ' ἐνίαιας αἱ ἐμάνων. *Ibid.*

Ibid. ἐν δὲ ἐνὶ γὰρ γὰρ, &c. read ἐν δὲ, &c. *Ibid.*

Epist. 13. Αἰὼν σὺ θαυμάζεις ἡμᾶς; perhaps θαυμάζεις. *Simon.*

Ibid. μὲντοι μὲν τοι αἰὲ μὲν καὶ δὲ. Ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ αἰὲν τοῖς σφαιροσώλῳ δῶκεν; read μὲντοι μὲν τοι αἰὲν καὶ δὲ. ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ αἰὲν τοῖς σφαιροσώλῳ δῶκεν: for to *Stobæus*, *Serm. 17.* citing this Fragment *ex Simonis Epistola ad Aristippum*: whence supply the Inscription also. *Ibid.*

Stobæus.

Serm. 82. citing *Hierocles*, πολὺ δ' ἀπερίττως

Themistius.

Orat. 4. ἐν Κρήτῳ δ' οἱ Λόκοι, διὰ γὰρ, read (as also in *Laertius, vit. Pyth.* for Κύλων) Κύλων; and in *Plutarch de Gen. Socr.* for Κυκλώνοι, Κυκλώνοι, twice. *Pyth. c. 19.*

Synef. Hymn. 4.

Πάτερ ὁ γὰρ,
Πάτερ ἄριστος,
Ἄγνωστος ἴσθι,
Ἄριστος ἄριστος,
Νέος ἰσθι ἴσθι,
Ψυχῆς ψυχῆς,
Θύσας δ' ὅσων.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE
CHALDAICK PHILOSOPHY.

T O

Sir John Marsham, *Knt.*

S I R,

I SEND this Book to You, because You first directed me to this Design. The Learned *Gassendus* was my Precedent ; whom nevertheless I have not followed in his Partiality : For he, though limited to a Single Person, yet giveth himself Liberty of Enlargement, and taketh occasion from his Subject to make the World acquainted with many excellent Disquisitions of his own. Our Scope being of a greater Latitude, affords less Opportunity to favour any Particular ; whilst there is due to every one the Commendation of their own Deserts. This Benefit I hope to have received from the Variety of the Subject ; but far more are those I owe to Your Encouragement, which, if I could wish less, I should upon this Occasion, that there might seem to have been expressed something of Choice and Inclination in this Action, which is now but an inconsiderable Effect of the Gratitude of,

Dear Uncle,

Your Most Affectionate Nephew,

and Humble Servant,

THOMAS STANLEY.

P R E F A C E.

WE are entering upon a Subject which I confess is in itself harsh, and exotick, very improper for our Tongue; yet I doubt not but they will pardon this, who shall consider, that other Philosophies and Sciences have been lately well received by several Nations translated into their own Languages; and that this, as being the first, contributes not a little to the understanding of the rest.

Another Disadvantage this Subject incurs far more considerable: There is not any thing more difficult to be retrieved out of the Ruins of Antiquities than the Learning of the Eastern Nations, and particularly that of the Chaldæans. What remains of it is chiefly transmitted to us by the Greeks, of whom, some converted it to their own use, intermixing it with their Philosophy, as Pythagoras and Plato; others treated expressly of it, but their Writings are lost. Of its first Authors nothing remains; what others took from it, is not distinguishable from their proper Philosophy. The Greeks were first made acquainted with it by Osthanes, and, long after, by Berosus; the former living in the time of Xerxes, the other under Ptolomæus Philadelphus. Whence it may be inferred, that the Discourse which Democritus writ of Chaldæa, and his Commentary of the sacred Letters at Babylon, either came short of these Sciences, or were so obscure, that they conduced little to their Discovery. Neither seems the Treatise, entituled Magicum, ascribed by some, to Aristotle, by others, to Rhodon, but indeed written by Antisthenes, to have considered the Learning and Sciences, so much as the History of the Professors. Of which kind were also the Writers concerning the Magi, cited, under that general Title, by Diogenes Laertius.

But there wanted not those, who further explained to the Greeks what Osthanes and Berosus had first communicated. Hermippus (to use Pliny's Words) wrote most diligently of Magic, and commented upon the Verses of Zoroaster. About the time of Antoninus Pius flourished the two Julians, Father and Son, Chaldaick Philosophers: The first wrote concerning the Chaldaick Rites, the latter, Theurgick Oracles in Verse, and other Secrets of that Science. Afterwards wrote Symbulus and Pallas, concerning the Magi; and the latter, Platonick Philosophers more frequently: Amelius, 40 Books of Confutation; Porphyrius 4 on the History of Julian the Chaldæan; Jamblichus 28, entituled, Of the most perfect Chaldaick Theology; and Syrianus 10, Upon the Oracles.

Of all these, there's nothing extant, unless) which we shall have occasion hereafter to prove) the few Oracles, dispersed among the Platonick Writers, be part of those which were, by the Greeks, (Hermippus, Julian the Son, and others) translated out of the Chaldaick. Some of these Pletho, and Pselus have explained with a Comment, adding too brief obscure Summaries of the Chaldaick Doctrine, which we have endeavoured to supply and clear, by adding and digesting the few Remains of those Sciences which lie dispersed amongst other Authors; taking care to reject such as are supposititious, or of no Credit, as in the historical Part, Annius Viterbiensis, Clemens Romanus, and the like: In the Philosophical, the Rabbinical Inventions, which tho' incuriously admitted by Kircher, Gaulmin, and others, manifestly appear to have been of later Invention.

THE
H I S T O R Y
OF THE
CHALDAICK PHILOSOPHERS.

THE FIRST BOOK.

Of the Chaldeans.

Philosophy is generally acknowledged even by the most learned of the *Grecians* themselves, to have had its Original in the East. None of the Eastern Nations, for Antiquity of Learning, stood in competition with the *Chaldeans* and *Egyptians*. The *Egyptians* pretended that the *Chaldeans* were a Colony of them, and had all their Learning and Institutions from them; but they who are less interested, and unprejudiced Judges of this Controversy, assert that *The Magi* (who derived their Knowledge from the *Chaldeans*) were more antient than the *Egyptians*: That *Astrological Learning* passed from the *Chaldeans* to the *Egyptians*, and from them to the *Grecians*; and, in a word, that the *Chaldeans* were *antiquissimum Doctorem genus*, The most ancient of Teachers.

Chaldaea is a Part of *Babylonia* in *Asia*; the Inhabitants termed *Chosdim*, (as if *Chusdim*) from *Chus* the Son of *Cham*. But the Philosophy of the *Chaldeans*, exceeded the Bounds of their Country, and diffused itself into *Persia* and *Arabia*, that border upon it; for which Reason the Learning of the *Chaldeans* *Persians*, and *Arabians* is comprehended under the general Title of CHALDAICK.

Of these therefore we shall begin with that from which the other two were derived, and is more properly termed CHALDAEAN, in respect of the

Country. In treating of which (as likewise of the other two) the first Part of our Discourse shall consider the Authors or Professors, and their Sects; the Second, their Doctrine.

THE FOURTEENTH PART.

The Chaldean Philosophers, Institution, and Sects.

S E C T. I.

Of the Chaldean Philosophers.

C H A P. I.

The Antiquity of the Chaldaick Learning.

THE Antiquity of the Chaldaick Learning, tho' such as other Nations cannot equal, comes far short of that to which they did pretend. When *Alexander*, by his Victories against *Darius*, was possessed of *Babylon*, (in the 438th Year of the *Julian Period*) *Aristotle*, a curious Promoter of Arts, requested his Nephew *Calisthenes*, who accompanied *Alexander* in the Expedition, to inform him of what Antiquity the Learning of the *Chaldeans* might

might with Reason be esteemed. The *Chaldeans* themselves pretended, that from the time they had first begun to observe the Stars until this Expedition of *Alexander into Asia*, were 470,000 Years. But far beneath this Number were the Observations, which (as *Porphyrius* cited by *Simplicius* relates) *Calisthenes* sent to *Aristotle*, being out of 1903 Years, preserved to that time, which from the 4383d Year of the *Julian* Period upward, falle upon the 2480th. And even this may with good Reason be question'd; for there is not any thing extant in the *Chaldaick* Astronomy more ancient than the *Æra of Nabonassar*, which began but on the 3967th of the *Julian* Period. By this *Æra* they compute their Astronomical Observations; of which, if there had been any more ancient, *Ptolemy* would not have omitted them. * The first of these is the first Year of *Merodach*, * (that King of *Babylon* who sent the Message to *Ahaz* concerning the Miracle of the Dial) which was about the 27th of *Nabonassar*. The next was in the 28th of *Nabonassar*. * The third Observation is in the 127th of *Nabonassar*, which is the 5th Year of *Nabopolassar*. This indeed is beyond all Exception; for we have them confirmed by the Authority of *Ptolemy*, who shews the Reasons and Rules for the Observations. What is more than this, seems to have been only hypothetical. And if we shall imagine a canicular Cycle, which consists of 1461 Years, (and are 1460 natural Years) to have been supposed by *Porphyrius* to make up his Hypothesis, then there will want but 18 Years of this Number.

CHAP. II.

That there were several Zoroasters.

THE Invention of Arts among the *Chaldeans* is generally ascribed to *Zoroaster*. The Name *Zoroaster* (to omit those who give it a Greek Etymology from *ζωω* and *αστρον*) *Dion* cited by *Laetius* interprets *αστρον*, rendered by his Translators a Worshipper of the Stars. *Kircher* finds Fault with this Etymology, as being compounded out of two several Languages, from the Greek, *αστρον*, and the Chaldee, *Zor*; and therefore endeavours to deduce it from *tsura*, a Figure, or *tsajar*, to fashion, and *as*, and *star*, hidden Fire, as if it were *Zairafar*, fashioning Images of hidden Fire; or, *tsura*, the Image of secret Things, with which the *Persian Zarat* agreeth. But it hath been observed, that *Ezher* in the *Persian* Language significeth a Star. The former Particle *Zor*, *Bocbartus* derives from the Hebrew, *Shur*, to contemplate; and thereupon, for *αστρον*, (in *Laetius*) reads *αστρον*, a Contemplator of the Stars. But we find *Zor*

used among other Words (by Composition) in the Name *Zorababel*, which we interpret, *Born at Babylon*: *Zoroaster* therefore properly signifies the Son of the Stars.

The same Name it is which some call *Zabratas*, others *Nazaratas*, others *Zares*, others *Zaran*, others *Zaratus*, others *Zaradas*; all which are but several Corruptions from the *Chaldee* or *Persian* Word, which the *Greeks* most generally render *Zoroaster*.

That there were several *Zoroasters* (except *Gorgippus*, who paradoxically maintains there was not any one) none deny; but in reckoning them up, there is no small Disagreement amongst Writers, grounded chiefly upon *Arnobius*, whom they differently interpret; his Words are these, *Age nunc veniat quis super igneam Zonam Magus interiore ab orbe Zoroastres*, *Hermippo ut assentiamur Autori*: *Bactrianus* & *illi conveniat, cujus Ctesias Res gestas Historiarum exponit in primo*; *Armenius*, *Hoftanis Nepos*, & *familiaris Pamphilus Cyri*. *Patricius*, *Noudæus*, *Kircher*, and others, conceive that *Arnobius* here mentions four *Zoroasters*; the first a *Chaldean*, the second a *Bactrian*, the third a *Pamphilius* (named also *Erus*) the fourth an *Armenian*, Son (as *Kircher* would have it) of *Hoftanes*. * *Salmasius* alters the Text thus, *Age nunc, veniat quæso per igneam Zonam Magus interiore ab orbe Zoroastres*, *Hermippo ut assentiamur Autori*, *Bactrianus*. *Et ille conveniat, cujus Ctesias Res gestas historiarum exponit in primo*, *Armenius*, *Hoftanis nepos*, & *familiaris Pamphilus Cyri*. Which Words, thus altered by himself, imply, as he pretends, but three *Zoroasters*; the first, according to sense, an *Æthiopian*, (a Country near the torrid Zone) but according to *Hermippus*, a *Bactrian*; the second, *Armenius*, Nephew of *Hoftanes*, of whose Actions *Ctesias* gives Account in the first Book of his Histories; the third named *Pamphilus*, Friend to *Cyrus*. * *Ursinus*, from the same reading of the Words, infers that *Arnobius* mentions only two, that he manifestly explodes the *Bactrian* *Zoroaster* of *Hermippus*, and that *Ctesias* confuting the fabulous Relation of *Eudoxus*, proved *Zoroaster* to have lived in the time of *Cyrus*. But the Words of *Arnobius* seem not to require such Alteration; which will appear more, if we mention particularly all those on whom the Name of *Zoroaster* was conferred.

The first a *Chaldean*, the same whom *Suidas* calls the *Assyrian*, adding that he died by Fire from Heaven; to which Story perhaps *Arnobius* alludes, or to that other Relation mentioned by *Dion Chrysostom*, that *Zoroaster* the *Persian* (for their Stories are confounded) came to the People out of a fiery Mountain; or else by fiery Zone, he means the Seat of the zoned Deities, just above the Empyrean or Corporeal Heaven, according to the Doctrine of the *Chaldeans*;

* In lib. 2 de Cælo, p. 123. l. 38.
l. 5. p. 123.

* Obelisk. Pamphil. l. 1. c. 2. sect. 1.
Phil. * Apol. Mag. 8.

* Ptol. lib. 4. ch. 6, 7.
* Obelisk. Pamphil. l. 1. c. 2. sect. 1.

* Geogr. Sac. l. 1. ch. 1.
* Plin. Exercit.

* 2 Kings xx. 12. * Chron. xxxi. 31.
* C. 1.

* In Zor.
* Cont. gent. l. 1.

* Ptol.
* Eus.

* Mag.
* Orat. Basilic.

dæans; for I find not any where that Zoroaster was esteemed an *Ethiopian*, or of interior *Lybia*, as *Salmafius* expounds. Concerning this Zoroaster, *Arnobius* cites *Hermippus*; who, as *Pliny* faith, wrote an *Explication of the Verfes*, and added *Tables to his Volumes*.

The second a *Bactrian*; ^b *Justin* mentions *Zoroastres*, King of *Bactria*, contemporary with *Ninus* the *Affrian*, by whom he was subdued and slain; adding, *He was said to be the first that invented Magical Arts, and observed the Beginning of the World, and the Motions of the Stars*. *Arnobius* faith, ^c he contended with *Ninus*, not only by *Steel and Strength*, but likewise by the magical and abstruse *Disciplines of the Chaldeans*. The Actions of this Zoroaster, *Ctesias* recorded in the first Book of his *Persica*; for so *Arnobius*, ^d *Baſtrianus* & *ille conveniat, cujus Ctesias res gesta historiam exponit in primo*. The first six Books of that Work treated (as ^e *Photius* shews) only of the *Affrian* History, and Passages that preceded the *Perſian* Affairs. Whereupon, I cannot assent to the Conjecture of *Salmafius*, who applies the Citation of *Ctesias* to the Nephew of *Hoſtanes*, since *Hoſtanes* (as ^f *Pliny* affirms) lived under *Darius*. But ^g *Diodorus* names the King of *Bactria*, whom *Ninus* conquered, *Oxyartes*; and some old MSS. of *Justin* attested by *Ligerius* *Oxyartes*, others *Zoroastres*: Perhaps the Nearness of the Names and Times (the *Chaldean* living also under *Ninus*, as ^h *Suidas* relates) gave occasion to some to confound them, and to ascribe to the *Bactrian* what was proper to the *Chaldean*; since it cannot be imagined, that the *Bactrian* was Inventor of those Arts, in which the *Chaldean*, who lived contemporary with him, was so well skilled. *Elichmannus*, a *Persian* Writer, affirms the *Arabians* and *Persians* to hold, that Zoroaster was not King of the *Bactrians*, but a *Magus* or *Prophet*; who, by *Persuasions*, having wrought upon their King, first introduced a new Form of Superstition amongst them, whereof there are some Reminders at this Day.

The third a *Persian*, so termed by ⁱ *Laertius* and others; the same whom *Clemens Alexandrinus* styles a *Mede*; ^j *Suidas*, a *Perso-Mede*, Institutor of the *Magi*, and Introducer of the *Chaldaick* Sciences amongst the *Persians*. Some confound this Zoroaster with the *Chaldean*, and both of them (as ^k *Kircher* doth) with *Cham* the Son of *Noah*, not without a very great Anachronism; for we find the Word *Persian* no where mentioned before the Prophet *Ezekiel*, neither did it come to be of note till the Time of *Cyrus*; the Occasion of which Mistake seems to have been, for that Zoroaster the *Persian*, is by *Pliny*, *Laertius*, and others, styled Institutor of *Magick*, and of the *Magi*; which is to be understood no otherwise than

that he first introduced them into *Persia*. For ^l *Plutarch* acknowledgeth, Zoroaster instituted *Magi* amongst the *Chaldeans*, in imitation of whom the *Persians* had theirs also: And the ^m *Arabick* History, that Zoroastir not first instituted, but reformed the Religion of the *Persians* and *Magi*, being divided into many Sects.

The fourth a *Pamphylian*, commonly called *Er*, or *Erus Armenius*. That he also had the Name of Zoroaster, ⁿ *Clemens* witnesseth: The same Author, (faith he, meaning *Plato*) in the 10th of his *Politicks*, mentioneth *Erus Armenius*, by Descent a *Pamphylian*, who is Zoroaster; now this Zoroaster writeth thus, ^o "This, wrote I, Zoroaster *Armenius*, by Descent "a *Pamphylian*, dying in War, and being in *Hades*, "I learned of the Gods." This Zoroaster, ^p *Plato* affirmeth to have been raised again to Life, after he had been dead ten Days, and laid on the Funeral Pile; repeated by ^q *Valerius Maximus*, and ^r *Macrobius*. To this Zoroaster, doubtless the latter Part of *Arnobius's* Words, with which Interpreters are so much perplexed, ought to be referred, *Armenius Hoſtanis nepos, & familiaris Pamphilus Cyri*. Some conjecture he mentions two Zoroasters; I rather conceive the Words relate only to this one, and perhaps are corrupt; thus to be restored and distinguished, *Armenius Hoſtanis nepos & familiaris, Pamphilus Erus Armenius*; Nephew and Disciple (in which Sense *γρῆμυ* is usually taken) of *Hoſtanes*, *Erus Pamphilus*.

The fifth a *Proconnesian*, mentioned by ^s *Pliny*; Such as are more diligent (faith he) place another Zoroaster, a *Proconnesian*, a little before *Hoſtanes*. This Zoroaster might probably be *Aristeus* the *Proconnesian*, who, according to ^t *Suidas*, lived in the time of *Cyrus* and *Cresus*. He adds, that his *Soul* could go out of his Body, and return as often as he pleased. ^u *Herodotus* relates an Instance hereof, not unlike that of *Erus Armenius*; That he died suddenly in a Fuller's Shop at *Proconnesius*, and was seen the same time at *Cyzicus*; his Friends coming to fetch his Body, could not find it. Seven Years after he returned home, and published the *Verfes* which were afterwards called *Arimaspian*, a Poem describing a happy Life, or rather an imaginary civil Government, after such a manner as he conceived most perfect. This we may gather from ^v *Clemens Alexandrinus*, who faith, that the *Hyperborean* and *Arimaspian Cities*, and the *Elizian Fields*, are Forms of civil Governments of just *Persians*; of which kind is *Plato's Commonwealth*.

To these may be added a sixth Zoroaster, (for so ^w *Apuleius* calls him) who lived at *Babylon*, at what time *Pythagoras* was carried Prisoner thither by *Cambyses*. The same Author terms him *omnis Divini arcum*

^a Lib. 30.^b Lib. 1.^c Coar. gent.^d Loc. cit.^e Biblioth.^f Lib. 30. 1.^g Lib. 2. p. 66.^h In Zor.ⁱ In Proem.^j Obel. Pamp. lib. 1. cap. 4. sect. 1.^k De Isid. & Ofirid.^l Set forth by *Epiphanius*.^m Strom. lib. 1.ⁿ Reading τὰς ἐννοίας ἐξῆς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ.^o In Arifian.^p Lib. 4. c. 14.^q Strom. lib. 4.^r Loc. cit.^s Flor.^t Lib. 1. c. 2.^u In Scen. Sup.

canum Antistitem; adding, that he was the chief Person whom Pythagoras had for Master; probably therefore, the same with Zabratus, by whom *Diogenes* affirms, he was cleansed from the Pollutions of his Life past, and instructed from what Things virtuous Persons ought to be free; and learnt the Discourse concerning Nature (Physick) and what are the Principles of the Universe; the same which *Nazaratas* the Assyrian, whom *Alexander*, in his Book of Pythagorick Symbols, affirms to have been Master to Pythagoras; the same whom *Suidas* calls Zares; *Cyriel, Zaru; Plutarch, Zaratus*.

That there should be so many Zoroasters, and so much Confusion amongst Authors that write of them, by mistaking one for another, is nothing strange; for, from extraordinary Persons, Authors of some publick Benefit, they who afterwards were eminent in the same kind, were usually called by the same Name. Hence it is, that there were so many *Belus's, Saturns, Jupiters*; and consequently, so much Confusion in their Stories. The like may be said of Zoroaster the Chaldean, who being the Inventor of Magical and Astronomical Sciences, they who introduced the same into other Countries, as Zoroaster the Persian did, in imitation (as *Plutarch* saith) of the Chaldeans, and such likewise as were eminently skilful in those Sciences, as the *Bactrian, the Pamphylian, and the Proconnesian*, are described to have been, were called by the same Name.

CHAP. III.

Of the Chaldean Zoroaster, Institutor of the Chaldean Philosophy.

THE first of these Zoroasters, term'd the Chaldean or Assyrian, is generally acknowledged the Inventor of Arts and Sciences amongst the Chaldeans; but concerning the time in which he lived, there is a vast Disagreement amongst Authors.

Some of these err so largely, as not to need any Confutation; such are *Eudoxus*, and the Author of the Treatise entitled *Μεγίστη*, commonly ascribed to *Aristotle*, and so *Pliny* cites it, who asserts he lived 5000 Years before *Plato*. Such likewise are *Hermippus, Hemodorus* the Platonic, *Plutarch* and *Gemistus Pletho* (following *Plutarch*) who place him 5000 Years before the Destruction of *Troy*.

Others conceive Zoroaster to be the same with *Cham*, the Son of *Noah*; of which Opinion (not to mention the *Pseudo Berosus* of *Annius Viterbiensis*) were *Diadmus* of *Alexandria*, *Agathias*, *Scholasticus*, and *Athenobius*: *Cham* (saith the last) was the Son of *Noah*; he first taught the worshipping of Idols, and first introduced Magical Arts into the World; his Name is Zoroaster, he the second Adria, a perpetual Fire.

Hither also some refer the Rabbinical Stories concerning *Cham*, that ^a by Magic he emasculated his Father, &c. That ^b *Noah* being by this means disabled from getting a fourth Son, cursed the fourth Son of *Cham*; That ^c this Curse (which was, that he should be a Servant of his Servants) implied strange Service, viz. Idolatry; That ^d hereupon the Posterity of *Chus* became Idolaters, *Cham* himself being the first that made Idols, and introduced strange Service into the World, and taught his Family the worshipping of Fire.

The greater Part of Writers place him later. *Epiphanius* in the time of *Nimrod*; with whom agree the Observations ^e said to be sent by *Calisthenes* to *Aristotle* 1903 Years before *Alexander's* taking *Babylon*; for from the Year of the Julian Period, in which *Babylon* was taken, the 1903d upward falls on the 2480 of the same *Æra*; about which time *Nimrod* laid the Foundations of that City, and there settled his Empire.

Suidas relates him contemporary with *Ninus*, King of *Assyria*; *Eusebius*, with *Semiramis*, Wife of *Ninus*; *Ninus* is placed by Chronologers above the 3447th of the Julian Period.

Suidas (elsewhere) reckons him to have lived 500 Years before the taking of *Troy*; *Xanthus*, 600 Years before *Xerxes's* Expedition into *Greece*. *Troy*, according to the *Marmor Arundelianum*, was taken 444 Years before the first Olympiad. *Xerxes's* Expedition was on the first of the 75th Olympiad, viz. the of the Julian Period. The Account of *Suidas* therefore falls on the 5030th, that of *Xanthus* on the 3634th of the Julian Period. The latest of these seemeth to me most historical, and agreeable to Truth.

Of his Birth, Life, and Death, there is little to be found; and even that uncertain, whether applicable to him, or to the Persian. *Plato* styles Zoroaster the Son of *Oromaspe*; but *Oromaspe* (as *Plutarch* and others shew) was a Name given to God by Zoroaster the Persian, and his Followers: Whence I conceive, that *Plato* is to be understood of the Persian Zoroaster, who, perhaps in regard of his extraordinary Knowledge, was either allegorically styled, or fabulously reported to be the Son of God, or of some good Genius, as *Pythagoras, Plato*, and many other excellent Persons were.

^f *Pliny* reports, that Zoroaster (not particularizing which of them) laughed the same Day he was born; and that his Brain did beat so hard, that it heaved up the Hand laid upon it, a Presage of his future Science; and that he lived in the Deserts twenty Years upon Cheese so tempered, as that it became not old. The Assyrian Zoroaster, (saith *Suidas*) prayed he might die by Fire from Heaven, and advised the Assyrians to preserve his Ashes, assuring them, that as long as they kept

^a Porph. vit. Pythag.

^b Laert in Proem.

^c Lib. 30. c. 1.

^d R. Levi in Gen. R. Samuel in fortitudo fidel.

^e Russ.

^f Aben Ezra in Gen.

^g R. Hanslic in Scut. fortium.

^h Simple.

ⁱ Lib. 30. c. 1.

kept them, their Kingdom should never fail; but *Cadmus* attributes the same to the *Persian*.

Of Writings attributed to him, are mention'd,
 1 *Verfes, two Millions*, upon which *Hermippus* wrote a Comment, and added Tables to them.

Oracles, perhaps Part of the forefaid *Verfes*; upon these *Syrianus* wrote a Comment in twelve Books.

Of *Agriculture*, or *Mechanicks*; *Pliny* alledgeth a Rule for Sowing; and the Author of the *Geoponicks*, many Experiments under his Name: But this was either spurious, or written by some other *Zoroaster*.

Revelations; supposititious also, forged (as *Porphyrius* professeth) by some *Gnosticks*.

To these add, cited by the *Arabians*, *A Treatise of Magick*; and another of *Dreams*, and their Interpretations, cited by *Gelaldin* frequently; Inventions doubtless of later Times.

Some ascribe the Treatises of the *Persian Zoroaster* to the *Chaldean*; but of those hereafter.

CHAP. IV.

Of *Belus*, another reputed Inventor of Sciences amongst the *Chaldeans*.

SOME there are who ascribe the Invention of Astronomy to *Belus*; of which Name there were two Persons, one a *Tyrian*, the other an *Assyrian*, who reigned in *Babylonia* next after the *Arabians*, about the 2682d Year of the World, according to the Account of *Africanus*; for whose Inventions the *Babylonians* honoured him as a God. There is yet standing, (saith *Pliny*) the Temple of Jupiter *Belus*; he was the Inventor of the Sciences of the Stars; and *Diodorus*, speaking of the *Egyptians*, They affirm, that afterwards many Colonies went out of *Egypt*, and were dispersed over the Earth; and that *Belus*, reputed to be the Son of *Neptune* and *Lybia*, carried one to *Babylon*; and making choice of the River *Euphrates*, to settle it, instituted Priests after the manner of those in *Egypt*, exempt from all publick Charges and Duties, which the *Babylonians* call *Chaldeans*; these observed the Stars, imitating the *Egyptian Priests*, *Naturalists* and *Astrologers*: Thus *Diodorus*. But that *Belus* was Son of *Neptune* and *Lybia*, is nothing but *Greek Mythology*; that he brought a Colony out of *Egypt* into *Babylon*, is fabulous. For the *Egyptians* had not any Correspondence with Foreigners for a long time after. But to confirm that he was skilful in those Sciences, *Ælian* gives this Relation:

Xerxes, Son of Darius, breaking up the Monument of ancient Belus, found an Urn of Glass, in which his dead Body lay in Oil; but the Urn was not full, it

1 *Plin. lib. 30. c. 2.* 2 *Lib. 6. c. 26.* 3 *Lib. 2.*
 4 *See etc.* 5 *Scilicet.* 6 *Lib. 24.* 7 *Jos. Scilicet in Ezech.*

wanted a Hand-breadth of the Top; next the Urn there was a little Pillar, on which it was written, That whosoever should open the Sepulchre, and did not fill up the Urn, should have ill Fortune; which *Xerxes* reading, grew afraid, and commanded that they should pour Oil into it with all Speed; notwithstanding it was not filled: Then he commanded to pour into it a second Time; but neither did it increase at all thereby. So that at last, failing of Success, he gave over; and shutting up the Monument, departed very sad. Nor did the Event foretold by the Pillar deceive him: For he led an Army of 50 Myriads against Greece, where he received a great Defeat, and returning home, died miserably, being murdered by his own Son, in the Night-time, a-bed.

To this *Belus, Semiramis* his Daughter " erected a Temple in the middle of *Babylon*, which was exceeding high, and by the Help thereof the *Chaldeans*, who addicted themselves there to Contemplation of the Stars, did exactly observe their Risings and Settings.

CHAP. V.

Other *Chaldean Philosophers*.

FROM *Zoroaster* were derived the *Chaldean Magi* and *Philosophers* his Disciples; amongst whom *Pliny* mentions one *Azanax* Master of *Zoroaster*; which doubtless must have been meant of some later *Zoroaster*, there being many of that Name, as we shewed formerly.

By the same Author are mention'd of the ancient *Magi, Marmardius* a *Babylonian*, and *Zarmocenedas* an *Assyrian*; of whom nothing is left but their Names, no Monuments extant of them.

To these add, *Zoromadres*, a *Chaldean Philosopher*, who wrote *Mathematicks* and *Physicks*; and *Tencer*, a *Babylonian*, an ancient Author, who wrote concerning the *Decanates*.

The *Mathematicians* also, saith *Strabo*, mention some of these, as *Cidenas*, and *Naburianus*, and *Sudinus*, and *Seleucus* of *Selucia*, a *Chaldean*, and many other eminent Persons.

CHAP. VI.

Of *Berosus*, who first introduced the *Chaldaick Learning* into Greece.

AFTER these flourished *Berosus*, or, as the *Greeks* call him *Βηρώς*, which Name some interpret the Son of *Oleas*; for as is manifest from *Ælian*, with the *Chaldees* is the same with *Ω* in *Syriack*; whence *Bar-Ptolemaus*, as if he the Son of *Ptolemy, Bar-Timarus*, and the like: *Gorionides* and

1 *Var. Hist. 23. l. 3.*

2 *Diod. l. 2.*

3 *Lib. 30. c. 1.*

other Rabbins call him * *Bar-Hofea*; the *Arabians Barafa*; ſo *Abenepe*, and others.

Barthius ¹ ſaith, that there are ſome who aſſert him Contemporary with *Mofes*; which Opinion juſtly he condemns as ridiculous; *Claudius* ² *Venerius* in his Cenſure upon the *Annian Berofus* affirms he lived a little before the Reign of *Alexander* the Great; upon what Authority I know not. That he lived in the time of *Alexander*, we find in the Oration of *Tatian* againſt the *Gentiles*; but the ſame *Tatian* adds, he dedicated his Hiſtory to that *Antiochus*, who was the third from *Alexander*. But neither is this Reading unqueſtionable; for * *Eufebius* cites the ſame Place of *Tatian* thus, *Berofus* the Babylonian, *Priſt* of *Belus* at *Babylon*, who lived in the time of *Alexander*, and dedicated to *Antiochus*, the third after *Seleucus*, a *Hiſtory* of the *Chaldeans* in three Books, and relates the *Adions* of their Kings, mentions one of them named *Nabuchodonofor*, &c. Here we find *Βερόσιος*, but in the Text of *Tatian*, *Βερόσιος* moſt conſonant to the Story. The next to *Alexander* was *Seleucus Nicanor*: the next to him, *Antiochus* *Σωτήρ*; the third, *Antiochus* *Θεός*, who began his Reign 61 Years after the Death of *Alexander*: Now, it is poſſible that *Berofus* at the time of *Alexander*'s taking *Babylon* might be thirty Years old or leſs; and at the 90th Year, or ſomewhat younger, might dedicate his Hiſtory to *Antiochus* *Θεός*. Or we may ſay, that by *Antiochus* the third from *Alexander* is meant *Antiochus* *Σωτήρ*, reckoning *Alexander* himſelf incluſively for one, *Seleucus* the ſecond, *Antiochus* *Σωτήρ* the third; to whom from the Death of *Alexander* are but 44 Years: And in approving this Account we may retain the Reading of *Eufebius*, ſuppoſing the firſt to be *Seleucus*, the ſecond *Antiochus* *Σωτήρ*, the third *Antiochus* *Θεός*: Neither is this inconfiſtent with *Gefner*'s Translation of the Words of *Tatian*, *καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου γυναικὸς*, as in *Stephens*' Edition of *Eufebius*; or, *καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου γυναικὸς*, as in *Tatian* himſelf, *qui Alexandri ætate vixit*; which Interpretation * *Onuphrius Paninius* alſo follows. But conſidering theſe Words more intently, it came into my Mind (ſaith *Vaffius*) that it might better be rendered, *qui Alexander ætate natus eſt*, whereby all Scruple may be taken away, ſuppoſing *Berofus* to have been born but two Years before *Alexander*'s Death; by which Account he muſt have been but 64 Years old when *Antiochus* *Θεός*, to whom he dedicated his Book, began to reign: Which way ſoever it is, *Berofus* publiſhed his Hiſtory in the Time of *Prolemaeus Philadelphus*; for he reigned 38 Years; and in the ſixth Year of his Reign *Antiochus* *Soter* began to reign in *Syria* in the 22d of *Antiochus* *Θεός*, to one of whom *Berofus* dedicated his Book.

But by no means we can aſſent to the Learned * *Conradus Geſnerus*, who by *Alexander* conceives to be meant not he who was ſurnamed the Great, Son of *Philip*, but that *Alexander* who ſucceeded *Demetrius Soter* in the Kingdom of *Syria*, and was ſucceeded by *Demetrius Nicanor*; by *Antiochus* underſtanding *Antiochus Sedetes* who reigned next after *Demetrius Nicanor*: For if it were ſo, *Berofus* muſt have been a whole Age later than *Manetho*; but *Manetho* flouriſhed under *Philadelphus*, (as *Voffius* eſewhere proves.) *Philadelphus* died in the third Year of the 133d Olympiad; but *Antiochus Sedetes* invaded *Syria* in the firſt of the 160th Olympiad: How then could *Berofus* live ſo late, who was a little precedent to *Manetho*, as *Synellus* expreſſly affirms? Again, we may aſſert the time of *Berofus* another way. *Pliny* ² ſaith, he gave Account of 480 Years, which doubtleſs were of *Nabonaſſar*: Now the *Æra* of *Nabonaſſar* began in the ſecond Year of the 8th Olympiad; from which if we reckon 480, it will fall upon the latter End of *Antiochus* *Soter*'s Reign; wherefore *Berofus* dedicated his Book either to him or to *Antiochus* *Θεός* his Son. Theſe Arguments will not ſuffer us to doubt of the Time of *Berofus*.

This *Berofus* is mentioned by many of the Ancients. *Vitruvius* ² ſaith, he firſt ſettled in the *Iſland Coos*, and there opened Learning. * *Joſephus* ³, that he introduced the Writings of the *Chaldaeans* concerning *Aſtronomy* and *Philophy* among the *Grecians*. *Pliny* ², that the *Athenians*, for his divine *Preditions*, dedicated to him publicly in their *Gymnaſium* a Statue with a golden Tongue. He is mentioned likewiſe by *Tertullian* ⁴, and the Author of the *Chronicon* ⁵ *Alexandrinum*.

He wrote *Babylonicks* or *Chaldaicks*, in three Books; for they are cited promiſcuouſly under both theſe Titles: The *Babylonicks* of *Berofus*, *Athenaeus* ¹ cites; but *Tatian* ſaith, he wrote the *Chaldaick Hiſtory* in three Books. And * *Clemens Alexandrinus* cites *Berofus*, his third of *Chaldaicks*; and elſewhere, ſimply his *Chaldaick Hiſtorics*. And *Agathias* affirms, he wrote the *Antiquities* of the *Aſſyrians* and *Medes*; for thoſe Books contained not only the *Aſſyrian* or *Chaldaean* Affairs, but alſo the *Median*; *Agathias* ², as ſomewhere *Berofus*, the *Babylonian*, and *Athenocles*, and *Simacus* relate, who have recorded the *Antiquities* of the *Aſſyrians* and *Medes*. Out of this Work * *Joſephus* hath preſerved ſome excellent Fragments; but the ſuppoſitions *Berofus* of *Annius* is moſt trivial and fooliſh, of the ſame kind as his *Megasthenes* and *Archilochus*: Many Kings are there reckoned which are no where to be found; and ſcarce is there any of thoſe Fragments which *Joſephus* cites out of the true *Berofus*; on the contrary, ſome things are plainly repugnant; as

when,

* *חושית*. ¹ Voff. de Hiſt. Græc. l. 1. c. 73. ² Adverſar. 51. 7. ³ Prepar. Evang. l. 10. ⁴ Lib. de Sibil.
⁵ Tatian. ⁶ Lib. 6. c. 55. ⁷ Lib. 9. c. 7. ⁸ Contr. Appion. l. 1. ⁹ Lib. 7. c. 37. ¹⁰ In Apologet. c. 19. ¹¹ P. 48.
¹² Deſign. l. 14. ¹³ Strom. 1. ¹⁴ Lib. 2. ¹⁵ Antiquit. Jud. l. 5. contra Appion. l. 1.

when he saith, *Semiramis* built *Babylon*, whereas *Josephus* saith *Berosus* wrote that it was not built by *Semiramis*.

A Daughter of this *Berosus* is mentioned by *Justin Martyr*^a, a *Babylonian* Sibyl, who prophesied at *Cumæ*; this cannot be understood of that *Cumæan* Sibyl, who lived in the time of *Tarquinius Priscus*; for betwixt *Tarquinius Priscus*, and the first *Pontick War*, (in which time *Berosus* lived) are 245 Years; but of some other *Cumæan* Sibyl, of much later Time. That there were several Sibyls, who prophesied at *Cumæ*, *Onuphrius* hath already proved out of the *Treatise of wonderful Things* ascribed to *Aristotle*; and out of *Martianus Capella*, and other Writers.

Berosus being the Person who introduced the *Chaldaick* Learning into *Greece*, we shall with him close the History of the Learned Persons or Philosophers amongst the *Chaldeans*.

SECT. II.

The Chaldaick Institution and Sects.

CHAP. I.

That all Professors of Learning were more peculiarly termed *Chaldeans*.

Philosophy or Learning was not taught and propagated by the *Chaldeans* after the *Grecian* Manner, communicated, by publick Professors, indifferently to all sorts of Auditors, but restrained to certain Families. These were by a more peculiar Compellation termed *Chaldeans*, addicted themselves wholly to Study, had a proper Habitation allotted for them; and lived exempt from all publick Charges and Duties.

Of these is ^a *Diodorus* to be understood; who relates, that *Belus* instituted Priests exempt from all publick Charges and Duties, whom the *Babylonians* call *Chaldeans*. *Strabo* adds, that there was a peculiar Habitation in *Babylonia* allotted for the Philosophers of that Country, who were termed *Chaldeans*; and that they inhabited a certain Tribe of the *Chaldeans*, and a Portion of *Babylonia*, adjoining to the *Arabians*, and the *Persian Gulf*.

There were those *Chaldeans* who, as *Cicero* saith, were named not from the Art, but Nation. And of whom he is elsewhere to be understood, when he affirms that in *Syria* the *Chaldeans* excel for Knowledge of the Stars, and Acuteness of Wit; and ^b 2.

Curtius, who describing the Solemnity of those two who went out of *Babylon* to meet *Alexander*, saith, Then went the *Magi* after their manner; next whom, the *Chaldeans*; *Nun vates modo, sed Artifices Babyloniorum*: Where tho' some interpret *Artifices*, those *Astralogers* who made Instruments for the Practice of their Art; yet *Curtius* seems to intend no more than the *Chaldeans* of both sorts, the *Plbeian* Tradesmen, and the Learned.

Of these *Chaldeans* peculiarly so termed, is ^c *Lactantius* likewise to be understood, when he cites as Authors of Philosophy amongst the *Persians*, the *Magi*; amongst the *Babylonians* or *Assyrians*, the *Chaldeans*. And *Hefycbius*, who interprets the *World Chaldeans*, a kind of *Magi* that know all things,

CHAP. II.

Their Institution.

THESE *Chaldeans* preserved their Learning within themselves by a continued Tradition from Father to Son. They learn not, (saith ^d *Diodorus*) after the same Fashion as the *Greeks*: For amongst the *Chaldeans*, Philosophy is delivered by Tradition in the Family, the Son receiving it from the Father, being exempted from all other Employment; and thus having their Parents for their Teachers, they learn all things fully and abundantly, believing more firmly what is communicated to them: And being brought up in these Disciplines from Children, they acquire a great Habit in *Astrology*, as well because that Age is apt to learn, as for that they employ so much time in Study. But among the *Greeks*, for the most part they come unprepared, and attain Philosophy very late, and having bestowed some Time therein, quit it to seek out Means for their Livelihood: And tho' some few give themselves up wholly to Philosophy, yet they persist in Learning only for Gain, continually innovating some things in the most considerable Doctrines, and never follow those that went before them: Whereas the *Barbarians* persevering always in the same, receive each of them firmly: But the *Greeks* aiming at Gain, by this Profession erect new Sects, and contradicting one another in the most considerable Theorems, make their Disciples dubious; their Minds, as long as they live, are in Suspense and Doubt, neither can they firmly believe any thing: for if a Man examine the chiefest Sects of the Philosophers, he will find them most different from one another, and directly opposite in the principal Assertions.

^a Pausan.^b Lib. de Sibyl.^c Lib. 2.^d Lib. 51^e In Proem.^f Lib. 2.

CHAP. III.

Sects of the Chaldeans distinguished according to their several Habitations.

AS all Professors of Learning among the *Chaldeans*, were distinguished from the rest of the People by the common Denomination of the Country, *Chaldeans*; so were they distinguished among themselves into Sects, denominated from the several Parts of the Country wherein they were seated: Whence ¹ Pliny and ² Strabo mention *Hipparenes* from *Hipparenum*, a City in *Mesopotamia*; *Babylonians*, from *Babylon*; *Orcheneis*, (a third Chaldaick Doctrine) from *Orchois* a City of *Chaldæa*; and *Borsippeneis*, from *Borsippe*, another City of *Babylonia* dedicated to *Apollo* and *Diana*. And though ³ *Diodorus* prefers the *Chaldeans* before the *Grecians*, for their Perseverance in the same Doctrines without Innovations; yet we must not infer thence, that there was an universal Consent of Doctrine amongst them; but only that each of them was constant in Belief and Maintenance of his own Sect, without introducing any new Opinion. For, that amongst these Sects there was no absolute Agreement, is manifest from *Strabo*, who adds, that 'they did (as indifferent Sects) assert contrary Doctrines; some of them calculated *Nativities*, others disapproved it; Whence ⁴ *Lucretius*,

*The Babylonick Doctrine doth oppose
The Chaldee, and Astrology c'ertrows.*

CHAP. IV.

Sects of the Chaldeans distinguished according to their several Sciences.

ANOTHER (more proper) Distinction of Sects amongst the learned *Chaldeans*, there was, according to the several Sciences which they professed. The Prophet ⁵ *Daniel* relating how *Nebuchadnezzar* sent for all the learned Men, to tell him his Dream, takes occasion to name the Principal of them, which were four; *Hbartumim*, *Aphaphim*, *Mecaphsim*, *Chasdim*.

Hbartumim, are by *Abrabaniel*, expounded *Magi*, skillful in natural Things; and by *Jacobiades*, those *Magi* who addicted themselves to contemplative Science; which Interpretation suits well with the Derivation of the Word; not as some would have from *Charminti*, Burnt Bones, (for that the *Magi* performed their Rites with dead Mens Bones) nor from *Chorati*, a Pen, or Scribe, (in regard the *Egyptians* used to call their wise Persons Scribes,) for the Word in

Chaldei is not taken in that Sense; but from *Chabad* a Persian Word, (by Transmutation of *h* into *w*) signifying to know; whence *Elmacinus*, instead of this *Persic-Chaldei*, useth two Arabic Words, *Al-bachamam*, *Walarraphaon*; Wise and knowing Persons. The *Hbartumim* therefore were not (as commonly rendered) *Magicians*, but rather such as studied the Nature of all things; under which Contemplation is comprehended Theology and Physics, the Knowledge of Beings, Divine and Natural.

Aphaphim ⁶ *Jacobiades* expounds those *Magi*, qui scientiam activam excolant: So *Constantinus* renders him; but adds, that *Jacobiades* is mistaken, and that the *Aphaphim* were rather the same as *Souphoun* in Arabic, Wise, Religious Person. This indeed is the more probable; *Souphoun* is an Attribute, proper to all those who deliver'd all Theology mystically and allegorically, deriv'd from *Seuph*, *Wool*; either for that the Garments of these Professors of Theology were made only of *Wool*, never of *Silk*; or from *attiring*, and *vailing* the things which concern the Love of God, under the Figures of visible Things; whence is derived the Word *Hatsseuph*, *Mystick Theology*; and perhaps from the Hebrew Root *Aphaph*, comes to the Greek *εσθ*, the first Attribute given by the Greeks to Learned Persons, afterwards changed into *επιστάτης*. These *Aphaphim*, the ordinary Interpretation of the Text in *Daniel* styles *Astrologers*: And *Aben-Ezra* derives the Word from *פסח* *Twilight*, because they observe the Heavens at that Time; but the *Astrologers* are meant afterwards by the Word *Chasdim*, (last of the four.) The *Aphaphim* of the *Chaldeans* seem rather to be the same with the *Magi* of the *Persians*, Priests, the Professors of Religious Worship, which they termed *Magick*.

Mecaphsim, properly, signifieth *Revealers*, (that is) of abstruse things: The Word is derived from *Cashaph*, which the *Arabians* still use in the same Sense of *Revealing*: *Mecaphsim* are generally taken, (as by *R. Moses*, *Nachmarides*, *Abrabaniel*, and others) for such as practised Diabolical Arts: Not improperly rendered, *Sorcerers*.

Chasdim, (or *Chaldeans*) was an Attribute (as we shewed formerly) conferred in a particular Sense upon the Learned Persons of the *Chaldeans*: Amongst whom, by a Restriction yet more particular, it signified the Professors of *Astrology*; this being a Study, to which they were more especially addicted, and for which most eminent; these are those *Chasdim*, whom *Strabo* ⁷ styles *χάλδαες ἀστρονόμοι*, *Astronomical Chaldeans*.

Besides these four Kinds (which seem to have been the principal) there are several others mentioned, and prohibited by the *Levitical Law*: *Deut.* 18. 10. *Chofor*,

¹ Lib. 6. c. 25.
² In D. n. p. 34.

³ Lib. 16. p. 739.
⁴ Lib. 16. p. 719.

⁵ Supra citat.

⁶ Loc. citat.

⁷ Loc. citat.

⁸ Lib. 5.

⁹ Chap. 2. v. 2.

Choser, Calnim, Megounim, Menacchabim, Hboer, Hboer, Shel, Ob, Jideini, Dorosh of Hammotin, R. Maimmides reciting them all, adds, that they were several sorts of Diviners; sprung up of old amongst the Chaldeans. *Jacbiades* mentions them as particular kinds of the *Mecaphbim*.

divide into seven Worlds, one *Empyeal*, three *Ethereal*, three *Corporal*.

CHAP. I.

Of the Eternal Being, God.

The FIFTEENTH PART.

The Chaldaick Doctrine.

FROM the four general Kinds of the Professors of Learning amongst the Chaldeans, mentioned by the Prophet *Daniel*, (of which we last treated) may be inferred, of what Parts or Sciences the Chaldaick Doctrine did consist. The *Hhartumim* were employed in Divine and Natural Speculation; the *Aphbim*, in Religious Worship and Rites; the *Mecaphbim* and *Chafdim* in Divination: These by *Astrology*, those by other Arts: which two last, *Diadurus*, speaking of the Learned Chaldeans, comprehends under the common Name of *Astrologers*; the other two, under that of *Natural Philosophers*, and *Priests*: for he saith, they imitated the Egyptian *Priests*, *Naturalists* and *Astrologers*.

In treating therefore of the Chaldaick Doctrine, we shall first lay down their *Theology* and *Physick*, the proper Study of the *Hhartumim*: Next, their *Astrology*, and other Arts of Divination, practised by the *Chafdim*, and *Mecaphbim*: Thirdly, their *Theurgy*; and Lastly, their *Gods*. Which Contemplation and Rites were peculiar to the *Aphbim*.

S E C T. I.

Theology and Physick.

THE Chaldaick Doctrine, in the first place, considers all Beings, as well Divine as Natural: The Contemplation of the first, is *Theology*; of the latter, *Physick*.

Zoroaster divided all things into three Kinds; the first *Eternal*, the second *born a Beginning in Time*, but shall have no End; the third, *Mortal*. The two first belong to *Theology*. The Subject of *Theology*, (saith *Eusebius*), speaking doubtless of the Followers of Zoroaster) they divided into four Kinds; the first is *God*, the *Father and King*; next him there followeth a multitude of other *Gods*; in the third place they rank *Dæmons*; in the fourth *Heroes*; or, according to others, *Angels*, *Dæmons*, and *Souls*.

The third, or mortal Kind is the Subject of *Physick*: It comprehends all things material; which they

THE first Kind of Things (according to Zoroaster) is *Eternal*, the Supreme God. In the first place (saith *Eusebius*) they conceive that God the *Father and King* ought to be ranked. This the *Delphian Oracle* (cited by *Porphyrius*) confirms.

Chaldees and Jews wise only, worshipping Purely a self-begotten God and King.

This is that Principle of which the Author of the Chaldaick Summary saith, *They conceive there is one Principle of all things, and declare that it is one and good.*

* God (as *Pythagoras* learnt of the *Magi*, who term him *Oromasdes*) in his Body resembles Light, in his Soul Truth: That God (according to the Chaldaick Opinion) is Light, besides the Testimony of *Eusebius*, may be inferred from the Oracles of Zoroaster, wherein are frequently mentioned the *Light*, *Beams*, and *Splendor of the Father*.

In the same Sense they likewise termed God a *Fire*; for *Ur* in Chaldean signifying both *Light* and *Fire*, they took *Light* and *Fire* promiscuously (as amongst many others *Plato* doth, when he saith that God began to compound the whole Body of the World out of *Fire* and *Earth*; by which *Fire* he afterwards professeth to mean the *Sun*, whom he stiles the *brightest and whitest of things*, as if *Light* and *Fire*, *Brightness* and *Whiteness* were all one;) this is manifest from the Zoroastrian Oracles also; wherein he is sometimes called simply *Fire*, sometimes the *paternal Fire*, the *one Fire*, the *first Fire* above.

Upon this Ground (doubtless) was the Worship of *Fire* instituted by the ancient Chaldeans, and from them derived to the *Persians*; of which hereafter, when we shall come to speak of their *Gods* and *Religious Rites*.

CHAP. II.

The Emanation of Light or Fire from God.

GOD (as we have shewn) an intellectual Light or *Fire*, did not (as the Oracle saith) shut up his *Fire* within his intellectual Power, but communicated it to all Creatures; first immediately to the first Mind (as the same Oracles assert) and to all other æviterial and incorporeal Beings,

* Part 1. Sect. 2. cap. 4. p. 72. & 727. † Agath.

‡ Psal. in Orac. p. 51.

• Prep. Evang. l. 4. c. 3.

• Porphy. vit. Pythag.

• Theocritus p. 9

ings (under which Notion are comprehended a Multitude of God's Angels, good Dæmons, and the Souls of Men :) The next Emanation is the Supramundane Light, an incorporeal, infinite luminous Space, in which the intellectual Beings reside; the supramundane Light kindles the first corporeal World; the Empyreum, or fiery Heaven, which being immediately beneath the incorporeal Light, is the highest, brightest, and rarest of Bodies. The Empyreum diffuseth itself through the Æther, which is the next Body below it, a Fire less refined than the Empyreum: But that it is Fire, the more condensed Parts thereof, the Sun and Stars sufficiently evince; from the Æther this Fire is transmitted to the material and sublunary World; for tho' the Matter whereof it consists be not Light, but Darknes, (as are also the material or bad Dæmons) yet this 'vivificative Fire' actuates and gives Life to all its Parts, insinuating, diffusing itself, and penetrating even to the very Center: *Passing from above (saith the Oracle) to the opposite Part, through the Center of the Earth.* We shall describe this more fully when we treat of the Particulars.

CHAP. III.

Of Things Æviterual and Incorporeal.

THE second or middle kind of Things (according to Zoroaster) is that which is begun in time, but is without End (commonly termed æviterual.) To this belong that *Multitude of Gods* which Eusebius saith they asserted next after God the Father and King; and the Souls of Men: Pfellus, and the other Summarists of the Chaldaick Doctrine, name them in this Order; *Intelligibles; Intelligibles and Intellectuals; Intellectuals; Fountains; Hyperarchii, or Principles; Unzoned Gods; Zoned Gods; Angels; Dæmons; Souls.* All these they conceive to be light, except the ill Dæmons which are dark.

Over this middle kind Zoroaster held Mithra to preside, whom the Oracles (saith Pfellus) call the Mind. This is employed about secundary Things.

CHAP. IV.

The First Order.

IN the first Place are three Orders, one *Intelligible*, another *Intelligible and Intellectual*, the third *Intellectual*. The first Order, which is of Intelligibles, seems to be (as the learned Patricius conjectures; for Pfellus gives only a bare Account, not an Exposition of these Things) that which is only understood: This is the highest Order: The second or middle Order is of Intelligibles and Intellectuals, that is,

those which are understood, and understand also; as Zoroaster.

There are *Intelligibles and Intellectuals*, which understanding, are understood.

The third is of Intellectuals; which only understand: as being Intellect, either essentially, or by Participation. By which Distinction we may conceive that the highest Order is above Intellect, being understood by the middle sort of Minds. The middle Order participates of the Superior, but consists of Minds which understand both the Superior and themselves also. The last Order seems to be of Minds, whose Office is to understand not only themselves, but Superiors and Inferiors also.

Of the first of which Orders, the anonymous Author of the Summary of the Chaldaick Doctrine, thus: *Then (viz. next the one and good) they worship a certain paternal Depth, consisting of three Triads; each Triad hath a Father, a Power, and a Mind: Pfellus somewhat more fully; Next the one they assert the paternal Depth completed by three Triads; each of the Triads having a Father first, then a Power middle, and a Mind the third amongst them; which (Mind) shutteth up the Triad within itself; these they call also Intelligibles.*

This tripple Triad seems to be the same with the Triad mentioned in the Oracles of Zoroaster. What Pfellus terms Father, he calls Father also.

The Father perfected all Things, and Paternal Monad.

Where the paternal Monad is.

The second, which Pfellus calls Power, he terms also the Power of the Father.

Neither did he shut up his own Fire in his intellectual Power.

And—The Strength of the Father.

And the Duad generated by the Monad, and resident with him:

The Monad is enlarged, which generates two.

And again,

The Duad resides with him.

This is also the first paternal Mind; for the third of this Triad, which Pfellus terms the Mind, he saith is the second Mind.

The Father perfected all Things, and delivered them over

To the second Mind, which all Mankind calls the first.

And as Pfellus saith that this Mind shuts up the Triad and paternal Depth within itself: So Zoroaster:

It is the Bound of the paternal Depth and Fountain of Intellectuals.

And again,

It proceeded not further, but remained in the paternal Depth.

CHAP.

^f Zoroaster &c.

^e Euseb. Prep. l. 4. c. 5.

^b Plot. in 16d, and Osiria.

ⁱ Plot. Ibid.

CHAP. V.

The second Order.

NE XT these (saith Pſellus) there is another Order of Intelligibles and Intellectuals; this also is divided threefold, into Jynge, Synoches, and Teletarchs. With him agrees the anonymous Summarist. Then is the intelligible Jynx; next which are the Synoches, the Empyreal, the Æthereal, and the Material; after the Synoches are the Teletarchs.

The first are Jynge of which the Oracle;

Intelligent Jynge do themselves also understand from the Father,

By unspeakable Counsels being moved so as to understand;

Pſellus saith, they are certain Powers next to the paternal Depth, consisting of three Triads (I would rather read, the paternal Depth which consists of three Triads, for so it is described in the foregoing Chapter by the same Author) which, according to the Oracle, understand by the paternal Mind, which contains the Cause of them singly within itself: Pletho. They are intellectual Species conceived by the Father, they themselves being conceptive also, and exciting Conceptions or Notions by unspeakable Counsels. These seem to be the Ideas described by the Zoroastrian Oracle;

The Mind of the Father made a jarring Noise, understanding by vigorous Counsels

Omnipotent Ideas, and flying out of one Fountain, They sprung forth; for from the Father was the Counsel and End;

But they were divided, being by Intellectual Fire distributed

Into other Intellectuals; for the King did set before the multi-form World

An intellectual, incorruptible Pattern, the Print of whose Form

He promoted through the World, and accordingly the World was framed,

Beautify'd with all kind of Ideas, of which there is one Fountain;

Out of which came rushing forth others undistributed,

Being broken about the Bodies of the World, which through the vast recesses,

Like Swarms, are carried round about every Way, Intellectual Notions from the paternal Fountain, cropping the Flower of Fire.

In the Point of sleepless Time, of this Primigenious Idea, the first self-budding Fountain of the Father budded.

Upon which Words, Proclus having cited them as an Oracle of the Gods, adds, Hereby the Gods declared as well where the Subsistence of Ideas is, as who that God is who contains the one Fountain of them, as also, after what manner the Multitude of them pro-

Epist.

ceeded out of this Fountain; and how the World was made according to them. And that they are Movers of all the Systems of the World, and that they are all intellectual essentially. Others may find out many other profound Things, by searching into these divine Notions; but for the present, let it suffice us to know, that the Gods themselves raise the Contemplations of Plato, forasmuch as they term these intellectual Causes, Ideas; and affirm, that they gave Pattern to the World, and that they are Conceptions of the Father: For they remain in the Intellections of the Father; and that they go forth to the making of the World, for so much implies their going forth, and that they are of all Forms, as containing the Causes of all things divisible: And that from this Fountain's Ideas there proceeded others, which by several Parts framed the World, and are said to be like Swarms (of Bees) because they beget the secondary Ideas. Thus Proclus.

The second are the Synoches, which are three, the Empyreal, the Æthereal, the Material: Answerable to the several Worlds which they govern. For they seem to be Minds, which receiving from Hecate the Influence of that Fire which dispenseeth Life, infuse it into the Empyreal, Æthereal, and Material Worlds, and support and govern those Worlds, and give them vital Motion. The Oracle termeth them Anoches.

Each World hath intellectual Anoches inflexible; where Pſellus interprets them the most excellent of intelligent Species, and of those that are brought down by the Immortals in this Heaven, in the Head of whom is conceived to be a God, the second from the Father.

The last of this Order are the Teletarchs, joined with the Synoches by the Oracle.

The Teletarchs are comprehended with the Synoches.

This second Order or Triad, Proclus and Damascius often mention, styling it by the double Name of Intelligent and Intellectual.

CHAP. VI.

The third Order.

THE last Order is of Intellectuals. Pſellus, After the middle Order is the Intellectual, having one paternal Triad, which consists of the Once above, and of Hecate, and of the Twice above; and another (Triad) which consists of the Amilioti, which are three; and one, the Hypozoci: These are seven Fountains. Anonymous Summarist, After these are the fountains Fathers, called also Cosmogogues; the first of whom is called the Once Above; next whom is Hecate; then the Twice Above, next whom three Amilioti; and last, the Hypozoci.

Of the Cosmogogues Pſellus interprets the Zoroastrian Oracle.

Ob

Oh how the World hath intellectual Guides, inflexible!

The Chaldeans, faith he, *affert Powers in the World, which they term Cosmaggi (Guides of the World)* for that they guide the World by provident Motions. These Powers the Oracle calls *Amoræes, Sustainers*, as sustaining the whole World. The Oracle faith, they are *immoveable*, implying their settled Power; *sustentive*, denoting their Guardianship. These Powers they design only by the Causes and Immobility of the Worlds. Pletio interprets them the most excellent of Intelligible Species, and of those that are brought down by Immortals in this Heaven. The Coryphaeus, of whom, he conceives to be a God, the second from the Father.

The *Amilioti* also, and the *Hyperæes* are mentioned by the Oracle.

— For from him

Spring forth all the implacable (*Amilioti*) Thunders. And the Recesses (*suscipient of Profeters*) of the omniluculent Strength.

Of Father-begotten Hecate, and Hyperæes the Flower of Fire.

The *Amilioti* [implacable] are Powers so termed, for that they are firm, and not to be converted towards these inferior things; and also cause, that Souls be not allured by Affections.

CHAP. VII.

Fountains and Principles.

BESIDES this last Order of Intellectuals, which *Pfellus* styles *seven Fountains*, and the Anonymous Summarist, *fountainous Fathers*, the latter gives Account of many other Fountains. "They reverence also (*saith he*) a fountainous "Triad of Faith, Truth, and Love; they likewise asserf a Principiative Son from the solar Fountain, and Archangelical, and the Fountain of Sense, and fountainous Judgment, and the Fountain of Perspectives, and the Fountain of Characters; which walketh on unknown Marks, and the fountainous "Tops of *Apello, Osyris, Hermes*, they asserf material Fountains of Centers and Elements, and a "Zone of Dreams, and a fountainous Soul."

Next the Fountains, faith " *Pfellus*, are the Hyperarchii; the Anonymous more fully, "Next the "Fountains, they say, are the Principiatives, for the "Fountains are more principal than the Principles." Both these Names of *Fountains* and *Principles* are used by *Diomyfus Areopagita* frequently; even in the third Triad, he puts the Name of *Principles*, *ἀρχαί*, (or Principialities) after whom the Arch-angels.

Of the Animal-productive Principles (continues the Anonymous) the Top is called Hecate, the Middle

principiative Soul, the Bottom principiative Virtue. This seems to be that Hecate, whom *Pfellus* saith, they held to be the Fountain of Angels and Demons, and of Soules, and of Natures; the same which the Oracle means, saying,

On the left Side of Hecate is the Fountain of Virtue; For the Chaldeans (as *Pfellus* saith) "esteem "Hecate a Goddess, seated in the middle Rank, "and possessing as it were the Center of all the "Powers; in her right Parts they place the Fountain of Souls, in her left the Fountain of Goods, "or of Virtues: Moreover they say, the Fountain "of Souls is prompt to Propagations; but the Fountain of Virtues continueth within the Bounds of "its own Essence, and is as a Virgin incorrupted; "which Settledness and Immobility it receives from "the Power of the *Amilioti*, and is girt with a "Virgin Zone." What *Pfellus* here calls the Fountain of Souls, and the Fountain of Virtues, is the same which the Anonymous styles, Principiative Soul, and Principiative Virtue.

CHAP. VIII.

Unzoned Gods and zoned Gods.

NEXT (the Hyperarchii, according to *Pfellus*) are the *Azoni*, (Unzoned Gods;) there are amongst them, (saith the Anonymous Summarist) "unzoned Hecates, as the Chaldaick, the Triecdotis, Comar, and Ecclustick: The unzoned Gods are Sarapis and Bacchus, and the "Chain of Osyris, and of Apollo; (continued Series of Geniuses, connected in the manner of a Chain.) They are called unzoned, for that they use their Power freely (without Restriction) in the Zones, and are enthroned above the conspicuous Deities: These conspicuous Deities are the Heavens and the Planets, (perhaps of the same kind as the Intelligencies, which the Peripatetics asserf Movers of the Spheres.) And whereas he saith, they live in Power, *ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ*, it is the same Attribute which *Diomyfus* gives the third of the second Hierarchy, *ἡ ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ*.

"The zoned Gods are next: "These are they "which have (Confinement to) particular Zones, and "are rolled freely about the Zones of Heaven, and "have the Office of governing the World; for "they hold, there is a zoned kind of Deity, which "inhabits the Parts of the sensible World, and girdeth, or circieth the Regions about the material "Place, according to several Distributions." The same Office *Diomyfus* seems to assign to the second and third Hierarchies.

These *Azoni* and *Zonæi* are mentioned also by *Damascius*; This (saith he) sendeth out of herself the Fountain of all Things, and the fountainous "Chain,

¹ Pfell. in Orac.

² *Σίψα*. ³ *Πέλλι*.

⁴ *Ἀμω*.

⁵ *Ἀμω*.

⁶ *Συμφυλάς*.

⁷ *Σίψα*.

⁸ *Ἀμω*.

⁹ In Orac.

¹⁰ Reading *ἐξουσία*.

but That (sendeth out of herself the fountainous Chain) of Particulars; and passeth on to Principles and Arch-Angels, and Azoni, and Zonei, as the Law is of the Procession of the renowned particular Fountains. And by Proclus, * The sacred Names of the Gods, delivered according to their mystical Interpretation, as those which are celebrated by the Assyrians, † Zonei, and Azoni, and Fountains, and Amiliēti, and Synoches, by which they interpret the Orders of the Gods.

C H A P. IX.

Angels and immaterial Dæmons.

NEXT (the Zonei) are the Angels. * Arnobius saith of Hofanes, (one of the Persian Magi, who received their Learning from the Chaldeans) that he knew the Angels, Ministers, and Messengers of God (the true God) did wait on his Majesty, and tremble as afraid at the Beck and Countenance of the Lord; the Zoroastrian Oracles mention redemptive Angels, † which reduce Souls to them, drawing them from several Things.

The next are Dæmons; of these the ‡ Chaldeans hold some to be good, others bad. The Good they conceive to be Light; the Bad Darknes. That there are good Dæmons, natural Reason tells us. Oracle :

Nature persuades, that there are pure Dæmons.

The Bourgeois, even of ill Matter, are beneficial and good.

Nature, or natural Reason, saith Pletbo, persuades, that the Dæmons are holy, and that all things proceeding from God, who is good in himself, are beneficial : If the Blossomings of ill Matter (viz. of last Substances) are good, much more are the Dæmons such, who are in a more excellent Rank, as partaking of rational Nature, and being mixed with mortal Nature.

C H A P. X.

Souls.

NEXT to Dæmons, Pfellus (in his Epitome of the Chaldaick Doctrine) placeth Souls, the last of æternital Beings.

¶ Of Forms, the Magi (and from them the Pythagoreans and Platonists) assert three kinds; one wholly separate from Matter, the super-celestial Intelligences; another inseparable from Matter, having a Substance not subsisting by itself, but dependent on Matter, together with which Matter, which is sometimes dissolved by reason of its Nature, subject to Mutation; this kind of Soul is dissolved also, and perisheth. This they hold to be wholly irrational.

¶ Betwixt these, they place a middle Kind, a rational Soul, differing from the Superclestial Intelligences, for that it always co-exists with Matter; and from the irrational kind, for that it is not dependent on Matter, but on the contrary, Matter is dependent on it; and it hath a proper Substance potentially subsistent by itself. It is also indivisible, as well as the supercelestial Intelligences, and performing some Works in some manner ally'd to theirs, being itself also busied in the Knowledge and Contemplation of Beings, even unto the Supreme God, and for this Reason is incorruptible.

¶ This Soul is an immaterial and incorporeal Fire, exempt from all Compounds, and from the material Body; it is consequently immortal: for nothing material or dark is commixed with her, neither is she compounded so as that she may be resolved into those things of which she consists.

¶ This Soul hath a self-generate and self-animate Essence; for it is not moved by another. For if (according to the Oracle) it is a Portion of the divine Fire, and a lucid Fire, and paternal Notion, it is an immaterial and self-subsistent Form; for such is every divine Nature, and the Soul is Part thereof.

¶ Of human Souls they alledge two fountainous Causes, the paternal Mind, and the fountainous Soul : The particular Soul, according to them, proceeds from the Fountainous, by the Will of the Father.

¶ Now, whereas there are several Mansions; one wholly bright, another wholly dark; others betwixt both, partly bright, partly dark; the Place beneath the Moon is circumnebulous, dark on every side; the lunar, partly lucid, and partly dark; one half bright, the other dark; the Place above the Moon circumlucid, or bright throughout; the Soul is seated in the circumlucid Region.

¶ From thence this kind of Soul is often sent down to Earth, upon several occasions, either by reason of the flagging of its Wings (so they term the Deviation from its original Perfection) or in obedience to the Will of the Father.

¶ This Soul is always co-existent with any æthereal Body as its *Vehiculum*, which by continual Approximation maketh also immortal. Neither is this her *Vehiculum* inanimate in itself, but it is animated with the other Species of the Soul, the irrational (which the Wise call εἰδωλον, the Image of the rational Soul) adorned with Phantasy and Sense, which seeth and heareth itself whole through the whole, and is furnished with all the Senses, and with all the rest of the irrational Faculties of the Soul.

¶ Thus by the principal Faculty of this Body Phantasy, the rational Soul is continually joined to

* In Proem. Parmenid.
† Ibid. ‡ Pfell. in Orac.
‡ Luc. ut.

* Read *Sorain*.
† In Orac.

* Pfell.
† Epit.

* In Orac.
† Pfell. in Orac.

* Pfell. in Orac.
‡ Pfell. & Pletb. p. 81.

* Pletbo in Orac.
† Pletb. in Orac.

such a Body, and by such a Body sometimes the human Soul is joined with a mortal Body, by a certain Affinity of Nature, the whole being enfolded in the whole enlivening Spirit of the Embryo; this *Vehiculum* itself being of the Nature of a Spirit.

* The Image of the Soul, viz. that Part which being itself void of irrational, is joined to the rational Part, and depends upon the Vehicle thereof, hath a Part in the circumlucid Region; for the Soul never layeth down the Vehicle adherent to her.

† The Soul being sent down from the Mansion wholly bright to serve the mortal Body, that is, to operate therein for a certain Time, and to animate and adorn it to her Power, and being enabled according to her several Virtues, do dwell in several Zones of the World; if she performs her Office well, goes back to the same Place; but if not well, she retires to the worst Mansions, according to the things she hath done in this Life. † Thus (the Chaldeans) restore Souls to the first Condition, according to the Measure of their several Purifications, in all the Regions of the World; some also they conceive to be carried beyond the World.

CHAP. XI.

The Supramundane Light.

ALL these æthereal and incorporeal Beings are seated in the Supramundane Light, which itself also is incorporeal, placed immediately above the highest corporeal World, and from thence extending upwards to infinite.

Proclus (cited by *Simplicius* on this Oracle of *Zoroaster*,

Abundantly animating Light, Fire, Æther, Worlds,)

saith, “This Light is above all the seven Worlds, “as a Monad before or above the Triad of the Empyrean, Æthereal, and Material Worlds: adding, “that this primary Light is the Image of the paternal Depth, and is therefore supramundane, because the paternal Depth is supramundane.” And again, “This Light, saith he, being the supramundane Sun, sends forth Fountains of Light; and “the mystick Discourses tell us, that its Generality is among supramundane things, for there is the “Solar World, and the Universal Light, as the “Chaldaick Oracles assert.”

And again, “The Centers of the whole World, “as one, seem to be fixed in this: for if the Oracles fixed the Centers of the Material World above “itself, in the Æther, proportionably ascending, “we shall affirm that the Centers of the highest of “the Worlds, are seated in this Light. Is not this

“first Light the Image of the Paternal Depth, and “for that reason supramundane also, because that is “so?”

CHAP. XII.

Of Things Temporal (or Corruptible) and Corporeal.

THE third and last Kind of Things, according to *Zoroaster*, is Corruptible or Temporal; which as it began in Time, so shall it likewise in Time be dissolved: The President over these is *Arimanes*.

Under this third Kind are comprehended the Corporeal Worlds; the Empyrean immediately below the Supramundane Light, the Æthereal next the Empyrean, and the Material the lowest of all, as the Oracle ranks them.

Abundantly animating Light, Fire, Æther, Worlds.

These Corporeal Worlds are seven. *Orac.*

For the Æther formed seven Firmaments of Worlds, Including Heaven in a round Figure,

He fixed a great Company of innervatick Stars,

He constituted a Heptad of errattick Animals,

Placing the Earth in the middle, but the Water in the Bosom of the Earth;

The Air above these,

Pfellus explaining how they are seven, saith, *They affirm that there are seven Corporeal Worlds; one Empyrean and first; then three Æthereal; and lastly, three Material, the fixed Circle, the Errattick, and the Sublunary Region.* But this Enumeration seems to fall short; for he mentions but two Æthereal Worlds (the Orb of fixed Stars, and the Planetary Orb) and one Material (the Sublunary Region;) as the learned *Patricius* observes, who therefore reckons the seven thus; one Empyrean, three Æthereal, (the fixed Orb, the Planetary Orb, the Orb of the Moon) and three Elementary, (the Aerial, the Watry, and the Terrestrial;) but perhaps it will better suit with the Oracle (which includes the Moon within the Planetary Orb, and placeth the Water under the Earth) as also with *Pfellus* (who calls the last three Worlds, Material) to dispose them thus:

Corporeal Worlds; Seven,	{	<p><i>One Empyrean World.</i></p> <p><i>Three Æthereal Worlds;</i></p> <p><i>The Supreme Æther next the Empyreum,</i></p> <p><i>The Sphere of fixed Stars, The Planetary Orb.</i></p> <p><i>Three Material Sublunary Worlds;</i></p> <p><i>The Air,</i></p> <p><i>The Earth,</i></p> <p><i>The Water.</i></p>
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Neither

* In *Orac.*

† *Pletho*. in *Orac.*

‡ *Picl.* in *Epit.*

Neither can it seem strange that the three last only should be called Material; for the Chaldeans conceiving Matter to be a dark Substance, or rather Darkness itself, the Empyrean and Æthereal Worlds, which (as we shall shew) consist of Light or Fire, cannot in their Sense be said to be Material, though Corporeal.

"The Empyrean or First of these, (Pfellus) they attributed to the Mind, the Æthereal to the Soul, the Material to Nature.

CHAP. XIII.

The Empyrean World.

THE ° First of the Corporeal Worlds, is the Empyrean; (by Empyreum the Chaldeans understand not, as the Christian Theologists, the Seat of God, and the blessed Spirits, which is rather analogous to the Supreme Light of the Chaldeans, but the utmost Sphere of the corporeal World.) It is round in Figure, according to the Oracle,

Inclusing Heaven in a round Figure.

It is also a solid Orb, or Firmament: for the same Oracles call it *εσθίαμα*. It consists of Fire, whence named the Empyrean, or, as the Oracles, the *Fiery World*; which Fire being immediately next the incorporeal supramundane Light, is the rarest and subtlest of Bodies, and by reason of this Subtility penetrates into the Æther, which is the next World below it, and, by mediation of the Æther, through all the Material World. This may be evinced more particularly, saith Proclus, from the Divine Tradition (meaning the Zoroastrian Oracles:) for the Empyreum penetrates through the Æther, and the Æther through the Material World; and thro' all the intellectual Tetrads and Heptads have a fountains Order, and consequently an Empyrean President; nevertheless they are contained in the Worlds, since the Empyrean passeth through all the Worlds.

Nevertheless, the Empyreum itself is fixed and immovable; as Simplicius, further explicating the Chaldaick Doctrine, acknowledgeth, by this Similitude: Let us imagine to ourselves (saith he) two Spheres, one consisting of many Bodies, these two to be of equal Bigness; but place one together with the Center, and put the other into it; you will see the whole World existing in Place, moved in immovable Light; which World according to its whole self is immovable, that it may imitate Place, but is moved as to its Parts, that herein it may have less than Place.

CHAP. XIV.

The Æthereal Worlds.

AFTER the Empyreum, the Oracle names the Æther, Fire, Æther, Worlds; confirmed by

Pfellus and the anonymous Summarist, who assert, that next the Empyreum are the three Æthereal Worlds; but of these three they mention only two, (and those misapply'd to the Material Worlds) *The Sphere of fixed Stars, and the Planetary Sphere*: The third (perhaps implied though not express'd) might be the Æther which is betwixt the Empyreum and the Sphere of fixed Stars.

The Æther is a Fire (as its Name implies) less subtle than the Empyreum, for the Empyreum penetrates through the Æther: yet is the Æther itself so subtle, that it penetrates through the Material World.

The second Æthereal World is the Sphere of fixed Stars, which are the more compacted or condensed Parts of the Æthereal Fire, as Parnicius ingeniously interprets this Oracle;

*He compacted a great Number of innervick Stars,
Forcing (or pressing) Fire to Fire.*

The Third Æthereal World is that of the Planetary Orb, which contains the Sun, Moon, and five Planets; stiled by the Oracles, Erratick Animals and Fire:

*He constituted a Heptad of Erratick Animals.
And again, He constituted them six; the seventh was that of the Sun,
Mingling Fire in them.*

CHAP. XV.

The Material Worlds.

THE last and lowest are the Material Worlds; which Pfellus and the other Summarists assert to be three, meaning doubtless the Air, Earth, and Water, for so the Oracle ranks 'em.

*Placing the Earth in the middle, but the Water in the Bosom of the Earth,
The Air above them.*

This is that last Order of Worlds, of which the Chaldaick Summary saith, it is called *Terrastrial*, and the *Hater of Light*: it is the Region beneath the Moon, and comprehends within itself Matter, which they call the Bottom. By which Words it appears upon what ground the Chaldeans asserted only these Sublunary Worlds to consist of Matter, but the Empyrean and Æthereal to be Immaterial though Corporeal: for Matter they understand to be the Hater of Light, Darkness, and the bottom of a Nature

5 F 2 quite

quite different from the Empyreum and Æther, whose very Substance is Light itself, yet it is actuated by their vivificative Fire which penetrates quite through it even to the Center, as we shewed formerly.

Concerning the Earth, *Diodorus Siculus* saith, they held Opinions peculiar to themselves, asserting that it is in *Figure like a Boat, and hollow*; for which, as likewise for other things concerning the World, they abound with probable Arguments.

Pfellus adds, that they sometimes call this Sublunary *Hæcæ*.

CHAP. XVI. Of Material Dæmons.

OF Dæmons, as we said, they asserted two Kinds, some good, others ill; the good, light; the ill, dark. The former are those whom *Hesiod* calls the *Ministers and Messengers of God*, dwelling in his Presence: But these he describes as *Terrestrial, wandering up and down, and Enemies to Mankind*. Of the first we have treated already; of the latter, *Pfellus* in his Discourse upon this Subject gives a large Account from one *Marcus of Mesopotamia*, who having been of this Religion, and well acquainted with their Institutions, was afterwards converted to Christianity: What he relates, as well from the Doctrine itself, as from the Place, sufficiently appears to be of the *Chaldaick* Tradition. It is to this effect:

These Dæmons are of many Kinds, and various Sorts, both as to their Figures and Bodies, insomuch that the Air is full of them, as well that which is above us, as that which is round about us. The Earth likewise is full, and the Sea, and the most retired Cavities and Depths.

There are six general Kinds of these Dæmons. The first named *Leliurius*, which signifies Fiery. This Kind dwelleth in the Air that is above us: for from the Places next above the Moon, as being Sacred, all Kinds of Dæmons, as being Prophane, are expelled. The second Kind is that which wandereth in the Air contiguous to us, and is by many peculiarly called Aereal. The third, Terrestrial. The fourth, Watery and Marine. The fifth, Subterraneous. The sixth, Lucifugous, and hardly sensible.

All these Kinds of Dæmons are Haters of God, and Enemies of Man. Moreover, of these ill Dæmons, some are worse than others. Aquatile, and Subterraneous, and Lucifugous, are extremely malicious and pernicious: For these do not hurt Souls by Phantasms and Delusions, but by Assault, like the most savage Beasts, accelerate the Destruction of Men. The Watery drown those who are

failing upon the Water. The Subterraneous and Lucifugous, insinuating into the Entrails, cause Epilepsies and Frenzy. The Aereal and Terrestrial circumvent Men by Art and Subtily, and deceive the Minds of Men, and draw them to absurd and illegal Passions.

They effect these things, not as having Dominion over us, and carrying us as their Slaves whithersoever they please, but by Suggestion; for applying themselves to the phantastick Spirit, which is within us, they themselves being Spirits also, they insinuate Discourses of Affections and Pleasures, not by Voice vibrating the Air, but by Whisper, insinuating their Discourse.

Nor is it impossible that they should speak without Voice, if we consider that he who speaks, being as far off, is forced to use a greater Sound; being near, he speaks softly into the Ear of the Hearer, and if he could get into the Spirit of the Soul, he would not need any Sound, but what Discourse soever he pleases, would, by a way without Sound, arrive there where it is to be received; which they say is likewise in Souls, when they are out of the Body, for they discourse with one another without Noise. After this manner the Dæmons converse with us, privately, so that we are not sensible which way the War comes upon us.

Neither can this be doubted, if we observe what happens to the Air. For when the Sun shineth it assumeth several Colours and Forms, transmitting them to other things, as we may see in Looking-glasses. In like manner the Dæmons, assuming Figures and Colours, and whatsoever Forms they please, transmit them into our animal Spirit, and by that means afford us much Business, suggesting Counsels, representing Figures, resuscitating the Remembrance of Pleasures, exciting the Images of Passions, as well when we sleep, as when we wake, and sometimes titillating the genital parts, inflame us with frantick and unlawful Desires, especially if they take, co-operating with them, the hot Humidities which are in us.

The rest of the Dæmons know nothing that is subtle, nor how to breed Disturbance, yet are they hurtful and abominable, hurting in the same manner as the Spirit or Vapour in *Charon's* Cave: For as that is reported to kill whatsoever approacheth it, whether Beast, Man, or Birds; in like manner these Dæmons destroy those upon whom they chance to fall, overthrowing their Souls and Bodies, and their natural Habits, and sometimes by Fire, or Water, or Precipice, they destroy not Men only, but some irrational Creatures.

The Dæmons assault irrational Creatures, not out of Hate, or wishing them ill, but out of the Love they have of their animal Heat: For dwelling in the moist

* Lib. 2.

* Apud Minut. Fel.

most remote Cavities, which are extremely cold and dry, they contract much Coldness, wherewith being afflicted, they affect the humid and animal Heat, and, to enjoy it, they insinuate themselves into irrational Creatures, and go into Baths and Pits; for they hate the Heat of Fire and of the Sun, because it burns and drieth up.

But they most delight in the Heat of Animals, as being temperate, and mixt with Moisture, especially that of Men, being best tempered; into which insinuating themselves, they cause infinite disturbance, stopping up the Pores in which the animal Spirit, is inherent, and strengthening and compressing the Spirit, by reason of the Grossness of the Bodies with which they are indued. Whence it happeneth that the Bodies are disorder'd, and their principal Faculties distemper'd, and their Motions become dull and heavy.

Now if the insinuating Dæmon be one of the Subterraneous Kind, he distorteth the possessed Person, and speaketh by him, making use of the Spirit of the Patient, as if it were his own Organ. But if any of those who are called Lucifugous get privately into a Man, he causeth Relaxation of the Limbs, and stoppeth the Voice, and maketh the possessed Person in all respects like one that is dead. For this being the last of Dæmons, is more Earthly, and extremely Cold and Dry, and into whomsoever it insinuates, it habitates and makes dull all the Faculties of his Soul.

And because it is irrational, void of all intellectual Contemplation, and is guided by irrational Phantasy, like the more savage Kind of Beasts, hence it comes to pass, that it stands not in Awe of Menaces, and for that reason most Persons aptly call it Dumb and Deaf, nor can they who are possessed with it by any other means be freed from it, but by the Divine Favour obtained by Fasting and Prayer.

That Physicians endeavour to persuade us, that these Passions proceed not from Dæmons, but from Humours, and Spirits ill affected, and therefore go about to cure them, not by Incantations and Expiations, but by Medicines and Diet, is nothing strange, since they know nothing beyond Sense, and are wholly addicted to study the Body. And perhaps not without reason are some things ascribed to ill affected Humours, as Lethargies, Melancholies, Frenzies, which they take away and cure, either by evacuating the Humours, or by replenishing the Body, if it be empty, or by outward Applications. But as for Enthusiasms, Ravings, and unclean Spirits, with which whosoever is possessed is not able to act any thing, neither by Intellect; Speech, Phantasy nor Sense; or else there is some other thing that moves them unknown to the Person possessed, which sometimes foretelleth future Events; how can we call these the Motions of depraved Matter?

No kind of Dæmon is in its own Nature Male or Female, for such Affections are only proper to Compounds: but the Bodies of Dæmons are simple, and

being very ductile and flexible, are ready to take any figure. As we see the Clouds represent sometimes Men, sometimes Bears, sometimes Dragons, or any other Figures; so is it with the Dæmoniack Bodies. Now the Clouds appear in various Figures according as they are driven by exterior Blasts or Winds: But in Dæmons, who can pass as they please into any Bodies, and sometimes contract, sometimes extend themselves like Worms on the Earth, being of a soft and tractable Nature, not only the Bulk is changed, but the Figure and Colour, and that several ways; for the Dæmoniack Body being by Nature capable of all those, as it is apt to recede, it is changed into several Forms; as it is Aerial, it is susceptible of all sorts of Colours, like Air, but the Air is coloured by something extrinsecal.

The Dæmoniack Body, from its intrinsecal Phantastick Power and Energy, produceth the Forms of Colours in itself, as we sometimes look pale, sometimes red, according as the Soul is affected either with Fear or Anger. The like we must imagine of Dæmons: for from within they send forth several kinds of Colours into their Bodies. Thus their Bodies being changed into what Figure, and assuming what Colour they please, they sometimes appear in the Shape of a Man, sometimes of a Woman, of a Lion, of a Leopard, of a wild Boar, sometimes in the Figure of a Bottle, and sometimes like a little Dog fawning upon us.

Into all these Forms they change themselves, but keep none of them constantly: for the Figure is not solid, but immediately is dissipated; as when we pour something coloured into Water, or draw a Figure in the Air. In like manner is it with Dæmons, their Colour, Figure, and Form presently vanish.

But all Dæmons have not the same Power and Will; there is much Inequality among them as to these. Some there are Irrational, as amongst compound Animals; for, as of them, Man participating of Intellect and Reason, hath also a longer Phantasy, extending also to all Sensibles, as well in the Heavens, as on Earth and under the Earth; but Horses, Oxen, and the like, have a narrow, and more particular Phantasy, yet such as extends to the Knowledge of the Creatures that feed with them, their Managers and their Masters. Lastly, Flies, Gnats, Worms, have it extremely contracted and incoherent; for they know neither the Hole out of which they came, nor whither they go, nor whither they ought to go; they have only one Phantasy, which is that of Aliment. In like manner there are different Kinds of Dæmons. Of these some are Fiery, others Aereal; these have a various Phantasy, which is capable of extending to any thing imaginable. The Subterraneous and Lucifugous are not of this Nature; whence it comes to pass, that they make not use of many Figures, as neither having Variety

of Phantasm; nor a Body apt for Action or Transformation. But the Watry and Terrestrial being of a middle Kind betwixt these, are capable of taking many Forms, but keep themselves to that in which they delight. They which live in humid Places, transform themselves into the Shapes of Birds and Women, whence termed by the Greeks *Naiades*, and *Nereides*, and *Dryades*, in the Feminine Gender. But such as are conversant in dry Places, have also dry Bodies, such as the *Oniscæles* are said to be. These transform themselves into Men, sometimes into Dogs, Lions, and the like Animals, which are of a masculine Disposition.

The Bodies of Demons are capable of being struck, and are pained thereby, though they are not Compounds; for Sense is not only proper to Compounds. That thing in Man which feeleth, is neither the Bone nor the Nerve, but the Spirit which is in them: Whence if the Nerve be pressed, or seized with Cold, or the like, there ariseth Pain from the Emission of one Spirit into another Spirit: For it is impossible that a compound Body should in itself be sensible of Pain, but in as much as it partaketh of Spirit; and therefore being broken into pieces, or dead, it is absolutely insensible, because it hath no Spirit. In like manner, a Demon being all Spirit, is of his own nature sensible in every Part; he immediately feelth, and heareth, he is obnoxious to suffering by Touch; being cut asunder, he is pained like solid Bodies; only therein differing from them, that other things cut asunder can by no means or very hardly be made whole again; whereas the Demon immediately cometh together again, as Air or Water parted by some more solid Body. But though this Spirit joins again in a moment, nevertheless at the very time in which the dissection is made it is pained.

Hitherto the Theology and Physick of the Chaldeans.

SECTION II.

Astrology, and other Arts of Divination.

THE second Part of the *Chaldaick* Learning consists in Arts of Divination; the chief whereof is Astrology. This as it is generally acknowledged to have been their proper Invention, so were they most particularly addicted to it; for which *Ptolomy* gives a Reason out of the Art itself, *because they are under Virgo and Mercury*; but *Cicero* one much better,

that the Plainness and Evenness of the Country did invite them to Contemplation of the Stars.

It consists of two Parts; 1. *Meteorologic*, which considers the Motions of the Stars; the other *Apothelematick*, which regards Divination. The first was known to the ancient *Græcians* by the common Names of *Astronomy* and *Astrology*; until the other being brought into *Greece* also, they, for Distinction, called the former more particularly *Astronomy*, the latter *Astrology*. The excellent *Joseph Scaliger*, to advance the Credit of the *Greek* Learning, constantly avers, that the *Chaldeans* had only a gross and general, not exact Knowledge of *Astronomy*, *ἀστρονομία*, tantum, non etiam *ἀστρολογία*, and that the *Greeks* learned nothing therein of the *Chaldeans*: whereas *Aristotle* ingenuously acknowledgeth the contrary: The *Egyptians* and *Babylonians*, saith he, from whom we have many Informations concerning each of the Stars. Though doubtless they were far short of that Height in this Art, to which the *Greeks*, who brought it out of the East, improved it: for *Diodorus Siculus* affirms, that they alledged very weak Reasons for the Eclipses of the Sun, which Eclipses they neither durst foretell, nor reduce to certain Periods.

But of the *Apothelematick* Part they boasted themselves not only the Inventors, but Masters; inasmuch that all the Professors of it, of what Country soever, were (as we formerly shewed) called after them, *Chaldeans*.

CHAPTER I.

Of the Stars fixed and errattick, and of their Presignification.

THEY first lay down for a Ground, That Terrestrials sympathise with the Cœlestials, and that every one of those is renewed by the Influence of these.

*For every Man's endued with such a Mind,
As by the Sire of Gods and Men's assign'd.*

Above all things they hold that our Act and Life is subjected to the Stars, as well to the Errattick as the Fixed, and that Mankind is governed by their various and multiplicitous Course: That the Planets are of the kind of efficient Causes in every thing that happens in Life, and that the Signs of the Zodiac co-operate with them: That they confer all Good and Ill to the Nativities of Men, and that by Contemplation of their Natures may be known the chief things that happen to Men.

They

* Proleg. in Manil.
l. 2.

† Lib. 2.

‡ Sext. Emp. Adv. Mathem.

§ Cœles.

¶ Sext. Emp. loco cit.

¶ Diod.

They * held the principal Gods to be Twelve, to each of which they attributed a Month, and one of the Signs of the Zodiac.

Next * the Zodiac they asst twenty-four Stars, whereof half they say are ranked in the Northern Parts, the other half in the Southern: Of these they which are apparent they conceive to be deputed to the Living, the inapparent congregated to the Dead: These they call Judges of all things.

But the greatest Observation and Theory they hold to be that concerning the five Stars termed Planets, which they call the Interpreters¹, because the rest of the Stars being fixed, and having a settled Course, these only having a peculiar Course, foretel Things that shall come to pass, interpreting and declaring to Men the Benevolence of the Gods: For some things (say they) they pre-signify by their rising, some things by their setting, some things by their Colour, if observed; sometimes they foretel great Winds, sometimes extraordinary Rains or Droughts. Likewise the Rising of Comets, and Eclipses of the Sun, and of the Moon, and Earthquakes; and in a word, all Alterations in the Air signify things advantageous or hurtful, not only to Nations or Countries, but even to Kings and private Persons.

Beneath the * Course of these, they hold that there are placed thirty Stars, which they call Constellatory Gods; that half of these oversee the Places under the Earth, the other half oversee the Earth and the Business of Men, and what is done in the Heavens; and that every ten Days one of these is sent to those below as a Messenger, and in like manner one of the Stars under the Earth is sent to those above, and that they have this certain Motion settled in an eternal Revolution.

CHAP. II.

Of Planets.

THE ¹ greatest Theory they hold (as we said) to be that which concerns the Planets: These they call the Interpreters; because, whereas the rest of the Stars are fixed, and have a settled Course, these having their proper Courses, foretel what things shall come to pass, interpreting and declaring to Men the Benevolence of the Gods.

Of the * Seven, they hold the Sun and Moon to be the chief, and that the other five have less Power than they, as to the causing Events.

Of the five ², they affirm there are three which agree with, and are assistant to the Sun, viz. Saturn, Jupiter and Mercury; these they call diurnal, because

the Sun, to whom they are assistant, predominates over the things that are done in the Day.

As * concerning the Powers of the five, some they say are benevolent, others malevolent, others common; the benevolent are Jupiter and Venus; the malevolent, Mars and Saturn; the common, Mercury, who is benevolent with the benevolent, and malevolent with the malevolent.

CHAP. III.

The Divisions of the Zodiac.

THE Chaldeans³ having at first no certain Rule of Observation of the other Stars, inasmuch as they contemplated not the Signs as within their proper Circumscriptions, but only together with their Observation of the seven Planets, it came at length into their Minds to divide the whole Circle into twelve Parts: The manner they relate thus; they say that the Ancients having observed some one bright Star of those in the Zodiac, filled a Vessel (in which they bored a Hole) with Water, and let the Water run into another Vessel placed underneath, so long until the same Star rose again; collecting that from the same Sign to the same, was the whole Revolution of the Circle: Then they took the twelfth Part of the Water which had run out, and considered how long it was in running; affirming that the 12th Part of the Circle past over in the same Space of Time; and that it had that Proportion to the whole Circle which the Part of Water had to the whole Water: By this Analogy (I mean of the Dodecatemoria or 12th Part) they marked out the extreme Term from some signal Star which then appeared, or from some that arose within that time, Northern, or Southern; the same Course they took in the rest of the Dodecatemoria.

That to each of these Dodecatemoria, the ancient Chaldeans apply'd a particular Figure and a Character, (as for Instance, to the first, the Figure of a Ram, and this Character τ) tho' denied by the Learned * John Picus Mirandula, seems manifest enough from what we find ascribed peculiarly to them, by Ptolemy, Sextus Empiricus and others, which we shall cite in their due Places.

To each of these Signs they appropriated one of the principal Gods, which they held to be Twelve, and one of the Months; the Zodiac itself they termed the Circle Mazaloth, which the Septuagint render μαζαλιθ, interpreted by Suidas, the Constellations which are commonly termed Zodiac Signs; for Mazaloth signifieth a Star. That they ascribed several Gods to them,

* Dioid. l. 2.
Emp. loc. cit.

* Dioid. loc. cit.
* Ibid.

¹ Ibid.
² Ibid.
³ Contra Astron. lib.

¹ Dioid. l. 2.
² Dioid. l. 2.

* Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem.

* Sext.

them, agreeth with what is said of the Followers of *Baal* (whom Rabbi *Maimonides* conceives the same with these Chaldeans) 'they burnt Incense to *Baal*, to the Sun and to the Moon, and to the *Mazaloth*, and to all the Host of Heaven.' Hence some are of Opinion that *Homer* received this Doctrine from the Egyptians, as the Egyptians from the Chaldeans; alluding to it in the first of his Iliads, where he mentions the Entertainment of *Jupiter* and the rest of the Gods in *Ethiopia* twelve Days, with the several Houses built for them by *Vulcan*. And better deserve they to be credited than those Ancients, who (according to *Eusebius*) writ that *Homer* first gave the Hint of this Opinion to the Mathematicians. Neither is what he adds in Explanation of this Mythology dissonant from the Chaldaick Doctrine, 'that the making those Mansions for the Gods or Stars, is ascribed to *Vulcan* in respect of the Etherial Heat of the Celestial Orb.

* Of the Signs some they call Masculine, others Feminine; some Double, others Single; some Tropical, others Solid.

The Masculine or Feminine are those which have a Nature that co-operates towards the Generation of Males or Females. *Aries* is a Masculine Sign, *Taurus* a Feminine, *Gemini* a Masculine; in like manner the rest alternately are Masculine and Feminine. In Imitation of whom, as I conceive, the *Pythagoreans* call the Monad Masculine, the Duad Feminine, the Triad Masculine, and so on thro' all Numbers, Odd and Even. Some there are who divide every Sign into 12 Parts, observing almost the same Order; as in *Aries* they call the first 12th part *Aries* and Masculine, the second *Taurus* and Feminine, the third *Gemini* and Masculine, and so of the rest.

Double Signs are *Gemini*, and its diametrically opposite *Sagittarius*; *Virgo* and *Pisces*: The rest are single.

Tropical are those to which when the Sun cometh he turneth back, and maketh a Conversion: Such is the Sign *Aries*, and its opposite *Libra*, *Capricorn* and *Cancer*; In *Aries* is the Spring Tropic, in *Capricorn* the Winter, in *Cancer* the Summer, in *Libra* the Autumnal. The Solid are *Taurus* and its opposite * *Scorpio*, *Leo*, and *Aquarius*.

Some Chaldeans there are who attribute the several parts of Man's Body to particular Signs, as sympathizing with them; To *Aries* the Head, to *Taurus* the Neck, to *Gemini* the Shoulders, *Cancer* the Breast, *Leo* the Sides, *Virgo* the Bowels and Belly, *Libra* the Reins and Loins, *Scorpio* the Secret Parts and Womb, *Sagittarius* the Thighs, *Capricorn* the Knees, *Aquarius* the Legs, *Pisces*, the Feet. This did they not without Consideration,

for if any Star shall be in any Affention of these malignant Signs, it will cause a Maim in that Part which bears the same Name with it. Thus much in brief of the Nature of the Signs in the Zodiack.

Besides this Division of the Zodiack into Signs, they subdivided every Sign into 30 Degrees, every Degree into 60 Minutes; so they call the least indivisible Parts, (as *Empiricus* affirms; whence it may be argued, that the Chaldeans made not any lower Divisions into Seconds, or the like.) The Degrees being in every Sign 30, are in the whole Zodiack 360; in some one of these the Sun must necessarily be at the Time of the Nativity; which Degree the Chaldeans properly call the Place of the Birth. Hence the Greeks call these Degrees *μίστρα*, in Allusion to the *μίστρα*, Goddesses of Destiny, these being our Fates; for it is of greatest Importance which of these Degrees is Ascendant at the Time of Birth.

Three other ways there are of dividing of the Zodiack ascribed to the Chaldeans, which are *Triplivites*, *Terms*, *Decanates*.

The * Trigns or Triplicities are these four. The first is *Aries*, *Leo*, *Sagittarius*; the second *Taurus*, *Virgo*, *Capricorn*; the third *Gemini*, *Libra*, *Aquarius*; the last *Cancer*, *Scorpio*, *Pisces*. That the Chaldeans divided the Zodiack according to these Triplicities is manifest from their way of collecting the Terms of the Planets described by *Ptolemy*.

Every Sign hath five Terms. The * Chaldaick way of finding out the Quantity of the Terms in every Sign is one, and that very plain, for their Quantities differ by an equal Diminution; every Term is less than the precedent by one Degree, for they made the first Term of every Sign to be eight Degrees, the second seven, the third six, the fourth five, the fifth four, which makes up 30 Degrees.

Lastly, the Signs are divided into Faces, for so the Ancients called them; in Hebrew *Phanim*, in Arabick *Mageah*, in Greek *πρόσωπα*; but the later Astrologers, *Decanates* *δωδεκά*; *Decans* a Word (as *Scaliger* * observes) deriv'd from the Roman Militia; of these in every Sign there are three, each of which comprehends ten Degrees. That the Chaldeans were not ignorant of these is manifest, inasmuch as *Temer the Babylonian*, an Author of great Antiquity, wrote concerning them.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Planets considered in respect to the Zodiack.

THE Chaldeans held that the * Planets have not always Power alike, as the procuring of Good and

* 2 Kings 23. * In Iliad. 1. * Ibid. * Sext. Emp.
* 1^o. 3. * Prol. * In Manil. * Sext. Emp.

* Sext. loc. cit. * Sext. Emp. * Censorin. de die natali.

and III; but that in some Places [or Signs of the Zodiac] * they are more efficacious, in others less; and that some Stars have greater Power being in their proper Houses, or in their Exaltations [or Triplicities,] or Terms, or Decanates. All which the later Astrologers call their Essential Dignities.

* The most efficacious is that of Houses. They hold the Sun's House to be *Leo*, the Moon's *Cancer*, Saturn's *Capricorn* and *Aquarius*, Jupiter's *Sagittarius* and *Pisces*, that of *Mars Aries* and *Scorpio*, that of *Venus Taurus* and *Libra*, that of *Mercury Gemini* and *Virgo*.

* They call the Exaltations and Depressions of the Planets, when they are in Signs wherewith they are delighted, or when they are in those in which they have little (or no) Power: For they are delighted in their Exaltations, but have little (or no) Power in their Depressions. As the Sun's Exaltation is in *Aries*, when he is exactly in the nineteenth Degree thereof, his Depression is in the Sign and Degree diametrically opposite to it.

The Moon's Exaltation is in *Taurus*, her Depression (or Detriment) in the Sign diametrically opposite. That of *Saturn* is in *Libra*, of *Jupiter* in *Cancer*, of *Mars* in *Capricorn*, of *Venus* in *Pisces*; and their Depressions are in the Signs diametrically opposite to their Exaltations.

The Trignes or Triplicities of Planets are order'd by the Chaldeans after this manner. * The Lord of the first Triplicity (of the Zodiac) is *Jupiter*, of the second *Venus*; the same Order they observe in the other two Triplicities, except that the third is

said to have two Lords, *Saturn* and *Mercury*: The first Part of the Day is assigned to *Saturn*, the Night to *Mercury*. The Lord of the last Triplicity is *Mars*. How much this differs from the vulgar Way (which takes in the Sun and Moon) will easily appear to those who will take the pains to compare them. The latter Way see in *Firmicus*.

* They call the Terms of the Planets in every Sign those in which any Planet from such a Degree to such a Degree is most powerful or prevalent. * The Chaldaick Way of Terms is gathered from the Lords of the Triplicities, (which is plainer and more effectual than that of the *Egyptians* from the Lords of the Houses) yet neither in their Orders nor Quantities do they always follow those Planets which govern the Triplicities. In the first Triplicity, their Division of Terms in every Sign thereof is one and the same. The first Term they give to the Lord of the Triplicity, *Jupiter*, the second to the Lord of the following Triplicity, *Venus*, the third and fourth, to the two Lords of the Triplicity of the *Gemini*, which are *Saturn* and *Mercury*; the fifth, to the Lord of the last Triplicity, *Mars*. In the second Triplicity they divide every Sign alike, and allot the first Term to *Venus*, by reason of her Dominion in that Triplicity; the second and third to the two Lords of the Triplicity of the *Gemini*, which are *Saturn* and *Mercury*; the fourth to *Mars*; the last to *Jupiter*. To *Saturn* are attributed in the Day 66 Degrees, in the Night 78, to *Jupiter* 72, to *Mars* 60, to *Venus* 75, to *Mercury* in the Day 66, in the Night 78.

e Sext. Emp. loc. cit.

* Ibid.

* Sext. loc. cit.

f Plot.

g Sext. Emp.

h Plot.

The Terms of the Chaldeans or Babylonians.

Aries	Jupiter	8	Venus	7	Saturn	6	Mercury	5	Mars	4
Taurus	Venus	8	Saturn	7	Mercury	6	Mars	5	Jupiter	4
Gemini	Saturn	8	Mercury	7	Mars	6	Jupiter	5	Venus	4
Cancer	Mars	8	Jupiter	7	Venus	6	Saturn	5	Mercury	4
Leo	Jupiter	8	Venus	7	Saturn	6	Mercury	5	Mars	4
Virgo	Venus	8	Saturn	7	Mercury	6	Mars	5	Jupiter	4
Libra	Saturn	8	Mercury	7	Mars	6	Jupiter	5	Venus	4
Scorpio	Mars	8	Jupiter	7	Venus	6	Saturn	5	Mercury	4
Sagittarius	Jupiter	8	Venus	7	Saturn	6	Mercury	5	Mars	4
Capricorn	Venus	8	Saturn	7	Mercury	6	Mars	5	Jupiter	4
Aquarius	Saturn	8	Mercury	7	Mars	6	Jupiter	5	Venus	4
Pisces	Mars	8	Jupiter	7	Venus	6	Saturn	5	Mercury	4

The Decanates or Faces of the Planets have reference to those of the Zodiac; the first Face is that Planet whose Sign it is; the second, the next Planet;

and so on. That these were of ancient Chaldaick Invention is manifest, not only in regard that *Taucer* the *Babylonian* wrote concerning them, but likewise

they were observed by the *Egyptians*, who (as *Josephus* saith) derived this Learning from the *Chaldeans*. *Nicipo* King of *Egypt*, a most just Governor and excellent Astrologer, did (if we credit *Julius Firmicus*) collect all Sickneses from the *Decanates*, shewing what Diseases every *Decanate* caused; because one Nature was overcome by another, and one God by another. The same Author adds, that *Ptolemy* touched this Part of Astrology but lightly; not as being ignorant of it, but not willing to communicate his immortal Learning unto Posterity.

CHAP. V.

Aspects of the Signs and Planets.

EVERY * Sign of the Zodiac hath a mutual Aspect to the rest; in like manner the Planets have several Aspects: * They are said to be in mutual Aspect or Configuration, when they appear either in Trine or Square. They are said to behold one another in Trine, when there is an Interposition of three Signs between them; in Square or Quartile, when of two.

* The Sun passing into the Sign next to that wherein he was at the time of Birth, regards the Place of Conception either with a very weak Aspect, or not at all; for most of the *Chaldeans* have absolutely denied, that the Signs which are next to one another behold one another; but when he is in the third Sign, that is, when there is a Sign betwixt them, then he is said to behold the first Place whence he came, but with a very oblique and weak Light, which Aspect is termed Sextile; for it subtends the sixth Part of a Circle; for if we draw Lines from the first Sign to the third, from the third to the fifth, and from thence to the seventh, and so on, we shall describe an æquilateral Hexagon. This Aspect they did not wholly rely on, for that it seemed to conduce the least to the Nativity of the Child; but when he comes to the fourth Sign, so that there are two betwixt, he looks on it with a quarterly Aspect: For that Line which his Aspect makes, cuts off a fourth Part of the Circle. When he is in the fifth, there being three betwixt it, is a Trine Aspect, for it subtends a third Part of the Zodiac: which two Aspects the Quartile and Trine, being very efficacious, afford much Increase to the Birth. But the Aspect from the sixth Place is wholly inefficacious, for the Line there makes not a Side of any Polygon, but from the seventh Sign, which is the opposite to the Aspect, is most full and powerful, and bringeth forth some Infants already mature, termed Septimæstres, from being born in the seventh Month: But if within that Space it be not mature, in the eighth Month it is not born; for from the eighth Sign, as from the

sixth, the Aspect is inefficacious; but either in the ninth Month, or in the tenth; for the Sum from the ninth Sign beholds again the Particle of the Conception in a Trine Aspect, and from the tenth in a Quartile; which Aspects, as we said, are very efficacious: But in the eleventh Month they hold it cannot be born, because then the Light being weak, sends forth his languishing Ray in a Sextile Aspect; much less in the twelfth, which Aspect is not at all valid.

CHAP. VI.

Schemes.

THE way by which the * *Chaldeans* from the very Beginning observed the Horoscope of any Nativity, corresponds with that of their Division of the Zodiac (mentioned formerly:) For a *Chaldean* sat in the Night-time on some high Promontory contemplating the Stars; another sat by the Woman in Travel until such time as she was delivered. As soon as she was delivered, she signified it to him on the Promontory, which as soon as he heard, he observed the Sign then rising for the Horoscope, but in the Day he attended the Ascendants and Sun's Motion.

Of the twelve parts or Houses into which the Zodiac is divided, * those which are predominant in every Nativity, and chiefly to be considered in Prognosticks, are four, by which one common Name they term Centers or Angles, but more particularly they call one the Horoscope or Ascendant, another the *Medium Cæli*, (the tenth House), another the Descendant, (the seventh House), another the Subterrestrial and opposite to the *Medium Cæli*, (the fourth House.) The Horoscope is that which happens to be Ascendant at the time of the Birth, the *Medium Cæli* is the fourth Sign inclusively from it. The Descendant is that which is opposite to the Horoscope. The Subterrestrial and *Imum Cæli*, that which is opposite to the *Medium Cæli*: As (to explain it by an Example) if *Cancer* be the Horoscope, *Aries* is the *Medium Cæli*, *Capricorn* Descendant, and *Libra* Subterrestrial. That House which goes before either of these Houses they call cadent; that which followeth succeedent: Now that which goeth before the Horoscope being apparent to us, they affirm to be of the ill *Genius*; that next which followeth the *Medium Cæli*, of the good *Genius*; that which is before the *Medium Cæli*, the inferior Portion and single Lot, and God. That which is before the Descendant, a slothful Sign, and the Beginning of Death; that which is after the Ascendant, and is not apparent to us, the Fury and ill Fortune; that which cometh under the Earth, good Fortune, opposite to the good *Genius*; that which is beyond the *Imum Cæli*

* Censor. c. 8

* Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem.

* Censor. ibid.

* Sext. Emp.

* Sext. Emp.

Call towards the East, Goddess; that which followeth the Horoscope, slothful, which also is opposite to the slothful.

Or more briefly thus: 'The Cadent of the Horoscope is called the ill *Genius*; the Succedent, slothful; the Cadent of the *Medium Caeli*, God; the Succedent, good *Genius*; the Cadent of the *Imum Caeli*, Goddess; the Succedent, good Fortune; the Cadent of the Descendant, ill Fortune; the Succedent, slothful. These, as they conceive, ought to be examined not superficially.

Upon these Grounds the *Chaldeans* made their *Apotelesmatick* Predictions, of which there is a Difference; for some of them are more simple, others more accurate: The more simple those which are made from any one Sign, or the simple Force of a single Star, as that a Star being in such a Sign shall cause such kind of Men: The more accurate, those which are made by the Concourse, and as they say, the Contemperation of many. As if one Star be in the Horoscope, another in the Mid-heaven, another in the opposite Point to the Mid-heaven, others thus or thus posited, then these or these Things will come to pass. These are all the Remains of this Art, which can be attributed to the ancient *Chaldeans*.

CHAP. VII.

Other Arts of Divination.

THE *Chaldeans*, besides Astrology, invented and used many other ways of Divination, of which ¹ *Diodorus Siculus* instanteth, Divination by Birds, Interpretation of Dreams, Explication of Prodigies, and Hieroscropy. ¹ *R. Maimonides* likewise affirms, that among the *Chaldeans* anciently there arose several Sorts of Diviners; in particular these, *Megnonemim*, *Menacepsim*, *Mecapshepsim*, *Chober chaber*, *Shel ob*, *Jidepami*, *Doreth el hammetim*; all which are mentioned, Deut. xviii. 10, 11.

The first ascribed by *Diodorus* to the *Chaldeans*, is Divination of Birds, *hierōn pterōn*, or Augury: neither is it probable, that they who were so great Inquisitors into the several kinds of Divination, should be ignorant of this, which After-ages esteem'd one of the most considerable. But they who understand the Word *Menacepsim* in this Sense, seem to have been drawn to it by a Mistake of the Latin Word *augurari*, by which it is rendered.

The next, Interpretation of Dreams, *ἐνύπνιον* *ἐρμηνεία*, ¹ *Philo Judæus* affirms to have been invented by *Abraham*. That it was profess'd by the ancient *Chaldeans* appears from their Answer to *Nebuchadnezzar*, 'Tell thy Servants the Dream, and we will shew the Interpretation. There are extant many onirocritcal Verses, under the Name of *Astrampylus*,

chus, collected out of *Suidas*, and digested by *Joseph Scaliger*: *Astrampylus* is mentioned among the Magi, by *Laertius*: And ² there are who conceive the Name to be only an Interpretation of the *Chaldean* or *Persian* *Zoroaster*, which some render, a living Star.

The third, Explication of Prodigies, *ἱερόσκοπος*, *ῥασιών*; this kind the *Greek* Interpreters conceive included in the Word *Jydepami*, for they render it *ἐνυπνίου ῥασιών*.

The last that *Diodorus* mentions is *Hieroscropy*, by which I conceive to be meant *extispicium*, Divination by Inspection into the Entrails (*ισπύριον*) of sacrificed Beasts. That the *Chaldeans* used this kind, may be argued from the Prophet *Ezekiel*; who saith of the King of *Babylon* (using Divination) ³ he looked into the Liver. These seem to be the *gazarin*, reckoned by ⁴ *Daniel* among the *Chaldean* Diviners, from *gazar*, to cut; for they cut open the Beast, and divined by his Entrails.

Ob is rendered *Pytho*, or rather *Pythonicus Spiritus*: The Word originally signifieth a Bottle; and thereupon is taken for that Spirit which speaketh *ex utero Pythoniæ*. The sacred Text calls the Woman *Efth Baaleth Ob*, which the Septuagint render *γυναικα ἱππασεύου*; and where *Saul* saith, ⁵ I pray thee divine to me in *Ob*; they translate, *μηντεῖλαι εἰ μὴ ἐν τῇ ἱππασεύῃ*. *R. Maimonides* saith, the that was initiated, held in her Hand a Myrtle Wand, and received Suffumigations. *R. Abraham ben David*, that these Rites were usually performed at some dead Man's Tomb.

Doreth el hammetim, is properly (as rendered) a *Necromancer*; ⁶ some affirm this kind of Divination had its Original in *Chaldea*.

These and the rest of this kind are all comprehended under the general Name *Mecapshepsim*; of which formerly.

SECT. III.

Magick, Natural, and Theurgick,

THE third Part of the *Chaldaick* Doctrine was *Magick*: for though the Name is conceived to be *Persian* (by some derived from *Mag*, ¹ a Surname of the *Persian Zoroaster*, ² by others, from the *Magusians*) yet this Science itself was originally *Chaldean*, and properly the Study of the *Asapim*; of whom *Laertius* is to be understood, when he saith, that the *Chaldeans* were the same with the *Babylonians*, as the *Magi* with the *Persians*: Hence it is also, that the Term *Magi* is sometimes extended to the *Chaldean* Philosophers.

G 2

Pliny

¹ Best. loc. cit.
² Chap. 2. v. 21.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Lib. 21.

⁵ 1 Sam. 22. v. 8.

⁶ Mor. Nev. l. 3. c. 29.

⁷ Fran. Mirand. de rer. praenot. lib. 4. p. 328.

⁸ Suid.

⁹ Dan. 2.

¹⁰ Urfin. Zoro.

¹¹ Salmst.

¹² Chap. 22.

¹³ Suid.

Pliny indeed faith, that 'Magick had its Beginning in *Perſia* from *Zoroafter*; but adds, that whether this *Zoroafter* was one, or afterwards a ſecond alſo, is not certain: And that he rather meant the *Chaldean*, than the *Perſian*, may be inferred from his citing thoſe Authors who placed this *Zoroafter* 6000 Years before *Plato*, or 5000 Years before the *Trojan War*; which Accounts (tho' extravagant) were doubtleſs intended of the moſt ancient *Zoroafter*, the *Chaldean*. He likewiſe inſtanceth, "as ſkilful in this Art, *Marmaridius* a *Babylonian*, and *Zormocenis* an *Aſſyrian*, both fo ancient, as that there are not any Monuments of them extant.

The few Remains we find of the *Chaldaick Magick* may be reduced to two kinds, *Natural* and *Theurgick*.

CHAP. I.

Natural Magick.

THE firſt Part of the *Chaldaick Magick* is that which we commonly term *natural*; becauſe it contemplates the Virtues of all natural Beings, cœleſtial and ſublunary, "makes Scrutiny into their Sympathy and mutual Application of them, produceth extraordinary Effects.

By this kind of Magick the *Chaldeans* professed "to perform many admirable Things, not only upon particular Perſons, but upon whole Countries. *R. Maimonides* inſtanceth "the expelling noxious Animals, as Lions, Serpents, and the like, out of Cities; the driving away all kinds of Harms from Plants, Prevention of Hail, the deſtroying of Worms, that they hurt not the Vines. Concerning theſe (faith he) they have written much in their Books; and ſome there are who boaſt they can cauſe that no Leaves or Fruit ſhall fall from the Trees.

CHAP. II.

Magical Operations, their Kinds.

THEIR Operations " *R. Maimonides* reduceth^h to three kinds. The firſt of thoſe which deal in Plants, Animals and Metals. The ſecond, conſiſts in Circumſcription and Determination of ſome Time, in which the Operations are to be performed. The third conſiſts in human Geſtures and Actions; as in clapping the Hands, leaping, crying aloud, laughing, lying proſtrate on the Earth, burning any Thing, kindling of Smoak, and laſtly, in pronouncing certain Words intelligible or unintelligible. Theſe are the kinds of their magical Operations.

"Some there are which are not performed but by all theſe kinds: As when they ſay, Take ſuch a Leaf of ſuch an Herb, when the Moon is in ſuch a

Degree and Place: Or, Take of the Horn of ſuch a Beaſt, or of his Hair, Sweat, or Blood, ſuch a Quantity, when the Sun is in the Middle of Heaven, or in ſome other certain Place: Or, Take of ſuch a Metal, or of many Metals, melt them under ſuch a Conſtellation, and in ſuch a Poſition of the Moon; then pronounce ſuch and ſuch Words; make a Suffumigation of ſuch and ſuch Leaves, in ſuch and ſuch a Figure, and this or that Thing ſhall come to paſs.

"Other magical Operations there are which they conceive may be performed by one of the forementioned kinds, only theſe (ſay they) are performed for the moſt part by Women, as we find amongſt them: For the bringing forth of Waters, if ten Virgins ſhall adorn themſelves, and put on red Garments, and leap in ſuch a manner that one ſhall thruſt on the other; and this to be done going backwards and forwards, and afterwards ſhall ſtretch out their Fingers towards the Sun, making certain Signs; this Action being finiſhed, they ſay, that Waters will iſſue forth. In like manner they write, that if four Women, &c. uſing certain Words and certain Geſtures, by this Action they ſhall divert Hail from falling down. Many other ſuch like Vanities they mention all along their Writings, which are to be performed by Women.

"But none of theſe (as they imagine) can be performed without having Reſpect and Conſideration of the Stars; for they conceive, that every Plant hath its proper Star. They aſcribe alſo certain Stars to all living Creatures and Metals: Moreover, theſe Operations are peculiar Worſhips of the Stars, and that they are delighted with ſuch an Action, or Speech, or Suffumigation, and for its ſake afford them what they wiſh. Hitherto *R. Maimonides*, who only hath preſerved theſe Remains of the ancient *Chaldaick Superſtition*.

CHAP. III.

Of the Tſilmenaiä (or Teleſmus) uſed for Averrunca-tion.

MOREOVER, the *Chaldeans* are by the Rabbies reported, to have been the firſt that found out the ſecret Power of Figures; neither was there any thing more celebrated than the Images of this kind, made by them.

They are called in *Chaldee* and *Perſian*, *Tſilmenaiä*, from the *Hebrew*, *Tſelem*, an Image; in *Arabick*, *Taliſſmam*, or *Tſalimam*, perhaps from the ſame Root; rather than as ſome conjecture from the Greek Word, *Ταλισμα τῆς ἀποκρίσεως*.

Theſe Images were prepared under certain Conſtellations, for ſeveral Purpoſes; ſome for Averrun-cation, others for Prediction.

Thoſe

* Lib. 30. c. 1.
* Loc. cit.

* Loc. cit.
* Loc. cit.

* Pſcl.
* Maim. Mor. No.

* Maimon. Mor. No.

* Mor. No. L. 3. c. 37.

* Mor. No.

Those that serve for *Avertuncation*, some conceive to have been of later Invention, and ascribe them to *Apollonius Tyanaus*: he indeed was the first amongst the *Grecians* that was famous for them: But it is most probable that he brought this Art out of the East, there being yet to be seen many of these Figures or *Teleims* throughout the whole Eastern Part of the World, and some of them very ancient, which *A. Gasseri* alledgeth, to confirm that the *Persians*, or if you will, the *Babylonians*, were the first that found them out.

These the *Greeks* term also *συζεία*, and *σοφισμους*, and the Makers of them *Stoicheiomaticks*: " *Ptolemy*, " The generable and corruptible Forms are affected " by the celestial Forms; for which Reason the " *Stoicheiomaticks* make use of them, considering " the Entrance of Stars into them: On which " Words *Hali Aben Rodaan* (or as the *Hebrew* " Translation, *Aben Giasar*) writes thus. In this " Chapter, *Ptolemy* means to discover many Secrets " of Images; and that the Figures which are here " below are correspondent to the like Figurations " above, which preJominate over them: As for Instance, the celestial *Scorpion* predominates over the terrestrial *Scorpions*, and the celestial *Serpent* over the terrestrial *Serpents*; and the skilful in Images, (*Stoicheiomaticks*) observed, when a Planet was out of his Combustion, and entred into any of these Figures, then placing the Planet in the Horoscope, they engraved the Figure upon a Stone, and having added what elfe was necessary, they fitted it for Preservation, or Destruction, as they pleased; and this Power continued in the Stone a long time after."

C H A P. IV.

Of the *Tsilmenaiâ*, used for Prediction.

ANother kind there was of *Tsilmenaiâ*, or *Teleims*, used for Prediction: " These Images (according to the Description of *R. Maimonides*) they did erect to the Stars: Of Gold to the Sun, of Silver to the Moon, and so distributed the Metals and Climates of the Earth among the Stars; for they said, that such a Star is the God of such a Climate. There they built Temples, and placed the Images in them, conceiving that the Power of the Stars did flow into those Images, and that those Images had the Faculty of Understanding, and did give to Men the Gift of Prophecy; and in a word, did declare to them what Things were good for them. So also they say of Trees, which belong to those Stars, every Tree being dedicated to some Star, and planted to its Name, and worshipped for this or that Reason; because the spiritual Virtues of the Stars are infused

" into that Tree. So that after the manner of " Prophecy, they discourse to Men, and speak to them also in Dreams."

The Word *Teraphim*, in the sacred Scripture, among other Significations, is sometimes taken for these Images; whence *Onkelos*, the *Chaldee* Paraphrast, renders it *Tsilmenaiâ*, with which the *Syriack* Version agrees; the Septuagint *διδωκε* and *παρρησιάζει*, and *παρρησιάζει*; implying, by all these Interpretations, that they were indued with the Gift of Prediction: Which is no more than the Text itself confirms; For *Ezekiel* saith of the King of *Babylon*, using Divination, that he consulted the *Teraphim*.

Of this kind are those *Teraphims* conceived to be, which *Rachel* stole from her Father *Laban*; for he calls them his *Gods*; the *Coptick* Version renders it, the greatest of his *Gods*: *R. D. Kimchi* conceives they were made by Astrologers, to foretell Things to come, and that they were Images whose Figures we know not, by which the Ancients were informed of future Events, they being in some manner like the Oracles, which often spake by the Mouth of the Devil. *R. Elizer*, that they were Statues made in the Figure of Men under certain Constellations, whose Influences (which they were capable of receiving) caused them to speak at some set Hours, and give an Answer to whatsoever was demanded of them. *Aben Ezra*, That they were made after the Shapes of Men, to the end they might be capable of celestial Influence (and in the same manner interprets he the *Teraphim* placed by *Micah* in *David's* Bed.) Adding, that the Reason why *Rachel* took them away, was not to take her Father off from Idolatry; for if it were so, why then did she take them along with her, and not rather hide them in the Way near his House? But by reason that her Father was skilful in Astrology, she feared, lest by consulting those Images and the Stars, he should know which way *Jacob* was gone. And *St. Austin*,^{*} that *Laban* saith, *Why hast thou stolen my Gods?* It is perhaps inasmuch as if he had said he divined; [*I divined the Lord because of thee*] for so the more ancient Expositors interpret the Word *Nitaphiti*; and the *Jews* understand that Place, of Prescience, Divination or Conjecture, as *Mr. Selden* observes.

Philo Judeus, speaking of the *Teraphim* of *Micah*, fancies that *Micah* made of fine Gold and Silver three Images of young Lads, and three Calves, and one Lion, one Dragon, and one Dove; so that if any had a mind to know any Secret concerning his Wife, he was to have Recourse to the Image of the Dove, which answered his Demands; if concerning his Children, he went to the Boy; if concerning Riches, to the Eagle; if concerning Power and Strength, to the Lion; if it any thing concerned

Sons

* *Censor. inedit.*

* *Centiles.*

* *Mori Ne.*

* *Gen. 3.*

* *Ch. 21. 21.*

* *Gen. 31.*

* *Gen. quest.*

94. * *Gen. 30.*

* *De Diâ Syriâ. Syntag. 1.*

* *Judg. 17.*

Sons and Daughters, he went then to the Calves; and if about the Length of Years and Days, he was to consult the Image of the Dragon. This, how light soever, shews that he also understood the *Tera-phim* to be prophetic.

CHAP. V.

Theurgic Magick.

THE other Part of the Chaldaick Magick is *Theurgick*; to which perhaps *Plato* more particularly alluded, when he defined ° the Magick of *Zoroaster*, the Service of the Gods. This they called also ° the Method of Rites, the Works of Piety, and (as rendered by the *Greeks*) *τῆς πίετης ἔργα*, *The telestic Science and Telurgick*. Of what it did consist may be gathered from what *Suidas* saith of the two *Julians*; *Julian* (saith he) the *Chaldean*, a Philosopher, Father of *Julian*, surnamed the *Theurgick*; he wrote of *Dæmons* four Books; they treat of Preservatives of every Part of Man's Body, of which kind are the *Chaldaick Telurgicks*. And again, *Julian*, Son of the afore-mentioned, lived under *Marcus Antoninus* the Emperor; he also wrote *Theurgick Initiatory Oracles* in Verse; and all other Secrets of the Science.

Thus the *Telestic Science* was conceived to procure a Conversation with *Dæmons* by certain Rites and Ceremonies, and ° to initiate or perfect the Soul by the Power of Materials here on Earth; for the supreme Faculty of the Soul cannot, by its own Guidance, aspire to the sublimest Institution, and to the Comprehension of Divinity; but the Work of Piety leads it by the Hand to God by Illumination from thence. *Plato* indeed holds, that we may comprehend the ungenerate Essence by Reason and Intellect; but the *Chaldean* asserts, that there is no other means for us to arrive at God, but by strengthening the Vehicle of the Soul by material Rites; for he supposeth that the Soul is purified by Stones, and Herbs, and Charms, and is rendered expedite for Ascend.

It is likewise beneficial to the Body, as well as to the Soul; for ° if a Man shall give his Mind to these, he shall not only render his Soul unvanquishable by Passions, but shall also preserve his Body the better in Health: for the usual Effect of divine Illuminations is to consume the Matter of the Body, and to establish Nature by Health, that we be not seized either by Passions or Diseases.

CHAP. VI.

Theurgick Rites.

BY *theurgick* or *telestic* Rites they conceived, that they could procure a Communication with the good *Dæmons*, and Expulsion and Averrunation of the bad.

* Aleibad. 1.

† Psel. in Oraz.

‡ Psel. in Oraz.

§ Psel. in Oraz.

• De Mystr. Egypt.

• De Astronimis.

The chief of these Rites was Sacrifice; concerning which, there is a remarkable Passage in ° *Jamblichus*, who delivers the *Chaldaick* Opinion thus: The Gods give those Things that are truly good; to such as are purified by Sacrifices; with whom also they converse, and by their Communication drive away Wickedness and Passion far from them, and by their Brightness chase from thence the dark Spirit; for the evil Spirits, when the Light of the Gods cometh in, fly away as Shadows at the Light of the Sun: Neither are they able any longer to disturb the pious Sacrificer, who is free from all Wickedness, Perverseness, and Passion. But such as are pernicious, and behave themselves insolently in opposition to sacred Rites and Orders, these, by reason of the Imbecility of their Action, and Want of Power, are not able to attain to the Gods, but because of certain Pollutions, are driven away from the Gods, and associated with ill *Dæmons*, by whose bad Breath they are inspir'd, and depart thence most wicked, prophane, and dissolute; unlike the Gods in Desire, but in all things resembling the bad *Dæmons* with whom they converse daily. These Men therefore being full of Passion and Wickedness, by the Affinity that is betwixt them, draw the evil Spirits to them, by whom being quickly possest, they are again excited to all Iniquity, one assisting and strengthening the other, like a Circle whose Beginning and End meet.

Several other Rites they used also, which they conceived to be prevalent in Evocation of these *Dæmons*. They are allowed (saith ° *Gregorius Nicophorus*) out of the Air and Earth, by certain Stones or Pulse, or certain Voices or Figures, which they call Characters, invented by the *Chaldeans* and *Egyptians*, who first found out the proper dignificative Sign of every *Dæmon*.

Some few of these are mentioned in the *Chaldaick* Oracles; as,

*When thou seest the terrestrial Dæmon approach,
Sacrifice the Stone Minoxuris, using Invocation.*

The *Dæmons* (saith *Pfellus*) that are near the Earth, are by Nature lying, as being far off from the Divine Knowledge, and filled with dark Matter. Now if you would have any true Discourse from these, prepare an Altar, and sacrifice the Stone *Minoxuris*: This Stone hath the Power of Evocations; the other greater *Dæmon* who invisibly approacheth to the material *Dæmon*, will pronounce the true Relation of Demands, which transmits to the Demandant the Oracle the vocative Name, with the sacrificing of the Stone.

Another of these Rites mentioned by the same Oracles, is that of the *Hecatine Strophalus*.

Labour about the Hecatine Strophalus.

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The *Hecate Strophalus* (saith *Pfellus*) is a golden Ball, in the midst whereof is a Sapphire, they fold about it a Leather Thong, it is beset all over with Characters; thus whipping it about, they made their Invocations. These they use to call Jynges, whether it be round or triangle, or any other Figure; and whilst they are doing thus, they make insignificant or brutish Cries, and lash the Air with their Whips. The Oracle adviseth to the Performance of these Rites, or such a Motion of the *Strophalus*, as having an expellible Power. It is called *Hecate*, as being dedicated to *Hecate*. *Hecate* is a Goddess amongst the *Chaldeans*, having at her right Side the Fountain of Virtues.

No little Efficacy was attributed to certain Words used in these Rites, which the *Chaldaick* Oracles expressly forbid to be changed.

Never change barbarous Names.

There are certain Names (saith *Pfellus*) among all Nations delivered to them by God, which have an unspeakable Power in Divine Rites; change not these into the *Greek* Dialect; As *Seraphim* and *Che- rubim*, and *Michael* and *Gabriel*; these, in the *Hebrew* Dialect, have an unspeakable Efficacy in Divine Rites; but changed into *Greek* Names, are ineffectual.

CHAP. VII.

Apparitions.

THE Apparitions procured by these Rites are of two kinds.

The first is called *ἐκστασις*, *Super-inspection* (in respect to the initiated Person.) When he who orders the divine Rites seeth a meer Apparition, (as for instance) of Light in some Figure or Form, concerning which the *Chaldaick* Oracle adviseth, that if any one sees such a Light, he apply not his Mind to it, nor esteem the Voice proceeding from thence to be true. Sometimes likewise to many initiated Persons there appears whilst they are sacrificing some Apparitions in the Shape of Dogs, and several other Figures. These are Apparitions of the Passions of the Soul in performing divine Rites, meer Appearances, having no Substance, and therefore not signifying any thing true.

The second is called *ἐντομία*, *Self-inspection*; this is when the initiated Person seeth the divine Light itself without any Figure or Form: This the Oracle calls *ὁρασις*, *Sacro-sanct*, for that it is seen with a Beauty by sacred Persons, and glides up and down pleasantly and graciously through the Depths

of the World. This will not deceive the initiated Person, but whatsoever Question you shall propose, the Answer will be most true,

When thou seest (saith the Oracle) a sacred Fire without

Form, shining flashingly thro' the Depths of the whole World,

Hear the Voice of Fire.

When thou beholdest the divine Fire void of Figure, brightly gliding up and down the World, and graciously smiling, listen to this Voice, as bringing a most perfect Prescience.

But these things which appear to initiated Persons, as Thunder, Lightning, and all else whatsoever, are only Symbols or Signs, not the Nature of God.

CHAP. VIII.

Material Demons how to be repulsed.

AS it is one Property of *Theurgy* to evocate and procure a Conversation with good Demons, so is it another, to repulse and chase away the material Demons, which, as they conceive may be effected several Ways; either by Words or Actions.

By Words: For (as *Marcus* delivers the *Chaldaick* Opinion) these material Demons fearing to be sent to Abysses and subterranean Places, and standing in awe of the Angels who send them thither, if a Man threaten to send them thither, and pronounce the Names of those Angels whose Office that is, it is hardly to be expressed how much they will be affrighted and troubled; so great will their Astonishment be, as that they are not able to discern the Person that menaces them; and tho' it be some old Woman, or a little old Man that threatens them, yet so great is their Fear, that they depart as if he that menaces were able to kill 'em.

By Actions: For the Bodies of Demons (saith the same Author) are capable of being struck, and are pained thereby; Sense is not the Property of Compounds, but of Spirits; That thing in a Man which feeleth, is neither the Bone nor the Nerve, but the Spirit which is in them: Whence, if the Nerve be pressed or seized with cold, or the like, there ariseth Pain from the Emission of one Spirit into another; for it is impossible that a compound Body should in itself be sensible of Pain, but in as much as it partakes of Spirit; and therefore being cut into Pieces, or dead, it is absolutely insensible, because it hath no Spirit. In like manner, a Demon being all Spirit, is of his own Nature sensible in every Part; he immediately seeth and heareth; he is obnoxious to suffering by Touch; being cut asunder, he is pained

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* Pfcil. in Orac. 15. * Ibid. 24. * Ibid. 19. * Ibid. 15. * Loc. cit. * Ibid. * Pfcil. in Orac. 21.
 † Ibid. † Pfcil. de Demons. † Ibid.

like solid Bodies; only herein differing from them, that other things being cut asunder, can by no means, or very hardly be made whole again; whereas the Dæmon immediately comes together again, as Air or Water parted by some more solid Body. But tho' this Spirit join again in a Moment, at the time in which the Dissection is made 'tis pain'd; for this Reason they are much afraid of Swords; which they who chase them away knowing, stick up pointed Irons or Swords in those Places where they would not have them come, chasing them away by things antipathetical to them, as they allure them by things sympathetic.

From these Material Demons, upon those that worship them, descend certain fiery Irradiations, like those they call falling Stars, gliding up and down, which those mad Persons term Apparitions of God; but there is nothing true, firm, or certain in them, but Cheats, like those of Jugglers, which the common People term Wonders, because they deceive the Eye, ² for being removed far from the Beatitude of divine Life, and destitute of intellectual Contemplation, they cannot presignify Futures, but all that they say or shew is false and not solid; for they know Beings *μυστηριώδεις*, by their Outrides, but that which knoweth Futures particularly, useth Notions indivisible and not figured.

SECT. IV.

Of the Gods, and Religious Worship of the Chaldeans.

IN the last place, as to the Explication of the Chaldaick Doctrine, (especially of that part which concerns their *Ashaphim*) it is necessary we give account of the Gods of the Chaldeans, and of their Religious Worship.

And tho' Mr. Selden hath reduced all the *Asiatick* Gods under the common Name of *Syrian* in his excellent Treatise upon that Subject; yet we shall take notice of such only as were proper to *Assyria*, (whether as being worshipped no where else, or from thence brought into *Syria* and other Countries) conceiving the rest nothing pertinent to the Chaldeans or *Babylonians*.

The Religious Worship of the Chaldeans may be reduced to three Kinds: The first, a Worship of the true God, but after an idolatrous manner: The second, of Demons, or Spirits: The third, of the celestial Bodies, and Elements.

CHAP. I.

Of their idolatrous Worship of the true God.

THE first kind of the Chaldaick Worship was of the true God, tho' after an idolatrous Man-

ner: The Author of the Chaldaick Summary affirms, that they held one Principle of all things, and declare that it is one and good. That by this one and good they meant the true God, (to whom alone those Attributes belong) may be gathered from ^a *Eusebius*, who saith, (speaking doubtless of the Followers of Zoroaster) that in the first place they conceive God the Father and King ought to be ranked; for this Reason the Delphian Oracle; attested by *Porphyrus*, joins them with the Hebrews;

Chaldees and Jews wise only, worshipping Purely a self-begotten God and King.

But (notwithstanding the Oracle) that this Worship, though of the true God, was idolatrous, is beyond doubt; so as to them might be applied what St. Paul saith of the Romans, *When they knew God they glorify'd him not as God, but ^b changed the Glory of the uncorruptible God into an Image made like to corruptible Man.*

The Name and Image whereby they represented the supreme God was that of *Bel*, as appears by the Prohibition given by God himself, not to call him so any more; *Thou shalt call me no longer Baal: Bel with the Chaldeans is the same as Baal with the Phœnicians*, both derived from the Hebrew *Baal*, Lord; this *Bel* of the Babylonians is mentioned by the Prophets *Ezay* and *Jeremy*. They who first translated the Eastern Learning into *Greek*, for the most part interpret this *Bel* by the Word *Jupiter*. So *Herodotus*, *Diodorus*, *Hesychius*, and others: *Berosus* (saith *Eusebius*) was Priest of *Belus*, whom they interpret (*Δία*) *Jupiter*; the Reason of which seems to be, for that *Bel* was the chief God with the Chaldeans, as *Jupiter* with the Grecians, who by that Name meant the true God, as the Chaldeans by the other; for to him St. Paul applies that Hemistick of *Aratus*, *τὸ θεὸν ὡς υἱοῦ*, (for we are also his Off-spring) which hath Reference to the first Verse, *ἐν Διὶ ἐκτετυγένει*. And ^c upon these Words of St. Peter, *Worship ye God, but not as the Grecians*; *Clemens Alexandrinus* ^d observes, that he saith not, *Worship not the God whom the Grecians, but as the Grecians*; he changed the manner of the Worship, but preached not another God.

The Temple of this *Jupiter Belus* at *Babylon*, is exactly described by *Herodotus*, an Eye-witness, in whose time it was yet extant, thus: The ^e Gates were of Brass; the Temple itself square; every Side two Furlongs broad. In the midst of the Temple there was a solid Tower (not hollow) of Thickness and Height of a Stadium; upon which there was set another, and another upon that, and so on to eight: On the Outside of these were Stairs, by which to go up every one of them; in the midst of the Stairs were Seats for such as went up, to rest them-

selves:

^a Psel. de Demon.

^b Psel. in Orac. 23.

^c Pzepar. Evang. l. 4.

^d Rom. i. 20.

^e Versè 23.

^f Hof. ii. 16.

^g Act. xvii. 23.

^h Strom. 6.

ⁱ Lib. 1.

selves: In the highest Tower there was another Temple (or Chapel) and in it a Bed sumptuously furnish'd, and a Table of Gold; but neither in this was there any Statue, nor doth any Person lie here a-nights except one Woman, a Foreigner, of whom the God makes choice above all other, as the *Chaldeans* who are Priests of this God aver: for they say (tho' I hardly credit it) that the God himself comes into this Temple, and rests in this Bed: There is moreover in this Temple another lower Chapel, in which there is a great Statue of *Jupiter* all of Gold, sitting; and beside it a Table and Bench all of Gold also, inasmuch that the *Chaldeans* value it at 800 Talents: Likewise without the Chapel there is an Altar of Gold, and another Altar very great, upon which are sacrificed Sheep of full Growth; for upon that of Gold, it is not lawful to sacrifice any but Sucklings: On this greater Altar the *Chaldeans* burn yearly of Frankincense to the Value of 100000 Talents, in sacrifice to their Gods. There was also at the same time in this Temple a Statue 12 Cubits high, of massy Gold, which I saw not, but take upon the Report of the *Chaldeans*; this Statue *Darius* Son of *Hystaspes* had a great Mind to take, but durst not; but his Son *Xerxes* afterwards took it, and slew the Priest which forbade him to stir it: Thus was this Temple built and beautified, beside infinite Gifts and Presents. Hitherto *Heredotus*. He terms the Priests of *Belus*, *Chaldeans*; and *R. Maimonides* asserts the *Chaldean* Idolaters to be the same with the Prophets of *Babyl*.

The Festival of *Bel* is mentioned, 2 *Kings* x. 20. his Oracle by *Arrian*; the same which *Stephanus* means, saying, The *Chaldeans* had an Oracle which was no less in Esteem with them, than that at *Delphi* was with the *Grecians*.

CHAP. II.

Worship of other Gods, Angels and Dæmons.

THE second kind of their religious Worship, was that of other Gods, Angels and Dæmons: Next the supreme God (saith *Eusebius*, delivering their Opinion) there followeth a Multitude of other Gods, Angels and Dæmons. These Gods they distinguished into several Orders, *Intelligibles*; *Intelligibles and Intellectuals*; *Intellectuals*; *Fountains*; *Principles*; *Unsexed Gods*; *Sexed Gods*; *Angels* and *Dæmons*. To the Worship of these belongs what we have already delivered concerning their *Theurgy*.

CHAP. III.

The Chaldean Worship of the Celestial Bodies.

THE third kind of idolatrous Worship used by the *Chaldeans* and *Babylonians* was of the Celestial Bodies; into which, *Maimonides*' faith, they fell soon after the Flood; perhaps occasioned by their continual Addition to Contemplation of them, and grounded upon Observation of the great Benefits communicated to Mankind by their Influence.

The *Levitical* Law, in prohibiting this Idolatry, sets down the Particulars of it; ' *Left thou lift up thine Eyes unto Heaven, and when thou seest the Sun, and the Moon, and the Stars, even all the Host of Heaven, should be driven to worship them and serve them.* And of the *Jewish* Idolaters put down by *Jehoiakim* (besides those that burnt Incense to *Baal*, of whom already) are reckoned those that burnt Incense to the *Sun*, and to the *Moon*, and the *Planets* (or Signs, *Mazoth*) and to all the *Host of Heaven*. This doubtless they learned of their Neighbours the *Affrians*, on whom the Prophet *Ezekiel* complains that they doted.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Sun.

THE Sun and Moon are first named and distinguished from the rest; with them perhaps this Kind of Idolatry began, before it came to be apply'd to any of the other Stars; for in the most ancient mention of it, (which is by *Job*, a Neighbour to the *Chaldeans*) we find these two only named: That the *Chaldeans* esteemed these the Principal, is confirmed by *R. Maimonides*, who faith, *They held the rest of the seven Planets to be Gods, but the two Luminaries the greatest*.

But * of these (adds *Maimonides*) they held the Sun to be the greatest God. What he farther relates in Confirmation hereof, out of the Books of the *Sabæans* concerning *Abraham*, and the like, was delivered formerly. Of the *Affryan* Idols dedicated to the Sun, *Macrabi* mentions three, *Adad*, *Adonis* and *Jupiter Heliopolites*.

Adad * signifieth One; this God they adore as most powerful, but they join with him a Goddess named *Atargates*, ascribing to these two an absolute Power over all things; by these they mean the Sun and the Earth: That hereby they understand the Sun, is manifest, for the Image of *Adad* is very fair, and hath Beams bending downwards, to shew that the Power of Heaven consists in the Beams of the Sun, sent down upon the Earth. The Image of *A-*

* Mor. No. I. 3.
* Sæm. 2. c. 21.

* Deut. iv. 29.

* 2 Kings xxiii. 5.

* Cap. xxxii. §. 26.

* Mor. No. I. 3.

* Ibid.

targetes hath Beams erected, to shew that the Earth produceth all things by the Power of the Beams sent from above: Thus *Macrobius*. But whereas he saith that *Adad* signifieth One, either he himself is mistaken, or his Text depraved, for (as Mr. *Selden* observes) with the *Syrians*, and *Chaldeans* or *Affyrians*, *Chad*, from the Hebrew *Achad*, signifieth One; but *Adad* or *Adod* which in the Scripture is *Habadad*, is of a different spelling; *Drusus* reads (in *Macrobius*) *Hhadda*, which signifies One in *Syriack*. Of this Idol perhaps is the Prophet *Isaiah* to be understood, *They* * that sanctify and purify themselves after One in the midst of the Gardens, dedicated to that Idol behind the Temple; *Subintelligendum enim Templum, pone Templum*, saith *Joseph Scaliger*.

Adonis † is derived from *Adon*, Lord. "That *Adonis* is the Sun (saith *Macrobius*) is not doubted, upon view of the Religion of the *Affyrians*, with whom *Venus Arctiis* (now worshipped by the *Phœnicians*) and *Adonis* were held in great Veneration: For the Naturalists worshipped the superior Hemisphere of the Earth, in part whereof we dwell, by the Name of *Venus*, the inferior they called *Proserpina*. Hereupon among the *Affyrians* or *Phœnicians*, the Goddess is introduced mourning, because the Sun in performing his annual Course passeth through the 12 Signs of the inferior Hemisphere; for of the Signs of the Zodiac, six are esteemed superior, six inferior; and when he is in the inferior, and consequently makes the Day shorter, the Goddess is believ'd to mourn, as if the Sun were snatch'd away by Death for a time, and detained by *Proserpina* the Goddess of the inferior Part, and of the *Antipodes*. Again, they conceive that *Adonis* is restor'd to *Venus* when the Sun surmounting the six Stars of the inferior Order begins to illuminate our Hemisphere, and lengthen the Light and Days."

The last is *Jupiter* * *Heliopolites*: "The *Affyrians* (saith the same Author) under the Name of *Jupiter* worship the Sun (whom they stile *Adad* *Δαδοις*) with extraordinary Ceremonies: "The Image of this God was taken from a Town in *Egypt*, named *Heliopolis* also, at what time *Senecmus*, perhaps the same as *Senepos*, reign'd over the *Egyptians*. It was brought thither by *Oppias* Ambassador of *Delebois*, King of the *Affyrians*, and by the *Egyptian* Priests, the chief of whom was *Parmetis*; and having been a long time kept by the *Affyrians*, was afterwards removed to *Heliopolis* (in *Egypt*); the Reason of which, and why being carry'd out of *Egypt* it was brought back into the Place where now it is, and where it is worshipp'd with Rites that are more *Affyrian* than *Egyptian*, I forbear to relate, as being nothing pertinent to our Purpose, † That this *Jupi-*

ter is the same with the Sun, appears as well by their religious Rites, as by the Fashion of the Image; for its being of Gold, (of which Metal *Maimonides* describes those Temples to have been which the *Chaldeans* made to the Sun) and without a Beard, is sufficient Argument hereof. The Right Hand is lifted up, holding a Whip like a Charioteer, the Left holds a Thunder-bolt and some Ears of Corn; all which denote the confociate Powers of *Jupiter* and the Sun. Moreover, the Religion of this Temple is excellent for Divination, which is ascribed to the Power of *Apollo*, who is the same with the Sun: Likewise the Image of the *Heliopolitan* God is carried on a Bier, as the Image of the Gods are carried at the Solemnity of the Games of the *Circensian* Gods: Many Nobles of that Country follow, their Heads shaved, they themselves pure by a long Chastity; they are driven by divine Inspiration, not as they will themselves, but whither the God carries them. This God they consult even absent, by sending Table-books sealed up, and he writes back in order to the Questions inserted in them: Thus the Emperor *Trajan* being to go out of that Country into *Parthia* with his Army, at the Request of his Friends, zealous in this Religion, who having had great Experiments in this kind, persuaded him to enquire concerning the Success of his Expedition, proceeded with *Roman* Prudence, lest there might be some Deceit of Man in it, and first sent the Table-book sealed up, requiring an Answer in writing: The God commanded Paper to be brought, and ordered that it should be sent to him blank, to the Astonishment of the Priests. *Trajan* received it with Admiration, for that he also had sent a blank Table-book to the God. Then he took another Table-book, and wrote in it this Question, Whether having finish'd this War he should return to *Rome*; this he sealed up: The God commanded a Centurial Vine, one of those Gifts that were in the Temple, to be brought, and to be cut into two Pieces, and wrapt up in a Napkin and sent. The Event appeared manifest in the Death of *Trajan*, his Bones being brought back to *Rome*: For by the Fragments, the kind of Relicks (his Bones) by the Token of the Vine, the future Chance was declared." Hitherto *Macrobius*.

To these add *Bel*, or *Belus*, a Name tho' more peculiar to the supreme Deity, yet common to many of the *Chaldean* Gods, and among others to the Sun, as *Servius* witnesseth. In *Punick Language* (saith he) God is named *Baal*; but amongst the *Affyrians* he is called *Bel*, and * by a certain mystical Reason, Saturn, and the Sun.

* Cap. 66. v. 27.

† Saturn. l. 21.

* Ibid. 23.

* In *Æncid.* 6.

C H A P. V.

The Chaldean Worship of the Moon.

THE Moon was worshipped by the *Chaldeans* under many Names, all which are feminine, and the greater Part answerable to those of the Sun (last mention'd;) which seems to confirm what R. *Maimonides*^a delivers of them, that they held the seven Planets to be Gods and Goddesses, male and female, marry'd to one another.

Now the *Chaldeans* (or rather they who first translated the *Chaldaick* Learning into *Greek*) among other Names applied to the Sun those of *Jupiter* and *Adonis*; in like manner did they give to the Moon the correspondent Attributes of *Juno* and *Venus*.

To *Juno* belong *Ada* and *Belta*, for so interpreted by *Hesychius*; ^c *Ada*, *Juno*, with the *Babylonians*; ^d *Belthes*, *Juno*, or *Venus*. Both which are doubtless no other than the feminine Names answerable to *Adad* and *Bel*, two Names of the Sun. That by *Juno* Mythologists sometimes understand the Moon, the learned^e Mr. *Selden* confirms by the old Form of Incantation, which the *Roman* Priests used at the Nones of every Month, *dies te quinque calo Juno novella* (or *covella*, *Caelestis*.) To this *Juno* perhaps may more properly be referred what *Julius Firmicus* applies to the Air: "The *Affyrians* (saith he) ascribed the Principality of the Elements to the Air, the Image whereof they worshipped, styling it by the Name of *Juno* or *Venus* the Virgin; whom the Choirs of their Priests worshipped with effeminate Voices and Gestures, their Skin smooched, and their Habits after the Fashion of Women. Thus he; but that the *Affyrians* worshipped the Element of Air is not elsewhere easily found: What he adds concerning their immodest Rites, seems rather of Affinity with those of *Venus*, as described by other Authors.

To *Venus* (taken for the Moon) belong the Names *Mylitta* and *Alilat*. They learnt (saith *Herodotus*, speaking of the *Persians*) of the *Affyrians* and *Arabians* to sacrifice to *Urania*: the *Affyrians* call *Venus* *Mylitta*, the *Arabians* (or *Sabaeans*) *Alilat*. Thus *Herodotus*; who indeed seems to make this *Mylitta* distinct from the Moon, (of whom he had spoken a little before); but that by *Alilat* was meant no other, is evident from its Etymology from *Lail*, *Night*. The Ancients (saith *Sibyl Assensum*) among many other false Gods, served one whom they called *Alilat*, and affirmed that she is the Moon, as being the Mistress and Queen of the Night.

C H A P. VI.

The Chaldean Worship of the Planets.

THE rest of the seven Planets (as^a *Maimonides* saith) they held to be Gods also. To *Saturn*,

whom *Diodorus* (if the Text be not depraved, which I suspect) affirms they held to be the chiefest of the five, they gave the common Name of *Bel*. *Eusebius*, in the 28th Year of *Thara*, *Belus*, the first King of the *Affyrians*, died; whom the *Affyrians* styled a God; others call him *Saturn*; and *Servius* cited elsewhere, in the *Panick* Language God is named *Baal*; but among the *Affyrians* he is called *Bel*, and by a certain mystical Reason, *Saturn* and the Sun. Whence *Theophilus*, Patriarch of *Antioch*, Some worship *Saturn* as a God, and call him *Bel* and *Baal*; this is done chiefly by those who dwell in the Eastern Climates, not knowing who *Saturn* is, and who *Belus*.

Some^b conceive that the more particular Name of this Planet was *Chiun* or *Remphan*; of which the Prophet *Amos*, *But ye have born the Tabernacle of your Moloch and Chiun your Images, the Stars of your God which ye made to yourselves*: Which Text *St. Stephen* renders thus, ^c *Yea, ye took up the Tabernacle of your God Remphan, Figures which ye made to worship them*; what is the Hebrew *Chiun*, the *Greek* renders *Remphan*. By *Chiun* *Aven Ezra* understands the Planet *Saturn*, whom *Plautus* also, as *Petitus* observes, calls *Chiun*: *Rephan* (as *Kircher* attests) is used in the *Coptic* Language for the same Planet.

Of *Jupiter* (having spoken already in treating of *Bel* and the Sun, to both which this Name was applied) there is little more to be said.

Mars (as the Author of *Chronicon Alexandrinum* relates) was first owned as a Deity by the *Affyrians*: The *Affyrians*, saith he, were the first who did erect a Column to *Mars*, and adored him as a God. They gave him the common Name of *Belus*, whence the *Babylonian* *Belus* is by *Hysitaeus* interpreted Ζεύς ἰωίνος, *Jupiter Martius*.

But a more particular Name of *Mars* was that of *Azizus*, under which he was worshipped together with *Mercury* in the Temple of the Sun at *Edessa*, a City of *Mesopotamia*. They who inhabit *Edessa* (saith *Julian*) a Region of a long time sacred to the Sun, place together with him in the Temple *Momus* and *Azizus*. That by *Momus* they understood *Mercury*, by *Azizus* *Mars*, and that both these were Assistants to the Sun, *Julian* acknowledges to have learned of his Master *Jamblicus*.

Some^d there are who refer the Idol *Negal* (brought by the *Samaritans* out of *Affyria*) to this Planet; for the Rabbits fancy this Idol to have been in the Form of a Cock. Now the Cock being^e sacred to *Mars*, and stiled his Bird in regard of his Courage, hence they infer that *Mars* was represented under that Form, as *Venus* under that of the Hen, by the Idol *Succoth Benoth*.

Venus was worshipped by the *Affyrians* and *Chaldeans* under many Names: Three of which we

5 H 2

find

^a Page 18.^b In *Ada*.^c In *Belthes*.^d De *Diis* Syc.^e Lib. 1.^f Mor. Nev.^g In *Aeneid*.^h Ad *Antioch*, lib. 3.ⁱ Chap. 5.^j Acts vi. 43.^k a Kings xvii. 30.^l Aristoph. Schol. in *Avd*.^m Kircher.

find in *Hefychius*; the first *Belthes* (or rather *Beita*) which he interprets *Juno* and *Venus*. This was a Name common to the Moon also, and spoken of formerly.

The next, *Delephat*, a Name more appropriate to *Venus* than the former, as appears by its Etymology from the Syriack word *Delpba*, Coition.

The last, *Myleta*, as *Hefychius* reads, who adds, the *Affrians* (so called) *Urania*. *Herodotus* writes it *Myllita*: They learned (saith he, speaking of the *Persians*) from the *Affrians* and *Arabians* to sacrifice to *Urania*: The *Affrians* call *Venus Myllita*, the *Arabians* *Alliat*. Of which two Names, tho' *Alliat* (as was observed heretofore) was given to the Moon also; yet that of *Myllita* seems peculiar to *Venus*, it being no other (as *Scaliger* observes) than the plain Syriack word *Myllidtha*, generative or prolifick: *Venus* Genetrix. With this Etymology well suit the Rites belonging to the Idol; of which thus *Herodotus*: "The *Babylonians* have one abominable Law; Every Woman of that Country must once in her Life sit in the Temple of *Venus*, and accompany with a Stranger. Some of the richer Sort disdain- ing to associate themselves with the rest of ordinary Quality, are carry'd thither in covered Chariots, and stand before the Temple, a Train of Attendants coming after them: the greater Part do in this manner. There are Women sitting in the Temple of *Venus* crowned with Garlands of Flowers, some coming, others going. There are also several Passages distinguished by Cords, which guide the Strangers to the Women; of whom they made choice as they best like. No Woman being once set there returns home, until some Stranger have cast Money in her Lap, and taking her aside, lain with her. The Stranger who offers this Money must say, I invoke the Goddess *Myllita* for thee; the *Affrians* call *Venus Myllita*; the Money she must not refuse whatever it be, for it is sacred: Neither may the Woman deny any Man, but must follow him that first offers her Money, without any Choice on her Part. As soon as she has lain with him, and performed the Rites of the Goddess, she returns home, nor from thenceforward can be allured by any Price whatsoever. Such as are handsome are the soonest dismiss'd; but the deformed are forced to stay longer before they can satisfy the Law; sometimes it happens that they attend a whole Year, or two, or three in Expectation." *Hieronymus* *Herodotus*; of which Custom some interpret the Words of the Prophet *Baruch* concerning the *Chaldaean* Women, *The Women sit in the Ways girded* (or rather surrounded, *ἡδαισθησάντων*) *with Rushes and burnt Straw; and if one of them be drawn away and lie with such as come by, she casteth her*

Neighbour in the Teeth, because she was not so worthily reputed, nor her Cord broken.

To these add a *Succoth* *benoth*, an Idol made by the Men of *Babylon*; the Signification of the Word being the *Tents of the Daughters*. Some conceive that hereby were meant those Tents or Partitions by Cords described by *Herodotus*, in which the Women sat to perform the Rites of *Venus Myllita*; *Venus* being, as *Mr. Selden* is of Opinion, derived from *Benoth*: But from the Words of the sacred Text it is manifest, that by *Succoth Benoth* was meant rather an Idol, than Temple or Tents. The Rabbinists fancy it to have been in Form of a Hen and Chickens; for as they called a Hen *Succus*, that is, covering; so they called Hens *Succoth*, as brooding and covering; and *Benoth* they interpreted her Chickens, which she useth to cover with her Wings. Whence *Kircher* expounds it of *Venus Myllita*.

CH A P. VII.

Of the other Stars.

NOR were the Planets only, but the Signs, and all the rest of the Stars, esteemed Gods by the *Chaldeans*; for they burnt Incense to the *Mazaloth*, and to all the rest of the Host of Heaven. *Mazal* is a Star: they called the Signs the twelve *Mazaloth*; the Zodiac the Circle *Mazaloth*; and sometimes changing γ into λ , *Mazaloth*; the Septuagint renders it $\mu\alpha\lambda\alpha\theta$, which *Suidas* interprets the *Constellations*, called $\kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\omicron\iota$, Signs. This agrees with what *Diodorus*' reports of the *Chaldeans*, that they held the principal Gods to be Twelve, to each of which they attributed a Month, and one of the Signs of the Zodiac.

That they worshipped the rest of the fixed Stars as Gods also, is imply'd by the sacred Text last cited, which adds, and to all the Host of Heaven; and is more expressly asserted (among others) by *Diodorus*, who in his Account of their Doctrine affirms, that as they called the Planets *Interpreters*, so of the other Stars, they called some the *Judges of all things*, others *consiliary Gods*; as we shall shew more particularly, when we come to speak of their Astrology: Neither is it to be doubted, but that as they owned some of the fixed Stars by these common Titles of Dignity, *Judges* and *Counsellors*; so to the principal of them they attributed particular Names and Idols, as well as to the Planets. And since the *Chaldaick* Polytheism was not (like that of the *Greeks*) founded upon an imaginary Mythology, (tho' later Writers treat of it after the same manner) but had reference to the celestial Bodies, which they worshipped under several Names and Idols; it is no less probable than consonant to the *Chaldaick* Doctrine, that those other

other *Affyrian* Idols, (*Ashim*, *Nibbaz*, *Tartak*, *Adrammelek*, *Anammelek*, *Nisroch*) mentioned in the Scripture, were of the same Kind with the rest, and belonged to several other of the Stars: But this Conjecture is not easily evinced, in regard that there is little extant of those Idols more than the bare mention of their Names.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Fire.

THERE are who reckon the Elements among the Gods which the *Chaldeans* worshipped: That they had a particular Devotion to the Fire, is certain; by it, as some conceive, they represented the supreme God; as others, the Sun; the Ground of which Analogy we deliver'd formerly.

Concerning this Idolatry of the *Chaldeans*, there is a memorable Passage related by * *Rufinus*: "The *Chaldeans*, in the Time of *Constantine the Great*, travelled all over the Earth, to shew all Men that their God excelled all other Gods, for they destroyed all the Statues of other Gods by their Fire. At length coming into *Egypt*, and making this Challenge, the *Egyptian* Priests brought forth a large Statue of *Nilus*, filling it with Water, and stopping up the Holes it had (which were many) with Wax, so artificially, that it kept in the Water, but could not hold out against the Fire." *Suidas* * relates this something differently, as performed by a Priest of *Canopus*, who taking off the Head of an old Statue, put it upon a Water-pot, which (stopping the Holes with Wax) he painted over, and set up in the room of *Canopus*. "The *Chaldeans* began the Contest with much rejoicing, and put Fire round about the Statue; the Wax melted, the Holes opened, the Water gushing forth put out the Fire, and the *Chaldeans* were laughed at for their God."

CHAP. IX.

Of the Air and Earth.

OF the Air thus * *Julius Firmicus*: "The *Affyrians* ascribed the Principality of the Elements to the Air, the Image whereof they worshipped, filling it by the Name *Venus* the Virgin; whom the Choirs of their Priests worshipped with effeminate Voices and Gestures, their Skins smoothed, and their Habit after the Fashion of Women." As for the Earth, * *Macrobius* saith, "They worshipped the superior Hemisphere of it, in Part whereof we dwell, by the Name of *Venus*; the

"inferior Hemisphere of the Earth they called *Proserpina*." More of this Mythology, rather *Phœnician* than *Affyrian*, and perhaps more *Grecian* than either, see in *Macrobius*. Thus much concerning the Doctrine of the *Chaldeans*.

THE SECOND BOOK

Of the Persians.

BEYOND *Chaldæa*, to the South, on one Hand lies *Persia*; on the other, *Arabia*. Philosophy (or Learning) was communicated to both these Countries by their Neighbours the *Chaldeans*. *Zoroaster*, saith * *Plutarch*, instituted Magick among the *Chaldeans*, in Imitation of whom the *Persians* had theirs also. *Persia* is the most considerable Kingdom of *Asia*; bounded, on the North, by *Media*; on the East, by *Cilicia*; on the West, by *Susiana*; on the South, by Part of the *Persian* Gulf.

THE SIXTEENTH PART.

The Persian Philosophers, their Sects and Institutions.

SECT. I.

Of the Persian Philosophers.

CHAP. I.

Of the Persian Zoroaster, Institutor of Philosophy among the Persians.

THE *Persian* Learning is generally acknowledged to have been instituted by *Zarades*, *Zaradusht*, or *Zoroaster*: But this Name, (as we observed formerly) seems to have been commonly attributed to such Persons as were eminently learned. Who therefore this *Zoroaster* was, or * about what Time he lived, is uncertain. * *Laertius* styles him a *Persian*; * *Clement Alexandrinus*, a *Mede*; * *Suidas*, a *Perse-Mede*: Whence it may be argued, that he was not of so great Antiquity as most Authors conceive. For we find the word *Persian* no where used before the Prophet *Ezekiel*; neither did it come to be of any Note until the Time of *Cyrus*. The later *Persians*, saith * *Agathias*, affirm, he

* Hist. Eccl. lib. 2. c. 26.

* In voce *Kardades*.

* De Error. profan. Relig.

* Saturn. l. 1. c. 21.

* De Idid.

* Agath. l. 2.

* In Proem.

* Strabo. lib. 2.

* Zor.

* Lib. 2.

he lived under *Hyftafpes*; but fimplly, without any Addition; fo as it is much to be doubted, nor can it be certainly known, whether this *Hyftafpes* were the Father of *Darius*, or fome other. *Hyftafpes* the Father of *Darius* was contemporary with *Cyrus*; neither doth it appear that the Perfian *Zoroafter* lived much earlier.

But at what Time foever he lived, faith *Agathias*, he was the Author and Introducer of Magical Religion among the *Perfians*, and changing their old Form of facred Rites, he introduced feveral Opinions. So likewife *the Arabick* Hiftoriographer; *Zaraduft* not firft instituted, but reformed the Religion of the *Perfians* and *Magi*, it being divided into many Sects.

A fabulous Tradition of the Occafion and Manner thereof, related by the *Perfians* themfelves, receive from *Dion Chryfoftom*: " They fay, that " through Love of Wifdom and Juftice he withdrew " himfelf from Men, and lived alone in a certain " Mountain: That afterwards leaving the Mountain, " a great Fire coming from above, did continually " burn about him; that hereupon the King, toge- " ther with the Nobleft of the *Perfians* came nigh " him, intending to pray to God; that he came out " of the Fire unharmed, appeared propitioufly, bidding them be of good Cheer, and offered certain " Sacrifices, as if God had come along with him into that Place; that from thenceforward he converted not with all Men, but with fuch only as were " naturally moft addicted to Truth, and capable of " the Knowledge of the Gods, whom the *Perfians* " called *Magi*."

To this *Perfian Zoroafter* *Suidas* afcribes, *Of Nature*, four Books; *Of Precious Stones*, one; *Aftrofcopick Apotelesmes*, five. *Eufebius**, *A Sacred Collection of Perficks*, which by the Fragments he cites, feems to have treated of the *Perfian* Religion. Thefe fome attribute to the *Chaldaean Zoroafter*; others, to fome other, nor any with greater Certainty than the reft.

CH A P. II.

Of Hyftafpes, as a great Improver of the Perfian Learning.

THE Doctrine of the *Perfian* *Magi* was much augmented by *Hyftafpes*. He was (according to *Herodotus*) of *Achæmenia*, a Region of *Perfia*, Son of *Arfames*, or, (as other Editions) *Arfates*; he lived in the Time of *Cyrus*, whole Dream concerning *Darius*, the eldeft Son of *Hyftafpes*, prognosticating his being King of *Perfia*, together with the Difcource betwixt *Cyrus* and *Hyftafpes* concerning it, is related by *Herodotus*. *Darius*, the Son of this *Hy-*

ftafpes, was born in the 416th Year of the *Julian* Period, and was almoft twenty Years old a little before *Cyrus* died. About the fame time alfo *Hyftafpes* and *Adufus* joining together, conquer'd all *Phrygia* bordering upon the *Hellefpont*, and taking the King thereof, brought him Prifoner to *Cyrus*.

Hyftafpes was (as *Amnianus Marcellinus* affirms) a moft wife Perfon; who adds, that boldly penetrating into the inner Parts of the upper *India*, he came to a woody Defart, whose calm Silence was poffeffed by thofe high Wits the *Brachmans*. Of thefe he learnt the difcordant Concord of the Motions of the Stars, and of Heaven, and of pure Rites of Sacrifices; which, returning into *Perfia*, he contributed as an Addition and Complement to Magic.

CH A P. III.

Of Oſthanes, who firft introduced the Perfian Learning into Greece.

THE *Perfian* Learning, (as *Pliny* affirms) was firft communicated to the *Græcians* by *Oſthanes*. The firft, faith he, that I find to have commented on this Art (Magic) is *Oſthanes*, who accompanied *Xerxes*, King of the *Perfians*, in the War which he made upon *Greece*: *Xerxes* fet out from *Sufa* upon this Expedition in the Beginning of the fourth Year of the 74th Olympiad; though *Diodorus Siculus*, confounding the Tranſactions of two Years in one, relates this done in the firft Year of the Olympiad following. *Herodotus* affirms, that this Provision was in making the three whole Years before this Year; but with a Note premifed in the precedent Chapter, which cannot confift with the exact Courfe of the Times. For, faith he, from the ſubduing of *Egypt*, he was full four Years in gathering an Army, and in making his Preparations; and in the Beginning of the fifth Year he began to march with a huge Army: for indeed he fet out from *Sufa* in the Beginning of the fifth Year, not from his ſubduing of *Egypt*, but from his coming to the Crown. So that both *Juſtin* out of *Trogus*, and *Oroſius* following him, do unadvifedly attribute five Years; but moſt abſurdly doth *Julianus*, in his firft Oration of the Praiſes of *Conſantine*, fay that he was ten Years in making this Preparation. But more ingenious than all theſe (yet not over exquiſite in his Account) is *Libanius*, where he faith, that between *Darius* and *Xerxes* there was ten Years time ſpent in making this Preparation againſt *Greece*; ſince we have formerly ſhewed out of *Plato*, that from the Fight at *Marathon*, to the Fight of *Salamis*, which was fought in the firft Year of the 75th Olympiad (almoſt a full Year after *Xerxes* his ſetting out from *Sufa*) there were only ten Years run out.

Hence

^B Loc. cit.

^b Elm.

ⁱ Boſiſthen.

^z In *Zor.*

¹ Prep. Evang. l. 1. c. 7.

^m Lib. 1. c. 209.

^c Loc. cit.

^x Xenoph. Inſtit. Cyr. lib. 7.

^z Lib. 23. c. 6.

¹ Lib. 30. 1.

² Lib. 7. c. 27.

³ Lib. 2. c. 20.

⁴ In *Baruch*.

Hence it appears that *Pythagoras* and *Plato*, who were precedent in time to *Osthanes*, and in their Travels conversed with the *Persian Magi*, were not fully acquainted with the Depth of their Sciences, or else being more reserved forbore to communicate them, otherwise than as intermingling with those which they appropriated to themselves.

* *Pliny* adds, that *Osthanes*, whilst he accompanied *Xerxes* into *Greece*, scattered the Seeds as it were of his portentous Art (*Magick*) wherewith he infected the World, all the World whithersoever he went; and 'tis certain, that this *Osthanes* chiefly made the *Græcians* not desirous, but mad after his Art. Thus *Pliny*, alluding to *Goetick Magick*, of which the Author of the * Treatise *μαγικος*, asserts the *Magi* to have been wholly ignorant. And * *Arnobius* affords him a better Character; That he was chief of the *Magi*, both for Eloquence and Action; that he made Address to the true God with due Veneration; that he knew the Angels did wait upon the true God, and the like.

By *Osthanes* (as we said) the *Persian Learning* was brought into *Greece*, and therefore we shall not proceed farther in our Enquiry after the Professors of it among the *Persians*.

SECTION II.

The Institution, and Sects of the Persians.

CHAPTER I.

The Persian Magi their Institution.

ALL Professors of Learning among the *Persians* were termed *Magi*. * *Laertius*: It is said that Philosophy had its Original from the *Barbarians*, since among the *Persians* were *Magi*; among the *Babylonians*, or *Assyrians*, the *Chaldeans*; and *Gymnosophists* among the *Indians*; among the *Celtsæ* and *Gallatæ*, where those who were called the *Druids*, or *Seminethæ*, as *Aristotle*, in his Treatise *Magicum*, and *Sotion*, in the 23d Chap. of his Succession, affirms: Hence * *Suidas*, *Magi* among the *Persians* were *Philosophi* and *Philothæi*. But their principal Study and Employment consisting in Theology and religious Rites, *Magus* is more frequently interpreted a *Priest*. Among the *Persians*, saith *Porphyrus*, those wise Persons who were employed about the Divinity, and served him, were called *Magi*; this is the Signification of *Magus* in their Dialect. And * *Apuleius*, *Magus* in the *Persian Language* signifies the same as *Priest* in ours. *Hesychius*, A Worship-

per of God, and a Theologist, and a Priest, is by the *Persians* styled *Magus*.

Some conceive they were so termed by *Zoroaster*, at their first Institution. * *Suidas*; *Zoroaster* the *Perse-Mede*, who first began the Name of *Magi* celebrated among them. * Others derive the Word from *Mag*, a Sirname of *Zoroaster*, or from *Mije Gush*, one that hath short ears, affirming that *Zoroaster* was such.

The Author of the Arabick History relates, that the Religion of the *Persians* being before *Zoroaster's* Time divided into many Sects, he reformed it; *Agathius*, that he changed their old Form of sacred Rites, and introduced many new Opinions, and was the Author and Introducer of Magical Religion among the *Persians*.

* The *Magi* delivered their Learning successively in their Families from one Age to another; whence, after the Succession of many Ages, at this present, saith *Ammianus Marcellinus*, a multitude, sprung from one and the same Race, is dedicated to the Rites and Worship of the Gods. For, increasing by degrees, they grew at last to the Largeness and Name of a compleat Nation, dwelling in Towns not fortified with any Walls, and, being permitted to use their own Laws, they were honoured in respect of their Religion.

The Country of the *Magi* in *Persia* is mentioned by * *Clemens Alexandrinus*, who takes notice of three wonderful Mountains in it. And *Solinus* mentions, as belonging to them, the City *Pasargada*. *Suidas* and *Cedrenus* call them *Magusæans*, and affirm, that they were called *Magog* by those of their own Country.

So great was the Esteem which the *Magi* had among the *Persians*, that *Cicero* saith, the Kings of *Persia*, before they undertook the Government, were always initiated in the Sacred Mysteries of the *Magi*; which * *Plato* describes thus: "At fourteen Years old they whom they call the Royal *Pædagogues* take Charge of the Youth. These are four Men chosen out of the most excellent of the *Persians*, in the Prime of their Age. The most wife, the most just, the most temperate, and the most valiant. The first of these teacheth him the Magick of *Zoroaster* the Son of *Horemastæ*, (this is the Service of the Gods) and teacheth him also the Royal Institutions." *Dion Chrysostom* saith, that "the *Magi* were admitted to the King's Councils, and were Assessors with him in Judicature, as being well acquainted with the Natures of things, and knowing after what manner the Gods are to be served." "All publick Affairs (saith *Agathias*) were managed by their Direction and Advice. They adjudged Rewards or Punish-

* Loc. cit.

* *Laertius* proœm.

* *Cont. gent.*

* *Proœm.*

* *In voce Mag.*

* *Apolog. 1.*

* *In Zan.*

* *Salmat. de Hellen. p. 368.*

* *Ammian. Marcellin. l. 23. c. 6.*

* *Strom. 6.*

* *Alcib.*

"Punishments." *Dion* elsewhere relates, that *Cambyses*, upon his Expedition into *Egypt*, resign'd the Government of the *Perfians* into the hands of the *Magi*.^h *Constantius Manasses* styles them the Guardians of the Royal Palaces; and *Pliny*, speaking of *Magick*, saith, It grew up at last to so great height, that even at this Day it is exceeding prevalent with many Nations, and in the East it beareth Sway over the King of Kings. King of Kings was the proper Title of the *Persian* Monarch.

CHAP. II.

The Sects, Discipline and Manners of the Magi.

Eubulus,ⁱ who wrote the History of *Mythra* in many Volumes, affirms, that amongst the *Perfians* there were three kinds of *Magi*: the first, who were the most learned and eloquent of them, did eat no other Food but Meal and Oil. Thus *Eubulus* cited by *St. Hierom*. More of the Distinction of the *Magi* into three Sects we meet not elsewhere; but, probably, it had reference (as among the *Chaldeans*) to their several Studies; of which hereafter.

^k *Dion* and *Aristotle*, or rather the Author of the Treatise of *Magick* cited by *Laertius*, relate of the *Magi*, that they renounce rich Attire, and to wear Gold. Their Rayment is white upon occasion, their Beds the Ground, their Food nothing but Herbs, Cheese, and Bread; instead of a Staff they carry a Cane, in the top whereof they put their Cheese, which as occasion served they did eat.

They had one of their Society chief among 'em, called by *Zozomene*, the Prince of the *Magi*.

^l Their chief Employment was religious Worship, they being conceived to be the only Persons whose Prayers the Gods will hear.

^m They made Discourses concerning Justice, and esteemed it impious to burn the Bodies of the Dead, and lawful to lie with a Mother or a Daughter, as *Solon* in his 23d Book.

ⁿ *Herodotus* saith they differ, as from others, so from the *Egyptian Priests*, in this, that these pollute themselves with the Death of nothing but their Sacrifices, whereas the *Magi*, with their own Hands, kill any thing, except a Man and a Dog; yea they esteem it a great Exploit, if they have killed very many Ants, or Serpents, or other creeping or flying things.

THE SEVENTH PART.

The Doctrine of the Perfians.

THAT which is delivered to us of the *Persian* Doctrine and Opinions, is so little and so imperfect, as it will not easily admit of being knit together by any Method; yet, in regard of the near Affinity their Learning is conceived to have had with the *Chaldeans*, we shall observe the same Course in collecting and digesting the few Remains of it: First, to alledge what concerns their Theology and Physick; next their Arts of Divination; Thirdly, their Religious Worship and Rites, particularly termed *Magick*; and Lastly, to give a Catalogue of all their Gods.

CHAP. I.

Theology and Physick.

THAT the *Persian Magi* were not unacquainted with Theology and Physick, is confirm'd by *Suidas*. *Magi*, saith he, among the *Perfians* are Philosophers and Lovers of God. ^o *Laertius* affirms, they discoursed concerning the Substance and Generation of the Gods; and ^p *Dion Chrysostom*, that they were skilful in Natures.

^q *Zoroaster* the *Magus* in his sacred Collection of Physicks, saith expressly thus: "God hath the Head of a Hawk: he is the first Incorruptible, Eternal, Unbegotten, Indivisible, most like himself, the Chariteer of every Good, one that cannot be bribed: the best of things Good; the wisest of things Wise: Moreover, he is the Father of Equity and Justice: Self-taught, Natural, and Perfect; and Wife, and the sole Inventor of Sacred Nature."

^r *Plutarch* relates of *Zoroaster*, that he divided all things into three kinds. Over the first kind he conceived *Hormazes* to be President, the same whom the *Oracles* call the Father. Over the last, *Arimanes*; over the middle kind, *Mythra*, whom the *Oracles* call the second Mind. And that *Hormazes* made himself 3 times as big as the Sun (who in the *Persian* Language is called *Cyrus*.) *Mythra* made himself twice as big (as the Sun) who was next to *Hormazes*. To which these Platonick Assertions are correspondent, That all things are about the King of all, and that all things are for him. That he is the Cause of all good things. The second is employed about the secondary things. The third is employed about the third kind of things. The three Parts into which *Zoroaster* and *Plato* divided all things, are these; the first is Eternal; the second had a beginning

^h Jo. 1.

ⁱ V. c. Mag.

^k D. Hieron. advers. Jovin. li. 2.

^l In Proem.

^m Laert. in proem.

ⁿ Euseb. Præp. Evang. li. 1.

^o Laert. ibid.

^p Platho in Orac. ad fin.

^q Laert. proem.

^r Lib. 1. 140.

ning in Time, but is Eternal; the third is Corruptible. Thus *Platbo* citing *Plutarch*, whose own Words are these:

“ ‘ Some are of Opinion there are two Gods, one opposite in Operation to the other; one, working good, the other ill. Others call him who is the good, God; the bad, Dæmon. Of this Opinion was *Zoroaster* the *Magus*, whom they report to have preceded the Trojan War 5000 years. This *Zoroaster* declared the Names of the good to be *Oromazes*; of the bad, *Arimanius*; adding, that, of sensible things, the one did most resemble Light and Knowledge, the other Darkness and Ignorance. Wherefore the *Persians* call *Mythra* the Mediator. He further taught, that, to one, we ought to offer Votives and gratulatory Sacrifices, to the other, averruncative and dismal Oblations. For, pounding a certain Herb, called *Omani*, in a Mortar, they invoke Hades and Darkness, then mixing it with the Blood of a slain Wolf, they carry it forth and throw it into a Place where the Beams of the Sun come not: for, of Plants, they hold that some belong to the good God, others to the ill Dæmon; and that of Animals, some, as Dogs, Birds, and Porcupines, belong to the good, the Aquatile to the bad; for which reason they esteem him blessed who killed most of that kind.

“ ‘ They likewise relate many fabulous things concerning the Gods; of which kind is this I will allege, That *Oromazes* was produc'd of purest Light, *Arimanius* of Darkness, and that these two war against one another; That *Oromazes* made six Gods; The first, of Benevolence; the second of Truth; the third of Equity; the rest of Wisdom, Riches, and Pleasure, which good Things are attendant upon the Maker: That then *Oromazes* tripled himself, and removed himself so far from the Sun, as the Sun is distant from the Earth, and adorned the Heaven with Stars, appointed one the Dog-star, as Guardian and Watch for the rest: That he made twenty-four other Gods, and put them in an Egg, and that *Arimanius* having made as many more, they broke the Egg. Whence it comes, that Good is intermingled with Ill. That the fatal Time approacheth, in which these shall be destroyed by Famine and Pestilence, and *Arimanius* utterly destroyed, and the Earth made even and smooth: That there shall be one Life and one City (or common Society) of all Men living, and one Language.”

C H A P. II.

Arts of Divination.

Among the other Parts of the *Persians* Learning, are to be reckon'd their Arts of Divination and Prediction, which *Laertius* affirms were practised by the Magi. *Cicero* adds, that they assembled in (*Fana*) in Temples or consecrated Places, to consult about Divination.

Hence *Strabo* saith, that, by the Ancients, Diviners were much esteemed, such as among the *Persians*, were the Magi, and Necromancers, and Lecanomancers, and Hydromancers. *Ælian*, that the Wisdom of the *Persian* Magi, besides all other things which it was lawful for them to know, did consist also in Divination. And *Lucian* styles the Magi a kind of Persons skilful in Divination, and dedicated to the Gods. Of their Divination *Cicero* giveth an Instance concerning *Cyrus*. *Ælian*, another concerning *Ochus*.

Among other kinds of Divination, *Velleius Paterculus* affirms, they foretold by the Marks of the Body. They seem to have been skilful likewise in Astrology; for *Suidas* ascribeth to the *Persian Zoroaster* five Books of *Astroscopic Apotelesmes*. That they were also consulted concerning the Precognificiation of Prodiges, is manifest from the Relation of *Valerius Maximus*, concerning that which happened to *Xerxes*.

C H A P. III.

Of the religious Rites, or Magick of the Persians.

THE chief Science and Employment of the *Persian* Magi; was termed *Magick*, from the Professors, *Magi*, and is defined by *Plato*, ‘ the Service of the Gods, called also *Μαγιστεία*. The Magi, saith *Laertius*, are employed in the Service of the Gods, and about sacrificing and praying, as being the only Persons whom the Gods will hear. So *Dion Chrysostom*; The *Persians* call them Magi, who are skilful in the Worship of the Gods; not like the *Greeks*, who, ignorant of the Meaning of the Word, call them so who were skilful in Goetick Magick; of which, that the *Persian* Magi were ignorant, *Laertius* allegeth the Testimonies of *Aristotle*, in his Treatise entituled *Magick*, and *Diogenes* in the first Book of his Histories.

As concerning their religious Rites, *Herodotus* and *Strabo* affirm, that they had no Temples, Altars, or Images, but did impute it to Madness in such

* *Ibid.* & *Ofirid.* * *Loc. cit.* * *In Proem.* * *De Divinat.* l. 1. c. 41. * *Lib. 16.* * *Var. Hist.* l. 2. c. 17. * *Macrob.* * *Divinat.* l. 1. * *Var. Hist.* * *Lib. 2.* * *In Zor.* * *Lib. 1. c. 6.* * *Alcibiades* 6 *Proem.* * *Erythraen.* * *Proem.* * *Lib. 1. 131.* * *Ibid.* 15.

as had; the Reason whereof, = *Herodotus* conceives to have been, for that they did not believe as the *Grecians*, that the Gods were " of human Form; or as * *Cicero*, for that they conceived the Gods, to whom the whole World was but a Temple or House, could not be shut up within Walls; upon which Ground the Magi persuaded *Xerxes* to burn the *Grecian* Temples.

But *Strabo* frequently elsewhere mentions Temples, Altars, and Images; whence it may be argued, either that in the time of *Herodotus* they had not any, and that *Strabo*, in affirming the same, with *Herodotus*, is to be understood only of their primitive Institution, which when the *Macedonians* afterwards conquered them, became corrupted with *Grecian* Rites; or that there were different Sects among them from the Beginning; whereof some allowed Altars, Images, Temples, others disallow'd them.

Herodotus and *Strabo* further add, that they sacrificed in high Places. Their Rites and Sacrifices *Herodotus* describes thus: " When they go about to sacrifice, they neither erect an Altar, nor kindle Fire, nor use Libation, nor Flutes, nor Garlands, nor Cakes; but when any Man intends to sacrifice to one of these Gods, he drives the Victim to a clean Place, and invokes that God; his Tyara being crown'd with Myrtle; 'tis not lawful for him who sacrificeth to pray for good things for himself alone, but he must pray for all *Persians* in general; and in particular for the King: for in praying for all *Persians*, he includes himself. Having cut the Victim into little Pieces, he boils the Flesh, and strewing soft Herbs, especially *Trifoly*, he lays the Flesh on them; the Magus standing by, sings a theogonical Hymn; for this they conceive to be a powerful Incantation. Without a Magus it is not lawful for them to sacrifice. Soon after, he who sacrificeth, takes the Flesh, and disposeth of it as he pleaseth."

* *Strabo* adds, " that when the Magus who declares the Sacrifice, hath distributed the Pieces of Flesh, every one taking his Piece, they depart home; leaving no Part for the Gods; for they say the Gods require nothing but the Soul of the Victim: Yet some (it is said) lay Part of the Fat upon the Fire."

C H A P. IV.

The Gods of the Persians.

Herodotus ¹ and *Strabo* ² reckon the Gods of the *Persians* thus: *Jupiter*, the Sun, the Moon, *Venus*, the Fire, the Earth, the Winds, the Water. *Laertius* ³ not so fully, the Fire, the Earth, and not the Water.

¹ Loc. cit.
² Proem.
³ In *Stobaeut.*

⁴ De leg. 2. c. 11.
⁵ Loc. cit.
⁶ Gregor. Naz.

⁷ *Αἰσχυρίωνος, i. e. αἰσχυρίωνος.*
⁸ Oeconom.
⁹ Lib. 1.

By *Jupiter*, as *Herodotus* and *Strabo* affirm, they understood the whole Circuit of Heaven. *Agathias* adds, that they worshipped *Jupiter* under the Name of *Bel*; which sufficiently argues they derived this God from the *Chaldaeans*.

To the Sun (as both * *Herodotus* and *Strabo* witness) they sacrificed. *Strabo* adds, that they called him *Mithra*. This was the greatest of their Gods, as *Cyrus* (introduced by * *Xenophon*) acknowledgeth, swearing by him. *Hefychius* likewise affirms it was the greatest of their Gods, and that the greatest Oath which the King himself took was by *Mithra*.

They represented him with the Face of a Lion, in a *Persian* Habit, with a Tiara, holding with both Hands a Bull by the Horns, which seemed to strive to get from him; signifying, that the Moon begins to receive her Light from him when she leaves him.

* *Zoroaster* first among the *Persians* (as *Eubulius* affirms, who wrote many Volumes of the History of *Mithra*) did consecrate a natural Cave, in the Mountains next *Persia*, in Honour of *Mithra*, the King and Father of all; signifying by this Cave the World framed by *Mithra*; by the other things disposed within it, in fit Distances, the Elements and Quarters of the World. The Cave of *Mithra* is mentioned by many others.

In the *Mithraean* Rites (for so *Lampridius* terms them) *Celsus* (cited by ¹ *Origen*) saith, the twofold Motion of the Stars, fixed and erratic, was represented, and the Passage of the Soul through them; in Sign whereof there was set up a high Pair of Stairs, having seven Gates, the first of Lead, the second of Tin, the third of Brass, the fourth of Iron, the fifth of Leather, the sixth of Silver, the seventh of Gold: The first belongs to *Saturn*, the Lead signifying the Slowness of that Planet; the second to *Venus*, to whom they compare Tin, for its Brightness and Softness; the third to *Jupiter*, as being most solid, with brazen Steps; the fourth to *Mercury*, for they hold him to be the stoutest Undertaker of all Businesses, cunning and eloquent; the fifth to *Mars*, in regard of its unequal and various Commixture; the sixth to the Moon, of Silver; the seventh to the Sun, whose Colour, as also that of the Stars, resembles Gold.

He who was initiated into these Rites, proceeded, as *Suidas* relates, through several Degrees of Contumely. * *Nonnus* upon *Gregory Nazianzen* saith twelve; and of Pain, as Burning, Blows, and the like; by which Trial he was to give Testimony of his Sanctity, and of his being void of Passion.

Of the Rites of the Moon there is nothing said in particular.

Concerning those of *Venus*, ² *Herodotus* saith they sacrifice also to *Urania*, which they learnt of the *Assyrians*.

¹ Lib. 15.

² Ibid. 1.

³ Ibid. 15.

⁴ Porphy. in antr. Nymph.

⁵ Lib. 6. contra Cels.

fyrians and Arabians; the *Affrians* call *Venus* Milita, the *Arabians* Alilat, the *Persians* Metra. And as *Milidtha* in *Syriack* signifieth generative, prolific, *Venus* genitrix; so *Mader*, or *Mater*, with the *Persians*, signifies (as *Raphelemius* observes) a Mother. This perhaps was that Mother of the Gods, which *Cicero* affirms to have been worshipped by the *Persians*, *Affrians*, and all the Kings of *Europe* and *Asia*, with great Devotion.

The Fire, ^c *Julius Firmicus* saith, they preferred before all the other Elements; *Agathias* affirms, they learn'd to worship it of the *Chaldeans*: ^d *Strabo* relates, that in *Cappadocia* there was a great Number of Magi, called *Pyrethi*, and many Temples of the *Persian* Gods. They kill not the Victim with a Knife, but strike it down with a Club. Here also there are *Pyrethia* Chapels, in the Midst of which is an Altar, covered with great Store of Ashes, where the Magi preserve a Fire that never goes out, and coming in every Day sing almost the Space of an Hour, holding a Bundle of Rods before the Fire; (with which, as ^e *Mr. Selden* observes, they stir'd it up whilst they sung) their Heads are covered with Woolen Tiars, which being tied on both sides, hide their Lips and Cheeks: thus *Strabo*, an Eye-witness. These *Pyrethia* (or as *Suidas* terms them *Pyreia*) were those sempiternal Fires of the Magi mention'd by ^f *Ammianus Marcellinus*. Neither in Temples only did they use these Rites, but in private Caves, where ^g *Julius Firmicus* reports, they worshipped the Fire with many extraordinary Ceremonies; as among other Things, using to pronounce these Words, *Μικλαθω μουραθ ε λανθω ενδυσθ παλειθ ελθω*. Nor did this Worship extend to Fire only, but ^h to all things that resembled it, as *Diomysius* reports; whereof ⁱ *Strabo* instanceth the *Pyropus*. *Julius Firmicus* adds, that they called the Fire *Mithra*; by which, as also by their worshipping it in Caves, it is manifest, that (sometimes at least) they took it for the Sun, their greatest Deity.

Concerning the Worship of the Earth and Winds nothing particular is deliver'd. That of the Water was performed in this manner, ^k They go to a Lake, River, or Spring, where they make a Trench, and kill a Victim; taking Care that none of the Blood come at the Water; then laying Myrtle and Laurel on it, they burn it with Rods, and making some Prayers, sprinkle Oil mixed with Milk and Honey, not in the Fire or Water, but on the Earth.

Other Gods the *Persians* had, tho' not reckon'd among these, whether as less principal, or of later Date; of these are mentioned by the same Author (*Strabo*) and by others, *Anaitis* (*Venus*), *Amandatus* *Sacee*, *Sandae*, and *Nannae* (*Diana*.)

Hitherto of the Doctrine of the *Persians*.

The THIRD BOOK.

Of the Sabæans.

ARABIA, the noblest Peninsula (if we may so term it) of *Asia*, is terminated by the *Persian*, the *Indian*, and the *Red Sea*, except that on one side it is continuous to *Syria*; by which Vicinity was occasioned for near a Correspondence betwixt those Nations, that as the *Chaldeans* Learning overreading all *Mesopotamia*, *Syria*, and *Affria*, did on one side extend to their Neighbours the *Persians*; so on the other it reached to the *Arabians*: From which Nearness perhaps it was (not only of Situation, but Religion and Opinions) that *Pliny* useth their Names promiscuously, calling a great Part of *Mesopotamia*, *Arabia*; and the *Arabians* themselves, *Syrians*: And the later Eastern Writers, (especially the *Arabians*) under the Appellation of *Chasdim* or *Chaldanin* (*Chaldeans*;) comprehended not only the *Babylonians*, but the *Nabatheans*, *Charaneans*, and *Sabæans*; as (among others) *Muhamed Isacides* takes *Chasdanin* and *Nabathæa* to be synonymous; and *Ahmedus*, to his Book concerning the Religion of the *Sabæans*, gives this Title, *Of the Rites of the Charanean Chaldeans, commonly known by the Name of Sabæans*. He adds, commonly known by the Name of *Sabæans*; because the *Sabæans* being the most considerable of these, they likewise, under the Appellation of *Sabæans*, included all the rest; even the *Chaldeans* of *Mesopotamia*: using the Terms of *Chaldæa* and *Sabæa* no less promiscuously than *Pliny* those of *Arabia*, *Mesopotamia*, and *Syria*; for which *R. Maimonides* (who doth so throughout all his Writings) gives this Reason; because the Doctrine of the *Chaldeans* extended thither, and that the Religion of all these Nations was the same.

Now, whereas *Arabia* is commonly distinguish'd into the *Stony*, the *Desart*, and the *Happi*, we here mean not that Part which is styled the *Desart*, lying on the North of *Sabæa*, and first planted by *Ismael*, whose Posterity afterwards, having learned the Language of the *Sabæans* (*Arabic*) were called *Arabians* also, or more properly, *Hagarani*, as descended from *Hagar*, and *Aarab Mastiaarabah*, the made *Arabians*; (that is, made such by Cohabitation and Conversation with the true *Arabs*); but those other true *Arabs*, the Inhabitants of the *Desart* and the *Happi*; whereof the former came from *Nebaiathus*, Son of *Ismael*, and are by *Pliny*, *Strabo*, and *Ptolemy*, called *Nabatheans*, as the Country itself, *Nabathæa*; the latter from *Saba*, Son of *Chus*, the Son of *Cham*, after whom stiled *Sabæans* (as the Country *Sabæa*)

5 I 2 and

^a De Error. Prof. Relig.

^d Lib. 15.

^e De Diis Syn. Synt. 2. c. 7.

^f Lib. 23.

^g Lib. 7.

^h Prius.

ⁱ Lib. 15.

^k Strab. lib. 15.

and (in Distinction from the made *Arabians of Arabia the Desert*) the native *Arabians*. The *Charaneus*, mentioned together with these, were the Inhabitants of *Cata*, a City of *Arabia*, mentioned by *Pomponius Mela*, whose Inhabitants the *Carraens*, *Pliny* placeth next the *Sabeans*, distinct from *Hara* or *Caran*, in *Mesopotamia*.

THE EIGHTEENTH PART.

The Sabæan Philosophers.

CHAP. I.

Of the Institutions of the Sabæan Sect.

Concerning the first Institutor of Learning and Religion among the *Sabæans*, there is not any certain Agreement of Authors. *Saidus Patricides*, an *Arabian* Writer, attributes this Invention to a certain *Persian* named *Zoroaster*, contemporary with *Terah* Father to *Abraham*. *Zerodast* and *Zoroaster* are the same; whereby it appears, that *Patricides* means one of these two *Zoroasters*, whereof one was the first Author of Sciences among the *Chaldæans*; the other introduced the same Sciences among the *Persians*; and though he calls this *Zerodast* a *Persian*, yet by the Antiquity of the Time in which he conceives him to have lived, it is probable he rather intended the *Chaldæan*.

Others (adds *Patricides*) are of Opinion, that *Tachmurat*, King of *Persia*, gave Beginning to this Religion. The same perhaps whom *Elmacinus* (another *Arabian* Historian) calls *Tachurith*: Others (saith he) conceive, that the Religion of the *Sabæans* was manifested by a certain King of the *Persians*, whose Name was *Tachurith*.

Elmacinus mentions another *Persian*, to whom the same Invention was attributed. In those Days, saith he, came forth *Nazarib*, a *Persian*, who, as is reported, was Author of the Religion of the *Sabæans*.

Others (continues *Patricides*) derive the Infancy of the *Sabæans* from a certain *Græcian*, named *Juxan* or *Javan*, Son of *Berkely*, and him they will have to be the City of *Zaituma*, which was built in *Attica*. Thus he. Where *Hottinger* for *Berkely* reads *Mercolim*, *Mercury*; confirmed by *Elmacinus* upon the same Subject: Others, saith he, affirm, that the Religion of the *Sabæans* was brought forth by a Man whose Name was *Juxan*, Son of *Markelli*, a *Græcian*, who first found out the Science of the Stars.

To these, *Patricides* adds, the Opinion of some

others, who held, that the Authors of this Sect were some of those who were at the Building of the Tower of *Babel*. Thus the *Arabians*.

Some attribute the Institution of the *Sabæans* to *Cham*, Son of *Noah*; who, being banished from his Father's Sight, fled thither, and (to use the Words of *Lactantius*) settled in that Part of the Earth, which is now called *Arabia*. This was the first Nation that knew not God, because the principal Founder thereof had not received the Worship of God by Tradition from his Father: Thus *Lactantius*; with whom many agree in attributing the Original of Idolatry to *Cham*, and to his Son *Chus* the first Planter of *Chaldea*, from whose Son *Saba*, the *Sabæans* were named; and, upon this ground, some have laboured to prove *Cham* and *Chus* to be the same with the first and second *Zoroasters*. Of which formerly.

Others (as *Damasce*) ascribe the Original of Idolatry to *Zerug*, *Epiphanius*, and the Author of the *Chronicon Alexandrinum*, affirm, that *Hellenism* began in the Time of *Zerug*. This *Hellenism* some conceive the same with the *Sabæan* Superstition; what the *Greek* Fathers call *Hellenism*, the *Rabbins* term *Goth*, the *Arabians*, *Algiabeiston*, the Time of Ignorance and Paganism. And tho' to determine any thing of those early and obscure Times be very difficult, yet we cannot doubt, but that the idolatrous Worship of Fire, and of the Sun (ascribed to the *Sabæans*) was of great Antiquity among them, since mentioned by the most ancient Author, *Job*, who lived near them, as appears by the Inroad¹ which the *Sabæans* made upon him. If I² be held (saith he) the³ Sun when it shined, and the Moon walking in Brightness, and my Heart hath been secretly enticed, or my Mouth hath kissed my Hand, this also were an Iniquity to be punished by the Judge; for I should have denied the God that is above; where by kissing of the Hand is implied the ancient manner of Veneration.

CHAP. II.

Others of the Sabæan Sect.

THAT *Terah*, Father of *Abraham*, was bred up in this Doctrine, might be conjectur'd from *Joshua* xxiv. 2. where he is reckoned among those that served strange Gods. *Philo*⁴ terms him an Astronomer, one of those that were versed in Mathematicks.

Of *Abraham*, Son of *Terah*, *R. P. Maimonides* expressly saith, It is well known that our Father *Abraham* was educated in the Faith of the *Zabians*, who held, there is no God but the Stars; indeed⁵ *Berosus* acknowledgeth he was skillful in the *Celestials*; and *Eupolemus*, cited by *Eusebius*, ascribes to him the Invention of *Astrology* and *Chaldaick*. These *Zabians* them-

¹ Chap. i. v. 15.

² *Joseph* Antiquit. l. 1. 8.

³ Chap.

⁴ The Word is *Ur*, which signifieth as well *Fire*.

⁵ *De Nobilit.*

⁶ *Mor. Nev.* 3. 29.

themselves in their Annals give this Account of his Departure out of Chaldaea. "Abraham, say they, being educated in Ur, but dissenting from the Vulgar, and asserting that there was another Creator besides the Sun; they began thus, and objected against him, and among other Objections, they alledged the evident and manifest Operations of the Sun in the World: But Abraham answered them, You are right, which Sun is like the Axe which is in the Hand of him that striketh therewith. Then they recite some of the Objections which he brought against them, and at last, they say, that the King cast him in Prison; nevertheless, he persisted in Prison to oppugn them; whereupon, the King fearing lest he might do some Hurt to his Kingdom, and seduce Men from their Religion, confiscated all his Estate, and banished him to the utmost Borders of the East. Thus the Zabeans. From which Relation Josephus differs not much; who saith, that Abraham first undertook to convince the received erroneous Opinions of Men concerning the Deity; and that he first taught and proved that there is but one God; but seeing the Chaldeans and Mesopotamians began to mutiny against him for it, he thought it expedient to forsake the Country.

The Rabbinical Traditions are more particular herein. R. Solomon Hiarhi reports from an ancient Commentary, that Terah fell out with his Son Abraham, in the Presence of Nimrod, for breaking his Idols, and that Abraham was thereupon cast into a fiery Furnace. Moses Gerundenfis confirms the same Story; but R. Chaim relates it otherwise: Abraham, saith he, "met with a Woman holding a Dish in her Hand, and the Woman asking him whether he would offer any thing to the Gods, he took a Staff, and broke the Images which the Woman had, and threw away the Staff; his Father coming thither at the same time, demanded what was the Matter? Abraham answered, she had asked him to make an Offering, and upon his answering that he would first eat something, there arose a Dispute betwixt them; but his Father urged that the Business was otherwise, and that he was heard to say many reproachful Things of Nimrod. The Controversy was brought before Nimrod the King of Babel: He commanded Abraham to worship the Fire that was set before him. Abraham answered, If so, then adore you the Water, Water which quencheth Fire. Nimrod said to him, Worship the Water. Abraham answered, If so, worship the Clouds which distil the Water. Nimrod said, Then worship the Clouds; whereupon Abraham, If it be so, then the Wind is to be worshipped, which agitates and scatters the Clouds. Again, Nimrod, Worship the Wind; but Abraham, If so, then is Man much more to

be worshipped who understands the Wind. At length Nimrod growing angry, You talk, saith he, idly, I worship none but the Fire, into the midst of which I will cast thee. Let the God whom thou worshippest come and free thee by his Right Hand. Aran stood by and talked; they asked of which Opinion he was; he answered, if Abraham get the better, I will be for him, if Nimrod, for Nimrod. After Abraham had gone into the fiery Furnace and was freed, they said to Aran, Of which Side art thou? he said, of Abraham's: Then they took him, and cast him into the Fire, and all his Bowels were burned, and he was taken out dead in the Presence of his Father. Thus R. Chaim." But Cedrenus affirms, that Abraham throwing his Father's Idols into the Fire, his Brother Aran endeavouring to rescue them, was burned.

The Arabians, who imitate the Jews in Relations of this Kind, and fancy Superstitions of their own upon Fables of the Rabbins, give a further Account of what happen'd to Abraham after his Departure from Nimrod, as appears by a Fragment of a Mahometan Writer, of which I shall cite only so much as most particularly concerns the Sabaeans. Edris, on whom be Peace, was the first who after Enoch, the Son of Seth, the Son of Adam, on whom Peace, wrote with a Pen. This thing afterwards Edris taught his Sons, and said to them, O Sons, know that you are Sabaeans, learn therefore to read Books in your Youth. Now Sabaeans are Writers, of whom the High, he means Mahomet, said (Alc. Sur. 2.) The Sabaeans and the Nazarenes. The Author adds, that they ceased not to possess the Books of Seth and Edris, by hereditary Right among themselves, until the Times of Noah, and of Abraham; after that the High God aided him against Nimrod, on whom be Malediction. But in that Day wherein Abraham went out of the Land of Irack, and would go into Syria, into the Land of his Fore-fathers, he went to the Land of Charan and Ghysira, and there he found a People of the Zabians, who read old Books, and believed such Things as were contained in them. But Abraham said, O my God, I did not think that besides myself, and those that are with me, there had been any of the Faithful, who believed thee to be One. And God breathed to Abraham this Answer. O Abraham, the Earth is never destitute, but that there are some in it that dispute for God. But God commanded him to call them to his Religion; and he called them, but they would not, saying, how shall we believe thee, when thou readest not a Book? And God sent among them a Forgetfulness of those things which they knew of Sciences and Books; for they con-

ceived

ceived the Books which they used to be from God, and some of them believed, others not. Afterwards the *Zabians* were divided, and some of them believed, viz. the *Barbameans*, who did not separate themselves from *Abraham*, of blessed Memory, but the rest followed their Religion very eagerly, viz. those who were in the Land of *Churan*, who went not with *Abraham* into *Syria*, and said, we follow the Religion of *Seth*, *Edris*, and *Noah*. Thus, according to *Kiffæus*, the Religion of the *Sabæans* was the same with that of the *Haranaeans*, or *Mesopotamians*. What he relates of *Abraham's* being sent to the *Sabæans*, is all borrowed from the Rabbinical Traditions.

But that there were anciently learned Persons in *Arabia*, skilful in natural Philosophy, Astronomy, and other Sciences, is manifest from Testimonies far more authentick; (as particularly) from the Discourses betwixt *Job* and his Friends: Of the *Arabian* Philosophers it is understood, that *Salomon's* Wisdom is said to have excelled the Wisdom of all the Sons of the East. *Tacitus*, describing *Judea*, the Lands and Bounds to the East are terminated by *Arabia*. And that the *Jews* called *Arabia* the East Country, is evident from several Places in Scripture, as *Gen. x. 30.* and *xxv. 6, 18.* *Job i. 3.* Judges vi. 3, 4, &c. *Pliny* also mentions the Magi of *Arabia* (of whom he instanteth *Hippocus*). *Ptolemy*, the Gulf of the Magi, in *Arabia*; and *Porphyrius* (citing *Diogenes*) relates that *Pythagoras* (among other Countries to which he travell'd for Learning) went also to *Arabia*, and lived with the King there.

CHAP. III.

Their Writings.

THE *Sabæans* pretended (as was lately shewed out of *Kiffæus*) to have had the Books of *Seth* and *Edris*, and not only those, but some also written by *Adam*. For the same Author continuing the Story of *Abraham's* coming among the *Sabæans*, adds, that "afterwards *Abraham* opened the Chest of *Adam*, and behold, in it were the Books of *Adam*; likewise the Books of *Seth*, and of *Edris*; as also the Names of all the Prophets that were to be sent after *Abraham*: But *Abraham* said, Happy indeed are the Loins out of which all these Prophets shall come: And God breathed to him this Answer: Thou, O *Abraham*, art the Father of them all, and they thy Children; and for this Reason *Abraham* deserved to be called the Father of the Prophets, upon whom be Peace.

Of the same Allay *Maimonides* conceives the Book of Healings to have been, which was hid by *Ezekiel*.

The same *Maimonides* cites many other Books of the *Sabæans*, translated into *Arabic*; of which the chiefest is entitled, *Of the Agriculture of the Nabateans*¹, translated by *Aben Vachschijah*; full of idolatrical Extravagancies: It treats of the making of *Tjilmenaia*s; of the Descent of Familiar Spirits; of Conjurings of Dæmons; of Devils; of such as dwell in Deserts (as Satyrs were thought to do;) many other things it contained very ridiculous, by which nevertheless they conceived that they could confute the manifest Miracles of *Moses* and the Prophets.

Another entitled, *The Worship, or, of the Worship of the Nabateans*; out of which *Maimonides* cites a Story concerning *Abraham*, related formerly.

The *Book Haisfanchus*, ascribed to *Aristotle*, but false.

The *Book Hattelsmaoth*, of *Tjilmenaia*s; *Buxtorfius* renders it, Of speaking Images; the Reason we have given formerly.

The Book *Tamtam*.

The Book of *Hassiarab*.

The Book of the Degrees of the Cœlestial Orbs, and the Figures that are ascendent in every Degree.

Another Book concerning *Tjilmenaia*s, which also is attributed to *Aristotle*.

Another Book ascribed to *Hermes*.

The Book of *Isaak* the *Zabian*, wherein he argues in Defence of the Laws of the *Zabians*.

A great Book of the Customs and Particularities of the Law of the *Zabians*, as of their Feasts, Sacrifices, Prayers, and other things concerning their Belief: All these (saith *Maimonides*) are Books which treat of idolatrical things, and are translated into the *Arabic* Tongue.

Besides these, (as *Maimonides* acknowledgeth) there are many others. *Hettinger*² cites, (in his own Possession) *A Treatise* of *Mahomet* the Elder, Son of *Isaak*, who is otherwise called *Abuljark*, the Son of *Abi Jakub*.

THE NINETEENTH PART.

The Doctrine of the Sabæans.

WHAT is left to us of the Doctrine of the *Sabæans* is delivered upon later Authorities, than those from which we have the *Chaldaick*; and therefore perhaps is but an Account of what it was in later Times, degenerated from their primitive Doctrine, which was immediately derived from the *Chaldaick*. Nor is it impossible, but

¹ Mor. Nev. l. 3. 29.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Maim. Mor. Nev. ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Histor. Oriental. l. 1. c. 3.

but that this Corruption might be somewhat aggravated by the eager Opposition of the *Talmudists*, and some *Arabick* Writers that follow them, from whose Hands only we receive it. However, we conceive it necessary to be annexed to the former; of which, tho' depraved, it pretends at least to be the continued Succession.

C H A P. I.

Of the Gods and Rites of the Sabæans.

THE *Sabæans* held (as the *Chaldeans*) that the Stars are Gods, but the Sun the greatest God; for they plainly assert, that the Sun governs the superior and inferior Worlds; * and call him the great Lord, the Lord of Good. What they relate concerning *Abraham* refusing to worship the Sun, is delivered elsewhere. What they further fable of the Patriarchs, that *Adam* (not being the first Man, but begotten by a Man and Woman) was a Prophet of the Moon, and, by Preaching, persuaded Men to worship the Moon, and composed Books of Husbandry; That *Noah* was an Husbandman likewise, but believed not in Idols, for which they discommended him in all their Writings; That *Seth* also dissented from *Adam*, as to worshipping the Moon; see delivered more fully by * *Maimonides*.

Their Forms of worshipping these Gods was twofold, daily and monthly; the daily is by *Said Vahed* described thus: They make the first Day sacred to the Sun; the second to the Moon, the third to *Mars*; the fourth to *Mercury*; the fifth to *Jupiter*; the sixth to *Betha Venus*; the seventh to *Saturn*.

The Description of their monthly Worship receive from a MS. of *Mahumed ben Isaac*, cited by *Hottinger*: They begin the Year from the Month *Nisan*, of which they keep holy the first, second, and third Days, adoring and praying to their Goddess *Betha*: they go to her Temples, sacrificing Sacrifices, and burning living Creatures. On the sixth Day of the same Month they kill a Bull to their Goddess the Moon, and towards the Evening of the same Day eat it. On the eighth Day they keep a Fast, and likewise celebrate (at Night) a Feast in Honour of the seven Gods, and of the Dæmons, offering a Lamb to the God of the Blind (*Mars*). On the fifteenth Day is the Festival of *Sammael*, (by this name the *Talmudists* understand the Devil) celebrated with many Sacrifices, Holocausts, and Offerings. On the twentieth they visit a *Cænobium* of the *Hanaræans*, called *Cadi*, where they kill three Oxen, one to *Saturn*, another to *Mars* the blind God, the third to the Moon: they kill likewise nine Lambs, seven to their seven Gods (the Planets) one to the God of the Genius's, and one to the God of the Hours:

they likewise burn many Lambs and Cocks. On the twentyeighth Day they go into the Temple which they have in the City *Saba*, at a certain Gate of *Charran*, called the Gate *Affarab*, and kill to *Hermes* their God, a great Bull; as also seven Lambs to their seven Gods; one to the God of the Dæmons, and to the God of the Hours, eating and drinking; but they burn nothing of any Beast that Day.

The second Month, which is *Jiar*, they begin also with Sacrifices, celebrating the Consecration of *Sammael*, and Feasting: The second day they keep in honour of *Aben Salem*; drinking, and filling their Hands with *Tamarisk* and other Fruits.

The twentythird Day of the third Month they keep in Honour of *Sammael*, whom they affirm to be the God that maketh the Arrows fly; the *Cunar*, or Priest, makes an Arrow take fire twelve times, by rubbing another Stick against it: the last time he creeps upon the Ground, and puts Flax to it; if their Flax kindle, they conceive their Rites well accepted of the Gods, otherwise not.

The fourth Month *Thammuz* had a peculiar Solemnity about the Middle of it, called the Festival *Albukal*, of the Weeping Women: The Original of which is thus related by *R. Maimonides*; In the same Book, faith he, they tell a Story of a certain idolatrous Pseudo-Prophet, named *Thammuz*; who calling upon the King to worship the seven Planets, and the twelve Signs of the Zodiac, and being by the King put to an ignominious Death, the same Night in which he was slain, all the Images from all parts of the Earth met in the Palace which was erected at *Babylon* to the great golden Image of the Sun, suspended betwixt Heaven and Earth: There this Image of the Sun fell down prostrate in the midst, and (all the rest of the Images standing round about it) bewailed *Thammuz*, and began to relate what hapned to him; whereupon the rest of the Images fell a weeping, and lamented all that Night: But as soon as the Morning appeared they all flew away, and returned home to their several Temples. Hence came the Custom, that on the first day of the Month *Thammuz* (*June*) they Weep, Lament, and Bewail *Thammuz*. This Custom of Women Weeping for *Thammuz* is mentioned also by the Prophet * *Ezekiel*, as imitated by the Jews: the twentieth Day of this Month they consecrate to *Sammael* and to other Gods and Dæmons; sacrificing nine Lambs to *Hanan*.

In the fifth Month, which, as the *Syrians*, they call *Ab*, they press new Wine to their Gods, and give it several Names: this they do the eight first Days. They likewise kill a new born Infant to their Gods, which they beat all to pieces; then they take the Flesh and mix it with Rye-meal, Saffron,

* *Maimon. Mor. Nev. §. 2.** *Idem.** *Mor. Nev. lib. d.** *Chap. viii. 14.*

Ears of Corn, Mace, and little Cakes like Figs; they bake this in a new Oven, and give it to the People of the Congregation of *Sammael* all the Year long; no Woman eats of this, nor Servant, nor Son of a Bond-woman, nor Man that is possessed, or mad.

The Rites of the sixth Month, named *Elbul*, are thus described by the same Author: Three Days they boil Water to wash themselves, that they may perform the Rites of *Sammael*, who is the Prince of the Dæmons, and the greatest God; into this Water they cast some Tamarisk, Wax, Olives, Spice, &c. and when it is hot, take it before Sun-rise, and pour it upon their Bodies, as an Amulet: The same Day also they kill eight Lambs, seven to their Gods, and one to the God *Sammael*; they eat also in their Congregations, and drink every Man seven Cups of Wine: The Prince exacts of every one of them two Drachms to be paid into his Exchequer. On the 26th Day of the same Month they go forth to a Mountain, celebrating the Rites of the *Sun*, *Saturn*, and *Venus*; bunting eight Hen-chickens, eight Cocks, and as many Hens. He who made a Prayer and Request to Fortune, takes an old Cock, or a Cock-chicken, to the Wings of which he ties two Strings, and sets their Ends on Fire, and gives up the Chickens to the Goddess's Fortune: If the Chickens are quite consumed by the Fire his Prayer is heard; but if the Fire of those Strings goes out before the Chickens be quite burnt, the Lord of Fortune accepts not his Prayer, nor Offerings, nor Sacrifices. On the 27th and 28th they have their Mysteries, Sacrifices, Offerings, and Holocausts to *Sammael*, (who is the greatest Lord,) to the Dæmons and Genus's, which compass them about, defend them, and bestow good Fortune on them.

The seventh Month, which the *Syrians* and *Sabæans* call the first *Tisbri*, hath peculiar Rites, thus described by the same Author: About the middle of this Month, they burn Meat to the dead, in this manner: Every one buys of every Sort of Meat that is in the Market; of all Kind of Flesh, Fruits, green and dry; they likewise dress it several ways; all which they burn in the Night-time to the Dead, and with it the Thigh-bone of a Camel; they also pour mixed Wine upon the Fire for the Dead to drink.

In the eighth Month, which is called the latter *Tisbri*, they fast on the 21st Day, and so on for nine Days, the last of which is the 29th; this Day they do in Honour of the Lord of Fortunes, &c.

The ninth Month, called the first *Canun*, is chiefly sacred to *Venus*; on the fourth Day they set up a Tabernacle, which they call the Bed of *Beltha*, adorning it with several Leaves, Fruits, Roses, &c. Before they offer their Sacrifices of Beasts and Birds,

they say, Let these Sacrifices be destined to our Goddess *Beltha*: This they do for seven Days; all which time they burn many Beasts to their Gods and Goddesses. On the 30th Day of the same Month the Priest sits in an high Chair, to which he gets up by nine Steps; and taking in his Hand a Stick of Tamarisk, stretcheth it out to them all, and striketh every one of them with it, three, or five, or seven times. Afterwards he makes a Discourse to them, wherein he declareth to the Congregation their Continuance, Multitude, Places, and Excellency above all other Nations; he likewise tells them the Largeness of their Empire, and the Days of their Reign: After which he comes down from the Chair, and they eat of the things offered to the Idols, and drink; and the Prince exacts of every one of them this Day two Drachms to the Exchequer.

The tenth Month, called the other *Canun*, seems particularly devoted to the Moon; for on the 24th Day thereof is the Nativity of the Lord, that is, the Moon; at what time they celebrate the Rites of *Sammael*, sacrificing and burning fourscore living Creatures, four-footed Beasts and Fowl; they also eat, and drink, and burn *Badi*, Sticks or Canes of Palm, slender at the Bottom, to their Gods and Goddesses.

In the eleventh Month, *Sijubat*, they fast seven Days together, beginning from the 9th Day, upon which they proclaim a Fast to the Sun, who is the great Lord, the Lord of Good. They eat not in all this time any thing of Milk, nor drink Wine, nor pray during this Month to any but *Sammael*, the Genii, and Dæmons.

In the Month *Adar*, which is the twelfth and last, they fast also to the Moon, especially on the 28th Day: The President distributes a Barley Loaf to the Congregation in Honour of *Mari*; the Prince exacts of every one of them towards his Exchequer two Drachms.

CHAP. II.

Other Rites of the Sabæans, contrary to the Levitical Law.

R. *Maimonides* mentions several other Rites of the *Sabæans*, which were expressly repugnant to the *Levitical Law*; adding, that he was acquainted with the Reasons and Causes of many of the Laws of *Moses*, by means of knowing the Faith, Rites, and Worship of the *Sabæans*. The Examples alledged by him and others are these.

They offered leavened Bread only, and, for their Offerings, made choice of sweet things only, and appointed their Sacrifices with Honey; prohibited, *Lev. ii. 11.*

They used on a certain Day to feed on Swine's Flesh; prohibited, *Lev. xi. 7.*

They

They held it unlawful to kill and feed on some Beasts permitted to the Jews; as the Ox, which *Maimonides* saith they much honoured for the great Profit he brings by Agriculture, and therefore held it unlawful to kill him, as also the Sheep; neither of which they killed.

Some of the *Sabæans* worshipped Devils, believing they had the Shapes of Goats, and therefore called them *Seirim*; on the contrary, the *Levitical Law* prohibits to offer Sacrifices *le Seirim*, unto Goats, that is to say, Devils, appearing in the Forms of Goats, *Lev. xvii. 7.*

Though they did abominate Blood, as a thing exceeding detestable, yet they did eat it, believing it to be the Food of the Dæmons, and that he that did eat of it should become a Brother, or intimate Acquaintance of the Dæmons, inasmuch that they would come to him and tell him future Events; prohibited, *Lev. xvii. 10, 23.*

They worshipped the Sun at his Rising; for which Reason, as our Rabbins expressly teach in *Gemara*, saith *Maimonides*, *Abraham* our Father designed the West for the Place of the *Sanctum Sanctorum*, when he worshipped in the Mountain *Moriab*. Of this Idolatry they interpret what the Prophet *Ezekiel* saith, of the Men with their Backs toward the Temple of the Lord, and their Faces toward the East, worshipping the Sun towards the East.

Mahammed Ben-Isaac relates, that they shaved themselves with Razors, and branded themselves with Fire; there were also married Women among them who shaved themselves in the same manner; forbidden, *Lev. xxi. 5.*

They had a Custom of passing their Children, as soon as they were born, through the Fire, which they worshipped, affirming, that such Children as were not so passed would die. This was also expressly forbidden by the *Levitical Law*.

Another most obscene Custom they had of engraving, described by *Maimonides*, to which he conceives the *Levitical* Prohibition to allude.

Others there are of the same Kind cited by the same Author; who concludes, that as concerning those particular Laws, the Reasons whereof are concealed, and the Benefit unknown to me, it proceeds from hence, that the things which we hear are not such as those which we see and perceive with our Eyes. For this Cause, those things concerning the Rites of the *Sabæans*, which I have learnt by hearing, and from their Writings, are not so solid and certain, as with those who have seen them practised, especially seeing that their Opinions and Sects perished 1000 Years since, and their Names were abolished.

With the *Sabæans*, we conclude the *Chaldaick* Philosophy.

The Chaldaick Oracles of Zoroaster and his Followers.

THE most considerable Remains of the *Chaldaick* Philosophy are those Oracles which go under the Name of *Zoroaster*; some indeed condemn them as supposititious, *Forged* by some *Pseudo-Christian* Greek; (perhaps the rather, because *The Followers of Prodicus the Heretick*, boasted that they had the secret Books of *Zoroaster*.) But this seems less probable, in regard they lie dispersed among several Authors; nor are they to be neglected, in that they have been held in great Veneration by the *Platonick* Philosophers. Which sufficiently also argues, that they are none of the Writings charged by *Porphyrus* upon the *Gnosticks*, as forged by them under the Name of *Zoroaster*; since those (as he acknowledgeth) were by the *Platonick* Philosophers, (of whom he instanteth *Plotinus* and *Amelius*) rejected, and demonstrated to be spurious and supposititious.

Some argue, that they are not *Chaldaick*, because many times accommodated to the *Greek* Style; but there are in them many so harsh and exotic Expressions as discover them to be originally foreign; and where they agree in Terms with that which is proper to the *Greek* Philosophy, we may say of them as *Jamblichus* upon another Occasion, (on the Writings that go under the Name of *Hermes Trismegistus*) as they are published under the Name of *Zoroaster*, so also they contain the Doctrine of *Zoroaster*, though they frequently speak in the Style of the *Greeks*; for they were translated out of *Chaldee* into *Greek* by Persons skillful in the *Chaldaick* Philosophy.

To persuade us that they are genuine, and not of *Greekish* Invention, *Mirandula* professeth to *Ficinus*, that he had the *Chaldee* Original in his Possession, "I was (saith he) forcibly taken off from other Things, and instigated to the *Arabick* and *Chaldaick* Learning by certain Books in both those Languages, which came to my Hands, not accidentally, but doubtless by the Disposal of God, in Favour of my Studies. Hear the Inscriptions, and you will believe it. The *Chaldaick* Books, (if they are Books, and not rather Treasures) are the Oracles of *Aven Efra*, *Zoroaster*, and *Melchior*, *Magi*; in which those things which are faulty and defective in the *Greek*, are read perfect and entire. There is also (adds he) an Exposition by

* Chap. viii. 16.

† Maimon. Mor. Nev. 3.

‡ Mor. Nev. 3. 37.

§ Ibid. 3. 44.

¶ Beza.

‡ Clem. Strom. l. 1.

§ Vit. Plat.

¶ De Myst. Egypt.

‡ Epist. ad Marfil. Ficin.

"the Chaldaean wife Men upon these Oracles, short and knotty, but full of Mysteries: There is also a Book of the Doctrines of the Chaldaick Theology, and upon it a divine and copious Discourse of the Persians, Grecians, and Chaldeans:" Thus *Mirandula*; after whose Death these Books were found by *Ficinus*, but so worn and illegible that nothing could be made out of them.

Further, to confirm that these Oracles were (as we said) translated into Greek by Persons skilful in the Greek Philosophy, let us call to mind that *Berosus*¹ introduced the Writings of the Chaldeans concerning *Astronomy and Philosophy among the Grecians*; and that *Julian the Son*, a Chaldaick Philosopher, wrote ^a *theurgick Oracles in Verse, and other Secrets of that Science*; and probably, if these were no part of that Chaldaick Learning which *Berosus* first rendered in Greek, they yet might be some of the *Theurgick Oracles* (for such the Title speaks them) of *Julian*; for some of them are cited by *Proclus* as such. From the Account which *Mirandula* gives of those in his Possession, to which were added a Comment, and a Discourse of the Doctrines of the Chaldaick Theology, it might be conjectured, that what is delivered to us by *Pletho* and *Pfellus*, who, besides the Oracles, give us a Comment on them, together with a Chaldaick Summary, was extracted out of that Author which *Mirandula* describes to have been of the same Kind and Method, but much more perfect and copious.

This Title of *Oracles* was perhaps not given to them only metaphorically, to express the divine Excellence of their Doctrine, but as conceived indeed to have been delivered by the Oracle itself; for ^a *Stephanus* testifies, that the Chaldeans had an Oracle which they held in no less Veneration than the Greeks did theirs at Delphi. This Opinion may be confirmed by the high Testimonies which the *Platonick Philosophers* give of them, calling them ^b *the Assyrian Theology revealed by God, and the Theology delivered by God*. And *Proclus* elsewhere having cited as from the Gods, one of those Oracles which speaks of the Ideas, (a *Platonick Doctrine*) adds, that hereby the Gods declared the Subsistence of Ideas, and acquiesce as satisfied that the Gods themselves satisfy the Contemplation of Plato.

Some of these Oracles which escaped the Injuries of Time, were first published by *Ludovicus Tiletanus*, Anno 1563, at Paris; together with the Commentaries of *Gemistus Pletho*, under the Title of the *Ma-*

gical Oracles of the Magi descended from Zoroaster; the same were afterwards translated and put forth by *Jacobus Marthamus*; and lastly, together with the Comment of *Pfellus* also, by *Johannes Opsopæus* at Paris, 1607.

These by *Franciscus Patricius* were enlarged with a plentiful Addition out of *Proclus, Hermias, Simplicius, Damascius, Synesius, Olympiodorus, Nicephorus, and Arnobius*; increasing them ^c, by his own Account, to 324. and reducing them, for the better Perspicuity, to certain general Heads, put them forth, and translated them into Latin, Anno 1593.

They were afterwards put forth in Latin by ^d *Otho Heurnius*, Anno 1619. under the Title of *The sincere magical Oracles of Zoroaster, King of Bactria, and Prince of the Magi*; but *Heurnius*, under the Pretence of ^e putting them into good Latin, (as he calls it) and polishing them with a rougher File, hath patched up and corrupted what *Patricius* delivered faithfully and sincerely; endeavouring to put these Fragments into a continued Discourse, which in themselves are nothing coherent, but dispersed among several Authors.

Patricius indeed hath taken much learned Pains in the Collection of them; but with less Regard to their Measures and Numbers, and (as from thence may be shown) sometimes of the Words themselves; nor is there any certain means to redress this Omission by comparing them with the Authors out of which he took them, since few of those are extant; neither doth he, (as he professeth to have done) affix the Names of the Authors to the several Fragments, except to some few at the Beginning; However, we shall give them here according to his Edition, that being the most perfect; together with such Additions as we meet withal elsewhere, and some Conjectures to supply the Defect we mentioned.

And whereas many of these Oracles are so broken and obscure, that they may at first Sight seem rather ridiculous than weighty, yet he who shall consider, that as many of them as are explained by *Pletho, Pfellus*, and others, would, without those Explications, seem no less absurd than the rest, but being explained, disclose the Learning of the Chaldeans in a profound and extraordinary manner, will easily believe all the rest, (even those which appear least intelligible) to be of the same Kind, and consequently ought no more to have been omitted than any of the rest.

¹ Joseph. contra Apion 1.
barbar.

^a Suid. in voce Julianus.

^b De Urb.

^c Procl. in Tim.

^d Zer. pag. 4. b.

^e Philol.

Φ Ρ. Π Α Τ Ρ Ι Κ Ι Ο Υ
Τ Α Τ Ο Υ Ζ Ω Ρ Ο Α Σ Τ Ρ Ο Υ Λ Ο Γ Ι Α .

FRANCISCI PATRICII
ZOROASTRI ORACULA.

ΜΟΝΑΣ, ΔΥΑΣ, ΚΑΙ ΤΡΙΑΣ.

MONAS, DYAS, TRIAS.

Ψαλ. **Ο** Πα πατρὶς μονὰς ἐστὶ.
Δαμ. Ταρὰν ἔτι γεννᾷ ἢ δύο ἡμεῖς.
Περκ. Δαμ. Δύο εἰς ἄλλῃ τῇ δὲ κτίσται, καὶ γενεᾷ
ἀεὶ ἐστὶ τῆς αἰῶνι.

Καὶ τὸ κτισθῆναι τὰ πάντα, καὶ τὰ πλεονέχοντα ἐκ τῆς χρίσεως.

Δαμ. Πάντα γὰρ ἐκ κοίτης λαμπρῆς γεννᾷται, ὡς μονὰς
ἀρχῆς.

Ἀρχὴ πᾶσι τμήσις ἢ δὴ ἡ τάξις.

Περκ. Εἰς τρία γὰρ οὗς ἂν πατρὶς τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀναρτῇ,
ὅς τὸ δύναιτο κτίσασθαι, καὶ ἡδὴ πάντα ἐκτίσται.

Εἰς τρία γὰρ ἂν οὗς πατρὶς αἰδῇ,
ὡς πάντα κτισθῆναι.

Δαμ. Καὶ ἐκδοῦναι ἐκ αὐτῆς ἢ τ' ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ σοφία,
καὶ ἡ πολυφρονία ἀρετῆς.

Τῇ πᾶσι δὲ ἴσως γενεᾷ δὲ ἡμῶν ἀρετὴ ἔστι,

οὐ πρότερος, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ μακροῦς.

Ἀρχαίς γὰρ τῶν πᾶσι λαδῶν ἀναρτῇ ἀναρτῇ.

Ἰσως ἀρετῆς δὲ ἡμῶν, ἐκ δὲ ἀρετῆς οὐκ.

Ἡμεῖς, τὸν δὲ ἀλλῶν, ὅς ἐκ πνεύματος καὶ χρίσεως ἀναρτῇ.

Καὶ πᾶσι πᾶσι, καὶ πᾶσι ἀποδοῦναι.

Μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔστι τὰ πάντα.

Ἐν δὲ ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ ἡμῶν πολυφρονία ἔστι.

Περκ. Ἐν δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ
ἀρετῇ,

ἐκδοῦναι ἐκδοῦναι ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ.

Ἀρχαίς οὗς τὰ πᾶσι τῶν ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ.

ΠΑΤΗΡ ΚΑΙ ΝΟΣ.

PATER ET MENS.

Ψαλ. Ἐαυτὸν ὁ πατὴρ ἡμεῶν ἔδωκεν ἐκ τῆς

δυνάμεως οὐκ ἔστι κτίσασθαι ἡμῶν.

Ψαλ. οὐ γὰρ ἂν οὐκ ἔστι ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ.

Πάντα γὰρ ἐκδοῦναι ἀρετῇ,

καὶ ὡς ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ.

Ὁς ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ.

Περκ. Πατρὶς ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ.

Ἐκ πνεύματος ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ.

Ἐκ πνεύματος ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ.

Πάντα ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ.

Ὁς ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ ἀρετῇ.

Ψαλ. **U**BI paterna Monas est.

Δαμ. Ampliata est Monas, quae duo generat.

Proc. Dam. Duitas enim apud hunc sedet, & intellectualibus fulget sectionibus.

Et gubernare cuncta, & ordinare quodcunque non ordinatum.

Dam. Toto enim mundo lucet Trias, cujus Monas est princeps.

Principium omnis sectionis hic est ordo.

Proc. In tria namque Mens dixit Patris fecari omnia, Cujus voluntas annuit, & jam omnia facta fuere.

In tria namque dixit Mens patris aeterni, Mente omnia gubernans.

Dam. Et apparuerunt in ipsa Virtus & Sapientia, Et Multifida Veritas.

Hinc fuit Triadis vultus ante essentiam.

Non primam, sed eam quae mensuratur.

Principiis tribus hisce capias servire cuncta.

* * * *

Et fons fontium, & fontium cunctorum.

Matrix continens cuncta.

Indè affatim exilit generatio multifariae materiae.

Proc. Indè tractus prester exilis ignis flos,

Mundorum iadens cavitatibus. Omnia namque indè.

Incipit deorsum tendere radios admirandos.

Ψαλ. Scipsum rapuit pater neque suae

Potentiae mentali claudens proprium ignem.

Ψαλ. Non enim à paterno Principio imperfectum quid rotatur.

Cuncta namque perfecit pater,

Et menti tradidit secundae,

Quam primam vocat omne genus hominum.

Proc. Patrogenia lux, multum namque sola

E patris robore decerpens mentis florem.

Opera enim intelligens paterna mens è se genita,

Cunctis insemnavit vinculum ignigravis amoris.

Quo omnia maneant, tempus in interminatum a-

mantia.

5 K 2

Neque

Μίττι τῷ πᾶσι τοῖς νοῦσι ὑποκείμενα φέρονται.

Ἄς ἐν ἑσθῇ μόνῃ κόσμῳ συγκρατῆται μένοντα.

Ἐχρει τῷ νοῦν πατεκὼν γὰρ ἐκδηλῶνται

Πόσις παρὰ τὴν ἐν ἀρχαίς.

Ἐστὶ γὰρ πᾶσι τῷ πατεκὼν βαθὺ, καὶ παρὰ τῷ νοῦν.

Μήδῃ περὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἐν τῷ πατεκὼν βαθὺ,

Καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀδύτῳ, καὶ τῷ θεοφύκτῳ σὺν.

Οὐ γὰρ οἱ ὕλη, πῦρ ἐπικύματα τὸ πρῶτον

Ἐν τῷ δυνάμει κατακλείσθαι ἔχοντες, ἀλλὰ νόον.

Σύμβολα γὰρ πατεκὼν νόον ἔκτισται καὶ κόσμος

Ὅς τὸ νοῦν τῷ νοῦν ἐκφύκει καλλίῳ,

Δαμ. Ὁλοφύκει μακρῶς, καὶ ἀμείνεται.

Νοῦ γὰρ ἐκφύκει τὸ νοῦν, αἰδέσθαι δὲ ἐπικύματα κόσμου.

Νοῦ γὰρ ἐκφύκει τὸ νοῦν, ψυχὴ δὲ ἐπικύματα κόσμου.

NOTA, NOCTA, ET NOCTA.

Δαμ. Καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ νοῦν.

Περὶ. Οὐ γὰρ ἀντὶ τοῦ νοῦν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀπαρ-
χῇ.

Τὰ μὲν ἐν νοῦν καὶ νοῦν, ὅσα νοῦν νοῦν.

Τερψὶ τὸ νοῦν τὸ νοῦν.

Μάνδρας τὸ νοῦν, ὅσα νόον ὑποκείμενα.

Καὶ τὸ νόον, ὅς ἐν ἡμῶν κόσμῳ ἀγν.

Νοῦ γὰρ νόον ἐκτὶν ἐκτὶν παρὰ τὴν πύλιν.

Οἱ δὲ ὑποκείμενα πατεκὼν νοῦν ὅσα νοῦν.

Ἡ νοῦν πᾶσι τῷ κόσμῳ ἀγν.

Ἐστὶ γὰρ τὸ νοῦν, ὅ καὶ οἱ νοῦν νόον ἀγν.

Δαμ. Ἡ γὰρ ἐκφύκει, ὅς ἀντὶ νόον, ἀμείνεται νόον,

Ἄς τὸ νόον, ὅ καὶ νόον νόον.

Ἡστὶ γὰρ ἀμείνεται ἀμείνεται νόον,

Νοῦ γὰρ ἐκφύκει τῷ κόσμῳ ἀγν.

Νοῦ γὰρ νόον τὸ νοῦν ἐκτὶν.

Ἀλλὰ νόον παρὰ τὸν νόον.

Πάντα μίσηται, πᾶσι τὸ νοῦν ἐκτὶν.

Χρὴ δὲ τὸ νόον νόον. Ἡ γὰρ ἐκφύκει

Σὺν νόον, ἀμείνεται νόον ἐκτὶν.

Ἀλλὰ ἀγνὸν ἐκφύκει νόον,

Φέρονται οἱ ψυχὴ τῷ κόσμῳ ἀγν.

Ἐστὶ τὸ νοῦν, ὅ καὶ νόον τὸ νοῦν,

Ἐστὶ νόον νόον ἀγν.

Τὸν γὰρ νόον νόον, καὶ τὸ νόον ἐν νόον ἀμείνεται.

Νοῦ γὰρ νόον, καὶ τὸ νόον ἐν νόον ἀμείνεται.

Neque omnibus quæ patri mentaliter contexta mon-
stret.

Ut in amore maneat mundi elementa manentia.

Habet ipsa intelligentia paternam mentem indere

Omnibus fontibus & principatibus.

Est enim finis paterni profundi, & fons mentali-

um.

Neque progressus est, sed mansit in paterno pro-

fundo,

Et in adyto, per Deo-nutrients silentium.

Non enim in materiam, ignis trans prius

Suam potentiam claudit operibus, sed mente.

Symbola enim paterna mens feminavit per mun-

dum

Dam. Quæ intelligibilia intelligit, & ineffabilia exor-

nat.

Tota partitio, & impartibilis.

Mente quidem continet intelligibilia, sensum verò

inducit mundis.

Mente quidem continet intelligibilia, animam verò

inducit mundis.

MENS, INTELLIGIBILIA, ET MENTALIA.

Dam. Et unius mentis intelligibilis.

Proc. Non enim finē intelligibili mens est: non se-
orsum existit.

Quædam fanē sunt mentalia & intelligibilia, quæcun-
que dūm intelligunt intelliguntur.

Cibus verò intelligenti est intelligibile.

Disce intelligibile, quandoquidem extra mentem ex-
istit.

Et mentis, quæ Empyreum mundum ducit.

Mentis enim mens est quæ mundi est artifex igni.

Qui supermundanum paternum profundum estis intel-
ligentes.

Intelligibilis omnis sectionis princeps est.

Est enim quoddam intelligibile, quod oportet te intel-
ligere mentis flore.

Dam. Vel enim inclines, ut mentem, & illud in-
tellexeris.

Ut aliquid intelligens, non illud intelliges.

Est enim roboris circumquaque lucidi potentia,

Mentalibus fulgens sectionibus, non fanē oportet

Vehementiā intelligere intelligibile illud,

Sed mentis amplæ amplæ flammæ

Omnia metientes, præterquam intelligibile illud.

Opus ergo est hoc intelligere; nam si inclinaveris

Mentem tuam, etiam illud intelliges non parum.

Sed purum converte oculum,

Ferentem tuæ animæ tendere vacuam mentem

In intelligibile; ut dicas intelligibile,

Quandoquidem extra mentem existit.

Deum hunc intelligit omnis mens, non enim finē

Mente est intelligibili, & intelligibile non finē mente
existit.

Τοῖς ἢ πυρὸς τοῖσιν νοερίσιν φανεῖται πάντα
Εἴθε δὲ διαδόντα, παῖδες συνέλιδι βυλῇ.
Καὶ τὸ νοεῖν, αἰ τὸ μένον ἀόκνη εὐφράσιν.
Πηγάς τιν' ἢ ἀρχάς, διῶν, αἰ τὸ μένον ἀόκνη εὐ-
φράσιν.

Ἄλλω δ' ἢ νόμον σμῆν ἀκοιμάτῃ εὐφράσιν
Κόσμον ἐθεύσκον, κερωνῶ δὴ παῖδες ἐσιπν.
Τῷ δὲ νόῳ ἢ (νορῶν) παρὰ σέθεν) ψυχρῶν.
Καὶ ὁ ποιητής, ὅς αὐτῶν τιν' ταχέστατ' ἢ κόσμον.
*Ος ἐκ τοῦ ἐκδορε σέθεν.

*Εὐφράσιν) πνεύ, συνίσταται ἔργα κερῶν
Πηγάς κερῶν, ἢ πυρὸς ἀνθ' ἐστίν.
Νοερίσιν ἀσφῶν ταμῶν, ἔρῳ δ' ἐκφάνει τὸ
πάντα.

Τὸ ἀπύπνωτα πύπνω.
Σμῆναισι ἐκδορε φερῶν, ἢ ἐκδορε
Κόσμον ἀπὸ σέθεν.

*Α νῦς λίγνη, τὸ νοεῖν δὴ σὺ λίγνη.
Ἡ δ' ἢ δὴ δυνάμεισιν οὐ ἐκδορε, νῦς δ' ἀπ' ἐκδορε.

ΙΤΝΓΕΣ, ΙΔΕΑΙ, ΑΡΧΑΙ.

Πολλὰ δ' αἰδὲ ἐπιμαρτυρεῖται φανεροῖς λόγοις.
Ἐνδορῶνται, ἢ ἐν αἷς ἀρχήσιν ἡσά τῶν,
Ἐπὶ αἷς αὐταῖς ἀρχῇ αὐτῶν.
Ἀρχαί, αἰ παῖδες ἔργα νοήματα νοεῖ
Αἰδῶνται ἔργων, ἢ σέθεν ἀπὸ πύπνω.
Διαπύπνωται ἐπὶ τῇ σέθεν τῇ παρὰ τῇ ὕλῃ.
Καὶ τὰ ἡμερῶν μνημόνια τ' ἀφανῶν ἐραζομένη.
Καὶ τ' ἀφανῇ οἷς τ' ἡμερῶν κοσμοποιῶν ἐγχεύονται.
Νῦν παῖδες ἐκδορε, νοήματα ἀπὸ πύπνω
Παμῶνται ἰδέαι. παρῶν δ' ἀπὸ μᾶς ἀπὸ πύπνω
Εἰδῶνται. παῖδες ἢ ἡμερῶν τῇ ἰδέῃ τῇ
Δι' ὅν σμῆνται τῇ παρῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀλλὰ
Ζωῶν, ἀπὸ μνημόνιων ἐκδορε.

*Αλλ' ἡμερῶνται, νοεῖσιν πνεύ μνημόνιων,
Εἰς ἀλλὰ νοερίσιν κόσμον ἢ ἀναξ πολυμῶν
Πεπνῶνται νοερίσιν τῶν ἀρῶν, ἢ καὶ κόσμον

*Ἰκν) ἐκδορε μνημόνιων μνημόνιων καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἐκδορε.

Πατριᾶς ἰδέας κερῶνται, ὡν μὲν παρῶν.
Ἐξ ἡς νοερίσιν) μνημόνιων ἀλλὰ,
Ἀπῶνται, ἢ ἐκδορε κόσμον ἀπὸ σέθεν,
Αἰ σέθεν κερῶνται σμῆνται, σμῆνται ἐκδορε,
Φορῶν) τερῶνται) ἀπὸ δ' ἀμφοῖν ἀλλὰ ἀλλὰ.
Ἐννοια νοερίσιν παρῶν) παρῶν ἀπὸ
Πολυμῶν παρῶν) παρῶν ἀπὸ

*Ακοιμάτῃ ζῶν. ἀπὸ ἀρχῶν ἰδέας
Πρώτῃ παρῶν ἐκδορε) παρῶν δ' αὐτομῶνται παρῶν.
Νομῶνται ἢ ἐκδορε παρῶν) νοερίσιν ἢ αὐτοῖς.
Βυλῶν ἀρῶνται κερῶνται ὡς ἐκδορε.

Ignis mentibus preteritis cuncta
Cedunt ferventia, Patris persuasione consilio.
Et intelligere, semperque manere impigra verti-
gine.

Fonte & principiū, vertere, semperque manere impi-
grā vertigine.

Sed nomen venerandum in somni vertigini
Mundis indens, terribiles ob patris minas.
Sub duabus mentibus virigenius fons continetur ani-
marum.

Et factor, qui per se operans fabricavit mundum.

Qui ex mente exiit primus.

Indutus igne ignem, Vinculorum ut temperet

Fontanos crateras, sui ignis florem sustinens

Mentalibus fulget sectionibus, amorque implevit

omnia.

Infigurata figurans.

Examinibus similes feruntur, perrumpentes

Per mundi corpora.

Quæ mens dicit, intelligendo sanè dicit.

Potentia quidem cum illis, Mens verò ab illâ.

J YNGES, IDEÆ, PRINCIPIA.

Multæ quidem hæ scandunt lucidos mundos.

Infilientes, & in quibus summitates sunt tres.

Subiectum ipsis est principale pratum.

Principia; quæ patris opera intelligentes intelli-
gibilia

Sensibilibus operibus, & corporibus revelarunt.

Transvectrices stantes dicere patri & materię.

Et manifesta imitamina latentium operantes.

Et latentia in manifestam Cosmopœciam inferiben-
tes.

Mens patris stridit, intelligens vigente consilio

Omniformes Ideas. Fonte verò ab uno evolantes

Exilierunt. A patre enim erat consilium & finis.

Per quæ conjunguntur patri, per aliam atque ali-
am

Vitam, à compartitis canalibus.

Sed partitæ sunt, mentali igne dispositæ,

In alias mentales: mundo namque rex multiformi

Proposuit mentalem typum incorruptibilem, non per
mundum

Vestigium promovens formæ per quæ mundus appa-
ruit.

Omniformiam ideis gratiosus, quarum unus fons.

Ex quo strident disperitæ alie,

Immenfæ, peripentes mundi circa corpora:

Quæ per finis immensos, examinibus similes,

Ferunt conversæ: circumque alibi alia.

Conceptiones mentales fonte à paterno.

Multum decerpentes ignis florem

In somnis temporis. Vigor principigenie ideæ

Primus, patris emissus est: cuius per se florens fons.

Intellectæ Jynges à patre intelligunt & ipsæ.

Consilium ineffabilem moventur ut intelligant.

H E C A T E,

ΕΚΑΤΗ, ΣΥΝΟΧΕΙΣ, ΚΑΙ ΤΕ-
ΛΕΤΑΡΧΑΙ.

Ἐξ αὐτῶν γὰρ πάντες διαφράσσουσιν
Αμείλικτοι τε καὶ αὐτοὶ, καὶ ἀφροσύνης καὶ λυγρῆς
Προμυγίας ἀλλήλους περικυβέτῃς ἔχουσιν.
Καὶ ὡς ζωὴς πυρὶς ἀνέθι, καὶ ἡρεσταιὸν
Πνεῦμα πάλιν, πάλιν ἐπικρατεῖ.
Φεγγεῖν αὖ ἀφροσύνης οὐδὲ ἀλγέτης ἔδωκεν.
Ἐργασίας ἀλλήλους ἰδὼν καὶ ἐν σωραχῶσι,
Ὅπως ἔχει καὶ οὐ νοεῖς ἀπορῆς ἀσχετοῦ.
Ὅτι ἔρανος, ἐπὶ ἐκδοπῇ καὶ πυρὶς ζωοφόρος.
Ὅτι καὶ τὸ ζωογόνον πλεονεξίῃ ἔχουσιν καὶ λυγρῶν.
Καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν σωραχῶν ἀλλήλων ζήδοντες πυρὶς
Μίαν διαμαρτυροῦνται.
Ἀλλὰ καὶ φεγγεῖ τὴν ἔργων εἰς τὴν πύξιν.
Ἀφροσύνη γὰρ ἑαυτὴν, ἐκδοπῇ ἡρεσταιὸν
Τὸν πῦρ ἀφροσύνης τὸν ἐκδοπῇ.
Οἱ τελετάρχα ἀμείλικτοι τῇ σωραχῇ.
Τὸς γὰρ νοεῖς πυρὶς ἀφροσύνης
Ἀπαντα εἰκαδὲ δουλοῦνται.
Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑλαίοις ὅσα δουλοῦν σωραχῶν.
Ἐκαδὲ πᾶν τῶν ἀλλήλων φωτὸς καὶ ἐκδοπῇ.
Ἀλλὰ πεισλίχου, τοῦ πῦρος καὶ ὁ πῦρ καὶ λυγρῶν.
Παντοφῶν συνθήκη βάλαντος φεγγεῖ.
Μηδὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀπορῆς ἀσχετοῦ,
Ἀλλὰ πεισλίχου.
Οἱ γὰρ τὰ ἀπῆμα, καὶ αἰδῶντα διμυγρῶν,
Καὶ συμπεριεῖν, καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων εἰς ὕλην.

ΨΥΧΗ, ΦΥΣΙΣ.

Ὅτι ψυχὴ πῦρ διαμαρτυροῦνται ὅσα φεγγεῖ,
Ἄδωκατὲς τῇ μένῃ, καὶ ζῆντι διαμῶντι καὶ
Καὶ ἔχει κόσμον πολλὰ ἀφροσύνης καὶ λυγρῶν.
Νῦν γὰρ μέμνηται πάλιν, καὶ τὴν πύξιν καὶ οὐμῶν.
Μυγρῶν δὲ καὶ πῦρ, πῦρ ἀφροσύνης ἔργα πλεονεξίῃ.
Μετὰ γὰρ πεισλίχου ἀφροσύνης καὶ πῦρ, καὶ οὐμῶν.
Θεοῦ, ψυχῶν τὰ πάντα, καὶ τῶν πῦρ
Νῦν γὰρ ἐπὶ ψυχῇ, ψυχῇ δὲ ἐπὶ οὐμῶν ἀφροσύνης.
Ἡμεῖς ἡμετέρων πῦρ ἀφροσύνης τῇ πύξιν.
Ἀφροσύνης ἡμετέρων πῦρ, πῦρ, αἰδῶντα, κόσμον.
Σωραχῇ γὰρ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἔργα τῇ πῦρ καὶ οὐμῶν.
Τῇ πύξιν. Ψυχὴ γὰρ ἡ κατὰ τῶν πῦρ καὶ οὐμῶν
Οὐμῶν, καὶ κατὰ τῶν πῦρ καὶ οὐμῶν.
Καὶ τῇ γὰρ καὶ οὐμῶν καὶ οὐμῶν.
Νῦν γὰρ δὲ ἀφροσύνης οὐμῶν ἀφροσύνης καὶ οὐμῶν.

HECATE, SYNOCHES, ET
TELETARCHÆ.

Ex ipso enim omnes exiliunt
Amilictique fulminēs, & preterocapaces sinus
Omnilucide vigoris patrogenii Hecates.
Et Hypezocus ignis flos, & fortis
Spiritus polorum, igneo trans.
Custodire presteribus suis summitates dedit.
Immiscens vigoris proprium robur in Synochis.
Quo mundus habeat mentales sustentatores inflexi-
biles.
Quia operatrix, quia largitrix est ignis vitiferi.
Quia & vitigenum implet Hecates sinum.
Et influit Synochis vigorem vitidonum ignis
Magni potentis.
Sed & Custodes operum sunt patris.
Assimilat enim se ipsum; ille urgens
Tyrum induere idolorum.
Teletarchæ comprehensī sunt cum Synochis.
His verò ignis mentalis mentalibus presteribus
Omnia parent servientia.
Sed & quæcunque materialibus serviunt Syno-
chis.
Induti armorum vigorem luminis resonantis.
Vigore Triglicho, mentem animamque armantem.
Pervarium Synthema jacere ratiocinio.
Neque super incedere empyreis sparsim canali-
bus,
Sed collectim.
Hi verò individua, & sensibilia efficiunt,
Et corporiformia, & destinata in materiam.

ANIMA, NATURA.

Quoniam anima ignis potentiæ patris existens luci-
dus,
Immortalisque manet, & vitæ domina est:
Et tenet mundi multas plenitudines sinuum.
Mentis enim imitamen est, partum verò habet quid
corporis.
Mistis verò canalibus, ignis incorruptibilis opera effici-
ens.
Post verò Paternas conceptiones anima, ego, ha-
bito:
Calida, animans omnia, reposuit enim
Mentem sanè in animâ, animam verò in corpore
inerti.
Nostri imposuit pater hominūque Deūque,
Affatim animans lucem, ignem, æthera, mundos:
Coexistunt namque naturalia opera mentali splen-
dori
Patris. Anima enim est quæ ornavit magnum
Cælum, & quæ ornat simul cum patre.
Cornua & ipsius firmata sunt sursum.
Humeros verò circa Deæ natura immensa attollitur.
Imperat

Ἄρχη δ' αὖ φύσις ἀεὶ καὶ κόσμον τι καὶ ἔργον.

Οὐρανὸς ὅρα δέη δρόμον αἰθέρη κρατῶν
καὶ τὰ γῆς ὑπέλαθ' αἰὲν κέντρον, ὅπως ἐδάς ἔλθῃ.
Μὴ φύσις ἀμελέῃσι σήμερον ἔρομα τῆς αἰ.

K Θ Σ Μ Ο Σ.

Ὁ πατὴρ θεὸς αὐτῶν περικύβητο τὸν κόσμον.
καὶ πρὸς πυρὸς ὅγκου ἔλκεν ἔργον· τὰ δὲ πάντα

αὐτῶν, ἵνα σῶμα τὸ κοσμητὸν ἐκτελεσθῇ.
κόσμος τὸν ἐκείνου, καὶ μὴ φαίνεται ὁμοίως.

τὸν ἅλον κόσμον ἐκ πυρὸς, καὶ ὕδατος, καὶ ἀέρος, καὶ γῆς, καὶ περὶ τοῦ αἵματος.
τὸν ἀέρα, καὶ τὸν ὕδατος συνθεσθῆναι τὸν κόσμον.
Ἄλλω καὶ ἀλλῷ ζώῳ, ἵνα μὴ ἐκείνου ὁμοίως.
Ἄλλω δὲ καὶ ἄλλῳ, ὅπως τὸ καὶ ἀπὸ πυρὸς
αἰὲν τὸν κέντρον καὶ γῆς, καὶ πᾶσι μὲν ἄλλοις
Πυρὸς, ἵνα καὶ τῶν μὲν καὶ ὕδατος ὁμοίως.
Ζωὴν ὅσον πῦρ.

κέντρον ἐκτελεσθῇ αὐτῶν τοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ πυρὸς.
Πᾶσι ἄλλοις, ὅπως τὸ καὶ ἐκείνου κόσμον αἰεῖ.
κέντρον αἰὲν τὸ πᾶσι μὲν καὶ πᾶσι τοῦ καὶ αἰεῖ.
Σήμερον καὶ πᾶσι καὶ ἐκείνου καὶ πᾶσι κόσμον.

Μῆτις τὸν καὶ πᾶσι καὶ ἐκείνου καὶ πᾶσι τοῦ καὶ αἰεῖ.
Μὴ καὶ μὴ μὴ πᾶσι τὸν καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι τοῦ καὶ αἰεῖ.

Ο Τ Ρ Α Ν Ο Σ.

Ἐπὶ δὲ ἑξάγωνον πατὴρ στερέωσεν κόσμον·

τὸν ἑξάγωνον καὶ τὸν ὅγκον περικύβητο.
Πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι ὅγκον αἰεῖ καὶ πᾶσι,
Ζῶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι.
Γῶ δ' ἐκ μὲν πᾶσι, ὅπως δ' ἐκ γαίης καὶ αἰεῖ,
Ἥλιος δ' αἰεῖ καὶ πᾶσι.
Πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι ὅγκον αἰεῖ καὶ πᾶσι.
Μὴ τὰ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι.
Πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι.
Ἐπὶ καὶ πᾶσι ὅγκον αἰεῖ καὶ πᾶσι.
τὸ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι.
Πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι.
Ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι.
Μασημολογῶσι πᾶσι.
τὸ ἀπὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι.

Τῆς δὲ καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι.

αἰεῖ, ἵνα πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι.
Ἥλιος καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πᾶσι.

Imperat rursus natura infatigabilis mundiſque operi-
biſque:

Cælum ut currat curſum æternum trahens:
Et celer ſol circa centrum, ut aſſuetus veniat.
Non naturæ inſpicias fatale nomen ejus.

MUNDUS.

Factor qui per ſe operans fabrefecit mundum.

Etenim quedam ignis moles erat altera: hæc Omnia

Per ſe efficiens, ut corpus mundanum—

Mundus ut maniſeſtus, & non videatur membranæ-
us.

Totum mundum ex igne, & aquâ, & terrâ,
Et omni-alente ære.

Ineffabilia, & fabilia ſynthemata mundi.

Aliam per aliam vitam, & partitis canalibus.

Deſuper permeantis in oppoſitum

Per centrum terræ, & quintum medium, alium

Igneum, ubi deſcendit uſque ad materiales cana-
les.

Vitifer ignis.

Centro incitans Seipſum lumine reſonante.

Fontanum alium, qui Empyreum mundum ducit.

Centrum à quo omnes uſque quo fortè æquales fue-
rint.

Symbola enim paterna mens feminavit per mundum.

Medium inter patres ſingular centrum fertur.

Mentis enim imitamen eſt: quod verò partum eſt ha-
bet quid corporis.

COELUM.

Septem enim in moles formavit Pater firmamenta
mundorum:

Cælum rotundâ figurâ circumcludens.

Fixitque multum cœtum aſtrorum inerrantium,

Animaliūque errantium conſtituit ſeptenarium.

Terram in medio poſuit, aquâque in terræ ſinu-
bus.

Aerēque ſupra hæc.

Fixitque multum cœtum aſtrorum inerrantium.

Tenſione non laborioſâ malâ.

Sed ſixe errorum non habente in motu.

Fixitque multum cœtum aſtrorum inerrantium.

Ignem ad ignem cogens.

Fixione errorum non habente in motu.

Sex eos conſtituit, ſeptimum Solis,

In medium jaciens ignem.

Inordinationem eorum bene-ordinatis ſuſpendens zo-
nias.

Parturit enim Dea Solemque magnum, & ſplendi-
dam Lunam.

Æther, Sol, ſpiritus Lunæ, æris ductores,

Solariūque circuloꝝ, & lunarium eſt crepitu-
um,

Sinu

Κόλα πωρ τὴ ἡέσιον.

Αἰθέρις μέλας, ἡέλιος τε καὶ μὲν δὲ ἄλλοι, ἢ τε ἡέσιον.

Καὶ πλάτος αἰθρῶν, μὲν αὖτε τὸ δὲ μέλας, καὶ πάλιν ἡέλιος.

Συλλήγουσιν αὐτὸ, λαμβάνουσιν αἰθέρις μέλας,

ἡέλιος τε, σελήνη τε, καὶ ὅσα ἡέσιον συνέχον.

Πῦρ πυρὸς ἐξοχτάδωμα, καὶ πυρὸς ταμίσιον.

Καὶ ὅς ἐστι δὲ πυρὸς φωτὶ βλέποντι,

ἔνδοξον Κεῖνον.

ἡέλιος παρὰ δὲ ἐπικρατῶν πύλον ἀγρόν.

Λιθὸς τε δὲ μέλας, καὶ μὲν ἀσπλῆν δὲ ἡέλιος,

ἡέλιος τὸ ῥοαί.

ἡέλιος τὸ μέλαν, καὶ λαμπρὸν σελήνην.

Χ Ρ Ο Ν Ο Σ.

Θεὸν ἐκράτιστον, αἰώνιον, ἀπείραστον.

Νέον, καὶ παρὰ τὸν πύλον, ἑλκυστήν.

Καὶ πηγαίον ἄλλον, ὅς ἐστι ἐμπύρεον κόσμον ἀγρόν.

Ψ Τ Χ Η, Σ Ω Μ Α, Α Ν Θ Ρ Ω Π Ο Σ.

Χρήσιμον αὐτὸν αἰθρῶν τὸ πλάτος καὶ πύλον αἰθρῶν,

ἔνδοξον ἐμπύρεον σιν ψυχῇ, πελὺς ἐκράτιστον νέον.

Ταῦτα πατὴρ ἐνέσκη, βερεῖς δ' ἐστὶ ψυχῶν.

Σύμβολα δὲ πατρὸς ῥέον ἡέσιον τῶν ψυχῶν,

ἔσονται βερεῖς ἀναπλήσονται τὸν ψυχῶν.

Κατὰ δὲ τὸ νέον ἐστὶ ψυχῇ, ἐν σὺματι δ'

Ταῖς ἐκράτισται πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τὸ δὲ νέον.

Ἀσώματα μὲν ὄντα τὸ δὲ νέον.

Σώματα δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄντα ἔσονται ἐκράτιστον.

Μὴ δὲ σωματικὸν ἐκράτιστον ἀσώματος δ' ἐκράτιστον,

Διὰ τὸν σωματικόν, εἰς ἣν ἐκκράτισται, φύσιν.

ἔν δ' ἐστὶν κατὰ τὸν πυρὸς ἑλκυστήν ἀσώματος.

ἔκ πατρὸς ἐκράτιστον, ἀπὸ δὲ ψυχῇ ἐκράτιστον

ἑμπύρεον δὲ πύλον κατὰ τὸν ψυχῇ ἐκράτιστον ἀπὸ.

Διὰ δὲ ῥοήσων τὸ ἔργον ὅτι πατὴρ

Μέγας ἐκράτιστον τὸ πύλον δὲ πύλον αἰθρῶν.

Καὶ δὲ τὸν ψυχῇ ἐκράτιστον δὲ πύλον αἰθρῶν.

Ἀλλ' ἄλλω ἐκράτιστον πατὴρ, ἐκράτιστον ἔστι.

ἡ μέλας δὲ κατὰ τὸν κατὰ τὸν ἐκράτιστον πύλον

Ψυχῶν, κατὰ τὸν αἰθρῶν ἐκράτιστον αἰθρῶν.

Κατὰ δὲ τὸν αἰθρῶν, κατὰ τὸν αἰθρῶν, κατὰ τὸν αἰθρῶν.

ἔκ πατρὸς ἐκράτιστον. Μὴ κατὰ τὸν αἰθρῶν

ἡέλιος ψυχῇ κατὰ τὸν αἰθρῶν, ὅτι κατὰ τὸν αἰθρῶν

Πατὴρ ἐκράτιστον ἀπὸ.

Μὴ κατὰ τὸν αἰθρῶν εἰς δὲ κατὰ τὸν αἰθρῶν.

Sinuūque aereorum.

Ætheris cantus, Solisque, & Lunæ canalium, &

acris.

Et latus aer, lunarisque cursus, & polus Solis.

Col igit ipsum, accipiens ætheris harmoniam,

Solis; Lunæque, & quæcumque aere continentur.

Ignis ignis derivatio, & ignis penu.

Cunus enim in acutum nato lumini conspicui-

tur,

Ubi Saturnus.

Sol afflōr intuens polum purum.

Æthereusque cursus, & Lunæ ingens impetus,

Aerique fluxus.

Solēque magnum, & splendīdā Lunā.

T E M P U S.

Deum mundanum, æternum, infinitum.

Juvenem, & senem—

Et fontanum aliud, quod empyreum mundum ducit.

A N I M A, C O R P U S, H O M O.

Oportet te festinare ad lucem & patris lumina,

Unde missa est tibi anima, multam induta mem-

tem.

Hæc pater mente concepit, mortalisque ei est anima-

tus.

Symbola enim paterna mens feminavit in animis

Amore profundo replens animam.

Reposuit enim mentem in animā, in corpore verò

Vos reposuit pater hominūque deūque.

Incorporea quidem sunt divina omnia.

Corpora verò in ipsis vestri causā sunt alligata,

Non potentes continere incorporeos corpora,

Ob corpoream, in quam concentrati estis, natu-

ram.

Inque deo jacent faces trahentes validas.

A patre descendentes, à quibus anima descendenti-

bis

Empyreos carpit fructus, animam-alentem flo-

rem.

Ideoque mente concipientes opera patris

Parce fatalis alam fugiunt inverecundam.

Et si hanc animam videris redeuntē.

At aliam immittit pater, ut in numero sit.

Certe valde illæ sunt beatissimæ supra omnes

Animas, ad terram à Cælo profuse.

Illæque divites, & ineffabilia stamina habentes.

Quæcumque à lucente, ò rex, à te, vel ipso

Jove sunt progenitæ. Miti validā à necessitate

Ducatur animæ profunditas immortalis oculisque af-

fatim

Omnes fursum extende.

Nec deorfum pronus sis in nigricantem mun-

dum.

Cui

Ἄσπερον σεσφάρδμα, σῖδον ἔχει ἕκ' ἑλοχόδιον.
 Αἰθιέρῳ ὀρεῖσθον θερσὸς παλαῦς ἔ' ποτ' ἀλκυσῶ.
 Οὐ δύσθον παλάγγων τ' ὅτμαι· τέδ' αὐθύμαλα
 πύλα,
 Εμποικῆς ἀπάτης περιγυμῶα· ρεῦσά πο τῶλα
 Μίλλων εὐσεβείας ἱερὸν παρέρδειον ἀνοίγειν.
 Ἐνθ' ἀρετῇ, σοφίᾳ τε, καὶ εὐνομίᾳ συνάσθον·
 Σὸν γὰρ ἀγρίον θύρας θρόνους οὐκίσκω.
 Αὐτὸς ὃ γῶν κρῶνεν· ἵς τέκνα μάρζει.

ΔΑΙΜΟΝΕΣ, ΤΕΛΕΤΑΙ.

Ἡ φύσις τίθει τὴν τὰς δαίμονας ἀγρούς.
 Καὶ τὰ ἐκκῆς ὕλης βλαστῶματα χερσὶ, καὶ ἑσθλά.
 Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἐν ἀέθροις σκαῖς διανοίς ἀνελίθω.
 Πύρ ἱκαλον σκυρπιδὸν ἔπ' ἡέρε· οἶδμα πνίαν,
 Ἡ καὶ πύρ αὐτοπυαν, ὅσον φωνὴν σεσφίει,
 Ἡ φῶς παλίσσον ἀμφοτερίην, βρεχάειον, ἐλινχέν·
 Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἱππον ἰδύν φωτὸς πλέον ἀσεχέσθοντα,
 Ἡ καὶ παῖδα τοῖς νότοις ἐποχόμενον ἱππον,
 Ἡ μυσρον, ἢ χρυσὸν πεσυσφάνον, ἢ παλίσυμον,
 Ἡ καὶ πεζόδοντα, καὶ ἵππον ἐπὶ νότοις.
 Πολλὰ μὲν ἦν λέξις μοι, ἀδρήσας πύλα λείονα,
 Οὐτὶ γὰρ ἑσάνεθ'· κυρτὸς τίς τε φαίνει· ὄγκῳ.
 Ἀσπίς ἡ λάμπουσα, τὸ μήνους φῶς καυλῶσα,
 Χρῶν ἔχ' ἔσκη, βλεπνίαι τε πύλα καρυνοῖς.
 Μὴ δύσθως κελύσας αὐτόπιδεν ἀγλαμα,
 Οὐ γὰρ χρὴ κύνες σὲ βλέπειν σκῆν σῶμα πλεσθῆ.
 Ὅτι τὰς ἑλκὸς ἐπὶ λαντὸς ἀεὶ ὅτ' ἡλιγῆ' ἀπύγιστο.
 Ἐκ δ' ἄρα κάλυπτον γαῖας θρόνοι καὶ χθόνιοι κύνες,
 Οὐ ποτ' ἀλκυσὶ σῶμα βροτῶν ἀνδρῶν δεικνύλεις.
 Ἐνέργει σελ γ' ἔκαστον ἐρύμαλον.
 Ὁ νόμος βλάσας μὴ ποτ' ἀλλὰ ξηρῶς,
 Εἰσὶ γὰρ ὀνόματα παρ' ἑσθῶν θιερσθῶν
 Δύναμις ἐν τελεσθῶν ἀφῆρτον ἔχονα.
 Ἡνίκα βλεψῆς ζωφρὸς ἄσπερ εὐνίαν πύρ,
 Λαμπρόμων σκυρπιδὸν ὅλα καὶ ἑνὶ καὶ νόσσην,
 Κλυθὶ πυρὸς φωνήν.

Astreu progressus; tui gratiā non est partus.
 Æthereus avium pes latus nunquam verus est.

Non sacrificia visceraque cupio: hæc sunt omnia
 ludi,
 Mercatoriae deceptionis firmamenta; fuge tu hæc
 Si vis pietatis sacrum paradisum aperire.

Ubi Virtus, sapientiæque, & bona lex congregantur.

Tuum enim vas bestiae terræ habitabunt.
 Ipsas autem terra fepellit ad filios usque.

DÆMONES, SACRIFICIA.

Natura suadet esse Dæmonas puros.
 Et malæ materiæ germina, utilia, & bona.
 Sed hæc in abditis septis mentis evolvo.
 Ignis simulacrum saltatim in acre in tumorem exten-
 dens,
 Vel etiam ignem infiguratum, unde vocem curren-
 tem,
 Vel lumen abundans radians, streperum, convolu-
 tum:
 Sed & equum videre luce magis fulgurantem,
 Vel etiam puerum suis humeris inequantem equo,
 Ignitum, vel auro distinctum, vel spoliatum,
 Vel etiam sagittantem, & stantem super humeris.
 Multoties si dixeris mihi, cernes omnem leonem,
 Neque enim cœlestis curvitas tunc apparet moles.
 Astra non lucent, Lunæ lux opertum est,
 Terra non stat, cernuntur verò cuncta fulminibus.
 Neque naturæ voces per se visibile simulacrum,
 Non enim oportet illos te spectare antequam corpus
 Sacris purgetur.
 Quando animas mulcentes semper à Sacris abducunt.
 Ergo ex finibus terræ exiliunt terrestres canes,
 Nunquam verum corpus mortali homini monstran-
 tes.
 Operare circa Hecaticum turbinem.
 Nomina barbara nunquam mutaveris,
 Sent enim nomina apud fingulos à Deo data
 Potentiam in Sacris ineffabilem habentia.
 Quando videris formā sine Sacrum ignem,
 Collucentem saltatim totius per profundum mundi,
 Audi ignis vocem.

The ORACLES of ZOROASTER ;
collected by FRANCISCUS PATRICIUS.

MONAD. DYAD. TRYAD.

WHERE the paternal *Monad* is,
The *Monad* is enlarged, which generates two ;

For the *Dyad* fits by him, and glitters with intellectual Sections ;

And to govern all things, and to order all things not order'd :

For in the whole World shineth the *Triad*, over which the *Monad* rules :

This Order is the Beginning of all Section.

For the Mind of the Father said, that all things be cut into three ;

Whose Will assented, and then all things were divided :

For the Mind of the eternal Father said, into three, governing all things by Mind.

And there appeared in it (the *Triad*) Virtue, and Wisdom,

And multificient Verity :

This Way floweth the Shape of the *Triad*, being pre-existent.

Not the first (Essence,) but where they are measured :

For thou must conceive that all things serve these three Principles :

The first Course is sacred, but in the Middle :

Another the third, aerial ; which cherisheth the Earth in Fire ;

And Fountain of Fountains, and of all Fountains ;

The Matrix containing all things.

Thence abundantly springs forth the Generation of multivarious Matter.

Thence extracted a Prester, the Flower of glowing Fire ;

Flashing into the Cavities of the World : For all things from thence

Begin to extend downwards their admirable Beams.

FATHER. MIND.

THE Father hath snatch'd away himself ; neither hath he shut up his own Fire in his intellectual Power :

For the Father perfected all things, and deliver'd them over to the second Mind,

Which the whole Race of Men call the first

Light, begotten of the Father ; for he alone

Having cropp'd the Flower of the Mind from the Father's Vigour :

For the paternal, self-begotten Mind, understanding (his) Work,

Sowed in all the fiery Bond of Love,
That all things might continue for ever.
Neither those things which are intellectually
Context in the Light of the Father in all things ;
That being the Elements of the World they
might persist in Love :

For it is the Bound of the paternal Depth, and the Fountain of the Intellectuals.

Neither went he forth, but abode in the paternal Depth,

And in the Adytum, according to divinely nourished Silence.

For the Fire once above, flutteth not his Power

Into Matter by Actions, but by the Mind ;

For the paternal Mind hath sowed Symbols through the World,

Which understandeth Intelligibles, and beautifieth Ineffables :

Wholly Division and Indivisible.

By Mind he contains the Intelligibles, but introduceth Sense into the Worlds ;

By Mind he contains the Intelligibles, but introduceth Soul into the Worlds.

MIND. INTELLIGIBLES.
INTELLECTUALS.

AND of the one Mind, the intelligible (*Mind*) :
For the Mind is not without the intelligible ; it exists not without it :

These are Intellectuals and Intelligibles, which being understood, understand :

For the Intelligible is the Aliment of the Intelligent.

Learn the Intelligible, since it exists beyond the Mind,

And of the Mind, which moves the Empyrean Heaven :

For the Framer of the fiery World is the Mind of the Mind.

You who know certainly the supermundane, paternal Depth ;

The Intelligible is predominant over all Section.

There is something intelligible, which it behoves thee to understand with the Flower of the Mind :

For if thou inclinest thy Mind, thou shalt understand this also ;

Yet understanding something (of it) thou shalt not understand this wholly ; for it is a Power

Of circumlucid Strength, glittering with intellectual Sections (Rays) :

But it behoves not to consider this Intelligible with Vehemence of Intellection,

But with the ample Flame of the ample Mind, which measureth all things,

Except this Intelligible : But it behoves to understand this :

For if thou inclinest thy Mind, thou shalt understand this also,

Not fixedly, but having a pure turning Eye (*thou say'st*)

Extend the empty Mind of thy Soul towards the Intelligible;

That thou may'st learn the Intelligible, for it exists beyond the Mind:

But every Mind understands this God; for the Mind is not

Without the Intelligible; neither is the Intelligible without the Mind.

To the intellectual Prefers of the intellectual Fire, all things

By yielding are subservient to the persuasive Counsel of the Father.

And to understand, and always to remain in a restless Whirling.

But insinuating into Worlds the venerable Name in a sleepless Whirling,

Fountains and Principles; to turn, and always to remain in a restless Whirling,

By reason of the terrible Menace of the Father. Under two Minds the Life generating Fountain Souls is contained;

And the Maker, who self-operating, framed the World,

Who sprung first out of the Mind, Cloathing Fire with Fire, binding them together, to mingle

The Fountainous Craters, preserves the Flower of his own Fire.

He glittereth with intellectual Sections, and filled all things with Love.

Like Swarms they are carried, being broken, About the Bodies of the World,

That things unfashion'd may be fashion'd. What the Mind speaks, it speaks by Understanding.

Power is with them, Mind is from her.

JYNGES, IDEAS, PRINCIPLES.

THESE being many ascend into the lucid Worlds, Springing into them, and in which there are three Tops.

Beneath them lies the chief of Immaterials. Principles which have understood the intelligible Works of the Father;

Disclosed them in sensible Works as in Bodies; Being (as it were) the Ferry-men betwixt the Father and Matter,

And producing manifest Images of unmanifest things,

And inscribing unmanifest things in the manifest Frame of the World.

The Mind of the Father made a jarring Noise, understanding by vigorous Counsel,

Omniform Idea's; and flying out of one Fountain,

They sprung forth; for, from the Fathers was the Counsel and End,

By which they are connected to the Father by alternate

Life from several Vehicles.

But they were divided, being by intellectual Fire distributed

Into other Intellectuals; for the King did set before the multiform World

An intellectual, incorruptible Pattern. This Print thro' the World he promoting, of whose Form

According to which the World appeared Beautified with all kind of Ideas; of which there

is one Fountain, Out of which come rushing forth others undistributed,

being broken about the Bodies of the World, which through the vast Recesses,

Like Swarms, are carried round about every Way. Intellectual Notions from the paternal Fountain

cropping the Flower of Fire. In the Point of sleepless Time, of this primigenious Idea,

The first self-budding Fountain of the Father budded.

Intelligent Jynges do (themselves) also understand from the Father:

By unspeakable Councils, being moved so as to understand.

HECATE, SYNOCHES, TELETARCHS.

FOR out of him spring all

Implacable Thunders, and the Prester-receiving Cavities

Of the entirely-lucid Strength of Father-begotten *Hecate*.

And he who begirds (*viz.*) the Flower of Fire, and the strong

Spirit of the Poles fiery above. He gave to his Prefers that they should guard the

Tops, Mingling the Power of his own Strength in the *Synoches*.

O how the World hath intellectual Guides inflexible!

Because she is the Operatrix, because she is the Dispenatrix of Life-giving Fire.

Because also it fills the Life-producing Bosom of *Hecate*,

And infills in the *Synoches* the enliv'ning Strength Of potent Fire.

But they are Guardians of the Works of the Father. For he disguises himself, professing

To be clothed with the Print of the Images. The *Teletarchs* are comprehended with the *Synoches*.

To these intellectual Prefers of intellectual Fire, All things are subservient.

But as many as serve the material *Synoches*, Having put on the completely-armed Vigour of

the resounding Light,

With

With triple Strength fortifying the Soul and the Mind.

To put into the Mind the Symbol of Variety;
And not to walk dispersedly on the Empyræal Channels;
But stiffly.

These frame Indivisible, and Sensibles,
And Corporiforms, and things destin'd to Matter.

S O U L. N A T U R E.

FOR the Soul being a bright Fire, by the Power of the Father

Remains immortal, and is Mistress of Life;
And possesseth many Complexions of the Cavities of the World;

For it is in Imitation of the Mind; but that which is born hath something of the Body.

The Channels being intermixed, she performs the Works of incorruptible Fire.

Next the paternal Conceptions I (the Soul) dwell;
Warm, heating all things; for he did put
The Mind in the Soul, the Soul in the dull Body.
Of us the Father of Gods and Men imposed,
Abundantly animating Light, Fire, Æther, Worlds.

For natural Works co-exist with the intellectual
Light of the Father, for the Soul which adorn'd the great

Heaven, and adorning with the Father.

But her Horns are fixed above,

But about the Shoulders of the Goddesses, immense
Nature is exalted.

Again, indefatigable Nature commands the Worlds
and Works.

That Heaven drawing an eternal Course may run.
And the swift Sun might come about the Center as

heath.

Look not into the fatal Name of this Nature.

T H E W O R L D.

THE Maker who operating by himself framed
the World.

And there was another Bulk of Fire,

By itself operating all things that the Body of the
World might be perfected,

That the World might be manifest and not seem
membranous.

The whole World of Fire, and Water, and Earth,
And all-nourishing Æther,

The unexpressible and expressible Watch-words of
the World.

One Life by another from the distributed Channels
Passing from above to the opposite Part,

Through the Center of the Earth; and another
fifth middle:

Fiery Channel, where it descends to the material
Channels.

Life-bringing Fire,

Stirring himself up with the Goad of refunding
Light.

Another fountainous, which guides the Empyræal
World.

The Center from which all (Lines) which way
forever are equal.

For the paternal Mind sowed Symbols through
the World.

For the Center of every one is carried betwixt the
Fathers.

For it is in Imitation of the Mind, but that which
is born hath something of the Body.

H E A V E N.

FOR the Father congregated seven Firmaments
of the World;

Circumscribing Heaven in a round Figure,

He fixed a great Company of innerratick Stars;

And he constituted a Septenary of erratick Animals,

Placing Earth in the middle, and Water in the
middle of the Earth.

The Air above these.

He fixed a great Company of innerratick Stars,

To be carry'd not by laborious and troublesome
Tension,

But by a Settlement which hath no Error.

He fixed a great Company of innerratick Stars,

Forcing Fire to Fire,

To be carry'd by a Settlement which hath not
Error.

He constituted them six; casting into the midst

The Fire of the Sun,

Suspending their Disorder in well-order'd Zones:

For the Goddess brings forth the great Sun and the
bright Moon.

O Æther, Sun, Spirit, Guides of the Moon and
of the Air;

And of the solar Circles, and of the monthly
Clasings,

And of the aerial Recesses.

The Melody of the Æther, and of the Passages
of the Sun, and Moon, and of the Air,

And the wide Air, and the Lunar Course, and the
Pole of the Sun.

Collecting it, and receiving the Melody of the Æ-
ther,

And of the Sun, and of the Moon, and of all that
are contained in the Air.

Fire, the Derivation of Fire, and the Dispenser
of Fire;

His Hair pointed is seen by his native Light;

Hence comes Saturn.

The Sun Asseffor beholding the pure Pole;

And the Ætherial Course, and the vast Motion of
the Moon,

And

And the aerial Fluxions,
And the great Sun, and the bright Moon.

T I M E.

THE Mundane God ; Eternal, Infinite.

Young, and Old, of a spiral Form.

And another fountinous, who guides the empyræal Heaven.

S O U L. B O D Y. M A N.

IT behoves thee to hasten to the Light, and to the Beams of the Father ;

From whence was sent to thee a Soul clothed with much Mind.

These things the Father conceived, and so the Mortal was animated :

For the paternal Mind sowed Symbols in Souls ;

Replenishing the Soul with profound Love.

For the Father of Gods and Men placed the Mind in the Soul ;

And in the Body he established you.

For all divine things are incorporeal :

But Bodies are bound in them for your sakes,

Incorporeals not being able to contain the Bodies,

By reason of the corporeal Nature in which you are concentrated.

And they are in God, attracting strong Flames,
Descending from the Father, from which descending the Soul,

Crops of Empyræal Fruits the Soul-nourishing Flower.

And therefore conceiving the Words of the Father

They avoid the audacious Wing of fatal Destiny ;

And though you see this Soul manumitted,

Yet the Father sends another to make up the Number.

Certainly these are superlatively blessed above all Souls ; they are sent forth from Heaven to Earth, And those rich Souls which have unexpressible Fates ;

As many of them (O King) as proceed from shining Thee, or from

Love himself, under the strong Power of (his) Thread.

Let the immortal Depth of thy Soul be predominant ; but all thy Eyes

Extend upward.

Stoop not down to the dark World,

Beneath which continually lies a faithless Depth, and Hades,

Dark all over, squalid, delighting in Images, unintelligible,

Precipitous, craggy, a Depth ; always rolling,

Always espousing an opacous, idle, breathless Body,

And the Light-hating World, and the winding

Currents,

By which many things are swallowed up.

Seek Paradise ;

Seek thou the way of the Soul, whence, or by what Order,

Having served the Body, to the same Place from which thou didst flow,

Thou may'st rise up again, joining Action to sacred Speech,

Stoop not down, for a Precipice lies below on the Earth ;

Drawing through the Ladder which hath seven Steps ; Beneath which

Is the Throne of Necessity.

Enlarge not thou thy Destiny :

The Soul of Man will in a manner clasp God to herself ;

Having nothing mortal, she is wholly inebriated from God :

For she boasts Harmony, in which the mortal Body exists.

If thou extend the fiery Mind

To the Work of Piety, thou shalt preserve the fluxible Body.

There's a Room for the Image also in the circumlucid Place.

Every Way to the unfashion'd Soul stretch the Reins of Fire.

The Fire glowing, Cogitation hath the first Rank.

For the mortal approaching to the Fire, shall have Light from God.

For to the slow Mortal the Gods are swift.

The Furies are Strangers of Men.

The Bourgeons, even of ill Matter, are profitable good.

Let Hope nourish thee in the fiery Angelic Region.

But the paternal Mind accepts not her Will

Until she go out of Oblivion, and pronounce a Word, Inserting the Remembrance of the pure

paternal Symbol.

To thee he gave the docible Character of Life to be comprehended.

Those that were asleep he made fruitful by his own Strength.

Defile not the Spirit, nor deepen a Superficies.

Leave not the Drofs of Matter on a Precipice.

Bring her not forth, lest going forth she have something.

The Souls of those who quit the Body violently, are most pure.

The Ungirders of the Soul which give her breathing are easy to be loosed.

In the side of sinister *Hecate*, there is a Fountain of Virtue,

Which remains entire within, not omitting her Virginity.

O Man, the Machine of boldest Nature !

Subject not to thy Mind the vast Measures of the Earth ; For the Plant of Truth is not upon Earth.

Nor measure the Measures of the Sun, gathering together Canons;

He is moved by the eternal Will of the Father, not for thy fake.

Let alone the swift Course of the Moon; she runs ever by the Impulse of Necessity.

The Progression of the Stars was not brought forth for thy fake.

The æthereal wide Flight of Birds is not veracious, And the Dissections of Entrails and Victims, all these are Toys,

The Support of gainful Cheats; fly thou these If thou intend to open the sacred Paradise of Piety, Where Virtue, Wisdom, and Equity are assembled; For thy Vessel the Beasts of the Earth shall inhabit.

These the Earth bewails, even to their Children.

DEMONS. RITES.

Nature persuades there are pure Demons;

The Bourgeois, even all ill Matter, are profitable and good:

But these things I revolve in the reclusé Temples of my Mind.

Extending the like Fire sparklingly into the spacious Air,

Or Fire unfigur'd, a Voice issuing forth,
Or Fire abundant whizzing and winding about the Earth;

But also to see a Horse more glittering than Light,
Or a Boy on [thy] Shoulders riding on a Horse,
Fiery, or adorned with Gold, or divested,
Or shooting, and standing on [thy] Shoulders.

If thou speak often to me, thou shalt see absolutely that which is spoken:

For then neither appears the celestial concave Bulk, nor do the Stars shine: The Light of the Moon is covered.

The Earth stands not still, but all things appear Thunder.

Invoke not the self-conspicuous Image of Nature; For thou must not behold these before thy Body be initiated.

When soothing Souls they always reduce them from these Mysteries.

Certainly out of the Cavities of the Earth spring terrestrial Dogs,

Which shew no true Sign to mortal Man.

Labour about the *Hecatick Strophalus*.

Never change barbarous Names;

For there are Names in every Nation given from God, which have an unspeakable Power in Rites.

When thou seest a sacred Fire without Form,
Shining flashingly through the Depths of the World,
Hear the Voice of Fire.

Pletho, his Exposition of the more obscure Passages in these Oracles.

Seek thou the Way of the Soul, whence or by what Order,

Having served the Body, to the same Order from which thou didst flow,

Thou may'st rise up again; joining Action to sacred Speech.]

THE *Magi* that are Followers of *Zoroaster*, as also many others, hold, That the human Soul is immortal, and descended from above to serve the mortal Body, that is, to operate therein for a certain Time, and to animate and adorn it to her Power; and then returns to the Place from which she came. And whereas there are many Mansions there for the Soul, one *wholly bright*, another *wholly dark*; others betwixt both, *partly bright, partly dark*: The Soul being descended from that which is wholly bright, into the Body, if she perform her Office well, runs back into the same Place; but if not well, she retires into worse Mansions, according to the things which she hath done in Life. The Oracle therefore saith, *Seek thou the Soul's Path*, or the Way by which the Soul floweth into thee; or by what Course (*viz.* of Life) having performed thy Charge toward the Body, thou may'st mount up to the same Place from which thou didst flow down, *viz.* the same Track of the Soul, joining Action to sacred Speech. By sacred Speech, he understands that which concerns divine Worship; by Action, divine Rites. The Oracle therefore saith, that to this Exaltation of the Soul, both Speech concerning divine Worship (Prayers) and religious Rites (Sacrifices) are requisite.

Stoop not down, for a Precipice lies below on the Earth,

Drawing through the Ladder which hath seven Steps; beneath which

Is the Throne of Necessity.]

He calls the Descent into Wickedness and Misery, a Precipice; the terrestrial and mortal Body, the Earth: for by the Earth he understands mortal Nature, as by the Fire frequently the Divine; by the Place with seven Ways, he means Fate dependant on the Planets, beneath which there is seated a certain dire and unalterable Necessity: The Oracle therefore adviseth, that thou stoop not down towards the mortal Body, which being subject only

to the Fate which proceeds from the Planets, may be reckoned among those things which are at our Arbitrement; for thou wilt be unhappy if thou stoop down wholly to the Body, and unfortunate, and continually failing of thy Desires, in regard of the Necessity which is annexed to the Body.

For thy Vessel the Beasts of the Earth shall inhabit.]

The *Vessel* of thy Soul, that is, this mortal Body, shall be *inhabited* by Worms and other vile Creatures.

Enlarge not thou thy Destiny.]

Endeavour not to increase thy Fate, or to do more than is given thee in charge, for thou wilt not be able.

For nothing proceeds from the Paternal Principality imperfect.]

For from the paternal Power, which is that of the supreme God, nothing proceedeth imperfect, so as thou thyself mightest compleat it; for all things proceeding from thence are perfect, as appears in that they tend to the Perfection of the Universe.

But the paternal Mind accepts not her Will, until she go out of Oblivion, and pronounce a Word, inserting the Remembrance of the pure paternal Symbol.]

The paternal Mind, (*viz.* the second God and ready Maker of the Soul) admits not her Will or Desire until she come out of the Oblivion which she contracted by Connexion with the Body; and until she speak a certain Word, or conceive in her Thoughts a certain Speech, calling to Remembrance the paternal divine Symbol or Watch-word; this is the Pursuit of the Good which the Soul calling to Remembrance, hereby becomes most acceptable to her Maker.

It behoves thee to hasten to the Light, and to the Beams of the Father;

From whence there was sent to thee a Soul endued with much Mind.]

The Light and Splendor of the Father is that Mansion of the Soul which is circumlucid, from whence the Soul arrayed with much of the Mind was sent hither, wherefore we must hasten to return to the same Light.

These the Earth bewails, even to their own Children.]

Those who hasten not to the Light, from which their Soul was sent to them, the Earth or mortal

Nature bewails; for that they being sent hither to adorn her, not only not adorn her, but also blemish themselves by living wickedly; moreover the Wickedness of the Parents is transmitted to the Children, corrupted by them through ill Education.

The Ungirders of the Soul, which give her breathing, are easy to be loosed.]

The Reasons which expel the Soul from Wickedness, and give her breathing, are easy to be untied; and the Oblivion which keeps them is easily put off.

In the Side of the sinister Bed there is a Fountain of Virtue, Which remains entire within; not emitting her Virginity.]

In the left Side of thy Bed, there is the Power or Fountain of Virtue, residing wholly within, and never casting off her Virginity, or Nature void of Passion; for there is always in us the Power of Virtue without Passion, which cannot be put off, altho' her Energy or Activity may be interrupted; he saith the Power of Virtue is placed on the left Side, because her Activity is seated on the right: By the Bed is meant the Seat of the Soul, subject to her several Habits.

The Soul of Man will, in a manner, clasp God to herself.

Having nothing mortal, she is wholly inebriated from God;

For she boasts Harmony, in which the mortal Body consists.]

The human Soul will in a manner clasp God, and join him strictly to herself, (who is her continual Defence) by resembling him as much as we can possibly; having nothing mortal within her, she is wholly drenched in Divinity, or replenished with divine Goods; for though she is fettered to this mortal Body, yet the glories in the Harmony or Union in which the mortal Body exists; that is, she is not ashamed of it, but thinks well of herself for it; as being a Cause, and affording to the Universe, that as Mortals are united with Immortals in Man, so the Universe is adorned with one Harmony.

Because the Soul being a bright Fire by the Power of the Father, Remains immortal, and is Mistress of Life, And possesseth many Completions of the Cavities of the World.]

The second God, who first before all other things proceeded from the Father and supreme God, these Oracles call all along, *The Power of the Father,* and his

his *intellectual Power*, and the *paternal Mind*. He saith therefore, that the *Soul procreated by this Power of the Father, is a bright Fire*; that is, a divine and intellectual Essence, and *perfiseth immortal* through the Divinity of its Essence, and is *Mistress of Life*, viz. of herself, possessing Life which cannot be taken away from her; for, how can we be said to be Masters of such things as may be taken from us, seeing the Use of them is only allowed us? but of those things which cannot be taken from us, we are absolute Masters: The Soul, according to her own Eternity, *possesseth many Rooms in the Receptacles of the World*, or divers Places in the World, which according as she hath led Life past is allotted to every one.

Seek Paradise.]

The circumlucid Mansion of the Soul.

Defile not the Spirit, nor deepen a Superficies.]

The Followers of *Pythagoras* and *Plato* conceive the Soul to be a Substance not wholly separate from all Body, nor wholly inseparable; but partly separate, partly inseparable; separable potentially, but never separate actually. For they assert three Kinds of Forms, one wholly separate from Matter, the supercelestial Intelligences; another wholly inseparable from Matter, having a Substance not subsistent by itself but dependent on Matter; together with which Matter, which is sometimes dissolved by reason of its Nature subject to Mutation, this kind of Soul is dissolved also and perisheth; this kind they hold to be wholly irrational. Betwixt these they place a middle kind, the rational Soul, differing from the supercelestial Intelligences, for that it always co-exists with Matter; and from the irrational kind, for that it is not dependent on Matter; but, on the contrary, Matter is dependent on it; and it hath a proper Substance potentially subsistent by itself: It is also indivisible, as well as the supercelestial Intelligences, and performing some Works in some manner ally'd to theirs, being itself also busied in the Knowledge and Contemplation of Beings, even unto the supreme God; and for this Reason is incorruptible. This kind of Soul is always co-existent with an æthereal Body, as its *Vehiculum*, which the by continual Approximation maketh also immortal: Neither is this her *Vehiculum* inanimate in itself, but it is itself animated with the other Species of the Soul, the irrational (which the wise call the Image of the rational Soul) adorned with Phantasy and Sense, which seeth and hears itself whole through whole; and is furnished with all the Senses, and with all the rest of the irrational Faculties of the Soul. Thus by the principal Faculty of this Body, Phantasy, the ratio-

nal Soul is continually joined to such a Body, and by such a Body sometimes the human Soul is joined with a mortal Body by a certain Affinity of Nature, the whole being enfolded in the whole enlivening Spirit of the Embryon: This *Vehiculum* itself being of the Nature of a Spirit. The Dæmons Souls differ not much from the human, only they are more noble, and use more noble Vehicles: Moreover, they cannot be mingled with corruptible Nature. Likewise the Souls of the Stars are much better than the Dæmons, and use better Vehicles; are Bodies splendid by reason of the Greatness of the operative Faculty. These Doctrines concerning the Soul, the *Magi*, Followers of *Zoroaster*, seem to have used long before. Defile not this kind of Spirit of the Soul, saith the Oracle, nor deepen it, being a Superficies; he calls it Superficies, not as if it had not a triple Dimension, for it is a Body, but to signify its extraordinary Rarity; nor makes it become gross by Accession of more Matter to its Bulk; for this Spirit of the Soul becomes gross, if it declines too much towards the mortal Body.

There is a Room for the Image also in the circumlucid Place.]

He calls the Image of the Soul that Part, which being itself void of irrational, is joined to the rational Part, and depends upon the Vehicle thereof: Now he saith that this kind of *Image hath a Part in the circumlucid Region*; for the Soul never layeth down the Vehicle adherent to her.

Leave not the Drift of Matter on a Precipice.]

He calls the mortal Body the *Drift of Matter*; and exhorteth, that we neglect it not being ill-affected, but take care of it whilst it is in this Life, to preserve it in Health as much as possible, and that it may be pure, and in all things else correspond with the Soul.

Carry not forth, lest going forth she have something.]

Carry not forth, meaning the Soul out of the mortal Body, *lest by going forth*, thou incur some Danger, implying as much as to carry her forth beyond the Laws of Nature.

If thou extend the fiery Mind to the Work of Piety, thou shalt preserve the fixable Body.]

Extending up thy divine Mind to the Exercise of Piety, or to religious Rites, and *thou shalt preserve the mortal Body* more sound by performing these.

*Certainly out of the Cavities of the Earth, spring terrestrial Dogs,
Which shew no true Sign to mortal Man.]*

Sometimes to many initiated Persons there appear, whilst they are sacrificing, some Apparitions in the Shape of *Dogs*, and several other Figures. Now the Oracle saith, that these *issue out of the Receptacles of the Earth*; that is, out of the terrestrial and mortal Body, and the irrational Passions planted in it, which are not yet sufficiently adorned with Reason; these are Apparitions of the Passions of the Soul in performing Divine Rites; meer Appearances having no Substance, and therefore not signifying any thing true.

*Nature persuadeth that Dæmons are pure;
The Bourgeois, even of ill Matter, are profitable and good.]*

Nature, or natural Reason, persuadeth that *Dæmons are sacred*, and that all things proceeding from God, who is in himself good, are beneficial; and the very *Bloomings of ill Matter*, or the Forms dependent upon Matter as such: Also he calls Matter *ill*, not as to its Substance; for how can the Substance be bad, the Bloomings whereof are beneficial and good? But for that it is ranked last among the Substances, and is the least participant of Good; which Littleness of Good is here expressed by the Word *Ill*. Now the Oracle means, that if the Bloomings of ill Matter, viz. of the least of Substances, are good, much more are the *Dæmons* such, who are in an excellent Rank, as partaking of rational Nature, and being not mixed with mortal Nature.

The Furies are Stranglers of Men.]

The *Furies*, or the vindictive *Dæmons*, clasp Men close, or restrain and drive them from Vice, and excite them to Virtue.

*Let the immortal Depth of the Soul be predominant;
but all thy Eyes
Extend quite upward.]*

Let the divine Depth of thy Soul govern; and lift thou all thy Eyes, or all thy knowing Faculties upward.

O Man, the Machine of boldest Nature!

He calls Man *the Machine of boldest Nature*, because he attempts great things.

*If thou speak often to me, thou shalt see absolutely that
which is spoken:
For there neither appears the celestial concave Bulk*

*Nor do the Stars shine: The Light of the Moon is covered,
The Earth stands not still, but all Things appear
Thunder-]*

The Oracle speaks as from God to an initiated Person, *If thou often speak to me, or call me, thou shalt see that which thou speakest*, viz. Me whom thou callest every where; for then thou shalt perceive nothing but *Thunder* all about, Fire gliding up and down all over the World.

Call not on the self-conspicuous Image of Nature.]

Seek not to behold the self-seeing *Image of Nature*, viz. of the Nature of God, which is not visible to our Eyes; but those things which appear to initiated Persons, as *Thunder*, *Lightning*, and all else whatsoever, are only Symbols or Signs, not the Nature of God.

*Every way to the unfashioned Soul stretch out the Reins
of Fire.]*

Draw unto thyself every way the *Reins of Fire*, which appear to thee when thou art sacrificing with a sincere Soul; viz. a simple, and not of various Habits.

*When thou seest a sacred Fire, without Form,
Shining flashingly through the Depth of the World,
Hear the Voice of Fire.]*

When thou beholdest the divine Fire, void of Figure, brightly gliding up and down the World, and graciously smiling; listen to this Voice as bringing a most perfect Presence.

The Paternal Mind hath implanted Symbols in Souls.]

The *Paternal Mind*, viz. the sedulous Maker of the Substance of the Soul, hath ingrafted Symbols, or the Images of Intelligibles in Souls, by which every Soul possesseth in herself the Reasons of Beings.

*Learn the Intelligible, so farasmuch as it exists beyond the
Mind.]*

Learn the *Intelligible*, because it exists beyond thy Mind, viz. actually; for, tho' the Images of intellectual things are planted in thee by the Maker of All; yet they are but potentially in thy Soul; but it behoves thee to have actually the Knowledge of the Intelligible.

*There's a certain Intelligible, which it behoves thee to
comprehend with the Flower of thy Mind.]*

The Supreme God, who is perfectly One, is not conceived

conceived after the same manner as other things; but by the *Flower of the Mind*, that is, the supreme and singular Part of our Understanding.

For the Father perfected all things, and deliver'd them over to the Second Mind, which the Nations of Men call the first.]

The Father perfected all things, viz. the intelligible Species, (for they are absolute and perfect) and delivered them over to the second God, next him to rule and guide them: Whence, if any thing be brought forth by this God, and formed after the Likeness of him, and the other intelligible Substance, it proceeds from the Supreme Father; this other God Men esteem the first, that is, they who think him the Maker of the World, to whom there is none superior.

Intelligent Jynges do themselves also understand from the Father; By unspeakable Counsels being moved so as to understand]

He calls *Jynges* the intellectual Species which are conceived by the Father; they themselves also being conceptive, and exciting Conceptions or Notions, by unspeakable, or unutterable Counsels: By Motion here is understood Intellection, not Transition, but simply the Habitude to Notions so as unspeakable Counsels is as much unmoved; for speaking consists in Motion; the meaning is this, That these Species are immovable, and have a Habitude to Notions not transiently as the Soul.

Oh how the World hath intellectual Guides inflexible.]

The most excellent of the intelligible Species, and of those which are brought down by the Immortals in this Heaven, he calls the *intellectual Guides of the World*; the *Corypheus*, whom he conceives to be a God, which is the second from the Father: The Oracle saying, that the *World hath inflexible Guides*, means, that it is incorruptible.

The Father hath snatched away himself; Neither hath he stout up his own Fire in his intellectual Power.]

The Father hath made himself exempt from all others; not including himself neither in his own intellectual Power, nor in the second God, who is next him; or limiting his own Fire, his own Divinity; for it is absolutely ungenerate, and itself existing by itself; so that his Divinity is exempt from all others; neither is it communicable to any other, altho' it be loved of all: That he communicates not himself, is not out of Envy, but only by reason of the Impossibility of the thing.

The Father infuseth not Fear, but Persuasion.]

The Father makes no Impression of Fear, but infuseth Persuasion or Love; for he being extremely good, is not the Cause of Ill to any, so as to be dreadful; but is the Cause of all Good to all; whence he is loved of all.

These Oracles of Zoroaster many eminent Persons have confirmed by following the like Opinions; especially the Pythagoreans and Platonists.

PSELLUS'S EXPOSITION of the ORACLES.

There is a Room for the Image also in the circumlucid Place.]

IMAGES, εἰδωλα, with the Philosophers, are those things which are connatural to things more excellent than themselves, and are worse than they; as the Mind is connatural to God, and the rational Soul to the Mind, and Nature to the rational Soul, and the Body to Nature, and Matter to the Body. The Image of God is the Mind; of the Mind, the rational Soul; of the rational Soul, the irrational; of the irrational, Nature; of Nature, the Body; of the Body, Matter. Here the Chaldaick Oracle calleth the irrational Soul the Image of the rational, for it is connatural to it in Man, and yet worse than it. It saith moreover, that there is a Part assigned to the Image in the circumlucid Region; that is to say, the irrational Soul, which is the Image of the rational Soul, being purified by Virtues in this Life, after the Dissolution of the human Life, ascends to the Place above the Moon, and receives its Lot in the circumlucid Place, that is, which shineth on every Side, and is splendid throughout; for the Place beneath the Moon is circumnebulous, that is, dark on every side: But the Lunar, partly lucid, and partly dark, that is, one half bright, the other half dark; but the Place above the Moon is circumlucid or bright throughout. Now the Oracle saith, that the circumlucid Place, is not design'd only for the rational Soul, but for its Image also; or the irrational Soul is destin'd to the circumlucid Place, when as it cometh out of the Body bright and pure; for the Grecian Doctrine asserting the irrational Soul to be immortal, also exalts it up to the Elements under the Moon; but the Chaldaick Oracle, it being pure and unanimous with the rational Soul, seats it in this circumlucid Region above the Moon. These are the Doctrines of the Chaldeans.

Leave on the Dregs of Matter on a Precipice.]

By the *Dregs of Matter*, the Oracle understands the Body of Man, consisting of the four Elements; it speaks to the Disciple by way of Instruction and Exhortation, thus; Not only raise up thy Soul to God, and procure that it may rise above the Confusion of Life; but if it be possible, leave not the Body, wherewith thou are clothed (and which is *Dregs of Matter*, that is, a thing neglected and rejected, the Sport of Matter) in the inferior World: For this Place, the Oracle calls a *Precipice*. Our Soul being darted down hither from Heaven, as from a sublime Place. It exhorteth therefore, that we refine the Body (which he understands by the *Dregs of Matter*) by divine, or that, being stripped, we raise it up to the Æther; or that we be exalted by God to a Place immaterial and incorporeal, or corporeal but æthereal or celestial, which *Elias* the *Tibite* attained; and, before him, *Enoch*, being translated from this Life into a more divine Condition, not leaving the *Dregs of Matter*, or their Body, in a *Precipice*; the *Precipice* is, as we said, the terrestrial Region.

Bring not forth, lest going forth she have something.]

This Oracle is recited by *Plotinus* in his Book of the Education of the irrational Soul; it is an excellent and transcendent Exhortation. It adviseth, that a Man busy not himself about the going forth of the Soul, nor take care how it shall go out of the Body; but remit the Business of its Dissolution to the Court of Nature; for, Anxiety and Solitude about the Solution of the Body, and the Education of the Soul out of it, draws away the Soul from better Cogitations, and busieth it in such Cares that the Soul cannot be perfectly purified; for if Death come upon us at such a time as we are busied about this Dissolution, the Soul going forth not quite free, but retaining something of a passionate Life. Passion the *Chaldaean* defines, a Man's solicitous thinking of Death; for we ought not to think of any thing, but of the more excellent Illuminations; neither concerning these ought we to be solicitous: But resigning ourselves to the Angelical and Divine Powers, which raise us up, and shutting up all the Organs of Sense in the Body and in the Soul also without distracting Cares and Solitudes, we must follow God who calls us.

Some interpret this Oracle more simply: *Bring it not out lest it go forth, having something*; that is, anticipate not thy natural Death, altho' thou be wholly given up to Philosophy; for as yet thou hast not a complete Expiation: So that if the Soul pass out of the Body by the way of educating, it will go forth retaining something of mortal Life; for if we Men are in the Body as in a Prison (as *Plato* saith), certainly no Man can kill himself, but must expect till God shall send a Necessity.

Subject not to thy Mind the vast Measures of the Earth:

For the Plant of Truth is not upon the Earth; Nor measure the Measures of the Sun, gathering together Canons:

He is moved by the eternal Will of the Father, not for thy sake.

Let alone the swift Course of the Moon; she runs ever by the Impulse of Necessity.

The Progression of the Stars was not brought forth for thy sake.

The æthereal broad-footed Flight of Birds is not veracious,

And the Diffusions of Entrails and Victims, all these are Toys,

The Supports of gainful Cheats. Fly thou those, If thou intend to open the sacred Paradise of Piety, Where Virtue, Wisdom, and Equity are assembled.]

The *Chaldaean* withdraws the Disciple from all Grecian Wisdom, and teacheth him to adhere only to God. *Subject not*, saith he, *to thy Mind the vast Measures of the Earth*; for the Plant of Truth is not on Earth; that is, enquire not solicitously into the vast Measures of the Earth, as Geographers use to do, measuring the Earth; for the Seed of Truth is not in the Earth. *Nor measure the Measures of the Sun, gathering together Canons*; he is moved by the eternal Will of the Father, not for thy sake: That is, busy not thyself about the Motion and Doctrine of the Stars, for they move not for thy sake, but are perpetually moved according to the Will of God. *Let alone the swift Course of the Moon, she runs ever by the Impulse of Necessity*: That is, enquire not anxiously the rolling Motion of the Moon, for she runs not for thy sake, but is impelled by a greater Necessity. *The Progression of the Stars was not brought forth for thy sake*; that is, the Leaders of the fixed Stars, and the Planets, received not their Essence for thy sake. *The æthereal broad-footed Flight of Birds is not veracious*; that is, the Art concerning Birds flying in the Air, called Augury, observing their Flight, Notes, and Perchings, is not true. *By broad Feet*, he means the walking or Pace of the Foot, in respect of the Extension of the Toes in the Skin. *And the Diffusions of Entrails and Victims, all these are Toys*: that is, the Art of sacrificing, which enquireth after future Events, as well by Victims, as by Inspection into the Entrails of sacrificed Beasts, are merely Toys. *The Supports of gainful Cheats: fly thou those*; that is, fraudulent Acquisitions of Gain. *If thou intend to open the sacred Paradise of Piety, where Virtue, Wisdom, and Equity are assembled*. Thou, saith he, who art under my Discipline, enquire not curiously after these things, if thou wouldst that the sacred Paradise of Piety be open to thee. The sacred Paradise of Piety, according to the *Chaldaean*, is not that which the Book of *Moses* describes, but the Meadow

Meadow of the sublimest Contemplations, in which there are several Trees of Virtues; and the Wood, or Trunk of Knowledge, of Good and Evil; that is, dijudicative Prudence, which distinguisheth Good from Evil; likewise the Tree of Life, that is, the Plant of divine Illumination, which bringeth forth to the Soul the Fruit of a more holy and better Life; in this Paradise, therefore, grow Virtue, Wisdom, and Equity. Virtue is one in general, but hath many Species; Wisdom comprehendeth within itself all the Virtues which the divine Mind pronounceth as only unspcakable.

*Seek thou the Way of the Soul, whence, or by what Order,
Having served the Body, to the same Order from which thou didst flow,
Thou mayst rise up again; joining Action to sacred Speech.]*

That is, *Seek the Origin of the Soul*, from whence it was produced and served the Body, and how Men cherishing and raising it up by the Exercise of Divine Rites, may reduce it to the Place whence it came. *Uniting Action to sacred Reason*, is to be understood thus. *Sacred Reason* (or Discourse) in us is the intellectual Life, or rather the suprem Faculty of the Soul, which the Oracle elsewhere stiles the Flower of the Mind. But this sacred Reason cannot by its own Guidance aspire to the more sublime Institution, and to the Comprehension of Divinity; the Work of Piety leads it by the Hand to God, by Assistance of Illuminations from thence: But the *Chaldean* by the Telestick Science, perfects, or initiates the Soul by the Power of Materials here on Earth. To this sacred Reason, saith he, when thou hast united Action, that is, joined the Work of Initiation to the sacred Reason, or better Faculty of the Soul.

Our Theologift, *Gregory*, raiseth the Soul to the more divine things by Reason and Contemplation: By Reason, which is in us the best and most intellectual Faculty; by Contemplation, which is an Illumination coming from above: But *Plato* affirms, that we may comprehend the ungenerate Essence by Reason and Intellect. But the *Chaldean* saith, that there is no other means for us to arrive at God, but by strengthening the Vehiculum of the Soul by material Rites; for it supposeth that the Soul is purified by Stones, and Herbs, and Charms, and is rendred expedite for Assent.

*Sloop not down; for a Precipice lies below on the Earth.
Drawing through the Ladder which hath seven Steps,
beneath which
Is the Throne of Necessity.]*

The Oracle adviseth the Soul which is next to God, that the adhere only to him with her whole Mind, and bend not downwards; for there is a great *Precipice* betwixt God and the Earth, which draweth Souls down the *Ladder*, which hath *seven Steps*: The *Ladder of seven Steps*, signifies the Orbs of the seven Planets; if therefore the Soul decline, she is carried to the Earth through the seven Orbs; but that Passage through the seven Circles leads her as by so many Steps to the Throne of Necessity, whither, when the Soul arriveth, she is necessitated to suffer the terrestrial World.

Never change barbarous Names.]

That is, there are certain *Names* among all Nations delivered to them by God, which have an unspeakable Power in Divine Rites; change not these into the *Greek* Dialect; as *Seraphim*, and *Cherubim*, and *Michael*, and *Gabriel*: These in the *Hebrew* Dialect have an unspeakable Efficacy in Divine Rites; but changed into *Greek* Names are ineffectual.

The World hath intellectual Guides inflexible.]

The *Chaldeans* assert Powers in the World, and call them *Cosmogogi*, *Guides of the World*; for that they guide the World by provident Motions: These Powers the Oracles call *dyonias*, *Sustainers*, as sustaining the whole World. Unmoveable implies their settled Power; sustentive, their Guardianship; these Powers they design only by the Cause and Immobility of the Worlds. There are also other Powers (*Amilisti*) implacable, as being firm and not to be converted towards these inferior things, and cause that Souls be never allured with Affections.

Labour about the Hecatine Strophalus.]

The *Hecatine Strophalus* is a golden Ball, in the midst whereof is a Sapphire; they told about it a Leather Thong; it is beset all over with Characters; thus whipping it about, they made their Invocations; these they use to call *Jynge*, whether it be round, or triangular, or any other Figure; and whilst they are doing thus, they make insignificant or brutish Cries, and lash the Air with their Whips. The Oracle adviseth to the Performance of these Rites, or such a Motion of the *Strophalus*, as having an expreßible Power. It is called *Hecatine*, as being dedicated to *Hecate*: *Hecate* is a Goddess among the *Chaldeans*, having at her right Side the Fountain of Virtues.

*If thou speak often to me, thou shalt see absolutely that which is spoken:
For then neither appears the celestial concave Bulk, nor do the Stars shine; the Light of the Moon is covered;*

The Earth stands not still, but all things appear Thunder.]

The Lion is one of the twelve Signs of the Zodiac, and is called the House of the Sun, whose Fountain, or the Cause of his Lion-formed Constellation, the Chaldeans call *Asivlaxer*: Now he saith, that amidst the sacred Rites, if thou call this Fountain by its Name, thou shalt see nothing else in Heaven but the Apparition of a Lion; neither will the concave Vault, or the Circumference of Heaven appear to thee, neither shall the Stars shine, even the Moon herself shall be covered, and all things shall be shaken; but this Lion-having Fountain takes not away the Effluence of those, but their own predominating Excellence hides their View.

Every way to the unfashion'd Soul, extends the Reins of Fire.]

The Oracle calls the Soul *ἄλλασον*, that is, *without Form and Figure*, or most simple, and most pure. Reins of Fire of such a Soul are the expeditious Activity of the Theurgick Light, which raiseth up the fiery Mind to the Divine Light; therefore by stretching the Reins of Fire to the inform Soul, he means, endeavour that all the Faculties consisting both in the Intellect, Cogitation, and Opinion, may receive divine Illuminations suitable to themselves. This is the Meaning of *stretch the Reins of Fire*; but Nature useth to fail, and busy itself in the second or worse Life.

Oh Man, the Machine of boldest Nature!]

Man is called a *Machine*, as being framed by God with unspeakable Art: The Oracle likewise calleth him *audacious Nature*, as being busied about excellent things, sometimes measuring the Course of the Stars, sometimes enquiring into the Orders of the supernatural Powers; contemplating also the things which are far above the celestial Orb, and extending to discourse something of God. For these Endeavours of the Mind in Disquisition proceed from an audacious Nature; he calls it Boldness, not by way of Reproach, but to express the Forwardness of Nature.

In the side of the sinister Hecate is a Fountain of much Virtue, which remains entire within, not emitting her Virginity.

The Chaldeans esteem Hecate a Goddess, seated in the middle Rank, and possessing as it were the Center of all the Powers; in her right Parts they place the Fountain of Souls, in her Left, the Fountain of Goods, or of Virtues; and they say, that the Fountain of Souls is prompt to Propagations, but the Fountain of Virtues continues within the Bounds of

its own Effluence, and is as a Virgin incorrupted: this Settledness and Immobility it receives from the Power of the *Amiliati*, the Implacables, is girt with a Virgin Zone.

When thou seest a sacred Fire without Form Shining flashingly through the Depths of the whole World, Hear the Voice of Fire.]

The Oracle speaks of *Divine Light*, seen by many Men, and adviseth, That if any one see such a Light in some Figure and Form, he apply not his Mind to it, nor esteem the Voice proceeding from thence to be true; but if he see this without any Figure or Form he shall not be deceived: And whatsoever Question he shall propose, the Answer will be most true; he calls this *wisest, Sacred*; for that it is seen with a Beauty by sacred Persons, and glides up and down pleasantly and graciously through the Depth of the World.

Invoke not the self-conspicuous Image of Nature.]

Ἀυτοψία, *Self-inspection*, is, when the initiated Person (or he who performs Divine Rites) seeth the Divine Lights: but if he who orders the Rites seeth an Apparition, this, in respect of the initiated Person is *ὑπεροψία*, *super-inspection*. The Image which is evoked at Sacred Rites, must be Intelligible and wholly separate from Bodies: But the Form or Image of Nature is not every way intelligible: for Nature is for the most part an administrative Faculty. Call not, saith he, in the Rites the *self-conspicuous Image of Nature*; for it will bring thee nothing along with it but only a crowd of the four Natural Elements.

Nature persuades that Demons are pure. The Bourgeois even of ill matter are profitable and good.]

Not that Nature herself persuades this, but that being called before her presence, there floweth in a great Company of *Dæmons*, and many dæmonious Forms of several shapes appear raised up out of all the Elements, compounded and shaped from all the parts of the Lunar Course, and many times appearing pleasant and gracious, they make shew of an Apparition of some good to the initiated Person.

The Soul of Man will in a manner clasp God to herself. Having nothing Mortal she is wholly inebriated from God. For she boasts Harmony, in which the mortal Body exists.]

He faith that the Soul *forceth* (for that is the meaning of *εγχεσθαι*), the divine Fire into herself, through Immortality and Purity; for then she is *sublimely inebriated*, that is, she is replenished with the more excellent Life and Illumination, and exists as it were out of herself. The Oracle faith to her, *Beast of Harmony*; that is, glory in the obscure and unintelligible Harmony by which thou art tied together in arithmetical and musical Proportions: for under this unintelligible Harmony even the mortal and compounded Body is composed, having its Compositions derived from thence.

Let the immortal Depth of the Soul be predominant; but all thy Eyes extend upward.]

The *Depth of the Soul* is her threefold Powers; the Intellectual, the Intelligent, the Opinionative. Her Eyes are the threefold cognoscitive Operations of these; for the Eye is the Symbol of Knowledge, as Life is of Appetite. Open therefore, faith he, the immortal Depth of the Soul, and extend thy cognoscitive Powers upwards, and even thy own self (to use our own Expression) *transfer to the Lord*.

Defile not the Spirit, nor deep not a Superficies.

The *Chaldaeans* cloath the Soul with two Garments: one they call Spiritual, woven for it by the sensible World; the other Luci-form, tenuous and intangible, which is here termed *Superficies*: *Defile not*, faith he, the spiritual Garment of thy Soul with Impurity, neither cause its Superficies to grow deep by certain material Additions; but preserve both in their own Natures, one pure, the other undipt.

Soul Paradise.]

The *Chaldaick Paradise* is the whole Chorus of divine Powers about the Father, and the fiery Beauties of the creative Fountains: The opening thereof by Piety is the Participation of the Gods: the flaming Sword is the implacable Power which withstands those that approach it unworthily; to such Persons it is shut, for they are not capable of its Felicity. To the Pious it is open: To this place tend all the Theurgick Virtues.

This Vessel the Beasts of the Earth shall inhabit.]

The *Vessel* is the compounded Mixture of the Soul; the Beasts of the Earth are the Dæmons which rove about the Earth: our Life therefore being full of Passions shall be inhabited by such Beasts; for such kinds are effluviated in Passions, and have a material Seat and Order. Wherefore such as are addicted to Pas-

sions are glued to them by Assimilation, (for they attract what is like them, having a Motive Faculty from the Passions.

If thou extend the fiery Mind to the Work of Piety, thou shalt preserve the fluxible Body.]

That is, *If thou extend thy illuminated Mind upwards, and the Work of Fire to the Works of Piety*, (the Works of Piety with the *Chaldaeans*, are the Methods of Rites,) thou shalt not only render the Soul unvanquishable by Passions, but shalt also preserve thy Body the more healthful; for this ordinarily is the Effect of divine Illuminations, *viz.* to consume the Matter of the Body, and to establish Health, that it be not seized either by Passion or Diseases.

Certainly out of the Cavities of the Earth spring terrestrial Dogs, Which shew no true Sign to mortal Man.]

The Speech is of material Dæmons: These he calls *Dogs*, for that they are Executioners of Souls; *Terrestrial*, for that they fall from Heaven, and are rolled about the Earth. These, faith he, being removed far from the Beatitude of divine Life, and destitute of intellectual Contemplation, cannot presignify Futures: whence all that they say or show is false, and not solid: for they know Beings *μυστηριώδεις*, by their outides; but that which knoweth Figures *μυεαυτός*, particularly, useth Notions indivisible and not figured.

For the Father perfected all things, and deliver'd them over to the second Mind, which all Nations of Men call the first.]

The first *Father of the Triad* having made the universal Frame, deliver'd it over to the *Mind*; which Mind the whole Race of Mankind (being ignorant of the paternal Excellency) call the *first God*: but our Doctrine holds the contrary, *viz.* that the first Mind the Son of the Great Father, made and perfected every Creature; for the Father, in the Book of *Moses*, declareth to the Son the Idea of the Production of Creatures, but the Son himself is the Maker of the Work.

The Furies are Stranglers of Men.]

(*Ἀναισθητοὶ ἄγγελοι*) The reductive Angels reduce Souls to them, drawing them from general things; but the *Furies* (*αἰσῆαι*) being the Tormentors of the Natures which are dispersed, and Enviors of human Souls, entangle them in material Passions, and, as it were, strangle them; and not only torture

ture such as are full of Passions, but even those that are converted towards the immaterial Essence; for these also coming into Matter and into Generation, stand in need of such Purification; for we see many Persons even of those who live holily and purely, fall into unexpected Miseries.

The Paternal Mind hath implanted Symbols in Souls.]

As the *Mosaic* Book saith, that Man was formed after the Image of God; so the *Chaldean* saith, that the Maker and Father of the World sowed Symbols of his Essence in the Souls thereof. For out of the paternal Seed, not only Souls, but all superior Orders sprung. But in incorporeal Substances there is one kind of Signs, viz. incorporeal, and individual; in the World, there are other Signs and Symbols, the unspeakable Properties of God, which are far more excellent than the Virtues themselves.

The Souls of those who quit the Body violently are most pure.]

Whosoever shall take this Saying rightly, will find that it contradicts not our Doctrine; for the crowned Martyrs who in Time of Persecution leave their Bodies by a violent End, purify and perfect their Souls: but this is not that which the *Chaldean* means. He praiseth all violent Death, because the Soul, which leaveth the Body with Trouble, abhors this Life, and hateth Conversation with the Body, and, rejoicing, flieth up to the things above; but those Souls which forsake this Life, their Bodies being naturally dissolved by Sickness, do regret its Propension and Inclination to the Body.

Because the Soul being a bright Fire, by the Power of the Father Remains immortal, and is Mistress of Life, And possesseth many Completions of the Cavities of the World.]

The Soul being an immaterial and incorporeal Fire, exempt from all Compounds, and from the material Body, is immortal; for nothing material or dark is commixed with her, neither is she compounded, so as that she may be resolved into those things of which she consists; but she is the Mistress of Life, enlightening the Dead with Life, she hath the Completions of many Recesses, that is, susceptible of the Government of Matter; for she is enabled, according to her different Virtues, to dwell in different Zones of the World.

The Father infuseth not Fear, but instead of it Persuasion.]

That is, the Divine Nature is not stern and full of Indignation, but sweet and calm; whence it doth not cause Fear in the Natures subject to it, but attracts all things by Persuasion and Graciousness; for if it were formidable and minacious, every Order of Beings would have been dissolved, none of them being able to endure his Power. And this Doctrine is in part esteemed true amongst us, for God is a Light, and a Fire consuming the wicked: The Menaces and affrightings of God are the Intermission of the Divine Goodness towards us, by reason of our ill Management of our Affairs.

The Father hath snatched away himself: Neither hath he shut up his own Fire in his intellectual Fire.]

The Meaning of which Oracle is this: The God of all things, who is also termed Father, hath made himself Incomprehensible, not only to the first and second Natures, and to our Souls, but even to his own Power; for the Father, saith he, hath snatch'd himself away from every Nature. But this Doctrine is not Orthodox; for with us the Father is known in the Son, as the Son in the Father, and the Son is the Definition of the Father, and the Divine supernatural World.

For the Intelligible is something, which it behoves thee to comprehend with the Flower of the Mind.]

The Soul hath a Power correspondent to every thing that is conceivable by the Mind; as to Sensibles, Sense; to Cogitables, Cogitation; to Intelligibles, Mind. Now the *Chaldean* saith, that although God is an Intelligible, yet he is not comprehensible by the Mind, but only by the *Flower of the Mind*. The Flower of the Mind is the (wisdom) singular Power of the Soul: since therefore God is properly One, endeavour not to comprehend him by the Mind, but by the singular Power: for that which is first One, can only be apprehended by that which is one in us, and not either by Cogitation or Mind.

The Ungirders of the Soul which give her breathing are easy to be loosed.]

Let any one should say, I would free my Soul from my Body, but I cannot; the Oracle tells us, that the Powers which thrust the Soul out of the natural Body, and give her breathing, as it were, from the Toil and Trouble of the Body, are easily loosed; that is, these Faculties are free, and not restrained by any Nature, and able to set the Body at Liberty generously from corporeal Bonds.

*hoves thee to hasten to the Light, and... the Beams
the Father,
substance was sent to thee a Soul clothed with much
find.]*

Seeing that the Soul hath not its Being from Seed,
consists of corporeal Mixtures, but had its
essence from God above; therefore he ought to turn
towards him, and to make her Return to the *Divine
Light*: for she came down *cloathed with much Mind*;
that is, she was furnished by the Maker and Father
with many Remembrances of the divine Sayings,
when she came hither, whence she should endeavour
to return by the same Remembrances.

All things are produced out of one Fire.]

This is a true Doctrine, conformable to our Religion; for all Beings, as well intelligible as sensible, received their Essence from God above, and are converted to God alone; those which have Being, only Essentially; those which have Being and Life, essentially and vitally; those which have Being, and Life, and Mind, essentially, and vitally, and intellectually. From *One* therefore *all things came*, and to *One* is their Return. This Oracle is not to be condemned, but is full of our Doctrine.

What the Mind speaks, it speaks by Intuition.]

When (saith he) thou shalt hear an articulate Voice, thundering from above out of Heaven, think not that the Angel, or God, who sends forth that Voice, did articulate it after our manner enunciatively; but that he, according to his own Nature, conceived it only inarticulately: but thou, according to thy own Impotence, hearest the Notion syllabically and enuntiatively. For as God heareth our Voice not vocally, so Man receiveth the Notions of God vocally, every one according to the Operation of his Nature.

These the Earth bewails, even to their Children.]

It is meant of *Atheists*, that God extends his Vengeance even to their Posterity: for the Oracle, to express the Torments which they shall receive under the Earth, saith, *It howls beneath for them*: that is, the Place under the Earth bellows to them, and roareth like a Lion. Whence *Proclus* also saith, The imposition of Souls that are of Affinity with one another, is of like Nature; and those which are not clothed from the Bands of Nature, are entangled stained by like Passions. These therefore must all Punishments, and since by natural Affinity are infected with Pollutions, must again be freed from them.

Enlarge not thy Destiny,]

The wisest of the *Greeks* call Nature, or rather the Completion of the Illuminations which the Nature of Beings receiveth (*συσχετισμός*) *Fate*. Providence is an immediate Beneficence from God. But Fate is that which governs all our Affairs by the Concatenation of Beings. We are Subjects to Providence, when we act Intellectually; to Fate, when Corporeally. Increase not therefore, saith he, thy Fate, nor endeavour to surmount it, but commit thyself wholly to the Government of God.

For nothing proceeds from the paternal Principality imperfect.]

The Father (saith he) produceth all things perfect and self-sufficient according to their Order, but the Imbecility and Remission of the things produced sometimes causeth a Defect and Imperfection, but the Father calleth back again that Defect to Perfection, and converts it to its Self-sufficiency. Like this, is that which *James* the Brother of our Lord pronounceth in the Beginning of his Epistle, *Every perfect Gift cometh down from above, from the Father of Lights*. For nothing proceeds imperfect from the Perfect, and especially when we chance to be ready to receive that which is primarily distilled from him.

But the paternal Mind accepts her not until she come forth.]

The paternal Mind doth not admit the Impulsions of the Desires of the Soul, before she hath excluded the Forgetfulness of the Riches which she received from the most bountiful Father, and called back to her Memory the sacred Watch-words which she received from him, and pronounce the good Speech imprinting in her Remembrance the Symbols of the Father who begot her. For the Soul consists of sacred Words and divine Symbols, of which those proceed from the sacred Species, these from the divine Monads; and we are (*εἰκόνες*) Images of the sacred Essences, but (*εἰδωλά*) Statues of the unknown Symbols. Moreover, we must know that every Soul differs from another Soul specifically, and that there are as many several Species of Souls as there are Souls.

When thou seest the terrestrial Demon approach, sacrifice the Stone Minizuris, using Invocation.]

The Demons that are near the Earth are by Nature lying, as being far off from the divine Knowledge, and filled with dark Matter. Now if you
5 N would

would have any true Discourse from these, prepare an Altar, and *sacrifice the Stone Mizurim*. This Stone hath the Power of evocating the other greater Dæmon, who, invisibly approaching to the material Dæmon, will pronounce the true Solution of Demands, which he transmits to the Demandant. The Oracle joineth the evocative Name with the sacrificing of the Stone. The *Chaldaei* assert some Dæmons good, others ill; but our Religion defines them to be all ill, as having by a premeditated Defection exchanged good for ill.

Learn the intelligible, forasmuch as it exists beyond the Mind.]

For though all things are comprehended by the Mind, yet God the first Intelligible exists *without or beyond the Mind*. This *without* you must not understand distantly, nor according to intellectual Alternity, but according to the intelligible Excess alone, and the Propriety of the Existence, it being *without*, or beyond all Mind, whereby the super-essential is manifested. For the first intelligible Mind is Essence, beyond which is the Self-intelligible. Besides these is God, who is beyond the Intelligible, and Self-intelligible; for we assert the Divinity to be neither Intelligible nor Self-intelligible, it being more excellent than all Speech and Notion, so as that it is wholly unintelligible and unexpressible, and more to be honoured by Silence, than revered by wonderful Expressions; for it is more sublime than to be revered, spoken, and conceived.

*Intelligent Fynges do themselves also understand from the Father,
By unspeakable Counsels being moved so as to understand.]*

Fynges (Virtues or) Powers next paternal Depth, consisting of three Triads. They understand according to the paternal Mind, which containeth their Cause solely in himself. Now Counsels of the Father in regard of their intelligible Sublimity, are not vocal; but the intellectual Mass of abstract things, though understood by *Secundæ* (or Inferiors) are understood as without speech, and as it were abstracted from intelligible Prolixity. For as the Conceptions of Souls, they understand intellectual Orders, yet understand them as immutable: So the Acts of the Intellectuals understanding the intellectual Signs, understand them as not a vocal subsisting in unknown Existences.

Conjectures upon the Greek Text of the Oracles.

WHO it was that rendred these Oracles in *Greek* is (as we said) uncertain; much more certain is it that they were all composed in Hexameter Verse; though they are sometimes cited indistinctly and abruptly by *Patricius*, seeming wholly irreconcilable with poetick Numbers, yet that the greater Part of them are Hexameters, none can deny; and whoever shall look more cautiously upon the rest, will find Prints enough, by which they may be traced and demonstrated to have been of the same kind, though confounded in the manner of Citations, sometimes by the Authors out of which *Patricius* took them, sometimes by *Patricius* himself, who was far more diligent to collect and digest, than curious to distinguish them, or to regard their Numbers; which Defect we shall endeavour, in some measure, to supply.

Δ Τ Α Σ, Κ Α Ι Τ Ρ Ι Α Σ.

παρεκλή μινός ἐστι.

—The 2^d part of the Hexameter — — — — —
 τινος μινός ἐστι as is that also which immediately follows,

— Ταναή [ἔστι] μινός, ἢ δὲ οὐ γινώσκει.
 and the next,

— Δυνός [ἔστι] ἔστι τινός κείνου. That which follows is cited again by itself afterwards,

Καὶ τὸ κωδερῶν.]

This seems to be a loose Citation of two several Hemistichs, with reference to the Phrase (infinitively) not to the Verse.

Ἄρρη πόντος τριήσας ἢ ὅ ἢ πείσεις]

perhaps,

ἐρῶ ται πόντος τ τριήσας, ἢ δὲ ὅ πείσεις.

Οὐ τὸ δὴθεν κωδερῶν, καὶ ἢ δὲ πάντα ἐπὶ-
 μνη.]

The Verse requires — πείσει ἐπὶ μνη.

Εἰς τεία γὰρ πόντος πείσει.]

before,

Εἰς τεία γὰρ πόντος πείσει.

Καὶ ἐρῶντων ἐν αὐτῇ ἢ τ' ἀρετῇ.]

Perhaps [ἔστι]

— ἐρῶντων ἐν αὐτῇ

ἢ τ' ἀρετῇ, σοφίᾳ τε, καὶ ἢ πλούθων ἀξέκιστα.

ἢ ἐρῶντων ἐν αὐτῇ, ἐν δὲ ἀρετῇ μίσθω]

Read μίσθω.

Καὶ παρὰ πηγῶν.]

'erhaps,

Καὶ παρὰ πηγῶν, μίσθω σωίχουσα τὰ πνεύματα.

The rest being a Gloss.

Ἐνδυν ἀρδύω.

should be Ἐνδ' ἀρδύω.

Ἐνδυν συζεύξω — ἀρδύω ἀμυδρῶ πνεύ-
 σι.]

scelus reads ἀμυδρῶ in Theolog.

Π Α Τ Η Ρ Κ Α Ι Ν Ο Τ Σ.

Ἐαυτὸν ὁ πατὴρ ἡσπασεν, ὅδ' ἐστιν.]

Ibo reads,

ὅδ' ἐν τῇ δυνάμει νοεῖται κλείσας ἰδίον πνεύ-

Πάντα γὰρ ὁρῶντες.]

Ibo,

— τὰ γὰρ ὁρῶντες πατὴρ, καὶ Νὺν περιέλαβε
 ἑαυτὸν, ὅν ἡσπασεν κλείσας (perhaps κλείσας)
 πᾶν γένος ἀνθρώπων.

ἢ γὰρ μόνον.]

Distinguish,

— πολὺ γὰρ μόνον ἐν πατρὶς ἀλλήλῃς]

Δεῖν ἀρδύω — νόον ἀρδύω.

Πάντα ἐκκαταρῶ — ἐκκαταρῶν — and afterwards,

ἡσπασεν καὶ κλείσας.

Μὴτε πᾶσι τὰ πατρὶς νοεῖται ὑπερβαίνει φέρει.]

Perhaps,

Μὴτε πᾶσι πατρὶς, &c.

Ἐρῶ τὰ νοεῖν πατρὶς ἐν ἐκκαταρῶν.]

Perhaps, —

Ἐρῶ τὰ νοεῖν πατρὶς ἐν ἐκκαταρῶν.]

Ἐκκαταρῶν πᾶσι (ἐκκαταρῶν) πατρὶς τὰ καὶ ἀρδύω.

Οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἅπαντα, πᾶσι ἐκκαταρῶν τὰ ἀρδύω.]

Distinguish,

— ἢ γὰρ εἰς ἅπαντα

Πᾶσι ἐκκαταρῶν τὰ ἀρδύω ἐν δυνάμει κλείσας.

Ἐρῶντες, ἀρδύω νόον.

Νὺν γὰρ ἐκκαταρῶν.]

Distinguish,

— νὺν γὰρ ἐκκαταρῶν τὰ νοεῖται,

Αἰσῶντες δὲ ἐκκαταρῶν κλείσας —

Ν Ο Τ Σ, Ν Ο Η Τ Α, Κ Α Ι Ν Ο Ε Ρ Α.

Οὐ γὰρ ἀρδύω νόον ἐν νοεῖται ὅ καὶ ἀρδύω.

Afterwards cited thus,

Οὐ γὰρ ἀρδύω νόον ἐν νοεῖται, καὶ τὸ νοεῖται

Οὐ γὰρ καὶ ἀρδύω.

Μάνθαστε τὸ νοεῖται.]

Afterwards,

Ὁφείδει μάλιστα τὸ νοεῖται —

Νὺν γὰρ νῦν ἐκκαταρῶν ὅ καὶ κλείσας τελεῖται.]

Distinguish,

— νὺν γὰρ νῦν ἐκκαταρῶν ὅ καὶ κλείσας

Τελεῖται τελεῖται —

Ἐστὶ γὰρ πὲρ νοεῖται.] Ἐστὶν.

ἢ γὰρ ἐκκαταρῶν, ὅς ἐστιν ὅν.]

Read and distinguish,

ἢ γὰρ ἐκκαταρῶν, ὅν νῦν, καὶ κλείσας νοεῖται,

ἢ πὲρ νοεῖται, ὅ καὶ κλείσας νοεῖται ἔστι γὰρ κλείσας.

Ἀμφοτέρω δυνάμει νοεῖται ἐκκαταρῶν νοεῖται.

ὅς ἐστι γὰρ ἐκκαταρῶν νοεῖται τὸ νοεῖται ἐκκαταρῶν.

Ἀλλὰ νῦν ταναῶν ταναῶν φλογὶ, πάντα μετὰ ἑαυ-

Πᾶσι τὸ νοεῖται ἐκκαταρῶν καὶ ἐν τῇ νοεῖται.

ἢ γὰρ ἐκκαταρῶν ὅν νῦν, καὶ κλείσας νοεῖται

ὅς ἐστιν ὅν, ἀλλὰ ἀρδύω ἐκκαταρῶν ὅ καὶ, ἐκκαταρῶν

Τῶν ἑαυτὸν τελεῖται καὶ ἐν τῇ νοεῖται.

Ὁφείδει μάλιστα τὸ νοεῖται, ἐκκαταρῶν ὅ καὶ ἐκκαταρῶν.

And presently after,

— ἢ γὰρ ἀρδύω νόον ἐν νοεῖται, καὶ τὸ νοεῖται

Οὐ γὰρ καὶ ἀρδύω.

